research paper about labor market

How Tight are U.S. Labor Markets?

Since the outset of the Covid-19 pandemic, labor market indicators that traditionally move together have been sending different signals about the degree of slack in the U.S. labor market. While some indicators on the supply-side, such as the prime-age employment-to-population ratio, suggest that there is still some slack in the labor market, other indicators on the demand-side, such as the job vacancy rate and the quits rate, imply that the labor market is already very tight. In light of these divergent signals, this paper compares alternative labor market indicators as predictors of wage inflation. Using national time series and state cross-section data, we find (i) unemployment is a better predictor of wage inflation than non-employment and (ii) vacancy rates and quit rates have substantial predictive power for wage inflation. We highlight the fact that vacancy and quit rates currently experienced in the United States correspond to a degree of labor market tightness previously associated with sub-2 percent unemployment rates. Finally, we show that predicted firm-side unemployment has dominant explanatory power with respect to subsequent inflation. Our results, along with a cursory analysis of labor force participation information, suggest that labor market tightness is likely to contribute significantly to inflationary pressure in the United States for some time to come.

Thanks to Jason Furman for comments and to Regis Barnichon for providing us with data. The views expressed herein are those of the authors and do not necessarily reflect the views of the National Bureau of Economic Research.

MARC RIS BibTeΧ

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• Measuring the Tightness of the Late-COVID Labor Market Author(s): Alex Domash Lawrence H. Summers Jason Faberman Andreas I. Mueller Ayşegül Şahin Two recent NBER working papers develop new strategies for measuring the tightness of US labor markets and conclude that during 2021,...

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The Future of Jobs Report 2023

1. Introduction: the global labour market landscape in 2023

The past three years have been shaped by a challenging combination of health, economic and geopolitical volatility combined with growing social and environmental pressures. These accelerating transformations have and continue to reconfigure the world’s labour markets and shape the demand for jobs and skills of tomorrow, driving divergent economic trajectories within and across countries, in developing and developed economies alike. The Fourth Industrial Revolution, changing worker and consumer expectations, and the urgent need for a green and energy transition are also reconfiguring the sectoral composition of the workforce and stimulating demand for new occupations and skills. Global supply chains must also quickly adapt to the challenges of increasing geopolitical volatility, economic uncertainty, rising inflation and increasing commodity prices.

Like previous editions, The Future of Jobs Report 2023 offers insights into these transformations and unpacks how businesses are expecting to navigate these labour-market changes from 2023 to 2027, leveraging a unique cross-sectoral and global survey of Chief Human Resources, Chief Learning Officers and Chief Executive Officers of leading global employers and their peers.

This report is structured as follows: Chapter 1 reviews the global labour-market landscape at the beginning of 2023. Chapter 2 explores how key macrotrends are expected to transform this landscape over the 2023–2027 period. Chapters 3 and 4 then discuss the resulting global outlooks for jobs and skills over the 2023–2027 period. Chapter 5 reviews emerging workforce and talent strategies in response to these trends. The report’s appendices provide an overview of the report’s survey methodology and detailed sectoral breakdowns of the five-year outlook for macrotrends, technology adoption and skills.

In addition, The Future of Jobs Report 2023 features a comprehensive set of Economy, Industry, and – for the first time – Skill Profiles. User Guides are provided for each of these profiles, to support their use as practical, standalone tools.

As a foundation for analysing respondents’ expectations of the future of jobs and skills in the next five years, this chapter now assesses the current state of the global labour-market at the beginning of 2023.

Diverging labour-market outcomes between low-, middle- and high-income countries

The intertwined economic and geopolitical crises of the past three years created an uncertain and divergent outlook for labour markets, widening disparities between developed and emerging economies and among workers. Even as a growing number of economies have begun to recover from the COVID-19 pandemic and its associated lockdowns, low- and lower-middle-income countries continue to face elevated unemployment, while high-income countries are generally experiencing tight labour markets.

At the time of publication, the latest unemployment rates stand below pre-pandemic rates in three quarters of OECD countries, 1 and across a majority of G20 economies (Figure 1.1). At 4.9%, the 2022 unemployment rate across the OECD area is at its lowest level since 2001. 2

By contrast, many developing economies have experienced a comparatively slow labour-market recovery from the disruptions induced by the COVID-19 pandemic. In South Africa, for example, the formal unemployment rate has climbed to 30%, five percentage points higher than it was pre-pandemic (Figure 1.1). Developing economies, especially those reliant on the sectors hardest hit by recurring lockdowns, such as hospitality and tourism, still exhibit slow labour-market recoveries.

The asymmetry of the recovery is exacerbated by countries’ varying capacities to maintain policy measures to protect the most vulnerable and maintain employment levels. While advanced economies were able to adopt far-reaching measures, emerging economies have provided less support to the most vulnerable firms and workers due to their limited fiscal space. 3,4

In 2022, various employment indicators pointed towards a strong labour-market recovery for high-income countries, with many sectors experiencing labour shortages. In Europe, for example, almost three in 10 manufacturing and service firms reported production constraints in the second quarter of 2022 due to a lack of workers. 5 Nursing professionals, plumbers and pipefitters, software developers, systems analysts, welders and flame cutters, bricklayers and related workers, and heavy truck and lorry drivers were among the most needed professions (Figure 1.2).

In the United States, businesses in Retail and Wholesale of Consumer Goods reported close to 70% of job openings remaining unfilled, with close to 55% of roles unfilled in manufacturing and 45% in leisure and hospitality. 6 Businesses also reported difficulties in retaining workers. According to a global survey conducted in late 2022 across 44 countries, one in five employees reported they intend to switch employers in the coming year. 7

Diverging employment levels by gender, age and education level

Women experienced greater employment loss than men during the pandemic 8 , and according to the World Economic Forum’s Global Gender Gap Report 2022 9 , gender parity in the labour force stands at 62.9% – the lowest level registered since the index was first compiled. The global pandemic also disproportionately impacted young workers, with less than half of the global youth employment deficit projected to have recovered by the end of 2022. 10 As highlighted in Figure 1.3, the youth employment deficit relative to 2019 is largest in Southern Asia, Latin America, Northern Africa and Eastern Europe, with only Europe and North America likely to have fully recovered at the time of publication.

Workers with a basic education were also hardest hit in 2020, and slower to recover their prior participation in the labour market. In many countries the increase in unemployment from 2019 to 2021 of workers with a basic education level was more than twice as large as the impact on workers with advanced education (Figure 1.4).

Access to social protection

From January 2020 to January 2022, almost 3,900 social-protection measures were implemented across 223 economies to support the labour force impacted by COVID-19. 11 These measures are estimated to have reached close to 1.2 billion people globally. Wage subsidies, cash transfers, training measures and extending unemployment-benefit coverage have all been crucial tools to protect the most vulnerable during the pandemic. Most such short-term support measures are now being phased out, 12 and targeted medium to long-term investments will be needed to alleviate the long-term effects of recurring economic shocks on firms and workers.

Yet, there remains an urgent need to provide adequate social protection to those not covered by full-time employment contracts (Figure 1.5). Nearly 2 billion workers globally are in informal employment, representing close to 70% of workers in developing and low-income countries, as well as 18% in high income ones. 13 Given their susceptibility to economic shocks and working poverty, informal workers represent a crucial labour-market cohort and need better representation in data, broad-based income support in the short term and a longer term shift towards formalization.

Real wages and cost of living

According to the International Labour Organization (ILO), labour income in many developing countries remains below pre-pandemic levels. 14 In 2020, the global economy started experiencing inflation levels not seen in almost 40 years. 15 With high inflation, the global cost-of-living crisis has hit the most vulnerable hardest. 16 According to the ILO, for the first time over the last 15 years, workers’ real wages have declined – by 0.9% in the first half of 2022. 17

Across regions, real wage growth was most affected in Northern, Southern and Western Europe; Latin America; Asia Pacific; and North America. 18 In Africa, real wages saw a 10.5% drop in 2020 due to the global pandemic. 19 However, real wages have continued to increase in 2022 across Asia Pacific, Central and Western Asia and Arab states. 20

In line with rising inflation, purchasing power has declined for the most vulnerable, given the higher weight of energy and food in expenditures of the lowest-income households. 21 According to recent research by the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP), rising food and energy prices could push up to 71 million people into poverty, with hot spots in Sub-Saharan Africa, the Balkans and the Caspian Basin. 22 This cost-of-living crisis highlights the importance of designing permanent models of social protection for non-standard employment and the informal economy that provide security and support resilience. 23

Worker preferences

In this context of diverging labour-market outcomes, issues around the quality of work have come to the fore. This section reviews some of the latest worker preference research to analyse which job attributes are of most importance to workers currently. As a starting point, data shows workers, openness to changing employer. Data on worker preferences from CultureAmp 24 and Adecco 25 find that more than a quarter (33% and 27% of workers, respectively) do not see themselves at their current company of employment in two years’ time. In line with this, a little under half of workers (42% and 45%, according to CultureAmp and Adecco, respectively) actively explore opportunities at different companies.

Worker surveys at both CultureAmp 26 and Randstad 27 suggest that salary levels are the main reason workers decide to change their job. 52% of Randstad respondents say they worry about the impact of economic uncertainty on their employment and 61% of respondents to Adecco’s worker-preference survey worry that their salary is not high enough to keep pace with the cost of living given rising rates of inflation. 28

Additional data explores the protection and flexibility of employment: 92% of respondents to Randstad’s employee survey 29 say job security is important and more than half of these respondents wouldn’t accept a job that didn’t give assurances regarding job security. 83% prioritize flexible hours and 71% prioritize flexible locations.

A fourth theme identified by workers is work-life balance and burnout: 35% of CultureAmp respondents indicate that work-life balance and burnout would be the primary reason to leave their employer. Workers responding to Randstad’s employee survey 30 value salary and work-life balance equally, with a 94% share identifying both aspects of employment as important to choosing to work in a particular role.

Data also suggests that diversity, equity and inclusion (DEI) at work is particularly important to young workers. According to Manpower, 31 68% of Gen Z workers are not satisfied with their organization’s progress in creating a diverse and inclusive work environment, and 56% of Gen Z workers would not accept a role without diverse leadership. Meanwhile, data suggests that fewer women than men are trained.

Lastly, workers across age ranges indicate dissatisfaction about training opportunities. Manpower data 32 show that 57% of surveyed employees are pursuing training outside of work, because company training programmes do not teach them relevant skills, advance their career development or help them stay competitive in the labour market. Respondents to Adecco’s survey criticize companies for focusing their efforts too much on managers’ development, skills and rewards. Only 36% of non-managers who responded to Adecco’s survey said that their company is investing effectively in developing their skills, compared to 64% of managers.

Employment shifts across sectors

The past two years have witnessed a volatility in the demand and supply of goods and services resulting from lockdowns and supply-chain disruptions. The global economic rebound has reconfigured the sectoral distribution of employment across industries. Figure 6 presents OECD data demonstrating that, while Information Technology and Digital Communications experienced a strong rebound in most countries, the Accommodation, Food and Leisure; Manufacturing and Consumer; and Wholesale and Consumer Goods sectors are experiencing a slower rate of recovery. Since the first quarter of 2019, a majority of countries have experienced employment growth in Professional Services, Education and Training, Health and Healthcare, and Government and Public Sector, but employment in the Supply Chain and Transportation and Media, Entertainment and Sports sectors lags behind 2019 levels.

In addition to the pandemic-induced employment shifts we have seen across sectors during the last few years, generative AI models are likely to continue shaping sectoral shifts in employment. While AI applications are shown to be effective general-purpose technologies, 33 the development of general-purpose technologies have previously been hard to predict, which is why regulation needs to be both prompt and adaptable as institutions learn how these technologies can be used.

Through research conducted for the Future of Jobs Report, LinkedIn has identified the fastest growing roles globally over the past four years, shedding further light on the types of jobs employers have been seeking (Box 1.1).

The transformations that labour markets are experiencing have also increased the need for swifter and more efficient job reallocation mechanisms within and across different firms and sectors. The coming years represent a generational opportunity for businesses and policy-makers to embrace a future of work which fosters economic inclusion and opportunity, sets in place policies which will influence not only the rate of growth but its direction, and contribute to shaping more inclusive, sustainable and resilient economies and societies.

The green transition, technological change, supply-chain transformations and changing consumer expectations are all generating demand for new jobs across industries and regions. However, these positive drivers are offset by growing geoeconomic tensions and a cost-of-living crisis. 34

The Future of Jobs Survey was conducted in late 2022 and early 2023 bringing together the perspective of 803 companies – collectively employing more than 11.3 million workers – across 27 industry clusters and 45 economies from all world regions. The Survey covers questions of macrotrends and technology trends, their impact on jobs, their impact on skills, and the workforce transformation strategies businesses plan to use.

This chapter analyses findings from the World Economic Forum’s Future of Jobs Survey to explore how businesses expect macrotrends and technology adoption to drive industry transformation and employment.

BOX 1.1 The fastest-growing jobs support sales growth and customer engagement, the search for talent, and technology/IT

In collaboration with LinkedIn

Research conducted by LinkedIn for the Future of Jobs Report 2023 describes the 100 roles that have grown fastest, consistently and globally, over the last four years – known as the “Jobs on the Rise”. While ILO and OECD data show which sectors are employing more people, Jobs on the Rise data identifies the specific job types that have experienced significant growth. Figure B.1 organizes the 100 Jobs on the Rise into broad types.

In line with ILO and OECD data on the growth of roles in the Information Technology and Digital Communication sector, Technology and IT related roles make up 16 of the top 100 Jobs on the Rise, the third-highest of all job groupings. Jobs related to Sales Growth and Customer Engagement top the list, with 22 of the 100 roles. With roles such as Sales Development Representatives, Director of Growth, and Customer Success Engineer featuring in this group, this may suggest an increasing focus on broadening customer groups and growth models in a world with increasing digital access and rapid technological advancement (more detail on how increasing digital access and adoption of frontier technologies could transform demand for specific job types is available in Chapter 3). Human Resources and Talent Acquisition roles are the second-most popular roles, and most of these relate to Talent Acquisition and Recruitment, including a specific role for Information Technology Recruitment – perhaps illustrating the increasing difficulty and importance of accessing talent in a generally strong labour market.

Of the groups further down the list, Sustainability and Environment related roles are notable for all being in the top 40, including three of the top 10 roles (Figure B.2). This might suggest the green transition is both a significant and developing labour-market trend, where roles have titles such as “Sustainability Analyst”. Chapter 3 further examines the outlook for roles related to a green transition.

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Reshoring, Automation, and Labor Markets Under Trade Uncertainty

Hamid Firooz

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2024-16 | May 8, 2024

We study the implications of trade uncertainty for reshoring, automation, and U.S. labor markets. Rising trade uncertainty creates incentive for firms to reduce exposures to foreign suppliers by moving production and distribution processes to domestic producers. However, we argue that reshoring does not necessarily bring jobs back to the home country or boost domestic wages, especially when firms have access to labor-substituting technologies such as automation. Automation improves labor productivity and facilitates reshoring, but it can also displace jobs. Furthermore, automation poses a threat that weakens the bargaining power of low-skilled workers in wage negotiations, depressing their wages and raising the skill premium and wage inequality. The model predictions are in line with industry-level empirical evidence.

Backstory: Francesco Amodio on Labor Market Power, Self-employment, and Development Backstory: How Research Papers in Economics Get Made

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From the military to the workforce: How to leverage veterans’ skills

US employers face multiple challenges when it comes to filling jobs and retaining workers, including a shortage of skilled labor and an aging workforce. To meet the moment in this era of technological change, some companies are broadening their hiring lens beyond the traditional college résumé. They are evaluating candidates on their capacity to learn , their intrinsic capabilities, and their transferable skills.

About the authors

This article is a collaborative effort by Scott Blackburn , Michael Kim, Charlie Lewis , Hannah Oh, and Kallman Parry.

This is where military veterans can make a difference. Veterans represent a source of labor potential that is untapped relative to the breadth of experience and depth of skills  that they acquire and develop during their service. Members of the military receive technical training, operate under pressure in austere environments, and develop strong interpersonal skills throughout their service, making them well qualified for numerous civilian occupations. While not every military role is directly transferrable to a civilian job, most skills are—including those that correspond to US industries experiencing labor shortages, such as infrastructure and manufacturing.

And veterans aren’t the only ones who stand to benefit from a longer look by employers: the economic opportunity of unleashing the value of veterans’ work experience through skills-based hiring could reach almost $15 billion over a ten-year period, new McKinsey research shows.

In this article, we explore the complex employment picture for military veterans , including in jobs and industries that will be most affected by automation and generative AI . We look at actions the military can take to help service members prepare for their transition to civilian work. We focus particularly on enlisted veterans, who make up the majority of those shifting out each year but who tend to fare worse in the labor market because employers don’t recognize their technical skills. We then discuss ways that the military and the private sector can close the veteran opportunity gap by improving employment outcomes.

The veteran employment landscape

Military veterans are not a homogeneous demographic, nor is their labor profile. Veterans’ work experiences differ by age, skills, and educational degrees. Our research shows that, in the aggregate, veterans with bachelor’s degrees and those skilled through alternate routes (known as STARs 1 According to the not-for-profit Opportunity@Work, STARs are individuals who are at least 25 years old, are currently active in the workforce, and who have a high school diploma but no bachelor’s degree. ) outearn their nonveteran peers (Exhibit 1).

Veteran STARs are, on average, eight years older and earn $3.91 more per hour than civilian STARs, though they tend to cluster in fewer, technical occupations. The largest veteran STAR group is aged 45 to 54; this cohort has the highest median hourly wage ($26.44) of all STAR groups. The group with the highest median hourly wage overall ($42.58) is made up of veterans aged 55 to 64 and with a bachelor’s degree or higher.

The roles with the highest representation of veterans are often analogs of military specialties. These roles include aircraft pilots, flight engineers, and aircraft mechanics and service technicians, as well as detectives and criminal investigators. Veterans are also well-represented in middle- to high-wage occupations that are accessible from low-wage jobs and rarely require an undergraduate degree. These roles include occupational-health and safety specialists and technicians, crane and tower operators, paramedics, and construction and building inspectors.

When viewed as a monolith, veterans are doing relatively well. But when broken down into subsets, many veterans are struggling to find jobs that use, recognize, and compensate them commensurate with their level of military experience. This is especially true for those who have difficulty translating their experience to civilian employment opportunities—in particular, veterans without a four-year degree, who represent 61 percent of all employed veterans. 2 Opportunity@Work analysis of the Integrated Public Use Microdata Series (IPUMS) 2021 Annual Social and Economic Supplement (ASEC) to the Current Population Survey (CPS).

Of the roughly 150,000 active-duty service members who transition from the military each year, 3 Demographics report , US Department of Defense, 2021. approximately 90,500 earn less in their first year after being discharged than they did on active duty, resulting in billions of dollars of lost economic value (Exhibit 2). 4 Integrated Public Use Microdata Series (IPUMS) 2022 Annual Social and Economic Supplement (ASEC) to the Current Population Survey (CPS), as well as data analysis of the US Census Bureau’s Veteran Employment Outcomes. And while some categories of veterans fare better than others—including former officers, as well as Special Forces and personnel who specialized in intelligence, IT, and cyber operations—veterans across categories are, on average, entering the civilian workforce at lower median wages than they had in the military.

Enlisted service members are disproportionately affected: veteran STARs tend to occupy lower-paying and more physically demanding roles than veterans with bachelor’s degrees, indicating that they may be hampered by not having a four-year degree.

Our methodology

To understand the lost economic opportunity associated with the lower wages for transitioning enlisted service members, we grouped junior enlisted service members who had undervalued occupational skills and noncommissioned officers (NCOs) who had undervalued managerial skills. We identified the one-year postdischarge salary for each category as a baseline, then assigned best-fit skills-based careers to each category. We narrowed the field of choices by factoring in required education, preparation needed, and projected annual job openings. Based on those choices, we identified salaries and calculated projected future earnings. We then determined the economic difference between current and potential salaries for all categories. Top careers included registered nurses; electricians; first-line supervisors of mechanics, installers, and repairers; industrial-machinery mechanics; and municipal and forest firefighters.

The cohort of enlisted veterans postdischarge excludes occupational groups (intelligence, Special Operations forces, and IT) that earn roughly equal to or greater than their last year of active-duty regular military compensation. The comparison of actual and potential average salary for enlisted veterans postdischarge is based on the latest data set to track income relative to military occupation from the US Census Bureau’s Veteran Employment Outcomes, which covers army veterans who left active-duty service between 2000 and 2015. 1 “Veteran Employee Outcomes,” US Census Bureau, accessed October 24, 2023. Actual earnings are from the Department of Labor; future-earnings projections are based on the 2023 Bureau of Labor Statistics annual wage increase and converted to 2018 dollars to match the Department of Labor data set. We also referred to the Department of Defense’s digital employment tool, Occupational Information Network, or O*NET; a 2023 RAND report on service members’ knowledge, skills, and abilities 2 Elizabeth Hastings Roer, Jeffrey B. Wenger, and Jonathan P. Wong, Military-to-civilian occupational matching: Using the O*NET to provide match recommendations for the US Navy, Marine Corps, and Air Force , RAND, 2023. ; and an internal survey of veterans working at McKinsey that matched the RAND findings.

McKinsey analyzed what the total potential loss of annual earnings for a cohort of 90,500 transitioning enlisted service members would mean in terms of lost overall economic potential (Exhibit 3). The research, which combined labor data and a skills-based analysis, found that the economic potential of improving employment outcomes for a single cohort of transitioning veterans could be almost $15 billion over a ten-year period (see sidebar, “Our methodology”). This presents a significant opportunity for the military, the private sector, and not-for-profit organizations supporting veterans as employers seek workers with ready-made skills.

How veterans’ skills apply to jobs—now and in the future

In the broad economic context, McKinsey research on the US labor market shows a disconnect  between available jobs and people qualified to fill them. Two industries in particular stand out: infrastructure and manufacturing.

The Bipartisan Infrastructure Law (BIL) is expected to create hundreds of thousands of additional jobs on projects ranging from roads, bridges, and waterways to clean energy and electric vehicles. However, a labor crunch in construction jobs exists across sectors, occupations, and geographies . In manufacturing, McKinsey analysis suggests that reviving the industry —in which the bulk of employees don’t need four-year degrees—could boost GDP and add up to 1.5 million jobs. 5 “ Delivering the US manufacturing renaissance ,” McKinsey, August 29, 2022.

Veterans map well to these high-demand jobs. To identify the specific actions that can help improve veterans’ employment outcomes in these industries and others, the research matched military specialties and skills to their full spectrum of civilian occupations. The goal was to identify high-potential pathways that are likely to improve veterans’ livelihoods based on skill overlap. 6 To focus the analysis and gain an understanding of the distribution of veterans across occupations, their education attainment levels, and incomes today, we examined employment and demographic data from external sources such as the US Bureau of Labor Statistics and the US Census Bureau, in addition to analysis from internal sources such as the McKinsey Global Institute. For the purposes of this research, veterans’ livelihood represents their overall well-being, as well as the strength of their means to provide essentials (for example, food, shelter, clothing, healthcare) to support themselves and their families. Our ratings of veterans’ occupational skills were based on a 2023 RAND survey of more than 5,100 veterans and augmented with a small sample of McKinsey veteran employees. For more, see Elizabeth Hastings Roer, Jeffrey B. Wenger, and Jonathan P. Wong, Military-to-civilian occupational matching: Using the O*NET to provide match recommendations for the US Navy, Marine Corps, and Air Force , RAND, 2023.

The analysis found that enlisted veterans are highly rated on occupational skills associated with trades such as electricians, mechanics, and construction professionals. For example, veterans were consistently rated higher on technical skills such as installation, equipment maintenance, repairing, and troubleshooting than the threshold required for the average civilian occupation.

Conversely, enlisted veterans were rated lower on “softer” occupational skills associated with management, sales, and office and administrative-support roles, such as reading comprehension, persuasion, and negotiation, suggesting real or perceived deficiencies in interpersonal skills that are required to succeed in business environments. However, these lower ratings tended to improve with military rank and the accompanying experience that rank brings, as both midlevel and senior noncommissioned officers (NCOs) scored above average on all occupational skills. 7 Melissa A. Bradley et al., Helping soldiers leverage army knowledge, skills, and abilities in civilian jobs , RAND, 2017.

Veterans overall score higher on service orientation, which the analysis defined as “actively looking for ways to help other people,” than the threshold for the average civilian occupation. However, this skill may not fully capture inherent veteran strengths, such as dependability, punctuality, discipline, and integrity.

While the typical veteran tool kit favors technical ability over verbal and written communication, veterans can consider developing and refining their soft skills to allow for better access to high-potential “gateway” roles , while continuing to pursue in-demand occupations that require technical skills. 8 “New research finds workers without four-year degrees not realizing wage gains despite having the skills for higher-wage work; identifies 51 job roles that unlock economic mobility,” Opportunity@Work press release, accessed October 30, 2023. These roles create a bridge between frontline work and destination roles, which require higher-level skills training and academic credentials.

The top 15 occupations that employ veterans today are generally expected to experience strong positive labor demand change and low change-of-work activities in the coming years as digitization and other technological changes take hold  (Exhibit 4). These occupations include nursing (expected to experience a 41 percent increase in labor demand); laborers and freight, stock, and material movers (a 26 percent increase); construction laborers (a 22 percent increase); and truck drivers (a 12 percent increase). Veterans can continue to pursue these occupations at even higher rates.

On the other hand, certain occupations that employ veterans are at risk of displacement due to declining job demand and adoption of automation, as well as the acceleration of generative AI in these occupations. This includes retail salespeople (expected to experience a 23 percent decrease in labor demand), supervisors of office and administrative-support workers (a 20 percent decrease), and customer service representatives (a 14 percent decrease).

Transitioning veterans can consider avoiding these roles, and veterans already in these occupations can continue to focus on upskilling, while taking advantage of reskilling opportunities to move into more secure occupations. Veterans looking to move into more senior positions can also use generative AI tools to their own advantage to help boost their capabilities and output.

Veterans looking to move into more senior positions can use generative AI tools to their own advantage to help boost their capabilities and output.

Several gateway occupations offer high potential to improve veterans’ livelihoods, including heating, ventilation, and air-conditioning (HVAC) mechanics and installers, human resources specialists, and industrial-machinery mechanics. However, these occupations are being accessed by less than 2 percent of employed veterans today (Exhibit 5).

Closing the opportunity gap: Actions stakeholders can take

We’ve looked at the skills that many veterans offer and the potential roles that a majority of veterans pursue, including gateway jobs for those without four-year degrees. To carve out better pathways and help make transitions more successful for those who need more support, the military services and employers can consider the following interventions.

The military: Recruit, retain, retrain

The military can address three recruiting and retention challenges by communicating the value of service and how skills developed in the military can translate to future careers.

Reverse declining interest in military service. The US military itself is facing a recruiting crisis that is likely to worsen if the value proposition of employment beyond military service doesn’t improve. 9 Ben Kesling, “The military recruiting crisis: Even veterans don’t want their families to join,” Wall Street Journal , June 30, 2023. The general population is largely unaware of the benefits of service, with 50 percent of young people saying they know little to nothing about military service and its unique professional-development offerings. 10 “Facts and figures,” US Army Recruiting Command, accessed August 29, 2023.

To shift perceptions and to help support candidates on their holistic career journey, the military can train recruiters to promote how service-developed skills can lead to well-compensated civilian careers and improved livelihoods, including how different military specialties map to various civilian occupations. As discussed earlier, there are several high-potential career pathways that are open to veterans that will continue be viable even as AI adoption increases. Recruiters who can communicate the value of military service in the context of these pathways could improve interest levels over the longer term.

The US Department of Defense (DOD) and service branches can launch a public relations campaign that highlights how the military develops desirable skills during service and provides support, education, and training opportunities during and beyond the transition. These programs include the GI Bill, tuition and credentials assistance, leadership academies, military occupation-related training, and SkillBridge, which allows transitioning service members to intern with civilian employers during the last 90 to 180 days of their service. 11 For more, see Army Credentialing Opportunities Online (Army COOL), US Army; “Education and training,” US Department of Veterans Affairs; “Tuition assistance,” US Army; and “What is SkillBridge?,” US Department of Defense, all sources accessed October 23, 2023.

Reduce disparities in commercial-sector employment opportunities . As noted earlier, the military has effective transition programs aimed at increasing the presence of veterans in the tech space and elsewhere. In one example of a successful transition, a naval flight officer looking for a civilian job emphasized her experiences in combat, as a NATO instructor, and in leading teams. Through the DOD SkillBridge program, she found a role focusing on public sector sales at a tech start-up. Starting as a customer success manager, she was promoted three times to a director-level role at the company, which is now a unicorn.

However, in many cases the digital career tools available to those transitioning to civilian work are inconsistent and often focus on literal job translations, neglecting inputs beyond military occupational specialties, such as rank, education, and formal training. For instance, recruiters from the Army and the Marine Corps receive different career recommendations from a widely used digital tool, the DOD’s Occupational Information Network, or O*NET, which transitioning service members are encouraged to use to evaluate potential careers.

Service members with critical skills, such as cyber-operations specialists and unpiloted-aerial-systems operators, are more likely to leave for commercial opportunities after their first enlistment, while other specialties are less in demand because of a lack of clear occupational analogs. The services could adopt reenlistment incentives that amplify the value of more military experience for skill development, rather than providing potentially ineffective financial incentives for service members so they stay for an additional enlistment.

For instance, promoting the long-term NCO tool kit, with a focus on leadership of personnel and resources, could improve both retention and recruiting outcomes. The services could enhance NCO leadership academies to offer upskilling and additional training, which improve the likelihood of employment in civilian occupations that offer increased earning power.

The military could also promote occupations such as nursing, which has a significant labor shortage, with more than 200,000 openings annually . Veterans with experience as medics are well suited for nursing roles. In addition, the military could offer nursing prerequisites on base as a part of its Installation Education Centers and highlight veterans in diverse nursing careers (in intensive care units, emergency rooms, and flight or transport roles).

In another individual example, an air force aerospace medical technician earned his associate’s degree in nursing while in the service, then used the GI Bill to complete his bachelor’s degree in nursing after leaving the air force. He then went on to earn his MBA and is now a healthcare consultant.

Increase job satisfaction rates. Twenty-two percent of active service members report dissatisfaction with their military experience, 12 See “Military-to-civilian occupational matching,” 2023; and “Navy readiness: Actions needed to evaluate and improve surface warfare officer career path,” US Government Accountability Office, June 17, 2021. a percentage that spikes further in certain demographics, such as the 88 percent of female Naval Surface Warfare Officers who leave within their first ten years.

To encourage younger generations to seek out military service as a career, the military can partner with more universities, trade associations, and employers to diversify the service member experience and to allow service members to pursue opportunities outside their specialty while still contributing to the capabilities of their service.

The private sector: Build a talent model around skills

As the United States invests in infrastructure- and climate-related projects, the labor shortage the country is currently experiencing may only grow . And as generative AI and other technologies take off, productivity changes will likely affect the occupations that veterans pursue and the skills that transitioning service members will need to be competitive for employment.

To help expand talent pools , corporate leaders should take note that 60 percent of American workers over the age of 25 don’t hold a four-year degree. 13 “Hire for the skills it takes to do the job,” Opportunity@Work, accessed October 24, 2023. That roughly matches the percentage of those transitioning out of the military who don’t have a bachelor’s degree.

By moving to a skills-based approach, companies can boost the number and quality of applicants  who apply to open positions. Internally, they can build skills and retrain their existing workforces to prepare people for new roles. Retention improves when workers find more opportunities to advance internally, McKinsey research shows . 14 Sandra Durth, Asmus Komm, Florian Pollner, and Angelika Reich, “ Reimagining people development to overcome talent challenges ,” McKinsey, March 3, 2023. Skills-based practices have a greater impact when they’re implemented across the whole talent journey, including in sourcing, hiring, and career development.

Companies can also set targets for veteran recruitment and hiring. One company that has pledged to hire veterans is Micron, which is building a $100 billion semiconductor plant in upstate New York. 15 Steve Lohr, “Micron pledges up to $100 billion for semiconductor factory in New York,” New York Times , October 4, 2022. Of the 9,000 people it expects to hire for the plant, Micron is aiming to hire 1,500 veterans, or 17 percent of its workforce. The company has found that veterans are a good fit for the semiconductor industry because of their experience with heavy machinery and technology, along with their disciplined mindset and team-building skills.

In the public sector, US states and local governments that are receiving BIL funding  can reserve a portion of jobs for veterans, just as they have for stakeholders such as local construction companies, engineering firms, trade schools, and others.

A hiring strategy that focuses on expanding the pool of potential talent can help communities by creating more and better job opportunities for a broader, diverse pool of workers. It can also provide upward mobility for millions of workers—including veterans—at a crucial time for the US economy.

The military can take more steps to support veterans, particularly enlisted service members, as they navigate the transition to civilian work. Companies can open their hiring practices to consider veterans for a variety of roles, not just those that match perfectly with their military skills. Together, these actions can add billions in value to the US economy as veterans moving into civilian jobs maintain or increase their earning power to support their families and build their communities.

Scott Blackburn is a senior partner in McKinsey’s Washington, DC, office, where Kallman Parry is a senior analyst; Michael Kim and Hannah Oh are consultants in the Southern California office; and Charlie Lewis is a partner in the Stamford, Connecticut, office. All are veterans of the US armed forces.

This article was edited by Barbara Tierney, a senior editor in the New York office.

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• ISSN: 2510-5027 (electronic)

Suburbanization Problems in the USSR : the Case of Moscow

• Référence bibliographique

Gornostayeva Galina A. Suburbanization Problems in the USSR : the Case of Moscow . In: Espace, populations, sociétés , 1991-2. Les franges périurbaines Peri-urban fringes. pp. 349-357.

DOI : https://doi.org/10.3406/espos.1991.1474

www.persee.fr/doc/espos_0755-7809_1991_num_9_2_1474

• RIS (ProCite, Endnote, ...)

Résumé (fre)

La suburbanisation n'existe pas en URSS au sens des phénomènes décrits dans les villes occidentales. Cependant on observe certains transferts limités d'activités industrielles exigeantes en espace ou polluantes, voire même de centres de recherches, vers les zones suburbaines ou des villes-satellites. Mais ces déconcentrations répondent à une logique de planification administrative. En outre, les Moscovites hésitent à aller habiter dans ces centres d'emploi, de crainte de perdre les privilèges liés à l'autorisation d'habiter Moscou (la propiska) et du fait des communications insuffisantes avec la capitale. Le taux de croissance de la population moscovite reste supérieur à celui du reste de l'oblast. Par contre le développement de datchas de seconde résidence est très important dans l'oblast de Moscou, en particulier aux alentours des stations de chemin de fer. L'abolition du système de propiska pourrait transformer les datchas les plus proches de Moscou en résidences principales.

Résumé (eng)

The suburbanisation does not exist as such in the USSR with the meaning one has of the phenomena in Western cities. Though one may notice some limited transfers of industrial activities demanding a lot of space or polluting ones, even research centres, towards the suburban areas or satellite-towns. But these déconcentrations correspond to an administrative planification logics. Moreover the Muscovites hesitate before going and living in these employment centres, because they are afraid of loosing the privileges linked with the authorisation to live in Moscow (the propiska) and because of insufficient communications with the capital. The growth rate of the Muscovite population remains higher than this of the remainder of the oblast. To the contrary developing of datchas for second residences is very high in the Moscow oblast, especially in the vicinity of a railway station. The abolishment of the «propiska» system might transform the datchas nearer to Moscow into main residences.

• Economic structure [link]
• Suburbanization of activities [link]
• Suburbanization of population [link]
• Conclusions [link]
• Literature [link]

Liste des illustrations

• Table 1. Employment structure, % [link]
• Table 2. Annual rate of population increase, % [link]
• Fig. 1. Spatial distribution of country-cottages and gardening associations in the Moscow region [link]

Texte intégral

Galina A. GORNOSTAYEVA

Moscow University

Suburbanization Problems

in the USSR :

the Case of Moscow

Suburbanization processes typical to cities in Western Europe, the USA and other countries are not observed in the USSR or they are distorted to such an extent that they may not be compared with existing standards. This states the question how Soviet cities-succeeded in escaping this stage of urban development. In order to answer this question, we should first summarize the main aspects of Western suburbanization.

Firstly, it is well known that the urbanization processes are linked to structural changes in the economy. Thus the transition from the stage of concentration to this of suburbanization is associated with industrialization, and the transition to the third stage - déconcentration - is related with the rapid growth of employment in the non-industrial sphere. Secondly, a suburbanization of economic activities can be distinguished. It applies in the first place to the building and iron- working industry, transports, engineering and chemical works. These are polluting and requiring extensive areas. This suburbanization of industry is caused by the following factors: rising demand for land from firms ; worsening of transport

tions in the inner cities ; demand for lower land costs and taxation levels in suburbs ; rapid growth of road transports; state policies regulating the growth of large cities ; migration of the labour force to the suburban zones. Scientific and educational activities are also transferred from the centre to the suburbs.

The third important aspect of suburbanization applies to the population. In the suburbs two opposite flows of population meet ; one is centripetal, coming from non- metropolitan regions, the other is centrifugal, coming from the central city. The reasons for the migration to the suburbs are as follows : declining living standards in large cities (overcrowding, slow housing renewal, environmental problems, etc.); growth of motorization of the population, development of communications (telephone, telex, fax, computer) ; intensifying decentralization of working places ; lower land prices in the suburbs ; state support for the intensification of real estate development in the suburbs. The above-mentioned factors and reasons for suburbanization are altered in the Soviet cities. Let us explore them, by taking for example the largest one - Moscow.

Economic structure

The employment structure in the USSR reveals sharp differences from those in developed urbanized countries. The USSR is characterized by a high share of employment in agriculture, industry, construction and a low share in the non-industrial sphere (tab. 1).

A correlation analysis of the percentage of urban population and employment in the different spheres of economic activity reveals that the share of urban population in the USSR is higher than in countries with the same percentage of persons employed in agriculture.

TABLE 1. EMPLOYMENT STRUCTURE,

Source: personal calculations.

The urbanization processes in the Moscow Capital Region (MCR) are more intensive than in other regions of the USSR. Structural changes are more obvious here : the share of employment in the non-industrial sphere increases more substantially and the percentage of persons employed in industry and agriculture is lower than in the whole country. However the MCR cannot therefore be compared with a metropolitan region in a Western country. Although Moscow is the most advanced agglomeration in the USSR, it lags is far behind the major world cities in terms of development and it is at the very start of the post- industrial stage of its structural and urban transformation.

The structural «anomaly» of the USSR as a whole and of the MCR in particular is explained by the enforced process of industrialization (starting from the thirties) at the expense of the peasantry (thus, there is not only a booming industrial employment in cities, but also worsening living and working conditions in villages and forced collectivization having triggered off the massive rural emigration). As a result, the share of urban population in the USSR is higher than expected, based on changes in the economic structure. While urbanization in the developed countries was due, among

other causes, to an increasing labour efficiency in agriculture, this remained quite low in the USSR. Therefore the employment share in agriculture is overstated in comparison with countries with a similar percentage of urban population, and even this considerable part of the labour force is unable to feed the whole population of the country.

The share of agricultural employment in the mcr increased from 7,4 % to 7,6 °7o between 1980 and 1985 (as a result of Moscow attractiveness and the better living standards in its surrounding villages), whereas it continued to decline in other parts of the Central region. The population growth in villages adjacent to Moscow is especially intensive, though labour efficiency in localities near Moscow is higher than in the other oblasts. In spite of this, Moscow oblast provides only 61 % of milk, 34 °/o of potatoes, 45 % of vegetables and 23 % of meat needed by the population in Moscow city and oblast (Argumen- ty i facty, 1988, N50, p. 3). The structural anomaly is not only related to processes in agricultural sphere but also in industrial sector. As a result of the low economic mobility of socialist firms and of the absence of market relations, the industrial development was extensive,

without significant increases of the labour

productivity.

Thus the employment transfer from the

agricultural to the industrial sector, their

extensive development and their low labour

productivity are intrinsically related with the political definition of productiorfrela- tions and course of structural economic transformation.

Suburbanization of activities

Moscow and Moscow oblast show divergent economic structures and changes (tab. 1). In Moscow the employment share in the non-industrial sphere in Moscow is growing more rapidly, whereas the share of industrial employment is decreasing. In Moscow oblast the part of transport and communication infrastructure, retail trade, administration, housing (presently less developed than in Moscow) is increasing. Some stages in the transformation of activities in the mcr's settlements may be pointed out here. The stage of industrialization and reconstruction after World War II is characterized by the swift industrial development and the active restructuration of the Moscow and Moscow oblast economy. New industries have been built (motor-car and aircraft assembly, machine-tool industry, organic synthesis, etc.), around Moscow research and production potential. Nevertheless, this restructuration is extensive, since traditional industries don't curtail production. It favours the heavy concentration of modern functions in Moscow. There is no transfer of firms outside Moscow. Suburbanization of industrial activities did not occur because of the state owning the means of production and of thé socialist form of production relations. When research and technological progress are slowing down, these firms become inefficient and spatially immobile. The period 1956-1970 is marked by an intensive development of the region scientific sphere and by the rise of « satellite » urban policy. The new centres were specialized in modern branches of machinery and research-engineering activities and were undoubtedly very attractive for the population. Therefore towns like Dubna were growing rapidly. While the aim was to redirect part of Moscow population

growth, they display a quite specific relation with the capital. For instance, Muscovites working in Pushchino cannot reach their job every day because they lack transport facilities. Nevertheless, they don't wish to move and register their passports in the city in which they actually work, since they would have to give up their Moscow registration and then lose all Moscow privileges (see further). These new centres are isolated from information sources in Moscow. Poor telephone communications, lack of computers and telex systems hamper contacts and teamwork with colleagues in the city. It seems that material resources for experimental work in research centres are not sufficient to compensate for lack of information and communications. At the same time, poor transport links with Moscow and the other towns of Moscow oblast isolate the scientists from the higher standard of culture in the centre and from a well developed social infrastructure. An original home-work relation can be observed in Dubna: the Muscovites get the second registration of passports and live there in hostel apartments during 4 or 5 working days, during the weekends they go back to Moscow, where their families are living. The change of functions in Moscow oblast towns is still going on. Inside the towns of the first circle adjacent to Moscow, the share of employment in the non-industrial sectors and transport is growing. Inside the towns of the second circle (suburban zone) these changes lead to an increasing potential of non-industrial, industrial and construction functions. Finally, in the outlying parts of the region the further grovth of construction and industrial functions is observed and the organization potential is intensifying in some towns. The mcr towns display a crawling concen-

tration of the regional most important functions and their extension outside the boundaries of Moscow to the towns of the suburban zone. But the déconcentration of functions in the mcr is not only of natural- economic character. It also results from the state urban policy. Déconcentration is not related to the search for more advantageous sites for firms and institutions as regards to economic or social relations (the availability of cheaper labour force or more comfortable living conditions, etc.), nor is it sustained by the expansion of transport and communication facilities. Thus, this déconcentration is independent from curtailment of any function in central Moscow, whose potential is still growing, and it is also completely inadequate regarding the continuing concentration of population (see below). All this, together with the slow economic and territorial mobility of firms, is an obstacle to the economic restructuration of the region, and to the reorientation of Moscow and its suburbs to non-industrial activities and to progressive scientific and informational work. The mass labour-consuming functions still remain in Moscow and its suburbs, but they are inevitably cut off from modern types of activities.

The idea of alleviating Moscow's development appeared from the very beginning of its rapid growth, since the excessive concentration of population and employment led (as in the other major world cities) to environmental discomfort, worsening of transport, strip-holding of land and other congestion signs. In market economies, the firms react to alterations of economic or social conditions by their mobility: some

of them close, other relocate in more convenient places. In the USSR, the problem of firm transfer (unhealthy or unprofitable firms) becomes unsolvable because of the special type of production relations. Economic and territorial passivity of firms is apparent in the difficulties of erecting industrial buildings and dismantling machinery and equipment, in the low turnover of the means of production. The same problem exist regarding the labour force. Firms transferred to the suburban towns of Moscow oblast are encountering great difficulties in recruiting staff in sufficient numbers and of required skill. The local labour force is rather weak, while the Moscow workers wouldn't leave the capital to follow their firm, because they are afraid of being deprived of passport registration in Moscow. From the social point of view, giving up a Moscow registration is more significant to people than losing their job. The processes going on in the mcr are therefore not quite comparable with those in the Western world. The market economy is more «lively» and replacement of functions has the character of territorial waves. Some functions disappear while new ones emerge. In the mcr, the waves are replaced by stratification. New functions do not replace the old ones, but joining them. At the same time, this process of relative déconcentration of functions overpass the process of stable concentration of population. In the mcr, the modern branches are gravitated closely to Moscow, where skilled workers are retained by their registration advantages. Suburban towns have to be satisfied with commuters or specialists from the outlying regions of the USSR.

Suburbanization of population

The urbanization structure of the region is characterized by the predominance of its main centre - Moscow. The share of the capital in the total Moscow oblast population was as follows: in 1929 - 44,3 Vo, in 1939 - 51,6 %, in 1959 - 54,9 %, in 1979 -54,5 Vo, in 1985 - 57,3 % (Moscow Capital Region, p. 137.). Within the agglomeration, the share of Moscow is still higher, in 1959 it was 75,5 % and in 1985

- 67,3 % (ibid., p. 141), whereas in the highly developed capital regions of the world the agglomeration counts one half or less of the total population and of the economic potential, the second half being concentrated in the suburbs (Gritsay, p. 71). Moreover, the growth rate of Moscow population is higher than that of Moscow oblast (tab . 2).

TABLE 2. ANNUAL RATE OF POPULATION INCREASE,

Migrations are of great importance to the mcr. The internal migration of rural population to the cities is rather substantial, and the immigration flow from the rest of the USSR is not compensated by the decrease of rural population in the mcr. The nearer a town to Moscow, the larger the migration share in its total population increase.

The dynamics of population in the mcr has a specific character. In agglomerations of the developed countries the principle of the «broken glass» summarizes the suburbanization process. When, for some reasons, the centre loses its attractiveness the urban population moves to suburbs in search of higher living standard. In Moscow agglomeration the principle of the «overfilled glass» is operating. People wanting to live in Moscow cannot enter the city and are forced to settle near it. In Moscow immigration undoubtedly prevails over emigration, confirming the extreme territorial differentiation in conditions, level and way of life. As a rule, commuting is oriented from suburbs to Moscow (600 thousand persons come to Moscow and only 200 thousand leave it), but it accounts only for 12-15 % cf the total employment in Moscow's economy. Moreover, these commuters are not Muscovites but potential new inhabitants of the capital (striving for passport registration and domicile in Moscow).

Moscow became the most attractive place for living and an intensive flow of ruined rural residents as well as residents from other regions of the country were rushing -to Moscow. These processes were generated not only by the inception of the country structural economic transformation,

but also by the policy of special privileges for Moscow. These privileges came into being after the establishment of a centralized distribution system. Such a system involves the assignment of a priority level of foodstuffs and manufactured goods to each territory. Moscow was awarded the highest priority level. From the very beginning, better living standards and higher income for certain population categories were established there. In the thirties the artificial differentiation in living standards was confirmed by imposing restrictions to passport registration in the capital, and also by the division of administrative bodies into Moscow and Moscow oblast authorities. In the period 1925-30 dozens of new large firms were located in Moscow, but housing was insufficient at that time. Therefore, a great number of migrants from every corner of the country came to get a job in Moscow and settled in cottages in the nearby countryside. Soon, these settlements in the nearby countryside. Soon, these settlements turned into urban ones. For example, towns like Mytishchi and Luberstsy developed rapidly, and even Muscovites moved there when the railways were electrified. This was clearly the outset of a suburbanization process, but it stopped as soon as the restrictions on passport registration in Moscow were imposed and the social barrier between Moscow and Moscow oblast was established. In the period 1930-40, new industrial developments were banned from Moscow and firms drawn towards the city were located on the outskirts thus causing a rapid growth of the old and new towns. Although the development of cottages as second residence near Moscow started even before the revolution, since the en-

vironmental degradation of Moscow was practically completed at that time, they became the main resorts of those years. They had flourished in the districts with privileged natural conditions and convenient transport services (not further than 2 km from a railway station). In the period 1930-40, this sprawl of leisure housing carried on - cottage settlements expanded into an entire belt of scattered one- storeyed buildings. But at the same time, urban multi-storeyed housing also increased and after World War II these multi- storeyed buildings were found in the cottage settlements of the leisure zone. In the period 1950-60 a network of gardening associations was established. In those

years the most convenient land near Moscow had already been built on. The gardening plots allotted to the Muscovites were located in the remote parts of the mcr, outside the suburban zone, and very frequently they were on improper territories. Because of their remoteness, the difficulties in cultivation and building, the lack of infrastructure, these plots cannot become effective leisure resorts. More frequently Muscovites use them for fruit and vegetable growing.

The desire of the Muscovites for having a second residence in the suburbs can be interpreted as an unfulfilled suburbanization tendency. This desire has the same, mainly environmental, causes as suburbaniza-

tion in Western countries. The cottages within the reach of Moscow's traffic and having access to appropriate infrastructure and amenities, might become the principal residence of Muscovites if passport registration is abolished. The restrictions of passport registration in Moscow fixed in the thirties were devised as an administrative solution against the effects of Moscow's unique attractiveness and not as a means of eliminating the attractiveness itself. For this reason, Moscow became even more attractive, like a forbidden fruit. The consequences were both the concentration of the upper strata of society in the city and the extensive development of industry, resulting in a growing shortage of unskilled labour.

The shortage of regular workers in Moscow is sometimes explained by the increasing number of working places. An adequate planning of the «limiters» (1) system is then put forward as the solution for controlling the growth of Moscow is found in (Glushkova, 1988, p. 43). To be frank, about twenty industrial units and more than one hundred scientific institutions were already created in the seventies alone, in spite of the industrial building ban in Moscow, only a few firms moved outside the city in return. New industrial units easily find staff, since they offer new machinery, relatively good working conditions and higher wages. New scientific and administrative institutions are in a similar position. But the situation is totally different in the old industrial units, with rundown equipment and a high level of manual tasks. Those units suffer from a staff shortage. Moreover, as in any other city, there is a social mobility in Moscow, in most cases improving - from manual up to mental, from unskilled up to highly skilled work. Furthermore, the prestige of a higher education (university) is overestimated in Moscow, whereas the prestige of the manual professions has declined as a result of the stagnation of reinvestments in industry, the high share of manual labour (40 %), and also favouritism and

crowding in the administrative staffs. The attractiveness of an upper class position is therefore overestimated, and social mobility activated. Since Moscow cannot admit free «immigrants» the lower strata of the social structure are vacant and there appears a shortage of unskilled labour force. The lower strata of the social structure were filled in with « limiters ». Available employment in Moscow was not the cause of an organized immigration flow, but represented the only possible way to register the passport there. Roughly half of these people drawn into Moscow's economy left their jobs. «Limiters» get the right to register their passports in Moscow and take up their residence in new houses when their contract expires. They usually quit their job as soon as possible in search of better working conditions (Glushkova, 1988, p. 42). The nature of unskilled work in Moscow and the associated working conditions are so unattractive that it is nearly impossible to find Muscovites willing to perform them.

The institution of passport registration raised many problems. Thus the « limiters » are recruited in social groups not needing most of the advantages of a large city, their psychology and value system differ sharply from native Muscovites. The direct environment of the hostels where «limiters » live, has a pronounced criminal character. Fictitious marriage in order to register the passport in Moscow has become a widespread practice.

Moscow's environmental problems can hardly be solved as long as passport registration exists. The population is literally locked up within the city boundaries. Notwithstanding the environmental stresses, the Moscow privileges prevent the Muscovites from leaving the city. The urban districts not saturated with harmful industrial units are the most prestigious. The social and economic causes of Moscow's extensive growth reveal that its problems are a reflection of the ones facing the USSR. The concentration of economic, social and management functions in Mos-

cow in Soviet times materializes the strong centralism of the particraty and weighs down on the city's development. Low labour efficiency in agriculture and sheer desolation of villages on the one hand, rapid but extensive industrialisation together with forced increasing social attraction of Moscow, confirmed by the restrictions on passport registration, on the other hand, were the key factors of the mcr's polarization during decades. Together with objective factors found in other large cities of the world, subjective factors related to the Soviet political and economic system influence Moscow's growth.

The objective factors are as follows: the diversity of employment in the capital, the emergence of new types of occupations, the concentration of high-skilled and creative labour, the higher living standards, the large educational and cultural opportunities.

The subjective factors are the higher supply level of foodstuff and manufactured goods different than in other regions (the existence of meat-rationing system in many regions of the country and its absence in Moscow establishes a significant threshold not only in terms of supply but also in the outlook of the population); the lack of communications and individual motorized transport (in the rsfsr one counts 47 cars per 1000 urban inhabitants against 560 in the USA) (Argumenty i facty, 1988, N47, p. 2); the craving for joining the upper social classes and for accessing neighbourhoods with a high quality of life; unjustified promotion of upward social mobility releasing «the ground floors» of Moscow's economy; continued growth of employment due to the extensive economic development and the low economic and territorial mobility of firms. Today, the hierarchy of priorities for selecting a residence within the mcr and the whole country is as follows. Food supply comes first. The supply of manufactured

goods, the opportunities to obtain better and larger living quarters and to accede to a prestigious employment with a wage increase, social promotion, well developed consumer services come next. And only at the end of the scale appears the opportunity to fulfil cultural needs and education. Thus, there is a process of «pseudo- urbanization» characteristic of the Soviet economic and social system, superimposed on the process of «natural» urbanization. By natural urbanization we mean the process related to economic development and to the natural difference between rural and urban ways of life. The specificity, the structural changes and the hierarchy of city functions shape the migration flows conditioned by natural urbanization. «Pseudo-urbanization» points to «the scum» of the process, that may complete the economic and socially conditioned urbanization. The «pseudo-urbanization» is generated by a disproportionate development of the country's economic structure (hypertrophie share of industry; economic and political reforms have triggered off a massive flow of the peasantry towards the cities, related not with the rising but with the lowering of labour efficiency in agriculture, with impoverishment of the countryside and hence with the urge towards the centres of relative well-being), and by the territorial inequalities in standards of living, artificially created and maintained by the institution of passports and registration.

The suburbanization of population cannot be observed in the MCR. The centripetal tendencies mentioned above resulted in rapid growth of Moscow and its suburbs, as well as in some stagnation of its periphery. Thus Moscow agglomeration is now in the first stage of development, the stage of «crawling» concentration where centrifugal forces are very weak. This situation will last as long as the barrier in terms of standards of living exists between Moscow and Moscow oblast.

Conclusions

This study has reaffirmed the general lack of suburbanization in the Soviet cities. Some signs of suburbanization like the

transfer of some activities from Moscow to the suburbs, the concentration of population in towns and villages near the central

city and commuting, differ significantly pie and firms will emancipate, only if the from the Western cities. The process of ur- existing political and economic system in banization will take its normal course, peo- the USSR is dismantled.

Argumenty i facty, 1988, N47, p. 2 Argumenty i facty, 1988, N50, p. 3

GLUSHKOVA V.G. Questions of Interrelated Settlement in Moscow and the Moscow Region, Problems of Geography, vol. 131, Moscow, 1988, pp. 40-56.

GRITSAY O.V. Western Europe : Regional Contrasts at the New Stage of Scientific-Technological Progress, Moscow, 1988, 148 p.

Moscow in Figures. 1980, Moscow, 1981, 220 p. Moscow in Figures. 1985, Moscow, 1986, 240 p.

National Economy of Moscow Oblast. 1981-1985, Moscow, 1986, 271 p.

National Economy of the ussr. 1985, Moscow, 1986, 421 p. Yearbook of Labour Statistics. 1987, Geneva, 1987, 960 p.

Moscow Capital Region: Territorial Structure and Natural Environment, Moscow, 1988, 321 p.

(1) Limiters are unskilled workers, hired in an organised way by Moscow firms; after working there for several years of working they get the right to register

their passports and to take up their residence in Moscow.

The American Labor Market: Fact vs. Fiction

When we consider markets, we typically think of commerce - the buying and selling of goods and services, international trade, investing, supply and demand. Markets are the backbone of our economy. Almost everything has a market - food, medical care, toys, films and entertainment, weapons, drugs, stocks. But there is one market that surpasses them all in importance, without which no other market could exist - the labor market.

Labor is crucial for commerce. Without people to produce goods and services, commerce would cease to exist. Businesses rely on labor to function, creating a demand similar to that of material goods and services. In other words, the labor market is the foundation on which all other markets depend.

In an age where everyone feels the need to have an opinion on just about everything, many people consider themselves “economic experts.” However, when everyone has an opinion on a complex issue, most of those opinions are bound to be wrong. Economics is a prime example of this, filled with false consensuses. With that in mind, let’s go ahead and debunk some common myths about the history of the American labor market, from the Industrial Revolution to the present.

When examining the history of America’s labor market, we must set ideology aside. Certain truths can be inconvenient when they contradict deeply held beliefs. Economics and politics are so intertwined that stating an objectively factual statement can lead to derision depending on the company one keeps. Contemporary Western society collectively holds onto many dogmas and assumptions that are patently incorrect.

One area of contention is the Industrial Revolution and the Gilded Age, often subject to criticism regarding the relationship between industry and climate change, income inequality, exploitation, and corruption by capitalism’s so-called excesses. Another common talking point is that the workforce suffered greatly from the Industrial Revolution , and it was only through the rise of unions that the labor market diversified , living standards improved , and the labor market thrived. However, none of these statements are true, as Nobel Prize-winning economist F. A. Hayek discusses in his 1954 book Capitalism and the Historians .

Hayek sets the record straight regarding the effects of the so-called “Robber Barons” on American labor markets during the Gilded Age. Many contemporary historians argue that wealthy industrialists exploited the poor through industrial centralization, forcing urban workers to work for multimillion-dollar corporations that were intent on exploiting their labor (false claims that we often find in many modern classroom textbooks). They also claim that these corporations coerced rural populations to move to crowded, polluted cities for work, leaving them worse off. However, Hayek reveals that this is far from the truth . While the consolidation of industry did lead to spikes in the labor market and increased productivity, there is no correlation between this and corporate exploitation.

The Industrial Revolution did not result in the poor getting poorer and the rich getting richer due to “capitalist oppression”. In fact, the generation of wealth was a result of a symbiotic relationship between the emerging industrial labor market and innovative industrialists. While the industrialists did become richer at a faster rate than the average laborer, unskilled workers also experienced significant increases in wealth due to the industrial economy .

The mass exodus of poor rural farmers to urban industrial centers was voluntary. Life in the countryside was more difficult and dangerous compared to urban life. The growing labor markets in major cities attracted rural folk, as there was a rise in demand for unskilled laborers. These workers were often taken care of by the firms that employed them .

New technological breakthroughs led to an increase in consumer demand and mass production. This incentivized the capitalist class to hire new workers on a large scale. Working for these firms provided financial security that exceeded what the rural poor had access to. Thus, the expanding labor demand offered liberation from the hardships of rural living. Long story short, the reality of the situation is that the captains of industry and the ordinary bourgeoisie were responsible for laying the foundations for the diverse job market we have today.

While labor unions played a minor role in improving working conditions and the wellbeing of workers, the impact of private industry far outweighed that of the labor movement. Early labor unions were generally hostile towards the growth of the industrial labor market and implemented barriers of entry to protect their own interests, discriminating particularly on the basis of race and religion. Labor unions were reactionary in nature, a backlash against the progress of the Industrial Age. For example, organized labor largely opposed technological innovations that would ultimately benefit both worker safety and economic productivity. The policies they pushed for reduced the real wages of their members. They initially opposed concepts like the five-day workweek and company benefits, wanting to control the conditions themselves, as well as restrict the labor supply.

Workplace conditions and benefits improved before unions actively endorsed them. The labor laws passed by Congress in the first half of the 20th century had little impact, as many private businesses had already banned exploitative practices. Businesses recognized that treating employees well led to increased productivity and economic growth. This resulted in higher employment rates and a rise in the net-wealth of American citizens. For example , Henry Ford decreased hours, doubled wages, and began providing various employee benefits nearly a decade before Congress passed legislation requiring such.

F.A. Hayek and his fellow Austrian Economists present a more accurate picture of the consequences of the Industrial Revolution and the individuals, movements, ideas, and innovations that emerged from it. Their valuable insights provide a far more accurate understanding in contrast to most mainstream contemporary and modern economic historians.

The Mises Institute is a non-profit organization that exists to promote teaching and research in the Austrian School of economics, individual freedom, honest history, and international peace, in the tradition of Ludwig von Mises and Murray N. Rothbard. 

Non-political, non-partisan, and non-PC, we advocate a radical shift in the intellectual climate, away from statism and toward a private property order. We believe that our foundational ideas are of permanent value, and oppose all efforts at compromise, sellout, and amalgamation of these ideas with fashionable political, cultural, and social doctrines inimical to their spirit.

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New DPRU working paper: "Watts happening to work? The labour market effects of South Africa´s electricity crisis"

Authored by Haroon Bhorat and Timothy Köhler,  DPRU Working Paper 202401 considers the labour market effects of ongoing power outages (loadshedding) in South Africa.

This study contributes to this relatively sparse literature in the context of South Africa, a middle-income country characterized by extreme unemployment and systemic power supply issues referred to as load shedding, which have increased in incidence and intensity in recent years. The authors merge labour force survey data with macroeconomic data and high-frequency electricity production and consumption data from 2008 to 2023 and exploit temporal variation in the incidence and intensity of outages to estimate average and heterogenous associations with employment, working hours, hourly wages, and monthly earnings.

Making use of multiple measures of load shedding, the authors analyse four outcomes in particular on both the extensive and intensive margins: employment, working hours, hourly wages, and monthly earnings. They estimate associations on average and additionally consider heterogeneity by outage intensity, firm size, and industry. Their results show that there is a significant, negative relationship between these outages and employment, working hours, and monthly earnings. A null association with hourly wages suggests the monthly earning reductions are driven by working hour reductions. All these associations are, however, not evident for low levels of load shedding but tend to significantly increase with load shedding intensity.

This study was supported by the United Nations University – World Institute for Development Economics Research (UNU-WIDER) as part of the Southern Africa - Towards Inclusive Economic Development (SA-TIED) programme. This study is reproduced here from the original WIDER working paper 2024/20 and SATIED working paper 227 with full acknowledgement of UNU-WIDER, Helsinki.

Read the paper in full here:

DPRU WP 202401

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Anti-semitic attitudes of the mass public: estimates and explanations based on a survey of the moscow oblast.

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JAMES L. GIBSON, RAYMOND M. DUCH, ANTI-SEMITIC ATTITUDES OF THE MASS PUBLIC: ESTIMATES AND EXPLANATIONS BASED ON A SURVEY OF THE MOSCOW OBLAST, Public Opinion Quarterly , Volume 56, Issue 1, SPRING 1992, Pages 1–28, https://doi.org/10.1086/269293

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In this article we examine anti-Semitism as expressed by a sample of residents of the Moscow Oblast (Soviet Union). Based on a survey conducted in 1920, we begin by describing anti-Jewish prejudice and support for official discrimination against Jews. We discover a surprisingly low level of expressed anti-Semitism among these Soviet respondents and virtually no support for state policies that discriminate against Jews. At the same time, many of the conventional hypotheses predicting anti-Semitism are supported in the Soviet case. Anti-Semitism is concentrated among those with lower levels of education, those whose personal financial condition is deteriorating, and those who oppose further democratization of the Soviet Union. We do not take these findings as evidence that anti-Semitism is a trivial problem in the Soviet Union but, rather, suggest that efforts to combat anti-Jewish movements would likely receive considerable support from ordinary Soviet people.

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US labor market poised for sharp pullback

• Dow and S&P slightly green, Nasdaq slips
• Financials lead S&P sector gainers; Cons Disc weakest group
• Dollar ~flat; gold gain; crude falls; bitcoin down >2%
• U.S. 10-Year Treasury yield rises to ~4.50%

US LABOR MARKET POISED FOR SHARP PULLBACK

Signs are building that the U.S employment market is on track for a sharp weakening, according to the latest research note from Citi, led by U.S. economist Veronica Clark. The devil is in the small details.

While payrolls job growth from the establishment survey has been solid, other labor market indicators are flashing warning signals, Citi says.

The bank cites the decline in the hiring rate in the JOLTS survey, which has fallen to 2014-15 levels. This level of hiring, Citi says, can be consistent with still-rising employment, but the downward trend is a cause for concern.

"Lack of hiring alongside a falling quit rate would suggest much less labor market churn than usual," Citi writes. "A benign explanation could be that this simply reflects a natural pullback after the period of high labor market churn over the last few years and is just a symptom of labor market normalization."

Survey measures also show weaker hiring plans and outlook, the bank says, pointing to the NFIB survey of small businesses' plans to increase employment. This has been consistently lower and, like the hiring rate, has fallen to levels last seen around 2015.

The Conference Board's labor market differential, however, still indicates that more consumers view jobs as abundant than hard to get, but this gap has narrowed. Citi says this scenario usually happens before a sharper fall during mid-recession.

Also, the more leading details within the establishment payrolls survey have looked less positive over the last year. Temporary help employment has slid below pre-pandemic levels and is still falling, though at a slower pace. Average hours worked fell to 34.3 hours in April from 34.4 in March, which is at the lower end of the range of normal hours worked.

"Mixed, noisy data means there is no completely reliable rule that can predict when the job market will crack," according to the Citi note.

"But there is a stable pattern where gradual softening in a variety of indicators is followed by a nonlinear rise in the unemployment rate and some version of that seems to be repeating in the current data."

(Gertrude Chavez-Dreyfuss)

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