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• 1 March, 2024

Introduction to Kodak’s Downfall

The rise and fall of Kodak, once a powerhouse in the photography industry, serves as a cautionary tale of how a lack of adaptation and innovation can lead to the downfall of even the most dominant players. In this section, we will explore Kodak’s rise to dominance and its subsequent struggles during the digital revolution.

Kodak’s Rise and Dominance

Kodak’s journey began with its founding in 1888, when it introduced the first flexible roll film, revolutionizing the photography industry. Over the years, Kodak became synonymous with photography, establishing itself as a leader in the film market. By the early 20th century, Kodak had a firm grip on the industry, with a strong brand presence and a wide range of popular consumer products.

Kodak’s dominance reached its peak in the 1970s and 1980s when they introduced the world’s first digital camera in 1975, demonstrating their early investments in digital technology. At that time, Kodak held a staggering 90% market share of the US film industry and ranked among the top five most valuable brands in the country.

The Digital Revolution and Kodak’s Hesitation

Despite their early foray into digital photography, Kodak’s downfall began with their reluctance to disrupt their traditional film-based business model, which had been their core revenue stream for decades. This hesitation stemmed from a fear of cannibalizing their profitable film business ( Forbes ).

As the digital revolution gained momentum in the photography industry, Kodak failed to fully embrace the rapid advancements in digital technology. They were slow to recognize the transformative potential of digital photography and the changing preferences of consumers. While Kodak had the technology and expertise to lead the digital era, they struggled to effectively manage the digital transition within their core film business.

By the time Kodak realized the significance of the digital revolution, it was already too late. They filed for Chapter 11 bankruptcy in January 2012, having missed the digital wave and failed to adapt quickly enough to the changing market trends ( Forbes ). The failure to embrace technological advancements and their hesitation to disrupt their existing business ultimately led to Kodak’s downfall.

In the following sections, we will explore the various factors that contributed to Kodak’s failure, their flawed business model, and the lessons that can be learned from their experience. We will also delve into the impact of the digital era on Kodak, including the rise of competitors in the digital photography market and the disruptive influence of smartphones and social media.

Factors Contributing to Kodak’s Failure

Kodak’s decline and eventual failure can be attributed to several factors that hindered their ability to adapt to the changing landscape of the photography industry. These factors include their reluctance to disrupt the film business, missed opportunities in digital photography, and a lack of strategic foresight and innovation.

Reluctance to Disrupt the Film Business

One of the significant factors contributing to Kodak’s downfall was their reluctance to disrupt their core business of film photography. At the height of their power, Kodak had the opportunity to embrace digital photography, which they themselves had pioneered in the 1970s and 1980s. However, they hesitated to fully transition to digital, fearing the cannibalization of their lucrative film business Forbes .

Their unwillingness to disrupt their traditional film-based business model prevented them from fully capitalizing on the digital revolution, ultimately leading to their decline. By the time Kodak decided to shift their focus to digital photography, it was already too late, and they had missed the wave of technological advancements Forbes .

Missed Opportunities in Digital Photography

Despite their early investments in digital technology and being the inventors of the digital camera in 1975, Kodak failed to effectively manage the digital transition within their core film business Harvard Business Review . While they had a strong foundation in digital imaging technology, Kodak failed to fully leverage this advantage due to their focus on protecting their film-based business Forbes .

Kodak’s inability to capitalize on the digital photography technology they themselves had invented in the earlier decades prevented them from staying ahead of their competitors Harvard Business Review . This lack of agility and foresight played a significant role in their failure.

Lack of Strategic Foresight and Innovation

The lack of strategic foresight and innovation within Kodak was another critical factor contributing to their downfall. Despite being pioneers in digital photography, Kodak’s leadership focused more on preserving their traditional film-based business model rather than embracing the digital revolution Harvard Business Review .

Their failure to adapt to changing market dynamics and consumer preferences demonstrated a lack of strategic vision. Kodak’s leadership was slow to respond to the shifting industry trends and failed to recognize the importance of embracing technological advancements and evolving their business accordingly Harvard Business Review .

In summary, Kodak’s reluctance to disrupt their film business, missed opportunities in digital photography, and lack of strategic foresight and innovation played significant roles in their failure. These factors serve as lessons for companies in understanding the importance of adaptation, embracing technological advancements, and avoiding complacency in order to thrive in rapidly evolving industries.

Kodak’s Failed Business Model

As we analyze the reasons behind Kodak’s downfall, it becomes evident that their business model played a significant role. Two key aspects of their business model, namely the “Razor and Blades” strategy and overdependence on film sales, ultimately contributed to their failure in the digital era.

The “Razor and Blades” Strategy

Kodak’s business model was built upon the “Razor and Blades” strategy, a commonly used model in which a company sells a primary product at a low cost or even at a loss, while generating recurring revenue from complementary products or services. In Kodak’s case, they sold cameras at affordable prices, but their real profits came from film sales. This approach fostered customer loyalty and created recurring revenue streams, establishing Kodak as a household name synonymous with photography ( Medium ).

While this strategy initially worked well for Kodak, it became a liability in the digital age. As digital photography gained popularity, the demand for film declined rapidly. Kodak’s reliance on film sales left them vulnerable to the disruptive forces of digital technology. Competitors who embraced digital advancements, such as Sony and Canon, were able to capture market share and outpace Kodak’s growth. The company failed to adapt its business model to the changing market dynamics, leading to its downfall.

Overdependence on Film Sales

Another critical factor in Kodak’s failed business model was their overdependence on film sales. Despite the decreasing manufacturing costs of film, Kodak maintained high prices, which alienated cost-conscious consumers. This pricing strategy, coupled with the emergence of lower-priced alternatives in the market, allowed competitors to gain traction and erode Kodak’s market share. By failing to adjust their pricing strategy to align with market realities, Kodak missed out on opportunities to remain competitive in the evolving photography industry ( Medium ).

Furthermore, Kodak’s overreliance on film sales prevented them from fully embracing digital technology. Despite developing one of the first digital cameras in 1975, the company hesitated to fully transition to digital solutions. Kodak’s deeply rooted film culture and their initial success in the film industry made it challenging for them to shift gears and fully embrace the digital revolution in the photography industry. This hesitation proved to be a critical mistake, as competitors capitalized on digital advancements, while Kodak struggled to catch up, ultimately leading to their downfall.

In conclusion, Kodak’s failed business model, characterized by the “Razor and Blades” strategy and overdependence on film sales, prevented them from adapting to the digital era. Their reluctance to disrupt their successful film business, missed opportunities in digital photography, and lack of strategic foresight and innovation all contributed to their downfall. The lessons learned from Kodak’s failure emphasize the importance of adaptation, innovation, and the need to embrace technological advancements in order to stay relevant in a rapidly evolving market.

Lessons Learned from Kodak’s Downfall

The downfall of Kodak serves as a valuable case study, highlighting several important lessons for businesses in a rapidly evolving market. By examining their mistakes, we can gain insights into the importance of adaptation, innovation, and avoiding complacency.

Importance of Adaptation and Innovation

One of the key lessons from Kodak’s downfall is the critical role of adaptation and innovation in staying relevant. Despite inventing digital photography technology in the 1970s and 1980s, Kodak failed to effectively capitalize on this breakthrough due to their focus on protecting their existing film-based business. Kodak’s reluctance to take risks and move away from their comfort zone ultimately led to their decline ( Forbes ). This highlights the need for businesses to continuously adapt to changing market dynamics and embrace technological advancements to stay competitive ( Harvard Business Review ).

Embracing Technological Advancements

Kodak’s failure to embrace and leverage disruptive new technologies, such as digital cameras, contributed to their downfall. They kept their innovation hush-hush, hoping to protect their film business, but this strategy ultimately backfired as other companies surged forward in the digital camera market. Kodak’s story emphasizes the importance of staying ahead of the curve by proactively embracing technological advancements. Companies must be willing to explore new technologies, invest in research and development, and adapt their business models accordingly.

Avoiding Complacency and Protecting Core Business

Another crucial lesson from Kodak’s downfall is the danger of complacency and the need to protect the core business. Kodak’s leadership focused heavily on preserving their traditional film-based business model, even as the digital revolution gained momentum in the photography industry. This lack of strategic foresight and failure to adapt to market changes contributed significantly to their failure ( Harvard Business Review ). Kodak’s diversification into unrelated ventures further fragmented their portfolio, diverting attention and resources away from their core business ( LinkedIn ). Companies should strike a balance between exploring new opportunities and protecting the core business that sustains them, ensuring that innovation and diversification align with their core competencies and strategic goals.

By learning from Kodak’s mistakes, businesses can develop a proactive approach towards innovation, adapt to market changes, and nurture a culture of continuous improvement. Embracing technological advancements, staying agile, and avoiding complacency are key strategies for long-term success in today’s rapidly evolving business landscape.

Impact of the Digital Era on Kodak

The rise of the digital era had a profound impact on Kodak, ultimately contributing to the company’s downfall. As digital technology advanced, competitors seized the opportunity to capitalize on the digital photography market, leaving Kodak struggling to keep up. In this section, we will explore two key aspects of the digital era’s impact on Kodak: the rise of competitors in the digital photography market and the disruption caused by smartphones and social media.

Rise of Competitors in the Digital Photography Market

Kodak’s failure to recognize the transformative impact of digital technology allowed competitors to gain a significant foothold in the digital photography market. While Kodak was a pioneer in digital imaging technology, they underestimated the speed and scale of the digital revolution. Competitors such as Sony, Canon, and Fujifilm quickly seized the opportunity and released their own digital cameras, capitalizing on the growing demand for digital photography.

By the time Kodak realized the importance of digital photography, they had already fallen behind their competitors. Their hesitation to aggressively promote their digital cameras, fearing that it would cannibalize their film business, allowed other companies to forge ahead and establish themselves as leaders in the digital photography market. Kodak became a follower in a market it had once pioneered, and their competitors surpassed them in terms of innovation and market share ( LinkedIn ).

Disruption from Smartphones and Social Media

In addition to facing competition from traditional camera manufacturers, Kodak also faced disruption from the rapid proliferation of smartphones and the rise of social media platforms. The convenience and accessibility of smartphone photography, coupled with the ability to instantly share photos on platforms like Facebook and Instagram, changed the way people captured and shared moments.

Kodak failed to adapt their business model to this new reality, and their traditional camera and film products became less relevant in the age of smartphones. The ease of capturing high-quality photos with smartphones, along with the instant sharing capabilities, made standalone digital cameras less appealing to consumers. Kodak’s late entry into the smartphone market with their own device, the Kodak Ektra, was not able to reverse their fortunes. The disruption caused by smartphones and social media further marginalized Kodak, leading to a decline in their market presence and financial performance ( Medium ).

The impact of the digital era on Kodak serves as a cautionary tale for companies in any industry. It highlights the importance of embracing technological advancements, being agile and adaptable, and understanding the evolving needs and preferences of consumers. Failure to do so can result in being left behind and losing market relevance, as Kodak experienced in the face of digital disruption.

Kodak’s downfall can be attributed to several factors, including their failed business model. In this section, we will explore two key aspects of their business model that contributed to their decline: the “Razor and Blades” strategy and overdependence on film sales.

Kodak’s traditional business model, often referred to as the “Razor and Blades” strategy, revolved around selling cameras at low prices, while making significant profits from the ongoing sales of film and other consumables. This model worked well for them during the era of film-based photography, as consumers needed to continuously purchase film rolls to capture and develop their photos.

While this strategy was successful for many years, the rise of digital photography disrupted the market. Kodak failed to adapt and transition their business model to align with the changing landscape. As a result, they missed out on the opportunity to capitalize on the digital revolution and the shift towards digital cameras and storage media.

Another major factor in Kodak’s downfall was their overdependence on film sales. As the digital era emerged, film-based photography started to decline rapidly. Instead of recognizing the long-term impact of this shift and investing in digital technology, Kodak continued to prioritize and protect their film-based business.

Kodak’s reluctance to invest in digital photography and their failure to quickly adapt to the changing market dynamics led to missed opportunities. Despite inventing the digital camera in the 1970s and 1980s, Kodak did not fully leverage this technology to stay ahead of their competitors. They were slow to introduce digital cameras to the market and were outpaced by companies that embraced the digital revolution.

By clinging to their film-based business and underestimating the potential of digital photography, Kodak’s revenue and market share declined significantly. This overreliance on a declining product ultimately led to their downfall.

Understanding the failure of Kodak’s business model highlights the importance of adaptability, innovation, and the ability to foresee industry shifts. Companies must be willing to evolve and invest in new technologies to stay relevant and competitive in a rapidly changing market.

To explore further insights on Kodak’s downfall, you can refer to our article on Kodak SWOT analysis and Kodak competitive analysis .

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Kodak’s Downfall Wasn’t About Technology

• Scott D. Anthony

What it missed was the business model.

A generation ago, a “Kodak moment” meant something that was worth saving and savoring. Today, the term increasingly serves as a corporate bogeyman that warns executives of the need to stand up and respond when disruptive developments encroach on their market. Unfortunately, as time marches on the subtleties of what actually happened to Eastman Kodak are being forgotten, leading executives to draw the wrong conclusions from its struggles.

• Scott D. Anthony is a clinical professor at Dartmouth College’s Tuck School of Business, a senior partner at Innosight , and the lead author of Eat, Sleep, Innovate (2020) and Dual Transformation (2017). ScottDAnthony

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Why Did Kodak Fail? | Kodak Bankruptcy Case Study

Yash Taneja

Kodak, as we know it today, was founded in the year 1888 by George Eastman as ‘The Eastman Kodak Company’ . It was the most famous name in the world of photography and videography in the 20th century. Kodak brought about a revolution in the photography and videography industries. At the time when only huge companies could access the cameras used for recording movies, Kodak enabled the availability of cameras to every household by producing equipment that was portable and affordable.

Kodak was the most dominant company in its field for almost the entire 20th century, but a series of wrong decisions killed its success. The company declared itself bankrupt in 2012. Why did Kodak, the king of photography and videography, go bankrupt? What was the reason behind Kodak's failure? Why did Kodak fail despite being the biggest name of its time? This case study answers the same.

Why Did Kodak Fail? Biggest Reason Of Kodak's Failure - Fights against Fuji Films Kodak's Bankruptcy Protection Ressurection of Kodak: Kodak in the mobile industry?

Why Did Kodak Fail?

Kodak, for many years, enjoyed unmatched success all over the world. By 1968, it had captured about 80% of the global market share in the field of photography.

Kodak adopted the 'razor and blades' business plan . The idea behind the razor-blade business plan is to first sell the razors with a small margin of profit. After buying the razor, the customers will have to purchase the consumables (the razor blades in this case) again and again; hence, sell the blades at a high-profit margin. Kodak's plan was to sell cameras at affordable prices with only a small margin for profit and then sell the consumables such as films, printing sheets, and other accessories at a high-profit margin .

Using this business model, Kodak was able to generate massive revenues and turned into a money-making machine.

As technology progressed, the use of films and printing sheets gradually came to a halt. This was due to the invention of digital cameras in 1975. However, Kodak dismissed the capabilities of the digital camera and refused to do something about it. Did you know that the inventor of the digital camera, Steven Sasson, was an electrical engineer at Kodak when he developed the technology? When Steven told the bosses at Kodak about his invention, their response was, “That’s cute, but don’t tell anyone about it. That's how you shoot yourself in the foot!"

Kodak ignored digital cameras because the business of films and paper was very profitable at that time and if these items were no longer required for photography, Kodak would be subjected to huge losses and end up closing down the factories which manufactured these items.

The idea was then implemented on a large scale by a Japanese company by the name of ‘Fuji Films’. And soon enough, many other companies started the production and sales of digital cameras, leaving Kodak way behind in the race.

This was Kodak's first mistake. The ignorance of new technology and not adapting to the changing market dynamics initiated Kodak's downfall.

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Biggest Cause Of Kodak's Failure

After the digital camera became popular, Kodak spent almost 10 years arguing with Fuji Films , its biggest competitor, that the process of viewing an image captured by the digital camera was a typical process and people loved the touch and feel of a printed image. Kodak believed that the citizens of the United States of America would always choose it over Fuji Films, a foreign company.

Fuji Films and many other companies focused on gaining a foothold in the photography & videography segment rather than engaging in a verbal spat with Kodak. And once again, Kodak wasted time promoting the use of film cameras instead of emulating its competitors. It completely ignored the feedback from the media and the market . Kodak tried to convince people that film cameras were better than digital cameras and lost 10 valuable years in the process.

Kodak also lost the external funding it had during that time. People also realized that digital photography was way ahead of traditional film photography. It was cheaper than film photography and the image quality was better.

Around that time, a magazine stated that Kodak was being left behind because it was turning a blind spot to new technology. The marketing team at Kodak tried to convince the managers about the change needed in the company's core principles to achieve success. But Kodak's management committee continued to stick with its outdated idea of relying on film cameras and claimed the reporter who said the statement in the magazine did not have the knowledge to back his proposition.

Kodak failed to realize that its strategy which was effective at one point was now depriving it of success. Rapidly changing technology and market needs negated the strategy. Kodak invested its funds in acquiring many small companies, depleting the money it could have used to promote the sales of digital cameras.

When Kodak finally understood and started the sales and the production of digital cameras, it was too late. Many big companies had already established themselves in the market by then and Kodak couldn't keep pace with the big shots.

In the year 2004, Kodak finally announced it would stop the sales of traditional film cameras. This decision made around 15,000 employees (about one-fifth of the company’s workforce at that time) redundant. Before the start of the year 2011, Kodak lost its place on the S&P 500 index which lists the 500 largest companies in the United States on the basis of stock performance. In September 2011, the stock prices of Kodak hit an all-time low of $0.54 per share. The shares lost more than 50% of their value throughout that year.

Kodak's Bankruptcy Protection

By January 2012, Kodak had used up all of its resources and cash reserves. On the 19th of January in 2012, Kodak filed for Chapter 11 bankruptcy protection which resulted in the reorganization of the company. Kodak was provided with $950 million on an 18-month credit facility by the CITI group.

The credit enabled Kodak to continue functioning. To generate more revenue, some sections of Kodak were sold to other companies. Along with this, Kodak decided to stop the production and sales of digital cameras and stepped out of the world of digital photography. It shifted to the sale of camera accessories and the printing of photos.

Kodak had to sell many of its patents, including its digital imaging patents, which amounted to more than $500 million in bankruptcy protection. In September 2013, Kodak announced it had emerged from Chapter 11 bankruptcy protection.

Ressurection of Kodak: Kodak in the mobile industry?

Celebrated camera accessory manufacturers of yesteryear, Kodak, is looking to join Chinese smartphone manufacturing giant Oppo for an upcoming flagship smartphone. This new smartphone is rumored to have 50MP dual cameras, where the cameras of the device will be modeled upon the old classic camera designs of the Kodak models.

The all-new flagship model of Oppo is designed to be a tribute to the classic Kodak camera design. The camera of this Oppo model will allegedly use the Sony IMX766 50MP sensor. Furthermore, the phone will also embed a large sensor in its ultrawide camera as well along with a 13MP telephoto lens and a 3MP microscope camera.

No other information on this matter is currently available as of September 13, 2021.

The collaborations between Android OEMs and camera makers are not something new. Yes, numerous other companies have already come together with other camera manufacturing companies like Nokia, which joined hands with German optics company Carl Zeiss earlier in 2007 to bring in the camera phone Nokia N95. This can be concluded as the first of such collaborations that the smartphone industry has seen. Numerous other collaborations happened eventually, which resulted in outstanding results. OnePlus' partnership with Hasselblad, Huawei pairing up with Leica and the recent news of Samsung's associating with Olympus are some of the significant collaborations to be mentioned.

Kodak had earlier made a leap into the smart TV industry and is ushering in success through this new move. Kodak TV India has already commissioned a plant in Hapur, Uttar Pradesh in August 2020, designed to manufacture affordable Android smart TVs for India. Furthermore, the renowned photography company is looking to invest more than Rs 500 crores during the next 3 years for making a fully automated TV manufacturing plant possible in Hapur. The company committed to this plan as part of its ‘Make in India’ initiative and will leverage its Android certification. Kodak's announcement, as it seemed, was further recharged with the Aatmanirbhar Bharat campaign launched by PM Narendra Modi in the wake of the coronavirus pandemic in 2020.

The TV industry of India imports most of its raw materials and exhibits a value addition of only about 10-12%. However, with the investment that Kodak has promised the company has aimed to increase the value-added to around 50-60%. The Hapur R&D facility will foster the manufacturing of technology-driven products and introduce numerous other lines of manufacturing aligned with the "Make in India" belief.

Super Plastronics Pvt Ltd, a Noida-based company has obtained the license from Kodak Smart TVs to produce and sell their products in India in partnership with the New-York based company and has already launched a range of smart TVs already, as of September 2021 including:

• Kodak 40FHDX7XPRO 40-inch Full HD Smart LED TV
• Kodak 43FHDX7XPRO 43-inch Full HD Smart LED TV
• Kodak 42FHDX7XPRO 42-inch Full HD Smart LED TV
• Kodak 32HDXSMART 32-inch HD ready Smart LED TV

and more. Besides, Kodak HD LED TVs were also up for sale at the lowest prices for 2020, in partnership with Flipkart and Amazon for The Big Billion Days Sale and the Great Indian Sale respectively. This sale, which took place between 16th and 21st October 2020, also included the all-new Android 7XPRO series, which starts at Rs 10999 only and is currently dubbed as the most affordable android tv in India.

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What happened to Kodak?

Kodak was ousted from the market of camera and photography due to numerous missteps. Here are some insights into the same:

• The ignorance of new technology and not adapting to changing market needs initiated Kodak's downfall
• Kodak invested its funds in acquiring many small companies, depleting the money it could have used to promote the sales of digital cameras.
• Kodak wasted time promoting the use of film cameras instead of emulating its competitors. It completely ignored the feedback from the media and the market
• When Kodak finally understood and started the sales and the production of digital cameras, it was too late. Many big companies had already established themselves in the market by then and Kodak couldn't keep pace with the big shots
• In September 2011, the stock prices of Kodak hit an all-time low of $0.54 per share
• Kodak declared bankruptcy in 2012

Why did Kodak fail and what can you learn from its demise?

Kodak failed to understand that its strategy of banking on traditional film cameras (which was effective at one point) was now depriving the company of success. Rapidly changing technology and evolving market needs made the strategy obsolete.

Is Kodak still in Business?

Kodak declared itself bankrupt in 2012. Kodak's bankruptcy resulted in the formation of the Kodak Alaris company, a British organization that part-owns the Kodak brand along with the American Eastman Kodak Company.

When did Kodak go out of business?

Kodak faced its demise in 2012.

Is Kodak a good camera?

Kodak's cameras and accessories were of premium quality and the first of the choices professional photographers and others. The company was a winner in the analogue era of photography. However, the company dived down to hit the rock-bottom level.  

What does Kodak do now?

Currently, Kodak provides packaging, functional printing, graphic communications, and professional services for businesses around the world. Better known for making cameras, Kodak moved into drug making and has secured a $765m (£592m) loan from the US government in 2020.

Why was Kodak so successful?

Kodak adopted the 'razor and blades' business plan. The idea here was to first sell the razors with a small margin of profit. After buying the razor, the customers will have to purchase the consumables (the razor blades in this case) again and again; hence, sell the blades at a high-profit margin. Kodak's plan was to sell cameras at affordable prices with only a small margin for profit and then sell the consumables such as films, printing sheets, and other accessories at a high-profit margin.

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Kodak: The Rebirth of an Iconic Brand

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The University of Chicago The Law School

Abrams environmental law clinic—significant achievements for 2023-24, protecting our great lakes, rivers, and shorelines.

The Abrams Clinic represents Friends of the Chicago River and the Sierra Club in their efforts to hold Trump Tower in downtown Chicago accountable for withdrawing water illegally from the Chicago River. To cool the building, Trump Tower draws water at high volumes, similar to industrial factories or power plants, but Trump Tower operated for more than a decade without ever conducting the legally required studies to determine the impact of those operations on aquatic life or without installing sufficient equipment to protect aquatic life consistent with federal regulations. After the Clinic sent a notice of intent to sue Trump Tower, the State of Illinois filed its own case in the summer of 2018, and the Clinic moved successfully to intervene in that case. In 2023-24, motions practice and discovery continued. Working with co-counsel at Northwestern University’s Pritzker Law School’s Environmental Advocacy Center, the Clinic moved to amend its complaint to include Trump Tower’s systematic underreporting each month of the volume of water that it intakes from and discharges to the Chicago River. The Clinic and co-counsel addressed Trump Tower’s motion to dismiss some of our clients’ claims, and we filed a motion for summary judgment on our claim that Trump Tower has committed a public nuisance. We also worked closely with our expert, Dr. Peter Henderson, on a supplemental disclosure and on defending an additional deposition of him. In summer 2024, the Clinic is defending its motion for summary judgment and challenging Trump Tower’s own motion for summary judgment. The Clinic is also preparing for trial, which could take place as early as fall 2024.

Since 2016, the Abrams Clinic has worked with the Chicago chapter of the Surfrider Foundation to protect water quality along the Lake Michigan shoreline in northwest Indiana, where its members surf. In April 2017, the U. S. Steel plant in Portage, Indiana, spilled approximately 300 pounds of hexavalent chromium into Lake Michigan. In January 2018, the Abrams Clinic filed a suit on behalf of Surfrider against U. S. Steel, alleging multiple violations of U. S. Steel’s discharge permits; the City of Chicago filed suit shortly after. When the US government and the State of Indiana filed their own, separate case, the Clinic filed extensive comments on the proposed consent decree. In August 2021, the court entered a revised consent decree which included provisions advocated for by Surfrider and the City of Chicago, namely a water sampling project that alerts beachgoers as to Lake Michigan’s water quality conditions, better notifications in case of future spills, and improvements to U. S. Steel’s operations and maintenance plans. In the 2023-24 academic year, the Clinic successfully litigated its claims for attorneys’ fees as a substantially prevailing party. Significantly, the court’s order adopted the “Fitzpatrick matrix,” used by the US Attorney’s Office for the District of Columbia to determine appropriate hourly rates for civil litigants, endorsed Chicago legal market rates as the appropriate rates for complex environmental litigation in Northwest Indiana, and allowed for partially reconstructed time records. The Clinic’s work, which has received significant media attention, helped to spawn other litigation to address pollution by other industrial facilities in Northwest Indiana and other enforcement against U. S. Steel by the State of Indiana.

In Winter Quarter 2024, Clinic students worked closely with Dr. John Ikerd, an agricultural economist and emeritus professor at the University of Missouri, to file an amicus brief in Food & Water Watch v. U.S. Environmental Protection Agency . In that case pending before the Ninth Circuit, Food & Water Watch argues that US EPA is illegally allowing Concentrated Animal Feeding Operations, more commonly known as factory farms, to pollute waterways significantly more than is allowable under the Clean Water Act. In the brief for Dr. Ikerd and co-amici Austin Frerick, Crawford Stewardship Project, Family Farm Defenders, Farm Aid, Missouri Rural Crisis Center, National Family Farm Coalition, National Sustainable Agriculture Coalition, and Western Organization of Resource Councils, we argued that EPA’s refusal to regulate CAFOs effectively is an unwarranted application of “agricultural exceptionalism” to industrial agriculture and that EPA effectively distorts the animal production market by allowing CAFOs to externalize their pollution costs and diminishing the ability of family farms to compete. Attorneys for the litigants will argue the case in September 2024.

Energy and Climate

Energy justice.

The Abrams Clinic supported grassroots organizations advocating for energy justice in low-income communities and Black, Indigenous, and People of Color (BIPOC) communities in Michigan. With the Clinic’s representation, these organizations intervened in cases before the Michigan Public Service Commission (MPSC), which regulates investor-owned utilities. Students conducted discovery, drafted written testimony, cross-examined utility executives, participated in settlement discussions, and filed briefs for these projects. The Clinic’s representation has elevated the concerns of these community organizations and forced both the utilities and regulators to consider issues of equity to an unprecedented degree. This year, on behalf of Soulardarity (Highland Park, MI), We Want Green, Too (Detroit, MI), and Urban Core Collective (Grand Rapids, MI), Clinic students engaged in eight contested cases before the MPSC against DTE Electric, DTE Gas, and Consumers Energy, as well as provided support for our clients’ advocacy in other non-contested MPSC proceedings.

The Clinic started this past fall with wins in three cases. First, the Clinic’s clients settled with DTE Electric in its Integrated Resource Plan case. The settlement included an agreement to close the second dirtiest coal power plant in Michigan three years early, $30 million from DTE’s shareholders to assist low-income customers in paying their bills, and $8 million from DTE’s shareholders toward a community fund that assists low-income customers with installing energy efficiency improvements, renewable energy, and battery technology. Second, in DTE Electric’s 2023 request for a rate hike (a “rate case”), the Commission required DTE Electric to develop a more robust environmental justice analysis and rejected the Company’s second attempt to waive consumer protections through a proposed electric utility prepayment program with a questionable history of success during its pilot run. The final Commission order and the administrative law judge’s proposal for final decision cited the Clinic’s testimony and briefs. Third, in Consumers Electric’s 2023 rate case, the Commission rejected the Company’s request for a higher ratepayer-funded return on its investments and required the Company to create a process that will enable intervenors to obtain accurate GIS data. The Clinic intends to use this data to map the disparate impact of infrastructure investment in low-income and BIPOC communities.

In the winter, the Clinic filed public comments regarding DTE Electric and Consumers Energy’s “distribution grid plans” (DGP) as well as supported interventions in two additional cases: Consumers Energy’s voluntary green pricing (VGP) case and the Clinic’s first case against the gas utility DTE Gas. Beginning with the DGP comments, the Clinic first addressed Consumers’s 2023 Electric Distribution Infrastructure Investment Plan (EDIIP), which detailed current distribution system health and the utility’s approximately $7 billion capital project planning ($2 billion of which went unaccounted for in the EDIIP) over 2023–2028. The Clinic then commented on DTE Electric’s 2023 DGP, which outlined the utility’s opaque project prioritization and planned more than $9 billion in capital investments and associated maintenance over 2024–2028. The comments targeted four areas of deficiencies in both the EDIIP and DGP: (1) inadequate consideration of distributed energy resources (DERs) as providing grid reliability, resiliency, and energy transition benefits; (2) flawed environmental justice analysis, particularly with respect to the collection of performance metrics and the narrow implementation of the Michigan Environmental Justice Screen Tool; (3) inequitable investment patterns across census tracts, with emphasis on DTE Electric’s skewed prioritization for retaining its old circuits rather than upgrading those circuits; and (4) failing to engage with community feedback.

For the VGP case against Consumers, the Clinic supported the filing of both an initial brief and reply brief requesting that the Commission reject the Company’s flawed proposal for a “community solar” program. In a prior case, the Clinic advocated for the development of a community solar program that would provide low-income, BIPOC communities with access to clean energy. As a result of our efforts, the Commission approved a settlement agreement requiring the Company “to evaluate and provide a strawman recommendation on community solar in its Voluntary Green Pricing Program.” However, the Company’s subsequent proposal in its VGP case violated the Commission’s order because it (1) was not consistent with the applicable law, MCL 460.1061; (2) was not a true community solar program; (3) lacked essential details; (4) failed to compensate subscribers sufficiently; (5) included overpriced and inflexible subscriptions; (6) excessively limited capacity; and (7) failed to provide a clear pathway for certain participants to transition into other VGP programs. For these reasons, the Clinic argued that the Commission should reject the Company’s proposal.

In DTE Gas’s current rate case, the Clinic worked with four witnesses to develop testimony that would rebut DTE Gas’s request for a rate hike on its customers. The testimony advocated for a pathway to a just energy transition that avoids dumping the costs of stranded gas assets on the low-income and BIPOC communities that are likely to be the last to electrify. Instead, the testimony proposed that the gas and electric utilities undertake integrated planning that would prioritize electric infrastructure over gas infrastructure investment to ensure that DTE Gas does not over-invest in gas infrastructure that will be rendered obsolete in the coming decades. The Clinic also worked with one expert witness to develop an analysis of DTE Gas’s unaffordable bills and inequitable shutoff, deposit, and collections practices. Lastly, the Clinic offered testimony on behalf of and from community members who would be directly impacted by the Company’s rate hike and lack of affordable and quality service. Clinic students have spent the summer drafting an approximately one-hundred-page brief making these arguments formally. We expect the Commission’s decision this fall.

Finally, both DTE Electric and Consumers Energy have filed additional requests for rate increases after the conclusion of their respective rate cases filed in 2023. On behalf of our Clients, the Clinic has intervened in these cases, and clinic students have already reviewed thousands of pages of documents and started to develop arguments and strategies to protect low-income and BIPOC communities from the utility’s ceaseless efforts to increase the cost of energy.

Corporate Climate Greenwashing

The Abrams Environmental Law Clinic worked with a leading international nonprofit dedicated to using the law to protect the environment to research corporate climate greenwashing, focusing on consumer protection, green financing, and securities liability. Clinic students spent the year examining an innovative state law, drafted a fifty-page guide to the statute and relevant cases, and examined how the law would apply to a variety of potential cases. Students then presented their findings in a case study and oral presentation to members of ClientEarth, including the organization’s North American head and members of its European team. The project helped identify the strengths and weaknesses of potential new strategies for increasing corporate accountability in the fight against climate change.

Land Contamination, Lead, and Hazardous Waste

The Abrams Clinic continues to represent East Chicago, Indiana, residents who live or lived on or adjacent to the USS Lead Superfund site. This year, the Clinic worked closely with the East Chicago/Calumet Coalition Community Advisory Group (CAG) to advance the CAG’s advocacy beyond the Superfund site and the adjacent Dupont RCRA site. Through multiple forms of advocacy, the clinics challenged the poor performance and permit modification and renewal attempts of Tradebe Treatment and Recycling, LLC (Tradebe), a hazardous waste storage and recycling facility in the community. Clinic students sent letters to US EPA and Indiana Department of Environmental Management officials about how IDEM has failed to assess meaningful penalties against Tradebe for repeated violations of the law and how IDEM has allowed Tradebe to continue to threaten public and worker health and safety by not improving its operations. Students also drafted substantial comments for the CAG on the US EPA’s Lead and Copper Rule improvements, the Suppliers’ Park proposed cleanup, and Sims Metal’s proposed air permit revisions. The Clinic has also continued working with the CAG, environmental experts, and regulators since US EPA awarded $200,000 to the CAG for community air monitoring. The Clinic and its clients also joined comments drafted by other environmental organizations about poor operations and loose regulatory oversight of several industrial facilities in the area.

Endangered Species

The Abrams Clinic represented the Center for Biological Diversity (CBD) and the Hoosier Environmental Council (HEC) in litigation regarding the US Fish and Wildlife Service’s (Service) failure to list the Kirtland’s snake as threatened or endangered under the Endangered Species Act. The Kirtland’s snake is a small, secretive, non-venomous snake historically located across the Midwest and the Ohio River Valley. Development and climate change have undermined large portions of the snake’s habitat, and populations are declining. Accordingly, the Clinic sued the Service in the US District Court for the District of Columbia last summer over the Service’s denial of CBD’s request to have the Kirtland’s snake protected. This spring, the Clinic was able to reach a settlement with the Service that requires the Service to reconsider its listing decision for the Kirtland’s snake and to pay attorney fees.

The Clinic also represented CBD in preparation for litigation regarding the Service’s failure to list another species as threatened or endangered. Threats from land development and climate change have devastated this species as well, and the species has already been extirpated from two of the sixteen US states in its range. As such, the Clinic worked this winter and spring to prepare a notice of intent (NOI) to sue the Service. The Team poured over hundreds of FOIA documents and dug into the Service’s supporting documentation to create strong arguments against the Service in the imminent litigation. The Clinic will send the NOI and file a complaint in the next few months.

Students and Faculty

Twenty-four law school students from the classes of 2024 and 2025 participated in the Clinic, performing complex legal research, reviewing documents obtained through discovery, drafting legal research memos and briefs, conferring with clients, conducting cross-examination, participating in settlement conferences, and arguing motions. Students secured nine clerkships, five were heading to private practice after graduation, and two are pursuing public interest work. Sam Heppell joined the Clinic from civil rights private practice, bringing the Clinic to its full complement of three attorneys.