define personal identity essay

How to Identify Yourself in an Essay: Exploring Self-Identity in Writing

• by Brandon Thompson
• October 18, 2023

Writing an essay about oneself can be a daunting task. How do you capture the essence of who you are in just a few words or pages? How do you define yourself in a way that is both authentic and engaging? In this blog post, we will dive into the art of self-identification in essay writing, providing you with tips, insights, and examples to help you craft a compelling narrative about your own identity.

Whether you’re facing the challenge of answering questions like “How do you define yourself?” or “What makes up your identity?” or struggling with how to discuss yourself without using the first-person pronoun, we’ll guide you through the process step by step. We will explore various techniques for writing a self-identity essay, such as using reflection, describing your social identity, and introducing yourself in a creative way.

So grab a pen and paper, or open up that blank document, as we journey together to discover how to effectively identify yourself in an essay – a reflection of who you are in this ever-evolving world of 2023.

How to Identify Yourself in an Essay: Let Your Words Shine!

When it comes to writing an essay, one of the most important aspects is identifying yourself and expressing your unique voice. After all, no one wants to read a dull and lifeless piece of writing! So, how can you make sure your essay stands out? Let’s dive in and explore some tips on how you can identify yourself effectively in your writing.

Find Your Writing Persona

Just like superheroes have alter egos, writers too have their own personas. Embrace your inner writer and let your personality shine through your words! Whether you’re witty, introspective, or even a bit sarcastic, infusing your essay with your authentic voice will make it engaging and relatable. Don’t be afraid to show some personality – after all, who said essays have to be boring?

Inject Some Humor

Who says essays can’t be entertaining? Injecting humor into your writing can captivate your readers and make your essay stand out from the crowd. Of course, don’t force it or try too hard to be funny; instead, lightheartedly sprinkle in some jokes or clever anecdotes that relate to your topic. A humorous tone can make your essay more enjoyable to read while still conveying your thoughts effectively.

Reflect Your Unique Perspectives

We all have our own perspectives and experiences that shape the way we view the world. Use your essay as an opportunity to showcase your unique point of view. Whether you’re tackling a philosophical question or exploring a personal experience, don’t be afraid to express your thoughts and feelings authentically. Remember, your perspective is what sets your essay apart.

Play with Structure

While essays typically have a formal structure, that doesn’t mean you can’t play around with it a little. Use subheadings, bullet points, or even numbered lists to organize your thoughts and make the reading experience more enjoyable. Breaking up your content into smaller, digestible sections makes it easier for your readers to follow along and keeps them engaged from start to finish.

Dare to Be Different

Everyone loves a fresh perspective, so dare to be different in your writing. Challenge conventional ideas or take a unique stance on a topic. By offering a fresh take or a creative spin, you’ll leave a lasting impression on your readers. Remember, the goal is not to conform but to stand out and be memorable.

Embrace Your Quirkiness

We all have our quirks, so don’t be afraid to let them shine in your essay. Whether it’s an unusual hobby, a unique talent, or a peculiar fascination, incorporating your quirks into your writing can make it more interesting and authentic. By embracing your individuality, you’ll create a personal connection with your readers and leave a lasting impact.

In conclusion, when it comes to identifying yourself in an essay, the key is to be genuine, entertaining, and captivating. Let your writing persona shine, inject some humor, reflect your unique perspectives, play with structure, dare to be different, and embrace your quirkiness. By following these tips, you’ll not only create an essay that stands out but also enjoy the process of writing and expressing yourself. So, grab your pen and let your words do the talking!

FAQ: How do you identify yourself in an essay?

How do you answer what defines you.

In an essay, when asked what defines you, it’s important to delve deep into your values, beliefs, experiences, and passions. Reflecting on your unique qualities and characteristics will help you provide an authentic and meaningful response. Remember, you are more than just a list of accomplishments or titles – you are the sum of your values and experiences.

How do you write a self-identity essay

Writing a self-identity essay can be both challenging and liberating. Start by introspecting and reflecting on your identity – the cultural, social, and personal influences that shape you. Then, craft a compelling narrative that showcases your journey of self-discovery. Share anecdotes, milestones, and experiences that have contributed to your growth and sense of self.

How can I define myself

Defining oneself is like peeling an onion – layer by layer, you discover who you truly are. Embrace introspection and explore your passions, values, strengths, and weaknesses. Look beyond external expectations and societal norms. Remember, it’s a lifelong process, and it often takes time and self-reflection to truly understand and define yourself.

What is an identity example

Identity is as unique as a fingerprint, and each person’s identity is formed by a combination of factors. For example, an identity can be shaped by cultural heritage, such as being a proud Latina or a devoted fan of Korean pop music. It can also be influenced by personal traits, such as being an adventurous thrill-seeker or a compassionate and empathetic friend. Ultimately, identity is the intricate tapestry that makes each person who they are.

What makes up a person’s identity essay

A person’s identity essay encompasses various aspects that contribute to their sense of self. These include cultural background , beliefs, values, interests, experiences, and relationships. It is the fusion of these elements that shapes a person’s unique identity and makes them the individual they are.

How do you write an identity statement

Crafting an identity statement is like capturing the essence of who you are in a concise and powerful sentence. Start by reflecting on the core values, passions, and qualities that define you. Then, articulate these elements into a clear and compelling statement that encapsulates your identity. Be authentic, genuine, and unafraid to showcase what makes you extraordinary.

How do you make a new identity for yourself

Making a new identity for yourself can be both exciting and challenging. Start by identifying the changes you want to make, whether it’s adopting new habits, exploring new interests, or reassessing your values. Embrace personal growth, surround yourself with supportive individuals, and be open to new experiences. Remember, creating a new identity is a journey, and it takes time, effort, and self-reflection.

How do you write a few lines about yourself

When writing a few lines about yourself, it’s important to strike a balance between showcasing your unique qualities and maintaining brevity. Highlight your key accomplishments, interests, and passions. Inject a touch of humor, if appropriate, to engage your readers. Remember, the goal is to leave a lasting impression and pique curiosity about the person behind those few lines.

How do you define yourself reflection

Defining yourself through reflection involves introspection and analyzing your thoughts, feelings, and experiences. Take the time to understand your values, strengths, weaknesses, and aspirations. Explore how your past experiences have shaped you and consider how you want to grow in the future. Through reflection, you can gain a deeper understanding of yourself and thereby define your identity.

How would you describe your social identity

Describing social identity involves considering how you relate to different social groups and communities. It encompasses aspects such as race, ethnicity, gender, religion, and socioeconomic background. When describing your social identity, you may discuss the intersectionality of these various facets and how they influence your perspective, experiences, and interactions within society.

What makes up your identity

Your identity is an intricate tapestry woven from various threads that make you unique. It comprises elements such as your cultural background, personal values, experiences, relationships, and aspirations. It is the combination of these factors that gives you a distinct identity, shaping your beliefs, actions, and overall sense of self.

How do you talk about yourself in an essay without using “I”

Crafting an essay about yourself without relying heavily on the pronoun “I” requires creativity and alternative perspectives. Instead of constantly using “I,” focus on sharing specific experiences, achievements, or insights. Use descriptive language to engage your readers and help them visualize your narrative. By varying sentence structures and utilizing storytelling techniques, you can effectively convey your unique story without relying solely on “I.”

How would you describe yourself in one sentence

In one sentence, I am a curious wanderer, forever seeking adventures, embracing new experiences, and finding joy in the simple moments of life.

What is meant by self-identity

Self-identity refers to the recognition, understanding, and acceptance of one’s own unique characteristics, values, and beliefs. It is a journey of self-discovery that involves introspection, reflection, and a deep connection with one’s true self. Self-identity allows individuals to define who they are and navigate their lives authentically.

How would you describe yourself in a college essay

Describing oneself in a college essay requires striking a delicate balance between showcasing personal qualities and demonstrating suitability for academic pursuits . Be authentic and genuine, highlighting your unique traits, experiences, and ambitions. Emphasize your academic achievements, extracurricular involvements, and personal growth. However, remember to let your personality shine through your writing, engaging the readers with your unique voice.

How do I identify myself example

An example of identifying oneself could be acknowledging oneself as an adventurous explorer who finds solace in nature, a compassionate listener who provides comfort to others, or an analytical thinker who thrives in problem-solving. Identifying oneself involves understanding and embracing personal traits and qualities that make each person unique.

How do you introduce yourself in a class essay

When introducing yourself in a class essay, start with a captivating anecdote or a thought-provoking question related to the topic. Provide a brief overview of your background, emphasizing experiences or interests relevant to the class. Establish credibility while showcasing enthusiasm and curiosity for the subject matter. Engage the reader from the start to set the tone for an engaging essay.

What are 5 important parts of your identity

Five important parts of one’s identity may include cultural background, personal values, aspirations, relationships, and experiences. These elements shape who we are, influence our decision-making, and provide a lens through which we view the world. Each individual’s identity is unique, comprising an intricate web of multifaceted components.

How do you introduce yourself in academic writing

In academic writing, introducing yourself should be done succinctly and professionally. Start with your full name, followed by your current academic affiliation, such as the university or institution you attend. If applicable, mention your area of study or research interests in a concise manner. Avoid unnecessary personal details and maintain a confident and polished tone throughout your introduction.

What is your identity as a student

As a student, your identity extends beyond being a mere participant in academic pursuits. It encompasses your intellectual curiosity, enthusiasm for learning, and dedication to personal growth. Your identity as a student is shaped by how you navigate challenges, collaborate with peers, and actively engage in the pursuit of knowledge. Embrace this multifaceted identity as a student, allowing it to empower and guide you on your academic journey.

How do you identify yourself meaning

Identifying yourself is about recognizing and defining your unique qualities, values, beliefs, and experiences. It involves understanding how these elements shape your perspective, actions, and life choices. By acknowledging and embracing your identity, you gain a sense of self-awareness, enabling personal growth and an authentic connection with others.

How do you introduce yourself in writing examples

Hello, fellow readers! I’m Jane, a passionate storyteller with a penchant for adventure. Whether lost in the pages of a book or exploring the great outdoors, I find solace in embracing new worlds and acquiring fresh perspectives.

Greetings, everyone! I’m John, a coffee-fueled wordsmith on a perpetual quest for knowledge. When I’m not decoding complex theories at my laptop, you can find me immersing myself in the creative realms of photography or scouring the city for the perfect cup of joe.

How do you introduce yourself in a creative essay

In a creative essay, the introduction is your chance to make a memorable first impression. Craft an opening that hooks the reader and sets the tone for your creative exploration. Utilize vivid descriptions, figurative language, or an intriguing anecdote that illuminates your unique perspective. Take the reader on a journey, introducing yourself as a protagonist in your own story, ready to embark on an adventure of self-expression.

How do you introduce yourself as a student

As a student, introducing yourself is an opportunity to showcase your enthusiasm for learning and to connect with your peers. Share your name, grade or year level, and a personal interest or hobby that reflects your individuality. Consider mentioning your academic goals and aspirations, highlighting your determination to excel. Be approachable, friendly, and open to forging new connections in the student community.

• cultural background
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• self-identity essay
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Brandon Thompson

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Why Identity Matters and How It Shapes Us

Verywell / Zoe Hansen

Defining Identity

• What Makes Up a Person's Identity?

Identity Development Across the Lifespan

The importance of identity, tips for reflecting on your identity.

Your identity is a set of physical, mental, emotional, social, and interpersonal characteristics that are unique to you.

It encapsulates your core personal values and your beliefs about the world, says Asfia Qaadir , DO, a child and adolescent psychiatrist at PrairieCare.

In this article, we explore the concept of identity, its importance, factors that contribute to its development , and some strategies that can help you reflect upon your identity.

Your identity gives you your sense of self. It is a set of traits that distinguishes you from other people, because while you might have some things in common with others, no one else has the exact same combination of traits as you.

Your identity also gives you a sense of continuity, i.e. the feeling that you are the same person you were two years ago and you will be the same person two days from now.

Asfia Qaadir, DO, Psychiatrist

Your identity plays an important role in how you treat others and how you carry yourself in the world.

What Makes Up a Person's Identity?

These are some of the factors that can contribute to your identity:

• Physical appearance
• Physical sensations
• Emotional traits
• Life experiences
• Genetics 
• Health conditions
• Nationality
• Race  
• Social community 
• Peer group 
• Political environment
• Spirituality
• Sexuality 
• Personality
• Beliefs 
• Finances 

We all have layers and dimensions that contribute to who we are and how we express our identity.

All of these factors interact together and influence you in unique and complex ways, shaping who you are. Identity formation is a subjective and deeply personal experience.

Identity development is a lifelong process that begins in childhood, starts to solidify in adolescence, and continues through adulthood.

Childhood is when we first start to develop a self-concept and form an identity.

As children, we are highly dependent on our families for our physical and emotional needs. Our early interactions with family members play a critical role in the formation of our identities.

During this stage, we learn about our families and communities, and what values are important to them, says Dr. Qaadir. 

The information and values we absorb in childhood are like little seeds that are planted years before we can really intentionally reflect upon them as adults, says Dr. Qaadir.

Traumatic or abusive experiences during childhood can disrupt identity formation and have lasting effects on the psyche.

Adolescence

Adolescence is a critical period of identity formation.

As teenagers, we start to intentionally develop a sense of self based on how the values we’re learning show up in our relationships with ourselves, our friends, family members, and in different scenarios that challenge us, Dr. Qaadir explains.

Adolescence is a time of discovering ourselves, learning to express ourselves, figuring out where we fit in socially (and where we don’t), developing relationships, and pursuing interests, says Dr. Qaadir.

This is the period where we start to become independent and form life goals. It can also be a period of storm and stress , as we experience mood disruptions, challenge authority figures, and take risks as we try to work out who we are.

As adults, we begin building our public or professional identities and deepen our personal relationships, says Dr. Qaadir.

These stages are not set in stone, rather they are fluid, and we get the rest of our lives to continue experiencing life and evolving our identities, says Dr. Qaadir.

Having a strong sense of identity is important because it:

• Creates self-awareness: A strong sense of identity can give you a deep sense of awareness of who you are as a person. It can help you understand your likes, dislikes, actions, motivations, and relationships.
• Provides direction and motivation: Having a strong sense of identity can give you a clear understanding of your values and interests, which can help provide clarity, direction, and motivation when it comes to setting goals and working toward them.
• Enables healthy relationships: When you know and accept yourself, you can form meaningful connections with people who appreciate and respect you for who you are. A strong sense of identity also helps you communicate effectively, establish healthy boundaries, and engage in authentic and fulfilling interactions.
• Keeps you grounded: Our identities give us roots when things around us feel chaotic or uncertain, says Dr. Qaadir. “Our roots keep us grounded and help us remember what truly matters at the end of the day.”
• Improves decision-making: Understanding yourself well can help you make choices that are consistent with your values, beliefs, and long-term goals. This clarity reduces confusion, indecision, and the tendency to conform to others' expectations, which may lead to poor decision-making .
• Fosters community participation: Identity is often shaped by cultural, social, political, spiritual, and historical contexts. Having a strong sense of identity allows you to understand, appreciate, and take pride in your cultural heritage. This can empower you to participate actively in society, express your unique perspective, and contribute to positive societal change.

On the other hand, a weak sense of identity can make it more difficult to ground yourself emotionally in times of stress and more confusing when you’re trying to navigate major life decisions, says Dr. Qaadir.

Dr. Qaadir suggests some strategies that can help you reflect on your identity:

• Art: Art is an incredible medium that can help you process and reflect on your identity. It can help you express yourself in creative and unique ways.
• Reading: Reading peoples’ stories through narrative is an excellent way to broaden your horizons, determine how you feel about the world around you, and reflect on your place in it.
• Journaling: Journaling can also be very useful for self-reflection . It can help you understand your feelings and motivations better.
• Conversation: Conversations with people can expose you to diverse perspectives, and help you form and represent your own.
• Nature: Being in nature can give you a chance to reflect undisturbed. Spending time in nature often has a way of putting things in perspective.
• Relationships: You can especially strengthen your sense of identity through the relationships around you. It is valuable to surround yourself with people who reflect your core values but may be different from you in other aspects of identity such as personality styles, cultural backgrounds, passions, professions, or spiritual paths because that provides perspective and learning from others.

American Psychological Association. Identity .

Pfeifer JH, Berkman ET. The development of self and identity in adolescence: neural evidence and implications for a value-based choice perspective on motivated behavior . Child Dev Perspect . 2018;12(3):158-164. doi:10.1111/cdep.12279

Hasanah U, Susanti H, Panjaitan RU. Family experience in facilitating adolescents during self-identity development . BMC Nurs . 2019;18(Suppl 1):35. doi:10.1186/s12912-019-0358-7

Dereboy Ç, Şahin Demirkapı E, et al. The relationship between childhood traumas, identity development, difficulties in emotion regulation and psychopathology . Turk Psikiyatri Derg . 2018;29(4):269-278.

Branje S, de Moor EL, Spitzer J, Becht AI. Dynamics of identity development in adolescence: a decade in review . J Res Adolesc . 2021;31(4):908-927. doi:10.1111/jora.12678

Stirrups R.  The storm and stress in the adolescent brain .  The Lancet Neurology . 2018;17(5):404. doi:10.1016/S1474-4422(18)30112-1

Fitzgerald A. Professional identity: A concept analysis . Nurs Forum . 2020;55(3):447-472. doi:10.1111/nuf.12450

National Institute of Standards and Technology. Identity .

By Sanjana Gupta Sanjana is a health writer and editor. Her work spans various health-related topics, including mental health, fitness, nutrition, and wellness.

Exploring a Personal Identity: What Defines Me as an Individual Essay

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The process of shaping a personal identity is rather complex and often convoluted since it is defined by multiple forces, some of which may turn out to be quite contradictory. The exploration of a personal identity becomes even more difficult for immigrants, who have been affected by sudden changes in their environment and the influences that often appear to be too intrusive ad dominant. However, due to openness to new ideas and the ability to retain my cultural values, I have managed to shape my personal identity in a unique way that included both the core values of my native community and those of the cultures that have influenced me profoundly.

On the surface, the portrait that I have painted of myself over the entirety of my life is quite basic. Regarding my ethnic roots, I have always viewed myself as a member of the Latino/Hispanic community, which implies following the relevant major traditions and philosophy. For example, motherhood and the related roles, including those of nurturing and educating, have always been a priority for me. However, I have managed to overcome the gender-conforming standards that the specified roles suggested by exploring career opportunities that the related qualities provided. Namely, I have found my calling as an educator for PreK children, to whom I provide support, guidance, and the necessary instructions.

Connecting my experiences and current self-perception, I will have to mention two key people who have influenced me profoundly. These were my mother and my grandmother, who introduced me to the idea of self-determination, helped me to embrace my womanhood and encouraged my education and, later on, my professional development. At the same time, they have been supporting me as a mother, thus helping me with my self-actualization tremendously. They have taught me to overcome the limitations set for me by gender roles, prejudices, and cultural misconceptions, while choosing the available opportunities wisely to grow as a person and a professional. As a result, none of the roles that I have assumed, including that one of a mother and a teacher, have ever restricted me in the options for personal development and communication.

Although religion has never been the focus of my spiritual development due to the impact of the Socialist philosophy of my country of origin, several key Catholic values such as the importance of human life have defined my career and personal evolution. Speaking of the cultural values that have defined my identity as an educator, a parent, and a learner, I must mention the value of human life and respect for others, which have been ingrained in me since childhood due to the family values and the cultural principles. Being appreciative of every opinion and valuing human life as the ultimate treasure is what has affected the development of my identity, both as a teacher and a parent. Specifically, I have been approaching the issue of early childhood development with especial care, making sure that the needs of every child are met and that none is deprived of an essential learning resource.

Although the concept of a cultural identity is quite pliable, and I expect mine to be enriched with new elements in the future, my current perception of self has been shaped largely by the idea of valuing human life, as well as my Latino/Hispanic heritage. The multiple influences that I have experienced throughout my personal journey have contributed to the creation of a unique concept of self that I hope to improve and enrich with new ideas in the future. Overall, my current life as a mother and an educator is entirely fulfilling, yet I am always open to new opportunities.

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Hi all! I'm thinking about writing an essay that focuses on my personal identity. What are some ways to make this type of essay engaging and interesting to colleges? Any examples I should check out for inspiration? Thanks in advance!

Hello! Writing an essay that focuses on your personal identity can be a powerful way to showcase your unique experiences, interests, and perspectives. To make this type of essay engaging and interesting to colleges, consider the following tips:

1. Be authentic and vulnerable: Share your true feelings, thoughts, and struggles as they pertain to your identity. By being open about your experiences, you create a deep connection with the reader.

2. Focus on a specific aspect: Instead of trying to cover every detail of your identity, choose one or two key facets that define you. Delving into particular experiences and emotions will allow you to demonstrate depth and create a more compelling narrative.

3. Use descriptive language and vivid imagery: Paint a picture for the reader by using descriptive words and vivid imagery. This will help them visualize and connect with your story on a deeper level.

4. Show rather than tell: Instead of simply stating your thoughts and feelings about your identity, use anecdotes and examples to illustrate your point. By showing the reader your experiences, you'll create a more compelling and engaging essay.

5. Incorporate growth and development: Demonstrate how your understanding of your identity has evolved over time, and how it has shaped you as a person. This could include personal challenges you've faced, accomplishments, or newfound insights.

6. Reflect on the impact: Discuss how your identity has influenced your decisions, interests, and relationships. This reflection will help demonstrate the importance of your identity and its role in your life.

For examples and inspiration, you can browse through essays shared by students who were admitted to top colleges. Just be mindful not to copy their ideas or writing styles. Instead, use these examples to inspire your own unique angle in exploring your personal identity.

Best of luck with your essay and application process!

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CollegeVine’s Q&A seeks to offer informed perspectives on commonly asked admissions questions. Every answer is refined and validated by our team of admissions experts to ensure it resonates with trusted knowledge in the field.

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Locke on Personal Identity

John Locke (1632–1704) added the chapter in which he treats persons and their persistence conditions (Book 2, Chapter 27) to the second edition of An Essay Concerning Human Understanding in 1694, only after being encouraged to do so by William Molyneux (1692–1693). [ 1 ] Nevertheless, Locke’s treatment of personal identity is one of the most discussed and debated aspects of his corpus. Locke’s discussion of persons received much attention from his contemporaries, ignited a heated debate over personal identity, and continues to influence and inform the debate over persons and their persistence conditions. This entry aims to first get clear on the basics of Locke’s position, when it comes to persons and personal identity, before turning to areas of the text that continue to be debated by historians of philosophy working to make sense of Locke’s picture of persons today. It then canvases how Locke’s discussion of persons was received by his contemporaries, and concludes by briefly addressing how those working in metaphysics in the twentieth and twenty-first centuries have responded to Locke’s view—giving the reader a glimpse of Locke’s lasting impact and influence on the debate over personal identity.

1. Locke on Persons and Personal Identity: The Basics

2. locke on persons: what’s up for debate, 3. the early modern reception of locke’s picture of persons, 4. locke’s lasting impact on the personal identity debate, primary literature by locke, other historical literature, contemporary literature, other internet resources, related entries.

Locke’s most thorough discussion of the persistence (or diachronic identity) of persons can be found in Book 2, Chapter 27 of the Essay (“Of Identity and Diversity”), though Locke anticipates this discussion as early as Book 1, Chapter 4, Section 5, and Locke refers to persons in other texts, including the Second Treatise of Government . The discussion of persons and their persistence conditions also features prominently in Locke’s lengthy exchange with Edward Stillingfleet, Bishop of Worcester (1697–1699).

Locke begins “Of Identity and Diversity” by first getting clear on the principle of individuation, and by setting out what some have called the place-time-kind principle—which stipulates that no two things of the same kind can be in the same place at the same time, and no individual can be in two different places at the same time (L-N 2.27.1). [ 2 ] With some of the basics of identity in place, Locke posits that before we can determine the persistence conditions for atoms, masses of matter, plants, animals, men, or persons, we must first know what we mean by these terms. In other words, before we can determine what makes atoms, masses of matter, plants, animals, men, or persons the same over time, we must pin down the nominal essences—or general ideas—for these kinds. Of this Locke says,

’Tis not therefore Unity of Substance that comprehends all sorts of Identity , or will determine it in every Case: But to conceive, and judge of it aright, we must consider what Idea the Word it is applied to stands for…. (L-N 2.27.7)

That we must define a kind term before determining the persistence conditions for that kind is underscored in Locke’s definition of “person”. Locke starts off by saying,

This being premised to find wherein personal Identity consists, we must consider what Person stands for….

He goes on,

which, I think, is a thinking intelligent Being, that has reason and reflection, and can consider it self as itself, the same thinking thing in different times and places…. (L-N 2.27.9)

A person for Locke is thus the kind of entity that can think self reflectively, and think of itself as persisting over time.

Locke additionally asserts that persons are agents. For Locke “person” is a

…Forensick Term appropriating Actions and their Merit; and so belongs only to intelligent Agents capable of a Law, and Happiness and Misery. (L-N 2.27.26)

Persons are therefore not just thinking intelligent beings that can reason and reflect, and consider themselves as the same thinking things in different times and places, but also entities that can be held accountable for their actions. It is because persons can think of themselves as persisting over time that they can, and do, plan ahead, with an eye toward the punishment or reward that may follow.

Just after Locke defines “person”, he begins to elucidate what makes any person the same person over time. He asserts that

…consciousness always accompanies thinking, and ‘tis that, that makes every one to be, what he calls self . (L-N 2.27.9)

Consciousness is what distinguishes selves, and thus,

…in this alone consists personal Identity, i.e. the sameness of rational Being: And as far as this consciousness can be extended backwards to any past Action or Thought, so far reaches the Identity of that Person ; it is the same self now it was then; and ‘tis by the same self with this present one that now reflects on it, that that Action was done. (L-N 2.27.9)

After the initial assertion that the diachronic identity of persons consists in sameness of consciousness, Locke goes on to use various imaginary cases to drive this point home.

The imaginary cases that Locke employs are not dissimilar to ancient cases, such as the Ship of Theseus, reported by Plutarch. In this case, we are asked to imagine a ship that has slowly had its planks replaced with new ones. The intuition Plutarch’s case is intended to test is whether, at the end (when the ship has an entirely new material constitution), we have the same ship as before. Likewise, Locke is using cases to test readers’ intuitions about persistence and identity. But it is arguable that Locke is the first to devise such cases to specifically test readers’ intuitions about persons and the conditions under which they are the same. Locke is thus carving out a new conceptual space through such imaginary cases. A few of these will be outlined and discussed in what follows.

In the “prince and the cobbler” passage, or L-N 2.27.15, Locke asks the reader to imagine the soul of a prince entering and informing the body of a cobbler, taking all of its “princely thoughts” with it. In this scenario, the person called “prince” ends up persisting in the man identified as the “cobbler”, because the prince’s consciousness goes along with the prince’s soul. Just after Locke describes this scenario, he says,

I know that in the ordinary way of speaking, the same Person, and the same Man, stand for one and the same thing. And indeed every one will always have a liberty to speak, as he pleases, and to apply what articulate Sounds to what Ideas he thinks fit, and change them as often as he pleases. But yet when we will enquire, what makes the same Spirit, Man , or Person , in our Minds; and having resolved with our selves what we mean by them, it will not be hard to determine, in either of them, or the like, when it is the same , and when not. (L-N 2.27.15)

Through the “prince and the cobbler” passage it not only becomes clear that a person goes where their consciousness goes, but also that Locke distinguishes between the term “man” (which is synonymous with “human being”) and “person”.

Other scenarios that Locke conjures, such as the “waking and sleeping Socrates” case (L-N 2.27.19), make clear that even if an individual remains the same man, he may not persist as the same person. Here Locke says,

If the same Socrates waking and sleeping do not partake of the same consciousness , Socrates waking and sleeping is not the same Person. And to punish Socrates waking, for what sleeping Socrates thought, and waking Socrates was never conscious of, would be no more of Right, than to punish one Twin for what his Brother-Twin did, whereof he knew nothing, because their outsides were so like, that they could not be distinguished; for such Twins have been seen. (L-N 2.27.19)

If Socrates has a different consciousness by day than he does by night, then waking Socrates ought not be punished for what sleeping Socrates does. This is because although Socrates is the same man by day as he is by night, he is a different person by day than he is at night (and moral responsibility lies with persons, according to Locke). Thus while the identity of consciousness determines the identity of person, the identity of persons and the identity of men come apart for Locke—or at least they can . [ 3 ]

Locke additionally distinguishes between persons and souls. There is evidence for this in L-N 2.27.13. Here Locke claims,

But yet to return to the Question before us, it must be allowed, That if the same consciousness … can be transferr’d from one thinking Substance to another, it will be possible, that two thinking Substances may make but one Person.

If consciousness can actually be transferred from one soul to another, then a person can persist, despite a change in the soul to which her consciousness is annexed. Thus if a reader’s soul switches out as she progresses from the start of L-N 2.27 to the end, so long as the reader’s consciousness remains the same, she remains the same person, according to Locke.

On top of this, Locke asserts that even if an individual has the same soul, he may fail to be the same person. Locke makes this point in L-N 2.27.14, 23, and 24. In the “day and night-man” passage, or 2.27.23, Locke asks the reader to imagine “…two distinct incommunicable consciousnesses acting the same Body, the one constantly by Day, the other by Night” (L-N 2.27.23). Locke goes on to suggest that the “… Day and the Night-man ” are “as distinct persons as Socrates and Plato ” (L-N 2.27.23). Locke then makes clear that this is the case even if day and night-man share the same soul:

For granting that the thinking Substance in Man must be necessarily suppos’d immaterial, ‘tis evident, that immaterial thinking thing may sometimes part with its past consciousness, and be restored to it again, as appears in the forgetfulness Men often have of their past Actions, and the Mind many times recovers the memory of a past consciousness, which it had lost for twenty Years together. Make these intervals of Memory and Forgetfulness to take their turns regularly by Day and Night, and you have two Persons with the same immaterial Spirit, as much as in the former instance two Persons with the same Body. So that self is not determined by Identity or Diversity of Substance…but only by identity of consciousness. (L-N 2.27.23)

Just as the “waking and sleeping Socrates” passage, L-N 2.27.23 shows that there can be a change of person due to a change in consciousness, and this is the case even though there is no change in man. But, what Locke also makes clear through L-N 2.27.23 is that there can be a change of person even though there is no change in soul. Thus while many philosophers (including Plato, Rene Descartes, Samuel Clarke, etc.) think that one cannot be a person unless one has an immaterial soul, and the identity of persons rests in the identity of souls, Locke makes the bold move of pulling persons and souls apart.

In addition to this, Locke calls the substantial nature of souls into question. Locke takes thought to be immaterial, and while Locke contends that the immaterial cannot be reduced to, or explained in terms of, the material, Locke is not committed to substance dualism, when it comes to finite thinkers. This is because Locke thinks substratum—or the substance that underlies and supports any particular substance’s qualities—is impossible for finite minds to penetrate. Additionally there is nothing in the concepts “thought” and “matter” that allows us to deduce that one excludes the other, and God could have superadded the ability to think to formerly inert systems of matter. In Locke’s picture, we cannot know whether the substance (or substratum) that underlies thinking and willing is different from the substance (or substratum) that underlies being solid and white, or yellow and malleable. Locke’s official position on the substantial nature of finite thinkers is therefore one of agnosticism.

This section outlines some of the areas of Locke’s text, and aspects of Locke’s view, that continue to be debated by historians of philosophy working to make sense of Locke’s picture of persons and their persistence conditions today. As will soon become clear, there is disagreement about almost every aspect of Locke’s discussion of persons, and even some of what has been presented thus far betrays a particular interpretive framework.

One of the overarching questions asked about Locke’s Essay is how much it includes metaphysical exploration. Some think that Locke’s project is exclusively epistemological, citing (among other passages) the following as evidence for their view: In the Epistle to the Reader , Locke describes himself as an “underlabourer”. Locke then goes on to say,

This, therefore being my Purpose to enquire into the Original, Certainty, and Extent of humane Knowledge; together, with the Grounds and Degrees of Belief, Opinion, and Assent; I shall not at present meddle with the Physical Consideration of the Mind; or trouble my self to examine, wherein its Essence consists, or by what Motions of our Spirits, or Alterations of our Bodies, we come to have any Sensation by our Organs, or any Ideas in our Understandings; and whether those Ideas do in their Formation, any, or all of them, depend on Matter, or no. These are Speculations, which, however curious and entertaining, I shall decline, as lying out of my Way, in the Design I am now upon. (L-N 1.1.2)

Under this reading, Locke is interested in determining what we can and cannot know by first determining how we come to have ideas, but what this entails is determining which activities give rise to our ideas, rather than investigating the metaphysical nature of the thinking thing wherein these activities—sensation and reflection—take place. Likewise all other explorations within the Essay eschew metaphysics.

Those who read L-N 2.27 as part of a project which is purely epistemological see the claims that Locke makes about the persistence of persons as claims about what we can know about the persistence of persons. As Lex Newman puts it,

Locke’s broader aim is to clarify the conditions under which we judge that we are numerically the same with some earlier person, not the conditions under which we strictly are the same person. (2015: 90)

Under this kind of reading, Locke’s claim that the identity of any person does not rest in the identity of substance (L-N 2.27.10 and 23) amounts to the claim that if any person wants to determine whether they are the same, they do not look to substance to find out. The idea is that because we have such an impoverished notion of substance in general, we do not look to substratum to determine if we are the same person over time in Locke’s view.

Other scholars tend to think that although Locke sets his task in the Essay as an epistemological one, he cannot help but dabble in some metaphysics along the way. What has been presented (regarding the basics of Locke’s picture of persons) in this entry thus far falls within this interpretive camp. This is why the imaginary cases that Locke employs in L-N 2.27 have been described as giving the reader information about what makes it the case that a person is the same at time 2 as at time 1. According to this view, what Locke is giving us in L-N 2.27 are inter alia “the conditions under which we strictly are the same person”.

Nevertheless, within the interpretive camp that takes Locke to dabble in metaphysics, there is widespread debate, both at the macro and the micro level. To start with the macro level: Some who fall into this camp see Locke making metaphysical claims in various passages throughout the text . Such scholars thus see what Locke is doing in L-N 2.27 as very much in keeping with moves that he makes in other parts of the Essay (see Stuart 2013, for example). However, others see L-N 2.27—and the metaphysics Locke is doing therein—as a significant break from the methodology that Locke employs in the rest of the Essay . This is because just after Locke claims that his project in the Essay is an epistemological one (1.1.2), he makes clear that in this project, he is using the historical plain method, or roughly, the Baconian method of induction (see Nuovo forthcoming). Of this, Locke says,

…I shall imagine I have not wholly misimploy’d my self in the Thoughts I shall have on this Occasion, if, in this Historical, plain Method, I can give any Account of the Ways , whereby our Understandings come to attain those Notions of Things we have, and can set down any Measures of the Certainty of our Knowledge, or the Grounds of those perswasions, which are to be found amongst Men, so various, different, and wholly contradictory…. (L-N 1.1.2)

Those who see a tension between Locke’s discussion of personal identity and the rest of the Essay contend that the way in which Locke proceeds in L-N 2.27 not only includes metaphysics, but also a reliance on thought experiments for data. Thus, rather than surveying a number of instances, and drawing inferences from there—or utilizing the historical, plain method—as he claims to be doing throughout the Essay , Locke is doing something quite different in 2.27: He is employing imaginary cases instead (see Antonia LoLordo 2012, for example).

However, what the historical plain method amounts to for Locke, and whether Locke’s use of thought experiments in L-N 2.27 is in tension with this method is also the subject of debate. So too is whether Locke uses thought experiments in 2.27 alone . Additionally, some have questioned whether the exercises that Locke walks readers through in 2.27 count as thought experiments at all (see Kathryn Tabb 2018, for more on this). There are thus wide-ranging debates about how to best describe 2.27 and the methodologies Locke employs therein. There is also much disagreement regarding how to square these methodologies with the general description Locke gives of his project in the Essay . Moreover, this is the case even amongst those who are in agreement that Locke is doing metaphysics in 2.27.

On top of this, there are deep and long-standing micro-level debates amongst those who think Locke is giving us some metaphysics in L-N 2.27. One such debate regards the implications of Locke’s assertion that the identity of any person does not rest in the identity of substance (2.27.10 and 23). Some scholars take Locke’s assertion that the identity of any person does not rest in the identity of substance, and other similar claims, to be evidence that Locke is a relativist about identity (see Stuart 2013, for example). To get a sense of what this entails, it is helpful to consider the contrast case: strict identity. If a philosopher holds a strict identity theory, then she takes it that we can ask, “Is y at time 2 the same as x at time 1?” and arrive at a determinate answer. On the other hand, if a philosopher is a relativist about identity, then she asserts that in response to the former question, we have to ask “Same what?” So if we ask, “Is Socrates the same?” a relativist about identity thinks we have to specify under which sortal term we are considering Socrates. Are we thinking about Socrates as a human being, or a body, or a soul (or something else altogether)?

On top of this, the relativist about identity thinks that an entity who is of two sorts can persist according to one, while failing to persist according to the other. We might say that from one day to the next, Socrates persists as the same human being, but not as the same body. Thus when Locke says that a person can persist despite a change in substance, or a person can persist despite a change in soul, some scholars take Locke to be showing that he is a relativist about identity. Relative identity readings were rather unpopular for some time, but have experienced a resurgence as of late (see Stuart 2013).

Still, some think that attributing this kind of reading to Locke is anachronistic. Others take issue with the fact that under a relative identity reading, there is, properly speaking, just one entity described under different sorts. (What we call “Socrates” does not pick out a human being, and person, with a body and soul, but rather one thing, described in these different ways.) This is appealing for some, especially those who think that this is the only way to save Locke from violating the place-time-kind principle, which stipulates that no two things of the same kind can be in the same place at the same time. But it lacks appeal for those who take Locke to be claiming that persons and the human beings who house them (for instance) are distinct. [ 4 ]

Some scholars take Locke’s assertion that the identity of substance is neither required nor enough for the persistence of any person to be evidence that persons are modes (or attributes), rather than substances (or things themselves). Such scholars then turn to Locke’s place-time-kind principle, for further evidence for their view. They take Locke’s assertion that no two things of the same kind can be in the same place at the same time to mean that no two substances of the same kind can be in the same place at the same time. Souls are thinking substances for Locke, and if persons are substances, they would count as such. Thus, persons cannot be substances, for otherwise wherever there is a person and her soul there are two thinking substances in the same place at the same time. Those who offer mode readings additionally turn to Locke’s claim that person is a “forensic term” and Locke’s bold assertion that a demonstrative science of morality is possible as evidence that the term “person” must be a mode term, rather than a substance term. This line of interpretation is popular today (see LoLordo 2012, Mattern 1980, Uzgalis 1990), but dates back to Edmund Law (1769).

Other Locke scholars defend substance readings of Locke on persons. They turn to Locke’s claims about substance, power, and agency, to conclude that if an entity has any power whatsoever it has to be a substance. Persons have powers. Thus, persons have to be substances for Locke (for arguments along these lines, see Gordon-Roth 2015, Rickless 2015, Chappell 1990). They then have to explain what Locke means when he asserts that the identity of any person does not rest in the identity of substance. Those who do not take the relative identity path usually end up working to get clear on what Locke could mean by “substance” when he makes this claim. Many conclude that what Locke means is that the identity of any person does not depend upon the identity of the simple substances that compose or constitute her. There are numerous defenders of this position today (see Alston and Bennett 1988, Bolton 1994, Chappell 1990, and Uzgalis 1990). Thus questions about two of the most basic features of Locke’s picture of personal identity—What is Locke’s (general) view on identity?; and, What kind of entity is a person, exactly?—are the subject of ongoing debate. [ 5 ]

So too are the most clearly stated aspects of Locke’s view: the claim that persons have consciousnesses, and the accompanying assertion that sameness of person rests in sameness of consciousness. What is consciousness for Locke? What does Locke mean by “sameness of consciousness”? Answering these questions turns out to be difficult, since Locke does not say much about what he takes consciousness to be (and we only know the persistence conditions of any entity, once we get clear on the nominal essence of that entity’s kind, according to Locke). Nevertheless, answering these questions is crucial to understanding Locke’s theory of personal identity since it is consciousness centered.

Some scholars take Locke to be a strict memory theorist. In other words, consciousness just is memory for Locke. As will become clear below, this reading dates back at least as far as Thomas Reid. Of course, it is the case that the way a person extends their consciousness backward is via memory. It thus may seem as if the identity of consciousness consists in memory, or that to have the same consciousness as she who did x , one has to have a memory of doing x , under Locke’s view. Nevertheless, as Margaret Atherton points out, Locke talks at length about forgetfulness, and if consciousness just is memory, then we cannot make sense of consciousness at any given moment where a person is not invoking memory (1983: 277–278). Atherton then goes on to develop an account of consciousness that is analogous with Locke’s conception of animal “life”.

The identity of consciousness is what allows for the persistence of any person, just as the identity of life is what allows for the persistence of any animal. “If we look at Locke in this fashion”, Atherton argues,

then what he is saying is that what makes me different at this moment from any other person is that my thoughts are identical with my consciousness of them. No one else can have my consciousness any more than any organism can have my life. (Atherton 1983: 283)

A person, in Atherton’s reading of Locke, is a single center of consciousness, and so long as that single center of consciousness persists, the person persists.

Other scholars hold what is called an “appropriation reading” (see Winkler 1991, Thiel 2011, LoLordo 2012). Under this reading, what Locke means when he says that sameness of person consists in sameness of consciousness, is that any person extends back only to those mental events or acts which they take to be their own . In other words, the persistence of any person or self is best seen in terms of the “subjective constitution of the self” (Winkler 1991: 204). There might be a worry that under this kind of reading, Locke gives persons too much authority. That is, a person could deny that she is the one who committed the crime, just because she doesn’t see that act as her own. But, although the “self has a certain authority over its own constitution”, Kenneth Winkler makes clear that

it is important to realize that this authority is not consciously exerted. I do not willfully disown one act and appropriate another; instead I accept what my consciousness reveals to me. There is also a severe limit on that authority, imposed by the transitivity of identity,

which comes through, as Winkler notes, in Reid’s objection—an objection which Winkler thinks sympathetic readers of Locke can answer and which is discussed in section 3 below (Winkler 1991: 206).

From these treatments it is still difficult to discern what consciousness is for Locke, however. Shelley Weinberg works to give a robust picture of Locke’s conception of consciousness in her recent book (2016). According to Weinberg, Locke uses the term “consciousness” in two different ways:

…Locke seems to see consciousness as (1) a mental state inseparable from an act of perception by means of which we are aware of ourselves as perceiving , and (2) the ongoing self we are aware of in these conscious states . (Weinberg 2016: 153)

The former is a momentary psychological state that allows for what Weinberg calls

a momentary subjective experience that the self presently perceiving is the same as the self that remembers having once had a past thought or action

and captures the first-person experience of persisting over time (Weinberg 2016: 153). The latter is an “objective fact of an ongoing consciousness” (Weinberg 2016: 153). This sense of consciousness is available from a third personal point of view, and fills in the gaps that any person’s subjective experience might entail.

Thus, Weinberg contends that the identity, or continued existence, of consciousness consists in a metaphysical fact, rather than appropriation. Nevertheless, Weinberg additionally argues that the first personal (conscious) experience of our own mental states, whether those states are occurrent sensations, reflections, or via remembering is a necessary, but not sufficient, condition of personal identity. In other words, to have the awareness (or knowledge) of an ongoing self—or (2)—we must have (1). Although there is a range of interpretations of Locke on consciousness on the table, Weinberg’s book, Consciousness in Locke , marks the first large-scale treatment of Locke’s views on consciousness. [ 6 ]

In addition to the debate over what consciousness is, and what Locke means when he says that the identity of any person consists in the identity of consciousness, there is ongoing debate about what Locke’s stance is when it comes to what can give rise to consciousness. That is, there is ongoing discussion of what Locke means when he says that God could have superadded thinking to formerly inert systems of matter, and what Locke’s actual position is on the substantial nature of finite thinkers. There are those who take Locke to be truly agnostic. Those who take this line of interpretation remind readers of Locke’s stated aims at the start of the Essay (as quoted earlier), and the epistemic modesty that Locke maintains throughout the text. But, there are others who think that Locke overstates the probability that souls are immaterial substances, so as not to ruffle the feathers of Stillingfleet and other religious authorities. Some in the latter group think that Locke leans toward materialism. This raises questions about how far Anthony Collins (discussed below) departs from the Lockean picture, or the degree to which Locke anticipates later materialist pictures of persons. [ 7 ] At the very least, it can be said that Locke challenges the importance that many philosophers place on the immaterial soul to personhood and personal identity. [ 8 ] As might be expected, this was met with mixed reviews.

This section addresses how Locke’s view was received by his contemporaries and by those writing in the remainder of the early modern period (16 th -18 th centuries). A good number of philosophers vehemently objected to Locke’s treatment of persons, though some defended it, and many others used it as an inspiration, or springboard, for their own views.

Many who objected to Locke’s treatment of persons did so because they objected to the decreased importance Locke places on the soul for personhood and personal persistence (see Joseph Butler, Thomas Reid, and Samuel Clarke, for example). Many such philosophers argue that numerical identity consists in no change at all , and the only kind of entity that allows for identity in this strict sense is an immaterial substance.

Along the way, some charged Locke’s theory of personal identity with circularity. As Joseph Butler puts it,

…[O]ne should really think it self-evident that consciousness of personal identity presupposes, and therefore cannot constitute, personal identity; any more than knowledge, in any other case, can constitute truth, which it presupposes. (1736 [1842: 298])

Butler then asserts that Locke’s misstep stems from his methodology. He says,

This wonderful mistake may possibly have arisen from hence; that to be endued with consciousness is inseparable from the idea of a person, or intelligent being. For this might be expressed inaccurately thus, that consciousness makes personality: and from hence it might be concluded to make personal identity. (1736 [1842: 298])

One of the points that Locke emphasizes—that persistence conditions are determined via defining kind terms—is what, according to Butler, leads Locke astray.

Butler additionally makes the point that memory is not required for personal persistence. He says,

But though present consciousness of what we at present do and feel is necessary to our being the persons we now are; yet present consciousness of past actions or feelings is not necessary to our being the same persons who performed those actions, or had those feelings. (1736 [1842: 298])

This is a point that others develop when they assert that Locke’s view results in contradiction.

The most popular, or well known, version of this line of objection comes from Thomas Reid (1785). In the “brave officer” objection, Reid poses the following challenge to Locke’s theory of personal identity. He says:

Suppose a brave officer to have been flogged when a boy at school for robbing an orchard, to have taken a standard from the enemy in his first campaign, and to have been made a general in advanced life; suppose, also, which must be admitted to be possible, that, when he took the standard, he was conscious of his having been flogged at school, and that, when made a general, he was conscious of his taking the standard, but had absolutely lost the consciousness of his flogging. These things being supposed, it follows, from Mr. Locke’s doctrine, that he who was flogged at school is the same person who took the standard, and that he who took the standard is the same person who was made a general. Whence it follows, if there be any truth in logic, that the general is the same person with him who was flogged at school. But the general’s consciousness does not reach so far back as his flogging; therefore, according to Mr. Locke’s doctrine, he is not the person who was flogged. Therefore, the general is, and at the same time is not, the same person with him who was flogged at school. (Reid 1785 [1851: 248–249])

In this exercise (and other similar versions of it) we are supposed to assume Locke’s theory of personal identity, and maintain that sameness of person consists in sameness of consciousness. When we do, Reid expects we will conclude that the general (C) is the same person as he who took the standard from the enemy (B) because the general (C) remembers doing so. Additionally he who took the standard from the enemy (B) is the same person as he who was flogged at school for robbing the orchard (A) because he (B) remembers that past traumatic experience. Thus C (he who is was made general) is identical to B (he who took the standard) and B (he who took the standard) is identical to A (he who was flogged at school).

Given the law of transitivity (which says that if C is identical to B and B is identical to A, then C is identical to A), we should conclude that C (the general) is identical to A (the flogged school boy). But, since we are assuming Locke’s theory of personal identity, Reid thinks we cannot come to this conclusion. If we assume Locke’s view, Reid contends that we have to conclude that C (the general) is not identical to A (the school boy). This is because C (the general) has no consciousness or memory of having been flogged at school (A).

This and other similar objections are meant to show that if we place the identity of persons in the identity of consciousness, as Locke suggests, then we run into a problem—namely one of contradiction—for we get the result that C and A both are, and are not, identical. Nevertheless, as is made clear above, there is debate about whether Locke’s claims about identity of consciousness should be read in terms of memory, and whether Reid is correct to take “memory” and “consciousness” as synonymous terms for Locke.

Circularity and contradiction are just two of the major objections launched at Locke’s theory of personal identity shortly after it is published. Importantly, these are objections to which sympathetic readers of Locke are still responding (see Atherton 1983, Weinberg 2016, LoLordo 2012, Thiel 2011, Garrett 2003, Schechtman 2014, etc). This gives the reader a glimpse of some of the lines of attack that were launched against Locke’s discussion of persons during the early modern period. Nevertheless, not all of Locke’s peers attacked his picture of persons, and numerous philosophers worked to defend his view.

One such philosopher is Catharine Trotter Cockburn. Cockburn pens her Defence of Mr. Locke’s Essay of Human Understanding in 1702. [ 9 ] In this text, Cockburn is responding to three pamphlets directed at Locke’s Essay . [ 10 ] These pamphlets take aim at Locke’s Essay rather broadly, and Cockburn’s Defence reflects this, but much is said about Locke on persons and their persistence conditions therein. Specifically, these pamphlets charge Locke with not proving that the soul is immortal, or threatening proofs of the immortality of the soul. They additionally charge that Locke’s view leaves us with the strange consequence that our souls are in constant flux, making it the case that we “awake with new souls each morning”. Given the importance of the soul, its persistence, and its immortality, to many traditional theories of personal identity, these objections are arguably intended to be objections to Locke’s picture of persons. Cockburn is quick to defend Locke, but proceeds carefully and thoroughly as she does so.

Cockburn points out that Locke never sets out to prove the soul immortal, and Locke actually claims that it is more probable that the soul is immaterial, than material. Moreover, even if Locke is not committed to the soul being immaterial, this ought not threaten proofs of the immortality of the soul. This is because what allows Locke to speculate that God could have superadded thinking to formerly inert systems of matter is that God is omnipotent, and surely an omnipotent being could make souls immortal even if they are material. Moreover, proofs for the immortality of the soul that rely on the immateriality of the soul are not likely to convince laymen of the soul’s immortality, and may actually leave them sceptical about whether the soul is indeed immortal (even if it is immaterial).

Cockburn additionally attacks the assertion that Locke’s claim that “men think not always” threatens proofs of the immortality of the soul. Of this she says,

But let it be granted, that it is ever so clearly proved, that thinking is necessary to the soul’s existence, that can no more prove, that it shall always exist, than it proves, that it has always existed; it being as possible for that omnipotence, which from nothing gave the soul a being , to deprive it of that being in the midst of its most vigorous reflections, as in an utter suspension of all thought. If then this proposition, that the soul always thinks , does not prove, that it is immortal, the contrary supposition takes not away any proof of it; for it is no less easy to conceive, that a being, which has the power of thinking with some intervals of cessation from thought, that has existed here for some time in a capacity of happiness or misery, may be continued in, or restored to the same state, in a future life, than that a Being which always thinks, may be continued in the same state. (Cockburn, in Sheridan (ed) 2006: 53)

As Cockburn points out, the notion that the soul is always thinking is not used as evidence for the soul’s immortality. Locke’s claim to the contrary thus ought not count as evidence against it, and we ought to have faith that an omnipotent God will ensure the soul’s immortality (whether it always thinks or not). Additionally, there is ample evidence that Locke thinks the soul is immortal, and that persons will go on to receive divine punishment and reward in the next life for their deeds in this life. This comes through not just in L-N 2.27 of the Essay , but also in Locke’s correspondence with Stillingfleet, and many of Locke’s religious writings, including the posthumously published “ Resurrectio et quae secuuntur ” (though Cockburn would not have had access to the latter while drafting her Defence ). [ 11 ]

Finally, Cockburn argues that the assumption that Locke’s view entails that we “awake with new souls each morning” rests on a misunderstanding. Just as a body that was in motion and comes to rest does not become a new body once it starts moving again, a soul that was thinking and ceases to think does not become a new soul once thought is restored to it. Thus, Locke’s claim that we do not always think—and indeed may have dreamless sleep—does not have the absurd consequences for the persistence of persons that the pamphlets charge. To this it might also be added that even if we awake with new souls each morning, it need not mean that we are new persons each morning, according to Locke.

Through the Defence , Cockburn additionally makes clear that although Locke’s theory of personal identity allows for sci-fi switches such as those described in the “prince and the cobbler” passage (L-N 2.27.15), the “waking and sleeping Socrates” passage (2.27.19), and the “day and night-man” passage (2.27.23), Locke does not think that this is the way things ordinarily go. In other words, in Locke’s view it is not that persons are switching bodies and swapping souls on a regular basis. Rather, Locke is making clear that we should distinguish between the concepts “man”, “body”, “soul”, and “person”. Moreover, the persistence of any person does not always align with the persistence of a human being or soul, as many assume. Making this point is the purpose of those imaginary cases.

Sixty-seven years after Cockburn’s Defence , and twenty-one years after the correspondence between Cockburn and Edmund Law ends, Law drafts a Defence of his own. Law’s Defence of Mr. Locke’s Opinion Concerning Personal Identity (1769) is later included in the 1823 version of Locke’s Works , and in it Law offers a particular reading of the ontological status of persons. Law defends a consciousness-based view, and makes much of Locke’s claim that person is a “forensic term”. Law moves from this point to the conclusion that Locke thinks persons are modes (or attributes) rather than substances (or things in themselves). He says,

Now the word Person , as is well observed by Mr. Locke …is properly a forensick term, and here to be used in the strickt forensick sense, denoting some such quality or modification in man as denominates him a moral agent, or an accountable creature; renders him the proper subject of Laws , and a true object of Rewards or Punishments. (1823: 1–2)

This is significant since whether Lockean persons are best thought of as substances, modes, or relations is something that is still debated amongst Locke scholars today.

While some philosophers were happy to defend Locke, as Cockburn and Law did, numerous philosophers writing in the eighteenth century utilized Locke’s theory of personal identity as a stepping stone to establish their own even more provocative views on persons. The ways in which these theorists go beyond Locke varies. Some of these are outlined below. [ 12 ]

In Anthony Collins’s correspondence with Samuel Clarke (1707–1708), it can often look as if Collins is a mere defender of Locke’s view. Collins holds a consciousness-based view of personal identity, and Collins invokes Locke’s discussion of persons and their persistence conditions throughout this lengthy exchange. Nevertheless, Collins takes Locke’s assertion that for all we know God could have superadded the ability to think to formerly inert systems of matter, and runs with it. As Larry Jorgensen puts it,

A significant difference between Collins and Locke…is that Collins thought that material systems provided a better explanatory basis for consciousness, which changes the probability calculus. Collins provides evidence that casts doubt on Locke’s claim that “it is in the highest degree probable” that humans have immaterial souls. Although he is building from a Lockean starting point, namely the possibility that God might superadd thinking to matter, he ends up with a naturalized version: thinking “follows from the composition or modification of a material system” (Clarke and Collins 2011: 48). (Jorgensen forthcoming)

Collins’s view on personal identity is a consciousness-based view, but what gives rise to consciousness, according to Collins, is likely a material system. Thus some take Locke’s purported agnosticism about the substantial nature of finite thinkers, and proceed more forcefully in the direction of materialism. In other words, Locke’s views on the substantial nature of finite thinkers opens the door to materialist views of persons and their persistence conditions.

Others take criticisms launched at Locke’s theory of personal identity, including the criticism that the self (or persisting self) is a fiction, and appear to embrace such consequences. [ 13 ] This can be seen rather readily in David Hume’s Treatise of Human Nature (1738). In the Treatise , Hume asserts that it is not clear how we can even have an idea of the self. This is because most take selves to be persisting entities, and all of our ideas come from corresponding impressions. But since our impressions constantly change, there is no one impression that can give rise to the idea we call “self”. Of this Hume says,

It must be some one impression, that gives rise to every real idea. But self or person is not any one impression, but that to which our several impressions and ideas are suppos’d to have a reference. If any impression gives rise to the idea of self, that impression must continue invariably the same, thro the whole course of our lives; since self is suppos’d to exist after that manner. But there is no impression constant and invariable. Pain and pleasure, grief and joy, passions and sensations succeed each other, and never all exist at the same time. It cannot, therefore, be from any of these impressions, or from any other, that the idea of self is deriv’d; and consequently there is no such idea. (1738 Book I, Part IV, Section VI [1896: 251–252])

Moreover, whenever Hume looks for himself, all he finds are impressions. He says,

For my part, when I enter most intimately into what I call myself, I always stumble on some particular perception or other, of heat or cold, light or shade, love or hatred, pain or pleasure. I never catch myself at any time without a perception, and never can observe any thing but the perception. (1738 [1896: 252])

This leads Hume to claim that we are just bundles of perceptions, in constant flux (1738 [1896: 252]).

Thus it is not only the case that we fail to have an idea of the self, according to Hume, but also the case that, properly speaking, no subsisting self persists from one moment to the next. It is the imagination that leads us astray when we think of ourselves, and other entities, as persisting over time (1738 [1896: 254]). As Hume puts it,

The identity, which we ascribe to the mind of man, is only a fictitious one, and of a like kind with that which we ascribe to vegetables and animal bodies. (1738 [1896: 259])

It cannot, therefore, have a different origin, but must proceed from a like operation of the imagination upon like objects. (1738 [1896: 259])

In moving away from a more traditional substance-based view of personal identity (where the identity of person lies in the identity of soul), Locke opens the door to more fragmentary treatments of selves and persons. [ 14 ]

Along similar lines, some take Locke’s claim that the identity of persons lies in the identity of consciousness as fuel for the assertion that, properly speaking, there is no special relation between person x and any other future person. That is, personal identity only exists between present and past selves, not present and future selves. For this reason, we ought not have prudential concern, or concern for a future self that is distinct from our concern for others. This is the argumentative move that William Hazlitt makes, and in An Essay on the Principles of Human Action (1805), he explicitly sets as his task showing

…that the human mind is naturally disinterested, or that it is naturally interested in the welfare of others in the same way, and from the same motives, by which we are impelled to the pursuit of our own interests. (1805: 1)

This line of argumentation is replicated and expanded almost one hundred and eighty years later by Derek Parfit in Reasons and Persons (1984), though it does not appear that Parfit is aware of Hazlitt’s view when he drafts his own. [ 15 ]

This section briefly outlines the lasting impact that Locke has had on the debate over persons and their persistence conditions by exploring how Locke’s theory of personal identity gets taken up in the twentieth and twenty-first centuries. Most metaphysicians contributing to the debate over personal identity refer to Locke’s treatment of persons in their texts. Many even directly respond to Locke’s view as they flesh out their own.

Most who hold psychological continuity theories of personal identity take their views to be descendants of Locke’s. This is true of John Perry (1975), David Lewis (1976), Sydney Shoemaker (1984), and Derek Parfit (1984), for instance (Schechtman “Memory, Identity, and Sameness of Consciousness”, forthcoming in The Lockean Mind ). In fact, Parfit defends what he calls a “Lockean view” as recently as 2016 (34). What makes each of these views Lockean (at least according to their authors) is that, as Locke does, they take personal identity to consist in the continuity of psychological life, and they take this to mean that personal identity is relational. Moreover, like Locke, they emphasize the forensic nature of personhood.

Marya Schechtman offers a rival interpretation to those held by Perry, Lewis, Shoemaker, and Parfit, but Locke is very much in the foreground of Schechtman’s narrative account as well. In The Constitution of Selves (1996: 15), Schechtman claims,

The argument that personal identity must be defined in psychological terms is first systematically presented and defended by Locke in his Essay concerning Human Understanding

Schechtman then goes on to show that the project of psychological continuity theorists is “incoherent” because

[t]he goal of offering reidentification criterion is fundamentally at odds with the goal of defining personal identity in terms of psychological continuity…. (1996: 24)

Importantly, Schechtman does this not just by making a passing reference to Locke and then treating Parfit, Perry, and the like, but via a thorough examination of Locke’s theory, and the objections raised to it by Butler, Reid, and others.

Moreover, this is the case not only in Schechtman’s earlier work, but in her most recent work as well. Schechtman includes a thirty-two page chapter titled, “Locke and the Psychological Continuity Theorists” at the start of Staying Alive: Personal Identity, Practical Concerns, and the Unity of a Life (2014), and in “Memory, Identity, and Sameness of Consciousness”, Schechtman turns to recent developments in the psychological study of memory to update Locke’s view to “…capture some of the crucial insights of Locke’s account, and show why it remains relevant and influential” (in The Lockean Mind , forthcoming).

Those who defend animalism—or the view that persons just are human organisms—hold a position that is quite different from psychological continuity theories or narrative based views. Still, most animalists respond to Locke. Some even invoke Locke’s view as they develop their own. For example, Eric Olson’s animalist view relies very heavily both on Locke’s conception of “life”, and the persistence conditions Locke gives for organisms (1997: 137–138, etc.). This is why Olson describes his view as “Lockean”.

At the same time, some animalists blame Locke for separating the discussion of persons and personal identity from the discussion of human beings or human animals. In Animalism: New Essays on Persons, Animals & Identity , Stephen Blatti and Paul Snowdon ask, “Why was the idea of an animal conspicuously absent…” in the personal identity debate for so long (2016: 3)? They go on,

To answer this question, we need to return to Locke’s famous discussion of personal identity, in which the notion of an animal was central…Locke exercised great care in specifying the different ideas for which the words ‘animal’ and ‘person’ stood. A reasonable conjecture, or proposal, we suggest, is that Locke’s treatment of these two terms and notions was so effective that it generated in people engaging with the problem the conviction that the notion of a person is the central one fixing the type of thing the problem is about, with the consequence that the notion of an animal was lost to sight. (2016: 3)

Locke does much to distinguish between human beings (or men)—which are animals—and persons, and Blatti and Snowdon assert that this sets the stage for how the personal identity debate plays out for the next several hundred years. In other words, Locke is the reason that animalist views do not emerge until later in the twentieth century. [ 16 ]

Finally, even those working to carve out an entirely new space for the discussion of persons and their persistence conditions say something about Locke as they proceed. Leke Adeofe outlines and develops a tripartite picture of persons according to what he calls the “African thought system”. As he does, Adeofe aligns his approach with Locke’s. He says,

My approach, partly descriptive and partly imaginative, ought to be familiar; it has been borrowed from a tradition that dates back at least to John Locke. (2004: 69)

Moreover, this is the case even though Adeofe uses the African, or Yoruba, conception of “person” to challenge Western philosophy’s treatment of persons and their persistence conditions.

In Real People: Personal Identity Without Thought Experiments (1988), Kathleen Wilkes takes aim at the proliferation of thought experiments in the personal identity literature. It is clear that Wilkes has the elaborate thought experiments that Parfit employs (including teletransportation, split brain cases, etc.) in mind throughout her critique. But, it is also clear that Wilkes traces this methodology back to Locke. Of this she says,

The subject of personal identity…has probably exploited the method [of thought experiments] more than any other problem area in philosophy. Many of the examples are familiar:…Locke testing ‘what we would say if’ the soul of a cobbler migrated into the body of a prince, or if the Mayor of Queinborough awoke one day with all of Socrates’ memories. (Wilkes 1988: 6)

The “prince and the cobbler” passage, or L-N 2.27.15, proceeds in the opposite direction, with Locke asking us what we would conclude about the soul of a prince entering and informing the body of a cobbler, but, regardless, Wilkes takes Locke and the tradition that follows, as her target as she works to move the discussion of personal identity away from fantasy cases and toward real-life ones.

Locke’s discussion of personal identity is central to the current debate over persons and their persistence conditions. Nevertheless, there are many different versions of Locke’s view that contemporary metaphysicians take themselves to be embracing or rejecting. Even those who describe their respective views as “Lockean”—Parfit and Olson, for instance—can end up defending very different pictures of persons. This highlights just how difficult it is to determine what Locke’s view on persons and their persistence conditions amounts to, despite how clear its importance is.

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• –––, 2006, The Rise and Fall of the Soul and Self: An Intellectual History of Personal Identity , New York: Columbia University Press.
• Mattern, Ruth, 1980, “Moral Science and the Concept of Persons in Locke”, The Philosophical Review , 89(1): 24–45. doi:10.2307/2184862
• McCann, Edwin, 1986, “Cartesian Selves and Lockean Substances”, The Monist , 69(3): 458–482. doi:10.5840/monist198669335
• –––, 1987, “Locke on Identity: Matter, Life, and Consciousness”, Archiv Für Geschichte Der Philosophie , 69(1): 54–77. doi:10.1515/agph.1987.69.1.54
• –––, 2002, “John Locke”, in Steven Nadler (ed.), A Companion to Early Modern Philosophy , Malden, MA: Blackwell Publishing, 354–375.
• Newman, Lex, 2000, “Locke on the Idea of Substratum”, Pacific Philosophical Quarterly , 81(3): 291–324. doi:10.1111/1468-0114.00107
• ––– (ed.), 2007, The Cambridge Companion to Locke’s “Essay Concerning Human Understanding” , Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. doi:10.1017/CCOL0521834333
• –––, 2015, “Locke on Substance, Consciousness, and Personal Identity”, in Lodge and Stoneham 2015: 128–145.
• Noonan, Harold, 1978, “Locke on Personal Identity”, Philosophy , 53(205): 343–351. doi:10.1017/S0031819100022397
• –––, 1989, Personal Identity , London and New York: Routledge.
• Nuovo, Victor L., 2011, Christianity, Antiquity, and Enlightenment: Interpretations of Locke , Dordrecht: Springer. doi:10.1007/978-94-007-0274-5
• –––, 2017, John Locke: The Philosopher as Christian Virtuoso , Oxford: Oxford University Press. doi:10.1093/oso/9780198800552.001.0001.
• –––, forthcoming, “Locke, John”, in Christine Helmer et al. (eds.), Encyclopedia of the Bible and Its Reception , Berlin: De Gruyter.
• Olson, Eric T., 1997, The Human Animal: Personal Identity Without Psychology , New York: Oxford University Press. doi:10.1093/0195134230.001.0001
• –––, 2007, What Are We? A Study in Personal Ontology , New York: Oxford University Press. doi:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780195176421.001.0001
• Parfit, Derek, 1984, Reasons and Persons , Oxford: Oxford University Press. doi:10.1093/019824908X.001.0001
• –––, 2016, “We Are Not Human Beings”, in Blatti and Snowdon 2016: 31–49. doi:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199608751.003.0002
• Pasnau, Robert, 2011, Metaphysical Themes 1274–1671 , Oxford: Oxford University Press. doi:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199567911.001.0001
• Perry, David L., 1967, “Locke on Mixed Modes, Relations, and Knowledge”, Journal of the History of Philosophy , 5(3): 219–235. doi:10.1353/hph.2008.1493
• Perry, John (ed.), 1975 and 2008 (second edition), Personal Identity , Berkeley: University of California Press.
• –––, 1983, “Personal Identity and the Concept of a Person”, in Philosophy of Mind , (Contemporary Philosophy: A New Survey 4), Guttorm Fløistad (ed.), The Hague: M. Nijhoff, 11–43. doi:10.1007/978-94-009-6932-2_2
• Rickless, Samuel C., 2014, Locke , (Blackwell Great Minds, 14), Malden, MA: Wiley-Blackwell.
• –––, 2015, “Are Locke’s Persons Modes or Substances?” in Lodge and Stoneham 2015: 110–127.
• Rogers, G.A.J., 2008, “Locke and the Creation of the Essay ”, in Hoffman, Owen and Yaffe 2008: 141–156.
• Schechtman, Marya, 1996, The Constitution of Selves , Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press.
• –––, 2014, Staying Alive: Personal Identity, Practical Concerns, and the Unity of a Life , Oxford: Oxford University Press. doi:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199684878.001.0001
• –––, forthcoming, “Memory, Identity, and Sameness of Consciousness”, in Gordon-Roth and Weinberg forthcoming.
• Sheridan, Patricia (ed.), 2006, Catharine Trotter Cockburn: Philosophical Writings , Peterborough, Ontario: Broadview Press.
• Shoemaker, Sydney, 1963, Self-Knowledge and Self-Identity , Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press.
• –––, 1984, Personal Identity , Oxford: Blackwell.
• –––, 1996, The First Person Perspective and Other Essays , Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. doi:10.1017/CBO9780511624674
• Simendić, Marko, 2015, “Locke’s Person Is a Relation”, Locke Studies , 15: 79–97. doi:10.5206/ls.2015.681
• Soles, David and Katherine Bradfield, 2001, “Some Remarks on Locke’s Use of Thought Experiments”, Locke Studies , 1: 31–62.
• Sorabji, Richard, 2006, Self: Ancient and Modern Insights About Individuality, Life, and Death , Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
• Spolaore, Giuseppe, 2012, “Not Just a Coincidence. Conditional Counter-examples to Locke’s Thesis”, Thought , 1(2): 108–115. doi:10.1002/tht3.12
• Stewart, M.A., 1997, “Reid on Locke and Personal Identity: Some Lost Sources”, Locke Newsletter , 28: 105–117.
• Strawson, Galen, 2011, Locke on Personal Identity: Consciousness and Concernment , Princeton: Princeton University Press.
• Stuart, Matthew, 2013, Locke’s Metaphysics , Oxford: Oxford University Press. doi:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199645114.001.0001
• –––, 2013, “Revisiting People and Substances”, in Stewart Duncan and Antonia LoLordo (eds.), Debates in Modern Philosophy , (Key debates in the history of philosophy), New York: Routledge.
• ––– (ed.), 2016, A Companion to Locke , Chichester: Wiley-Blackwell.
• Tabb, Kathryn, 2018, “Madness as Method: On Locke’s Thought Experiments about Personal Identity”, British Journal for the History of Philosophy , 26(5): 871–889. doi:10.1080/09608788.2017.1350936
• Thiel, Udo, 1981, “Locke’s Concept of Person”, in Reinhard Brandt (ed.), John Locke: Symposium Wolfenbüttel 1979 , Berlin: de Gruyter, 181–192.
• –––, 1998, “Locke and Eighteenth-Century Materialist Conceptions of Personal Identity”, Locke Newsletter , 29: 59–84.
• –––, 1991, “Cudworth and Seventeenth-Century Theories of Consciousness”, in The Uses of Antiquity , Stephen Gaukroger (ed.), Dordrecht: Springer Netherlands, 79–99. doi:10.1007/978-94-011-3412-5_4
• –––, 1998, “Personal Identity”, in The Cambridge History of Seventeenth-Century Philosophy , Daniel Garber and Michael Ayers (eds.), Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, vol. 1: 868–912. doi:10.1017/CHOL9780521307635.028
• –––, 2006, “Self-Consciousness and Personal Identity”, in The Cambridge History of Eighteenth-Century Philosophy , Knud Haakonssen (ed.), Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, vol. 1: 286–318. doi:10.1017/CHOL9780521867429.011
• –––, 2011, The Early Modern Subject: Self-Consciousness and Personal Identity from Descartes to Hume , Oxford: Oxford University Press. doi:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199542499.001.0001
• Uzgalis, William L., 1990, “Relative Identity and Locke’s Principle of Individuation”, History of Philosophy Quarterly , 7(3): 283–297.
• –––, 2008, “Locke and Collins, Clarke and Butler, on Successive Persons”, in John Perry (ed.), Personal Identity , second edition, Berkeley: University of California Press.
• Walmsley, J.C., H. Craig, and J. Burrows, 2016, “The authorship of the Remarks upon an Essay concerning Humane Understanding ”, Eighteenth-Century Thought , 6: 205–243.
• Wedeking, Gary, 1987, “Locke’s Metaphysics of Personal Identity”, History of Philosophy Quarterly , 4(1): 17–31.
• Weinberg, Shelley, 2008, “The Coherence of Consciousness in Locke’s Essay ”, History of Philosophy Quarterly , 25(1): 21–39.
• –––, 2012, “The Metaphysical Fact of Consciousness in Locke’s Theory of Personal Identity”, Journal of the History of Philosophy , 50(3): 387–415. doi:10.1353/hph.2012.0051
• –––, 2016, Consciousness in Locke , Oxford: Oxford University Press. doi:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780198749011.001.0001
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• Wiggins, David, 1967, Identity and Spatio-Temporal Continuity , Oxford: Blackwell.
• –––, 2001, Sameness and Substance Renewed , second edition, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. doi:10.1017/CBO9780511612756
• Wilkes, Kathleen, 1988, Real People: Personal Identity without Thought Experiments , Oxford: Oxford University Press. doi:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780198240808.001.0001
• Wilson, Fred, 1994, “Substance and Self in Locke and Hume”, in Barber and Garcia 1994: 155–199.
• Winkler, Kenneth, 1991, “Locke on Personal Identity”, Journal of the History of Philosophy , 29(2): 201–226. doi:10.1353/hph.1991.0041
• Woolhouse, R. S, 1972, “Locke on Modes, Substances, and Knowledge”, Journal of the History of Philosophy , 10(4): 417–424. doi:10.1353/hph.2008.1052
• –––, 1983, Locke , (Philosophers in Context), Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press.
• Yaffe, Gideon, 2004, “Locke on Ideas of Substance and the Veil of Perception”, Pacific Philosophical Quarterly , 85(3): 255–272. doi:10.1111/j.1468-0114.2004.00198.x
• –––, 2007, “Locke on Ideas of Identity and Diversity”, in Newman 2007: 192–230. doi:10.1017/CCOL0521834333.008
• –––, 2011, “Locke on Consciousness, Personal Identity and the Idea of Duration”, Noûs , 45(3): 387–408. doi:10.1111/j.1468-0068.2010.00773.x
• Yolton, John W., 2004, The Two Intellectual Worlds of John Locke: Man, Person, and Spirits in the Essay , Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press.

How to cite this entry . Preview the PDF version of this entry at the Friends of the SEP Society . Look up topics and thinkers related to this entry at the Internet Philosophy Ontology Project (InPhO). Enhanced bibliography for this entry at PhilPapers , with links to its database.

• Author Meets Critics on “Locke’s Moral Man” , July 2013 discussion of LoLordo’s book at The Mod Squad (Modern Philosophy Group Blog).
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animalism | Clarke, Samuel | Cockburn, Catharine Trotter | consciousness: seventeenth-century theories of | Descartes, René | Hume, David | Leibniz, Gottfried Wilhelm | Locke, John | Locke, John: moral philosophy | personal identity

Acknowledgments

I am grateful to the Chicago Early Modern Round Table for helpful feedback on an earlier draft of this entry, Shelley Weinberg and an anonymous referee from SEP for insightful comments on later drafts. I’m also deeply indebted to Margaret Atherton, John Whipple, Marya Schechtman, and the many audiences I’ve gotten feedback from when I was just starting to think about Locke on personhood and personal identity.

Copyright © 2019 by Jessica Gordon-Roth < gordo216 @ umn . edu >

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Essay Samples on Personal Identity

Personal identity encompasses the fundamental question of “Who am I?” It delves into the complex layers of our individuality, examining the factors that define and distinguish us as unique beings. Exploring personal identity involves introspection and contemplation of various aspects, such as our beliefs, values, experiences, and relationships. It invites us to unravel the intricacies of our self-perception and the influences that shape our identities in personal identity essay examples.

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How Does Society Shape Our Identity

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Best topics on Personal Identity

1. How Does Society Shape Our Identity

2. How Does Family Influence Your Identity

3. Exploring the Relationship Between Illness and Identity

4. Evolving Identities: The Concept of Self-Identity and Self-Perception

5. Free Cultural Identity: Understanding of One’s Identity

6. My Cultural Identity and Relationship with God

7. My Cultural Identity and Preserving Ancestors’ Traditions

8. Gregor Samsas` Burden In “The Metamorphosis” By F. Kafka

9. Reflections On Personal Intercultural Experience

10. Literature of African Diaspora as a Postcolonial Discourse

11. The Ideology of Giving People Status or Reward

12. Features And Things That Shape Your Identity

13. Identity Crisis: What Shapes Your Identity

14. My Passion And Searching What You Are Passionate About

15. The Importance Of Inner Beauty Over Outer Beauty

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The notion of personal identity

Bodily and immaterial-substance theories, traditional criticisms, fission and special concern, coincident entities, too many minds.

personal identity

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personal identity , in metaphysics , the problem of the nature of the identity of persons and their persistence through time.

One makes a judgment of personal identity whenever one says that a person existing at one time is the same as a person existing at another time: e.g., that the president of the United States in 1802—namely, Thomas Jefferson —was the person who in 1776 was the primary author of the Declaration of Independence . Matters of great importance often turn on the truth of such judgments. Whether someone should be punished for a crime, for example, depends on whether he is the person who committed it, and whether someone is the owner of something now may depend on whether he is the person who purchased it at some past time. Whether there is personal immortality , or survival of death , depends on whether a person who dies can be identical with a person existing subsequent to that person’s death .

The topic of personal identity has to do with what the truth of judgments of personal identity consists of and how it can be known. Equivalently, it has to do with the nature of the persistence of persons through time and their awareness of such persistence. Some scholars, such as the 20th-century American philosopher Roderick Chisholm , have denied that there can be an informative answer to such questions; they think that personal identity is “simple and unanalyzable.” But it seems plausible that something can be said about what the sameness through time of automobiles, rivers, and cities consists of, and so it is natural to think that the same should be true of the sameness through time of persons.

What one normally relies on in making judgments of personal identity in everyday life are facts about human bodies—sameness of appearance, sameness of fingerprints , sameness of DNA , and so on. This fact suggests that the sameness of persons consists of the sameness of human bodies. This suggestion of course raises the question of what the sameness of human bodies consists of. It cannot consist simply of similarity of bodily characteristics: different bodies can be alike in appearance and could be alike in fingerprints and DNA. A better answer would be that it consists of spatiotemporal continuity and continuity of bodily characteristics. A single body’s career traces a continuous path through space-time in which bodily properties change only gradually and in certain ways. Such an account would be unacceptable to those, such as the 17th-century French philosopher René Descartes , who take persons to be immaterial substances, or souls , that are only contingently connected with bodies. These philosophers would say that the persistence of a person consists of the persistence of such an immaterial substance. As to what that consists in, the most common answer is that the identity of such substances is simple and unanalyzable.

The psychological view

Both of these accounts of personal identity—the bodily theory and the immaterial-substance theory—were rejected by the 17th-century English philosopher John Locke in his Essay Concerning Human Understanding (1689), which contained the first extended treatment of the topic in Western philosophy . Book II, chapter 27, of the Essay , “Of Identity and Diversity,” introduces a famous example in which the soul of a prince, carrying with it consciousness of the prince’s past life, is transferred to the body of a cobbler. Locke argued that the post-transfer cobbler-body person would be the same person as the prince, despite not having the prince’s former body. (Updated versions of this example involve brain transplants rather than soul transfers.) He also held that consciousness can be transferred from one immaterial substance to another, so that the immaterial substance that was initially the mind of one person might become the mind of a different person.

Locke said that the identity of persons consists of sameness of consciousness. This is usually interpreted to mean that identity consists of facts about memory : someone existing now is the same as someone existing yesterday because he remembers the thoughts, experiences, or actions of the earlier person.

The 18th-century Scottish philosopher Thomas Reid objected to this view with what has come to be known as the “ brave officer” example. A small boy is flogged for stealing an apple; later, as a young officer, he remembers the flogging; later still, as an old general, he remembers acting bravely as a young officer but does not remember being flogged as a boy. According to Locke’s theory, Reid thought , the young officer is the same person as the small boy, and the old general is the same person as the young officer, but the old general is not the same person as the small boy—a contradiction , because identity is logically transitive (if A = B and B = C, then A = C). The 18th-century English bishop and philosopher Joseph Butler raised a different objection: Locke’s theory is circular, because the notion of memory it employs presupposes the notion of personal identity.

Despite these objections, views inspired by Locke—called neo-Lockean, or psychological, accounts—have dominated discussions of personal identity since his time, and much of the subsequent history of the topic has centred on debates about whether Reid’s and Butler’s objections can be met. The first response to Reid’s brave officer example, given a prominent statement by the 20th-century British philosopher Paul Grice , was that personal identity consists of continuity of memory. A person’s life can be conceived as consisting of a series of momentary “person stages.” In order for the old general to be identical with the small boy, it is not required that the general remember experiences and actions of the boy but only that the old-general person-stage be linked to the small-boy person-stage by a series of person-stages, each member of which contains memories of something occurring in the immediately preceding stage.

In a subsequent elaboration of this response, memory continuity was replaced by psychological continuity, which includes memory continuity as a special case. Psychological continuity consists of the holding of a number of psychological relations between person-stages—e.g., relations that hold when beliefs and desires produce, through reasoning , new beliefs, desires, intentions, or decisions—as well as the holding of relations that are involved in the retention over time of personality and character traits. The shift from a simple memory theory to a psychological-continuity theory goes some way toward answering Butler’s circularity objection, since it is possible to know whether the relevant psychological relations obtain without already knowing whether the person-stages in question are stages of the same person.

Another response to Butler’s objection, advanced by the contemporary American philosopher Sydney Shoemaker , is to replace the notion of memory with that of “ quasi-memory.” A person quasi-remembers a past experience or action if he has a memory experience that is caused in some appropriate way by that past action or experience. It may be theoretically possible for a person to quasi-remember past experiences or actions—i.e., to have the experience of remembering them as his own—even though they are not in fact his own ( see below Fission and special concern ). But remembering will be a special case—and perhaps the only actual case—of quasi-remembering. And no circularity will be involved if one uses the notion of quasi-memory in place of the notion of memory in giving one’s account of the psychological continuity that constitutes personal identity. Of course, a psychological-continuity theory based on quasi-memory will be satisfactory only if it contains provisions that determine whether a case of quasi-remembering is a case of genuine remembering.

Most contemporary versions of the psychological view of personal identity assume that persons are physical in nature. As already mentioned, Locke’s soul-transfer example was replaced in the 20th century by brain-transplant examples. The idea is that the recipient of a brain transplant could be expected to have memories corresponding to the past life of the donor, as well as a psychological history generally continuous with that of the donor before the transplant. The recipient would think that he is the donor—and, according to the psychological view, others should think the same. In addition to appealing to the possibility of brain transplants, some psychological theorists have envisaged “teletransportation” devices that move persons around by transmitting information about their neural states from one location to another.

A variant of the brain-transplant example, due to the British philosopher David Wiggins , in which the two hemispheres of a brain are transplanted into two different bodies, has been extensively discussed since the 1970s. Here the supposition is that after the transplant there are two persons who are psychologically continuous with the person who existed before. Because these two persons are not identical to each other, it is impossible for both to be identical to the original person. Yet neither of them seems to have any characteristic that would make the original person identical to him and not to the other. Because such “ fission” cases seem to constitute examples of psychological continuity without personal identity, they have been regarded as a challenge to the psychological view. They also seem to provide examples of quasi-memory that is not memory: the fission products would quasi-remember the past of the original person but arguably not remember it, if neither is identical to the original person.

Some proponents of the psychological view have responded by saying that what personal identity consists of is not psychological continuity itself but “nonbranching” psychological continuity, the fission cases being examples of “branching” psychological continuity. Theorists differ, however, in how convincing they find this proposal.

Fission cases also raise questions about the special concern that people have for their own future well-being . It seems plausible that a person anticipating fission would have a special concern for the welfare of both of the fission products, even though—strictly speaking—he would be identical to neither of them.

The idea of special concern has figured prominently in the work of the contemporary English philosopher Derek Parfit . In Reasons and Persons (1984) and other works, he argued that one’s special concern is not with personal identity per se but with the psychological continuity and connectedness that is normally sufficient for personal identity but is not sufficient in cases of fission. If by “survival” is meant having what is valued, or what matters, in the prospect of continuing to exist with a life worth living, then, according to Parfit, in fission cases there is survival without identity. Parfit’s treatment of fission cases has given rise to a new criterion of adequacy for any account of personal identity: it must explain why personal identity matters in the way it does.

Another objection to the psychological view has to do with the possibility of amnesia : the view seems to imply that a victim of complete amnesia is not the same person as he was before he was stricken. Alternatively, the psychological theorist would be committed to saying that, despite appearances, amnesia is not really possible. Defenders of the psychological view reply that the sort of amnesia that actually occurs is compatible with the psychological view, because people can recover from ordinary amnesia—which means that their memories continue to exist in a latent state—and in any case there is more to psychological continuity than continuity of memory. In order for a case of amnesia to be apparently incompatible with the psychological view, it would have to amount to a “brain zap” that destroys not only all the subject’s memories but also all past features of his psychology . There is no reason to think that a person could survive this.

The psychological view versus animalism

A powerful set of criticisms , raised in the late 20th century, has to do with the intuitively plausible assumption that persons are human animals. Although (as mentioned earlier) most versions of the psychological view assume that persons are physical entities, they are committed to holding that a person is not identical to his body, because the relations that constitute personal identity are different from those that constitute bodily identity. For similar reasons, the psychological view is also committed to holding that a person is not identical to the particular human animal (the individual Homo sapiens ) that exactly coincides with his body’s physical space. If this is correct, however, then the psychological theorist must accept the existence of “coincident entities”: numerically different things (the person and the animal) that happen to occupy the same space and to be composed of the same matter. For some philosophers, this is reason enough to reject the psychological view. Others have argued that, even if coincident entities are possible, the psychological view implies the counterintuitive claim that persons are not animals.

Furthermore, the view also seems vulnerable to what has been called the objection from “too many minds” (or “too many thinkers”). Given that a person and his coincident human animal are physically exactly alike, it would seem (on a physicalist view about mentality) that the human animal should have the same mental states as the person and so should itself be a mental subject and a person, contrary to what the psychological view maintains. It might seem that the only way to avoid this conclusion is to assume that animals cannot think, which is also strongly counterintuitive. (The claim that the psychological view implies that animals cannot think is often referred to as the “thinking animal” objection.

Considerations such as these have been raised by proponents of “animalism,” the theory that in the 1990s became the main competitor of the psychological view. According to the American philosopher Eric Olson and others, persons are biologically individuated animals whose persistence through time consists of biological continuity, which is constituted by the biological processes that make up an organism’s life. Animalism is additionally supported by the fact that in actual cases (not involving brain transplants and the like) sameness of person and sameness of human animal always go together.

Defenders of the psychological view, including Shoemaker, deny that they are committed to too many minds. Although persons and their coincident biological animals share the same physical properties, the result is not the instantiation of mentality in two different things, person and animal, but its instantiation in just one thing, the person. Only in the career of a creature having the persistence conditions of mental subjects—e.g., persons—are the physical-property instantiations embedded in such a way as to realize mental properties. Defenders also maintain that there is a good sense in which persons are animals, though not biologically individuated animals, and that animals in that sense can think. What they hold against animalism is the same as what Locke held against a similar view, the bodily theory: animalism is committed to rejecting the highly plausible intuition that in a brain transplant (or in a Lockean soul transfer) the person goes with the brain (or soul).

Other topics that have been addressed in contemporary discussions of personal identity include whether there can be survival of death, whether persons can exist in disembodied form, and whether there can be persons that are not constituted by organisms—possibly including computers and organized groups of organisms.

Self-Image, Self-Concept

Reviewed by Psychology Today Staff

Identity encompasses the memories, experiences, relationships, and values that create one’s sense of self. This amalgamation creates a steady sense of who one is over time, even as new facets are developed and incorporated into one's identity.

• What Is Identity?
• How to Be Authentic
• Theories of Identity

Everyone struggles with existential questions such as, “Who am I?” and “Who do I want my future self to be?” One reason why may be that the answer is so complex.

Identity includes the many relationships people cultivate, such as their identity as a child, friend, partner, and parent. It involves external characteristics over which a person has little or no control, such as height, race, or socioeconomic class. Identity also encompasses political opinions, moral attitudes, and religious beliefs, all of which guide the choices one makes on a daily basis.

People who are overly concerned with the impression they make, or who feel a core aspect of themselves, such as gender or sexuality , is not being expressed, can struggle acutely with their identity. Reflecting on the discrepancy between who one is and who one wants to be can be a powerful catalyst for change.

Identity encompasses the values people hold, which dictate the choices they make. An identity contains multiple roles—such as a mother, teacher, and U.S. citizen—and each role holds meaning and expectations that are internalized into one’s identity. Identity continues to evolve over the course of an individual’s life.

Identity formation involves three key tasks: Discovering and developing one’s potential, choosing one’s purpose in life, and finding opportunities to exercise that potential and purpose. Identity is also influenced by parents and peers during childhood and experimentation in adolescence .

Every individual has a goal of nurturing values and making choices that are consistent with their true self. Some internalize the values of their families or culture, even though they don’t align with their authentic self. This conflict can drive dissatisfaction and uncertainty. Reflecting on one’s values can spark change and a more fulfilling life.

The idea of an identity crisis emerged from psychologist Erik Erikson, who delineated eight stages of crises and development, a concept later expanded upon by others. Although not a clinical term, an identity crisis refers to facing a challenge to one’s sense of self, which may center around politics , religion, career choices, or gender roles.

Adolescence is a time in which children develop an authentic sense of self, distinct from their parents, in order to become an independent adult. Experimentation is an important part of the process: As teens try on different identities—in terms of friends, hobbies, appearance, gender, and sexuality—they come to understand who they are and who they want to be.

Features of identity can highlight similarities or differences between people—through race, gender, or profession—which can function to either unite or divide. People who view themselves as members of a larger overarching group tend to have stronger kinship with other people, animals, and nature.

A hunger for authenticity guides us in every age and aspect of life. It drives our explorations of work, relationships, play, and prayer. Teens and twentysomethings try out friends, fashions, hobbies, jobs, lovers, locations, and living arrangements to see what fits and what's "just not me." Midlifers deepen commitments to career, community, faith, and family that match their self-images, or feel trapped in existences that seem not their own. Elders regard life choices with regret or satisfaction based largely on whether they were "true" to themselves.

Authenticity is also a cornerstone of mental health. It’s correlated with many aspects of psychological well-being, including vitality, self-esteem , and coping skills. Acting in accordance with one's core self—a trait called self-determination—is ranked by some experts as one of three basic psychological needs, along with competence and a sense of relatedness.

Everyone subconsciously internalizes conventions and expectations that dictate how they believe they should think or behave. The decision to examine or challenge those assumptions, even though it’s difficult, is the first step to living more authentically. This set of 20 steps can guide you through that process.

There can be tension between being wholly yourself and operating successfully in your relationships and career. No one should be completely deceitful or completely forthright; a guiding principle to achieve a balance is that as long as you’re not forced to act in opposition to your values or personality , a little self-monitoring can be warranted.

Relationships can come under threat when there’s a disconnect between expressing yourself freely and taking your partner’s feelings into account. The Authenticity in Relationships scale —which measures this construct through statements such as “I am fully aware of when to insist on myself and when to compromise”—can initiate discussion and help couples cultivate a healthy balance.

As so much of the world has shifted online, discrepancies have emerged between one’s virtual self and real self. People may cultivate their online avatar more and more carefully over time, and the virtual self can influence the perception of the real self. Therefore, it can be valuable to reflect on whether the virtual self is really authentic .

One of the most enduring theories of development was proposed by psychologist Erik Erikson. Erikson divided the lifecycle into eight stages that each contained a conflict, with the resolution of those conflicts leading to the development of personality. The conflict that occurs during adolescence, Erikson believed, is “identity versus role confusion.”

Adolescents grapple with so many different aspects of identity, from choosing a career path to cultivating moral and political beliefs to becoming a friend or partner. Role confusion pertains to the inability to commit to one path. Adolescents then go through a period of experimentation before committing, reconciling the pieces of their identity, and emerging into adulthood.

Identity formation is most acute during adolescence, but the process doesn’t stop after the teen years. Taking on a new role, such as becoming a parent, can make self-definition a lifelong process.

As a person grows older, the overall trend is toward identity achievement. But major life upheavals, such as divorce , retirement , or the death of a loved one, often lead people to explore and redefine their identities.

According to Freud’s psychoanalytic framework, the mind was composed of the id, driven by instinct and desire, the superego, driven by morality and values, and the ego which moderates the two and creates one’s identity. Many features contribute to ego functioning, including insight, agency, empathy, and purpose.

Erik Erikson’s proposed a theory of development based on different stages of life. He also coined the term “ego identity,” which he conceived as an enduring and continuous sense of who a person is. The ego identity helps to merge all the different versions of oneself (the parent self, the career self, the sexual self) into one cohesive whole, so that if disaster strikes, there's a stable sense of self.

Social psychologist Henri Tajfel conducted pioneering research on prejudice , revealing that people favor those in their own groups, even when those groups are designated randomly, such as by people’s preferences for artwork. This research was the basis for Social Identity Theory—that self-esteem is in part derived from group membership, which provides pride and social identity.

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Home — Essay Samples — Sociology — Personal Identity — Reflection On Personal Identity

A Reflection on My Personal Identity

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Published: May 7, 2019

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Identity Reflection (essay)

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