essay on greed of money

24/7 writing help on your phone

To install StudyMoose App tap and then “Add to Home Screen”

Greed for Money and Power: A Root Cause of Human Misery

Save to my list

Remove from my list

The Deceptive Nature of Monetary Pursuits

The Political Temptation of Wealth and Power

Overcoming the allure of wealth.

Greed for Money and Power: A Root Cause of Human Misery. (2018, Aug 30). Retrieved from https://studymoose.com/greed-for-money-essay

"Greed for Money and Power: A Root Cause of Human Misery." StudyMoose , 30 Aug 2018, https://studymoose.com/greed-for-money-essay

StudyMoose. (2018). Greed for Money and Power: A Root Cause of Human Misery . [Online]. Available at: https://studymoose.com/greed-for-money-essay [Accessed: 4 Sep. 2024]

"Greed for Money and Power: A Root Cause of Human Misery." StudyMoose, Aug 30, 2018. Accessed September 4, 2024. https://studymoose.com/greed-for-money-essay

"Greed for Money and Power: A Root Cause of Human Misery," StudyMoose , 30-Aug-2018. [Online]. Available: https://studymoose.com/greed-for-money-essay. [Accessed: 4-Sep-2024]

StudyMoose. (2018). Greed for Money and Power: A Root Cause of Human Misery . [Online]. Available at: https://studymoose.com/greed-for-money-essay [Accessed: 4-Sep-2024]

• An Analysis of Greed in Lord of the Flies: An Study of Greed in the Novel by William Golding Pages: 3 (792 words)
• Hillsborough County’s Teen Pregnancy Root Cause Analysis Pages: 6 (1605 words)
• A Root Cause Analysis Pages: 10 (2836 words)
• The Collapse of HIH Insurance: Identifying the Root Cause Pages: 6 (1525 words)
• Root Cause Analysis: Enstrom Auto Mirror Plant Milestone Pages: 4 (1185 words)
• Money Is the Root of Evil Pages: 2 (481 words)
• Money Is the Root of All Evil Pages: 2 (484 words)
• Authors Who Used Humor to Comment on Gender, Greed, and Power Pages: 7 (1853 words)
• Greed and Power in Macbeth Pages: 3 (709 words)
• Examining the Dual Nature of Greed: Wealth and Power Pages: 2 (433 words)

👋 Hi! I’m your smart assistant Amy!

Don’t know where to start? Type your requirements and I’ll connect you to an academic expert within 3 minutes.

November 1, 2013

Greed: How Economic Selfishness Harms Us All

Taming greed in favor of cooperation would benefit both individuals and society

By Dan Ariely & Aline Grüneisen

“I am not a destroyer of companies. I am a liberator of them! The point is, ladies and gentleman, that greed, for lack of a better word, is good. Greed is right, greed works. Greed clarifies, cuts through and captures the essence of the evolutionary spirit.” These are the words of Gordon Gekko, played by Michael Douglas in the 1987 film Wall Street . The poster boy for unharnessed greed echoes the sentiment of rational free-market economists, who view greed as not only an inevitable aspect of human nature but ultimately a desirable one.

As the prevailing (yet simplistic) economic theory goes, greed motivates competition, and competition is essential for growth in a functioning market. By focusing on personal gains, people directly contribute to the greater good. The late American economist Milton Friedman espoused this ideology of greed when he said, “The world runs on individuals pursuing their separate interests.” He asked, “Is there some society you know that doesn't run on greed?” Homo economicus , the rational self-interested being that represents standard economic theory, benefits society only to the extent that he maximizes his own utility.

Yet greed has historically had a bad reputation. Even today the overwhelming majority of people shun greedy behavior. When we consider the situations in which financial self-interest benefits individuals and society and when it impedes, there are few of the former and many of the latter. The belief that greed allows markets to flourish is more likely a reflection of the ability of Homo sapiens to justify our selfish motivations than it is a prescription for economic success. Understanding this fact, along with a greater appreciation of greed's harm, can go a long way toward curtailing selfish behavior.

On supporting science journalism

If you're enjoying this article, consider supporting our award-winning journalism by subscribing . By purchasing a subscription you are helping to ensure the future of impactful stories about the discoveries and ideas shaping our world today.

“Thou Shalt Not Covet …” If we rewind to ancient times, the idea of greed as a sin is planted throughout history. Philosophers from Socrates and Plato to David Hume and Immanuel Kant viewed greed as a moral violation, to be avoided and denounced. Roman Christian poet Prudentius depicted greed in the Early Middle Ages as the most frightening of all vices. And in its itemized treatment of this sin, among others, the Bible set forth the 10th commandment: “Thou shalt not covet thy neighbor's house, thou shalt not covet thy neighbor's wife, nor his manservant, nor his maidservant, nor his ox, nor his ass, nor any thing that is thy neighbor's.”

Today, rather than taking a purely moral approach, much of the opposition to greed appears to stem from its negative effects on others. When people prosper at the expense of others, for example, observers are repulsed. In a study published in 1986 psychologist Daniel Kahneman, now emeritus professor at Princeton University, and his colleagues showed that consumers refuse to support companies that take advantage of their customers for the sake of profit (through price gouging, for example). More recently, in unpublished work, Amit Bhattacharjee, now at the Tuck School of Business at Dartmouth, and his colleagues at the University of Pennsylvania reported that people judge even the mere act of profit seeking as harmful to society. The researchers found that more profitable firms were regarded as less deserving of their winnings, less subject to competition and more motivated to make money regardless of the consequences. Furthermore, when asked to compare two hypothetical organizations that were identical aside from their “for-profit” or “nonprofit” status, people perceived for-profit firms as less valuable and more socially damaging than the nonprofits. Thus, the perception of greed as harmful extends to the mere act of profiting, which is of course the only way that capitalist markets can function.

This aversion to greed-driven, profit-seeking behavior may be based on a fundamental desire for fairness, including, for example, more equal wealth distribution. In a study published in 2013 sociology graduate student Esra Burak of Stanford University showed that 61 percent of Americans claim that they would support a cap on compensation for extremely high earners, regardless of how hard they have worked or what they have achieved. In addition, in laboratory games in which people are asked to contribute to a public pool of money that will later be split among all participants, players readily penalize those who greedily hold on to their resources. They keep defectors in check and will do so even when restoring fairness comes at a personal financial cost.

Yet not everyone finds value in suppressing greed. In a series of studies published in 2011 organizational behavior professor Long Wang of the City University of Hong Kong and his colleagues had students play the “dictator game,” in which participants are granted a sum of money that they can divvy up among themselves and an anonymous partner in any way they choose. The researchers found that the more a student had studied economics, the more money he or she kept for himself or herself and the less likely the individual was to explain his or her actions in terms of fairness. In a second study, students reflected on their past greedy behavior in writing, rated the morality of greed in general, and tried to define greed in their own words. By all three measures, the more students had been schooled in economics, the more positively they viewed greed. And as a third experiment showed, even just a hint of exposure to economic theory can convince people of the virtues of greed. The researchers found that students with no prior training held more positive opinions of greed just after they read a statement on the economic benefits of self-interest.

Corrosive Competition Although we may be easily swayed by these convenient rationalizations, the economic justification for greed is nonetheless shortsighted. Ferocious competition may occasionally lead to optimal market outcomes, but it can also have harmful side effects. Think about competition in sports. At first glance, the drive to be the best appears to propel human achievements to new heights. World records are surpassed, and yesterday's Olympic medalists pale in comparison with today's champions. Yet extreme dedication has costs. Athletes may not spend enough time with their friends and families, or they may sacrifice their long-term health to perform better in the short term—by overexerting their body or taking performance-enhancing drugs such as steroids.

The consequences of unchecked greed can also spill over into society. In his 2011 book The Darwin Economy , economist Robert H. Frank of Cornell University outlines some of the disastrous effects of allowing competition to run free. Take, for example, neighbors gunning for social status. Each tries to outdo the others, purchasing a slightly flashier car, bigger pool or more expensive grill. When Joe Jones down the block builds a home theater and Jane Smith across the street installs a 3-D amphitheater, you will no longer be satisfied with your meager widescreen television. We don't simply try to keep up with the Joneses, we try to surpass them—triggering what Frank calls “expenditure cascades.” That is, high spending by top earners shifts the reference point for those earning just a bit less, affecting those next in the ladder of prosperity, and so on. This chain of events can culminate in all classes spending more than they can afford, leading to a higher likelihood of bankruptcy (from increased debt), divorce (from the pressures of financial instability) and longer commutes to work (after moving to cheaper neighborhoods to cope with the debt).

The financial crisis of 2008 arose from a similar conflict between eagerness for short-term gains and long-term prosperity. High competition among financial institutions drove them to “financial innovations” that eventually left many of us with bankruptcies, foreclosures, a lack of trust in the market and a substantial national debt that we will be paying for generations to come.

Greed can also encourage ethically dubious behaviors. In an unpublished experiment with Lalin Anik of Duke University, we investigated whether people would be more willing to profit at the expense of others if they could rationalize their actions more easily—specifically by claiming that their motives were intended to benefit another group: shareholders. To explore this hypothesis, we asked participants to imagine themselves as the CEO of a publicly traded bank. We gave them a list of ethically questionable actions that would profit their company and asked which ones they would take. They could, for example, charge overdraft fees, increase interest on securities held or use tax shelters to offset income with losses from previous years. When participants were told that their primary goal as CEO was to maximize shareholder value, they were much more willing to partake in these ethically questionable acts. And when some of these participants were told that their year-end bonuses depended on satisfying this goal, the questionable behaviors became even more popular.

Perhaps shockingly, these results were most pronounced for those who aced the three-item financial literacy test we gave them. That is, those who were more educated in finance were even more inclined toward questionable behavior. Although most of us perceive avarice in a negative light, we can be greedy ourselves when given the right justifications for our behavior.

Cultivating Cooperation Despite this capacity to rationalize selfishness, people do not always avail themselves of it. They can often be quite selfless, sacrificing their own welfare to benefit others. People help those in need, donate money to charities and volunteer their time. (Yes, even economists sometimes help the elderly lady carry her groceries across the street.) In scenarios such as the dictator game, most participants reliably share some of their wealth—despite the fact that the rational economic decision is to keep it all.

All in all, humans are part Scrooge and part Robin Hood. We are more likely to be selfish when we can easily explain our choices or when we fail to consider the people who could suffer from them. Yet when we think about the people whom we can hurt and help, we behave more considerately. The lessons are straightforward: we must not let rational economic theory eclipse the fact that greed can be damaging. Next, we should work to make the consequences of our actions clearer, with the hope that our cooperative spirit will be boosted by concrete examples of those who might bear the brunt of our actions. And finally, we must combat the rationalizations of self-interest, including the simplistic mantra that greedy behavior propels society forward.

Yet if you are still trying to surpass the Joneses, bear in mind that above the poverty line, having more money will not make you appreciably happier. In fact, research shows that individuals who focus on financial success are less stable and less happy overall. So rather than splurging on a high-end grill that will make your neighbor jealous—and perhaps add to your debt—choose instead to help your neighbor assemble her grill for a block party cookout. And if the party small talk turns to the economy, slip in a pitch for cooperation rather than greed.

Dan Ariely is James B. Duke Professor of Psychology & Behavioral Economics at Duke University and founder of the Center for Advanced Hindsight. He is co-creator of a documentary on corruption and a bestselling author.

What causes greed and how can we deal with it?

Assistant Professor of Religious Studies, Goldstein Family Community Chair in Human Rights, University of Nebraska Omaha

Disclosure statement

Laura E. Alexander does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.

University of Nebraska Omaha provides funding as a member of The Conversation US.

View all partners

Recent news stories have highlighted unethical and even lawless actions taken by people and corporations that were motivated primarily by greed.

Federal prosecutors, for example, charged 33 wealthy parents, some of whom were celebrities, with paying bribes to get their children into top colleges. In another case, lawyer Michael Avenatti was accused of trying to extort millions from Nike, the sports company.

Allegations of greed are listed in the lawsuit filed against members of Sackler family , the owners of Purdue Pharma, accused of pushing powerful painkillers as well as the treatment for addiction.

In all of these cases, individuals or companies seemingly had wealth and status to spare, yet they allegedly took actions to gain even further advantage. Why would such successful people or corporations allegedly commit crimes to get more?

As a scholar of comparative religious ethics , I frequently teach basic principles of moral thought in diverse religious traditions.

Religious thought can help us understand human nature and provide ethical guidance, including in cases of greed like the ones mentioned here.

Anxiety and injustice

The work of the 20th-century theologian Reinhold Niebuhr on human anxiety offers one possible explanation for what might drive people to seek more than they already have or need.

Niebuhr was arguably the most famous theologian of his time. He was a mentor to several public figures . These included Arthur Schlesinger Jr. , a historian who served in the Kennedy White House, and George F. Kennan , a diplomat and an adviser on Soviet affairs. Niebuhr also came to have a deep influence on former President Barack Obama .

Niebuhr said the human tendency to perpetuate injustice is the result of a deep sense of existential anxiety, which is part of the human condition. In his work “The Nature and Destiny of Man,” Niebuhr described human beings as creatures of both “spirit” and “nature.”

As “spirit,” human beings have consciousness, which allows them to rise above the sensory experiences they have in any given moment.

Yet, at the same time, he said, human beings do have physical bodies, senses and instincts, like any other animal. They are part of the natural world and are subject to the risks and vulnerabilities of mortality, including death.

Together, these traits mean that human beings are not just mortal, but also conscious of that mortality. This juxtaposition leads to a deeply felt anxiety, which, according to Niebuhr, is the “inevitable spiritual state of man.”

To deal with the anxiety of knowing they will die, Niebuhr says, human beings are tempted to – and often do – grasp at whatever means of security seem within their reach, such as knowledge, material goods or prestige.

In other words, people seek certainty in things that are inherently uncertain.

Hurting others

This is a fruitless task by definition, but the bigger problem is that the quest for certainty in one’s own life almost always harms others. As Niebuhr writes :

“Man is, like the animals, involved in the necessities and contingencies of nature; but unlike the animals he sees this situation and anticipates its perils. He seeks to protect himself against nature’s contingencies; but he cannot do so without transgressing the limits which have been set for his life. Therefore all human life is involved in the sin of seeking security at the expense of other life.”

The case of parents who may have committed fraud to gain coveted spots for their children at prestigious colleges offers an example of trying to find some of this certainty. That comes at the expense of others, who cannot gain admission to a college because another child has gotten in via illegitimate means.

As other research has shown, such anxiety may be more acute in those with higher social status. The fear of loss, among other things, could well drive such actions .

What we can learn from the Buddha

While Niebuhr’s analysis can help many of us understand the motivations behind greed, other religious traditions might offer further suggestions on how to deal with it.

Several centuries ago, the Buddha said that human beings have a tendency to attach themselves to “things” – sometimes material objects, sometimes “possessions” like prestige or reputation.

Scholar Damien Keown explains in his book on Buddhist ethics that in Buddhist thought, the whole universe is interconnected and ever-changing. People perceive material things as stable and permanent, and we desire and try to hold onto them.

But since loss is inevitable, our desire for things causes us to suffer. Our response to that suffering is often to grasp at things more and more tightly. But we end up harming others in our quest to make ourselves feel better.

Taken together, these thinkers provide insight into acts of greed committed by those who already have so much. At the same time, the teachings of the Buddha suggest that our most strenuous efforts to keep things for ourselves cannot overcome their impermanence. In the end, we will always lose what we are trying to grasp.

• Sackler family
• Reinhold Niebuhr
• College admissions scandal
• Impermanence

Admissions Officer

Director of STEM

Community member - Training Delivery and Development Committee (Volunteer part-time)

Chief Executive Officer

Head of Evidence to Action

Essay on Money Is the Root of All Evil

Students are often asked to write an essay on Money Is the Root of All Evil in their schools and colleges. And if you’re also looking for the same, we have created 100-word, 250-word, and 500-word essays on the topic.

Let’s take a look…

100 Words Essay on Money Is the Root of All Evil

Introduction.

Money is a vital tool in our lives. It helps us buy goods, services and secures a comfortable life. But, it’s often said that “Money is the root of all evil.”

Money and Evil

The phrase doesn’t mean money itself is evil. Rather, it’s the love of money that can lead to evil actions. People may lie, cheat, or steal for money, causing harm to others.

So, it’s not money, but the misuse of it that causes evil. We must learn to use money wisely, ensuring it benefits us without causing harm.

250 Words Essay on Money Is the Root of All Evil

The saying “Money is the root of all evil” is a phrase that incites much debate. It is a statement that has been used to critique and analyze the societal obsession with wealth and monetary gain.

Money: A Tool or a Master?

The destructive power of greed.

Greed, often fueled by the desire for money, can lead to a host of evils. It can breed corruption, inequality, and even violence. The widening wealth gap and the exploitation of vulnerable populations are tangible manifestations of this greed.

Money and Morality

However, it’s crucial to note that money itself is not inherently evil. It is the love of money, the obsession, and the greed that can lead to immoral actions. Hence, it’s not money, but the misuse of money that is the root of evil.

In conclusion, money is a necessary tool in our society, but it becomes a problem when individuals value it above all else. Thus, it’s not the money, but the human attitude towards it that can potentially be the root of all evil. This understanding can help us foster a healthier relationship with wealth and prevent the evils associated with its misuse.

500 Words Essay on Money Is the Root of All Evil

The notion of money as the root of all evil.

Money, a medium of exchange, has been a part of human civilization for thousands of years. It has been a driving force behind human progress, facilitating trade, and fostering economic development. However, it is often said that “money is the root of all evil,” a phrase derived from a biblical quote. This essay will delve into this contentious assertion, examining the role of money in society and its potential to engender malevolence.

Money’s Inherent Neutrality

Money, in its essence, is a neutral entity. It is a tool that can be used for good or ill, depending on the intentions of the user. Money can fund philanthropic endeavors, support scientific research, and provide for basic human needs. Conversely, it can also be used to finance illicit activities, corruption, and greed. The problem, therefore, does not lie with money itself but with the human attitudes and behaviors associated with it.

The Human Factor: Greed and Corruption

Money and power dynamics.

Money also plays a pivotal role in power dynamics, often leading to inequality and injustice. Those with wealth can exert influence over political systems, skewing policies in their favor and perpetuating social inequities. In this sense, money can be seen as a source of evil. However, again, it is the misuse of money for power and control, rather than money itself, that is the root of such evils.

Money as a Means, Not an End

To mitigate the potential negative impacts of money, society must shift its perspective. Money should be viewed as a means to an end, not an end in itself. This requires fostering a culture that values integrity, fairness, and social responsibility above the accumulation of wealth. Education plays a critical role in this, promoting ethical behavior and responsible financial management.

Conclusion: A Nuanced Understanding

If you’re looking for more, here are essays on other interesting topics:

Leave a Reply Cancel reply

Save my name, email, and website in this browser for the next time I comment.

• The Big Think Interview
• Your Brain on Money
• Explore the Library
• The Universe. A History.
• The Progress Issue
• A Brief History Of Quantum Mechanics
• 6 Flaws In Our Understanding Of The Universe
• Michio Kaku
• Neil deGrasse Tyson
• Michelle Thaller
• Steven Pinker
• Ray Kurzweil
• Cornel West
• Helen Fisher
• Smart Skills
• High Culture
• The Present
• Hard Science
• Special Issues
• Starts With A Bang
• Everyday Philosophy
• The Learning Curve
• The Long Game
• Perception Box
• Strange Maps
• Free Newsletters
• Memberships

Greed and the philosophy of wealth

Credit : Evelyn De Morgan / Wikipedia / Public domain

• It’s common wisdom that most things in life are best in moderation.
• Most of us agree that owning property is okay but are hard-pressed to say why and when it has gone too far.
• Greed dominates your life if the pursuit of wealth is a higher priority than charity, kindness, and solidarity with others.

The great Greek poet, Hesiod, wrote, “Observe due measure; moderation is best in all things.” It’s a wisdom that finds support across all ages, stages, and aspects of life. Drinking water is a good thing, but drinking too much is dangerous . A shot of vodka won’t kill you, but a gallon probably will. Working hard is good, but burning yourself out is not. Being nice is great, but a sycophant is creepy. Moderation in all things.

But, it’s not always easy to determine where that line falls, and a great example of this concerns property and wealth.

Most of us agree that owning things, or at least having the right to own things, is good. It’s okay to buy a phone, to own a car, or to have your own clothes. But equally true is that most people feel uneasy about a world which has both billionaires in vast mansions as well as children dying malnourished. Greed, avarice, envy, and venality are considered vices. To be obsessively driven for material things is still, in the main, considered to be either misguided or, at its worst, utterly immoral. So, when does wealth become greed?

John Locke and the philosophy of property

It’s hard to pinpoint exactly when humans first called a thing “mine,” but the philosophy and law of property is much easier to track. One of the biggest names to consider the issue was the 17th century English philosopher John Locke.

Locke’s political philosophy is famously cited as a major influence on the U.S. Declaration of Independence but also fed heavily into the French Revolution and the Great Reform movements of Britain. His work on property is perhaps one of his most important contributions.

Although subject to a fair bit of debate — what isn’t in philosophy? — it’s generally accepted that Locke adopted a “fair usage” view of property. He argued that one can hold any property that meets the following criteria:

• It can be used before it spoils (e.g., we don’t have huge stores of food that just rots).
• It leaves “good and enough” for everyone else (e.g., one person cannot own all the land in a country).
• The property must come from your own work and effort or what he calls “mixing your labor” with that thing (e.g., if you farm a field, the field and its produce become yours).

If we were to follow these rules, it seems hard to envisage a world of greed and inequality. Everyone can have and get what they want, so long as enough is left for everyone else to get what they want, as well.

But, there’s a lot of ambiguity in these rules, and money rather changes things. Money, especially modern money in the form of digital numbers on a screen, does not spoil. And, thanks to modern banking, there is no limit to the amount of money there could be — a bank can, and does, literally create money each time they give you a credit card or a loan (although, in practice, few countries allow this and place limits on money creation). So, no matter how many billions someone creates, there will always be “good and enough” money for others, too.

(Of course, in practice, constantly creating huge new pools of money will lead to hyperinflation, devaluing the money for everyone. Yet, even if we were to ban all new money creation today, a Lockean could argue that there’s more than enough already for a generous distribution around the world.)

So, money changes things for Locke’s account. It won’t spoil and there will always be at least some money for everyone else. It’s even been argued that Locke, far from advocating an equal and distributive philosophy, can easily support rampant capitalist accumulation of wealth. Locke wrote that, because of money, “Now one man could have… a disproportionate and unequal possession of the earth… and fairly possess more land than he himself can use.”

It’s the philosophy of greed.

Too much greed

The idea that greed is an essential part of being human (or at least an animal) goes back at least to Plato and has a rich philosophical history from there. Today, it often takes the form of evolutionary psychology or genetics, exemplified by Richard Dawkins’ The Selfish Gene.

It’s when we think of little else than increasing our experiences and material possessions. This is the point at which greed has come to dominate your life.

One thinker who has challenged this is Peter Singer. Singer acknowledges the fact that evolution does work on a certain competitiveness, that is, the fittest will pass on their genes. But he also believes that it’s wrong to associate this wholly with greed or selfishness. Cooperation and productive relationships are just as vital to survival.

Singer argues that the desire to do good, to work hard, and to succeed are admirable parts of the human condition, but when they are taken to excess, they turn into greed. That line comes when the want of more — particularly, the desire for material wealth — becomes the sole focus of a life. It’s when working late or constantly looking for that promotion is prioritized over family, friends, and common human compassion.

The fact is that, in the West, most people have enough. Even poor people generally have TVs, smartphones, and automobiles. The average person in the West lives far better than royalty did for millennia. Singer asks us to get a sense of perspective. We spend more on bottled water than some families in developing countries live off for a day. We’re so fixated on our current day-to-day condition, that we lose sight of how much we really have.

Greed über alles

Singer’s argument helps us identify the point at which drive and success insidiously morph into greed: It’s when we are loath to spend our money and devote all of our waking lives to determinedly accumulating more and more at the expense of our relationships. It’s when we think of little else than increasing our experiences and material possessions. This is the point at which greed has come to dominate your life.

But it’s also when greed replaces our common sense of compassion. It’s when property and wealth become virtues greater than charity, kindness, and solidarity with others. It’s when dollar signs and fast cars matter more than people dying in the street. It’s when getting a pay raise matters more than someone else getting fired.

Nobody likes to think of themselves as greedy, but if you examine yourself closely, you will probably find some aspects of your life that are at least tainted by greed. We should all check ourselves from time to time.

Jonny Thomson teaches philosophy in Oxford. He runs a popular Instagram account called Mini Philosophy (@ philosophyminis ). His first book is Mini Philosophy: A Small Book of Big Ideas .

• Table of Contents
• Random Entry
• Chronological
• Editorial Information
• About the SEP
• Editorial Board
• How to Cite the SEP
• Special Characters
• Advanced Tools
• Support the SEP
• PDFs for SEP Friends
• Make a Donation
• SEPIA for Libraries
• Entry Contents

Bibliography

Academic tools.

• Friends PDF Preview
• Author and Citation Info
• Back to Top

Philosophy of Money and Finance

Finance and philosophy may seem to be worlds apart. But they share at least one common ancestor: Thales of Miletus. Thales is typically regarded as the first philosopher, but he was also a financial innovator. He appears to have been what we would now call an option trader. He predicted that next year’s olive harvest would be good, and therefore paid a small amount of money to the owners of olive presses for the right to the next year’s use. When the harvest turned out to be as good as predicted, Thales earned a sizable amount of money by renting out the presses (Aristotle, Politics , 1259a).

Obviously, a lot has changed since Thales’ times, both in finance and in our ethical and political attitudes towards finance. Coins have largely been replaced by either paper or electronic money, and we have built a large infrastructure to facilitate transactions of money and other financial assets—with elements including commercial banks, central banks, insurance companies, stock exchanges, and investment funds. This institutional multiplicity is due to concerted efforts of both private and public agents, as well as innovations in financial economics and in the financial industry (Shiller 2012).

Our ethical and political sensitivities have also changed in several respects. It seems fair to say that most traditional ethicists held a very negative attitude towards financial activities. Think, for example, of Jesus’ cleansing of the temple from moneylenders, and the widespread condemnation of money as “the root of all evil”. Attitudes in this regard seem to have softened over time. However, the moral debate continues to recur, especially in connection with large scandals and crises within finance, the largest such crisis in recent memory of course being the global financial crisis of 2008.

This article describes what philosophical analysis can say about money and finance. It is divided into five parts that respectively concern (1) what money and finance really are (metaphysics), (2) how knowledge about financial matters is or should be formed (epistemology), (3) the merits and challenges of financial economics (philosophy of science), (4) the many ethical issues related to money and finance (ethics), and (5) the relationship between finance and politics (political philosophy).

1.1 What is Money?

1.2 what is finance, 2. epistemology, 3. philosophy of science, 4.1.1 the love of money, 4.1.2 usury and interest, 4.1.3 speculation and gambling, 4.2.1 deception and fraud, 4.2.2 avoiding conflicts of interest, 4.2.3 insider trading, 4.3.1 systemic risk and financial crises, 4.3.2 microfinance, 4.3.3 socially responsible investment, 5.1 financialization and democracy, 5.2 finance, money, and domestic justice, 5.3 finance and global justice, other internet resources, related entries, 1. metaphysics.

Money is so ever-present in modern life that we tend to take its existence and nature for granted. But do we know what money actually is? Two competing theories present fundamentally different ontologies of money.

The commodity theory of money: A classic theory, which goes back all the way to Aristotle ( Politics , 1255b–1256b), holds that money is a kind of commodity that fulfills three functions: it serves as (i) a medium of exchange, (ii) a unit of account, and (iii) a store of value. Imagine a society that lacks money, and in which people have to barter goods with each other. Barter only works when there is a double coincidence of wants ; that is, when A wants what B has and B wants what A has. But since such coincidences are likely to be uncommon, a barter economy seems both cumbersome and inefficient (Smith 1776, Menger 1892). At some point, people will realize that they can trade more easily if they use some intermediate good—money. This intermediate good should ideally be easy to handle, store and transport (function i). It should be easy to measure and divide to facilitate calculations (function ii). And it should be difficult to destroy so that it lasts over time (function iii).

Monetary history may be viewed as a process of improvement with regard to these functions of money (Ferguson 2008, Weatherford 1997). For example, some early societies used certain basic necessities as money, such as cattle or grain. Other societies settled on commodities that were easier to handle and to tally but with more indirect value, such as clamshells and precious metals. The archetypical form of money throughout history are gold or silver coins—therefore the commodity theory is sometimes called metallism (Knapp 1924, Schumpeter 1954). Coinage is an improvement on bullion in that both quantity and purity are guaranteed by some third party, typically the government. Finally, paper money can be viewed as a simplification of the trade in coins. For example, a bank note issued by the Bank of England in the 1700s was a promise to pay the bearer a certain pound weight of sterling silver (hence the origin of the name of the British currency as “pounds sterling”).

The commodity theory of money was defended by many classical economists and can still be found in most economics textbooks (Mankiw 2009, Parkin 2011). This latter fact is curious since it has provoked serious and sustained critique. An obvious flaw is that it has difficulties in explaining inflation, the decreasing value of money over time (Innes 1913, Keynes 1936). It has also been challenged on the grounds that it is historically inaccurate. For example, recent anthropological studies question the idea that early societies went from a barter economy to money; instead money seems to have arisen to keep track of pre-existing credit relationships (Graeber 2011, Martin 2013, Douglas 2016).

The credit theory of money: According to the main rival theory, coins and notes are merely tokens of something more abstract: money is a social construction rather than a physical commodity. The abstract entity in question is a credit relationship; that is, a promise from someone to grant (or repay) a favor (product or service) to the holder of the token (Macleod 1889, Innes 1914, Ingham 2004). In order to function as money, two further features are crucial: that (i) the promise is sufficiently credible, that is, the issuer is “creditworthy”; and (ii) the credit is transferable, that is, also others will accept it as payment for trade.

It is commonly thought that the most creditworthy issuer of money is the state. This thought provides an alternative explanation of the predominance of coins and notes whose value is guaranteed by states. But note that this theory also can explain so-called fiat money, which is money that is underwritten by the state but not redeemable in any commodity like gold or silver. Fiat money has been the dominant kind of money globally since 1971, when the United States terminated the convertibility of dollars to gold. The view that only states can issue money is called chartalism , or the state theory of money (Knapp 1924). However, in order to properly understand the current monetary system, it is important to distinguish between states’ issuing versus underwriting money. Most credit money in modern economies is actually issued by commercial banks through their lending operations, and the role of the state is only to guarantee the convertibility of bank deposits into cash (Pettifor 2014).

Criticisms of the credit theory tend to be normative and focus on the risk of overexpansion of money, that is, that states (and banks) can overuse their “printing presses” which may lead to unsustainable debt levels, excessive inflation, financial instability and economic crises. These are sometimes seen as arguments for a return to the gold standard (Rothbard 1983, Schlichter 2014). However, others argue that the realization that money is socially constructed is the best starting point for developing a more sustainable and equitable monetary regime (Graeber 2010, Pettifor 2014). We will return to this political debate below ( section 5.2 ).

The social ontology of money: But exactly how does the “social construction” of money work? This question invokes the more general philosophical issue of social ontology, with regard to which money is often used as a prime example. In an early philosophical-sociological account, Georg Simmel (1900) describes money as an institution that is a crucial precondition for modernity because it allows putting a value on things and simplifies transactions; he also criticizes the way in which money thereby replaces other forms of valuation (see also section 4.1 ).

In the more recent debate, one can distinguish between two main philosophical camps. An influential account of social ontology holds that money is the sort of social institution whose existence depends on “collective intentionality”: beliefs and attitudes that are shared in a community (Searle 1995, 2010). The process starts with someone’s simple and unilateral declaration that something is money, which is a performative speech act. When other people recognize or accept the declaration it becomes a standing social rule. Thus, money is said to depend on our subjective attitudes but is not located (solely) in our minds (see also Lawson 2016, Brynjarsdóttir 2018, Passinsky 2020, Vooys & Dick 2021).

An alternative account holds that the creation of money need not be intentional or declarative in the above sense. Instead money comes about as a solution to a social problem (the double coincidence of wants) – and it is maintained simply because it is functional or beneficial to us (Guala 2016, Hindriks & Guala 2021). Thus what makes something money is not the official declarations of some authority, but rather that it works (functions) as money in a given society (see also Smit et al. 2011; 2016). (For more discussion see the special issue by Hindriks & Sandberg 2020, as well as the entries on social ontology and social institutions ).

One may view “finance” more generally (that is, the financial sector or system) as an extension of the monetary system. It is typically said that the financial sector has two main functions: (1) to maintain an effective payments system; and (2) to facilitate an efficient use of money. The latter function can be broken down further into two parts. First, to bring together those with excess money (savers, investors) and those without it (borrowers, enterprises), which is typically done through financial intermediation (the inner workings of banks) or financial markets (such as stock or bond markets). Second, to create opportunities for market participants to buy and sell money, which is typically done through the invention of financial products, or “assets”, with features distinguished by different levels of risk, return, and maturation.

The modern financial system can thus be seen as an infrastructure built to facilitate transactions of money and other financial assets, as noted at the outset. It is important to note that it contains both private elements (such as commercial banks, insurance companies, and investment funds) and public elements (such as central banks and regulatory authorities). “Finance” can also refer to the systematic study of this system; most often to the field of financial economics (see section 3 ).

Financial assets: Of interest from an ontological viewpoint is that modern finance consists of several other “asset types” besides money; central examples include credit arrangements (bank accounts, bonds), equity (shares or stocks), derivatives (futures, options, swaps, etc.) and funds (trusts). What are the defining characteristics of financial assets?

The typical distinction here is between financial and “real” assets, such as buildings and machines (Fabozzi 2002), because financial assets are less tangible or concrete. Just like money, they can be viewed as a social construction. Financial assets are often derived from or at least involve underlying “real” assets—as, for example, in the relation between owning a house and investing in a housing company. However, financial transactions are different from ordinary market trades in that the underlying assets seldom change hands, instead one exchanges abstract contracts or promises of future transactions. In this sense, one may view the financial market as the “meta-level” of the economy, since it involves indirect trade or speculation on the success of other parts of the economy.

More distinctly, financial assets are defined as promises of future money payments (Mishkin 2016, Pilbeam 2010). If the credit theory of money is correct, they can be regarded as meta-promises: promises on promises. The level of abstraction can sometimes become enormous: For example, a “synthetic collateralized debt obligation” (or “synthetic CDO”), a form of derivative common before the financial crisis, is a promise from person A (the seller) to person B (the buyer) that some persons C to I (speculators) will pay an amount of money depending on the losses incurred by person J (the holder of an underlying derivative), which typically depend on certain portions (so-called tranches) of the cash flow from persons K to Q (mortgage borrowers) originally promised to persons R to X (mortgage lenders) but then sold to person Y (the originator of the underlying derivative). The function of a synthetic CDO is mainly to spread financial risks more thinly between different speculators.

Intrinsic value: Perhaps the most important characteristic of financial assets is that their price can vary enormously with the attitudes of investors. Put simply, there are two main factors that determine the price of a financial asset: (i) the credibility or strength of the underlying promise (which will depend on the future cash flows generated by the asset); and (ii) its transferability or popularity within the market, that is, how many other investors are interested in buying the asset. In the process known as “price discovery”, investors assess these factors based on the information available to them, and then make bids to buy or sell the asset, which in turn sets its price on the market (Mishkin 2016, Pilbeam 2010).

A philosophically interesting question is whether there is such a thing as an “intrinsic” value of financial assets, as is often assumed in discussions about financial crises. For example, a common definition of an “asset bubble” is that this is a situation that occurs when certain assets trade at a price that strongly exceed their intrinsic value—which is dangerous since the bubble can burst and cause an economic shock (Kindleberger 1978, Minsky 1986, Reinhart & Rogoff 2009). But what is the intrinsic value of an asset? The rational answer seems to be that this depends only on the discounted value of the underlying future cash flow—in other words, on (i) and not (ii) above. However, someone still has to assess these factors to compute a price, and this assessment inevitably includes subjective elements. As just noted, it is assumed that different investors have different valuations of financial assets, which is why they can engage in trades on the market in the first place.

A further complication here is that (i) may actually be influenced by (ii). The fundamentals may be influenced by investors’ perceptions of them, which is a phenomenon known as “reflexivity” (Soros 1987, 2008). For example, a company whose shares are popular among investors will often find it easier to borrow more money and thereby to expand its cash flow, in turn making it even more popular among investors. Conversely, when the company’s profits start to fall it may lose popularity among investors, thereby making its loans more expensive and its profits even lower. This phenomenon amplifies the risks posed by financial bubbles (Keynes 1936).

Given the abstractness and complexity of financial assets and relations, as outlined above, it is easy to see the epistemic challenges they raise. For example, what is a proper basis for forming justified beliefs about matters of money and finance?

A central concept here is that of risk. Since financial assets are essentially promises of future money payments, a main challenge for financial agents is to develop rational expectations or hypotheses about relevant future outcomes. The two main factors in this regard are (1) expected return on the asset, which is typically calculated as the value of all possible outcomes weighted by their probability of occurrence, and (2) financial risk, which is typically calculated as the level of variation in these returns. The concept of financial risk is especially interesting from a philosophical viewpoint since it represents the financial industry’s response to epistemic uncertainty. It is often argued that the financial system is designed exactly to address or minimize financial risks—for example, financial intermediation and markets allow investors to spread their money over several assets with differing risk profiles (Pilbeam 2010, Shiller 2012). However, many authors have been critical of mainstream operationalizations of risk which tend to focus exclusively on historical price volatility and thereby downplay the risk of large-scale financial crises (Lanchester 2010, Thamotheram & Ward 2014).

This point leads us further to questions about the normativity of belief and knowledge. Research on such topics as the ethics of belief and virtue epistemology considers questions about the responsibilities that subjects have in epistemic matters. These include epistemic duties concerning the acquisition, storage, and transmission of information; the evaluation of evidence; and the revision or rejection of belief (see also ethics of belief ). In line with a reappraisal of virtue theory in business ethics, it is in particular virtue epistemology that has attracted attention from scholars working on finance. For example, while most commentators have focused on the moral failings that led to the financial crisis of 2008, a growing literature examines epistemic failures.

Epistemic failings in finance can be detected both at the level of individuals and collectives (de Bruin 2015). Organizations may develop corporate epistemic virtue along three dimensions: through matching epistemic virtues to particular functions (e.g., diversity at the board level); through providing adequate organizational support for the exercise of epistemic virtue (e.g., knowledge management techniques); and by adopting organizational remedies against epistemic vice (e.g., rotation policies). Using this three-pronged approach helps to interpret such epistemic failings as the failure of financial due diligence to spot Bernard Madoff’s notorious Ponzi scheme (uncovered in the midst of the financial crisis) (de Bruin 2014a, 2015).

Epistemic virtue is not only relevant for financial agents themselves, but also for other institutions in the financial system. An important example concerns accounting (auditing) firms. Accounting firms investigate businesses in order to make sure that their accounts (annual reports) offer an accurate reflection of the financial situation. While the primary intended beneficiaries of these auditing services are shareholders (and the public at large), accountants are paid by the firms they audit. This remuneration system is often said to lead to conflicts of interest. While accounting ethics is primarily concerned with codes of ethics and other management tools to minimize these conflicts of interests, an epistemological perspective may help to show that the business-auditor relationship should be seen as involving a joint epistemic agent in which the business provides evidence, and the auditor epistemic justification (de Bruin 2013). We will return to issues concerning conflicts of interest below (in section 4.2 ).

Epistemic virtue is also important for an effective governance or regulation of financial activities. For example, a salient epistemic failing that contributed to the 2008 financial crisis seems to be the way that Credit Rating Agencies rated mortgage-backed securities and other structured finance instruments, and with related failures of financial due diligence, and faulty risk management (Warenski 2008). Credit Rating Agencies provide estimates of credit risk of bonds that institutional investors are legally bound to use in their investment decisions. This may, however, effectively amount to an institutional setup in which investors are forced by law partly to outsource their risk management, which fails to foster epistemic virtue (Booth & de Bruin 2021, de Bruin 2017). Beyond this, epistemic failures can also occur among regulators themselves, as well as among relevant policy makers (see further in section 5.1 ).

A related line of work attests to the relevance of epistemic injustice to finance. Taking Fricker’s (2009) work as a point of departure, de Bruin (2021) examines testimonial injustice in financial services, whereas Mussell (2021) focuses on the harms and wrongs of testimonial injustice as they occur in the relationship between trustees and fiduciaries.

Compared to financial practitioners, one could think that financial economists should be at an epistemic advantage in matters of money and finance. Financial economics is a fairly young but well established discipline in the social sciences that seeks to understand, explain, and predict activities within financial markets. However, a few months after the crash in 2008, Queen Elizabeth II famously asked a room full of financial economists in London why they had not predicted the crisis (Egidi 2014). The Queen’s question should be an excellent starting point for an inquiry into the philosophy of science of financial economics. Yet only a few philosophers of science have considered finance specifically (Vergara Fernández & de Bruin 2021). [ 1 ]

Some important topics in financial economics have received partial attention, including the Modigliani-Miller capital structure irrelevance theorem (Hindriks 2008), the efficient market hypothesis (Collier 2011), the Black-Scholes option pricing model (Weatherall 2017), portfolio theory (Walsh 2015), financial equilibrium models (Farmer & Geanakoplos 2009), the concept of money (Mäki 1997), and behavioral finance (Brav, Heaton, & Rosenberg 2004), even though most of the debate still occurs among economists interested in methodology rather than among philosophers. A host of topics remain to be investigated, however: the concept of Value at Risk (VaR) (and more broadly the concept of financial risk), the capital asset pricing model (CAPM), the Gaussian copula, random walks, financial derivatives, event studies, forecasting (and big data), volatility, animal spirits, cost of capital, the various financial ratios, the concept of insolvency, and neurofinance, all stand in need of more sustained attention from philosophers.

Most existing work on finance in philosophy of science is concerned with models and modelling (see also models in science and philosophy of economics ). It seems intuitive to view financial markets as extremely complex systems: with so many different factors at play, predicting the price of securities (shares, bonds, etc.) seems almost impossible. Yet mainstream financial economics is firmly committed to the idea that market behavior should be understood as ultimately resulting from interactions of agents maximizing their expected utility. This is a direct application of the so-called neoclassical school of economics that was developed during the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. While this school continues to dominate textbooks in the field, there is a growing scholarly trend that seeks to criticize, complement or even replace some of its main assumptions. We can see how the problems play out in both corporate finance and asset pricing theory.

Corporate finance concerns the financing of firms. One question concerns a firm’s capital structure: should a firm obtain funding through equity (that is, from shareholders expecting dividends) or through debt (that is, from bondholders who lend money to the firm and have a contractual right to receive interest on the loans), or through a combination of the two. A key result in corporate finance is the Modigliani-Miller theorem, which says that a firm’s capital structure is irrelevant to its market value (Modigliani & Miller 1958). This theorem makes a number of highly unrealistic assumptions, among them the assumption that markets are efficient, and that there are no taxes. Alongside many other results in economics, it may therefore be considered as useless for predictive purposes; or even as dangerous, once used for such purposes nonetheless (Egidi 2014). In a detailed study of the Modigliani-Miller theorem, Hindriks (2008) has argued, however, that the value of highly idealized models in economics may lie in their providing counterfactual insights, just as in physics. Galileo’s law of free fall tells us what happens in a vacuum. Despite the fact that vacuum is rare in reality, the law is not uninformative, because it allows us to associate observed phenomena to the extent to which an unrealistic assumption must be relaxed. Similarly, if one of the assumptions that the Modigliani-Miller theorem makes is the absence of taxes, the observed relevance of capital structure may well have to be explained as resulting from particular tax regimes. The explanation obtained by relaxing unrealistic assumptions is called “explanation by concretization” (Hindriks 2008).

Explanation by concretization works if models and reality share at least a few concrete features. This is arguably the case for many extant models in finance, including models of bubbles and crises that are immediately relevant to explaining the 2008 crisis (Abreu & Brunnermeier 2003). A fairly recent development called “econophysics” may, however, be an exception. Econophysics uses physics methods to model financial markets (see Rickles 2007 for an overview). Where traditional models of crises include individual investors with beliefs and desires modelled by probability distributions and utility functions, econophysics models capture crises the way physicists model transitions of matter from fluid to solid state (Kuhlmann 2014).

Next, consider asset pricing theory. Ever since Bachelier’s groundbreaking mathematical treatment of asset pricing, financial economists have struggled to find the best way to determine the price developments of securities such as shares, bonds, and derivative instruments such as options. The mathematics of financial returns has received some attention in the literature (de Bruin & Walter 2017; Ippoliti & Chen 2017). Most models assume that returns follow Gaussian random walks, that is, stochastic processes in discrete time with independent and identically distributed increments. Empirical studies show, however, that returns are more peaked than Gaussian distributions, and that they have “fat tails”. This means that extreme events such as financial crises are far less improbable than the models assume. An exception with regards to these assumptions is Benoît Mandelbrot’s (1963) well-known contribution to financial mathematics, and work in this direction is gaining traction in mathematical finance.

A third aspect of financial models concerns the way they incorporate uncertainty (Bertolotti & Magnani 2017). Some of the problems of contemporary financial (and macroeconomic) models are due to the way they model uncertainty as risk, as outlined above (Frydman & Goldberg 2013). Both neo-classical models and behavioral economics capture uncertainty as probabilistic uncertainty, consequently ignoring Knightian uncertainty (Knight 1921 see also decision theory ). The philosophy of science literature that pertains to financial economics is, however, still fairly small (Vergara Fernández & de Bruin 2021).

Having considered the epistemic and scientific challenges of finance, we now turn to the broad range of compelling ethical challenges related to money and finance. The present part is divided into three sections, discussing 1) the claim that financial activities are always morally suspect, 2) various issues of fairness that can arise in financial markets, and 3) discussions about the social responsibilities of financial agents.

4.1 Money as the Root of All Evil?

Throughout cultural history, activities that involve money or finance have been subject to intense moral scrutiny and ethical debate. It seems fair to say that most traditional ethicists held a very negative attitude towards such activities. We will here discuss three very sweeping criticisms, respectively directed at the love of money (the profit motive), usury (lending at interest), and speculation (gambling in finance).

At the heart of many sweeping criticisms of money and finance lies the question of motive. For instance, the full Biblical quotation says that “the love of money is the root of all [kinds of] evil” (1 Timothy 6:10). To have a “love of money”, or (in less moralistic words) a profit motive, means to seek money for its own sake. It has been the subject of much moral criticism throughout history and continues to be controversial in popular morality.

There are three main variations of the criticism. A first variation says that there is something unnatural about the profit motive itself. For example, Aristotle argued that we should treat objects in ways that are befitting to their fundamental nature, and since money is not meant to be a good in itself but only a medium of exchange (see section 1.1 ), he concluded that it is unnatural to desire money as an end in itself ( Politics , 1252a–1260b). A similar thought is picked up by Marx, who argues that capitalism replaces the natural economic cycle of C–M–C (commodity exchanged for money exchanged for commodity) with M–C–M (money exchanged for commodity exchanged for money). Thus the endless accumulation of money becomes the sole goal of the capitalist, which Marx describes as a form of “fetishism” (Marx 1867, volume I).

A second variation of the criticism concerns the character, or more precisely the vice, that the profit motive is thought to exemplify (see also virtue ethics ). To have a love for money is typically associated with selfishness and greed, i.e., a desire to have as much as possible for oneself and/or more than one really needs (McCarty 1988, Walsh & Lynch 2008). Another association is the loss of moral scruples so that one is ready to do anything for money. The financial industry is often held out as the worst in this regard, especially because of its high levels of compensation. Allegations of greed soared after the 2008 crisis, when financial executives continued to receive million-dollar bonuses while many ordinary workers lost their jobs (Piketty 2014, McCall 2010, Andersson & Sandberg 2019).

A third variation of the criticism says that the profit motive signals the absence of more appropriate motives. Kant argued that actions only have moral worth if they are performed for moral reasons, or, more specifically, for the sake of duty. Thus it is not enough that we do what is right, we must also do it because it is right (Kant 1785). Another relevant Kantian principle is that we never should treat others merely as means for our own ends, but always also as ends in themselves (see also Kant’s moral philosophy ). Both of these principles seem to contrast with the profit motive which therefore is rendered morally problematic (Bowie 1999, Maitland 2002). It should come as no surprise that Kant was a strong critic of several examples of “commodification” and other market excesses (see also markets ).

There are two main lines of defensive argumentation. The most influential is Adam Smith’s well-known argument about the positive side-effects of a self-interested pursuit of profits: although the baker and brewer only aim at their own respective good, Smith suggested, they are “led by an invisible hand” to at the same time promote the public good (Smith 1776, see also Mandeville 1732). This argument is typically viewed as a consequentialist vindication of the profit motive (see also consequentialism ): positive societal effects can morally outweigh the possible shortcomings in individual virtue (Flew 1976).

A second argument is more direct and holds that the profit motive can exemplify a positive virtue. For example, there is the well-known Protestant work ethic that emphasizes the positive nature of hard work, discipline and frugality (Long 1972, Wesley 1771). The profit motive can, on this view, be associated with virtues such as ambition, industry, and discipline (see also Brennan 2021). According to Max Weber (1905), the Protestant work ethic played an important role in the development of capitalism. But it is not clear whether any of these arguments can justify an exclusive focus on profits, of course, or rather give permission to also focus on profits under certain circumstances.

If having a love of money seems morally suspect, then the practice of making money on money—for instance, lending money at interest—could seem even worse. This is another sweeping criticism directed at finance that can be found among the traditional ethicists. Societies in both Ancient and Medieval times typically condemned or banned the practice of “usury”, which originally meant all charging of interest on loans. As the practice started to become socially acceptable, usury came to mean the charging of excessive rates of interest. However, modern Islam still contains a general prohibition against interest, and many countries still have at least partial usury laws, most often setting an upper limit on interest rates.

What could be wrong with lending at interest? Some of the more obscure arguments concern the nature of money (again): Aristotle argued that there is something unnatural with “money begetting money”. While he allowed that money is a useful means for facilitating commercial exchange, Aristotle thought that it has no productive use in itself and so receiving interest over and above the borrowed amount is unnatural and wrong ( Politics , 1258b). A related argument can be found in Aquinas, who argued that money is a good that is consumed on use. Although a lender can legitimately demand repayment of an amount equivalent to the loan, it is illegitimate to demand payment for the use of the borrowed amount and so adding interest is unnatural and wrong ( Summa Theologica , II–II, Q78).

Some more promising arguments concern justice and inequality. For example, as early as Plato we see the expression of the worry that allowing interest may lead to societal instability ( The Republic , II). It may be noted that the biblical condemnations of usury most straightforwardly prohibit interest-taking from the poor. One idea here is that we have a duty of charity to the poor and charging interest is incompatible with this duty. Another idea is that the problem lies in the outcome of interest payments: Loans are typically extended by someone who is richer (someone with capital) to someone who is poorer (someone without it) and so asking for additional interest may increase the inequitable distribution of wealth (Sandberg 2012, Visser & MacIntosh 1998). A third idea, which is prominent in the protestant tradition, is that lending often involves opportunism or exploitation in the sense of offering bad deals to poor people who have no other options (Graafland 2010).

The Islamic condemnation of interest, or riba , adds an additional, third line of argument which holds that interest is essentially unearned or undeserved income: Since the lender neither partakes in the actual productive use of the money lent, nor exposes him- or herself to commercial risk, the lender cannot legitimately share in the gains produced by the loan (Ayub 2007, Birnie 1952, Thomas 2006). Based on this argument, contemporary Islamic banks insist that lenders and borrowers must form a business partnership in order for fees on loans to be morally legitimate (Ayub 2007, Warde 2010). Economists have over the years given several retorts to this argument. Some economists stress that lending also involves risk (e.g., that the borrower defaults and is unable to repay); others stress the so-called opportunity costs of lending (i.e., that the money could have been used more profitably elsewhere); and yet again others stress the simple time-preference of individuals (i.e., that we value present more than future consumption, and therefore the lender deserves compensation for postponing consumption).

The gradual abandonment of the medieval usury laws in the West is typically attributed to a growing acknowledgment of the great potential for economic growth unleashed by easy access to capital. One could perhaps say that history itself disproved Aristotle: money indeed proved to have a productive use. In a short text from 1787, Bentham famously poked fun at many of the classical anti-usury arguments and defended the practice of charging interest from a utilitarian standpoint (Bentham 1787). However, this does not mean that worries about the ethics of charging interest, and allegations of usury, have disappeared entirely in society. As noted above, usury today means charging interest rates that seem excessive or exorbitant. For instance, many people are outraged by the rates charged on modern payday loans, or the way in which rich countries exact interest on their loans from poor countries (Baradaran 2015, Graeber 2011, Herzog 2017a). These intuitions have clear affinities with the justice-based arguments outlined above.

A sweeping criticism of a more contemporary nature concerns the supposed moral defects of speculation. This criticism tends to be directed towards financial activities that go beyond mere lending. Critics of the capitalist system often liken the stock market to a casino and investors to gamblers or punters (Sinn 2010, Strange 1986). More moderate critics insist on a strict distinction between investors or shareholders, on the one hand, and speculators or gamblers, on the other (Bogle 2012, Sorell & Hendry 1994). In any case, the underlying assumption is that the similarities between modern financial activities and gambling are morally troublesome.

On some interpretations, these concerns are similar to those raised above. For example, some argue that speculators are driven by the profit motive whereas investors have a genuine concern for the underlying business enterprise (Hendry 2013). Others see speculation as “parasitic”, that is, to be without productive use, and solely dependent on luck (Borna & Lowry 1987, Ryan 1902). This latter argument is similar to the complaint about undeserved income raised in particular by Islamic scholars (Ayub 2007, Warde 2010).

A more distinct interpretation holds that speculation typically includes very high levels of risk-taking (Borna & Lowry 1987). This is morally problematic when the risks not only affect the gambler him or herself but also society as a whole. A root cause of the financial crisis of 2008 was widespread speculation on very risky derivatives such as “synthetic collateralized debt obligations” (see section 1.2 ). When the value of such derivatives fell dramatically, the financial system as a whole came to the brink of collapse. We will return to this issue below (in section 4.3.1 ). In this regard, the question of risk imposition becomes important too (Moggia 2021).

A related interpretation concerns the supposed short-sightedness of speculation. It is often argued that financial agents and markets are “myopic” in the sense that they care only about profits in the very near term, e.g., the next quarter (Dallas 2012). Modern disclosure requirements force companies to publish quarterly earnings reports. The myopia of finance is typically blamed for negative effects such as market volatility, the continuous occurrence of manias and crashes, inadequate investment in social welfare, and the general shortsightedness of the economy (e.g., Lacke 1996).

Defenders of speculation argue that it can serve a number of positive ends. To the extent that all financial activities are speculative in some sense, of course, the ends coincide with the function of finance more generally: to channel funds to the individuals or companies who can use them in the most productive ways. But even speculation in the narrower sense—of high-risk, short-term bets—can have a positive role to play: It can be used to “hedge” or off-set the risks of more long-term investments, and it contributes to sustaining “market liquidity” (that is, as a means for providing counterparties to trade with at any given point of time) which is important for an efficient pricing mechanism (Angel & McCabe 2009, Koslowski 2009).

4.2 Fairness in Financial Markets

Let us now assume that the existence of financial markets is at least in general terms ethically acceptable, so that we can turn to discuss some of the issues involved in making them fair and just for all parties involve. We will focus on three such issues: deception and fraud (honesty), conflicts of interest (care for customers), and insider trading (fair play).

Some of the best-known ethical scandals in finance are cases of deception or fraud. Enron, a huge US corporation, went bankrupt after it was discovered that its top managers had “cooked the books”, i.e., engaged in fraudulent accounting practices, keeping huge debts off the company’s balance sheet in an effort to make it look more profitable (McLean & Elkind 2003). Other scandals in the industry have involved deceptive marketing practices, hidden fees or costs, undisclosed or misrepresented financial risks, and outright Ponzi schemes (see section 2 ).

While these examples seem obvious, on further examination it is not easy to give an exact definition of financial deception or fraud. The most straightforward case seems to be deliberately misrepresenting or lying about financial facts. However, this assumes that there is such a thing as a financial fact, i.e., a correct way of representing a financial value or transaction. In light of the socially constructed nature of money and finance (see section 1 ), this may not always be clear. Less straightforward cases include simply concealing or omitting financial information, or refraining from obtaining the information in the first place.

A philosophical conception of fraud, inspired by Kant, defines it as denying to the weaker party in a financial transaction (such as a consumer or investor) information that is necessary to make a rational (or autonomous) decision (Boatright 2014, Duska & Clarke 2002). Many countries require that the seller of a financial product (such a company issuing shares) must disclose all information that is “material” to the product. It is an interesting question whether this suggestion, especially the conception of rationality involved, should include or rule out a consideration of the ethical nature of the product (such as the ethical nature of the company’s operations) (Lydenberg 2014). Furthermore, there may be information that is legitimately excluded by other considerations, such as the privacy of individuals or companies commonly protected by “bank secrecy” laws.

But is access to adequate information enough? A complication here is that the weaker party, especially ordinary consumers, may have trouble processing the information sufficiently well to identify cases of fraud. This is a structural problem in finance that has no easy fix, because financial products are often abstract, complex, and difficult to price. Therefore, full autonomy of agents may not only require access to adequate information, but also access to sufficient know how, processing ability and resources to analyze the information (Boatright 2014). One solution is to require that the financial services industry promotes transparent communication in which they track the understanding of ordinary consumers (de Bruin 2014b, Endörfer & De Bruin 2019, Shiller 2012).

Due to the problems just noted, the majority of ordinary consumers refrain from engaging in financial markets on their own and instead rely on the services of financial intermediaries, such as banks, investment funds, and insurance companies. But this opens up new ethical problems that are due to the conflicts of interest inherent in financial intermediation. Simply put, the managers or employees of intermediaries have ample opportunity, and often also incentives, to misuse their customers’ money and trust.

Although it is once again difficult to give an exact definition, the literature is full of examples of such misuse—including so-called churning (trading excessively to generate high fees), stuffing (selling the bank’s undesired assets to a client), front-running (buying an asset for the bank first and then reselling it to the client at a higher price) and tailgating (mimicking a client’s trade to piggyback on his/her information) (Dilworth 1994; Heacock, Hill, & Anderson 1987). Interestingly, some argue that the whole industry of actively managed investment funds may be seen as a form of fraud. According to economic theory, namely, it is impossible to beat the average returns of the market for any given level of financial risk, at least in the long term. Therefore, funds who claim that they can do this for a fee are basically cheating their clients (cf. Hendry 2013, Kay 2015).

A legal doctrine that aims to protect clients is so-called fiduciary duty, which imposes obligations on fiduciaries (those entrusted with others’ money) to act in the sole interest of beneficiaries (those who own the money). The interests referred to are typically taken to be financial interests, so the obligation of the fiduciary is basically to maximize investment returns. But some argue that there are cases in which beneficiaries’ broader interests should take precedence, such as when investing in fossil fuels may give high financial returns but pose serious risks to people’s future (Lydenberg 2014; Sandberg 2013, 2016). In any case, it is often thought that fiduciary duties go beyond the ideal of a free market to instead give stronger protection to the weaker party of a fragile relationship.

As an alternative or compliment to fiduciary duty, some argue for the adoption of a code of ethics or professional conduct by financial professionals. A code of ethics would be less arduous in legal terms and is therefore more attractive to free market proponents (Koslowski 2009). It can also cover other fragile relationships (including those of bank-depositor, advisor-client, etc.). Just as doctors and lawyers have a professional code, then, so finance professionals could have one that stresses values such as honesty, due care and accuracy (de Bruin 2016, Graafland & Ven 2011). But according to critics, the financial industry is simply too subdivided into different roles and competencies to have a uniform code of ethics (Ragatz & Duska 2010). It is also unclear whether finance can be regarded as a profession in the traditional sense, which typically requires a body of specialized knowledge, high degrees of organization and self-regulation, and a commitment to public service (Boatright 2014, Herzog 2019).

Probably the most well-known ethical problem concerning fairness in finance, and also perhaps the one on which philosophers most disagree, is so-called insider trading. Put simply, this occurs when an agent uses his or her position within, or privileged information about, a company to buy or sell its shares (or other related financial assets) at favorable times and prices. For example, a CEO may buy shares in his or her company just before it announces a major increase in earnings that will boost the share price. While there is no fraud or breach of fiduciary duty, the agent seems to be exploiting an asymmetry of information.

Just as in the cases above, it is difficult to give an exact definition of insider trading, and the scope of its operative definition tends to vary across jurisdictions. Most commentators agree that it is the information and its attendant informational asymmetry that counts and, thus, the “insider” need not be inside the company at all—those abusing access to information could be family, friends or other tippees (Irvine 1987a, Moore 1990). Indeed, some argue that even stock analysts or journalists can be regarded as insiders if they trade on information that they have gathered themselves but not yet made publicly available. It is also debatable whether an actual trade has to take place or whether insider trading can consist in an omission to trade based on inside information, or also in enabling others to trade or not trade (Koslowski 2009).

Several philosophical perspectives have been used to explain what (if anything) is wrong with insider trading. A first perspective invokes the concept of fair play. Even in a situation with fully autonomous traders, the argument goes, market transactions are not fair if one party has access to information that the other has not. Fair play requires a “level playing field”, i.e., that no participant starts from an unfairly advantaged position (Werhane 1989, 1991). However, critics argue that this perspective imposes excessive demands of informational equality. There are many asymmetries of information in the market that are seemingly unproblematic, e.g., that an antiquary knows more about antiques than his or her customers (Lawson 1988, Machan 1996). So might it be the inaccessibility of inside information that is problematic? But against this, one could argue that, in principle, outsiders have the possibility to become insiders and thus to obtain the exact same information (Lawson 1988, Moore 1990).

A second perspective views insider trading as a breach of duty, not towards the counterparty in the trade but towards the source of the information. US legislation treats inside information as the property of the underlying company and, thus, insider trading is essentially a form of theft of corporate property (often called the misappropriation theory) (Lawson 1988). A related suggestion is that it can be seen as a violation of the fiduciary duty that insiders have towards the company for which they work (Moore 1990). However, critics argue that the misappropriation theory misrepresents the relationship between companies and insiders. On the one hand, there are many normal business situations in which insiders are permitted or even expected to spread inside information to outside sources (Boatright 2014). On the other hand, if the information is the property of the company, why do we not allow it to be “sold” to insiders as a form of remuneration? (Engelen & van Liedekerke 2010, Manne 1966)

A third perspective deals with the effects, both direct and indirect, of allowing insider trading. Interestingly, many argue that the direct effects of such a policy might be positive. As noted above, one of the main purposes of financial markets is to form (or “discover”) prices that reflect all available information about a company. Since insider trading contributes important information, it is likely to improve the process of price discovery (Manne 1966). Indeed, the same reasoning suggests that insider trading actually helps the counterparty in the trade to get a better price (since the insider’s activity is likely to move the price in the “right” direction) so it is a victimless crime (Engelen & Liedekerke 2010). However, others express concern over the indirect effects, which are likely to be more negative. Allowing insider trading may erode the moral standards of market participants by favoring opportunism over fair play (Werhane 1989). Moreover, many people may be dissuaded from even participating in the market since they feel that it is “rigged” to their disadvantage (Strudler 2009).

4.3 The Social Responsibility of Finance

We will now move on to take a societal view on finance, and discuss ideas relating to the broader social responsibilities of financial agents, that go beyond their basic role as market participants. We will discuss three such ideas here, respectively focusing on systemic risk (a responsibility to avoid societal harm), microfinance (a responsibility towards the poor or unbanked), and socially responsible investment (a responsibility to help address societal challenges).

One root cause of the financial crisis of 2008 was the very high levels of risk-taking of many banks and other financial agents. When these risks materialized, the financial system came to the brink of collapse. Many banks lost so much money that their normal lending operations were hampered, which in turn had negative effects on the real economy, with the result that millions of “ordinary” people around the world lost their jobs. Many governments stepped in to bail out the banks and in consequence sacrificed other parts of public spending. This is a prime example of how certain financial activities, when run amok, can have devastating effects on third parties and society in general.

Much subsequent debate has focused on so-called systemic risk, that is, the risk of failures across several agents which impairs the functioning of the financial system as such (Brunnermeier & Oehmke 2013, Smaga 2014). The concept of systemic risk gives rise to several prominent ethical issues. To what extent do financial agents have a moral duty to limit their contributions to systemic risk? It could be argued that financial transactions always carry risk and that this is “part of the game”. But the important point about systemic risk is that financial crises have negative effects on third parties (so-called externalities). This constitutes a prima facie case for a duty of precaution on the part of financial agents, based on the social responsibility to avoid causing unnecessary harm (James 2017, Linarelli 2017). In cases where precaution is impossible, one could add a related duty of rectification or compensation to the victims of the harm (Endörfer 2022). It is, however, a matter of philosophical dispute whether finance professionals can be held morally responsible for these harms (de Bruin 2018, Moggia 2021).

Two factors determine how much an agent’s activity contributes to systemic risk (Brunnermeier & Oehmke 2013, Smaga 2014). The first is financial risk of the agent’s activity in the traditional sense, i.e., the probability and size of the potential losses for that particular agent. A duty of precaution may here be taken to imply, e.g., stricter requirements on capital and liquidity reserves (roughly, the money that the agents must keep in their coffers for emergency situations) (Admati & Hellwig 2013). The second factor is the agent’s place in the financial system, which typically is measured by its interconnectedness with—and thereby potential for cascading effects upon—other agents. This factor indicates that the duty of precaution is stronger for financial agents that are “systemically important” or, as the saying goes, “too-big-to-fail” institutions (Stiglitz 2009).

As an alternative to the reasoning above, one may argue that the duty of precaution is more properly located on the collective, i.e., political level (James 2012, 2017). We return to this suggestion below (in section 5.1 ).

Even in normal times, people with very low income or wealth have hardly any access to basic financial services. Commercial banks have little to gain from offering such services to them; there is an elevated risk of loan losses (since the poor lack collateral) and it is costly to administer a large amount of very small loans (Armendáriz & Morduch 2010). Moreover, there will likely be cases where some bank officers discriminate against underprivileged groups, even where extensive legal protection is in place. An initiative that seeks to remedy these problems is “microfinance”, that is, the extension of financial services, such as lending and saving, to poor people who are otherwise “unbanked”. The initiative started in some of the poorest countries of the world, such as Bangladesh and India.

The justifications offered for microfinance are similar to the justifications offered for development aid. A popular justification holds that affluent people have a duty of assistance towards the poor, and microfinance is thought to be a particularly efficient way to alleviate poverty (Yunus 1998, 2007). But is this correct? Judging from the growing number of empirical “impact studies”, it seems more correct to say that microfinance is sometimes helpful, but at other times can be either ineffective or have negative side-effects (Hudon & Sandberg 2013, Roodman 2012). Another justification holds that there is a basic human right to subsistence, and that this includes a right to savings and credit (Hudon 2009, Meyer 2018). But critics argue that the framework of human rights is not a good fit for financial services that come with both benefits and challenges (Gershman & Morduch 2015, Sorell 2015).

Microfinance is of course different from development aid in that it involves commercial banking relations. This invites the familiar political debate of state- versus market-based support. Proponents of microfinance argue that traditional state-led development projects have been too rigid and corrupt, whereas market-based initiatives are more flexible and help people to help themselves (Armendáriz & Morduch 2010, Yunus 2007). According to critics, however, it is the other way around: Markets will tend to breed greed and inequality, whereas real development is created by large-scale investments in education and infrastructure (Bateman 2010, H. Weber 2004).

In recent years, the microfinance industry has witnessed several “ethical scandals” that seemingly testify to the risk of market excesses. Reports have indicated that interest rates on microloans average at 20–30% per annum, and can sometimes be in excess of 100%, which is much higher than the rates for non-poor borrowers. This raises questions about usury (Hudon & Ashta 2013; Rosenberg, Gonzalez, & Narain 2009). However, some suggest a defense of “second best”, or last resort, when other sources of aid or cheaper credit are unavailable (Sandberg 2012). Microfinance institutions have also been accused of using coercive lending techniques and forceful loan recovery practices (Dichter & Harper (eds) 2007; Priyadarshee & Ghalib 2012). This raises questions about the ethical justifiability of commercial activity directed at the desperately poor, because very poor customers may have no viable alternative to accepting deals that are both unfair and exploitative (Arnold & Valentin 2013, Hudon & Sandberg 2013).

Socially responsible investment refers to the emerging practice whereby financial agents give weight to putatively ethical, social or environmental considerations in investment decisions—e.g., decisions about what bonds or stocks to buy or sell, or how to engage with the companies in one’s portfolio. This is sometimes part of a strictly profit-driven investment philosophy, based on the assumption that companies with superior social performance also have superior financial performance (Richardson & Cragg 2010). But more commonly, it is perceived as an alternative to mainstream investment. The background argument here is that market pricing mechanisms, and financial markets in particular, seem to be unable to promote sufficient levels of social and environmental responsibility in firms. Even though there is widespread social agreement on the evils of sweatshop labor and environmental degradation, for instance, mainstream investors are still financing enterprises that sustain such unjustifiable practices. Therefore, there is a need for a new kind of investor with a stronger sense of social responsibility (Sandberg 2008, Cowton & Sandberg 2012).

The simplest and most common approach among these alternative investors is to avoid investments in companies that are perceived to be ethically problematic. This is typically justified from a deontological idea to the effect that it is wrong to invest in someone else’s wrongdoing (Irvine 1987b, Langtry 2002, Larmer 1997). There are at least three interpretations of such moral “taint”: (1) the view that it is wrong in itself to profit from others’ wrongdoings, or to benefit from other people’s suffering; (2) the view that it is wrong to harm others, or also to facilitate harm to other; or (3) the view that there is a form of expressive or symbolic wrongdoing involved in “morally supporting” or “accepting” wrongful activities.

The deontological perspective above has been criticized for being too black-and-white. On the one hand, it seems difficult to find any investment opportunity that is completely “pure” or devoid of possible moral taint (Kolers 2001). On the other hand, the relationship between the investor and the investee is not as direct as one may think. To the extent that investors buy and sell shares on the stock market, they are not engaging with the underlying companies but rather with other investors. The only way in which such transactions could benefit the companies would be through movements in the share price (which determines the companies’ so-called cost of capital), but it is extremely unlikely that a group of ethical investors can significantly affect that price. After all, the raison d’être of stock exchanges is exactly to create markets that are sufficiently liquid to maintain stable prices (Haigh & Hazelton 2004, Hudson 2005). In response to this, the deontologist could appeal to some notion of universalizability or collective responsibility: perhaps the right question to ask is not “what happens if I do this?” but instead “what happens if we all do this?”. However, such more complicated philosophical positions have problems of their own (see also rule consequentialism and collective responsibility )

A rival perspective on socially responsible investment is the (more straightforward) consequentialist idea that investors’ duty towards society consists in using their financial powers to promote positive societal goods, such as social justice and environmental sustainability. This perspective is typically taken to prefer more progressive investment practices, such as pushing management to adopt more ambitious social policies and/or seeking out environmentally friendly technology firms (Mackenzie 1997, Sandberg 2008). Of course, the flip side of such practices, which may explain why they are less common in the market, is that they invite greater financial risks (Sandberg 2011). It remains an open question whether socially responsible investment will grow enough in size to make financial markets a force for societal change.

Recent work has started exploring whether concrete sustainable finance policies (such as those suggested by the European Commission’s Sustainable Finance Action Plan) will generate sufficient funds to pay for climate change mitigation and adaptation, based as they are on policies of information provision only (De Bruin 2023).

5. Political Philosophy

Discussions about the social responsibility of finance are obviously premised on the observation that the financial system forms a central infrastructure of modern economies and societies. As we noted at the outset, it is important to see that the system contains both private elements (such as commercial banks, insurance companies, and investment funds) and public elements (such as central banks and regulatory bodies). However, issues concerning the proper balance between these elements, especially the proper role and reach of the state, are perennially recurrent in both popular and philosophical debates.

The financial system and the provision of money indeed raise a number of questions that connect it to the “big questions” of political philosophy: including questions of democracy, justice, and legitimacy, at both the national and global levels (on the history of political thinking about money see Eich 2019, 2020, 2022; Ingham 2004, 2019; Martin 2013). The discussions around finance in political philosophy can be grouped under three broad areas: financialization and democracy; finance, money and domestic justice; and finance and global justice. We consider these now in turn.

Many of the questions political philosophy raises about finance have to do with “financialization”. The phenomenon of “financialization”, whereby the economic system has become characterized by the increasing dominance of finance capital and by systems of financial intermediation (Ertürk et al. 2008; Davis 2011; Engelen et al. 2011; Palley 2013), is of potentially substantial normative significance in a number of regards. A related normative concern is the potential growth in political power of the financial sector, which may be seen as a threat to democratic politics.

These worries are, in effect, an amplification of familiar concerns about the “structural power” or “structural constraints” of capital, whereby capitalist investors are able to reduce the freedom of action of democratic governments by threatening “investment strikes” when their preferred political options are not pursued (see Lindblom 1977, 1982; Przeworski & Wallerstein 1988; Cohen 1989; B. Barry 2002; Christiano 2010, 2012; Furendal & O’Neill 2022). To take one recent version of these worries, Stuart White argues that a republican commitment to popular sovereignty is in significant tension with the acceptance of an economic system where important choices about investment, and hence the direction of development of the economy, are under the control of financial interests (White 2011).

In many such debates, the fault-line seems to be the traditional one between those who favor social coordination by free markets, and hence strict limitations on state activities, and those who favor democratic politics, and hence strict limitations on markets (without denying that there can be intermediate positions). But the current financial system is not a pure creature of the free market. In the financial system that we currently see, the principle that individuals are to be held financially accountable for their actions, and that they will therefore be “disciplined” by markets, is patchy at best. One major issue, discussed above, is the problem of banks that are so large and interconnected that their failure would risk taking down the whole financial system—hence, they can anticipate that they will be bailed out by tax-payers’ money, which creates a huge “moral hazard” problem (e.g., Pistor 2013, 2017). In addition, current legal systems find it difficult to impose accountability for complex processes of divided labor, which is why there were very few legal remedies after the financial crisis of 2008 (e.g., Reiff 2017).

The lack of accountability intensifies worries about the power relations between democratic politicians and individuals or corporations in the financial realm. One question is whether we can even apply our standard concept of democracy to societies that have the kinds of financial systems we see today. We may ask whether societies that are highly financialized can ever be true democracies, or whether they are more likely to be “post-democracies” (Crouch 2004). For example, states with high levels of sovereign debt will need to consider the reaction of financial markets in every significant policy decision (see, e.g., Streeck 2013 [2014], see also Klein 2020) Moreover “revolving doors” between private financial institutions and supervising authorities impact on the ability of public officials to hold financial agents accountable. This is similar to the problems of conflicts of interest raised above (see sections 2 and 4.2.2 ). If financial contracts become a central, or maybe even the most central, form of social relations (Lazzarato 2012), this may create an incompatibility with the equal standing of citizens, irrespective of financial position, that should be the basis of a democratic society and its public sphere of deliberation (see also Bennett 2020 from an epistemic perspective).

While finance has, over long stretches of history, been rather strictly regulated, there has been a reversed trend towards deregulation since roughly the 1970s. After the financial crisis of 2008, there have been many calls for reregulation. Proposals include higher capital ratios in banks (Admati & Hellwig 2013), a return to the separation of commercial banking from speculative finance, as had been the case, in the US, during the period when the Glass-Steagall Act was in place (Kay 2015), or a financial transaction tax (Wollner 2014). However, given that the financial system is a global system, one controversial question is whether regulatory steps by single countries would have any effect other than capital flight.

When it comes to domestic social justice, the central question relating to the finance system concerns the ways in which the realization of justice can be helped or hindered by how the financial system is organized.

A first question here, already touched upon in the discussion about microfinance above ( section 4.3.2 ), concerns the status of citizens as participants in financial markets. Should they all have a right to certain financial services such as a bank account or certain forms of loans, because credit should be seen as a primary good in capitalist economies (see, e.g., Hudon 2009, Sorell 2015, Meyer 2018)? More broadly, how does the pattern of access to credit affect the distribution of freedom and unfreedom within society? (see Dietsch 2021; Preiss 2021). These are not only issues for very poor countries, but also for richer countries with high economic inequality, where it becomes a question of domestic justice. In some countries all residents have the right to open a basic bank account (see bank accounts in the EU in Other Internet Resources ). For others this is not the case. It has been argued that not having access to basic financial services creates an unfairness, because it drives poorer individuals into a cash economy in which they are more vulnerable to exploitative lenders, and in which it is more difficult to build up savings (e.g., Baradaran 2015). Hence, it has been suggested either to regulate banking services for individuals more strictly (e.g., Herzog 2017a), to consider various forms of household debt relief (Persad 2018), or to offer a public banking service, e.g., run by the postal office, which offers basic services at affordable costs (Baradaran 2015).

Secondly, financialization may also have more direct effects on socio-economic inequality. Those with managerial positions within the financial sector are disproportionately represented among the very top end of the income distribution, and so the growth of inequality can in part be explained by the growth in the financial sector itself (Piketty 2014). There may also be an effect on social norms, whereby the “hypermeritocratic” norms of the financial sector have played a part in increasing social tolerance for inequality in society more broadly (Piketty 2014: 265, 2020; see also O’Neill 2017, 2021). As Dietsch et al. point out, the process of increasing financialization within the economies of the advanced industrial societies has been encouraged by the actions of central banks over recent decades, and so the issue of financialization also connects closely to questions regarding the justice and legitimacy of central banks and monetary policy (Dietsch, Claveau, & Fontan 2016, 2018; see also Jacobs & King 2016).

Thirdly, many debates about the relation between distributive justice and the financial system revolve around the market for mortgages, because for many individuals, a house is the single largest item for which they need to take out a loan, and their mortgage their main point of interaction with the financial system. This means that the question of who has access to mortgage loans and at what price can have a major impact on the overall distribution of income and wealth. In addition, it has an impact on how financial risks are distributed in society. Highly indebted individuals are more vulnerable when it comes to ups and downs either in their personal lives (e.g., illness, loss of job, divorce) or in the economy as a whole (e.g., economic slumps) (Mian & Sufi 2014). The danger here is that existing inequalities—which many theories of justice would describe as unjust—are reinforced even further (Herzog 2017a).

Here, however, a question about the institutional division of labor arises: which goals of distributive justice should be achieved within markets—and specifically, within financial markets—and which ones by other means, for example through taxation and redistribution? The latter has been the standard approach used by many welfare systems: the idea being to let markets run their course, and then to achieve the desired patterns of distribution by taxation and redistribution. If one remains within that paradigm, questions arise about whether the financial sector should be taxed more highly. In contrast, the approach of “pre-distribution” (Hacker 2011; O’Neill & Williamson 2012; O’Neill 202), or what Dietsch calls “process redistribution” (2010), is to design the rules of the economic game such that they contribute to bringing about the distributive pattern that is seen as just. This could, for example, mean regulating banking services and credit markets in ways that reduce inequality, for example by imposing regulations on payday lenders and banks, so that poor individuals are protected from falling into a spiral of ever higher debt. A more radical view could be to see the financial problems faced by such individuals as being caused by more general structural injustices the solution of which does not necessarily require interventions with the financial industry, but rather more general redistributive (or predistributive) policies.

Money creation: Another alternative theoretical approach is to integrate distributive concerns into monetary policy, i.e., when it comes to the creation of money. So far, central banks have focused on the stability of currencies and, in some cases, levels of employment. This technical focus, together with the risk that politicians might abuse monetary policy to try to boost the economy before elections, have been used in arguments for putting the control of the money supply into the hands of technical experts, removing monetary policy from democratic politics. But after the financial crisis of 2008, many central banks have used unconventional measures, such as “quantitative easing”, which had strongly regressive effects, favoring the owners of stocks or of landed property (Fontan et al. 2016, Dietsch 2017); they did not take into account other societal goals, e.g., the financing of green energy, either. This raises new questions of justice: are such measures justified if their declared aim is to move the economy out of a slump, which presumably also helps disadvantaged individuals (Haldane 2014)? Would other measures, for instance “helicopter money” that is distributed to all citizens, have been a better alternative? And if such measures are used, is it still appropriate to think of central banks as institutions in which nothing but technical expertise is required, or should there be some form of accountability to society? (Fontan, Claveau, & Dietsch 2016; Dietsch 2017; Riles 2018; see also Tucker 2018; van ’t Klooster 2020; James & Hockett 2020, Downey 2021). [ 2 ]

We have already discussed the general issue of the ontological status of money ( section 1.1 above). But there are also significant questions in political philosophy regarding the question of where, and by what sorts of institutions, should the money supply be controlled. One complicating factor here is the extensive disagreement about the institutional basis of money creation, as described above. One strand of the credit theory of money emphasizes that in today’s world, money creation is a process in which commercial banks play a significant role. These banks in effect create new money when they make new loans to individual or business customers (see McLeay, Radia, & Thomas 2014; see also Palley 1996; Ryan-Collins et al. 2012; Werner 2014a,b). James Tobin refers to commercial bank-created money, in an evocative if now dated image as “fountain pen money”, that is, money created with the swish of the bank manager’s fountain pen (Tobin 1963).

However, the relationship between private commercial banks and the central bank is a complicated one, such that we might best think of money creation as a matter involving a kind of hybrid public-private partnership. Hockett and Omarova refer to this relationship as constituting a “finance franchise”, with private banks being granted on a “franchise” basis the money-creating powers of the sovereign monetary authority, while van ’t Klooster describes this relation between the public and private as constituting a “hybrid monetary constitution” (Hockett & Omarova 2017; van ’t Klooster 2017; see also Bell 2001). In this hybrid public-private monetary system, it is true that private commercial banks create money, but they nevertheless do so in a way that involves being regulated and subject to the authority of the central bank within each monetary jurisdiction, with that central bank also acting as “lender of last resort” (Bagehot 1873) when inter-bank lending dries up. [ 3 ]

When the curious public-private nature of money creation is brought into focus, it is not surprising that there should exist views advocating a shift away from this hybrid monetary constitution, either in the direction of a fully public option, or a fully private system of money creation.

Advocates of fully public banking envisage a system in which private banks are stripped of their authority to create new money, and where instead the money supply is directly controlled either by the government or by some other state agency; for example by the central bank lending directly to firms and households. Such a position can be defended on a number of normative grounds: that a public option would allow for greater financial stability, that a fully public system of money creation would allow a smoother transmission of democratic decisions regarding economic governance; or simply because of the consequences of such a system with regards to socioeconomic inequality and environmental sustainability (see Jackson & Dyson 2012; Wolf 2014a,b; Lainà 2015; Dyson, Hodgson, & van Lerven 2016a,b; Ingham, Coutts, & Konzelmann 2016; Dow 2016; Wodruff 2019; van’t Klooster 2019, Mellor 2019, Dietsch 2021; for commentary and criticism see Goodhart & Jensen 2015; Fontana & Sawyer 2016, Larue et al. 2020).

In stark contrast, a number of libertarian authors have defended the view that the central bank should have no role in money creation, with the money supply being entirely a matter for private suppliers (and with the consumers of money able to choose between different rival suppliers), under a system of “free banking” (e.g., Simons 1936; Friedman 1962; von Hayek 1978; Selgin 1988). Advocacy of private money creation has received a more recent stimulus with the rise of Bitcoin and other crypto-currencies, with some of Bitcoin’s advocates drawing on similar libertarian arguments to those offered by Hayek and Selgin (see Golumbia 2016, Robison 2022). One can also mention the “alternative currencies” movement here which defends private money creation on entirely different grounds, most often by appeal to the value of community (see Larue 2022, Larue et al. 2022).

Finally, a number of issues relate questions about finance to questions about global justice. The debate about global justice (see also global justice ) has weighed the pros and cons of “statist” and “cosmopolitan” approaches, that is, approaches to justice that would focus on the nation state (maybe with some additional duties of beneficence to the globally poor) or on the global scale. The financial system is one of the most globalized systems of social interaction that currently exist, and global entanglements are hard to deny (e.g., Valentini 2011: 195–8). The question thus is whether this creates duties of justice on the financial system, and if so, whether it fulfills these duties, i.e., whether it contributes to making the world more globally just, or whether it tends in the opposite direction (or whether it is neutral).

There are a number of institutions, especially the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund (IMF), that constitute a rudimentary global order of finance. Arguably, many countries, especially poorer ones, cannot reasonably opt out of the rules established by these institutions (e.g., Hassoun 2012, Krishnamurthy 2014). It might therefore appear to be required by justice that these institutions be governed in a way that represents the interests of all countries. But because of historical path-dependencies, and because a large part of their budget comes from Western countries, the governance structures are strongly biased in their favor (for example, the US can veto all important decisions in the IMF). Miller (2010: 134–41) has described this situation as “indirect financial rule” by the US (see also Herzog 2021).

An issue worth noting in this context is the fact that the US dollar, and to a lesser degree the Euro, function as de facto global currencies, with a large part of global trade being conducted in these currencies (e.g., Mehrling 2011, Eichengreen 2011). This allows the issuing countries to run a current account deficit, which amounts to a redistribution from poorer to richer countries for which compensation might be owed (Reddy 2005: 224–5). This fact also raises questions about the distribution of power in the global sphere, which has often been criticized as favoring Western countries (e.g., Gulati 1980, United Nations 2009). However, global financial markets serve not only to finance trade in goods and services; there are also questions about fluctuations in these markets that result exclusively from speculations (see also sect.1.4.3 above). Such fluctuations can disproportionately harm poorer countries, which are more vulnerable to movements of capital or rapid changes in commodity prices. Hence, an old proposal that has recently been revived and defended from a perspective of global justice is that of a “Tobin tax” (Tobin 1978), which would tax financial transactions and thereby reduce volatility in international financial markets (Reddy 2005, Wollner 2014).

A second feature of the current global order that has been criticized from a perspective of justice is the “borrowing privilege”. As Pogge describes (e.g., 2008: chap. 4), the governments of countries can borrow on international financial markets, no matter whether they have democratic legitimacy or not. This means that rogue governments can finance themselves by incurring debts that future generations of citizens will have to repay.

Sovereign debt raises a number of questions that are related to global justice. Usually, the contracts on which they are based are considered as absolutely binding (e.g., Suttle 2016), which can threaten national sovereignty (Dietsch 2011), and raises questions of the moral and political responsibilities both of citizens of debtor nations, and of creditor countries themselves (Wiedenbrüg, 2018a, 2018b). These problems obtain in particular with regard to what has been called “odious” debt (Sack 1927, Howse 2007, Dimitriu 2015, King 2016): cases in which government officials sign debt contracts in order to enrich themselves, with lenders being aware of this fact. Such cases have been at the center of calls for a jubilee for indebted nations. At the moment, there are no binding international rules for how to deal with sovereign bankruptcy, and countries in financial distress have no systematic possibility of making their claims heard, which is problematic from a perspective of justice (e.g., Palley 2003; Reddy 2005: 26–33; Herman 2007; C. Barry & Tomitova 2007; Wollner 2018). The IMF, which often supports countries in restructuring sovereign debt, has often made this support conditional upon certain requirements about rearranging the economic structures of a country (for a discussion of the permissibility of such practices see C. Barry 2011).

Finally, and perhaps most importantly, the issue of financial regulation has a global dimension in the sense that capital is mobile across national boundaries, creating the threats to democracy described above. This fact makes it difficult for individual countries, especially smaller ones, to install the more rigid financial regulations that would be required from a perspective of justice. Just as with many other questions of global justice (see, e.g., Dietsch 2015 on taxation), we seem to see a failure of coordination between countries, which leads to a “race to the bottom”. Making global financial institutions more just is therefore likely to require significant levels of international cooperation.

• Abreu, Dilip and Markus K. Brunnermeier, 2003, “Bubbles and Crashes”, Econometrica , 71(1): 173–204. doi:10.1111/1468-0262.00393
• Admati, Anat and Martin Hellwig, 2013, The Bankers’ New Clothes. What’s Wrong with Banking and What to Do about It , Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.
• Andersson, Alexander and Joakim Sandberg, 2019, “Moralising Economic Desert,” in Christopher Cowton, James Dempsey, and Tom Sorell (eds.), Business Ethics After the Global Financial Crisis: Lessons from the Crash , New York: Routledge, pp. 165–184.
• Angel, James J. and Douglas M. McCabe, 2009, “The Ethics of Speculation”, Journal of Business Ethics , 90(supp. 3): 277–286. doi:10.1007/s10551-010-0421-5
• Aquinas, Summa Theologica , Fathers of the English Dominican Province, trans. 5 vols. Westminster, MD: Christian Classics, 1981.
• Aristotle, Politics , in The Complete Works of Aristotle , J. Barnes (ed.), Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1984. [ Politics available online ]
• Armendáriz, Beatriz and Jonathan Morduch, 2010, The Economics of Microfinance , second edition, Cambridge, MA: The MIT Press.
• Arnold, Denis G. and Andres Valentin, 2013, “Corporate Social Responsibility at the Base of the Pyramid”, Journal of Business Research , 66(10): 1904–1914. doi:10.1016/j.jbusres.2013.02.012
• Ayub, Muhammad, 2007, Understanding Islamic Finance , Chichester: John Wiley & Sons.
• Bagehot, Walter, 1873 [1999]. Lombard Street: A Description of the Money Market , New York: Wiley Investment Classics.
• Baradaran, Mehrsa, 2015, How the Other Half Banks. Exclusion, Exploitation, and the Threat to Democracy , Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.
• Barry, Brian, 2002, “Capitalists Rule Ok? Some Puzzles About Power”, Politics, Philosophy & Economics , 1(2): 155–184. doi:10.1177/1470594X02001002001
• Barry, Christian, 2011, “Human Rights Conditionality in Sovereign Debt Relief”, Journal of Political Philosophy , 19(3): 282–305. doi:10.1111/j.1467-9760.2011.00395.x
• Barry, Christian and Lydia Tomitova, 2007, “Fairness in Sovereign Debt”, Ethics & International Affairs , 21(S1): 41–79. doi:10.1111/j.1747-7093.2007.00084.x
• Bateman, Milford, 2010, Why Doesn’t Microfinance Work? London: Zed Books.
• Bell, Stephanie, 2001, “The Role of the State and the Hierarchy of Money”, Cambridge Journal of Economics , 25(2): 149–163. doi:10.1093/cje/25.2.149
• Bennett, Michael, 2020, “An Epistemic Argument for an Egalitarian Public Sphere”, Episteme , first online 26 October 2020. doi:10.1017/epi.2020.42
• Bentham, Jeremy, 1787, Defence of Usury , London: Payne and Foss.
• Bertolotti, Tommaso and Lorenzo Magnani, 2017, “Contemporary Finance as a Critical Cognitive Niche: An Epistemological Outlook on the Uncertain Effects of Contrasting Uncertainty”, Studies in Applied Philosophy, Epistemology and Rational Ethics , 34(2): 129–150. doi:10.1007/978-3-319-49872-0_8
• Birnie, Arthur, 1952, The History and Ethics of Interest , London: William Hodge & Company.
• Boatright, John Raymond (ed.), 2010, Finance Ethics: Critical Issues in Theory and Practice , Hoboken, NJ: John Wiley & Sons. doi:10.1002/9781118266298
• –––, 2014, Ethics in Finance , third edition, Chichester: John Wiley & Sons.
• Bogle, John C., 2012, The Clash of Cultures: Investment vs. Speculation , Hoboken, NJ: John Wiley & Sons.
• Booth, Anthony and Boudewijn de Bruin, 2021, “Stakes Sensitivity and Credit Rating: A New Challenge for Regulators”, Journal of Business Ethics , 169: 169–179. doi:10.1007/s10551-019-04260-2
• Borna, Shaheen and James Lowry, 1987, “Gambling and Speculation”, Journal of Business Ethics , 6(3): 219–224. doi:10.1007/BF00382867
• Bowie, Norman E., 1999, Business Ethics: A Kantian Perspective , Oxford: Blackwell.
• Brav, Alon, J.B. Heaton, and Alexander Rosenberg, 2004, “The Rational-Behavioral Debate in Financial Economics”, Journal of Economic Methodology , 11(4): 393–409. doi:10.1080/1350178042000177978
• Brennan, Jason, 2021, Why It’s OK to Want to Be Rich , New York: Routledge.
• Brunnermeier, Markus K. and Martin Oehmke, 2013, “Bubbles, Financial Crises, and Systemic Risk”, in Handbook of the Economics of Finance , George M. Constantinides, Milton Harris, and Rene M. Stulz (eds), Amsterdam: Elsevier, Volume 2, Part B: 1221–1288. doi:10.1016/B978-0-44-459406-8.00018-4
• Brynjarsdóttir, Eyja, 2018, The Reality of Money: The Metaphysics of Financial Value , London: Rowman & Littlefield International.
• Cetina, Karin Knorr and Alex Preda (eds.), 2012, The Oxford Handbook of the Sociology of Finance , first edition, Oxford: Oxford University Press. doi:10.1093/oxfordhb/9780199590162.001.0001
• Christiano, Thomas, 2010, “The Uneasy Relationship between Democracy and Capital”, Social Philosophy and Policy , 27(1): 195–217. doi:10.1017/S0265052509990082
• –––, 2012, “Money and Politics”, in David Estlund (ed.), The Oxford Handbook of Political Philosophy , Oxford: Oxford University Press, 241–257. doi:10.1093/oxfordhb/9780195376692.013.0013
• Cohen, Joshua, 1989, “The Economic Basis of Deliberative Democracy”, Social Philosophy and Policy , 6(2): 25–50. doi:10.1017/S0265052500000625
• Collier, Charles W., 2011, “An Inefficient Truth”, Critical Review , 23(1–2), 29–71. doi:10.1080/08913811.2011.574469
• Cowton, Christopher J. and Joakim Sandberg, 2012, “Socially Responsible Investment”, in R. Chadwick (ed.), Encyclopedia of Applied Ethics , second edition, vol. 4, San Diego: Academic Press, pp. 142–151. doi:10.1016/B978-0-12-373932-2.00086-7
• Crouch, Colin, 2004, Post-Democracy , Cambridge: Polity.
• Dallas, Lynne L., 2012, “Short-Termism, the Financial Crisis, and Corporate Governance”, Journal of Corporation Law , 37: 265–364.
• Davis, Gerald F., 2011, Managed by the Markets. How Finance Re-Shaped America , New York: Oxford University Press.
• de Bruin, Boudewijn, 2013, “Epistemic Integrity in Accounting: Accountants as Justifiers in Joint Epistemic Agents”, Business & Professional Ethics Journal , 32(2): 109–130. doi:10.5840/bpej2013321/25
• –––, 2014a, “Epistemically Virtuous Risk Management: Financial Due Diligence and Uncovering the Madoff Fraud”, in Christoph Luetge and Johanna Jauernig (eds.), Business Ethics and Risk Management , Dordrecht: Springer, 27–42. doi:10.1007/978-94-007-7441-4_3
• –––, 2014b, “Ethics Management in Banking and Finance”, in Nicholas Morris and David Vines (eds.), Capital Failure: Rebuilding Trust in Financial Services , Oxford: Oxford University Press, 255–276. doi:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780198712220.003.0012
• –––, 2015, Ethics and the Global Financial Crisis. Why Incompetence is Worse than Greed , Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
• –––, 2016, “Pledging Integrity: Oaths as Forms of Business Management”, Journal of Business Ethics , 136(1): 23–42. doi:10.1007/s10551-014-2504-1
• –––, 2017, “Information as a Condition of Justice in Financial Markets: The Regulation of Credit-Rating Agencies”, in Herzog 2017b: 250–270. doi:10.1093/oso/9780198755661.003.0011
• –––, 2018, “Moral Responsibility for Large-Scale Events: The Difference between Climate Change and Economic Crises”, Midwest Studies in Philosophy , 42(1): 191–212. doi:10.1111/misp.12090
• –––, 2021, “Epistemic Injustice in Finance”, Topoi , 40(4): 755–763. doi:10.1007/s11245-019-09677-y
• –––, 2023, “Climate Change and Reflexive Law: The EU Sustainable Finance Action Plan”, in Joakim Sandberg & Lisa Warenski (eds.), The Philosophy of Money and Finance , Oxford: Oxford University Press.
• de Bruin, Boudewijn and Christian Walter, 2017, “Research Habits in Financial Modelling: The Case of Non-normativity of Market Returns in the 1970s and the 1980s”, in Ippoliti and Chen 2017: 73–93. doi:10.1007/978-3-319-49872-0_5
• Dichter, Thomas W. and Malcolm Harper (eds.), 2007, What’s Wrong with Microfinance? Rugby: Practical Action Publishing.
• Dietsch, Peter, 2010, “The Market, Competition, and Equality”, Politics, Philosophy & Economics , 9(2): 213–244. doi:10.1177/1470594X09359148
• –––, 2011, “Rethinking Sovereignty in International Fiscal Policy”, Review of International Studies , 37(5): 2107–2120. doi:10.1017/S0260210511000349
• –––, 2015, Catching Capital: The Ethics of Tax Competition , New York: Oxford University Press. doi:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780190251512.001.0001
• –––, 2017, “Normative Dimensions of Central Banking: How the Guardians of Financial Markets Affect Justice”, in Herzog 2017b: 231–249. doi:10.1093/oso/9780198755661.003.0010
• –––, 2021, “Money creation, debt, and justice”, Politics, Philosophy and Economics , 20(2): 151–179.
• Dietsch, Peter, François Claveau, and Clément Fontan, 2016, “Central banking and inequality: taking off the blinders”, Politics, Philosophy & Economics , 15(4): 319–357.
• Dietsch, Peter, François Claveau, and Clément Fontan, 2018, Do Central Banks Serve the People? Oxford: Polity Press.
• Dilworth, John B., 1994, “The Ethical Importance of Conflicts of Interest: Accounting and Finance Examples”, Business & Professional Ethics Journal , 13(1): 25–40.
• Dimitriu, Cristian, 2015, “Odious Debts: A Moral Account”, Jurisprudence , 6(3): 470–491. doi:10.1080/20403313.2015.1065646
• Downey, Leah, 2021, “Delegation in Democracy: A Temporal Analysis”, Journal of Political Philosophy , 29(3): 305–29. doi: 10.1111/jopp.12234
• Douglas, Alexander X., 2016, The Philosophy of Debt , New York: Routledge.
• Dow, Sheila, 2016, “The Political Economy of Monetary Reform”, Cambridge Journal of Economics , 40(5): 1363–1376. doi:10.1093/cje/bew013
• Duska, Ronald F. and James J. Clarke, 2002, “Ethical Issues in Financial Services”, in Norman E. Bowie (ed.), The Blackwell Guide to Business Ethics , Oxford: Blackwell, 206–224.
• Dyson, Ben, Graham Hodgson, and Frank van Lerven, 2016a, Sovereign Money: an Introduction , London: Positive Money.
• –––, 2016b, “A Response to Critiques of ‘Full Reserve Banking’”, Cambridge Journal of Economics , 40(5): 1351–1361. doi:10.1093/cje/bew036
• Egidi, Massimo, 2014, “The Economics of Wishful Thinking and the Adventures of Rationality”, Mind and Society , 13(1): 9–27. doi:10.1007/s11299-014-0146-8
• Eich, Stefan, 2019, “Between Justice and Accumulation: Aristotle on Currency and Reciprocity”, Political Theory , 47(3): 363–90. doi: 10.1177/0090591718802634
• –––, 2020, “John Locke and the Politics of Monetary Depoliticization”, Modern Intellectual History , 17(1): 1–28. doi: 10.1017/S1479244318000185
• –––, 2022, The Currency of Politics: The Political Theory of Money from Aristotle to Keynes , Princeton: Princeton University Press.
• Eichengreen, Barry J., 2011, Exorbitant Privilege: The Rise and the Fall of the Dollar and the Future of the International Monetary System , Oxford: Oxford University Press.
• Endörfer, Richard, 2022, Weapons of Mass Destruction: Financial Crises from a Philosophical Perspective , Gothenburg: Acta Universitatis Gothoburgensis.
• Endörfer, Richard and Boudewijn de Bruin, 2019, “Freedom in Finance: The Importance of Epistemic Virtues and Interlucent Communication”, in Business Ethics after the Global Financial Crisis: Lessons from the Crash , Christopher Cowton, James Demsey and Tom Sorell (eds.), New York: Routledge, 104–130.
• Engelen, Peter-Jan and Luc Van Liedekerke, 2010, “Insider Trading”, in Boatright 2010: 199–221. doi:10.1002/9781118266298.ch11
• Engelen, Ewald, Ismail Ertürk, Julie Froud, Sukhdev Johal, Adam Leaver, Mick Moran, Adriana Nilsson, and Karel Williams, 2011, After the Great Complacence: Financial Crisis and the Politics of Reform , Oxford: Oxford University Press. doi:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199589081.001.0001
• Ertürk, Ismail, Julie Froud, Sukhdev Johal, Adam Leaver, and Karel Williams (eds.), 2008, Financialization at Work: Key Texts and Commentary , London: Routledge.
• Fabozzi, Frank J., 2002, The Handbook of Financial Instruments , Hoboken: Wiley.
• Farmer, J. Doyne and John Geanakoplos, 2009, “The Virtues and Vices of Equilibrium and the Future of Financial Economics”, Complexity , 14(3): 11–38. doi:10.1002/cplx.20261
• Ferguson, Niall, 2008, The Ascent of Money: A Financial History of the World , London: Penguin.
• Flew, Antony, 1976, “The Profit Motive”, Ethics , 86(4): 312–322. doi:10.1086/292007
• Fontan, Clément, François Claveau, and Peter Dietsch, 2016, “Central Banking and Inequalities: Taking off the Blinders”, Politics, Philosophy & Economics , 15(4): 319–357. doi:10.1177/1470594X16651056
• Fontana, Giuseppe and Malcolm Sawyer, 2016, “Full Reserve Banking: More ‘Cranks’ Than ‘Brave Heretics’”, Cambridge Journal of Economics , 40(5): 1333–1350. doi:10.1093/cje/bew016
• Friedman, Milton, 1962, “Should There Be an Independent Monetary Authority?” in Leland B. Yeager (ed.), In Search of a Monetary Constitution , Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 219–43.
• Furendal, Markus and Martin O’Neill, 2022, “Work, Justice, and Collective Capital Institutions: Revisiting Rudolf Meidner and the Case for Wage-Earner Funds”, Journal of Applied Philosophy , first online 24 November 2022. doi: 10.1111/japp.12631
• Frydman, Roman and Michael D. Goldberg, 2013, “Fallibility in Formal Macroeconomics and Finance Theory”, Journal of Economic Methodology , 20(4): 386–396. doi:10.1080/1350178X.2013.859425
• Gershman, John and Jonathan Morduch, 2015, “Credit Is Not a Right”, in Microfinance, Rights and Global Justice , Tom Sorell and Luis Cabrera (eds.), Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 14–26. doi:10.1017/CBO9781316275634.002
• Golumbia, David, 2016, The Politics of Bitcoin: Software as Right-Wing Extremism , Minneapolis, University of Minnesota Press.
• Goodhart, Charles A.E. and Meinhard A. Jensen, 2015, “Currency School versus Banking School: an Ongoing Confrontation”, Economic Thought , 4(2): 20–31. [ Goodhart & Jensen 2015 available online ]
• Graafland, Johan J., 2010, “Calvin’s Restrictions on Interest: Guidelines for the Credit Crisis”, Journal of Business Ethics , 96(2): 233–248. doi:10.1007/s10551-010-0462-9
• Graafland, Johan J. and Bert W. van de Ven, 2011, “The Credit Crisis and the Moral Responsibility of Professionals in Finance”, Journal of Business Ethics , 103(4): 605–619. doi:10.1007/s10551-011-0883-0
• Graeber, David, 2011, Debt: The First 5000 Years , New York: Melville House.
• Guala, Francesco, 2016, Understanding Institutions: The Science and Philosophy of Living Together , Princeton: Princeton University Press.
• Gulati, Iqbal, 1980, International Monetary Development and the Third World: A Proposal to Redress the Balance , New Dehli: Orient Longman.
• Hacker, Jacob S., 2011, “The Institutional Foundations of Middle-Class Democracy”, in Priorities for a New Political Economy: Memos to the Left , Policy Network Briefs, < Hacker 2011 available online >
• Haigh, Matthew and James Hazelton, 2004, “Financial Markets: A Tool for Social Responsibility?”, Journal of Business Ethics , 52(1): 59–71. doi:10.1023/B:BUSI.0000033107.22587.0b
• Haldane, Andrew G., 2014, “Unfair Shares”, Remarks given at the Bristol Festival of Ideas, May 21. [ Haldane 2014 available online ]
• Hassoun, Nicole, 2012, Globalization and Global Justice: Shrinking Distances, Expanding Obligations , Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. doi:10.1017/CBO9780511845802
• Hawley, James P., Andreas G.F. Hoepner, Keith L. Johnson, Joakim Sandberg, and Edward J. Waitzer (eds.), 2014, Cambridge Handbook of Institutional Investment and Fiduciary Duty , Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. doi:10.1017/CBO9781139565516
• Heacock, Marian V, Kendall P. Hill, and Seth C. Anderson, 1987, “Churning: An Ethical Issue in Finance”, Business and Professional Ethics Journal , 6(1): 3–17.
• Hendry, John, 2013, Ethics and Finance: An Introduction , Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. doi:10.1017/CBO9781139162494
• Herman, Barry, 2007, “The Players and the Game of Sovereign Debt”, Ethics & International Affairs , 21(S1): 9–39. doi:10.1111/j.1747-7093.2007.00083.x
• Herzog, Lisa, 2017a, “What Could be Wrong with a Mortgage? Private Debt Markets from a Perspective of Structural Injustice”, Journal of Political Philosophy , 25(4): 411–434. doi:10.1111/jopp.12107
• ––– (ed.), 2017b, Just Financial Markets? Finance in a Just Society , Oxford: Oxford University Press. doi:10.1093/oso/9780198755661.001.0001
• –––, 2019, “Professional Ethics in Banking and the Logic of ‘Integrated Situations’: Aligning Responsibilities, Recognition, and Incentives”, Journal of Business Ethics , First Online: 12 May 2017. doi:10.1007/s10551-017-3562-y
• –––, 2021, “Global reserve currencies from the perspective of structural global justice: distribution and domination”, Critical Review of International Social and Political Philosophy , 24(7): 931–953.
• Hindriks, Frank, 2008, “False Models as Explanatory Engines”, Philosophy of the Social Sciences , 38(3): 334–360. doi:10.1177/0048393108319414
• Hindriks, Frank & Joakim Sandberg, 2020, “Money: What It Is and What It Should Be,” Journal of Social Ontology , 6(2): 237–243.
• Hindriks, Frank & Francesco Guala, 2021, “The Functions of Institutions: Etiology and Teleology,” Synthese , 198(3): 2027–2043.
• Hockett, Robert C. and Saule T. Omarova, 2017, “The Finance Franchise”, Cornell Law Review , 102: 1143–1218. doi:10.2139/ssrn.2820176
• Howse, Robert, 2007, “The Concept of Odious Debt in Public International Law”, (UNCTAD Discussion Papers, 185), United Nations Conference on Trade and Development, July. [ Howse 2007 available online ]
• Hudon, Marek, 2009, “Should Access to Credit Be a Right?” Journal of Business Ethics , 84(1): 17–28. doi:10.1007/s10551-008-9670-y
• Hudon, Marek and Arvind Ashta, 2013, “Fairness and Microcredit Interest Rates: from Rawlsian Principles of Justice to the Distribution of the Bargaining Range”, Business Ethics: A European Review , 22(3): 277–291. doi:10.1111/beer.12026
• Hudon, Marek and Joakim Sandberg, 2013, “The Ethical Crisis in Microfinance: Issues, Findings, and Implications”, Business Ethics Quarterly , 23(4): 561–589. doi:10.5840/beq201323440
• Hudson, Richard, 2005, “Ethical Investing: Ethical Investors and Managers”, Business Ethics Quarterly , 15(4): 641–657. doi:10.5840/beq200515445
• Ingham, Geoffrey, 2004, The Nature of Money , Cambridge: Polity Press.
• Ingham, Geoffrey, Ken Coutts, and Sue Konzelmann, 2016, “Introduction: ‘Cranks’ and ‘Brave Heretics’: Rethinking Money and Banking after the Great Financial Crisis”, Cambridge Journal of Economics , 40(5): 1247–1257. doi:10.1093/cje/bew040
• Innes, A. Mitchell, 1913, “What is Money?”, Banking Law Journal , 30(5/May): 377–408.
• –––, 1914, “The Credit Theory of Money”, Banking Law Journal , 31(2/February): 151–168.
• Ippoliti, Emiliano and Ping Chen (eds.), 2017, Methods and Finance: A Unifying View on Finance, Mathematics, and Philosophy , (Studies in Applied Philosophy, Epistemology and Rational Ethics, 34), Cham: Springer. doi:10.1007/978-3-319-49872-0
• Irvine, William B., 1987a, “Insider Trading: An Ethical Appraisal”, Business and Professional Ethics Journal , 6(4): 3–33.
• –––, 1987b, “The Ethics of Investing”, Journal of Business Ethics , 6(1): 233–242. doi:10.1007/BF00382870
• Jackson, Andrew and Ben Dyson, 2012, Modernising Money: Why Our Monetary System Is Broken and How It Can Be Fixed , London: Positive Money.
• Jacobs, Lawrence R. and Desmond S. King, 2016, Fed Power: How Finance Wins , New York: Oxford University Press.
• Jaggar, Alison M., 2002, “A Feminist Critique of the Alleged Southern Debt”, Hypatia , 17(4): 119–142. doi:10.1353/hyp.2002.0078
• James, Aaron, 2012, Fairness in Practice: A Social Contract for a Global Economy , Oxford: Oxford University Press. doi:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199846153.001.0001
• –––, 2017, “The Distinctive Significance of Systemic Risk”, Ratio Juris , 30(3): 239–258. doi:10.1111/raju.12150
• James, Aaron and Robert Hockett, 2020, Money From Nothing: Or, Why We Should Stop Worrying about Debt and Learn to Love the Federal Reserve , Melville House Publishing.
• Kant, Immanuel, 1785, Grundlegung zur Metaphysik der Sitten , Riga: J. F. Hartknoch.
• Kay, J.A., 2015, Other People’s Money: Masters of the Universe or Servants of the People? London: Profile Books
• Keynes, John Maynard, 1936, The General Theory of Employment, Interest and Money , London: Palgrave
• Kindleberger, Charles P., 1978, Manias, Panics, and Crashes: A History of Financial Crises , London: Macmillan.
• Klein, Steven, 2020, “The power of money: Critical theory, capitalism, and the politics of debt”, Constellations 27(1): 19–35.
• King, Jeff, 2016, The Doctrine of Odious Debt in International Law. A Restatement , Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. doi:10.1017/CBO9781316422809
• Knapp, Georg Friedrich, 1924, The State Theory of Money , H. M. Lucas and James Bonar (trans.), London: Macmillan. Abridgment and translation of Staatliche Theorie des Geldes , Leipzig: Duncker & Humblot, 1905.
• Knight, Frank H., 1921, Risk, Uncertainty and Profit , Boston: Houghton Mifflin Company.
• Kolers, Avery, 2001, “Ethical Investing: the Permissibility of Participation”, Journal of Political Philosophy , 9(4): 435–452. doi:10.1111/1467-9760.00135
• Koslowski, Peter, 2009, Ethik der Banken: Folgerungen aus der Finanzkrise , Munich: Wilhelm Fink Verlag.
• Krishnamurthy, Meena, 2014, “International Financial Institutions”, in Darell Moellendorf and Heather Widdows (eds.), Handbook of Global Ethics , Abingdon: Routledge, 230–250.
• Kuhlmann, Meinard, 2014, “Explaining Financial Markets in Terms of Complex Systems”, Philosophy of Science , 81(5): 1117–1130. doi:10.1086/677699
• Lacke, Jay C., 1996, “The Ethics of Financial Derivatives in the History of Economic Thought”, in W. Michael Hoffman, Judith Brown Kamm, Robert E. Frederick, and Edward S. Petry (eds.), The Ethics of Accounting and Finance: Trust, Responsibility, and Control , Westport: Quorum Books, pp. 165–179.
• Lanchester, John, 2010, I.O.U.: Why Everyone Owes Everyone and No One Can Pay , New York: Simon & Schuster
• Lainà, Patrizio, 2015, “Proposals for Full-Reserve Banking: a Historical Survey from David Ricardo to Martin Wolf”, Economic Thought , 4(2): 1–19. [ Lainà 2015 available online ]
• Langtry, B., 2002, “The Ethics of Shareholding”, Journal of Business Ethics , 37(2): 175–85. doi:10.1023/A:1015074116149
• Larmer, Robert, 1997, “The Ethics of Investing: a Reply to William Irvine”, Journal of Business Ethics , 16(4): 397–400. doi:10.1023/A:1017944922741
• Larue, Louis, 2022, “The Case Against Alternative Currencies,” Politics, Philosophy and Economics , 21(1): 75–93.
• Larue, Louis, Clément Fontan & Joakim Sandberg, 2020, “The Promises and Perils of Central Bank Digital Currencies,” Revue de la Régulation , 28(2): 1–21.
• Larue, Louis, Camille Meyer, Marek Hudon & Joakim Sandberg, 2022, “The Ethics of Alternative Currencies,” Business Ethics Quarterly , 32(2): 299–321.
• Lawson, Gary, 1988, “The Ethics of Insider Trading”, Harvard Journal of Law & Public Policy , 11(3): 727–783.
• Lawson, Tony, 2016, “Social Positioning and the Nature of Money,” Cambridge Journal of Economics , 40(4): 961–996.
• Lazzarato, Maurizio, 2012, The Making of the Indebted Man. An Essay on the Neoliberal Condition , Cambridge, MA: The MIT Press.
• Linarelli, John, 2017, “Luck, Justice and Systemic Financial Risk”, Journal of Applied Philosophy , 34(3): 331–352. doi:10.1111/japp.12148
• Lindblom, Charles E., 1977, Politics and Markets: The World’s Political Economic Systems , New York: Basic Books.
• –––, 1982, “The Market as Prison”, The Journal of Politics , 44(2): 323–336. doi:10.2307/2130588
• Long, John D., 1972, “The Protestant Ethic Reexamined”, Business Horizons , 15(1): 75–82. doi:10.1016/0007-6813(72)90024-9
• Lydenberg, Steve, 2014, “Reason, Rationality and Fiduciary Duty”, in Hawley et al. 2014: 287–299. doi:10.1017/CBO9781139565516.027
• Machan, Tibor R., 1996, “What is Morally Right with Insider Trading”, Public Affairs Quarterly , 10(2): 135–142.
• Mackenzie, Craig, 1997, Ethical Investment and the Challenge of Corporate Reform , PhD Thesis, University of Bath, England. [ Mackenzie 1997 available online ]
• Macleod, Harry Dunning, 1889, The Theory of Credit , London: Longmans, Green, and Co.
• Maitland, Ian, 2002, “The Human Face of Self-Interest”, Journal of Business Ethics , 38(1–2): 3–17. doi:10.1023/A:1015716928549
• Mäki, U., 1997, “Universals and the Methodenstreit: a Re-Examination of Carl Menger’s Conception of Economics as An Exact Science”, Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part A , 28(3), 475–495. doi:10.1016/S0039-3681(96)00011-8
• Mandelbrot, Benoit, 1963, “The Variation of Certain Speculative Prices”, The Journal of Business , 36(4): 394–419. doi:10.1086/294632
• Mandeville, Bernard, 1732, The Fable of the Bees or Private Vices, Publick Benefits , Oxford: Clarendon Press.
• Mankiw, N. Gregory, 2009, Macroeconomics , seventh edition, New York: Worth Publishers.
• Manne, Henry G., 1966, Insider Trading and the Stock Market , New York: Free Press.
• Martin, Felix, 2013, Money: the Unauthorised Biography , London: The Bodley Head.
• Marx, Karl, 1867, Das Kapital: Kritik der politischen Oekonomie , Hamburg: Verlag von Otto Meissner.
• McCall, John J., 2010, “Executive Compensation”, in Boatright 2010: 547–564. doi:10.1002/9781118266298.ch29
• McCarty, Richard, 1988, “Business and Benevolence”, Business & Professional Ethics Journal , 7(2): 63–83.
• McLean, Bethany and Peter Elkind, 2003, The Smartest Guys in the Room: The Amazing Rise and Scandalous Fall of Enron , New York: Portfolio.
• McLeay, Michael, Amar Radia, and Ryland Thomas, 2014, “Money Creation in the Modern Economy”, Bank of England Quarterly Bulletin , Q1: 14–27. [ McLeay, Radia, & Thomas 2014 available online ]
• Mehrling, Perry, 2011, The New Lombard Street: How the Fed Became the Dealer of Last Resort , Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.
• Mellor, Mary, 2019, “Democratizing Finance or Democratizing Money?”, Politics and Society , 47(4): 635–650.
• Menger, Carl, 1892, “On the Origins of Money”, The Economic Journal , 2(6): 239–255. doi:10.2307/2956146
• Meyer, Marco, 2018, “The Right to Credit”, Journal of Political Philosophy , 26(3): 304–326. doi:10.1111/jopp.12138
• Mian, Atif and Amir Sufi, 2014, House of Debt , Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
• Miller, Richard W., 2010, Globalizing Justice. The Ethics of Poverty and Power , Oxford: Oxford University Press. doi:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199581986.001.0001
• Minsky, Hyman P., 1986, Stabilizing an Unstable Economy , New Haven: Yale University Press.
• Mishkin, Frederic S., 2016, The Economics of Money, Banking, and Financial Markets , eleventh edition, New York: Pearson Education.
• Modigliani, Franco and Merton H. Miller, 1958, “The Cost of Capital, Corporation Finance and the Theory of Investment”, The American Economic Review , 48(3): 261–297.
• Moggia, Jakob, 2021, “Moral Responsibility for Systemic Financial Risk”, Journal of Business Ethics , 169(3): 461–473. doi:10.1007/s10551-019-04288-4
• Moore, Jennifer, 1990, “What is Really Unethical about Insider Trading?” Journal of Business Ethics , 9(3): 171–182. doi:10.1007/BF00382642
• Mussell, Helen, 2021, “The Silenced and Unsought Beneficiary: Investigating Epistemic Injustice in the Fiduciary”, Business Ethics Quarterly , 31(4): 549–571. doi:10.1017/beq.2021.4
• O’Neill, Martin, 2017, “Philosophy and Public Policy after Piketty”, Journal of Political Philosophy , 25(3): 343–375. doi:10.1111/jopp.12129
• –––, 2020, “Power, Predistribution, and Social Justice”, Philosophy , 95(1): 63–91. doi:10.1017/S0031819119000482
• –––, 2021, “Justice, Power, and Participatory Socialism: on Piketty’s Capital and Ideology ”, Analyse & Kritik , 43(1): 89–124. doi:10.1515/auk-2021-0006
• O’Neill, Martin and Thad Williamson, 2012, “The Promise of Predistribution”, Policy Network Observatory . [ O’Neill and Williamson 2012 available online ]
• Palley, Thomas I., 1996, Post Keynesian Economics: Debt, Distribution and the Macro Economy , London: Macmillan.
• –––, 2003, “Sovereign Debt Restructuring Proposals: A Comparative Look”, Ethics & International Affairs , 17(2): 26–33. doi:10.1111/j.1747-7093.2003.tb00435.x
• –––, 2013, Financialization: the Economics of Finance Capital Domination , New York: Palgrave Macmillan.
• Parkin, Michael, 2011, Economics , tenth edition, Boston: Pearson Addison-Wesley.
• Passinsky, Asya, 2020, “Social Objects, Response-dependence, and Realism,” Journal of the American Philosophical Association , 6(4): 431–443
• Persad, Govind, 2018, “Distributive Justice and the Relief of Household Debt”, Journal of Political Philosophy , 26(3): 327–343. doi:10.1111/jopp.12153
• Pettifor, Ann, 2014, Just Money: How Society Can Break the Despotic Power of Finance , Margate: Commonwealth Publishing.
• Piketty, Thomas, 2014, Capital in the Twenty-First Century , Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.
• –––, 2020, Capital and Ideology , Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.
• Pilbeam, Keith, 2010, Finance & Financial Markets , third edition, Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan.
• Pistor, Katharina, 2013, “A Legal Theory of Finance”, Journal of Comparative Economics , 41(2): 315–330. doi:10.1016/j.jce.2013.03.003
• –––, 2017, “Money’s Legal Hierarchy”, in Herzog 2017b: 185–204. doi:10.1093/oso/9780198755661.003.0008
• Pogge, Thomas, 2008, World Poverty and Human Rights. Cosmopolitan Responsibilities and Reforms , second edition, Cambridge: Polity.
• Preiss, Joshua, 2021, “Did We Trade Freedom for Credit? Finance, Domination, and the Political Economy of Freedom”, European Journal of Political Theory , 20(3): 486–509. doi:10.1177/1474885118806693
• Priyadarshee, Anurag and Asad K. Ghalib, 2012, “Over-Indebtedness, Coercion, and Default: Causes of the Andhra Pradesh Microfinance Crisis and Regulatory Implications”, Enterprise Development and Microfinance , 23(3): 185–200. doi:10.3362/1755-1986.2012.020
• Przeworski, Adam and Michael Wallerstein, 1988, “Structural Dependence of the State on Capital”, American Political Science Review , 82(2): 11–29. doi:10.2307/1958056
• Ragatz, Julie A. and Ronald F. Duska, 2010, “Financial Codes of Ethics”, in Boatright 2010: 297–323. doi:10.1002/9781118266298.ch16
• Reddy, Sanjay G., 2005, “Developing Just Monetary Arrangements”, in Christian Barry and Thomas W. Pogge (eds.), Global Institutions and Responsibilities: Achieving Global Justice , Wiley, 218–234.
• Reinhart, Carmen M. and Kenneth S. Rogoff, 2009, This Time is Different: Eight Centuries of Financial Folly , Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.
• Reiff, Mark R., 2017, “Punishment in the Executive Suite. Moral Responsibility, Causal Responsibility, and Financial Crime”, in Herzog 2017b: 125–153. doi:10.1093/oso/9780198755661.003.0006
• Richardson, Benjamin J., and Wes Cragg, 2010, “Being Virtuous and Prosperous: SRI’s Conflicting Goals”, Journal of Business Ethics , 92(supp. 1): 21–39. doi:10.1007/s10551-010-0632-9
• Rickles, Dean, 2007, “Econophysics for Philosophers”, Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part B: Studies in History and Philosophy of Modern Physics , 38(4): 948–978. doi:10.1016/j.shpsb.2007.01.003
• Riles, Annelise, 2018, Financial Citizenship: Experts, Publics, and the Politics of Central Banking , Ithaca and London: Cornell University Press. [ Riles 2018 available online .
• Robison, John Mark, 2022, “The Neoliberal Utopianism of Bitcoin and Modern Monetary Theory,” Utopian Studies , 33(1): 127–143.
• Roodman, David, 2012, Due Diligence: An Impertinent Inquiry into Microfinance , Washington, DC: Center for Global Development.
• Rosenberg, R., A. Gonzalez, and S. Narain, 2009, “The New Moneylenders: Are the Poor Being Exploited by High Microcredit Interest Rates?”, CGAP Occasional Paper , 15, Washington DC: CGAP.
• Rothbard, Murray N., 1983, The Mystery of Banking , New York: Richardson & Snyder.
• Russell, Roseanne and Charlotte Villiers, 2017, “Gender Justice in Financial Markets”, in Herzog 2017b: 271–292. doi:10.1093/oso/9780198755661.003.0012
• Ryan, John A., 1902, “The Ethics of Speculation”, International Journal of Ethics , 12(3): 335–347.
• Ryan-Collins, Josh, Tony Greenham, Richard Werner, and Andrew Jackson, 2012, Where Does Money Come From? A Guide to the UK Monetary and Banking System , London: New Economics Foundation.
• Sack, A.N., 1927, Les Effets des Transformations des Etats sur leurs Dettes Publiques et Autres Obligations Financières: Traité Juridique et Financier , Paris: Recueil Sirey.
• Sandberg, Joakim, 2008, The Ethics of Investing. Making Money or Making a Difference? Gothenburg: Acta Universitatis Gothoburgensis.
• –––, 2011, “Changing the World through Shareholder Activism?”, Nordic Journal of Applied Ethics , 5(1): 51–78. doi:10.5324/eip.v5i1.1733
• –––, 2012, “Mega-Interest on Microcredit: Are Lenders Exploiting the Poor?”, Journal of Applied Philosophy , 29(3): 169–185. doi:10.1111/j.1468-5930.2012.00560.x
• –––, 2013, “(Re-)Interpreting Fiduciary Duty to Justify Socially Responsible Investment for Pension Funds?”, Corporate Governance: An International Review , 21(5): 436–446. doi:10.1111/corg.12028
• –––, 2016, “Pension Funds, Future Generations, and Fiduciary Duty”, in Institutions For Future Generations , Iñigo González-Ricoy and Axel Gosseries (eds.), Oxford: Oxford University Press, 385–399. doi:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780198746959.003.0023
• Schlichter, Detlev S., 2014, Paper Money Collapse: The Folly of Elastic Money , second edition, Hoboken: Wiley.
• Schumpeter, Joseph A., 1954, History of Economic Analysis , London: Allen & Unwin.
• Searle, John, 1995, The Construction of Social Reality , New York: The Free Press.
• –––, 2010, Making the Social World: The Structure of Human Civilization , Oxford: Oxford University Press. doi:10.1093/acprof:osobl/9780195396171.001.0001
• Selgin, George A., 1988, The Theory of Free Banking: Money Supply under Competitive Note Issue , Lanham, MD.: Rowman & Littlefield. [ Selgin 1988 available online ]
• Shiller, Robert J., 2012, Finance and the Good Society , Princeton: Princeton University Press.
• Simmel, Georg, 1900, Philosophie des Geldes , Leipzig: Duncker und Humblot.
• Simons, Henry C., 1936, “Rules versus Authorities in Monetary Policy”, Journal of Political Economy , 44(1): 1–30. doi:10.1086/254882
• Sinn, Hans-Werner, 2010, Casino Capitalism: How the Financial Crisis Came About and What Needs to be Done Now , Oxford: Oxford University Press.
• Smaga, Pawel, 2014, “The Concept of Systemic Risk”, SRC Special Paper No 5, Systemic Risk Center, London School of Economics and Political Science..
• Smit, J.P., Filip Buekens, and Stan du Plessis, 2011, “What Is Money? an Alternative To Searle’s Institutional Facts”, Economics and Philosophy , 27(1): 1–22. doi:10.1017/S0266267110000441
• –––, 2016, “Cigarettes, Dollars and Bitcoins – an Essay on the Ontology of Money”, Journal of Institutional Economics , 12(2): 327–347.
• Smith, Adam, 1776, An Inquiry into the Nature and Causes of the Wealth of Nations , London: W. Strahan and T. Cadell.
• Sorell, Tom, 2015, “Is There a Human Right to Microfinance?”, in Microfinance, Rights and Global Justice , Tom Sorell and Luis Cabrera (eds.), Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 27–46. doi:10.1017/CBO9781316275634.003
• Sorell, Tom and John Hendry, 1994, Business Ethics , Oxford: Butterworth-Heinemann.
• Soros, George, 1987, The Alchemy of Finance , Hoboken, NJ: John Wiley & Sons.
• –––, 2008, The Crash of 2008 and What it Means , New York: Public Affairs.
• Stiglitz, Joseph E., 2009, “Too Big to Fail or Too Big to Save? Examining the Systemic Threats of Large Financial Institutions”, testimony at a hearing of the United States Congress’s Joint Economic Committee, April 21, 2009. [ Stiglitz 2009 available online ]
• Strange, Susan, 1986, Casino Capitalism , Oxford: Basil Blackwell.
• Streeck, Wolfgang, 2013 [2014], Gekaufte Zeit , Berlin: Suhrkamp Verlag. Translated as Buying Time. The Delayed Crisis of Democratic Capitalism , Patrick Camiller (trans.), London: Verso, 2014.
• Strudler, Alan, 2009, “Insider Trading: A Moral Problem”, Philosophy & Public Policy Quarterly , 29(3/4): 12–16. [ Strudler 2009 available online ]
• Suttle, Oisin, 2016, “Debt, Default, and Two Liberal Theories of Justice”, German Law Journal , 17(5): 799–834.
• Thamotheram, Raj and Aidan Ward, 2014, “Whose Risk Counts?”, in Hawley et al. 2014: 207–221. doi:10.1017/CBO9781139565516.020
• Thomas, Abdulkader (ed.), 2006, Interest in Islamic Economics: Understanding Riba , New York: Routledge.
• Thorgeirsdottir, Sigridur, 2015, “Dependency and Emancipation in the Debt-Economy: Care-Ethical Critique of Contractarian Conceptions of the Debtor-Creditor Relation”, Hypatia , 30(3): 564–579. doi:10.1111/hypa.12157
• Tobin, James, 1963, “Commercial Banks as Creators of ‘Money’”, Cowles Foundation Discussion Paper , no. 159, New Haven, CT: Yale University. [ Tobin 1963 available online (PDF)]
• –––, 1978, “A Proposal for International Monetary Reform”, Eastern Economic Journal , 4(3–4): 153–159.
• Tucker, Paul, 2018, Unelected Power: The Quest for Legitimacy in Central Banking and the Regulatory State , Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.
• United Nations, 2009, “Report of the Commission of Experts of the President of the United Nations General Assembly on Reforms of the International Monetary and Financial System”, New York: United Nations. [ United Nations 2009 available online ]
• Valentini, Laura, 2011, Justice in a Globalized World , Oxford: Oxford University Press. doi:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199593859.001.0001
• van ’t Klooster, Johannes Maria, 2017, How to Make Money: Distributive Justice, Finance, and Monetary Constitutions , PhD thesis, Department of Philosophy, University of Cambridge. doi:10.17863/CAM.22062
• –––, 2019, “Central Banking in Rawls’ Property-Owning Democracy”, Political Theory , 47(5): 674–698. doi:10.1177/0090591718810377
• –––, 2020, “The Ethics of Delegating Monetary Policy”, Journal of Politics , 82(2): 587–99. doi:10.1086/706765
• Visser, Wayne A.M. and Alastair MacIntosh, 1998, “A Short Review of the Historical Critique of Usury”, Accounting, Business and Financial History , 8(2): 175–189. doi:10.1080/095852098330503
• von Hayek, Friedrich A., 1978, Denationalization of Money: The Argument Refined , London: Institute of Economic Affairs. [ von Hayek 1978 available online ]
• Vooys, Sarah and David G. Dick, 2021, “Money and Mental Contents,” Synthese , 198(4): 3443–3458.
• Walsh, Adrian and Tony Lynch, 2008, The Morality of Money , Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan.
• Walsh, D.M., 2015, “Variance, Invariance and Statistical Explanation”, Erkenntnis , 80(3), 469–489. doi:10.1007/s10670-014-9680-3
• Warde, Ibrahim, 2010, Islamic Finance in the Global Economy , Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press.
• Warenski, Lisa, 2018, “Disentangling the Epistemic Failings of the 2008 Financial Crisis”, in: David Coady and James Chase (eds.), The Routledge Handbook of Applied Epistemology , New York: Routledge.
• Weatherall, James, 2017, “The Peculiar Logic of the Black-Scholes Model”, SSRN Electronic Journal , 1–16. doi:10.2139/ssrn.2976242
• Weatherford, Jack, 1997, The History of Money , New York: Three Rivers Press.
• Weber, Heloise, 2004 “The ‘New Economy’ and Social Risk: Banking on the Poor?” Review of International Political Economy , 11(2): 356–86.
• Weber, Max, 1905, “Die protestantische Ethik und der Geist des Kapitalismus”, Archiv für Sozialwissenschaften und Sozialpolitik , 21(1): 1–110.
• Werhane, Patricia H., 1989, “The Ethics of Insider Trading”, Journal of Business Ethics , 8(11): 841–845. doi:10.1007/BF00384525
• –––, 1991, “The Indefensibility of Insider Trading”, Journal of Business Ethics , 10(9): 729–731. doi:10.1007/BF00705879
• Werner, Richard A., 2014a, “How Do Banks Create Money, and Why Can Other Firms Not Do the Same? An Explanation for the Coexistence of Lending and Deposit-Taking”, International Review of Financial Analysis , 36: 71–77. doi:10.1016/j.irfa.2014.10.013
• –––, 2014b, “Can Banks Individually Create Money out of Nothing?—The Theories and the Empirical Evidence”, International Review of Financial Analysis , 36: 1–19. doi:10.1016/j.irfa.2014.07.015
• Wesley, John, 1771, “The Use of Money”, in Sermon on Several Occasions , Grand Rapids, MI: Christian Classic Ethereal Library.
• White, Stuart, 2011, “The Republican Critique of Capitalism”, Critical Review of International Social and Political Philosophy , 14(5): 561–579. doi:10.1080/13698230.2011.617119
• Wiedenbrüg, Anahí, 2018a, “What Citizens Owe: Two Grounds for Challenging Debt Repayment”, Journal of Political Philosophy , 26(3): 368–387. doi:10.1111/jopp.12163
• –––, 2018b, “What Creditors Owe”, Constellations , 25(1): 101–16. doi:10.1111/1467-8675.12293
• Wolf, Martin, 2014a, “Strip Private Banks of Their Power to Create Money”, Financial Times , 24 April 2014.
• –––, 2014b, The Shifts and the Shocks: What We’ve Learned—and Still Have to Learn—from the Financial Crisis , London: Penguin Books.
• Wollner, Gabriel, 2014, “Justice in Finance: The Normative Case for an International Financial Transactions Tax”, Journal of Political Philosophy , 22(4): 458–485. doi:10.1111/jopp.12016
• –––, 2018, “Morally Bankrupt: International Financial Governance and the Ethics of Sovereign Default”, Journal of Political Philosophy , 26(3): 344–367. doi:10.1111/jopp.12151
• Woodruff, D. M. 2019. “To Democratize Finance, Democratize Central Banking”, Politics and Society 47(4): 593–610.
• Yunus, Muhammad, 1998, Banker to the Poor , Dhaka: The University Press Limited.
• –––, 2007, Creating a World Without Poverty: Social Business and the Future of Capitalism , New York: PublicAffairs.

How to cite this entry . Preview the PDF version of this entry at the Friends of the SEP Society . Look up topics and thinkers related to this entry at the Internet Philosophy Ontology Project (InPhO). Enhanced bibliography for this entry at PhilPapers , with links to its database.

• Bank accounts in the EU: Right to a basic bank account , at the official website of the European Union (europa.eu)
• Finance and Philosophy Blog , with updates on research at the intersection between philosophy and finance.

belief, ethics of | consequentialism | consequentialism: rule | decision theory | economics: philosophy of | ethics: virtue | justice: global | Kant, Immanuel: moral philosophy | markets | models in science | responsibility: collective | social institutions | social ontology

Copyright © 2023 by Boudewijn de Bruin < b . p . de . bruin @ rug . nl > Lisa Herzog < l . m . herzog @ rug . nl > Martin O’Neill < martin . oneill @ york . ac . uk > Joakim Sandberg < joakim . sandberg @ gu . se >

• Accessibility

Support SEP

Mirror sites.

View this site from another server:

• Info about mirror sites

The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy is copyright © 2023 by The Metaphysics Research Lab , Department of Philosophy, Stanford University

Library of Congress Catalog Data: ISSN 1095-5054

Stoic & Wealthy: 4 Essays on Stoicism and Investing

Over the course of four essays, we will uncover why Stoic wisdom can make you wealthy. These essays combine Stoicism and investing. Here’s what you can expect.

Table of Contents:

• #1: On greed
• #2: On fear
• #3: On consistency
• #4: On financial independence

Let’s get started.

Essay 1: On Greed

If you don’t get greedy, you can get wealthy.

Everyone who loves the stock market knows the phrase, “Greed is good.”

That’s from one of my all-time favorite movies,  Wall Street , starring Michael Douglas and Charlie Sheen.

The movie is from 1987, and it perfectly captures the greed that was widespread in the financial world. But greed is as old as the dawn of civilization.

And greed has always been one of the biggest obstacles to becoming wealthy. Because what does it even mean to be wealthy? If you ask me, I say, “To have freedom.”

It’s safe to say that freedom is a universal desire of human beings. After all, who doesn’t want to decide what to do with their life?

The first realization we must have when it comes to wealth and freedom is this: 

• Money is a means to an end
• And that end is to live peacefully, on your own terms
• To have no stress and anxiety about your future well-being

That’s wealth. That’s true freedom.

The ancient Stoics provided a wealth of information about how to accomplish that.

I’ve been reading the works of Epictetus, Marcus Aurelius, Seneca, and other Stoics for 10 years now. And I was always surprised why no one talked about how valuable their lessons are when it comes to achieving financial freedom.

One of my first “money” lessons from Stoicism was about greed.

From the beginning, the Stoics encouraged their students to choose the middle path of life, also called the “golden mean.”  They didn’t renounce the pleasures of society, nor did they run away from hardship. They offered a balanced view on every topic in life.

Seneca, one of the wealthier Stoics, talked about the golden mean in relation to money and its excess as follows: 

“You ask what is the proper measure of wealth? The best measure is to have what is necessary, and next best, to have enough.”

But if you let greed creep into your system, you will never have enough. You will be obsessed with money. You will let your world revolve around it.

The relationship between greed and money often follows a U-curve. When we have little money, we’re greedy because we need more to live well. But when we have a lot of money, we tend to keep accumulating it for the sake of having more.

This is why it’s critical to neutralize greed. And let’s face it, we all have it in our system because it’s a human emotion.

We hear about how so-and-so made X dollars with crypto. Or we see our co-workers and friends drive the latest cars and fly off to Bali on vacation. 

We start thinking, “What can I do to pay for those things?” 

In those moments, we should remind ourselves that we don’t want to fall into that trap. Your freedom is more important than owning a big house or driving a fancy car.

Simply aim to have enough money. 

As Jack Bogle, the founder of The Vanguard Group investment company, which has the second biggest global assets under management in the world, once said:

“Enough is one dollar more than you need.”

When we have enough money, we can be mentally and practically content with what we have.

That’s true freedom. When your mind is at peace with the present moment.

When you become too obsessed with chasing money, you sacrifice more important things. Like your health or time with people you care about. You can’t turn back time, no matter how much money you make.

Remember the age-old lesson of the Stoics: Money is a means. True wealth is about living a good life and having enough resources to fulfill one’s duties and responsibilities.

Stoic philosophy teaches us to be content with what we have and to practice moderation and simplicity. 

Stay balanced! 

In next week’s edition, I cover another human emotion: Fear.

Meditate on this…

At the end of every main chapter of  The Stoic Path to Wealth , I share a relevant quote from a Stoic philosopher. My goal is to turn these quotes into thought exercises. 

I call these little segments “Meditate on this…” I want to share one about greed with you here. 

  “Contentment comes not so much from great wealth as from few wants.”  — Epictetus

Think about the last time you felt content and were appreciative of what you had. Now, think of the last time you were thinking about something you wanted.

I bet you have thought about something you wanted very recently. I do it all the time too. 

Just remember to be content. That’s the best mindset to actually improve your life.

Essay 2: On Fear

Get over the fear of losing money so you can make money

Money and fear. For so many of us, they go hand in hand.

•  Some people fear losing the money they have
• Other people fear that they won’t be able to make money again in the future

It’s natural to fear loss. I’ve been there. I lost close to two-thirds of my money within a year when I first started investing. 

It’s painful to lose a significant amount of money. And that fear of loss has affected me so badly in the past that I became afraid of getting back into investing.

This same fear makes many people avoid the stock market. But if we let this fear control us, we will never take any risk.

Just like in any other aspect of life, there will always be risks involved when it comes to wealth building. Whether that’s in the stock market, real estate, or starting a business – you can always lose money.

But the problem is that we often get too fearful. And as a result, we never even invest. If we do invest, we don’t invest nearly enough.

End result: You leave a lot of money on the table.

Look, we’ve all hear the same old story of, “Many of the richest people in the world built their wealth with stocks.”

Think of Warren Buffett, Jeff Bezos, Elon Musk. All their wealth is created through the stock market.

We also can invest in stocks. But for some reason, we get fearful.

• “What if I lose my money?”
• “What if there’s a recession?”
• “What if the dollar collapses?”
• “What if there’s another war or pandemic?”

I get it. I’ve had those thoughts too. Especially if you spend some time on social media, you think the world is about to end.

But just look at the past 100 years. We’ve dealt with world wars, natural disasters, recessions, pandemics, currency issues, elections, social unrest… and yet, the stock market has gone up through everything.

What’s going to stop it if those things can’t stop it?

We need to overcome the fear of loss if we want to build long-term wealth. After all, when it comes to passive investing, losses are only temporary. 

Marcus Aurelius said this about time:

“Time is like a river made up of the events which happen, and a violent stream; for as soon as a thing has been seen, it is carried away, and another comes in its place, and this will be carried away too.” 

In a similar way, the stock market is also like a river, which keeps flowing no matter what’s going on in the world. Sometimes the current is faster or wilder than other times. But the river always flows in the same direction.

The stock market experiences its ups and downs, but on the whole, it keeps going up.

Those ups and downs are natural. Something temporary. 

Acceptance of this nature takes away our fear of investing. When we zoom out and stop looking at the day to day moves, we realize that it’s more costly to not invest.

The main takeaway from the Stoics is this: Never fear something that’s natural.

Next week, we’ll see how we can combine the skill of managing both fear and greed to become a more consistent investor.

All the best.

In my book,  The Stoic Path to Wealth , I share stoic quotes related to investing. The stoics’ ancient wisdom is still highly relevant and applicable today.

“The wise man is neither raised up by prosperity nor cast down by adversity; for always he has striven to rely predominantly on himself, and to derive all joy from himself” – Seneca

We can neutralize our fear of losing money if we trust in our own ability to build sustainable wealth. 

Everything starts with learning, which ultimately results in more confidence.

Essay 3: On Consistency

Consistency really pays off

Successful investing is not about figuring out what strategy is best; it’s about staying committed to a strategy that works. In today’s world, that’s one of the hardest things to do.

I honestly think it’s impossible to be consistent as an investor if you don’t have a clear-cut way of managing your emotions. You just have to spend 10 seconds on YouTube, Instagram, or X, and you’ve seen 20 people who all contradict each other.

• “Don’t invest in stocks! Buy real estate instead!”
• “The housing market is going to crash, buy gold!”
• “Everything’s going to crash, buy Bitcoin!”

And every person who’s preaching about their sure way of getting rich is a multi-millionaire. They pretend they have “the” solution to investing. 

Howard Marks warned us against people who try to trick investors in his book  Mastering the Market Cycle : 

“I’ve seen dozens of silver bullets touted over the course of my 48‑­ year career. Not one has proven out. No investment strategy or tactic will ever deliver a high return without risk, especially to buyers lacking a high level of investing skill.”

If there were silver bullets, we all would know about them. That’s not something you can keep secret.

Look, I’ve been investing for 17 years. I’ve read every single important investing book there is. I’ve talked to extremely wealthy people. 

The secret to building wealth is simple: Pick an investing strategy, and execute it without diverting an inch. Stay the course.

My father’s best friend is an accountant who works with some of the wealthiest people in The Netherlands. The other day, we were having lunch when the topic of building wealth came up.

“Most of my wealthy clients inherited money and simply got richer,” my father’s best friend said. “And then there’s a smaller group who started from nothing. They just got a little bit wealthier year by year.”

This is the harsh reality that no one really talks about. You don’t really hear it on social media.

If you want to be wealthy, you don’t have to hit a home run. Forget about the people who make hundreds of thousands or millions a month. The odds of accomplishing that are extremely low.

We’re much better off when we aim to just get a little bit wealthier every year. This also aligns with the Stoic way of life. Epictetus, one of the more stringent Stoics, once said:

“No great thing is created suddenly, any more than a bunch of grapes or a fig. If you tell me that you desire a fig, I answer you that there must be time. Let it first blossom, then bear fruit, then ripen.”

In a similar way, if you tell me you desire wealth, I answer you that there must be time.

Earn a living. Save your money. Invest. Repeat.

P.S. Next week we’ll tie all the topics we’ve covered until now (greed, fear, consistency) together into the ultimate outcome: Financial freedom.

Meditate on this…

“First say to yourself what you would be; and then do what you have to do.” — Epictetus

Take a moment and think about what you currently are  not  doing, but wish to do. 

This could be related to investing and wealth or any other area of your life. What aspect of your life do you want to improve? 

Now, open a note on your phone or grab a notebook and write those things down. 

Then, take these desires and translate them into actions. What exactly do you have to do daily to become what you want to be?

Start executing. Now it’s only a matter of time before you actually become what you want.

Essay 4: On financial independence

This is the fourth and final essay I’ve published every Thursday, leading up to the launch of my book,  The Stoic Path to Wealth .

Through these four essays, we will uncover why Stoic wisdom can make you wealthy. If you missed the previous edition,  read it here .

You don’t need to be rich to feel financially free

Many of us have an unhealthy obsession with early retirement and financial freedom. We work hard, save diligently, invest consistently, and we wait…

We live our lives in a waiting room. “I will enjoy my life when I retire early.”

What’s a goal or outcome you’re waiting for to happen?

• A promotion
• Getting a degree
• Starting your own business
• Having a certain amount of money

The Stoic philosopher Seneca often talked about how we tend to neglect the present. When Seneca retired from active life in Ancient Rome, he started to write letters to his friend, Lucilius, who was still in the midst of his career.

In one of those letters, he reminded his friend that, “While we are postponing, life speeds by.”

We postpone our happiness and contentment until a future moment. But all the while, time passes. We continue to age.

And if we live our lives like that, we will inevitably come to the following conclusion at some point:  Nothing in life is worth waiting for.

As Seneca also said: “Begin at once to live, and count each separate day as a separate life.”

If you want to have more financial freedom, you really don’t need to be rich to feel that way. You can start taking action now and you can accomplish that feeling much faster.

Here are a few ways you can feel financially free:

• Form the habit of spending less than you earn
• Be content with what you have
• Stop complaining
• Think in opportunities
• Do the right thing, day in and day out

This might sound very simplistic, but I guarantee you it works.

Just like millions of other people, I was obsessed with financial freedom when I was growing up. I fantasized about retiring early from the moment I had my first summer job when I was in high school.

“Oh man, I can’t wait to get rich so I don’t have to ever work again.”

I went through life like that until I was about 30. I was waiting until I would have enough money so I could just stop working.

But through reading philosophy and writing about financial freedom, I realized I was after the wrong thing. I was obsessed with the “financial” aspect of freedom.

I learned that you can have a sense of financial independence without being very wealthy. What matters more is that you go through life with “mental freedom.”

When your mind and spirit are free from fear and greed, you can live in the present moment.

Especially when you can become consistent with your habits, you can become truly free.

To me, this type of freedom is much more important than just having a lot of money.

This is a cliche, and I bet you’ve heard it many times, but we’ve all heard about the extremely wealthy people who are unhappy or depressed. If money was the answer to anything, every rich person would be happy without exception.

We know that life isn’t that simple. I would take mental freedom over pure financial freedom any day of the week.

Here’s when you know you’ve accomplished mental freedom:

• No fear of going broke
• No desire to acquire material objects
• Content with your existing lifestyle
• A healthy drive to improve yourself
• Driven to make an impact in the world

One of the main topics of  The Stoic Path to Wealth  book is that you will feel mentally free once you start taking the steps towards financial freedom.

If you’re doing all the right things, it’s only a matter of time before you build substantial wealth.

So you can just relax and enjoy the present moment.

P.S. I hope you enjoyed these four essays. If you want to dive deeper into Stoicism, wealth, and freedom, read my book,  The Stoic Path to Wealth .

Order  The Stoic Path to Wealth

My new book,  The Stoic Path to Wealth (Portfolio / Penguin) , is out now.

If you order now, you will  instantly  get free access to 4 products, worth over $500.

Learn more here:  stoicpathtowealth.com

Stoic & Wealthy #3: On consistency

Stoic & Wealthy #2: On fear

Stoic & Wealthy #4: On financial independence

Greed Is Good: A 300-Year History of a Dangerous Idea

Not long ago, the pursuit of commercial self-interest was largely reviled. How did we come to accept it?

Among MBA students, few words provoke greater consternation than “greed.” Wonder aloud in a classroom whether some practice might fairly be described as greedy , and students don’t know whether to stick up for the Invisible Hand or seek absolution. Most, by turns, do a little of both.

Such reactions shouldn’t be surprising. Greed has always been the hobgoblin of capitalism, the mischief it makes a canker on the faith of capitalists. These students' troubled consciences are not the result of doubts about the efficacy of free markets, but of the centuries of moral reform that was required to make those markets as free as they are.

We sometimes forget that the pursuit of commercial self-interest was largely reviled until just a few centuries ago. “A man who is a merchant can seldom if ever please God,” St. Jerome said, expressing the prevailing belief in Christendom about the relative worthiness of a life devoted to trade. The choice to enter business didn’t necessarily deprive one of salvation, but it certainly hazarded his soul. “If thou wilt needs damn thyself, do it a more delicate way then drowning,” Iago tells a lovesick Rodrigo. “Make all the money thou canst.”

The problem of money-making was not only that it favored earthly delights over divine obligations. It also enflamed the tendency to prefer our own needs over those of the people around us and, more worrisome still, to recklessly trade their best interests for our own base satisfaction. St. Thomas Aquinas, who ranked greed among the seven deadly sins, warned that trade which aimed at no other purpose than expanding one’s wealth was “justly reprehensible” for “it serves the desire for profit which knows no limit.”

It was not until the mischievous moralist Bernard Mandeville that someone attempted to gloss greed as anything other than a shameful motive. A name now largely lost to history, Mandeville became a foil for 18th-century philosophy when, in 1705, he first proposed his infamous equation: Private vices yield public benefits. It came as part of The Fable of the Bees , an allegorical poem that described a thriving beehive where dark intentions keep the wheels of commerce turning. The outrage Mandeville stoked had less to do with this causal explanation than with the assertion that only by such means could a nation grow wealthy and strong. As he contended (with characteristic bluntness) in the conclusion to the Fable :

T’ enjoy the World’s Conveniences, Be fam’d in War, yet live in Ease, Without great Vices, is a vain EUTOPIA seated in the Brain.

Philosophers lined up to take their shots at Mandeville, whose moral paradox seemed so appalling precisely because it could not be so easily dismissed. The most notable among them was Adam Smith, the founding father of modern economics, who struggled to distinguish the mainspring of his system from the one Mandeville proposed.

Consider how Smith describes the selfish landowner, of whom he says the “proverb, that the eye is larger than the belly, never was more fully verified.” Looking out over his fields, in his imagination, he “consumes himself the whole harvest.” The belly, however, is not so obliging. The greedy landlord may engorge himself without making a dent in his crop, and he is “obliged to distribute” the rest in payment to all those who help supply his “economy of greatness.”

This is Smith’s Invisible Hand at work. It is counterintuitive force for good that, on first glance, seems not especially different from Mandeville’s contention that private vices yield public benefits. Smith was sensitive to this fact—Bernard Mandeville did not exactly make for good company—and he struggled to create distance between them.

He did this in two ways. First, Smith emphasized the moral distinction between primary aims and secondary effects. The Fable of the Bees never explicitly claimed that vice was good in itself , merely that it was advantageous—a subtle distinction that created confusion for Mandeville’s readers which the author, a cynic through and through, made little effort to dispel.

Smith, by contrast, made abundantly clear that, as a matter of moral assessment, one should distinguish between the intentions of an actor and the broader effects of his actions. Recall the greedy landlord. Yes, the primary aims of his daily labors—vanity, sway, self-indulgence—are far from admirable. But in spite of this fact, his efforts still have the effect of distributing widely “the necessaries of life” such that, “without intending it, without knowing it,” he, and others like him, “advance the interest of society.” This is another way of saying, for Smith, the moral logic of free markets was a law of unintended consequences. The Invisible Hand gives what a greedy landlord takes.

The second move Smith made was to effectively redefine “Greed.” Mandeville—and for that matter, the Church Fathers before him—spoke in such a way that any self-interested pursuit seemed morally suspect. Smith, for his part, refused to go along. He acknowledged that pursuing our interests often entails getting what we want from other people, but he maintained that not all of these pursuits, morally speaking, were equal. We get what we want in a complex commercial society—indeed, we get to have a complex commercial society—not because we seize things outright, but because we pursue them in a way that acknowledges legal and cultural constraints. That is how we distinguish the merchant from the mugger. Both pursue their own interests, but only one does so in a manner that confers legitimacy on the gains.

Greed, as such, became an acquisitive exercise that fell on the wrong side of this divide. Some of these activities, like the mugger’s, were fairly prohibited, but those of, say, the mean-spirited merchant were checked by censure and disgrace. These forces did not eradicate selfishness, but by the moral distinction they maintained, they helped establish a new ideal of the upstanding businessman.

That ideal was famously embodied by Smith’s friend, Benjamin Franklin. In his Autobiography , Franklin presented himself as the epitome of a new American Dream, a man who emerged from “Poverty & Obscurity” to attain “a State of Affluence & some Degree of Reputation in the World.” Franklin found nothing to be ashamed of in riches and repute, provided they were turned toward some broader purpose. His success allowed him to retire from the printing business at 42 so that he might spend the balance of his life on initiatives—civic, scientific, philanthropic—that all enhanced the common good.

The example of Franklin, and those like him, gave reason for optimism to those who understood the mixed blessing of free -markets. “Whenever we get a glimpse of the economic man, he is not selfish,” the great English economist Alfred Marshall wrote toward the end of the 19th century. “On the contrary, he is generally hard at work saving capital chiefly for the benefit of others.” By “others,” Marshall principally meant the members of one’s family, but he was also making a larger point about how our “self-interest” can expand and evolve when we have achieved financial security. The “love of money,” he declared, encompasses “an infinite variety of motives,” which “include many of the highest, the most refined, and the most unselfish elements of our nature.”

Then again, they also include lesser elements. Andrew Carnegie might have proclaimed that it was the responsibility of a rich man to act as “agent and trustee for his poorer brethren,” but the steel magnate’s beneficence was backstopped by cheap labor, dangerous working conditions, and swift action to break strikes. Besides, the active redistribution of wealth was something of a side-story (and a subversive one at that) to the moral logic of free markets. The Invisible Hand worked not by appealing to the altruism of exceptionally rich men, but by turning an antisocial instinct like greed into an unwitting civil servant.

Still, by the early 20th century, some believed his services might safely be dismissed. Reflecting on the extraordinary rate of development in Europe and the United States, John Maynard Keynes suggested that “the economic problem” (which he classed as the “struggle for subsistence”) might actually be “solved” by 2030. Then, Keynes said, we might “dare” to assess the “love of money” at its “true value,” which, for those who couldn’t wait, he described as “a somewhat disgusting morbidity, one of those semi-criminal, semi-pathological propensities which one hands over with a shudder to the specialists in mental disease.”  In other words, at last, we could afford to shift our attention from the advantages of greed and to disadvantages of greedy people.

Keynes’s views were extreme, but only in expression. Substantively, everyone agreed with him that greed was still a vice and a rather vicious one at that. A. Lawrence Lowell, the President of Harvard University, called “a motive above personal profit” among businessmen a prerequisite for establishing Harvard Business School, while its first dean, Edwin Francis Gay, told a prospective faculty hire that the pedagogy of his institution did not include “teaching young men to be ‘moneymakers.’”

As a lingering distaste for the profit-motive combined with continued economic development, the assumption began to wane that self-interested pursuits were the organizing force of a modern economy. Keynes pointed to this when he extolled the “tendency of big enterprise to socialize itself,” a phenomenon by which enlightened middle-managers—guided by science, reason, and administrative esprit du corps—would at last supplant the animism of the Invisible Hand.  If “the corporate system is to survive,” Adolf Berle and Gardiner Means wrote in the conclusion to their seminal study of the modern American corporation, “the ‘control’ of the great corporation should develop into a purely neutral technocracy, balancing a variety of claims by various groups in the community and assigning to each a portion of the income stream on the basis of public policy rather than private cupidity.”

Berle and Means wrote these lines in 1932. In hindsight, they don’t seem exactly prescient. As a matter of economic science, the revolt against managerial capitalism, and the reevaluation of greed, took shape after the Second World War, led by efforts of the Austrian economist Joseph Schumpeter and, later on, the architects of Agency Theory. Against Keynes, Schumpeter presented a new vision of capitalism as “Creative Destruction.” The “relevant problem” for economists, he said, was not how capitalism “administers existing structures” (the purview of the middle-manager) but “how it creates and destroys them,” an anarchic activity undertaken by Schumpeter’s hero, the entrepreneur.

As an icon for capitalism, the pugnacious individualism of the entrepreneur was entirely at odds with the vision of Berle and Means. According to Schumpeter, what drove an economy was headlong innovation, not careful administration. This was the hallmark of entrepreneurial activity, the courageous effort of an inspired mind, not the fruit of corporate collaboration.

An appeal to “private cupidity” was not the only way of eliciting such inspiration, but it was certainly the most obvious. It was also favored by the enthusiasts of Agency Theory, who began filling the ranks of business schools and economics departments in the ‘60s and ‘70s. They eschewed the common cause of managerial capitalism as an endorsement of soft socialism, an inducement to fuzzy thinking, and a recipe for corporate decay. Instead, they portrayed the company as a collection of self-serving individuals whose interests could be aligned with those of shareholders only by appeals to Keynes’s semi-pathological propensity: the love of money. Thus, the rise of stock options, performance pay, and other compensatory strategies that aimed to spark innovation in the executive suite. For the most part, the moral arguments called upon to support these recommendations took a familiar form. Greedy behavior could be tolerated, even encouraged, but only if it eliminated worse offenses: starvation, exposure, idiocy.

But choosing a lesser evil at the expense of a greater one is merely an exercise in good judgment. It does nothing to change the nature of what is chosen, and when a nation no longer fears, first and foremost, the pangs of abject misery, it may be said that greed has largely served its social purpose. An affluent people might fairly turn their attention to the ugly behavior greed encourages and to the social and political perils of extreme inequality. They may have good reason, in short, to restrain the Invisible Hand.

Accordingly, in recent decades, a new line of argument has opened in the moral defense of greed, a change that was augured and embodied above all others by Ayn Rand. Rand understood that, when someone defended greed by an appeal to the common good, he was also conceding that greed could be checked by it. As the moral foundation for free markets, such an argument was entirely unacceptable to Rand, who took aim at it in her 1965 essay What is Capitalism?

“Implicitly, uncritically, and by default, political economy accepted as its axioms the fundamental tenets of collectivism,” she declared in a sweeping indictment of the Invisible Hand tradition. “The moral justification of capitalism does not lie in the altruist claim that it represents the best way to achieve ‘the common good.’” That may be so, but it is “merely a secondary consequence.” Instead, capitalism is the only economic system in which “the exceptional men” are not “held down by the majority” and in which (as she said elsewhere) the “only good” that humans can do to one another and “the only statement of their proper relationship” are both acknowledged: “Hands off!”

A woman who titled a collection of essays The Virtue of Selfishness , Rand was given to brackish candor. Yet at a time when many people think that the common good is more often imperiled than empowered by unbridled greed, she provides an alternative defense of the acquisitive instinct by appealing to an ethics of gross achievement and a formulation of personal liberty that looks with suspicion and disdain on any talk of civic duty, moral obligation, or even prudential restraint. Her aim was simple: To relieve greed, once and for all, of any moral taint.

“I think greed is healthy,” an apparent acolyte told the graduating class at Berkeley’s business school in 1986. “You can be greedy and still feel good about yourself.” The speaker was Ivan Boesky, who shortly thereafter would be fined $100 million, and later go to prison, for insider trading. His address was adapted by Oliver Stone as the basis for Gordon Gekko’s “greed is good” speech in Wall Street . An exhortation to shareholders of a sagging company, it reads like a corporate raider’s war cry, with Gekko the grinning avatar of Agency Theory.

Such a blunt endorsement of greed today remains far beyond the mainstream. If we tolerate greed, it is because we accept the hard bargain of the Invisible Hand. We believe that greed can do good, not that it is good. That, we are unwilling to say.

But for the most part, I don’t think we don’t say very much about greed, not comfortably at least. Perhaps that is the inevitable price of an economic system that relies on the vigor of self-interested pursuits, that it instills a kind of moral quietism in the face of avarice, for whether out of a desire to appear non-judgmental or for reasons of moral expediency, unless some action verges on the criminal, we hesitate to call it greed, much less evidence of someone greedy. We don’t deny the existence of such individuals, but like Bigfoot, they tend to be more rumored than seen.

Moral revolutions come about in different ways. If we reject some conduct but rarely admit an example, we enjoy the benefit of being high-minded without the burden of moral restraint. We also embolden that behavior, which proceeds with a presumptive blessing. As a matter of public discourse and polite conversation, “Greed” is unlikely to be “Good” anytime soon, but a vice need not become a virtue for the end result to look the same.

About the Author

More Stories

Why CEOs Like Rex Tillerson Fail in Washington

Presidents Aren't CEOs

Greater Good Science Center • Magazine • In Action • In Education

How Money Changes the Way You Think and Feel

The term “affluenza”—a portmanteau of affluence and influenza, defined as a “painful, contagious, socially transmitted condition of overload, debt, anxiety, and waste, resulting from the dogged pursuit of more”—is often dismissed as a silly buzzword created to express our cultural disdain for consumerism. Though often used in jest, the term may contain more truth than many of us would like to think.

Whether affluenza is real or imagined, money really does change everything, as the song goes—and those of high social class do tend to see themselves much differently than others. Wealth (and the pursuit of it) has been linked with immoral behavior—and not just in movies like The Wolf of Wall Street .

Psychologists who study the impact of wealth and inequality on human behavior have found that money can powerfully influence our thoughts and actions in ways that we’re often not aware of, no matter our economic circumstances. Although wealth is certainly subjective, most of the current research measures wealth on scales of income, job status, or socioeconomic circumstances, like educational attainment and intergenerational wealth.

Here are seven things you should know about the psychology of money and wealth.

More money, less empathy?

Several studies have shown that wealth may be at odds with empathy and compassion . Research published in the journal Psychological Science found that people of lower economic status were better at reading others’ facial expressions —an important marker of empathy—than wealthier people.

“A lot of what we see is a baseline orientation for the lower class to be more empathetic and the upper class to be less [so],” study co-author Michael Kraus told Time . “Lower-class environments are much different from upper-class environments. Lower-class individuals have to respond chronically to a number of vulnerabilities and social threats. You really need to depend on others so they will tell you if a social threat or opportunity is coming, and that makes you more perceptive of emotions.”

While a lack of resources fosters greater emotional intelligence, having more resources can cause bad behavior in its own right. UC Berkeley research found that even fake money could make people behave with less regard for others. Researchers observed that when two students played Monopoly, one having been given a great deal more Monopoly money than the other, the wealthier player expressed initial discomfort, but then went on to act aggressively, taking up more space and moving his pieces more loudly, and even taunting the player with less money.

Wealth can cloud moral judgment

It is no surprise in this post-2008 world to learn that wealth may cause a sense of moral entitlement. A UC Berkeley study found that in San Francisco—where the law requires that cars stop at crosswalks for pedestrians to pass—drivers of luxury cars were four times less likely than those in less expensive vehicles to stop and allow pedestrians the right of way. They were also more likely to cut off other drivers.

Another study suggested that merely thinking about money could lead to unethical behavior. Researchers from Harvard and the University of Utah found that study participants were more likely to lie or behave immorally after being exposed to money-related words.

“Even if we are well-intentioned, even if we think we know right from wrong, there may be factors influencing our decisions and behaviors that we’re not aware of,” University of Utah associate management professor Kristin Smith-Crowe, one of the study’s co-authors, told MarketWatch .

Wealth has been linked with addiction

While money itself doesn’t cause addiction or substance abuse, wealth has been linked with a higher susceptibility to addiction problems. A number of studies have found that affluent children are more vulnerable to substance-abuse issues , potentially because of high pressure to achieve and isolation from parents. Studies also found that kids who come from wealthy parents aren’t necessarily exempt from adjustment problems—in fact, research found that on several measures of maladjustment, high school students of high socioeconomic status received higher scores than inner-city students. Researchers found that these children may be more likely to internalize problems, which has been linked with substance abuse.

But it’s not just adolescents: Even in adulthood, the rich outdrink the poor by more than 27 percent.

Money itself can become addictive

The pursuit of wealth itself can also become a compulsive behavior. As psychologist Dr. Tian Dayton explained, a compulsive need to acquire money is often considered part of a class of behaviors known as process addictions, or “behavioral addictions,” which are distinct from substance abuse.

These days, the idea of process addictions is widely accepted. Process addictions are addictions that involve a compulsive and/or an out-of-control relationship with certain behaviors such as gambling, sex, eating, and, yes, even money.…There is a change in brain chemistry with a process addiction that’s similar to the mood-altering effects of alcohol or drugs. With process addictions, engaging in a certain activity—say viewing pornography, compulsive eating, or an obsessive relationship with money—can kickstart the release of brain/body chemicals, like dopamine, that actually produce a “high” that’s similar to the chemical high of a drug. The person who is addicted to some form of behavior has learned, albeit unconsciously, to manipulate his own brain chemistry.

While a process addiction is not a chemical addiction, it does involve compulsive behavior —in this case, an addiction to the good feeling that comes from receiving money or possessions—which can ultimately lead to negative consequences and harm the individual’s well-being. Addiction to spending money—sometimes known as shopaholism—is another, more common type of money-associated process addiction.

Wealthy children may be more troubled

Children growing up in wealthy families may seem to have it all, but having it all may come at a high cost. Wealthier children tend to be more distressed than lower-income kids, and are at high risk for anxiety, depression, substance abuse, eating disorders, cheating, and stealing. Research has also found high instances of binge-drinking and marijuana use among the children of high-income, two-parent, white families.

“In upwardly mobile communities, children are often pressed to excel at multiple academic and extracurricular pursuits to maximize their long-term academic prospects—a phenomenon that may well engender high stress,” writes psychologist Suniya Luthar in “The Culture Of Affluence.” “At an emotional level, similarly, isolation may often derive from the erosion of family time together because of the demands of affluent parents’ career obligations and the children’s many after-school activities.”

We tend to perceive the wealthy as “evil”

On the other side of the spectrum, lower-income individuals are likely to judge and stereotype those who are wealthier than themselves, often judging the wealthy as being “cold.” (Of course, it is also true that the poor struggle with their own set of societal stereotypes.)

Rich people tend to be a source of envy and distrust, so much so that we may even take pleasure in their struggles, according to Scientific American . According to a University of Pennsylvania study entitled “ Is Profit Evil? Associations of Profit with Social Harm ,” most people tend to link perceived profits with perceived social harm. When participants were asked to assess various companies and industries (some real, some hypothetical), both liberals and conservatives ranked institutions perceived to have higher profits with greater evil and wrongdoing across the board, independent of the company or industry’s actions in reality.

Money can’t buy happiness (or love)

We tend to seek money and power in our pursuit of success (and who doesn’t want to be successful, after all?), but it may be getting in the way of the things that really matter: happiness and love.

There is no direct correlation between income and happiness. After a certain level of income that can take care of basic needs and relieve strain ( some say $50,000 a year , some say $75,000 ), wealth makes hardly any difference to overall well-being and happiness and, if anything, only harms well-being: Extremely affluent people actually suffer from higher rates of depression . Some data has suggested money itself doesn’t lead to dissatisfaction—instead, it’s the ceaseless striving for wealth and material possessions that may lead to unhappiness. Materialistic values have even been linked with lower relationship satisfaction .

But here’s something to be happy about: More Americans are beginning to look beyond money and status when it comes to defining success in life. According to a 2013 LifeTwist study , only around one-quarter of Americans still believe that wealth determines success.

This article originally appeared in the Huffington Post .

About the Author

Carolyn gregoire, you may also enjoy.

Are the Rich More Lonely?

When the Going Gets Tough, the Affluent Get Lonely

What Inequality Does to Kids

Why Does Happiness Inequality Matter?

Low-Income People Quicker to Show Compassion

Does Wealth Reduce Compassion?

Essay On Greed | Impacts of Greed on Personal & Professional Life

Greed is one of the deadliest sins of all. It has been there since time immemorial. When you have greed in you, you tend to indulge in it without thinking of its consequences. Greed is a kind of evil that destroys the soul of man.

It affects those who are greedy in personal and professional life. In fact, it destroys minds and sometimes even the whole society.

Short Essay On Greed Is A Rout Of All Evil

Introduction Paragraph

Greed is an effect of materialism. When a man wants to satisfy his desires all the time, he cannot do anything else, but to be greedy for worldly goods and for physical comforts.

In personal life, people tend to be selfish because of greed. Greed leads to fights between human beings. Some people become mean and cruel to others in order to fulfill their own greed.

Body Paragraphs

Greed also affects the professional life. A greedy person can never be a good team player. He always wants to be in the forefront and wants to get all the credit. Such a person is always after self-promotion and is never content with what he has. He is always ready to backstab his own colleagues and friends to get ahead in life. All these things show that greed is a destructive force. It has the power to destroy not only an individual but also the whole society. We should try to overcome greed in our own lives and should also help others to do the same.

Greediness often stems from a feeling of insecurity or lack of self-confidence. People who feel they have to prove something to others or to themselves are often the ones who exhibit greedy behavior. They feel they need to acquire as much as possible to feel content or happy. So, in a way, you could say that greediness is a form of self-absorption.

Greed also leads to a sense of entitlement. When people feel entitled to something, they often feel like they are owed it. And if they don’t get what they feel they are owed, they can become angry or violent. Greed is also closely linked to pride. People who are greedy often have a lot of pride. They think they are better than others and that they deserve more than others. This sense of superiority can lead to conflict and problems in both personal and professional relationships.

Greed is a destructive force, not only to the individual, but also to society as a whole. It is important to be aware of the signs of greed in our own lives and to try to overcome it. And we should also help others to do the same.

In conclusion, Greed is a dangerous emotion that can have disastrous consequences, not just for the individual, but also for society as a whole. We should all be aware of the signs of greed in our own lives and try to overcome it. We can also help others to do the same.

Hello! Welcome to my Blog StudyParagraphs.co. My name is Angelina. I am a college professor. I love reading writing for kids students. This blog is full with valuable knowledge for all class students. Thank you for reading my articles.

Related Posts:

Leave a Reply Cancel reply

Your email address will not be published. Required fields are marked *

Save my name, email, and website in this browser for the next time I comment.

Ethics and Morality

Is greed good, the psychology and philosophy of greed..

Updated June 23, 2024 | Reviewed by Kaja Perina

Greed is the disordered desire for more than is appropriate, decent, or deserved, not for the greater good but for one’s own (perceived) interest, and often at the detriment of others and society at large. Greed can be for anything, but is most commonly for food, money, possessions, power, fame, status, attention , admiration, and sex.

The Origins of Greed

Greed can arise from early traumas such as parental absence, inconsistency, or neglect. In later life, low self-esteem coupled with feelings of anxiety and vulnerability lead the person to fixate on a substitute for the love and security that they lacked. The pursuit of the substitute distracts from the painful feelings, while its hoarding provides some degree of comfort and compensation.

Another aetiology of greed is that the trait is written into our genes because, in the course of evolution, it has tended to promote survival and reproduction. Without a measure of greed, individuals and communities are more likely to run out of resources, and to lack the means and motivation to innovate and achieve, making them more vulnerable to the vagaries of fate and the designs of their enemies.

If greed is much more developed in human beings than in other animals, this is partly because human beings have the capacity to project themselves far into the future, to the time of their death and even beyond. The prospect of our demise gives rise to anxiety about our purpose, value, and meaning.

In a bid to quell this existential anxiety, our culture provides us with ready-made narratives of life and death. Whenever existential anxiety threatens to surface into our conscious mind, we turn to culture for comfort and consolation. And today, it so happens that our culture—or lack of it, for our culture is in a state of flux and crisis—places a high value on materialism , and, by extension, on greed.

Our culture’s emphasis on greed is such that many people have become immune to satisfaction; having acquired one thing, they immediately set their sights on the next thing that comes to mind. Today, the object of desire is no longer satisfaction but desire itself.

Can Greed be Good?

Although a blind and blunt force, greed leads to superior economic and social outcomes. Unlike altruism , which is a refined capability, greed is a primitive and democratic impulse, and ideally suited to our era of mass consumption. Altruism attracts passing praise, but really it is greed that our society rewards, and that delivers the material goods and economic growth upon which our governments have come to rely.

Like it or not, our society is fuelled by greed, and without it would soon descend into poverty and anarchy. Greed lies at the bottom of every successful ancient and modern society, including the glorious Athenian and Roman empires, and political systems designed to check or eliminate it have all ended in abject failure.

Gordon Gekko, in the film Wall Street (1987), is especially eloquent on the benefits of greed:

Greed, for the lack of a better word, is good. Greed is right, greed works. Greed clarifies, cuts through, and captures the essence of the evolutionary spirit. Greed, in all of its forms; greed for life, for money, for love, knowledge [sic.] has marked the upward surge of mankind.

The Nobel economist Milton Friedman (d. 2006) argued that the challenge for social organization is not to eradicate greed, but to set up an arrangement under which it does the least harm. For Friedman, capitalism is just that kind of system.

But greed is, to say the least, a mixed blessing. People who are consumed by greed become utterly fixated on the object of their greed. Their lives are reduced to little more than a quest to accumulate as much as possible of whatever it is that they covet and crave. Even when they have met their every reasonable need and more, they are utterly unable to redirect their drives and desires towards other and higher things.

Greed is associated with negative psychological states including stress , exhaustion, anxiety, depression , and despair, and with maladaptive behaviours such as gambling, hoarding, theft, deceit, and corruption. By overriding pro-social forces such as reason, compassion, and love, greed loosens family and community ties, undermining the bonds and values upon which society is built. Greed may drive the economy, but as recent history has made all too clear, unfettered greed can also precipitate a deep and long-lasting economic recession.

Last but not least, our consumer culture continues to inflict severe damage on the environment , resulting in, among others, deforestation, desertification, ocean acidification, species extinctions, and more frequent and severe extreme weather events. There is a question about whether such naked greed can be sustainable in the short term, let alone the long term.

Greed and Maslow’s Hierarchy of Needs

The psychologist Abraham Maslow (d. 1970) proposed that healthy human beings have a certain number of needs, and that these needs can be arranged in a hierarchy, with some needs (such as physiological and safety needs) being more primitive or basic than others (such as social and ego needs). Maslow’s so-called ‘hierarchy of needs’ is often presented as a five-level pyramid, with higher needs coming into focus only once lower, more basic needs have been met.

Maslow called the bottom four levels of the pyramid ‘deficiency needs’ because we do not feel anything if they are met but become distressed if they are not. Thus, physiological needs such as eating, drinking, and sleeping are deficiency needs, as are safety needs, social needs such as friendship and sexual intimacy , and ego needs such as self-esteem, prestige, and recognition.

On the other hand, he called the fifth, top level of the pyramid a ‘growth need’ insofar as the drive to self-actualize demands that we break beyond our limited selves to fulfil our potential as human beings. Once we have met our deficiency needs, the focus of our anxiety shifts to self-actualization, and we begin, even if only at a sub- or semi-conscious level, to contemplate our bigger picture.

The problem with greed is that grounds us on one of the lower levels of the pyramid, preventing us from ever reaching the pinnacle of growth and self-actualization. Of course, this is the precise purpose of greed: to defend against existential anxiety, which is the type of anxiety associated with the apex of the pyramid.

Greed and Religion

Because it removes us from the bigger picture, which is God, greed is roundly condemned by all the major religions.

In the Christian tradition, greed, or avarice, is one of the seven deadly sins, a form of idolatry that forsakes things eternal for things temporal. In Dante’s Inferno , the avaricious are bound prostrate on a floor of cold, hard rock as a punishment for their attachment to earthly goods and neglect of higher things.

In the Buddhist tradition, it is craving that keeps us from the path to enlightenment. Similarly, in the Hindu Mahabharata , when Yudhishthira asks to ‘hear in detail the source from which sin proceeds’, Bhishma replies in no uncertain terms that it is from covetousness that sin proceeds.

In Book 12, Section 158 (the Mahabharata is the longest poem ever written), Bhishma tells Yudhishthira:

From covetousness proceeds sin. It is from this source that sin and irreligiousness flow, together with great misery. This covetousness is the spring of also all the cunning and hypocrisy in the world. It is covetousness that makes men commit sin. From covetousness proceeds wrath; from covetousness flows lust, and it is from covetousness that loss of judgment, deception , pride, arrogance, and malice, as also vindictiveness, shamelessness, loss of prosperity, loss of virtue, anxiety, and infamy spring, miserliness, cupidity, desire for every kind of improper act, pride of birth, pride of learning, pride of beauty, pride of wealth, pitilessness for all creatures, malevolence towards all…

The song The Fear (2009) by singer and songwriter Lily Allen is a modern, secular version of this tirade. Here are a few choice lyrics by way of a conclusion:

I want to be rich and I want lots of money

I don’t care about clever I don’t care about funny

…And I’m a weapon of massive consumption

And it’s not my fault it’s how I’m programmed to function

…Forget about guns and forget ammunition

‘Cause I’m killing them all on my own little mission

I don’t know what’s right and what’s real anymore

And I don’t know how I’m meant to feel anymore

And when do you think it will all become clear?

‘Cause I’m being taken over by The Fear

Read more in Heaven and Hell: The Psychology of the Emotions .

Neel Burton, M.D. , is a psychiatrist, philosopher, and writer who lives and teaches in Oxford, England.

• Find a Therapist
• Find a Treatment Center
• Find a Psychiatrist
• Find a Support Group
• Find Online Therapy
• United States
• Brooklyn, NY
• Chicago, IL
• Houston, TX
• Los Angeles, CA
• New York, NY
• Portland, OR
• San Diego, CA
• San Francisco, CA
• Seattle, WA
• Washington, DC
• Asperger's
• Bipolar Disorder
• Chronic Pain
• Eating Disorders
• Passive Aggression
• Personality
• Goal Setting
• Positive Psychology
• Stopping Smoking
• Low Sexual Desire
• Relationships
• Child Development
• Self Tests NEW
• Therapy Center
• Diagnosis Dictionary
• Types of Therapy

It’s increasingly common for someone to be diagnosed with a condition such as ADHD or autism as an adult. A diagnosis often brings relief, but it can also come with as many questions as answers.

• Emotional Intelligence
• Gaslighting
• Affective Forecasting
• Neuroscience

• Power, Greed, and the Love of Money

By Mike DuBose

America, one of the wealthiest nations in the world, has a large population that enjoys a standard of life far higher than that of most people on Earth. Even our poorest citizens are considered rich by people in some Third World countries. “Americans are not ashamed of amassing huge quantities of material things, a mindset that differentiates us from much of the rest of the world. ‘Making it big’ and ‘having it all’ are part and parcel of the American Dream,” writes Diane Coutu, senior editor at Harvard Business Journal. Unfortunately, much of America’s economic success is driven by greed and the desire for power and money. Our nation is obsessed with these things, and the more we get, the more we want—even if our greed threatens to destroy us. Though many Americans share the motto “Greed is good,” like Gordon Gekko, played by Michael Douglas in the 1987 film Wall Street, their greed will eventually lead to punishment for their actions.

The Enron scandal demonstrated how money, power, and the accompanying greed can grow exponentially once we allow ourselves to start down that slippery slope. Our judgment becomes impaired, ethics compromised, and our management style blinded with ambition. What drives people who are so powerful and wealthy to take a path that can lead to prison and, in Ken Lay’s case, death? As I sadly followed the Enron story, I asked myself, “When is enough, enough?”

POWER: I worked for two governors in the 1980’s and was a campaign strategist for politicians from both parties. Thus, I was exposed to many powerful people. I found that many politicians have a high opinion of themselves, often seeking election out of a need for power and recognition that becomes insatiable once they’re in office.

Business leaders are not immune to this lust for power. When I was around those prominent people, I felt powerful, too! However, in Good to Great, Jim Collins contends that the most successful leaders do not intentionally seek power or recognition. In fact, he describes them as humble. Servant leaders earn recognition and power and lead with care, respect and ethical behavior. My early access to powerful people led to problems I had with one of the seven deadly sins later in life

GREED: Once, a colleague told me with great conviction, “Mike, you have a mean greedy streak! And one day, it’s going to be your downfall!”

I was taken aback by her criticism but reluctantly admitted that she was right. At the time, all I thought of was making more and more money. I was on an unyielding course of self-destruction and was determined to become a multimillionaire and own a corporate jet no matter what the intangible costs. I was allowing greed to control my life, sacrificing the well-being of my staff, my family and myself.

My colleague’s words, with God’s help, caused me to take inventory of my life. I realized that my lust for money and power came from a deep-seated need to overcome feelings from my childhood. Freud was right—childhood experiences influence our adult lives. My parents divorced in an era when people stayed married for life and my mother struggled financially. When I was in high school, we moved into the “big city” of Darlington, SC and I quickly ensconced myself with the popular crowd. They all had dreams of going to college, so I decided to go, too. When I met with my guidance counselor, she was not very encouraging. “Mike,” she said with a smirk on her face, “College is just a waste of time for you. You will never amount to anything!”

However, I went on to college and graduated in three years with honors and later obtained a graduate degree. Fast forward 30 years: my childhood insecurities fueled my desire for wealth and power. If you had asked me two years ago what I liked to do for fun, my answer would have been, “I like to make money! It’s fun!” And the problem was…I was good at it!

LOVE OF MONEY: Money isn’t the root of all evil—the love of money is. Recently, I shared with a well-known Midlands millionaire my passion for helping other business owners learn from my mistakes now that I had achieved reasonable success. I told him that I never dreamed I would accomplish the things I have and that I was satisfied with where I was in my life. Without blinking, he quipped, “Not me!” Sadly, I see many business owners like him, flying blindly down the road of unhappiness, driven by the insatiable success itch, chasing that elusive gold at the end of the rainbow.

Greed, power, and the love of money have ruined many business owners—and their companies. Blinded by their lust for more power and money, they self-destruct, leaving behind insecure children and unhappy spouses, not to mention the poor health they experience from the stress of never reaching their unattainable goals.

BEATING THE MONSTER: If you’re the captain of the ship and greed and power are steering you toward an iceberg, change course! The scenery may be a little nicer on the other route, but you may find that you’ll be just as content taking a slower-paced journey.

Recently, I promised my employees that money will not drive our company or the decisions we make. My team leaders and I remain keenly aware that we have to pay the bills and make a good profit, but if we don’t run people into the ground trying to keep the money rolling in, I believe the result will be happier employees who work smarter, not harder. We also decided to give away half the profits that the Columbia Conference Center generates to charity and schools to make our world a better place.

I have learned firsthand that it’s much more productive to appreciate what you have. Hold on to high quality standards, but be satisfied with a little less of the green stuff. Personally, I have learned that inner peace and contentment pay much richer dividends than a whopping cash flow. By the way, I still haven’t given up on that corporate jet!

Latest Post

Back Pain—Understanding the Causes and Treatments

Trolling Photography Lawyers May Be Coming After You!

Regrets of the Dying

Receive monthly e-mail notifications about new blogs and published articles on health, business, travel, and other interesting topics from Mike DuBose. Thank you for your interest in being our partner in our purpose of “Creating Opportunities to Improve Lives!”

Sign-up For Articles & Inspirational Daily Quotes

Please check one or both boxes. You can unsubscribe at any time.

Articles Daily Quotes

Home — Essay Samples — Life — Character Traits — Greed

Greed Essay Titles

Brief description of greed.

Greed is the intense desire for material wealth or power, often at the expense of others. It is a fundamental human characteristic that has been the cause of many societal issues throughout history. Understanding and exploring greed is crucial to understanding human behavior and its impact on society.

Importance of Writing Essays on This Topic

Essays on greed are significant for academic and personal exploration as they allow individuals to delve into the complexities of human nature, ethics, and morality. By examining greed through writing, students and writers can gain a deeper understanding of the consequences of excessive desire and the role it plays in shaping individual and societal values.

Tips on Choosing a Good Topic

• Consider current events and their relation to greed, such as corporate scandals or economic disparities.
• Look for literature and historical events that explore the theme of greed and its impact on individuals and society.
• Reflect on personal experiences or observations related to greed and its effects on relationships, communities, or personal well-being.

Essay Topics

• The role of greed in economic inequality
• The portrayal of greed in classic literature
• The impact of greed on environmental sustainability
• Corporate greed and its consequences
• Greed and its influence on personal relationships
• The ethical implications of greed in business
• Greed as a driving force in historical events
• The psychological roots of greed
• Greed in the context of modern consumerism
• Overcoming greed through mindfulness and self-awareness

Concluding Thought

Writing essays on greed offers a unique opportunity to critically analyze and understand the complexities of human desire and its impact on society. By exploring this topic, individuals can gain valuable insights into the moral, ethical, and psychological dimensions of greed, contributing to a deeper understanding of human behavior and societal dynamics.

The Manifestation of Greed in J.r.r. Tolkien's "The Hobbit"

The insidious nature of greed in shakespeare's macbeth, made-to-order essay as fast as you need it.

Each essay is customized to cater to your unique preferences

+ experts online

Gordon Gekko's "Greed is Good" Speech Analysis

Avatar: a deeper look into the human greed through cinematography , why greed for money in good for the economy and society, the definition and nature of human greed, let us write you an essay from scratch.

• 450+ experts on 30 subjects ready to help
• Custom essay delivered in as few as 3 hours

A Theme of Greed in The Pearl by John Steinbeck

Discussion of why greed is good for the economy, a theme of greed in the tragedy of macbeth, the impact of greed on a man in the monkey's paw by w. w. jacob, get a personalized essay in under 3 hours.

Expert-written essays crafted with your exact needs in mind

How Much Land Does a Man Need by Leo Tolstoy: I Shall Never Reach that Spot

The sickness of greed in modern society, the idea of greed in the necklace by guy de maupassant, the theme of greed in the treasure island and the pearl, greed and loss in the necklace and disabled, review of king leopold’s ghost: a story of greed, terror, and heroism in colonial africa by adam hochschild, the wolf of wall street: ethics, greed and corruption, the wolf of wall street: depiction of greed and corruption, greed in macbeth, gerald scarpelli case summary, the monkeys paw theme, macbeth greed quotes, relevant topics.

• Winter Break
• Childhood Memories

By clicking “Check Writers’ Offers”, you agree to our terms of service and privacy policy . We’ll occasionally send you promo and account related email

No need to pay just yet!

Bibliography

We use cookies to personalyze your web-site experience. By continuing we’ll assume you board with our cookie policy .

• Instructions Followed To The Letter
• Deadlines Met At Every Stage
• Unique And Plagiarism Free

Morning Rundown: Trump's attacks on Jewish Democrats, man charged in killing of sleeping train passengers, and this season's top NFL storylines

Judge rejects Trump's second bid to move New York hush money case to federal court

A federal judge on Tuesday denied former President Donald Trump's second and last ditch bid to transfer his New York hush money case to federal court.

U.S. District Judge Alvin Hellerstein of the Southern District of New York found that there was no good cause to grant Trump’s lawyers permission to even file a motion. Trump's attorneys filed a notice of appeal late Tuesday evening.

The judge's order said that in arguing “good cause” to move the case, Trump primarily argued that the state judge presiding over the criminal case, Juan Merchan, is biased against him and that the U.S. Supreme Court’s immunity ruling from July presents a valid federal defense for the hush money case.

Hellerstein rejected both arguments, finding first that a state court judge’s alleged bias does not present a federal question that would justify jurisdiction in a federal court, and was an issue for a state appeals court to decide.

Trump’s attorneys also argued the U.S. Supreme Court’s  ruling on presidential immunity  in a separate Trump criminal case should result in the charges him being dismissed because prosecutors used some evidence of Trump's "official acts" as a part of their case.

Hellerstein said he was standing by his July 2023 conclusion — following briefing and an evidentiary hearing — that removal of the case was not warranted because the case was centered on Trump's personal actions.

"I held in my Order and Opinion of July 19, 2023 that 'hush money paid to an adult film star is not related to a President's official acts,'" Hellerstein wrote. "Nothing in the Supreme Court's opinion affects my previous conclusion that the hush money payments were private, unofficial acts, outside the bounds of executive authority."

The judge’s decision comes after prosecutors in New York urged Merchan not to allow Trump’s eleventh-hour effort to move the case to federal court to prevent him from ruling on pending motions in the historic state criminal case.

Trump had asked Merchan to set aside the jury’s verdict because it allegedly relied on evidence of Trump’s “official,” and therefore immune, conduct, but also has requested that Merchan delay his sentencing until after the November election. Both motions are still pending.

"Federal law is clear that proceedings in this Court need not be stayed pending the district court's resolution of defendant's removal notice," the DA's letter said. It also added that "the concerns defendant expresses about timing are a function of his own strategic and dilatory litigation tactics: This second notice of removal comes nearly ten months after defendant voluntarily abandoned his appeal from his first, unsuccessful effort to remove this case; three months after he was found guilty by a jury on thirty-four felony counts; and nearly two months after defendant asked this Court to consider his CPL § 330.30 motion for a new trial."

The DA’s office opposes Trump’s efforts to overturn the verdict and contends the impact of the “official acts” that were referred to in the case were negligible.

Merchan is expected to rule on that matter Sept. 16 — two days before Trump’s sentencing.

Prosecutors have also said they would  defer to the judge  on pushing back the Sept. 18 date in order to give Trump “adequate time” to try an appeal, but also urged him to pronounce sentence “without unreasonable delay.”

Lisa Rubin is an MSNBC legal correspondent and a former litigator.

Adam Reiss is a reporter and producer for NBC and MSNBC.

Laura Jarrett is a senior legal correspondent for NBC News.

Dareh Gregorian is a politics reporter for NBC News.

Raquel Coronell Uribe is a breaking news reporter.