Name of the bank | Category | 2005–09 | 2009–14 | 2015–20 |
---|---|---|---|---|
Allahabad Bank | PSB | 3.23 | 2.81 | 14.69 |
Andhra Bank | PSB | 1.54 | 2.37 | 14 |
Bank of Baroda | PSB | 3.35 | 1.96 | 10.34 |
Bank of India | PSB | 3 | 2.79 | 14.7 |
Bank of Maharashtra | PSB | 4.18 | 2.44 | 14.99 |
Canara Bank | PSB | 2.1 | 1.9 | 9.55 |
Central Bank of India | PSB | 5.4 | 3.78 | 17.89 |
Corporation Bank | PSB | 2.13 | 1.58 | 13.64 |
Dena Bank | PSB | 4.95 | 2.42 | 13.87 |
Indian Bank | PSB | 2.21 | 1.93 | 7.1 |
Indian Overseas Bank | PSB | 3.04 | 3.63 | 20.36 |
Oriental Bank of Commerce | PSB | 4.41 | 2.6 | 13.25 |
Punjab and Sind Bank | PSB | 6.16 | 1.88 | 10.83 |
Punjab National Bank | PSB | 3.61 | 2.99 | 14.7 |
Syndicate Bank | PSB | 3.35 | 2.4 | 10.03 |
UCO Bank | PSB | 3.32 | 3.52 | 19.92 |
Union Bank of India | PSB | 3.19 | 2.8 | 12.94 |
United Bank of India | PSB | 3.99 | 4.45 | 16.55 |
Vijay Bank | PSB | 2.39 | 2.4 | 5.23 |
State Bank of India | PSB | 3.31 | 3.71 | 8.01 |
IDBI Ltd | PSB | 1.91 | 2.57 | 16.41 |
HDFC Bank Ltd | Private | 1.57 | 1.2 | 1.17 |
ICICI Bank Ltd | Private | 3.1 | 4.62 | 7.58 |
IndusInd Bank Ltd | Private | 2.82 | 1.16 | 1.8 |
Kotak Mahindra Bank Ltd | Private | 2.22 | 2.51 | 2.31 |
Yes Bank Ltd | Private | 0.16 | 0.32 | 4.72 |
Axis Bank | Private | 1.44 | 1.24 | 4.71 |
Variable | Obs | Mean | SD | Min | Max |
---|---|---|---|---|---|
NNPA | 472 | 2.85 | 2.99 | 0.10 | 16.70 |
OC | 472 | 0.25 | 0.08 | 0.10 | 0.60 |
II | 472 | 2.75 | 0.81 | 0.10 | 6.30 |
NII | 472 | 1.18 | 0.52 | 0.20 | 3.40 |
LSS | 472 | 19.73 | 10.76 | 4.70 | 72.10 |
CAR | 472 | 13.51 | 3.34 | 1.10 | 56.40 |
ROA | 472 | 0.54 | 1.16 | −5.50 | 3.00 |
SL | 472 | 82.76 | 14.62 | 18.20 | 99.80 |
NNPA | OC | II | NII | LSS | CAR | ROA | SL | |
---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
NNPA | 1 | |||||||
OC | −0.1412 | 1 | ||||||
II | −0.5189 | 0.4305 | 1 | |||||
NII | −0.2302 | 0.5038 | 0.6002 | 1 | ||||
LSS | −0.0757 | 0.3818 | 0.347 | 0.4912 | 1 | |||
CAR | −0.4228 | 0.3064 | 0.4522 | 0.2945 | 0.1993 | 1 | ||
ROA | −0.6433 | 0.0429 | 0.6421 | 0.4376 | 0.1552 | 0.4666 | 1 | |
SL | 0.3042 | −0.4729 | −0.4553 | −0.4164 | −0.4792 | −0.2796 | −0.3807 | 1 |
Independent variable = NNPA | FE model | RE model |
---|---|---|
OC | −4.197 | −5.946** |
(3.098) | (2.533) | |
II | −0.5817 | −0.511 |
(0.401) | (0.346) | |
NII | 1.975* | 1.416* |
(0.391) | (0.387) | |
LSS | −0.0436 | −0.008 |
(0.030) | (0.014) | |
CAR | 0.027 | −0.002 |
(0.044) | (0.045) | |
ROA | −1.335* | −1.567* |
(0.187) | (0.200) | |
SL | 0.0806* | 0.009 |
(0.017) | (0.010) | |
Constant | −3.513** | 3.182* |
(1.410) | (1.154) | |
Observations | 472 | 472 |
Hausman statistics | 0.667 81.41 (0.00) |
Variable | Obs | Mean | SD | Min | Max |
---|---|---|---|---|---|
NNPA | 219 | 4.25 | 3.28 | 0.20 | 16.50 |
OC | 219 | 0.21 | 0.05 | 0.10 | 0.60 |
II | 219 | 2.31 | 0.42 | 1.00 | 3.60 |
NII | 219 | 0.91 | 0.25 | 0.40 | 1.70 |
LSS | 219 | 16.46 | 4.18 | 7.50 | 27.00 |
CAR | 219 | 11.98 | 1.54 | 2.00 | 15.40 |
ROA | 219 | 0.05 | 1.07 | −5.50 | 1.70 |
SL | 219 | 85.86 | 6.25 | 64.90 | 97.10 |
NNPA | OC | II | NII | LSS | CAR | ROA | SL | |
---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
NNPA | 1 | |||||||
OC | 0.2872 | 1 | ||||||
II | −0.4832 | −0.0523 | 1 | |||||
NII | 0.2558 | 0.3955 | 0.0139 | 1 | ||||
LSS | 0.3512 | 0.4367 | −0.0908 | 0.3277 | 1 | |||
CAR | −0.4738 | −0.3249 | 0.3244 | 0.0085 | −0.1166 | 1 | ||
ROA | −0.6095 | −0.5305 | 0.4088 | −0.1541 | −0.4542 | 0.6082 | 1 | |
SL | 0.4838 | 0.076 | −0.1163 | −0.0458 | 0.0634 | −0.4372 | −0.3646 | 1 |
Independent variable = NNPA | FE model | RE model |
---|---|---|
OC | −5.253 | −5.460 |
(3.948) | (4.020) | |
II | −1.148** | −1.199** |
(0.515) | (0.494) | |
NII | 1.433 | 1.749 |
(1.379) | (1.228) | |
LSS | 0.043 | 0.032 |
(0.070) | (0.039) | |
CAR | −0.081 | −0.717 |
(0.137) | (0.254) | |
ROA | −0.491** | −0.101 |
(0.227) | (0.138) | |
SL | 0.080** | 0.096* |
(0.037) | (0.034) | |
Constant | −2.409 | −3.179 |
(3.388) | (3.234) | |
Observations | 219 | 219 |
Hausman statistics | 0.85 30.44 (0.023) |
Note(s): Standard errors in parentheses
* p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.001
Source(s): Author's calculation
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The paper is drawn from a research project “ Performance of India’s Banking Sector: A Critical Focus on Non-Performing Advances (NPAs) ,” funded by the Indian Council of Social Science Research under ICSSR-MHRD IMPRESS Scheme. The funding body has NO role in the designing of the study, analysis, interpretation of the data and in writing. The research paper/study has been designed and prepared by the author.
The data that support the findings of this study are collected from public domain resources. It is available at https://dbie.rbi.org.in/DBIE/dbie.rbi?site=publications [RBI publications/database on Indian economy].
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This editorial is based on the article “Resolving India’s banking crisis” which appeared in "The Hindu" on 11th May, 2019. The article talks about how the India’s banking problems can be solved without privatising the PSBs.
India's banking sector is an unresolved problem.
To resolve this problem we will need clarity on how the problem arose in the first place. Also, we will need to discard simplistic and ideologically-driven solutions in favour of those that can be practical and effective.
Here is why the NPA problem is such a big problem to Indian banks, especially PSBs.
The answer lies partly in the credit boom of the years 2004-05 to 2008-09.
In that period, commercial credit (or what is called ‘non-food credit’) doubled. It was a period in which the world economy as well as the Indian economy were booming. Indian firms borrowed furiously in order to avail of the growth opportunities they saw coming.
But soon after, as the Economic Survey of 2016-17 notes, many things began to go wrong.
This combination of adverse factors made it difficult for companies to service (i.e maintain and repay) their loans to Indian banks.
The year 2014-15 marked a watershed because of tightening of banking norms.
Is the problem public ownership of banks?
Since the problem is more concentrated in PSBs, some have argued that public ownership must be the problem.
There are problems with this idea of privatising PSBs.
A brief look at the state of PSBs show that they are not in as bad a shape as many make them out to be.
Wholesale privatisation of PSBs is thus not the answer to such a complex problem.
One immediate action that is required is resolving the NPAs.
Management of Concentration Risk
To conclude, the task of accelerating economic growth is urgent. This is not possible without finding a solution to the problems that confront the banking system.
Discuss the crisis of non-performing assets (NPAs) in the context of Public Sector Banks (PSBs) in India. What are some of the ways in which we can overcome this crisis? |
Richa roy , rr richa roy finance and public policy lawyer, graduate research fellow - global economic governance, university of oxford krishnamurthy subramanian , and krishnamurthy subramanian senior visiting fellow shamika ravi shamika ravi former brookings expert, economic advisory council member to the prime minister and secretary - government of india.
March 1, 2018
Content from the Brookings Institution India Center is now archived . After seven years of an impactful partnership, as of September 11, 2020, Brookings India is now the Centre for Social and Economic Progress , an independent public policy institution based in India.
The Indian banking system is beleaguered with non-performing assets (NPAs). According to the Reserve Bank of India’s Financial Stability Report of December 2017 , they currently stand at 10.2 per cent of all assets, while stressed assets, which are believed to be NPAs in effect, stand at 12.8 per cent. Related frauds amount to INR 612.6 billion in the last five financial years and governance failures on account of integrity and competence issues plague the banking system.
Brookings India recently organised a roundtable in Mumbai on NPA resolution; participants ranged from a former Deputy Governor of the RBI, to bankers from public and private sectors, asset reconstruction companies to rating agencies, IMF representatives to financial journalists and academics. In a wide-spanning discussion, a few key themes emerged: the privatisation and governance of public sector banks, the governance and regulatory practices of the RBI and reengineering of banking practices.
i) Public Sector Banks:
Public Sector Banks (PSBs) constitute over 70 per cent of the banking system and are in a state of crisis. Participants believed that fundamental reforms tended to happen when crisis hit and this was an opportune moment for such reforms and expressed optimism that this was likely under this government .
The umbilical cord connecting public sector banks to politicians and bureaucrats, which in turn stems from the ownership structure of these banks, has led to several inefficiencies.
Penalise for wrongdoing : Although vigilance mechanisms exist, lax enforcement means that wrongdoing is rarely penalized. For instance, the Chairman of Syndicate Bank who was bribed by the promoters of Bhushan Steel was in jail for barely a few months and has not been convicted as yet. Rotation of staff : The Punjab National Bank fraud demonstrates the extent of operational and risk management failures in PSBs. Improvements to HR practices can help mitigate egregious behavior like frauds. For instance, PSBs tend to man the business verticals with the brightest talent and less competent staff in the inspection and supervision roles. If officers are rotated in these roles, this could not only strengthen the supervision of banks, it would also mean that staff on the business development side have experience in supervision and inspection and will therefore self-regulate better. Credit appraisal, monitoring : Basic principles of credit appraisal and monitoring are obviated in PSBs and must be sharpened, to diagnose defects of capital, business purpose and character.
Public sector banks suffer from a severe identity crisis and require business, not just financial, restructuring.
ii) RBI governance and regulation
The RBI as a regulator has had qualified success in the face of structural impediments, including limited control over PSBs. RBI’s internal governance as well as its regulation of NPAs needs improvement.
iii) Reengineering of banking systems
iv) Bright Spots
Amidst the gloom, the functioning of the Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code (Code) is cause for optimism. The Code was passed an implemented in 13 months, which is faster even when compared to Singapore’s amendments to its insolvency law. The Code is also being implemented in full speed- 50 per cent of all NPAs are currently being resolved through the Code, another 25 per cent will soon be. The judiciary has been following the (very tight) timelines prescribed by the Code.
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Part of the book series: India Studies in Business and Economics ((ISBE))
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This paper narrates the story of the evolutionary journey of non-performing assets (NPA) in the Indian banking sector. Three distinct phases of the intertemporal behavioral of NPAs of the Indian banking sector can be discerned. First, since the initiation of financial sector reforms till about the beginning of the North Atlantic Financial Crisis (NAFC), NPAs showed a consistent downward trajectory. Second, during 2008–09 through 2017–18 the NPAs showed a distinct spurt. Third, since then, NPAs marked by a downward trend till 2019–20 until the economic disruptions caused by Covid 19. Contrary to the popular perception of treating the second phase of rising NPAs as one emanating exclusively from governance issues in public sector banks (PSBs), four factors have been identified: (a) falling commodity prices; (b) regulatory forbearance; (c) initial exuberance in infrastructure projects punctured by a downward phase of business cycles (leading to substantial debt accumulation of select big corporates); and (b) governance failure in select PSBs. Moving forward, while the pandemic and some of the associated policy measures could reverse the recent downward trends in NPA, more durable policy initiatives like bankruptcy reforms are expected to make significant positive changes in the NPA situation of Indian banks.
Disclosure: Rakesh Mohan was a Deputy Governor of Reserve Bank of India from 2002 to 2004 and from 2005 to 2009. Partha Ray was a staff member at RBI from 1989 to 2013. The paper reflects personal views of the authors. The authors are indebted to Shankar Acharya, Sajjid Chinoy, Jaimini Bhagwati and Anoop Singh for their comments on an earlier working paper version of the essay (CSEP Working Paper No. 22). An earlier version of the paper was presented in a Conference on “India’s Contemporary Macroeconomic Themes” at Madras School of Economics, April 21–22, 2023. The authors are also indebted to the participants of the Conference and in particular to C. Rangarajan, S. Mahendra Dev, M. Govinda Rao, and N. R. Bhanumurthy for their comments. The usual disclaimer applies.
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Following Mohan ( 2011 ), we use the term North Atlantic Financial Crisis (NAFC), in contrast to the more widespread usage of the global financial crisis (GFC). It has been conscious and has been prompted by (a) the origin of the crisis, and (b) its lack spread across the globe beyond the North Atlantic.
For the bulk of our analysis, we consciously avoid 2020–21 because of the Covid19-related complications.
This discussion follows RBI Circular on “Prudential Norms on Income Recognition, Asset Classification and Provisioning—Pertaining to Advances” of August 30, 2001 (DBOD No. BP.BC/20/21.04.048/2001-2002) (RBI, 2001 ); available at https://m.rbi.org.in/scripts/BS_ViewMasCirculardetails.aspx?Id=449&Mode=0 (accessed in May 2021).
Treatment of an agriculture loan is, however, slightly different and in the case of an advance granted for agricultural purpose, it is classified as an NPA if “interest and/or instalment of principal remains overdue for two harvest seasons but for a period not exceeding two half years”.
RBI Master Circular on Wilful Defaulters of July 2, 2007; available at https://www.rbi.org.in/Scripts/BS_ViewMasterCirculars.aspx?Id=3670&Mode=0 .
This period was marked by presence of “lazy bankers”; see Mohan ( 2002 ) for details. It is pertinent to turn to RBI’s Report on Currency and Finance, 2007 , which noted, “Bank credit, after witnessing an erratic pattern in the first half of the 1990s, showed a deceleration from 1996–97 to 2001–02….. Several factors, both on the demand and the supply sides, contributed to the contraction of credit. On the supply side, introduction of prudential norms relating to income recognition, asset classification and provisioning in the mid-1990s made banks cautious. Application of norms revealed large gross NPAs with banks…. Banks, therefore, became wary of enlarging their loan portfolio. The relatively high level of NPAs, in particular, had a severe impact on weak banks. Banks’ capacity to extend credit was also impaired due to little headroom available in the capital adequacy ratio ….. Banks found risk-adjusted returns on government securities more attractive. Hence, despite lowering of statutory pre-emption in the form of SLR, banks continued to invest in government securities, far in excess of the requirements. …. On the demand side…the corporate sector faced intense competition during the latter part of the 1990s. The focus of the corporate sector, thus, shifted from expanding capacity to restructuring and the industrial sector slowed down significantly. …Increased competition also forced corporates to restructure their balance sheets, whereby they increased their reliance on retained earnings and reduced their borrowings.”
The performance of recovery under the SARFAESI Act was not impressive. One of the major drawbacks of the Act is that it is not applicable to unsecured creditors. There were implementation-related issues. Some of the loopholes were, in principle, plugged in the Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code, 2016.
Banks were initially required to mark to market 30% of their investment portfolio in 1992–93—the proportion was gradually raised to 75% in 1999–2000.
Insofar as low growth during the initial years of this period is concerned, Mohan ( 2019 ) notes, “There was… some loss of the growth momentum in the latter half of the 1990s in the wake of the East Asian financial crisis, setbacks to the fiscal correction process, deterioration in the quality of fiscal adjustment, slowdown in agriculture growth affected by lower than normal monsoon years, some slackening in the pace of structural reforms, monetary tightening to contain inflation, and excessive enthusiasm and optimism with regard to investment plans in domestic industry following deregulation, some of which went awry” (p. 12).
RBI’s Report on Currency and Finance, 2007–08 noted, “Major factors that contributed to the acceleration in credit growth were pick-up in economic growth, improvement in asset quality of the credit institutions, moderation in inflation and inflation expectations, decline in real interest rates, rising income of households and increased competition with the entry of new private sector banks (as detailed in the subsequent sections). The removal of restrictions on retail credit and project finance by banks also created new sources of credit demand”.
See Mohan and Ray ( 2019 ) for details of India’s stimulus package following NAFC.
The word regulatory forbearance has been used repeatedly in this paper. A priori it could be interpreted in two senses, viz., (a) the regulator knows what was going on when there were periodic bouts of excessive lending particularly by public sector banks to dubious credits but held back on pointing out the dangers involved; and (b) the regulator is taking overall stability of the banking sector and ramifications for the financial sector as a whole, but chooses not to rattle markets by blowing the referee's sharp whistle in a situation where growth and perceived lack of credit could be a concern. We have primarily used the word regulatory forbearance in the sense of (b). Of course, regulatory forbearance of various shape and form tended to take place in various periods in Indian banking.
This is except in the case of direct advances to the agricultural and SME sectors which shall continue to attract provisioning of 0.25%, as earlier.
The RBI Report on Trends and Progress of Banking in India , 2015–16 noted, “AQR brought to the fore significant discrepancies in the reported levels of impairment and actual position and hence, led to increase in provisioning requirements for banks”.
The AQR used off-site data extensively and compared the quality of these loan assets against applicable Reserve Bank norms. The banks were advised about the position that emerged from the review, along with a recommendation to adjust impairments in their books appropriately.
RBI Circular on “Resolution of Stressed Assets—Revised Framework”, No. DBR.No.BP.BC.101/21.04.048/2017-18, available at https://www.rbi.org.in/scripts/NotificationUser.aspx?Id=11218&Mode=0 . In the revised framework, a strict deadline of 180 days was put in place; during this period. A resolution plan must be implemented, failing which stressed assets must be referred to the National Company Law Tribunal (NCLT) under IBC within 15 days.
The original PCA framework was introduced in December 2002 as “a structured early intervention mechanism along the lines of the FDIC’s PCA framework”. Subsequently, the RBI reviewed the framework in line with the recommendations of the Working Group of the Financial Stability and Development Council (FSDC) on Resolution Regimes for Financial Institutions in India (January 2014) and the Financial Sector Legislative Reforms Commission in March 2013 (Acharya, 2018 ).
The role of the commodity price fall in the generation of NPAs has been documented and analyzed in Kumar et al. ( 2022 ).
Of course, the macro and sectoral impact of a general fall in commodity prices could differ. As India is a net importer of several crucial commodities including oil, a general fall in commodity prices could be beneficial to the economy, but for the importing firms, it could have deleterious effects and may lead to NPA formation. Besides, if steel prices fall that may be bad for companies like Bhushan Steel but should be good for the construction industry and home sales. Hence, the initial fall in supply could be counterbalanced to some lesser extent.
This observation needs reconsideration in light of the recent severe banking stress exhibited in the United States. Even some relatively large banks have shown inadequate interest rate risk management in the presence of rapidly tightening of monetary policy by the US Federal Reserve in 2022–23. Hence there may be a legitimate role for banking regulators to stave off such potential financial instability through relevant regulation, analogous to macroprudential regulation.
Note that data sources for Tables 12.8 and 12.9 , on the one hand and Table 12.11 , on the other are distinct and, hence, strictly speaking, data are not comparable between these tables. While Tables 12.8 and 12.9 are derived from data collected under the especially collected Basic Statistical Returns, Table 12.11 is from the statutory returns of sectoral deployment of gross bank credit.
Later in 2012, in another auction of 2G spectrum (in both GSM and CDMA bands), the government received bids worth a total of Rs. 9,4 billion, far lower than its target of Rs. 280 billion from the sale of 2G spectrum in the GSM band. Subsequently, in March 2013 too response to the spectrum auction was poor.
These loans were restructured in 2012, with a three-year moratorium for the principal amount of Rs. 430 billion.
The names of the following corporate groups, viz., Adani Group, Essar Group, GMR Group, GVK Group, Jaypee Group, JSW Group, Lanco Group, Reliance ADAG, Vedanta Group, and Videocon Group have been reported in the House of Debt report of October 2015 (see, https://plus.credit-suisse.com/rpc4/ravDocView?docid=V4pSWN1AF-WElY95 ). In March 2007, “these groups owed the Indian banking system a total of Rs. 99,300 crore, or around 5.7% of the total loans given out by the Indian banking system. In March 2012, the loans had jumped to around Rs. 5,39,500 crore” (Kaul, 2020 ). Later it reached Rs. 7,335,45 crore in 2014–15. Chart 12.6 reports updated numbers from the Economic Survey, 2016–17.
Ashish Gupta, the then Head of Equity Research of the Credit Suisse, the principal author of the House of Debt Report, said in an interview, “In 2011 was when we first came out and said NPAs in the banking system are in double digits and not the 2% that is reported. But 2012 is when we narrowed it down. I remember in 2013–14 we did another report where we showed NPA numbers had gone up. We looked at annual reports of the companies, which according to Indian regulations had to start reporting if they were in default of payments to creditors. So we aggregated some top 200 annual reports and some of the companies we were tracking. Just by adding that, we were able to come to some double-digit number on the percentage of corporates where in the annual Report the company has mentioned it is in default of its debt obligations, and it was not reported by the banks. So in the banks’ book it was not an NPA. And in fact many of the companies in their reports even mentioned the amount in default, the period of default—and in many cases that was more than 90 days [the threshold for bad-loan recognition in India]. But still in the bank books everything was good. So I don’t know where the slip was” (“Ashish Gupta: The man who saw India’s NPA crisis early warns of new peril”, The Mint , March 20, 2020).
In response to the Lok Sabha Question No. 1551, the Minister of State in the Ministry of External Affairs [Gen. (Dr.) V. K. Singh (Retd)], listed 41 names on December 19 2018. Specifically, he replied, “According to the information provided by the ED, the list of people involved in financial irregularities and facing criminal investigation and who fled the country or are living abroad are as follows: (i) Shri Vijay Mallya; (ii) Shri Christian Michel James; (iii) Shri Nirav Modi; (iv) Shri Mehul Choksi; (v) Shri Ashish Sureshbhai Jobanputra; (vi) Mrs. Priti Ashish Jobanputra; (vii) Shri Ramachandran Viswanathan; (viii) Shri M.G. Chandrasekhar; (ix) Shri Sanjay Bhandari; (x) Shri Nitin Jayantilal Sandesara; (xi) Shri Chetan Jayantilal Sandesara; (xii) Smt. Dipti Chetan Sandesara; (xiii) Shri Hiteshkumar Narendrabhai Patel; (xiv) Shri Deepak Talwar; (xv) Smt Deepa Talwar; (xvi) Shri Sunny Kalra; (vii) Smt Aarti Kalra; (viii) Shri Sanjay Kalra; (xix) Smt Varsha Kalra; (xx) Shri Jatin Mehta; (xxi) Shri Lalit Modi; (xxii) Shri S. Harpal Singh Dutta; (xxiii) Shri Ritesh Jain (xxiv); Shri Mugundhan Ganyam; (xxv) Shri Pushpesh Kumar Baid; (xxvi) Shri Nitish J. Thakur; (xxvii) Smt. Purvi Modi; (xxviii) Shri Mihir Rashmi Bhansali; (xxix) Shri Aditya Nanawati; (xxx) Shri Sunil Verma; (xxxi) Shri Neeshal Deepak Modi; (xxxii) Shri Nehal Modi; (xxxiii) Shri Maiank Mehta; (xxxiv) Shri Jayesh Indervadan Shah; (xxxv) Shri Deepak Krishnrao Kulkarni; (xxxvi) Shri Deepak Modi; (xxxvii) Shri Subhash Shankar Parab; (xxxviii) Shri Rajiv Saxena; (xxxix) Shri Rajesh Gajera; (xl) Shri Carlo Valentino Fernando Gerosa; (xli) Shri Guido Ralph Haschke”; available at https://www.mea.gov.in/lok-sabha.htm?dtl/30788/QUESTION_NO1551_FINANCIAL_ABSCONDERS_ABROAD .
In the context of the political economy of financial sector corruption, Majumdar ( 2016 ) commented, “Firms borrowed more because banks willingly lent them more, irrespective of project or business viability”.
Two recent books do exciting analyses of the relevant issues for India; see Kaul ( 2020 ) and Bandopadhyay ( 2020 ) for select cases of corruption and interferences in Indian banking.
Shri Viond Rai, the first Chairman of BBB reportedly mentioned in a letter to the Finance Ministry, “The bureau, as a body of experts on public sector banking, would be able to provide greater utility to the FM on matters relating to the governance and performance of PSBs, if there were to be greater organic linkage and dialogue with the finance ministry. At present, the body is merely functioning as an appointment board” (Business Standard, October 20, 2018, available at https://www.business-standard.com/article/finance/rai-alleges-communication-breakdown-between-banks-board-bureau-and-govt-118031901218_1.html ).
RBI Circular on “Resolution of Stressed Assets—Revised Framework”, number RBI/2017-18/131 DBR.No.BP. BC.101/21.04.048/2017-18, available at https://www.rbi.org.in/scripts/BS_CircularIndexDisplay.aspx?Id=11218 .
Earlier schemes included CDR, JLF, SDR, S4A, flexible restructuring and others.
More recently, on April 3, 2019, however, the Supreme Court has effectively struck down the February 12, 2018 circular; the Bench assailed the circular as ultra vires to the provisions of the Banking Regulation Act, 1949 and the Reserve Bank of India Act, 1934 in the Dharani Sugars and Chemicals Ltd. v. Union of India case.
At present, the following PSBs are there: (1) Punjab National Bank (with Oriental Bank of Commerce and United Bank of India merged with it); (2) Canara Bank (with Syndicate Bank merged with it); (3) Indian Bank (with Allahabad Bank merged with it); (4) Union Bank of India (with Andhra Bank and Corporation Bank merged with it); (5) State Bank of India (with five of its Associate Banks and Bharatiya Mahila Bank merged with it from 2017); (6) Bank of Baroda; (7) Bank of India; (8) Central Bank of India, (9) Indian Overseas Bank; (10) Punjab and Sind Bank; (11) UCO Bank; and (12) Bank of Maharashtra.
In commenting on the paper, Dr. C. Rangarajan put forward the idea of relating credit growth to the growth of nominal GDP. After all, credit growth disproportionate to nominal income growth could generate NPAs. We have shown conclusively that much of the large corporate NPAs that arose in the 2010s were in fact the result of large lending in the post 2009 period.
Recognizing that the second wave of the pandemic could pose difficulties in loan servicing, the RBI announced Resolution Framework 2.0 allowing “restructuring of loans taken by individuals, small businesses and MSMEs with an exposure cap of ₹25 crore”. There were other measures as well, viz., fresh lending to MSMEs was allowed equivalent exemption from the Cash Reserve Ratio (CRR); and banks were also allowed to utilize 100% of countercyclical provisioning buffer for making specific provisions for NPAs.
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Mohan, R., Ray, P. (2023). Non-performing Assets of Indian Banking: An Evolutionary Journey. In: Srivastava, D.K., Shanmugam, K.R. (eds) India’s Contemporary Macroeconomic Themes. India Studies in Business and Economics. Springer, Singapore. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-981-99-5728-6_12
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NPA Crisis has been major concern for banking sector as well as economy since long time. This is very important essay topic for all competitive exams specially for banking exams like ibps po, sbi po exams. Here we have written essay on NPA crisis in India which is very helpful for your exam.
Non-Performing Assets (NPA) is the biggest overhang on credit growth and banking sector health in India and is great concern for the banking system and economy. There are various reasons for growing banking NPAs including bad credit decisions, poor monitoring, laxity in vigilance, routine business downturns etc. Huge NPA has prompted the government to initiate some measures to tackle the NPA crisis in India .
In simple words, Loans or advances for which the principal or interest payment remained overdue for a specified period generally 90 days and above are classified as Non-Performing Assets (NPA) . Further, NPAs are classified into three categories i.e. 1. Substandard Assets, 2. Doubtful Assets, 3. Loss Assets depending upon the overdue period.
Gross non-performing assets (NPA) of banks increased to 11.50% of total loans in 2017 which was 2.3% in 2008. However, as per Economic Survey 2019, the gross non-performing asset (NPA) ratio of public sector banks (PSBs) decreased to 10.1% in December 2018 which was 11.5% in March 2018. Though after initiating various measures to tackle the NPA crisis in India , still a huge proportion of a bank’s loan are not generating income for the bank which result in lower bank’s profitability and its decrease its ability to grant further credit.
Also Read: 20 Most Expected Essay Topics for IBPS PO Mains
There are various reasons for growing banking NPA in India. Economic crisis in the year 2008 made various loan under NPAs as it decreased repayment capability of various corporations which resulted in financial stress for banking sector as well as corporate sector. Another major reason for NPA is corporate frauds which contributed to rising NPAs. In addition to this, there are various reason for growing NPAs including bad credit decisions, poor monitoring, laxity in vigilance, routine business downturns etc. Download PDF of this Essay: Click Here
To control the growing NPAs both regulatory measures like the Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code and remedial measures have been taken. Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code was introduced in 2016 to resolve claims involving insolvent companies which consolidated all laws related to insolvency and bankruptcy and to tackle Non-Performing Assets (NPA) . Other necessary measures like Amendments to IBC, Fugitive Economic Offender Act 2018, 4R Strategy, Project Sashakt, Amendments in Banking Regulation Act, 1949 etc. have been initiated to curb down growing NPA.
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Despite several initiatives by the Government, Reserve Bank of India and Financial Institutions, the problem of non-performing assets (NPAs) is still unfinished. A well-researched practical laws and strict compliance of the same is required to solve the problem of NPA and inclusive growth of India.
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Npas and its effects on banks’ profitability.
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Introduction
The Indian economic crisis of 1990s fuelled the need of World Bank and IMF loans which led to the remodeling of the banking system in India along with the economic liberalization policies of 1991 in the ways of the Narsimham Committee reforms.
Among other things the Narsimham Committee recommended to reduce Non Performing Assets or NPAs.
What is a NPA of a bank?
NPA is nothing but old wine in new bottle. The bad loans which were known as Bad Debts has been renamed as Non Performing Assets as per the Narsimham Committee recommendations. Previously banks used to write off the bad debts as per their own decisions depending upon the health of the banks. But Narsimham Committee prescribed a standardized norm for provisioning of NPAs. Narsimham Committee was implemented in all banks in the year 1991. The committee also classified the assets in different categories and rates of %age for provisioning.
Classification of assets
Standard assets– no provision in 1991
Substandard assets — requires a provision of 15% on secured portion and 25% on the unsecured exposure. Doubtful assets — category 1–25% on secured portion and 100% on the unsecured portion
Category 2– 40% on the Secured portion and 100% on the unsecured portion
Category 3– 100%
Loss assets– 100%
Standard assets are those assets which are running good without any default. Previously there was no clause for provisioning of these standard assets. Subsequently banks were directed to provide on their standard assets also at the following rates:
Direct advance to agriculture or small and micro enterprise : 0.25%, Commercial real estate residential 0.75%, for real estate commercial 1% and teaser housing loan 2%.
Effects of NPAs
If it is analysed critically it would be evident that the banks started incurring losses after implementation of Narsimham Committee recommendations. Due to provisioning of assets in standardized form, the erosion of capital of the banks started. Thereafter the concept of strong banks and weak banks came into effect. For survival of weak banks the government started recapitalizing the weak banks.
RBI and government started pressuring the banks to implement stringent methods for recovery of the NPAs and to improve their balance sheets.
On critical analysis it has been observed that major portion of NPAs is contributed by several top industrialists. Generally the NPAs in agriculture and priority sector is comparatively lower than that of the corporate houses. It is said that due to government policies of waiving agriculture loans in cases of floods, droughts and natural calamities burden of NPAs of all PSBs is increasing. Generally marginal farmers and small entrepreneurs pay their loans in due time which is evident from surveys by different agencies.
Though the government has enacted SARFAESI Act in 2002 that empowered the banks to acquire the mortgaged land, building, etc and dispose the same in auction for recovery of bad loans but the banks are still facing problems while implementing the said Act.
Reasons for the rise in NPAs
Some are macroeconomic factors such as lower exports due to global recession, downturn in commodity price cycles, etc.
Most of today’s NPAs are from loans in the mid-2000s, when the economy was booming and business confidence was buoyant. But as economic growth stagnated post the global financial crisis of 2008, the repayment capacity of these borrowers declined. This lead to what is called the India’s Twin Balance Sheet problem, where both the banking sector and the corporates are reeling under financial stress.
Also political factors like crony capitalism too has caused high NPAs in India.
Further, recently there have also been frauds of high magnitude that have contributed to rising NPAs. Although the size of frauds as compared to the total volume of NPAs is relatively small, these frauds have been increasing, and there have been no instances of high profile fraudsters such as Vijay Mallya, Nirav Modi and Mehul Choksey being penalised.
Corrective Action Plan to Arrest increasing NPAs
Banks must identify early that there is going to be a non-payment and report it to the Central Repository of Information on Large Credits (CRILC).
Preventive Measures
Latest Measures by RBI
The main proposals are:
Loans moratorium on banks and NPAs
Banking sector performance had improved in FY20. Several PSU banks which were having high NPAs reported growth in earnings. Then the Covid-19 crisis emerged and loan moratorium was announced by RBI.
RBI had announced loan moratorium on banks to salvage borrowers due to Coronavirus. Loan moratorium means that the borrowers will not be required to pay interest and principal components of the loan to the bank during the moratorium period. This is to encourage borrowers to increase their spending and businesses to thwart low business confidence and expand and continue their businesses buoyantly so that economic growth does not be spoiled.
A stress test conducted by the RBI suggests that the RBI could push Indian banks’ gross bad loans to their highest in nearly two decades. Gross NPA declined to 8.5% in 2020 from 9.3% in 2019. Gross NPAs would rise to 15.2% by March 2021 from 11.3% a year earlier in the baseline scenario. In the “very severe stress” scenario, this could go as high as 16.3%.
Credit growth to corporates form 37% of total bank assets and generates 73% of NPAs. Credit growth to industry slowed to 0.8% in July 2020 as compared with 6.1% growth in July 2019.
Credit growth to food processing, mining, petroleum, coal & nuclear fuels, leather, wood industry, paper increased in July 2020. Sectors hit hard by the pandemic are tourism, aviation, entertainment, hospitality, petroleum, real estate and food.
Sectors performing well are pharmaceuticals, FMCG, ecommerce, utilities and IT sectors. Loans to these sectors are not likely to turn bad.
However, credit growth to chemicals, plastic, infrastructure, gems & jewellery, glass and beverage & tobacco decreased.
So we see that credit growth to sectors hit by pandemic will generate high NPAs.
Retail lending forms 22% of total bank lending and generates 3.7% of NPAs. Car loans, home loans and personal loans have low delinquencies and are good loans.
Personal loans performed well growing by 11.2% implying NPAs from this segment will be low and banks will enjoy higher margins.
Conclusion
Repo rate has been lowered substantially by the RBI since some time but banks have not much lowered their lending rates because of financial sustainability. So with the growth of loans in H1FY21 will translate into good earnings for banks despite the pandemic. Once moratorium is lifted and repayments start coming banks will become profitable. NPAs would rise and in this aspect RBI has asked banks to do provisioning, buffers and raise capital and thus be resilient organisations.
All banks are facing lot of problems due to various reasons.
PSBs are lifeline of the Indian economy and government should nourish them for their sustainability.
Only mergers of banks is not the only tool for economic growth. Interference by various political parties in functioning of the banks must be stopped.
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For banks in india, tackling the 'hidden' non-performing assets (npa) will be the biggest challenge in 2021 as loan defaults have spiked sharply in covid-hit 2020. many small and medium-scale companies are still struggling to repay dues owed to banks..
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The coronavirus pandemic has had a devastating impact on banks and financial institutions around the world as the global economic crisis has led to a rise in defaults and bad loans. The situation is particularly serious for Indian banks that are already struggling to cope with rising bad loans.
A large number of individuals are also struggling to repay their loans after losing income or employment due to the historic economic crisis triggered by the coronavirus pandemic and the initial lockdown.
While banks have been reporting a decline in NPAs in the last few months, there is a high possibility that forbearance on asset classification is masking bad loans that are constantly on the rise, according to S&P Global Ratings.
The rating agency fears that financials institutions in India will find it difficult in maintaining the momentum after the amount of new non-performing loans declined in the first half to September 30. It also expects the Indian banking sector’s bad loans to shoot up to 10-11 per cent of the total loans as on March 31, 22 from eight per cent on June 30, 2020.
From the magazine | Fixing the banking mess
The global rating agency also mentioned in its report that performance of Indian banks exceeded expectations in the second quarter, but added that much of it was due to the six-month loan moratorium and the Supreme Court’s decision barring banks from classifying loans as NPAs.
It said banks could have seen their NPAs rise by 10-60 basis points if it had not been for the top court's ruling. The top court had allowed banks to maintain loan accounts as standard even as borrowers defaulted.
Thousands of crores worth of loans have gone sour due to non-payment by borrowers and the amount of NPAs is likely to increase further. And the global rating agency is not too optimistic about the loan restructuring plan .
Read | High NPAs, sticky interest rates
“We estimate that more than half of our estimated restructured book may eventually slip into NPLs, leading to elevated NPL and credit cost levels in subsequent fiscal years," S&P Global Ratings said in its report.
While there are other problems like low corporate loan growth, the NPA problem seems to be the biggest “hidden” issue that may erupt by 2022 when relaxations like loan restructuring come to an end. But at the moment, the government and banks in the country are confident that there are enough provisions to absorb any forthcoming shock. Published By: Koustav Das Published On: Dec 29, 2020 --- ENDS ---
A study of non-performing assets of commercial banks and it’s recovery in india, non performing assets and profitability of commercial banks in india : assessment and emerging issues, a study on npa of public sector banks in india, non performing assets- a review on the problems and solution taken by banks in india., related papers.
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NPA management holds immense importance for banks as it is crucial for controlling losses and safeguarding their financial stability. Banks employ various strategies to manage and recover NPAs present in their loan portfolios. These strategies encompass activities such as continuous engagement with borrowers to regularize repayments, restructuring of loans by adjusting terms and conditions, offloading NPAs to asset reconstruction companies, and resorting to legal actions like initiating proceedings in forums such as Debt Recovery Tribunals and the National Company Law Tribunal as per the provisions of the Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code.
NPA management holds significant relevance in the context of the UGC-NET Commerce Examination. Understanding the intricacies of NPA management is imperative for students preparing for this examination. It is a topic that demands thorough comprehension for success in related assessments.
Rising Non-Performing Assets (NPAs) pose a significant challenge for Indian banks, affecting their profitability and lending capabilities. Effective NPA management is essential to mitigate losses and uphold the financial well-being of banks. The government and Reserve Bank of India (RBI) have implemented reforms to enhance NPA resolution. These measures involve stricter RBI regulations for early NPA identification, establishing NPA reduction targets for banks, and enhancing banks' internal recovery mechanisms along with tools like the Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code (IBC). While the initiatives taken so far have shown some progress, more comprehensive actions are necessary for effective NPA management in Indian banks. This includes expediting legal procedures, reinforcing governance within banks, imposing stricter penalties on loan defaulters, and enhancing the expertise of bank personnel to address NPAs. Through collaborative endeavors, banks can curtail NPA levels and bolster their financial stability in the long run.
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Non-performing assets or NPAs refer to loans and advances made by banks where the borrower has failed to make interest or principal repayments for at least 90 days. Rising NPAs pose a significant challenge for banks, affecting their profitability, asset quality, and ability to provide new loans. Effective NPA management is crucial for the financial health of banks.
The RBI and government have implemented various measures to enhance NPA management, including stricter NPA recognition norms, loan restructuring schemes, advisory on loan sales, and interventions under the Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code. However, challenges persist due to delays in legal processes, lack of transparency, and the practice of evergreening loans.
Effective NPA management requires a comprehensive approach from banks that focuses on early detection, timely recovery efforts, aggressive legal action, and making internal goods. With concerted efforts, banks can rein in NPA levels and save their financial health over the long term. Yet, reforms to the legal system and regulatory frame also play an vital role in enabling better NPA key.
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NPA can be managed by the following:
Non-Performing Assets (NPAs) can significantly impact a bank's financial health. Implementing sound strategies can help banks manage NPAs effectively and minimize losses. Let's explore key steps that banks can take:
By implementing these strategies cohesively, banks can enhance their NPA management practices and reduce financial losses. However, it's essential to complement internal efforts with external reforms to improve the overall NPA resolution landscape.
The international monetary system refers to the framework that facilitates international trade, investment, and capital flows among countries. It encompasses various institutions, rules, and conventions that govern global financial interactions.
The prevention of Non-Performing Assets (NPAs) can be achieved through the following strategies:
Understanding the Theory of Cost is crucial for businesses to effectively manage their expenses and optimize profitability.
Rising Non-Performing Assets (NPAs) have become a significant challenge for Indian banks, impacting their profitability and ability to lend. Effective management of NPAs is crucial, and banks have a range of tools at their disposal for identification, control, and resolution of NPAs. While some progress has been made, concerted efforts from all stakeholders are necessary to reduce India's high levels of NPAs in the long term. Policy reforms, technological advancements, improved governance, and capacity-building within banks can collectively enhance their ability to manage NPAs more effectively. Despite the availability of various NPA management tools, the key challenge lies in their successful implementation. Banks must adopt a proactive and comprehensive approach that integrates all available options seamlessly.
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The FDIC is a preeminent banking research institution. The FDIC established the Center for Financial Research to promote research on topics important to the FDIC's mission including deposit insurance, bank supervision, making large and complex financial institutions resolvable, and resolution of failed financial institutions. The Center has an active seminar series and maintains contacts with preeminent scholars in the industry, academics, and the public sector. Its research follows banking industry developments, risk measurement and management methods, regulatory policy, and related topics. The Center sponsors an annual Bank Research Conference, hosts short-term visiting scholars, and manages a Visiting Scholars Program. The work of our researchers helps the FDIC maintain a safe, sound, and vibrant banking sector.
The Center publishes working papers, staff studies, survey reports, and other analyses to prompt discussion among the FDIC's many stakeholders to expand knowledge and understanding of issues that affect the banking system.
The Center hosts an annual Bank Research Conference and other events throughout the year to foster dialogue among banking regulators and supervisors, academics, and the private sector.
The Center includes a team of highly qualified economists and researchers, who conduct and publish empirical and theoretical research on the banking industry, bank regulation, and deposit insurance. They also develop statistical and financial models to support FDIC operations. The Center is also supported by advisors, scholars, and fellows who advise senior management and coauthor research papers with economists.
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The rise in NPAs not only affects the banking sector but also poses a threat to the growing economy. The slowdown in the economy due to the piling of NPAs affects businesses in all sectors by curbing investments which in turn has an adverse impact on the economy and stock markets. While the NPA crisis in the banking sector began in the early ...
An example of NPA: Suppose the State Bank of India (SBI) gives a loan of Rs. 10 crores to a company (Eg: Kingfisher Airlines). ... Stress in banking sector causes less money available to fund other projects, therefore, negative impact on the larger national economy. ... Essay Writing Course for UPSC CSE (Online)
Three Main Types of NPAs: -. Substandard Asset. Doubtful Asset. Loss Asset. Substandard Asset. When a loan remains NPA for 12 months or less, it is called Sub-Standard Asset. In such a loan, the total assets or collateral of the borrower is not so much that the entire dues can be recovered from it. Doubtful Asset.
At present NPA in the banking sector is discussion issue because NPA is growing year by year mainly in nationalized banks The Gross Non-Performing Assets (GNPAs) of Nationalized Banks as on ...
Purpose. The level of non-performing assets (NPAs) best indicates the soundness of the banking sector of a country. The purpose of this study is an effort to look into the contribution of the different banks individually to the NPA in the industry by looking into its growth pattern during the period 2010-2017. Further, the study is made to look ...
From the 8856 billion the gross NPA was 476 billion which 5.4% of total advance. In 2018, the total advance of public sector banks was 61417 billion and the standard advance was 52461 billion with a 85.4% of total advance. The sub-standard advance and the doubtful advance were 2146 billion and 6277 billion.
Non-performing assets (NPAs) have plagued the Indian banking sector for long. NPAs refer to a classification for loans or advances that are in default and it is assumed that banks will not be able ...
Non-performing assets (NPAs) pose a significant challenge to the stability and growth of the Indian banking sector. According to the Reserve Bank of India (RBI), NPAs are loans where the borrower has failed to make interest or principal repayments for a period exceeding 90 days. The magnitude of NPAs in the Indian banking sector has
The paper has analysed the trends and determinants of the NPA crisis in India's banking sector, with a focus on understanding the drivers of the current phase of the crisis. We found that the PSBs have been badly affected. The NPA problem is not prevalent in private banks as a group, though their volume of loan defaults has increased.
Indian banks today hold the dubious distinction of having one of the world's worst asset quality ratios especially for the public sector banks.3 The proportion of non-performing loans (NPAs) in gross loans (GAs) went from about 2% in 2008 to over 10% in 2018. For the worst performing banks, the ratio is in excess of 20%.
In March 2018, non-performing assets (NPAs) at commercial banks amounted to ₹10.3 trillion, or 11.2% of advances. Public sector banks (PSBs) accounted for ₹8.9 trillion, or 86%, of the total NPAs. The ratio of gross NPA to advances in PSBs was 14.6%. These are levels typically associated with a banking crisis.
Abstract. Banking sector is the backbone of any economy, so it is necessary to focus on its performance which is largely affected by its non-performing assets (NPAs). In the year 2018-2019, NPA of scheduled banks was Rs 355,076 Crore which is 3.7% of net advances. The purpose of this study is to identify the determinants based on analysis ...
There has been increased concern about the continued deterioration in the asset quality of Indian public sector banks in recent times. Reserve Bank of India's Financial Stability Report 2017 acknowledged that the risks to the Indian banking sector have been increasing in the post-recession period, particularly, the risk of accumulating non-performing assets (NPAs). In this perspective, the ...
According to the Reserve Bank of India's Financial Stability Report of December 2017, they currently stand at 10.2 per cent of all assets, while stressed assets, which are believed to be NPAs in ...
Abstract. This paper narrates the story of the evolutionary journey of non-performing assets (NPA) in the Indian banking sector. Three distinct phases of the intertemporal behavioral of NPAs of the Indian banking sector can be discerned. First, since the initiation of financial sector reforms till about the beginning of the North Atlantic ...
Purpose The level of non-performing assets (NPAs) best indicates the soundness of the banking sector of a country. The purpose of this study is an effort to look into the contribution of the ...
Indian banking sector is facing the problem of rising bad loans as gross non-performing assets (GNPA) of Indian banks is on continuous rise. The present study is an attempt to analyse rising bad loans scenario of Indian banks, various factors that contributes to non-performing assets (NPA), along with the present state of Indian banks.
Essay on NPA Crisis in India. Non-Performing Assets (NPA) is the biggest overhang on credit growth and banking sector health in India and is great concern for the banking system and economy. There are various reasons for growing banking NPAs including bad credit decisions, poor monitoring, laxity in vigilance, routine business downturns etc. Huge NPA has prompted the government to initiate ...
Gross NPA declined to 8.5% in 2020 from 9.3% in 2019. Gross NPAs would rise to 15.2% by March 2021 from 11.3% a year earlier in the baseline scenario. In the "very severe stress" scenario ...
The NPA situation of India has been improving; especially in Mudra loans, it has shown quite promising results. Gross NPAs of public sector banks against Mudra loans have come down drastically from 4.77 per cent in 2020-21 to as low as 3.4 per cent in 2023-24. Even for private sector banks, there is a drop in NPAs due to Mudra loans to 0.95 per ...
Neha Rani (2014) in her research paper "Analysis of Non-Performing assets of Public Sector banks" revealed that share of nationalized banks in priority sector NPA was greater in 2008 but after that it is decreasing. However amount of NPA of both banks is increasing but there percentage share in total NPA is decreasing after 2010 continuously.
For banks in India, tackling the 'hidden' non-performing assets (NPA) will be the biggest challenge in 2021 as loan defaults have spiked sharply in Covid-hit 2020. Many small and medium-scale companies are still struggling to repay dues owed to banks. ... It also expects the Indian banking sector's bad loans to shoot up to 10-11 per cent of ...
There is need to focus on NPA of every p ublic sector bank in India. ... For this study, secondary sources such as RBI papers, Statistical Tables pertaining to Banks in India, etc. are used to ...
Document Description: Risk Management & NPA Management in Indian Banking Sector - 1 for UGC NET 2024 is part of UGC NET preparation. The notes and questions for Risk Management & NPA Management in Indian Banking Sector - 1 have been prepared according to the UGC NET exam syllabus. Information about Risk Management & NPA Management in Indian Banking Sector - 1 covers topics like Net Interest ...
DOI: 10.36948/ijfmr.2024.v06i04.25476 Corpus ID: 271758094; An Empirical Study of Public and Private Sector Bank's NPA for the Period of 2005-2021 @article{Singh2024AnES, title={An Empirical Study of Public and Private Sector Bank's NPA for the Period of 2005-2021}, author={Priyanka Singh and Prof. Harish Handa and Dr. Manoj Sain}, journal={International Journal For Multidisciplinary ...
Document Description: Risk Management & NPA Management in Indian Banking Sector - 2 for UGC NET 2024 is part of UGC NET preparation. The notes and questions for Risk Management & NPA Management in Indian Banking Sector - 2 have been prepared according to the UGC NET exam syllabus. Information about Risk Management & NPA Management in Indian Banking Sector - 2 covers topics like Overview of NPA ...
The work of our researchers helps the FDIC maintain a safe, sound, and vibrant banking sector. Papers, Studies, and Survey Reports. The Center publishes working papers, staff studies, survey reports, and other analyses to prompt discussion among the FDIC's many stakeholders to expand knowledge and understanding of issues that affect the ...
Business for SA and the Presidency have launched a new collaboration to expedite prosecutions of money laundering and terrorism financing in an effort to move off the grey list. Business will also help in the establishment of a digital evidence unit
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