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Kashmir Issue – Understand the multiple dimensions

Last updated on July 9, 2024 by Alex Andrews George

Table of Contents

Was Kashmir an independent nation? Learn the history of Kashmir

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Kashmir, and adjacent areas like Gilgit, Jammu, and Ladakh – were part of the different empires at different times. Over the years, this area was under the control of Hindu rulers, Muslim emperors, Sikhs, Afghans, and Britishers.

During the period before AD 1000, Kashmir was an important center of Buddhism and Hinduism. Many dynasties like  Gonanditya,  Karkota, and Lohara ruled Kashmir and surrounding areas of North-western India.

The Hindu dynasty rule which extended until 1339 was replaced by the Muslim rule by Shah Mir who became the first Muslim ruler of Kashmir, inaugurating the  Shah Mir dynasty . A few centuries later, the last independent ruler Yusuf Shah Chak was deposed by the Mugul emperor Akbar the Great.

Akbar conquered Kashmir in 1587, making it part of the Mughal Empire . Subsequently, the Mughal ruler Aurangzeb expanded the empire further.

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Thus, it can be seen that under the Mughal rule, which extended nearly all of the Indian subcontinent, Kashmir was an integral part of India – however, not an independent nation .

Also read : Ladakh Statehood

Kashmir Region – After the Mughals

Aurangzeb’s successors were weak rulers. Later Mughals failed to retain Kashmir. After Mughal rule , it passed to Afghan, Sikh, and Dogra rule.

In 1752, Kashmir was seized by the Afghan ruler Ahmed Shah Abdali. The Afghan Durrani Empire ruled Kasmir from the 1750s until 1819 when Sikhs , under Ranjit Singh, annexed Kashmir and ended the Muslim rule.

By the early 19th century, Sikhs under Maharaja Renjith Singh took control of Kashmir. He had earlier annexed Jammu. The Sikhs ruled Kashmir until they were defeated by the British (First Anglo-Sikh War) in 1846.

After that Kashmir became a princely state of the British Empire – under the Dogra Dynasty.

Jammu and Kashmir – as a princely state of the British Empire

Maharaja Gulab Singh of the Dogra Dynasty signed the ‘Treaty of Amritsar’ with the British East India Company in 1846. Under this treaty, he paid Rs. 75 lakhs to the East India Company in 1846 in exchange for Kashmir and some other areas.  Jammu and Kashmir as a single entity was unified and founded (1846).

Zorawar Singh, a General in the Dogra Anny later led many campaigns in the northern areas like Ladakh, Baltistan, Gilgit, Hunza, and Yagistan, consolidating smaller principalities. He expanded the dominions of Maharaja Gulab Singh.

However, Jammu and Kashmir, from 1846 until 1947, remained a princely state ruled by the Jamwal Rajput Dogra Dynasty. Like all other princely states in India then, Kashmir too enjoyed only partial autonomy, as the real control was with the British.

Also read: Special Category Status

The ruler’s stand (at the time of Partition)

During the time of partition of British India (1947), Jammu and Kashmir (J&K) was a Princely State. Britishers had given all princely states a choice – either to join India to join Pakistan or even to remain independent.

The ruler of Kashmir during that time (1947) was Maharaja Hari Singh, the great-grandson of Maharaja Gulab Singh. He was a Hindu who ruled over a majority-Muslim princely state.

He did not want to merge with India or Pakistan.

Hari Singh tried to negotiate with India and Pakistan to have an independent status for his state. He offered a proposal of a Standstill Agreement to both the Dominion, pending a final decision on the State’s accession. On August 12, 1947, the Prime Minister of Jammu and Kashmir sent identical communications to the Governments of India and Pakistan.

Pakistan accepted the offer and sent a communication to J&K Prime Minister on August 15, 1947. It read, “The Government of Pakistan agrees to have Standstill Agreement with Jammu and Kashmir for the continuation of existing arrangements …”

India advised the Maharaja to send his authorized representative to Delhi for further discussion on the offer.

What were the Kashmiri people’s aspirations in 1947?

Kashmiri people took part extensively in the Indian Nationalist Movement. They not only wanted to get rid of British rule but also never wanted to be under the rule of the Dogra dynasty once the nationalist movement achieved its mission. The Kashmiris had preferred democracy to monarchy.

Jammu and Kashmir was always a secular state – with a history of Hindu, Muslim, and Sikh rule. Even though the majority population was Muslims, it then had a significant Hindu population as well.

India in 1947 had suggested conducting a plebiscite to know the aspirations of Kashmiri people. With tall leaders of Jammu and Kashmir like Sheik Abdullah on its side, cherishing the common values – secularism, democracy, and pan-India nationalism – India was confident to win the Plebiscite if it was held in 1947.

India’s stand with Junagadh, another princely state, was also to conduct a plebiscite. In 1947, upon the independence and partition of India, the last Muslim ruler of the Junagadh state, Muhammad Mahabat Khanji III, decided to merge Junagadh into the newly formed Pakistan. The majority of the population were Hindus. The conflict led to many revolts and also a plebiscite, resulting in the integration of Junagadh into India.

However, the Pakistan attack on Kashmir in October 1947 changed all dynamics. The exact aspirations of Kashmiri People at that time is still unknown – as a plebiscite or referendum was never held.

The Pakistan Invasion of Kashmir in 1947

Pakistan, though entered into a Standstill Agreement with Jammu and Kashmir, had an eye on it. It broke the Standstill Agreement by sponsoring a tribal militant attack in Kashmir in October 1947.

Pashtun raiders from Pakistan invaded Kashmir in October 1947 and took control over a large area. Hari Singh appealed to the Governor General of free India, Lord Mountbatten for assistance.

India assured help on the condition Hari Singh should sign the Instrument of Accession. Maharaja Hari Singh signed the instrument of accession with India (1947). It was also agreed that once the situation normalized, the views of the people of J&K will be ascertained about their future.

Jammu and Kashmir signs the Instrument of Accession with India

The Maharaja Hari Singh signed the Instrument of Accession to India on 26 October 1947 in Srinagar.

As soon as the accession documents were signed, the Indian Armed Force took over the stage to repulse Pakistan-supported tribal assault.

Indian and Pakistani forces thus fought their first war over Kashmir in 1947-48.

India successfully drove out most of the Pak-supported tribal militants from Kashmir occupation. However, one part of the State came under Pakistani control. India claims that this area is under illegal occupation. Pakistan describes this area as ‘ Azad Kashmir ’. India however, does not recognize this term. India uses the term Pak-occupied Kashmir (PoK) for the area of Kashmir under the control of Pakistan.

India brings the United Nations (UN) into the picture

India referred the dispute to the United Nations Security Council on 1 January 1948. Following the set-up of the  United Nations Commission for India and Pakistan (UNCIP) , the UN Security Council passed Resolution 47 on 21 April 1948.

The UN Resolution was non-binding on India and Pakistan. However, this is what the UN resolution mentioned:

UN Resolution on Jammu and Kashmir

The UN resolutions clearly said :

• Pakistan is the aggressor in the state.
• Pakistan has to vacate all occupied territory in the state and hand over the vacated territory to India.
• India has to remove all its forces leaving aside enough to maintain law and order.
• India to conduct a plebiscite in the state.

Why has no Plebiscite or Referendum been held in Kashmir yet?

• The state of Jammu and Kashmir is defined as it existed on or before the invasion of Pakistan on 22nd October 1947. This includes the present territory of Pak-occupied Kashmir (POK), Gilgit, Baltistan, Jammu, Laddhak, and Kashmir Valley.
• Pakistan asked for time to vacate its occupation but it never complied.
• As nearly one-third of the state of Jammu and Kashmir is still under the occupation of Pakistan, it is a non-compliance of conditions leading to the plebiscite.

Sheikh Abdullah’s movement – Formal incorporation of Kashmir into the Indian Union

Kashmir’s first political party, the Muslim Conference, was formed in 1925, with Sheikh Abdullah as president. Later, in 1938, it was renamed as National Conference . The National Conference was a secular organization and had a long association with Congress. Sheikh Abdullah was a personal friend of some of the leading nationalist leaders including Nehru.

National Conference started a popular movement to get rid of the Maharaja. Sheikh Abdullah was the leader.

After Maharaja Hari Singh signed an ‘Instrument of Accession’ with the Government of India, Sheikh Abdullah took over as the Prime Minister of the State of J&K (the head of the government in the State was then called Prime Minister) in March 1948.

Sheikh Abdullah was against Jammu and Kashmir joining Pakistan. However, he took a pro-referendum stance and delayed the formal accession to India. The pro-Indian authorities dismissed the state government and arrested Prime Minister Sheikh Abdullah.

The new Jammu and Kashmir government ratified the accession to India. In 1957, Kashmir was formally incorporated into the Indian Union.

Kashmir Issue – External Disputes

Externally, ever since 1947, Kashmir remained a major issue of conflict between India and Pakistan (and between India and China to a minor extent).

Pakistan has always claimed that the Kashmir valley should be part of Pakistan. The conflict resulted in 3 main wars between India and Pakistan – 1947, 1965, and 1971. A war-like situation erupted in 1998 as well (Kargil war).

Pakistan was not only the illegal occupant of the Kashmir region. China too started claiming parts of the princely state of Jammu and Kashmir.

By the 1950s, China started to gradually occupy the eastern Kashmir (Aksai Chin) . In 1962, India fought a war with China over its encroachments, however, China defeated India. To make matters worse, Pakistan ceded the Trans-Karakoram Tract of Kashmir (Saksham Valley) to China.

Kashmir Issue – Internal Disputes

Internally, there is a dispute about the status of Kashmir within the Indian Union.

Kashmir was given autonomy and a special status by Article 370 of the Indian Constitution . Articles like 370, 371, 35A , etc are connected with privileges given to Jammu and Kashmir.

What is the special status given to Jammu and Kashmir?

• Article 370 gives greater autonomy to Jammu and Kashmir compared to the other States of India.
• The State has its own Constitution.
• All provisions of the Indian Constitution do not apply to the State.
• Laws passed by the Parliament apply to J&K only if the State agrees.
• Non-Kashmiri Indians cannot buy property in Kashmir.

This special status has provoked two opposite reactions.

A section feels that Article 370 is not needed!

There is a section of people outside of J&K that believes that the special status of the State conferred by Article 370 does not allow full integration of the State with India. This section feels that Article 370 should, therefore, be revoked and J&K should be like any other State in India.

Another section feels that Article 370 is not enough!

Another section, mostly Kashmiris, believes that the autonomy conferred by Article 370 is not enough.

Major Grievances of Kashmiris:

Kashmiris have expressed at least three major grievances.

• First, the promise that Accession would be referred to the people of the State after the situation created by tribal invasion was normalized, has not been fulfilled. They demand a ‘Plebiscite’ at the earliest.
• Secondly, there is a feeling that the special federal status guaranteed by Article 370, has been eroded in practice. This has led to the demand for restoration of autonomy or ‘Greater State Autonomy’.
• Thirdly, it is felt that democracy which is practised in the rest of India has not been similarly institutionalised in the State of Jammu and Kashmir.

Politics since 1948 – Conflict between the Kashmir State Government and the Central Government of India

After taking over as the Prime Minister, Sheikh Abdullah initiated major land reforms and other policies that benefited ordinary people. But there was a growing difference between him and the central government about his position on Kashmir’s status. He was dismissed in 1953 and kept in detention for several years.

The leadership that succeeded him did not enjoy as much popular support and was able to rule the State mainly due to the support of the Centre. There were serious allegations of malpractices and rigging in various elections.

During most of the period between 1953 and 1974, the Congress party exercised a lot of influence on the politics of the State. A truncated National Conference (minus Sheikh Abdullah) remained in power with the active support of Congress for some time but later it merged with the Congress.

Thus Congress gained direct control over the government in the State.

In the meanwhile, there were several attempts to reach an agreement between Sheikh Abdullah and the Government of India.

Finally, in 1974 Indira Gandhi reached an agreement with Sheikh Abdullah and he became the Chief Minister of the State.

The Revival of National Conference (1977)

He revived the National Conference which was elected with a majority in the assembly elections held in 1977.

Sheikh Abdullah died in 1982 and the leadership of the National Conference went to his son, Farooq Abdullah, who became the Chief Minister.

But he was soon dismissed by the Governor and a breakaway faction of the National Conference came to power for a brief period.

The dismissal of Farooq Abdullah’s government due to the intervention of the Centre generated a feeling of resentment in Kashmir. The confidence that Kashmiris had developed in the democratic processes after the accord between Indira Gandhi and Sheikh Abdullah, received a setback.

The feeling that the Centre was intervening in the politics of the State was further strengthened when the National Conference in 1986 agreed to have an electoral alliance with the Congress, the ruling party in the Centre.

1987 Assembly Elections, Political Crisis, and Insurgency

It was in this environment that the 1987 Assembly election took place. The official results showed a massive victory for the National Conference-Congress alliance and Farooq Abdullah returned as Chief Minister.

However, it was widely believed that the results did not reflect the popular choice and that the entire election process was rigged.

A popular resentment had already been brewing in the State against the inefficient administration since the early 1980s. This was now augmented by the commonly prevailing feeling that democratic processes were being undermined at the behest of the Centre. This generated a political crisis in Kashmir which became severe with the rise of the insurgency.

By 1989, the State had come into the grip of a militant movement mobilized around the cause of a separate Kashmiri nation.

The insurgents got moral, material, and military support from Pakistan. The balance of influence had decisively tilted in Pakistan’s favor by the late 1980s, with people’s sympathy no longer with the Indian Union as it had been in 1947-48, 1965 or 1971.

The terrorists and militants drove out almost all the Hindus from the Kashmir valley, ensuring that a future plebiscite (if it happens) would be meaningless.

India imposed the Armed Forces Special Powers Act (AFSPA) in Jammu and Kashmir in 1990.

For several years, the State was under President’s rule and effectively under the control of the armed forces . Throughout the period from 1990, Jammu and Kashmir experienced violence at the hands of the insurgents and through army action.

1990 and Beyond – Growing Trust Deficit

After 1987, the pro-India sentiments of Kashmiri people tilted heavily towards Kashmiri Separatism. Pakistan, of course, added fuel to the fire – by giving moral and financial support to terrorists, militants, and insurgents. As a result, Kashmir frequently witnessed violence, curfew, stone-pelting, and firing between the troops of India and Pakistan across the Line of Control (LoC).

Thousands of soldiers, civilians, and militants have been killed in the uprising and the Indian crackdown since 1989.

Even though state elections were conducted, Kashmir did not return to normalcy before 1987 .

Assembly elections in the State were held only in 1996 in which the National Conference led by Farooq Abdullah came to power with a demand for regional autonomy for Jammu and Kashmir.

J&K experienced a very fair election in 2002. The National Conference failed to win a majority and was replaced by the People’s Democratic Party (PDP) and Congress coalition government.

In 2015, India’s ruling BJP party was sworn into government in Indian-administered Kashmir for the first time in coalition with the local People’s Democratic Party, with the latter’s Mufti Mohammad Sayeed as chief minister (followed by Mehbooba Mufti because of the death of her father and party founder). However, this coalition didn’t last for long.

Even though the Government of India is taking many steps to stop the insurgency and bring Kashmir back to normalcy, terrorist attacks like that in Pulwama have seriously hindered the peace process.

The Current Stand of India – Regarding the Kashmir Question

• No more mediation with the UN or any other other third parties.
• India and Pakistan should resolve issues through bilateral talks as agreed by the Simla Agreement.
• No Plebiscite in Kashmir unless Pakistan reverses the situation back to what was in 1947 (territory and demographics).

Who are the Kashmir Separatists?

• All Parties Hurriyat Conference
• Jammu Kashmir Liberation Front
• Harkat-ul-Jihad al-Islami
• Lashkar-e-Taiba
• Jaish-e-Mohammed
• Hizbul Mujahideen
• Harkat-ul-Mujahideen
• Ansar Ghazwat-ul-Hind Flag.png Ansar Ghazwat-ul-Hind (Since 2017)

What do Separatists demand?

Separatist politics which surfaced in Kashmir from 1989 has taken different forms and is made up of various strands.

• There is one strand of separatists who want a separate Kashmiri nation, independent of India and Pakistan.
• Then some groups want Kashmir to merge with Pakistan.
• Besides these, there is a third strand which wants greater autonomy for the people of the state within the Indian union .

Demand for intra-state autonomy

Even though the name of the state is Jammu and Kashmir (J&K), it comprises three social and political regions: Jammu, Kashmir, and Ladakh.

• Jammu – The Jammu region is a mix of foothills and plains, of Hindus, Muslims, and Sikhs and speakers of various languages.
• Kashmir – Kashmir Valley is the heart of the Kashmir region. The people are Kashmiri-speaking and are mostly Muslims. There is also a small Kashmiri-speaking Hindu minority.
• Ladakh – The Ladakh region is mountainous, and has a very small population which is equally divided between Buddhists and Muslims. Ladakh is divided into two main regions – Leh and Kargil.

It should also be noted that out of the 3 main administrative divisions – Jammu, Kashmir, and Ladakh – insurgency and demand for independence is high only in the Kashmir Valley. Most of the people in Jammu and Ladakh still wish to be part of India, even though they demand autonomy differently. They often complain of neglect and backwardness. The demand for intra-state autonomy is as strong as the demand for State autonomy in the regions of Jammu and Ladakh.

Article 370: Changes made via Presidential order of 2019

On 5 August 2019, Home Minister Amit Shah announced in the  Rajya Sabha  (upper house of the Indian Parliament) that the President of India had issued  The Constitution (Application to Jammu and Kashmir) Order, 2019 (C.O. 272) under Article 370, superseding the Constitution (Application to Jammu and Kashmir) Order, 1954.

The order stated that all the provisions of the Indian Constitution applied to Jammu and Kashmir.

While the 1954 order specified that only some articles of the Indian constitution to apply to the state, the new order removed all such restrictions.

This in effect meant that the separate Constitution of Jammu and Kashmir stood abrogated.

The President issued the order with the “concurrence of the Government of State of Jammu and Kashmir”, which meant the Governor appointed by the Union government.

Change of status: Jammu and Kashmir Reorganisation Act, 2019

After the Government of India repealed the special status accorded to Jammu and Kashmir under Article 370 of the Indian constitution in 2019, the Parliament of India passed the Jammu and Kashmir Reorganisation Act, which contained provisions that dissolved the state and reorganized it into two union territories – Jammu and Kashmir in the west and Ladakh in the east.

The two union territories came into existence on 31 October 2019, which was celebrated as National Unity Day.

The union territory of Jammu and Kashmir was proposed to have a legislature under the bill whereas the union territory of Ladakh is proposed to not have one.

Urge for Peace

The initial period of popular support for militancy has now given way to the urge for peace.

The Centre has started negotiations with various separatist groups. Instead of demanding a separate nation, most of the separatists in the dialogue are trying to re-negotiate a relationship of the State with India.

The Kashmir issue – has multiple dimensions – external and internal; inter-state as well as intra-state. Not even the separatists are on the same ground – their demands are different.

The princely state of Jammu and Kashmir which was under the control of British India – is now not entirely with India. Pakistan and China too now occupy a significant portion of the territories of the erstwhile princely state.

Of course, the Kashmir problem also includes the issue of Kashmiri identity known as Kashmiriyat. However, almost every state in India has its own identity – Tamil Nadu, Karnataka, West Bengal, or Kerala. However, the people in each of these states even when seeing themselves as Tamilians, Kannadagans, Bengalis or Malayalis are also able to see the bigger picture – they identify themselves as Indians.

Jammu and Kashmir is one of the living examples of plural society and politics. Not only are there diversities of all kinds (religious, cultural, linguistic, ethnic, tribal) but there are also divergent political aspirations.

Unfortunately, from the perspective of the youth of Kashmir, there is a growing trust deficit. It’s a hard reality that Jammu and Kashmir never functioned like other Indian states since its accession to India. It had given higher autonomy initially, however, it got eroded in practice.

The first step to solving the Kashmir issue is to identify the problems behind the alienation of Kashmir. Here are some of them:

• Mishandling of the Kashmir Issue by the successive Central governments of India – which includes frequent dismissal of State Assemblies.
• The state governments of Kashmir failed to distribute the benefits of growth and development to every area of Kashmir.
• The terrorist and military outfits in Pakistan have been distancing the youth of Kashmir from the democratic form of the Indian government.
• The regular presence of the Indian Armed Force or CAPF in the Kashmir interiors, and the misuse of provisions like ASFPA.

To find a solution to the Kashmir issue – all stakeholders should be considered.

What is the need of the hour is proper integration of Kashmir, Jammu, and Ladakh with India. Integration should not be seen in a limited dimension of territory. India should be able to win the hearts of the people of Kashmir.

Only time can tell about the success of the changes made concerning the provisions of Article 370.

Kashmir was and still is an integral part of India. It has a plural and secular culture – just like the rest of India. Urgent steps should be taken to bridge the gaps of trust deficit in the minds of Kashmiri youth. All Kashmiris should get the due share in the growth story of India. Like all other states in India, there should be adequate political autonomy in Jammu and Kashmir.

Violence, terrorism, and killings are never the answer – be it on any side. What do you think?

Read: Ladakh statehood

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About Alex Andrews George

Alex Andrews George is a mentor, author, and social entrepreneur. Alex is the founder of ClearIAS and one of the expert Civil Service Exam Trainers in India.

He is the author of many best-seller books like 'Important Judgments that transformed India' and 'Important Acts that transformed India'.

A trusted mentor and pioneer in online training , Alex's guidance, strategies, study-materials, and mock-exams have helped many aspirants to become IAS, IPS, and IFS officers.

Reader Interactions

March 6, 2019 at 6:50 pm

The separatist themselves don’t want this situation to have a positive outcome as it will subsequently deteriorate/hamper their “political” stance which they’ve nurtured since a long time.

February 11, 2023 at 7:29 pm

I never seen a article like this…its amazing date wise i m from Kashmir i nvr understand Kashmir isssue , Kashmir history from beginning…but today i understand full 🌝 thanks to the author of this article 😊

March 6, 2019 at 7:30 pm

As long as radical brainwashed of youth continues…nothing can be done, first shut down all those radical institutions & then bring education that teaches about secularism & India’s beauty & achievements!

March 6, 2019 at 7:43 pm

kashmiri youth mind are washed out by these separatist…and some militant group ..work opportunity should be given to the youths of kashmir alike other states of india ….Empty mind see only a way to destruction…..

March 6, 2019 at 11:58 pm

The real situation of J&K can be assessed only by hearing the voices of the common people, the constitutional arrangements like Article 370, Article 35A & IoA must be respected to keep the relationship intact.

March 18, 2019 at 11:34 pm

Common people with normal situation ab toh majority Muslim log ka hi hai…. pehle un hinduwo ko bulo jinko waha se bhga diya gya …tb na brabar ka faisla hoga

March 7, 2019 at 9:52 am

there is another angle to look into this dispute and that is religion. religion play a major role in building and developing the behaviour of the society.

March 7, 2019 at 10:31 am

Yes, I do agree that wars, disputes, killing will no longer be a way to provide an efficient solution to Kashmir issue.

March 8, 2019 at 12:21 pm

wonderful article….!! what i believe is ..us Indians should stand together for Kashmir… and make people of Kashmir know that though we are 1000’s of kilometers away we still stand for them will be their strength…Apart from all the political drama they should know that a simple spark in kashmir will cause a wildfire in kanyakumari.. The role of govt here is the root cause of all the issues if u ask me .. what were you doing while the kidnapper lure the kid with the candy …? now indian govt should respect the kashmiri’s give them the hope and gain trust.. a lot of bloodshed ,mutilated bodies , power abuse , women abuse … give them hope …show them we love them .. youth from other states understand the kashmiris show them the support.. show them why they should be a part of india …

March 8, 2019 at 5:20 pm

For the violence to stop in Kashmir and preventing this problem to further aggravate development plans, projects should be well reached in the state so that the youth is engaged in something productive rather than destructive work. First of all, the politicisation of the State situation should be avoided.

March 13, 2019 at 11:31 pm

This is not the solution of problem,but give the right of people.As it is mentioned is article that Kashmir was a princely state,it has right to what they want,the Kashmir dispute has only one solution come India and Pakistan forward and give rights to Jammu and Kashmir people what they want,and destroy this illegal occupied.

March 14, 2019 at 2:54 pm

Further plubicite may useful for kashmiris yo choose their will…

March 27, 2019 at 7:14 pm

Your assumption of Kashmir being an integral part of India because the it was a part of The Mughal Empire is akin to the assumption that India is an integral part of Great Britain because it was a British colony once. That is ridiculous! The problem would not be solved till India accepts the fact that Kashmir is not an integral part of India. You cannot blame Pakistan for it then because Pakistan was as much ‘India’ once as new India is. So morally, historically, Politically and logically, by your argument, Pakistan is nowhere wrong to claim Kashmir for itself!

April 7, 2019 at 6:48 pm

but chirag The Government of Pakistan agrees to have Standstill Agreement with Jammu and Kashmir but india didn’t. So, Pakistan is wrong as it was a the first one who attack….in 1947 october after that indian government helps J&K and our military took over the charge.

April 7, 2019 at 9:33 pm

state politician are taking due benefit of the prevailing situation in jammu kashmir. They are making their vote bank at the cost of common public. Center should make efforts to ground level development through job creation employment generation education and overall development of state. mare education is not solution even the highly educated students after getting no source of income has diverted their route which mislead the other growing youth. Stone pelting is source of income for some public because they are paid for this for which politicians and other extremists are responsible as they bargain with center for normalcy of situation.

July 10, 2019 at 10:56 am

all is messed up because of british government gave 3 choice instead of two

August 2, 2019 at 2:47 am

Very good article, Alex! 🙂

August 9, 2019 at 8:30 pm

The only thing matters is that J&K belongs to India, anyone can claim it but won’t get even a stone of it. (At least till the plebiscite is done with all the Kashmiris taking part including the one who had left or removed from Kashmir). They do deserve to take their own decision with all due respect but including all the Hindus, Muslims, Sikhs and Buddhists.

August 14, 2019 at 6:31 pm

This is the best article I have ever read……!!! Really helpful in making a notes on Kashmir…..Thankyou very much…..!!!!!!

August 19, 2019 at 6:42 pm

Now the minds of kashmir people have been washed with the continuous presence of separatists and the Pak sponsored terrorism. No more plebiscites are needed to be given to these people. Indian government and the constitution is supreme. They have revoked 370 to bring the J & K into mainstream for all round development of J&K and its people. Pak does not have any right to interfere in our affairs, since its accession to India.

January 24, 2020 at 9:12 pm

Really good notes, grateful thanks to clearias team

February 9, 2020 at 6:21 pm

If Indian government wanted to integrated Kashmir into Indian Union, they should behave like human towards Kashmiri people who suffered from torture, disappearance, rapped by Indian Army from decades. Even Kashmiri youth experience torture, mob lynching by rest of indian people and although India wanted to integrate land of Kashmir not the people.

March 30, 2020 at 12:07 am

Can I download all of this in pdf format?

April 22, 2020 at 9:16 pm

Thank you sir

May 21, 2020 at 1:25 pm

It’s a very good article and has explained the J&K issue as easily as possible yet maintained the details. My look over the recent amendments on the J&K issue has changed, and it looks like a step that will work for the people in the long run (however not in the short term).

September 14, 2020 at 12:23 pm

Now come to know more about J & K issue… Contents of several book in one article.. Separatists,militants,terrorists, defunct politicians should be treated hard with central / State agencies … Hope for peace not only in valley… But in all parts including jammu,Kashmir & Ladakh……

October 27, 2020 at 12:44 am

I have a simple question. Even if both Pakistan and India want and agree on something. Should that be the solution, or should it be what the people want. To me, whether you like it or not, its the right of the Kashmiris to decide what they want for their future. Give them that right, thats the only fair solution.

And if you are not bothered by what is fair then the alternative is to go with the powerful and war is the way to find who is stronger.

March 21, 2022 at 3:38 pm

This Article is Baseless and Far From Ground Reality of Our Kashmir Nation , Kashmir Is not a integral or Vein of Any Nation wether is India or Pakistan , Kashmir Is Independent Before Birth of India or Pakistan.. Due to Continues occupation by Non Kashmirs Wehter is Muslim or Non Muslims , We Kashmirs Fight against the Occupation From years, still we are under Occupation joinlty by India paksitain and China ,, We Kashmirs are Peaceful Community between three Nation , we Lost more then 1 lakh we are wintess of crimes done by Non Kashmirs, we kashmiri Never agaist any Pakistain or India , but we never allow any indian or pakitain Interfercne in out kashmir , due to interference of India and Pakistan is responsible for destruction of our kashmir nation , We Peaple of kashmir never accept any occupation , 1000 political Drama playing by tri nation till date in our kashmir..

we Kashmiri appeal to Good and responsible Citizen of India and Pakistaini , both-side people are misguided regarding the Kashmir nation, the Ground Reality is different.. we Kashmiri respect both side nation as guest , we welcome every country peoples visit our kashmir people but we never accept India and pakistain occupation and we never forget the crimes of India and pakistain .

April 27, 2023 at 5:08 pm

Please update your notes. This is brilliantly done.

July 26, 2023 at 7:08 pm

Unbiased, good analysis and effectively presented. Hope the powers to be can affect the policy ideas presented here. Thanks!

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Kashmir , region of the northwestern Indian subcontinent. It is bounded by the Uygur Autonomous Region of Xinjiang to the northeast and the Tibet Autonomous Region to the east (both parts of China ), by the Indian states of Himachal Pradesh and Punjab to the south, by Pakistan to the west, and by Afghanistan to the northwest. The region, with a total area of some 85,800 square miles (222,200 square km), has been the subject of dispute between India and Pakistan since the partition of the Indian subcontinent in 1947. The northern and western portions are administered by Pakistan and comprise three areas: Azad Kashmir , Gilgit , and Baltistan , the last two being part of a single administrative unit called Gilgit-Baltistan (formerly Northern Areas). Administered by India are the southern and southeastern portions, Jammu and Kashmir and Ladakh . The Indian- and Pakistani-administered portions are divided by a “line of control” agreed to in 1972, although neither country recognizes it as an international boundary. In addition, China became active in the eastern area of Kashmir in the 1950s and has controlled the northeastern part of Ladakh (the easternmost portion of the region) since 1962.

The Kashmir region is predominantly mountainous, with deep, narrow valleys and high, barren plateaus. The relatively low-lying Jammu and Punch (Poonch) plains in the southwest are separated by the thickly forested Himalayan foothills and the Pir Panjal Range of the Lesser Himalayas from the larger, more fertile, and more heavily populated Vale of Kashmir to the north. The vale, situated at an elevation of about 5,300 feet (1,600 metres), constitutes the basin of the upper Jhelum River and contains the city of Srinagar . Jammu and the vale lie in Indian-administered Jammu and Kashmir, while the Punch lowlands are largely in Azad Kashmir.

Rising northeast of the vale is the western part of the Great Himalayas , the peaks of which reach elevations of 20,000 feet (6,100 metres) or higher. Farther to the northeast is the high, mountainous plateau region of Ladakh , which is cut by the rugged valley of the northwestward-flowing Indus River . Extending roughly northwestward from the Himalayas are the lofty peaks of the Karakoram Range , including K2 (Mount Godwin Austen), which at 28,251 feet (8,611 metres) is the second highest peak in the world, after Mount Everest .

The region is located along the northernmost extremity of the Indian-Australian tectonic plate. The subduction of that plate beneath the Eurasian Plate —the process that for roughly 50 million years has been creating the Himalayas—has produced heavy seismic activity in Kashmir. One especially powerful earthquake in 2005 devastated Muzaffarabad, which is the administrative center of Azad Kashmir, and adjacent areas including parts of India’s Jammu and Kashmir state (now Jammu and Kashmir union territory) and Pakistan’s North-West Frontier Province (now Khyber Pakhtunkhwa ).

The climate of the region ranges from subtropical in the southwestern lowlands to alpine throughout the high mountain areas. Precipitation is variable; it is heavier in areas that can be reached by the monsoonal winds west and south of the great ranges and sparse to the north and east where continental conditions prevail.

The people in the Jammu area are Muslim in the west and Hindu in the east and speak Hindi , Punjabi , and Dogri . The inhabitants of the Vale of Kashmir and the Pakistani areas are mostly Muslim and speak Urdu and Kashmiri . The sparsely inhabited Ladakh region and beyond is home to Tibetan peoples who practice Buddhism and speak Balti and Ladakhi.

According to legend , an ascetic named Kashyapa reclaimed the land now comprising Kashmir from a vast lake. That land came to be known as Kashyapamar and, later, Kashmir. Buddhism was introduced by the Mauryan emperor Ashoka in the 3rd century bce , and from the 9th to the 12th century ce the region appears to have achieved considerable prominence as a center of Hindu culture . A succession of Hindu dynasties ruled Kashmir until 1346, when it came under Muslim rule. The Muslim period lasted nearly five centuries, ending when Kashmir was annexed to the Sikh kingdom of the Punjab in 1819 and then to the Dogra kingdom of Jammu in 1846.

Thus, the Kashmir region in its contemporary form dates from 1846, when, by the treaties of Lahore and Amritsar at the conclusion of the First Sikh War , Raja Gulab Singh , the Dogra ruler of Jammu, was created maharaja (ruling prince) of an extensive but somewhat ill-defined Himalayan kingdom “to the eastward of the River Indus and westward of the River Ravi.” The creation of this princely state helped the British safeguard their northern flank in their advance to the Indus and beyond during the latter part of the 19th century. The state thus formed part of a complex political buffer zone interposed by the British between their Indian empire and the empires of Russia and China to the north. For Gulab Singh, confirmation of title to these mountain territories marked the culmination of almost a quarter century of campaigning and diplomatic negotiation among the petty hill kingdoms along the northern borderlands of the Sikh empire of the Punjab.

Some attempts were made in the 19th century to define the boundaries of the territory, but precise definition was in many cases defeated by the nature of the country and by the existence of huge tracts lacking permanent human settlement. In the far north, for example, the maharaja’s authority certainly extended to the Karakoram Range, but beyond that lay a debatable zone on the borders of the Turkistan and Xinjiang regions of Central Asia , and the boundary was never demarcated. There were similar doubts about the alignment of the frontier where this northern zone skirted the region known as Aksai Chin , to the east, and joined the better-known and more precisely delineated boundary with Tibet, which had served for centuries as the eastern border of the Ladakh region. The pattern of boundaries in the northwest became clearer in the last decade of the 19th century, when Britain, in negotiations with Afghanistan and Russia, delimited boundaries in the Pamirs region. At that time Gilgit, always understood to be part of Kashmir, was for strategic reasons constituted as a special agency in 1889 under a British agent.

The Kashmir conflict: How did it start?

The dispute between India and Pakistan over Kashmir was sparked by a fateful decision in 1947, and has resulted in decades of violence, including two wars.

Since 1947, India and Pakistan have been locked in conflict over Kashmir, a majority-Muslim region in the northernmost part of India. The mountainous, 86,000-square-mile territory was once a princely state. Now, it is claimed by both India and Pakistan.

The roots of the conflict lie in the countries’ shared colonial past. From the 17th to the 20th century, Britain ruled most of the Indian subcontinent, first indirectly through the British East India Company, then from 1858 directly through the British crown. Over time, Britain’s power over its colony weakened, and a growing nationalist movement threatened the crown’s slipping rule.

Though it feared civil war between India’s Hindu majority and Muslim minority, Britain faced increasing pressure to grant independence to its colony. After World War II, Parliament decided British rule in India should end by 1948.

Britain had historically had separate electorates for Muslim citizens and reserved some political seats specifically for Muslims; that not only hemmed Muslims into a minority status, but fueled a growing Muslim separatist movement. Mohammad Ali Jinnah , a politician who headed up India’s Muslim League, began demanding a separate nation for India’s Muslim population.

“It is high time that the British Government applied their mind definitely to the division of India and the establishment of Pakistan and Hindustan, which means freedom for both,” Jinnah said in 1945 .

As religious riots broke out across British India, leaving tens of thousands dead , British and Indian leaders began to seriously consider a partition of the subcontinent based on religion. On August 14, 1947, the independent, Muslim-majority nation of Pakistan was formed. The Hindu-majority independent nation of India followed the next day.

Under the hasty terms of partition, more than 550 princely states within colonial India that were not directly governed by Britain could decide to join either new nation or remain independent.

The maharaja of Kashmir, Hari Singh, in June 1946.

At the time, the princely state of Jammu and Kashmir, which had a majority Muslim population, was governed by maharaja Hari Singh, a Hindu. Unlike most of the princely states which aligned themselves with one nation or the other, Singh wanted independence for Kashmir. To avert pressure to join either new nation, the maharaja signed a standstill agreement with Pakistan that allowed citizens of Kashmir to continue trade and travel with the new country. India did not sign a similar standstill agreement with the princely state.

As partition-related violence raged across the two new nations , the government of Pakistan pressured Kashmir to join it. Pro-Pakistani rebels, funded by Pakistan, took over much of western Kashmir, and in September 1947, Pashtun tribesmen streamed over the border from Pakistan into Kashmir. Singh asked for India’s help in staving off the invasion, but India responded that, in order to gain military assistance, Kashmir would have to accede to India, thus becoming part of the new country.

Singh agreed and signed the Instrument of Accession , the document that aligned Kashmir with the Dominion of India, in October 1947. Kashmir was later given special status within the Indian constitution—a status which guaranteed that Kashmir would have independence over everything but communications, foreign affairs, and defense. This special status was revoked by the Indian government in August 2019.

The maharaja's fateful decision to align Kashmir with India ushered in decades of conflict in the contested region, including two wars and a longstanding insurgency.

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The Latest Kashmir Conflict Explained

India argues it is stabilizing Kashmir—but, Islamabad says it will have dire consequences for the region.

By: Tara Kartha;  Jalil Jilani

Publication Type: Analysis

Editor’s Note: USIP Jennings Randolph Fellows Dr. Tara Kartha and Ambassador Jalil Jilani look at the latest crisis in Kashmir from their respective views. Dr. Kartha was a member of India’s National Security Council for 15 years and has over 30 years’ experience in national security policy. Amb. Jilani, a career Pakistani diplomat, is a former ambassador to the U.S. and former foreign secretary. This post represents the views of the authors and not those of USIP.

India aims to stabilize Jammu and Kashmir. But, why now?

Kartha: On August 5, India decided to take a long-considered move using article 370 of its constitution to change the status of the state of Jammu and Kashmir. Although this has long been a part of the platform of Prime Minister Narenda Modi’s Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP), the overwhelming majority of parliamentarians across all parties supported the decision—with 351 votes for and 72 against. Even the general secretary of the opposition Congress Party expressed his approval. This has been a move long in the making, with the backing of a wide swath of Indian political actors. But, the question remains, why now?

New Delhi made this move in an effort to stabilize Jammu and Kashmir and integrate it more fully with the Indian state. The Modi government’s decision is aimed at promoting local governance and encouraging investment in a state that has lagged behind for decades. The lack of effective local governance has hampered the development of the entire state of Jammu and Kashmir, including Ladakh, Jammu, and tourism dependant areas like Sonamarg and Gulmarg.  

Although much criticized, New Delhi’s stepped-up security and communications restrictions implemented along with the August 5 decision were lifted in 136 of 197 police station areas. Many schools have also reopened. Jammu and Kashmir will gradually return to normal, barring any terrorist activity or violence.

India believes that the accession of Jammu and Kashmir is final, and any unfinished business regarding partition of the greater Kashmir region only concerns areas occupied by Pakistan. Reorganizing Jammu and Kashmir made no territorial changes, but sought to more closely integrate the state with the rest of India. Therefore, for India, the dispute between India and Pakistan remains unchanged.

The advancement of U.S.-Taliban talks, and the imminence of a deal, has demonstrated to India that the U.S. is serious about withdrawing from Afghanistan. India fears that this could lead to history repeating itself. When another superpower, the Soviet Union, left Afghanistan some 30 years ago, intense terrorism in Kashmir immediately followed, as those who fought the Soviets turned to India.

To India, Islamabad’s objections to the move ring hollow. Over the years, Pakistan has unilaterally changed the status of other territories it occupies in the greater Kashmir region, namely Azad Kashmir and Gilgit-Baltistan. Just last year, Pakistan changed the structure of Azad Kashmir’s government. India protested the change. But, unlike Pakistani Prime Minister Khan’s warning of a heightened risk of war and terrorism following the August 5 decision, India did not resort to threats over Azad Kashmir.

Islamabad now has a choice. It can continue to support terrorism in Kashmir, which has not only devastated the region, but also severely hurt Pakistan’s economy. Or it can choose to cease such support and focus on its internal economic problems. Once the threat of terrorism is removed, there will surely be room for dialogue.

By rooting out terrorism, Pakistan can focus on economic development and more effectively leverage its immense resources to boost its economy. This could encourage economic linkages across the region, leading to greater regional stability in the long run.

What are the consequences for India, Pakistan and the region?

Jilani: India’s unilateral decision to revoke Article 370 of its constitution has severely hampered the chances of a renewal of the peace process between New Delhi and Islamabad. From Pakistan's perspective the Indian action constitutes a grave violation of the U.N. Security Council resolutions on Kashmir and bilateral Pakistan-India agreements, such as the 1972 Shimla Agreement and the Lahore Declaration.

Prime Minister Narenda Modi’s government’s decision will have far reaching consequences for Pakistan-India relations and regional peace and security. Islamabad says that increased repression and human rights violations by Indian forces in Indian Occupied Kashmir will breed violence, fuel indigenous uprising, and further generate tension with Pakistan. Yet, since August 5, India has mobilized hundreds of thousands of troops, detained thousands of Kashmiris, and imposed a curfew resulting in food and medicine shortages. In Islamabad’s eyes, the disputed region of Jammu and Kashmir has become a garrison area.

With the illegal steps taken by the Indian government—imposition of curfew, arrests of political leaders and blockade of communications—the situation has reached a tipping point. Intensifying violence in Indian-occupied Kashmir poses serious challenges for Pakistan and the region. These challenges include:

• For Pakistan, Kashmir remains the core issue and Islamabad cannot envision a dialogue with India that excludes the Kashmir issue.
• Islamabad rejects India’s claim that Kashmir is an internal matter, pointing to past and present international and bilateral calls for a peaceful resolution through dialogue. India’s move violates multiple U.N. Security Council resolutions and is unacceptable to Pakistan and the international community.
• The faint hope for a reasonable settlement based on the four-point formula—which became the basis of back-channel negotiations during the 2004-08 peace process and envisaged self-governance for Kashmiris, demilitarization, travel across the Line of Control and a monitoring mechanism, while also protecting the vital interests of the two countries—has been extinguished.
• Pakistan fears India could stage a false flag in either Jammu and Kashmir or mainland India and blame it on Pakistan in order to divert attention from the volatile situation in Kashmir.
• The possibility of direct Indian intervention in Azad Kashmir or subversion inside Pakistan cannot be ruled out. In case India directly intervenes in Pakistan or in Azad Kashmir or Gilgit-Baltistan (both of which are part of what the U.N. calls Pakistan-administered Kashmir), it could result in war between the nuclear powers with incalculable implications for both countries and the region.
• The outcome of the current Indian actions could result in more refugees from India into Pakistan.
• The latest Indian action will complicate the resolution of other long-standing disputes over issues like the Siachen Glacier and Sir Creek.
• The Indian decision will adversely impact people-to-people contacts and trade relations between the two countries.
• Tension between India and Pakistan will have a negative impact on regional security. The South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation process is already suspended due to India-Pakistan tensions. India’s move is a further blow to regional cooperation.

Irrespective of India’s actions, the fact is that Kashmir is an internationally recognized disputed territory and will remain so until the legitimate aspirations of the Kashmiris are fulfilled. India’s repression in Kashmir is unlikely to change this reality.

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Global Elections & Conflict ;  Global Policy

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Conflict Between India and Pakistan

Center for Preventive Action

The conflict between India and Pakistan arose out of the 1947 Partition of British India, enshrined in the Indian Independence Act. The Partition established a Muslim-majority Pakistan and a Hindu-majority India and provided the diverse regions of Jammu and Kashmir the opportunity to choose which country to accede to. The maharaja (Kashmir’s monarch) at the time initially sought independence , as Kashmir was neglected and subjugated for centuries by conquering empires. However, he ultimately agreed to join India in exchange for help against invading Pakistani herders, triggering the Indo-Pakistani War of 1947-48. The Karachi Agreement of 1949 temporarily ended violence in the Jammu-Kashmir region by establishing a cease-fire line (CFL) overseen by members of a UN truce sub-committee.   

Tensions simmered until a skirmish between border controls escalated to a full-blown war in 1965. In 1971, India and Pakistan fought another brief war over East Pakistan, with Indian forces helping the territory gain independence, resulting in the establishment of present-day Bangladesh. India and Pakistan attempted to usher in a new era of bilateral relations with the 1972 Simla Agreement , which established the Line of Control (LOC), a provisional military control line that split Kashmir into two administrative regions. However, in 1974, the conflict took on a new dimension with the introduction of nuclear weapons , raising the stakes of any confrontation. That year, India tested its first nuclear weapon, triggering a nuclear arms race that would see Pakistan reach that same milestone two decades later.

In 1989, Pakistan capitalized upon a burgeoning resistance movement in Indian-administered Kashmir to undermine Indian control, reigniting tensions and beginning decades of communal violence . Despite a recommitment to the LOC in 1999, Pakistani soldiers crossed the LOC, sparking the Kargil War . Although both countries have maintained a fragile cease-fire since 2003, they regularly exchange fire across the contested border. Both sides accuse the other of violating the cease-fire and claim to be shooting in response to attacks.

On November 26, 2008, fears that India and Pakistan would once again head towards direct military confrontation abounded after militants laid siege to the Indian capital of Mumbai. Over three days, one hundred sixty-six people were killed , including six Americans. Both India and the United States blamed Pakistani-based Lashkar-e-Taiba (LeT), a militant group with alleged ties to the Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI)—Pakistan’s primary intelligence agency—for perpetrating the attack. Although evidence suggested linkages between LeT and facets of the Pakistani government, India’s response was even-handed. Instead of escalating tensions, the Indian government took the diplomatic route by seeking cooperation with the Pakistani government to bring the perpetrators of the attack to justice, paving the way for improved relations.

In 2014, there were hopes that India would pursue meaningful peace negotiations with Pakistan after India’s then-newly elected Prime Minister Narendra Modi  invited  Pakistani Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif to attend his inauguration. After a brief period of optimism, relations turned sour once more in August 2014 when India  canceled  talks with Pakistan’s foreign minister after the Pakistani high commissioner in India met with Kashmiri separatist leaders. A series of openings continued throughout 2015, including an unscheduled December  meeting  on the sidelines of the UN Climate Change Conference in Paris. This was followed by a  meeting  between national security advisors in Bangkok a few days later, where the Kashmir dispute was discussed. In the same month, Prime Minister Modi made a surprise  visit  to Lahore to meet with Prime Minister Sharif, the first visit of an Indian leader to Pakistan in more than a decade.

Momentum toward meaningful talks came to an end in September 2016, when armed militants  attacked  a remote Indian Army base in Uri, near the LOC, killing eighteen Indian soldiers in the deadliest attack on the Indian armed forces in decades. Indian officials  accused  Jaish-e-Mohammad (JeM), another group with alleged ties to ISI, of being behind the attack. In response, the Indian military  announced  it had carried out “surgical strikes” on terrorist camps inside Pakistani-administered Kashmir while the Pakistani military denied that any such operation had taken place.

This period was marked by a n uptick in border skirmishes that began in late 2016 and continued into 2018,  killing  dozens and  displacing  thousands of civilians on both sides of the Line of Control. In 2017, more than three thousand cross-border strikes were reported, while nearly one thousand were reported in the first half of 2018. Militants launched attacks in October 2017 against an  Indian paramilitary camp  near Srinagar and, in February 2018, against an  Indian army base  in the Jammu region, which killed five soldiers and a civilian. During this time, violent demonstrations and anti-India  protests  calling for an independent Kashmir also  continued ; over three hundred people, including civilians, Indian security forces, and militants, were killed in attacks and clashes in 2017. After months of Indian military operations targeting both Kashmiri militants and demonstrations, India  announced  in May 2018 that it would observe a cease-fire in Kashmir during the month of Ramadan for the first time in nearly two decades; operations  resumed  in June 2018. Later in May, India and Pakistan formally agreed to a  cease-fire  along the disputed Kashmir border that would restore the terms of their   2003 agreement .

In February 2019, an  attack on a convoy of Indian paramilitary forces in Pulwama, Indian-administered Kashmir, killed at least forty soldiers. The attack, claimed by the Pakistani militant group JeM, was the  deadliest in Kashmir  in three decades. India retaliated by conducting an air strike that targeted terrorist training camps within Pakistani territory; these were answered by Pakistani air strikes on Indian-administered Kashmir. The exchange escalated into an  aerial engagement , during which Pakistan shot down two Indian military aircraft and captured an Indian pilot; the pilot was  released two days later.

In August 2019, following a  deployment  of tens of thousands of additional troops and paramilitary forces to the region, the Indian government moved to  revoke Article 370  of the Indian constitution, removing the  special status  of Jammu and Kashmir. The abrogation of Article 370 removed Kashmir’s ability to determine its own property and settlement laws, forcing Kashmiris to abide by Indian property and customary law and effectively diminishing their autonomy. The ruling not only angered Kashmiris but was also viewed as a “ grave injustice ” by Pakistan. The removal of Article 370 signified the more aggressive approach of the Modi government to integrate Kashmir into India through a doctrine of Hindu nationalism .

Following the revocation of Article 370, India-administered Kashmir remained under lockdown for over a year, with internet and phone services intermittently cut off and thousands of people  detained. While India claimed the shutdown to be a crucial step toward security and economic development, Kashmir has instead become more dangerous , and economic investment has declined. Much to the dismay of Kashmiri locals, the Indian Supreme Court upheld the legality of the abrogation of Article 370 in December 2023, cementing the removal of Indian-administered Kashmir’s special status.

Violence along the LOC peaked in 2020, with more than four thousand reported cross-border firings . India also observed an increase in militant recruitment  despite a slight drop in militant activity. However, tensions eased following a February 2021 cease-fire that has since been held. Nonetheless, New Delhi continues to push for centralized control over Indian-administered Kashmir .

The United States has made several attempts to mediate India-Pakistan tensions with mixed results. In the 1960s, the United States and the United Kingdom conducted six rounds of talks to resolve the Kashmir dispute to little avail. Conversely, the Clinton administration’s intervention in the Kargil War of 1999 was largely credited with averting nuclear war and laying the groundwork for post-Cold War relations between the United States and India. The United States’ parallel relationships with India and Pakistan have limited its credibility as an honest broker in the dispute. The U.S.-Pakistan relationship was primarily founded upon their mutual interests in counterterrorism and regional stability following 9/11. However, the U.S. withdrawal from Afghanistan in 2021, further compounded by Pakistan’s domestic unrest and increasing ties with China, has thrown the relationship into flux. U.S.-India relations, on the other hand, have strengthened in recent years. Denoted a “strategic partnership” in 2005, the United States and India have deepened their defense cooperation, particularly under the Trump administration. Other international attempts to resolve India-Pakistan tensions, notably via the UN Security Council , have also been unsuccessful.

Separately, China has increasingly waded into the volatile region, stepping up its own border dispute with India in the Aksai Chin and Arunachal Pradesh border regions. In 2020, clashes broke out in the Galwan Valley over territory in Ladakh, and another skirmish occurred in 2022 near the countries’ Line of Actual Control (LAC) in Arunachal Pradesh. In April 2023, India pushed back against China’s renaming of thirty places in Arunachal Pradesh, calling the region an “integral” part of India. Other than at its shared disputed borders, China poses a significant threat to India through its collaboration with Pakistan. In recent years, China has increased its military, political, and economic cooperation with Pakistan, namely through China’s joint investment with Pakistan in the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC) . Infrastructural projects under CPEC include hydroelectric power stations and fiber-optic cabling along the disputed Kashmir territory. The fighting and intimidation tactics in the region have prompted greater militarization along the disputed borders, as India now fears the prospect of a conflict with China and Pakistan.

In 2022 and 2023, the Indian central government cracked down on independent media in the region, redrew the electoral map to privilege Hindu-majority areas in Kashmir, and held a G20 tourism meeting in Srinagar. Targeted killings against Hindus have become more frequent, motivating some to flee and protest government policies. In response to the uptick in violence, the Modi government has taken an increasingly militarized response that threatens to exacerbate the current political crisis in Kashmir.    

At the May 2023 Shanghai Cooperation Organization summit in India, the foreign ministers of India and Pakistan traded barbs over Kashmir, missing an opportunity to improve relations. Furthermore, the actions of the Pakistani military against Imran Khan in 2023 have raised concerns that Pakistani political turmoil will fuel the arguments of Indian hardliners and hinder peace. Indeed, a month after the summit, tensions heightened after U.S. President Joe Biden and Modi made a joint statement at the White House calling for Pakistan to “take immediate action” against extremist groups operating in its territories and to bring the perpetrators of the 2008 attacks in Mumbai to justice. The Pakistan Foreign Ministry responded by summoning the U.S. deputy chief of mission to reprimand the United States for encouraging “India’s baseless and politically motivated narrative against Pakistan” and reiterate the importance of continued U.S.-Pakistan counterterrorism cooperation. In December, India formally requested the extradition of Hafiz Saeed, a suspect in the 2008 Mumbai attacks currently imprisoned in Pakistan on terrorism-financing charges. Pakistan  rejected India’s request, citing the lack of a bilateral extradition treaty between the two countries.

Meanwhile, violence along the India-Pakistan border continues. In late June 2023, the Pakistani army accused Indian forces of killing two civilians along the LOC, the first such occurrence since both sides agreed to a cease-fire in 2021. A second similar incident occurred less than a month later, according to police in Pakistan-administered Kashmir. Most recently, Indian and Pakistani soldiers exchanged gun and mortar fire across the disputed border in November, killing an Indian border guard. Pakistan has also accused India of committing extrajudicial killings on its territory, a statement which the Indian foreign minister labeled as “malicious anti-Indian propaganda.” The accusations came after the murder of two Pakistani nationals: Muhammad Riaz , who was shot outside a mosque in Pakistan-administered Kashmir in September for his alleged ties with LeT, and Shahid Latif , a suspected member of JeM and critical figure involved in the Pathankot attack on an Indian airbase in January 2016 who was killed in October in Pakistan’s Punjab region. Around that same time, a bombing killed more than fifty-nine civilians in Pakistan’s Balochistan province, which Pakistan claimed was orchestrated by India’s intelligence agency.

In the coming weeks, instability in Kashmir may worsen as India begins the largest election in its history. From April 19 to June 1, more than 900 million people will vote to elect the members of India’s lower house of parliament, the 18 th Lok Sabha. In Jammu and Kashmir, this will be the first election held since the revocation of its autonomy in 2019. Prime Minister Modi’s Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP) aims to win its first seats in the region, arguing that they have fostered stability and economic development. In pursuit of this goal, Modi made his first official visit to the region’s capitol since 2019 in March, announcing the launch of several development projects and accusing opposition parties of misleading the Kashmiri people and promoting separatism in the area. However, continued militant violence and Modi’s heavy-handed tactics to quell unrest in Kashmir may prove challenging to overcome.

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India, pakistan and the kashmir issue: 1947 and beyond.

When I teach Kashmir in classrooms and lecture halls across the country, the questions I am most often asked are: What makes Kashmir special? Does it have natural resources that India and Pakistan covet? Both these and other related questions, of course, are designed to identify the underlying causes of the conflict between India and Pakistan over this region since the birth of the two countries in 1947. The answers to these questions, however, are complicated, not least because Kashmir does not, in fact, have any natural resources that India and Pakistan covet, although it is located strategically at the crossroads between South, Central, and East Asia. But even that does not satisfactorily answer the question of why the issue continues to simmer and bedevil relations between the two neighbors. Understanding the Kashmir issue requires a leap of the imagination, since the region holds a special place in the Indian and Pakistani nationalist imaginations, which is why a simple political solution to the problem has not been possible. Moreover, for the past two decades the Kashmir issue has been defined not merely by the conflict between India and Pakistan over the region, but quite as significantly, by an initially homegrown insurgency against the Indian government in the Indian state of Jammu and Kashmir.

Locating Kashmir

When we discuss the Kashmir issue, we are talking principally about three entities:

1. Indian state of Jammu and Kashmir (India’s northernmost state), which has a population of about 10.1 million and an area of 56,665 square miles. Jammu and Kashmir is divided into three main districts: the Kashmir Valley (ninety percent Muslim and Kashmiri speaking; summer capital of the state at Srinagar is located in the Valley); Jammu (fifty-six percent Hindu, forty-four percent Muslim, majority Dogri-speaking; Jammu city, winter capital of the state, is located in this district); and Ladakh: (Tibetan Buddhist fifty percent, Muslim forty-nine percent, mostly Tibetan-speaking).

2. Azad or Free Kashmir (or Pakistan-occupied Kashmir, as it is known in India), located in Pakistan’s northeast, with an area of 5,134 square miles and a majority Muslim, mostly Pahari, and Punjabi speaking population of about 3.2 million; its capital is Muzaffarabad. 3. Northern Areas of Pakistan, with an area of 27, 990 square miles with a very low-density majority Muslim, mostly Pashto and Urdu speaking population of about 1.8 million. This entire region (which includes these three major subdivisions), then, is disputed territory between India and Pakistan, as each side claims it in its entirety. To these three entities should be added Aksai Chin —a mostly mountainous, uninhabited high terrain in the Himalayas (northeastern portion of Kashmir)—that is occupied by China and claimed by both China and India.

History to 1947

The Kashmir Valley was a great center of Sanskrit and Buddhist learning and literary production in the ancient and medieval periods. By the thirteenth century, Muslims from Central Asia had begun to migrate to Kashmir, and the region came to be ruled by a Muslim dynasty. Most inhabitants of Kashmir had peacefully converted to Islam by the fourteenth century, usually because of the propagation of the mystical branch of Islam by Sufi preachers who came to Kashmir from Central Asia and Persia. Kashmir became part of a larger Islamic space, even as it continued to have strong ties with the Indian subcontinent, as it was conquered by the Mughal Empire, with its capital in Delhi and Agra, in 1586. It remained part of the Mughal Empire until 1758, when the empire was weakening; Ahmed Shah Abdali conquered the region and made it a part of the Afghan empire. The Sikh kingdom, which was the main rival of the English East India Company in the Indian subcontinent, took control of the region from the Afghans in 1819, and the Valley remained under Sikh control until 1846.

. . . the emergence of the conflict had less to do with religious affiliations than with the internal politics of the state of Jammu and Kashmir   and the mechanics of decolonization.

Kashmir was clearly coveted by these imperial entities because of its location as a crossroads for trade and commerce between the Indian subcontinent and Central Asia, but also because it produced a globally coveted commodity in this period—Kashmiri shawls—which were significant items of world trade from the sixteenth through the nineteenth centuries. Kashmiris lived in relative harmony with their imperial overlords, whom they challenged and negotiated with to produce a unique political culture. While Persian was the language of administration and high culture, Kashmiri had developed as the lingua franca, with roots in Sanskrit and heavily influenced by Persian. The region was also coveted because it was beautiful and had a temperate climate very different from the northern Indian plains; it was likened to a paradise on earth time and time again by its inhabitants and its rulers, a land where the valleys and meadows were surrounded by the Himalayas on all sides and lakes and rivers crisscrossed the region.

The British coveted this region for its strategic location, products, climate, and natural beauty quite as much as any previous rulers of the subcontinent. When they defeated the Sikhs in the 1840s, they created what became the princely state of Jammu and Kashmir by cobbling together several regions that had been under the control of various rulers at different times. It was the East India Company, then, that put together the Kashmir Valley, Jammu, Ladakh, Gilgit (northern areas)—all the areas that are now contested—into one entity known as the princely state of Jammu and Kashmir in 1846. The company placed a petty chieftain from Jammu, who had assisted them in their wars in Afghanistan, on its throne. So the region was not ruled directly by the colonial state, but rather was indirectly controlled by the Company and later the British Crown, while the successive rulers enjoyed unlimited powers within the state. These rulers, who were Dogra (from the Jammu region), Hindu, and non-Kashmiri, had little legitimacy to rule in the Kashmir Valley or the Ladakh region, a fact that was exacerbated by policies that favored non-Kashmiris and Hindus over Kashmiris and Muslims. This led to a vociferous movement in the Kashmir Valley against their rule, which was demanding responsible government by the 1920s and 30s and representative government by the 1940s.

The main political organization in Kashmir demanding these rights was the All Jammu and Kashmir Muslim Conference that changed its name to the All Jammu and Kashmir National Conference in the late 1930s. By the 1940s, its leader, Sheikh Abdullah, had developed strong ties with the Indian nationalist movement raging in British India under the leadership of the Indian National Congress. As the independence of India looked increasingly imminent and it became clear that British India would be partitioned, the question of what would happen to the 500-odd princely states, whose rulers recognized the paramountcy of the British crown while being autonomous within their states, became a matter of increasing concern. In short, the colonial state informed the princely rulers that they would have no protection from the British once the withdrawal had taken place and that they would have to make a choice between joining India or Pakistan. For most states, this was not an issue, since they simply chose India or Pakistan depending on their geographical location. But for a few states, this raised a variety of problems.

One such state was Jammu and Kashmir, which, because of its location, could theoretically choose either India or Pakistan; it also had a majority Muslim population. Several other factors complicated this choice for Kashmir—the ruler was Hindu, and had the legal authority to decide on the terms of accession; however, he harbored a dream of independence (which was not in the cards). The main political organization, the National Conference, had ties to the Indian National Congress and hence was inclined towards India, although its leader also suggested at various times the possibility of autonomy or some kind of arrangement between India and Pakistan to administer the region jointly. While most people in the Kashmir Valley followed his organization, Muslims of Jammu were more inclined toward Pakistan, while the Ladakhis and Hindus of Jammu wanted to cast their lot with India. As the next section illustrates, the emergence of the conflict had less to do with religious affiliations than with the internal politics of the state of Jammu and Kashmir and the mechanics of decolonization.

The Birth of the Kashmir Conflict: 1947-1949

Pakistan and India were born on August 14 and 15, 1947, respectively, amidst violence, confusion, and chaos. The ruler of Kashmir, Maharaja Hari Singh, continued to remain undecided on accession, entertained ideas of independence, and even, for a short time, courted Pakistan, which, unlike India, was promising a continuation of his royal privileges. In the meantime, a revolt against the ruler’s authority had broken out in Poonch, a district in the western part of the state, and by October 1947, with the help of Pakistan, the rebels had declared the formation of “Azad Kashmir.” To make matters worse for the ruler, on October 21, 1947, several thousand Pashtun tribesmen from the North West Frontier Province of Pakistan infiltrated the north and northwest region of the princely state, ostensibly to assist their ethnic brethren in Gilgit, who were also engaged in a popular rebellion against Maharaja Hari Singh. Although the Pakistani government claimed that this incursion was not supported by the Pakistani army, there is evidence to suggest that Pakistani regular forces accompanied and equipped the rebels. The ruler cabled Delhi to ask for India’s military help, since it was becoming clear that the rebels were headed straight for Srinagar, the capital of Kashmir. Before India sent its forces to Srinagar, the beleaguered ruler was asked to make up his mind regarding accession; he signed the document of accession to India, which was accepted by Lord Mountbatten, the last Viceroy of British India and the Governor-General of the Dominion of India, on October 27, 1947.

The Indian army landed in Srinagar soon after, and with the help of the National Conference, headed by Sheikh Abdullah (who had been sworn in as Prime Minister of Kashmir by India), regained the military initiative against the raiders. Jawaharlal Nehru, the Prime Minister of India, declared that his government pledged to hold a referendum in Kashmir once the combat was over to allow the people of Jammu and Kashmir to decide whether they wanted to join India or Pakistan. As the fighting between the two sides raged into 1948, the United Nations, at the request of India, which was hoping for an international condemnation of Pakistan’s incursion into Kashmir, entered the picture to play a mediating role between the two countries. In August 1948, it adopted a resolution calling on both India and Pakistan to withdraw their troops from the region and to reach a ceasefire agreement in Kashmir, with the ultimate aim of holding a plebiscite in the region. The ceasefire finally came into effect on January 1, 1949, but a plebiscite was not held. While Pakistan accuses India of betraying the people of Kashmir by not holding the plebiscite, India counters by accusing Pakistan of not withdrawing its troops from the region, which it argues was a prerequisite of the UN resolution for the plebiscite to be held.

The ceasefire line (renamed the line of control in 1972) gave India sixty-three percent of the territory of the original princely state of Jammu and Kashmir, including the Kashmir Valley, Ladakh, and most of Jammu (now the Indian state of Jammu and Kashmir). Pakistan gained a part of Jammu (now Azad Kashmir in Pakistan) and the remote areas of Gilgit and Baltistan (now the Northern Areas of Pakistan). The contours of the Kashmir dispute between India and Pakistan had been laid out.

Indo-Pak Dispute over Kashmir since 1949

India and Pakistan have fought several wars over Kashmir since 1949—in 1965, 1971 (Kashmir was only an ancillary battlefield in this particular war), and most recently in 1999. These wars have brought about remarkably little change in the placement of the line of control (LOC). While India officially claims the entire territory of the erstwhile princely state of Jammu and Kashmir, it has made several attempts to make the LOC into a permanent border. Pakistan, on the other hand, not only rejects this idea, claiming the entire erstwhile princely state on the basis of its Muslim-majority population, but also accuses India of reneging on its promise of plebiscite. The positions of the two countries and the rhetoric accompanying them have remained unchanged over the decades.

The Pakistani official map is without a northeastern border, literally unbounded. Instead, the words ‘frontier undecided’ curve around the map’s northeastern edge . . .

Let us return to our original questions here: What are India’s and Pakistan’s implacable ideological positions over this region, and why do the countries continue to hold on to them? What is so special about Kashmir? For both countries, the main cause of disagreement is the Valley of Kashmir, with its capital at Srinagar, and the Kashmiri-speaking, majority Muslim population. For the Pakistani state, particularly its military, Kashmir represents the unfinished business of partition, through which Pakistan itself as a home for the subcontinent’s Muslims came into existence. Kashmir as a Muslim-majority state, contiguous to Pakistan, is critical to Pakistan’s ideological raison-d’etre and is therefore considered an integral part of Pakistan. This has allowed the Pakistani military to foment tensions with India over the region and by extension legitimize its claim over power and resources in Pakistan. For India, which adopted a constitution in 1950 and became a secular republic, the presence of Muslim-majority Kashmir within the union provided evidence of the country’s secular credentials. While the Congress Party continues to hold to this credo, Hindu nationalist organizations have used Kashmir’s unsettled status within the Indian union for their own political purposes by taking a more belligerent stance towards Kashmir’s Muslim population, the insurgency, and Pakistan.

The official maps of India and Pakistan express the territorial anxieties of the two countries over the region. The Pakistani official map is without a northeastern border, literally unbounded. Instead, the words ‘frontier undecided’ curve around the map’s northeastern edge, even as the words ‘disputed territory’ stamped across Jammu and Kashmir challenge India’s claims to the region and proclaim the business of partition as unfinished. In the case of India, official maps simply claim the entire region of the erstwhile princely state as an integral part of India, thus belying Pakistan’s claim of the region as disputed territory.

Insurgency in Jammu and Kashmir since 1989

It is important to remember that the Kashmir issue is not simply a dispute over territory between India and Pakistan. Rather, this dispute is a far more complex and multidimensional problem due to the insurgency in Kashmir, raging since 1989, with which thousands of Indian security forces have been embroiled (several hundred thousand are stationed in Kashmir even today). Although begun as an indigenous movement against political repression and loss of democratic rights, the insurgency has grown into a ground for pan-Islamist groups such as Lashkar-i-Taiba (army of the pure) and Jaish-e-Mohammad (army of the prophet) as well as fighters from Pakistan and beyond, making the situation more dangerous and complicated for all sides.

In 1949, the Indian state of Jammu and Kashmir was headed by Sheikh Abdullah, the leader of the National Conference, who had been sworn in as Prime Minister of Jammu and Kashmir by the Indian government. He had helped the Indian army gain control of the region and condemned Pakistani actions in invading Kashmir. At the beginning of his tenure, Abdullah was immensely popular among the people in Kashmir as well as with the Indian administration. He instituted land reform measures, attempted to redistribute land to the peasants, and built roads and infrastructure in Kashmir. In the early 1950s, although still popular in his stronghold, the Kashmir Valley, Abdullah grew increasingly unpopular in the Jammu region as he began to emphasize the exceptional status of Kashmir within the Indian union. Not only had negotiations with Abdullah and other Kashmiri leaders led to the insertion of a clause in the Indian constitution that granted Kashmir special autonomy within the Indian union, but Abdullah made several speeches in the early 1950s in which he declared that Jammu and Kashmir (all of its parts) should become an independent entity whose sovereignty would be guaranteed by both India and Pakistan, since according to Abdullah, the status quo would simply mean a longstanding conflict in Kashmir.

In 1953, in what became the first in a series of interventions by the Indian state in the politics of Jammu and Kashmir, Abdullah was dismissed and incarcerated, much to the chagrin of the people. The feeling among the people of Kashmir, particularly the Valley Kashmiris, that they had no control over their own fate grew steadily in the 1950s and 60s, as Kashmir saw a series of corrupt and authoritarian regional governments and rigged and unfair elections. By the time the 1987 elections rolled around, a deep disillusionment with the Indian state had already set in. These elections were massively rigged to ensure the victory of the National Conference, which was by then recognized as a stooge of the central government. The National Conference’s main rival, the Muslim United Front Coalition, despite its electoral victory, was forced to concede defeat, and its leaders were arrested. Two of these leaders, Mohammad Yasin Malik and Yusuf Shah (aka Syed Salahuddin), went on to found two of the most formidable Kashmiri separatist organizations in the coming decade.

In the early years of the insurgency against the Indian state, there was a groundswell of popular support for the movement, in particular by young men from the Kashmir Valley, who joined the movement in huge numbers. The Jammu and Kashmir Liberation Front (JKLF), headed by Yasin Malik, became the main separatist organization during this time, carrying out a number of political assassinations and organizing massive demonstrations demanding independence ( azaadi ) for Kashmir. The JKLF was soon joined by the Hizbul Mujahideen (party of freedom fighters), a Pakistani-supported guerilla organization led by Syed Salahuddin. India’s response to these insurgent organizations and their supporters was brutal as security forces cracked down on the Valley, which only added more fuel to the insurgency.

It would be simplistic to regard this movement as a revolt of Muslim-majority Kashmir against Hindu-majority India, as it is often portrayed. The Kashmiris who joined this movement may have been Muslim, but for them, this was a regional revolt against the high-handedness of the Indian central government that could be resolved only through a separation from India. It is important to point out, however, that what azaadi , or freedom, meant for Kashmiris, and continues to mean for them today, is a complicated question. Some speak in terms of actual sovereignty for Kashmir (by which they mean the Kashmir Valley). For others, it means more autonomy within the Indian union. And for still others, the term encapsulates a desire that the Indian state admit to its denial of democratic rights to Kashmiris and carry out a sustained effort to restore these freedoms to the people of Kashmir.

More recently, especially in the past decade, the insurgency in Kashmir has been hijacked to a significant degree by radical Islamic groups, some of which were funded by the Pakistani military and intelligence services as their intermediaries to foment unrest in Kashmir, and by extension, India. Two such groups are the Lashkar-i-Taiba and the Jaish-e-Mohammad. Both see Kashmir as one element in their larger goal of establishing a global Islamic state. As is evident, from, among other things, their non-Kashmiri leadership, neither of these groups is particularly interested in advancing the rights of Kashmiris, although they use them as symbols of the persecution of Muslims around the world. This aspect of the insurgency, which has led to the infiltration into Kashmir of fighters from Pakistan, Afghanistan, and Yemen, among other countries, has not only subverted the popular nature of the Kashmiri insurgency, but also made the India-Pakistan angle more difficult to settle.

In 2009, we might be entering a new and better phase of the situation in the Indian state of Jammu and Kashmir, since perhaps the most free and fair assembly elections since 1977 were held in Jammu and Kashmir at the end of 2008, and a new government headed by Chief Minister Omar Abdullah, grandson of Sheikh Abdullah, assumed power. Much will depend on whether this government is able to break with the past and prove to the people that it is working for them, to not only bring about peace and restore law and order, but also to build infrastructure, schools, bridges, and the like, while not lining its own pockets. Kashmiris are weary of two decades of civil war, assassinations, disappearances, and related abuses. They are looking to the regional government to bring them peace.

The Future of Kashmir

The Kashmir issue is defined by a complex interplay between the internal political situation in the Kashmir Valley and the relationship between India and Pakistan, which is itself governed by the broader international situation as Pakistan continues to be drawn further into the war in Afghanistan that has spilled across its borders. While the Pakistani military battles the Taliban, it also wants to limit India’s influence in Afghanistan, in part by fomenting Islamic militancy in Kashmir. The situation is further complicated by the fact that India, Pakistan, and Kashmiri political organizations hold what appear to be irreconcilable ideological positions regarding Kashmir: Kashmir rightfully belongs to India, Kashmir is Pakistani, and Kashmir should be free, respectively. As a result, any long-term resolution to the ongoing conflict in the region must involve the three main actors. They need to reconcile their positions and recognize that the Kashmir issue is not simply a conflict between Muslim-majority Pakistan and Hindu-majority India, but rather a multifaceted problem that lies at the intersection of internal, domestic, and international issues that should be addressed simultaneously. In other words, the prospects for peace in the region would multiply with a combination of demilitarization of the entire region; conversion of the line of control into a soft border through a decriminalization and normalization of border crossings; negotiations among India, Pakistan, and Kashmiri political organizations; and, the continuation of the democratic process in Jammu and Kashmir.

Editor’s Note:  Since the Kashmir controversy is continually changing, we are fortunate that the author of this article was doing research in the region in summer 2009 and that she was kind enough to send us an update of events surrounding the controversy.

(filed by the author from Srinagar, Kashmir, July 2009)

The Kashmiri movement against the state seems to have entered a new phase. While militant activities have clearly declined and the capital city, Srinagar, even presents a look of normalcy, a few days in the Valley are enough to reveal the deep resentment and simmering anger of many people in Kashmir toward the governments of India and the state of Jammu and Kashmir. This was brought to the fore most recently in an incident involving the rape and murder of two young women. Police involvement was suspected, and the investigation was botched by state government agencies. Following the incident, the Valley completely shut down in protest. People took to the streets as demonstrations erupted, and in some cases, the demonstrators stone-pelted police and security forces. These men and women, young and old, poor and rich, shouted slogans for azaadi (freedom), as they cried out for freedom from India, but also for freedom from corruption, injustice, and bad government.

Several young men and women I spoke with at Kashmir University told me that they were tired of governments (Indian, Pakistani, or Kashmiri), and that they expected little of the local political organizations that claimed to represent Kashmiris. They were also quite cynical of Indo-Pakistani talks on the Kashmir issue. The only way forward, according to them, was to organize mass movements of civil disobedience against the high-handedness and utter disregard for human rights displayed by the government and security forces in Kashmir. One of them remarked that Kashmir would eventually win its freedom; after all, it took India several decades to oust the British from the subcontinent.

This massive involvement in the movement, and its localization as common people respond to specific incidents, no doubt makes the Indian state justifiably uncomfortable, since it is at its own peril that the Indian government ignores the voices and grievances of the Kashmiri people, which are now more apparent than ever before.

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FURTHER READING

Aggarwal, Ravina, Beyond Lines of Control: Performance and Politics on the Disputed Borders of Ladakh, India (Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 2004).

Bose, Sumantra, Kashmir: Roots of Conflict, Paths to Peace (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2003).

Kabir, Ananya Jahanara, Territory of Desire: Representing the Valley of Kashmir (Minneapolis, MN: University of Minnesota Press, 2009).

Lamb, A., Incomplete Partition: Genesis of the Kashmir Dispute 1947–48 (Hertingfordbury: Roxford Books, 1997).

Whitehead, Andrew, A Mission in Kashmir (New Delhi: Penguin, 2007).

Zutshi, Chitralekha, Languages of Belonging: Islam, Regional Identity and the Making of Kashmir (New York: Oxford University Press, 2004).

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5 Reasons Why Kashmir Matters

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The pulse  |  security  |  south asia.

Kashmir is not getting safe; it’s only getting more insecure and unsustainable to govern for the Indian government.

Kashmiri villagers are seen through the bullet ridden iron mesh of a window of the residential house where suspected rebels were taking refuge, after a gunfight in Pulwama, south of Srinagar, Indian controlled Kashmir, Friday, July 2, 2021.

Kashmir has always captured the imagination of the Pakistani people and stirred their emotions. This is partly because of shared religion but also because Pakistan’s largest province, Punjab, and its ruling elite have very close ethnic and cultural association with Kashmir.

But 9/11 led to dwindling preoccupation with Kashmir among Pakistanis. Especially for the generation that grew up in the 2000s and had first-hand experience of terrorism and fear, domestic issues became more pressing. Kashmir, therefore, took a backseat to even those in policy circles. In fact, for many in Pakistan, Kashmir became a needless burden that was sinking the Pakistani ship. “Save Pakistan before saving Kashmir” became a common mantra, especially in the liberal intellectual and elite circles.

Pakistani perceptions underwent another change in 2014 when Prime Minister Narendra Modi came to power in India. That coincided with Pakistan’s successful military operations against terrorist groups like the Tehrik-e-Taliban Pakistan that were causing mayhem in the country. With stability inside of Pakistan and the surge of violence in India against Muslims, along with the revocation of Kashmir’s autonomy by the Modi government in 2019, the Kashmir issue returned to the fore of Pakistani imagination, and this time on steroids with Prime Minister Imran Khan at the helm.

As divisive as the Kashmir issue is, it is important for both Pakistan and India to recognize why it is important to resolve the issue. Here are five reasons why Kashmir requires urgent attention:

1. Peace Either Everywhere or Nowhere

The events of 9/11 proved the point that underdevelopment, violence, and instability in one part of the world will directly impact the rest of the world – even the most developed countries in the West were not safe or secure. This has been the gist of U.N. calls for integrating security and development to stabilize the Global South to secure the Global North.  This new policy approach was best articulated by former British Prime Minister Tony Blair, who argued that “famines and instability thousands of miles away lead to conflict, despair, mass migration, and fanaticism that can affect us all.” Therefore, continued violence and subjugation in Kashmir on a slow burn is unlikely to remain within the borders of Kashmir. The repercussions may erupt around the world in different ways.

2. Status Quo Benefits Only a Few

The Kashmir issue is a byproduct of the British colonial project in India that led to a strained relationship between Pakistan and India. The international community has showed little capacity or interest to resolve the issue for 70 long years. The issue lingered on because the new status quo benefited many actors involved in the region and some external actors that thrive on the war industry. With the Modi government acting unilaterally to revoke Article 370, the status quo has become even more firm and volatile, leaving only extreme options for both sides.

3. The Untold Costs

Kashmir doesn’t bleed alone; Pakistan and India bleed with it perpetually. For as long as the Kashmir continues to bleed through militarization, killings, rape, and draconian tactics, the chaos will continue to permeate and affect the lives of the people in the region. This is why Pakistan has been insisting on resolving the Kashmir issue for the benefit of Kashmiri people first, and then the overall stability of the region. In many ways, the true potential of India, Pakistan, and Kashmir itself is a hostage to the inability of status quo powers (in this case India) to resolve the Kashmir issue.

4. Principles Matter

For Pakistan and India, Kashmir isn’t some far away land like Afghanistan was for the U.S., that it could exit at will. Pakistan and India share borders, cultures, traditions, and much more with the Kashmiris. To then stand for the rights of Kashmir may be exhausting and taxing, but it is principally right. As much as anyone argues otherwise through a reductionist “realist” lens, principles do matter in policymaking and international relations, especially in the mid and long run. Therefore, it is important that the international community fulfills its commitment to the peaceful resolution of the Kashmir issue.

5. Rule by Fear

In today’s world we should not allow for governance and fascist practices from the 19th century. Rule by fear or force is untenable. Kashmir is the most militarized region in the world, with India having deployed 900,000 soldiers here and Pakistan around 50,000. More people have died due to border shellings than war between Pakistan and India. Modi’s forceful annexation of Kashmir has renewed a wave of terror and fear in Kashmir with curfews, internet blackouts, growing violence, and killings. Kashmir is not getting safer; it’s only getting more insecure and unsustainable to govern for the Indian government – the effects of which will destabilize the entire region.

Kashmir is an integral part of the Kashmiri people, who have faced the worst consequences of decades of mindless subjugation of their rights. It is convenient for Western countries to ignore the plight of Kashmiris for a larger geopolitical game at play against China, but the prolonged human catastrophe in Kashmir will render the great power competition irrelevant if the unresolved crisis persists.

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Kashmir: The Roads Ahead

Subscribe to this week in foreign policy, stephen p. cohen stephen p. cohen former brookings expert.

March 1, 1995

• 37 min read

This chapter was first presented to a MCISS-South Asia seminar in 1992, and revised as a note prepared for the Center for the Study of Foreign Affairs of the Foreign Service Institute, U.S. Department of State. Both were based upon research conducted during the course of a joint U.S.-Russian study of Kashmir and Afghanistan in Nepal, India and Pakistan in March-April, 1992. See Stephen P. Cohen, Sergei Kamenev, Vladimir Moskalenko and Leo Rose, Afghanistan and Kashmir (New York: The Asia Society, and Moscow: The Russian Oriental Institute, 1993). I have made some minor additions in view of a year in residence with the Ford Foundation, New Delhi, 1992-93.

“What standing does Pakistan have in this dispute? What is their legal standing? Pakistan is not a party to the dispute; let’s get our facts right, then we can discuss it!” — A senior Indian strategist, New Delhi, mid-March, 1992

“My view is that if India continues on its present course, then consequences cannot be foreseen. I cannot say where boundaries will be drawn, but certainly the present boundaries will be changed. India must be prepared to make a reasonable agreement, then the process of partition begun in 1947 will be completed.” — A senior Pakistani foreign policy official, Islamabad, a few days later.

Kashmir and South Asian Security Since late 1989 the Kashmir problem has become intimately linked to the larger question of war and peace in South Asia. A virtual insurrection among Kashmiri Muslims in the Valley, and in Srinagar, the largest city in the former princely state of Jammu and Kashmir-created a serious crisis between New Delhi and Islamabad. From that date onward the United States, echoing the Pakistani argument that the only point of conflict between India and Pakistan was Kashmir, has regarded the disputed state as one of the few places in the world where large-scale war could break out soon. American officials and experts have built a scenario that leads, ultimately, to the horror of nuclear weapons falling on Indian and Pakistani cities. According to this scenario a local crisis in Kashmir could trigger off a military response by either India or Pakistan; then, the other side will overreact, leading to a direct clash between regular Indian and Pakistani forces; after that, the war could escalate to an exchange of nuclear weapons, since both states are thought now to be nuclear-capable-even if they do not have deployed nuclear forces. 2 In a refinement of the scenario, it has been argued that even the suspicion of escalation might lead to a nuclear strike, presumably by the weaker or more vulnerable of the two countries (in this case, Pakistan) since it would not want to risk having its small nuclear forces destroyed in an Indian pre-emptive attack.

This scenario has led to a great deal of diplomatic activity, much of it by American officials, and very recently (September, 1994) by the Secretary-General of the United Nations. There have been three strands to to this diplomacy. First, the Kashmiri problem has been addressed directly by several American officials. In a series of speeches and informal addresses, the traditional American position on Kashmir was subtly altered, so that the US now openly declares all of Kashmir to be disputed territory (in the past the US had never publicly challenged the legitimacy of the accession of Kashmir to India, only its wisdom ). Second, both India and Pakistan were urged to engage in additional “confidence building measures”—CBMs—that might prevent, or slow down the escalation process described above; third, both incentives and sanctions have been wielded, in an attempt to get the two countries to talk directly about their nuclear weapons programs. 3

It can be said that after four years none of these efforts have shown significant results. The Kashmir crisis is no closer to resolution than it was in 1990; there have been a few new CBMs introduced into South Asia, but there is some indication that the old ones have fallen into disuse or distrust; the nuclear dialogue that was to have begun a number of years ago has yet to commence, and public statements by officials and former officials on both sides seem to indicate a slow escalation of the nuclear arms race in South Asia, not any serious official dialogue on containing or managing it.

This chapter takes a somewhat different view than that of American officials and many strategists and journalists who see Kashmir as a “flashpoint” that could lead to conventional war and even a nuclear exchange. 4 Without belittling the importance of the Kashmir problem, it argues, first, that this crisis is far more complex than has been admitted by most American officials, and, therefore, that resolving the crisis—and addressing the supplementary problems of nuclear proliferation and regional distrust require a more sophisticated strategy than has hitherto been apparent. This chapter offers a strategic overview of the Kashmir crisis. It differs from other recent studies in that its primary focus is on a strategy for achieving a solution, not on the merit of individual solutions. 5

The Several Kashmir Problems The Kashmir problem is a mixture of terrorism, state violence, subversion and general horror that rests upon several layers of history. If the field existed we could use the skills of a political archaeologist to entirely unearth it. There are at least five different components of the Kashmir problem, each with its own origins, each with its own consequences:

• Kashmir originally came into dispute because of a British failure of will when they divided and quit India in 1947. The mechanism by which the princely states were sorted out was inadequate. Each prince or ruler was to decide whether he would accede to India or Pakistan, presumably taking into account the makeup and interests of his population; but there was no adequate mechanism for ensuring that each ruler would make a fair or reasonable decision, or to ensure that the “third option,” independence, would not be a temptation (the British, the Indians, and the Pakistanis all agreed that the further partition of the subcontinent would be wrong, and that the princes had to go to one state or the other). In the case of Kashmir, a Hindu ruler governed a largely Muslim population, but was also considering independence. While there were other failures in the partition process, none so crippled the successor states as Kashmir—and the British were no longer around to repair the damage. Indians and Pakistanis have lived with the consequences for forty-five years, but currently blame each other, rather than a faulty partition process.
• The leadership in both countries compounded the original problem when they turned Kashmir into a badge of their respective national identities . For Pakistan, which defined itself as a “homeland” for Indian Muslims, the existence of a Muslim majority area under “Hindu” Indian rule was grating; the purpose of creating Pakistan was to free Muslims from the tyranny of majority rule (and hence, of rule by the majority Hindu population); for Indians, their state had to include such predominately Muslim regions to demonstrate the secular nature of the new Indian state; since neither India nor Pakistan, so-defined, could be complete without Kashmir. This raised enormously the stakes involved for both.
• Subsequently, Kashmir came to play a role in the respective domestic politics of both states—but especially Pakistan. For Pakistani leaders, both civilian and military, Kashmir was a useful rallying cry and a diversion from the daunting task of building a nation out of disparate parts. Further, there were and are powerful Kashmiri dominated constituencies in all of the major Pakistani cities; on the Indian side, the small, but influential Kashmiri Hindu community was over-represented in the higher reaches of the Indian government (not least in the presence of the Nehru family, a Kashmiri Pandit clan that had migrated from Kashmir to Uttar Pradesh).
• Kashmir acquired an unexpected military dimension. After India crossed the cease-fire line during the course of the 1965 war it became a strategic extension of the international border to the south. Further, China holds substantial territory (in Ladakh) claimed by India, and New Delhi itself has made claims on regions which, historically, had been subordinated to the rulers of Kashmir (Gilgit, Swat, and the Northern Territories) but which are now under Pakistani governance. More recently, advances in mountaineering techniques have turned the most inaccessible part of Kashmir—the Siachin Glacier—into a battleground, although more soldiers were cruelly killed by frostbite than bullets. 6
• Finally, there is a contemporary dimension to Kashmir: the stirrings of a national self-determination movement among Kashmiri Muslims. Encouraged by neither India nor Pakistan, it burst into full view in late 1989, and threatens the integrity of both states. There are two or three new generations of Valley Muslims, educated and trained in India, but with a window open to a wider world. Angry and resentful at their treatment by New Delhi, and not attracted to even a democratic Pakistan, they look to Afghanistan, Iran, the Middle East, and Eastern Europe for models, and to émigrés in America, Britain, and Canada for material support. Further, in an era when the international economy is fast-changing (including the advent of self-sustaining “tourist-destinations”), and the prospect of the direct linkage of Central Asia to Kashmir, the old argument that Kashmir is not economically self-sufficient unless it is attached to a major state has lost credibility.

Ironically, we can now see that Kashmir was less of a Cold War problem than some in the region had thought. Americans and Soviets certainly armed India and Pakistan (often both at the same time), they certainly supported one side or the other in various international fora, but the Kashmir issue has outlived the Cold War—indeed, the forces of democracy and nationalism that destroyed the Soviet Union and freed Eastern Europe were at work in Kashmir itself. 7 Other models were the liberation and revolutionary movements in the Islamic world—Iran, Afghanistan, and, most strikingly (since it was extensively covered on Indian and Pakistani television services) the Palestinian Intifada .

As a strategic issue Kashmir has waxed and waned. It was the central objective of the first two India-Pakistan wars (1948, 1965). But it was not an issue of high priority for either India or Pakistan from after the 1965 war until late 1989—and the birth of a Kashmiri separatist movement. What is striking is how little a role Kashmir played in the large-scale 1971 conflict (which was fought over the status of the separation of East Bengal from Pakistan), and even in the 1987 crisis that developed during a major Indian military exercise along the India-Pakistan border, Operation Brasstacks. A recent study of Brasstacks indicates that the two countries were much closer to war in January, 1987 than in 1990 (when Kashmir was the point of contention), yet Kashmir had little to do with the origin or evolution of the Brasstacks crisis. 8

The Simla Summit of 1972 had seemed to offer a solution: defer a formal settlement, in the meantime improve India-Pakistan relations. In 1984, when the first major India-Pakistan conference to be held after the Soviet occupation of Afghanistan, several American participants argued that both sides had ignored Kashmir. But the conferees were told by Indians and Pakistanis alike that Kashmir was “an American preoccupation, we don’t think it is a problem; let another generation handle it.” Some who attended that conference disagreed—precisely because Kashmir was not then a subject of great controversy that it was the best time to tackle it. 9 If India and Pakistan could not solve the problems of the 19th century (their border dispute with each other, and with China and Afghanistan, respectively) and those growing out of partition then how could they cope with emerging problems such as the invasion of Afghanistan by the Soviets and the incipient nuclear arms race?

Since then, both regional instability and regional nuclear programs have continued on their respective paths, and are now linked to the Kashmir conflict. Many Indian policy makers believe that Pakistan intends to use its new nuclear capability, which makes escalation to conventional war risky because that in turn might become a nuclear conflict, to make a grab for Kashmir. They also point to the connections between the Afghan war and the training of Kashmiri militants, and thus the American responsibility for India’s Kashmir problem. 10 Pakistanis believe that India will not negotiate over Kashmir because of Delhi’s advanced nuclear capabilities—a Pakistani bomb, or at least a Pakistani bomb in the basement, is one way of getting India to the bargaining table. There is also a faction in Pakistan that does not want to negotiate Kashmir, but is content to let Delhi “bleed” until India itself collapses into civil war—a view held of Pakistan by some Indian hawks.

In both countries the greatest hawks on Kashmir are journalists, politicians, academics, and other civilians, and some of the intelligence services, especially Pakistan’s Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI). Ironically, in both countries the regular armed forces are very cautious, since both armies have calculated the risks of a large-scale war and conclude that its outcome would be very uncertain, that collateral damage would be very great, and that the possibility of escalation to a nuclear conflict is unacceptably high. This is one of the lessons that both sides drew from their retrospective studies of the 1987 crisis over Operation Brasstacks.

What is to Be Done? There is a Punjabi saying: “Three things are improved by beating: women, wheat, and a Jat.” The two quotations that begin this chapter are not dissimilar in spirit, and illustrate the difficulty of achieving a solution to the Kashmir dispute. The quotes are representative of wider views to the extent that many Pakistanis believe that India only responds to pressure and that many Indians deny that Pakistan has any legitimate role in Kashmir except to end its support of the militants. Kashmiris themselves—both Hindu and Muslim—have now tasted violence of a sort never experienced before as they undergo a terrible ordeal.

After 1971 Kashmir ceased to be the cause of bad India-Pakistan relations, but it remains a cause. It is also a symbol of their inability to compose their differences and live in peace. Kashmir is thus both cause and effect, which makes it so difficult to conceptualize as a political issue. Yet there is no shortage of solutions. Partition, plebiscite, referendum, UN trusteeship, “Trieste,” “Andorra,” revolutionary warfare, depopulation (and repopulation), patience, good government, a revival of “human values,” and doing nothing have all had their advocates. 11

Before we turn to a strategy for thinking about solutions, three points may somewhat clarify the matter. Physicists approach a problem by first “sizing” it. What are its parameters and contours? Here, “Kashmir” assumes an unusual shape.

First, while the Valley Muslims feel aggrieved that they are dominated by outsiders from India proper, other Kashmiri groups, especially the Valley Hindus and the largely Buddhist population of Ladakh, fear the dominance of the state by the Valley Muslims. Thus, a number of proposals have suggested the possibility of separating the Valley from other regions (Azad Kashmir, Ladakh, Jammu), and allocating parts of Jammu and Kashmir to India and Pakistan, leaving to the end the intensely disputed Valley. Here, the appropriate analogy is the Middle East peace process, where the overall strategy is to leave to the end such very contentious issues as the status of Jerusalem.

Second, there are, outside the propaganda mills of Delhi and Islamabad, remarkably diverse views on Kashmir in both India and Pakistan. Kashmir is not viewed in the same light by all Pakistanis and all Indians. Anyone who traveled throughout South Asia during the height of the 1990 Kashmir crisis quickly became aware that the further one was from Delhi and Islamabad the less passion there was about Kashmir. In Madras, Calcutta, Hyderabad (Deccan) and Bombay, Kashmir was, and is seen as New Delhi’s obsession; in Karachi, Quetta, Peshawar, and Hyderabad (Sindh), it is seen as a secondary issue, relations with Islamabad and the Punjab come first. Indeed, the size of demonstrations on behalf of the Kashmiri revolution in all Pakistani cities are in direct proportion to the presence of large Kashmiri populations. “Kashmir” is neither a homogeneous issue within the states of Azad Kashmir and Jammu and Kashmir, nor within India and Pakistan. 12

Third, it is important to recognize the crucial role of time, and timing, in resolving the Kashmir problem. Ironically, one of the obstacles to reaching a solution is the belief, on all sides of the dispute, that “ time is on our side.” Since the Kashmir problem has been mismanaged by two generations of Indians and Pakistanis (and Kashmiris must accept responsibility also, for their own errors of omission and commission), there is no age-group, except perhaps among the newest generation of South Asians, who believe that the time has come for a solution. And, timing is crucial. We do not know what steps should be taken first, what should be taken second, third, and which should be reserved to the last. Like proposals to resolve the Arab-Israeli dispute, “solutions” to the Kashmir problem must operate at many levels. This suggest both caution and flexibility. But it does not suggest that doing nothing is the best course. The examples of the Middle East, South Africa, and, perhaps, of Ireland, indicate that seemingly intractable disputes can be resolved, or ameliorated, by patience, outside encouragement, and, above all, a strategy that will address the many dimensions of these complex disputes. Not too many years ago Indians and Pakistanis took a disparaging view of these other conflicts, and argued that they were successfully managing South Asia. Now their region stands out as conflict-ridden, nuclear prone, and on the edge of war. The remainder of this chapter suggests the outline of a such a strategy of conflict resolution.

Parallel Processing In looking at strategies for achieving solutions (as opposed to management strategies and getting through the next month or year), we can draw on a model from the world of high-speed computers. We need a strategy that allows for parallel processing of the many issues, disputes, and tangles that make up the Kashmir problem. This approach has the virtue of honesty. We should not now pretend that we know what a suitable solution will look like. Certainly, it will protect the vital interests (including the quite conflicting identities) of India and Pakistan. Certainly, it will recognize the ambitions and legitimate interests of the Valley Muslims. But a just solution will also acknowledge the interests of other Kashmiris-not least the tens of thousands of Hindu and Muslim refugees who have fled the valley in fear, and the ethnically quite different Muslim population in Azad Kashmir, that has its own grievances with the Government of Pakistan. Indeed, a situation in which these refugees returned, and again lived in harmony and under democratic norms could be defined as an acceptable solution. Sadly, some of the Hindu groups have already given up on the idea of a secular, multi-ethnic Kashmir, and are either seeking resettlement elsewhere in India or abroad, or have begun to support the creation of a Kashmiri Hindu “homeland” within Kashmir proper.

Which of these problems do we address first? Or do we work on “building confidence” between India and Pakistan, and wait until a more opportune moment? Or, do we go back in history and attempt to untangle grievances which have their origins in the 10th century, or earlier? Or do we look to the law for a framework, or do we bring an international organization (or an outside power) on to the scene, to either offer friendly persuasion or to knock heads?

The only solution that should be ruled out is doing nothing. Time will not heal the Kashmir problem. Time has made things worse in Kashmir. If a strategy for resolution of this conflict had begun in the early or mid-1980s then we probably would have averted some of the crises that arose later in that decade, and certainly would not regard Kashmir now as one of the world’s nuclear flash-points. To those who would argue that the situation is not ripe for a solution (a view expressed by senior officials in the Bush Administration) it should be pointed out that not only are one hundred million Indian Muslims held hostage by the fate of Kashmir (oddly, a favorite argument of those Indians who do not want to do anything), but in reality a billion people are held hostage by the dispute itself. Imagine what South Asia would be if India and Pakistan were to cooperate, not only on bilateral trade, water, and population issues, but on preserving the strategic unity of South Asia? Each would, then, be truly counted among the great regional powers. It would not be a question, as it is now, of Indian power minus Pakistani power, but of a formidable block of states, with some differences, but with even more in common.

As Lewis Carroll has suggested, if you don’t know where you are going, any road will take you there. That has been the quality of many proposals to deal with Kashmir. They suggest action on one or another aspect of the Kashmir crisis. But we do not know, now, which of the Kashmir-related problems must be solved first before we can tackle a second, third, or fourth. Thus, we should begin to move down several paths at once. Some will be clear right to the end, on others there will be obstacles. Certainly, it is better to find out where the obstacles are sooner rather than later. It would be prudent, therefore, to pursue the following six paths simultaneously. After a few years an assessment of how far we have gone along each route, and where, if any, are the shortcuts to a settlement.

First: A Helping Hand, Not a Foreign Hand The Kashmir issue needs an outside perspective because Indian and Pakistani strategists are locked in a mindless competition over tactical advantage and scoring diplomatic points. 13 There is little strategic thinking on Kashmir. No one is looking beyond the immediate events and short-term calculations of gain and pain. A solution cannot occur until it is supported in both states—and by Kashmiris of several varieties—but in the meantime it is important to have a place, or an institution, where ideas, possibilities and pressures can be focused. There needs to be a helping hand, a facilitator, with no direct interest in the Kashmir conflict, yet with an interest in its resolution. 14

Should the United States take the lead? Or should there be a joint U.S.-Russian effort, perhaps backed up by the threat of UN sanctions? Probably not, at least not soon. 15 Washington and Moscow lack expertise and interest in Kashmir and neither are likely to make it a high priority item—although the new South Asia Bureau in the Department of State is acquiring expertise.

However, the United Nations is already engaged in Kashmir. Its role is sanctioned by numerous Security Council resolutions, and it maintains a peace keeping presence along the cease-fire line. There might be a plausible role for a UN fact-finding mission undertaken by a personal representative of the Secretary General. This was the pattern followed in the 1980s in the Afghanistan crisis. Such a representative could develop independent expertise, and his/her own line of communications with all of the contending parties, states, and factions. An expanded UN peacekeeping force or trusteeship is premature, and would not have the support of at least one major party, India. Nor could such a force be imposed on India. But a UN personage that coordinates and consolidates various diplomatic efforts now underway might, in three, four or five years, bear fruit.

The possibility of an enhanced UN role in Kashmir has contributed to the Government of India’s interest in a permanent seat on an expanded UN Security Council, and in 1993 Indian officials put forward a number of arguments why India should be considered for such a seat. However, India could then veto any UN action on Kashmir. Obviously, the Kashmir problem must be settled before India is admitted to the Security Council, but such membership could be part of a larger package of incentives and assurances for India, Pakistan, and responsible Kashmiri groups.

Second: Adjust India’s Federal Balance But also Pakistan’s Nowhere in the Constitution of India does the term federal appear. But there have been reasoned discussions in India about changing the balance between the center and the states in India—for good political and economic reasons. India already has a hierarchy of federalism: with some Union territories directly ruled from Delhi, and with some variation in the nature of the Indian states. Kashmir itself is the biggest variation: it has its own constitutional status in the form of Article 370. As many have suggested, India should now move in the direction it was headed anyway: towards greater autonomy for its component units. Within Jammu and Kashmir, there will have to be a further differentiation between those regions that want to become Union territories, and those that might arrive at a different constitutional structure.

The same process should be undertaken by Pakistan. Ideally, as some have suggested, the looser federation of the two parts of Kashmir with their respective states, along with increased flow of goods and people between them, would create a “soft” frontier where both the physical and cultural boundaries between India and Pakistan were somewhat fuzzy.

Third: Agreement on one Principle, But Honest Disagreement on Another In the past, high principle divided India and Pakistan as far as Kashmir was concerned. Pakistanis argued that India’s control over most of the state violated the right of self-determination of Kashmiris. Indians argued that Pakistan, more often than not a military dictatorship, was hardly a credible advocate of democracy. Pakistan’s position ignored the agreed-upon basis for the division of British India (and Pakistani diplomats shamelessly try to paper over the terms by which the princely states were to go to one side or another), and Indians cannot bring themselves to recognize Pakistan as a democracy. But this change in Pakistan is important. It suggests a principle that both states should accept. They can do so without any joint statement or formal agreement. This principle is that legitimacy will only flow from the ballot box, not the gun. Both in the past have argued that “the voice of the people” should be respected—Pakistan in Kashmir, India in Hyderabad. Both have taken the opposite position where necessary, and have used force. But forty-plus years of preaching one principle and acting upon another have led nowhere. India and Pakistan should want to settle the Kashmir problem with Kashmiris who share their own commitment to democracy—a commitment that must include the protection of minority rights. Getting agreement on this principle keeps open the door to a wide range of possible future relations between India, Pakistan, and Kashmiris. It would help ensure that the future will rest on the consent of the governed, not the coercion of the gun.

As desirable as it is to help India and Pakistan move towards agreement on democratic principles as a way to solve the Kashmir problem, it should be borne in mind that another principle will continue to divide them. New Delhi is not likely to give up the belief that its secularism would be damaged and that millions of Indian Muslims would be put at risk if a settlement of Kashmir took place on the basis of religion. The argument deserves serious consideration: it cannot simply be dismissed by Pakistanis as blackmail. Pakistanis must think of ways they can reassure India that a change in the status of Kashmir (or parts of that state) would not be seen as acceptance of the two-nation theory; Indians should likewise think of a way of peacefully accommodating Pakistani sensibilities and Kashmiri demands without damaging the core principles of Indian secularism.

Fourth: Back to the 19th Century? The Kashmir crisis has deep historical roots. Particularly egregious are those elements of the crisis that stem from imperial conflicts of the 19th century. The British acquired Kashmir, but did not make it part of British India; they established a boundary with China (and with the Afghans), but the boundaries were never fully demarcated. It seems absurd that two billion people should be entangled by conflicts generated by imperial governments that no longer exist. There are still border disputes apart from Kashmir. In Kashmir itself the line of actual control was never fully determined, which provided the opportunity for a bizarre struggle over the Siachin Glacier. Finally, China and Pakistan have come to a temporary agreement over a part of the border which is contested by India.

None of these border or territorial issues are strategically vital; all could be settled tomorrow without any loss of sovereignty or national identity. None involve significant domestic populations or ethnic rivalries. While these issues are not central to the Kashmir problem, they are related to it. Thus, prudence suggests that all of the concerned parties take more seriously the negotiations already underway to resolve the India-Pakistan and the India-China border disputes. In the long run, it would be important to associate Kashmiris themselves with such negotiations, and this might be one inducement for them to help restore order within their own state. But India, Pakistan, and China should, for their own reasons, attempt to eliminate such disputes, if only because there are more serious challenges awaiting them ahead in years to come. 16

Fifth: Invest in Stake-Building In the most interesting debate that the U. S.-Russian study team heard while in India and Pakistan, a group of Pakistanis argued back and forth as to whether Kashmir was the cause of India Pakistan tensions, or whether those tensions were the cause of the conflict. Both statements may be true—or we may never know what is the balance of truth. Our very ignorance about these matters suggests a heavy investment in two processes.

One is stake-building: increasing the number of people in India, Pakistan, and in all parts of Kashmir that have a stake in normal relations and in a process that moves the region towards a settlement. This is one side of CBMs: “confidence building measures.” Democracies that have bilateral problems need to encourage lobbies in each other. They are the bridge-builders who influence the internal debate in both countries, and make it possible for governments to actually do something useful. The growth of interest in trade in the business communities of both India and Pakistan is especially encouraging. 17

Further, a second aspect of stake-building should receive immediate attention. This is the restrictions placed on the flow of information, scholars, and journalists between the two states. It is surprising that the academics in both countries (especially India) have not raised their voices to demand the same rights of travel and access that foreign scholars and journalists have. Indeed, the academic community seems least interested in finding out the truth. As of mid-1993 there were no Indian scholars of any level studying in Pakistan, and only one Pakistani graduate student studying in India. By contrast, there are thousands of Indians in the United States, and about fifty Indians and Chinese in their respective countries. No Pakistani scholar has ever written a book about Indian politics, and there is only one Indian scholar who has written a good book based on field research in Pakistan. 18 By and large there is less in the way of genuine movement of ideas and people than there was before 1965. It is in the interest of India and Pakistan to unilaterally allow the flow of journalists and academics, without demanding reciprocity—but the policy communities in both countries have a difficult time of even imagining such a step.

Sixth: End Alphabet Diplomacy Finally, both sides should stop relying upon what could be termed the alphabet diplomats and begin to constrain their self-deceiving disinformation campaigns. Alphabet diplomats are RAW, ISI, KGB, KHAD, CIA, and so forth, and the local intelligence services have created a bizarre dimension to the Kashmir problem: supposedly well informed people in both countries make all kinds of wrong assumptions about which side is doing what to the other. Indians menacingly suggest that if Pakistani intelligence does not stop arming Kashmiris, “there will be hell to pay in Sindh.” Pakistanis themselves can’t figure out whether Sindh is their Kashmir, or is being stoked by the Indians. They claim that their dabbling in Kashmir is not the cause of India’s problems, but only the opportune exploitation of them. But then they will return the threat, and tell visitors to inform the Indians that if there is not movement of some sort in Srinagar, then India’s own survival may be at risk. In a kind of reverse mirror-imaging they will then go on to compare Kashmir with East Pakistan/Bangladesh.

An outsider is at a loss to determine what is fact and what is fiction. But it is likely that the insiders do not know the truth is either. 19 This has created an unstable state of affairs. Four years ago (in 1990) the risk of war between India and Pakistan over Kashmir was being exaggerated by outsiders, especially Americans. 20 Regional officials on both sides seemed to have a good grasp of the problem, and of the dangers of escalation. Neither side wanted to go to war for the sake of a few Kashmiris. That is still probably true, although there is a measure of crisis-weariness, especially in India. However, while the chances of an all-out war over Kashmir remain smaller than Americans have been predicting, it is greater than South Asians think. The latter have to remember that all of the earlier wars between the two countries were caused in one way or another by strategic calculations that turned out to be in error. With the existing levels of misinformation and disinformation, it could happen again, even with sober, responsible leaders in charge on both sides.

Conclusion: Problems without Solutions, Solutions without Problems While Kashmir consists of layers of problems we cannot assume that removing the source at each layer will lead to a solution. Certainly, nothing can be done about the original British decisions. That Kashmir has strengthened the conflicting identities of the two states is a fact that will not go away, and cannot be compromised. India and Pakistan can work around this history, but cannot rewrite it. However, as we have noted, Kashmir is nowhere near as important domestically in either state as it was a number of years ago, and the military/strategic issues embedded in the Kashmir conflict could be finessed by introducing various verification and inspection regimes, agreement on force levels, pullbacks, and so forth. 21 More problematic are strategies to deal with Kashmiri separatism (plebiscite or referendum—and if either, on what basis?). But here, also, there should be general agreement between India and Pakistan that accommodating Kashmiri sensibilities should not be the prelude to the break-up of either state. So, in addressing the issue of self-determination the two sides should be able to achieve an understanding over ground rules and context.

We have suggested in this chapter that the problems of India-Pakistan-Kashmiri relations are too complex to understand with full clarity. An initial strategy of conflict-amelioration, moving across a broad range of issues, is suggested as the best that can be done now. Some of these problems may not be amenable to solutions (the tension between Indian and Pakistani identity, for example). And, there may be solutions in search of problems. Confidence building measures are not solutions to any particular problem, but address the difficulty of getting both sides to meet and talk. CBMs build confidence, not solutions.

However, the biggest obstacle to movement on any of the Kashmir sub-problems seems to be their perception of time. Clearly, all sides to a dispute need to agree on the need for a solution. Yet Islamabad and Delhi seem to be on a teeter totter—when one side is up, the other side feels that it is accelerating downward. As they briefly pass through a point of balance or equilibrium neither wants to negotiate since both believe that time is on their side, that they are just about to, or will after some time, regain the advantage. And what is the advantage? Again, both sides seem to assume that the other will not compromise unless confronted by superior force. “Punjab rules”—a zero-sum game with a club behind the back—seem to dominate India-Pakistan relations. The greater Kashmir problem is getting both sides—and now the Kashmiris themselves, whose perception of how time will bring about an acceptable solution is not clear at all—to examine their own deeper assumptions about how to bring the other to the bargaining table, and reach an agreement. On balance, we should be optimistic that this will be done. A review of the history of the issue, and of recent crises it has helped to generate convinces me that while South Asia has had its wars and man-made disasters, it is well-stocked with responsible policy-makers and that India and Pakistan have increasingly well-informed publics. In the face of greater internal economic and ethnic problems, India—and now Pakistan—have built democratic institutions that are the envy of Russians and Yugoslavs, among others. They can, I believe, extend this success to their own relations. Outside powers, especially the United States, Russia, and Japan should be willing and capable at some time in the not-too-distant future to do more than stand by and watch.

NOTES 1. This chapter was first presented to a MCISS-South Asia seminar in 1992, and revised as a note prepared for the Center for the Study of Foreign Affairs of the Foreign Service Institute, U.S. Department of State. Both were based upon research conducted during the course of a joint U.S.-Russian study of Kashmir and Afghanistan in Nepal, India and Pakistan in March-April, 1992. See Stephen P. Cohen, Sergei Kamenev, Vladimir Moskalenko and Leo Rose, Afghanistan and Kashmir (New York: The Asia Society, and Moscow: The Russian Oriental Institute, 1993). I have made some minor additions in view of a year in residence with the Ford Foundation, New Delhi, 1992-93.

2. The exact status of Indian and Pakistani nuclear capabilities remains uncertain. For recent overviews see George Perkovich, “A Nuclear Third Way in South Asia,” Foreign Policy; Summer, 1993, pp. 85-104 and Devin Hagerty, “The Powers of Suggestion: Opaque Proliferation, Existential Deterrence, and the South Asian Nuclear Arms Competition,” Security Studies, 2:3/4, Spring/Summer, 1993, 256-283.

3. The most notorious of these was offering Pakistan some 40 F-16 aircraft in exchange for the “capping” of its nuclear program; no equivalent offer was made to India, and both Islamabad and Delhi publicly and vehemently rejected this strategy of arms-for-peace.

4. For examples of this scenario-building see the testimony of the Director of the Central Intelligence Agency, R. James Woolsey, before the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence, “Nomination of R. James Woolsey, Hearing,” 103rd Congress, First Session (Washington: Government Printing Office, 1993), and the exaggerated analysis by William E. Burrows and Robert Windrem in their Critical Mass: The Dangerous Race for a Superweapon in a Fragmented World (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1994). ,br> 5. For a fine collection of essays on different aspects of the Kashmir crisis see Raju Thomas, ed., Perspectives on Kashmir: The Roots of Conflict in South Asia (Boulder: Westview Press, 1992), and for a balanced summary of the Indian perspective on Kashmir see Sumit Ganguly and Kanti Bajpai, “India and the Crisis in Kashmir,” Asian Survey, Vol. 34, No. 5, May, 1994.

6. For a vivid overview see W. P. S. Sidhu, “Siachin: The Forgotten War,” India Today, May 31, 1992. Robert Wirsing has studied Siachin (and Kashmir) closely, and in a forthcoming book will provide the most authoritative account of the history of the conflict on (and over) the glacier.

7. This point is made by several Indian and Pakistani authors in Kanti P. Bajpai ad Stephen P. Cohen, eds., South Asia After the Cold War (Boulder: Westview, 1993). See especially the chapters by Pervaiz I. Cheema and Lieut. Gen. M. L. Chibber.

8. For a study of the origins and resolution of the Brasstacks crisis see Kanti Bajpai, P. R. Chari, Pervez Cheema, Stephen Cohen, Beyond Brasstacks: Perception and Crisis Management in South Asia (forthcoming, Program in Arms Control, Disarmament, and International Security, University of Illinois); for a discussion of the subsequent 1990 crisis by a number of the policy-makers in government at the time see See Michael Krepon, Mishi Farugues, eds., Conflict Prevention and Confidence Building Measures in South Asia: The 1990 Crisis. The Henry L. Stimson Center, Occasional Paper No. 17, April 1994.

9. See Stephen P. Cohen, “Conclusion,” in Cohen, ed., The Security of South Asia: Asian and American Perspectives (Urbana: University of Illinois Press, 1987), p. 240.

10. The Indian logic is that if the US had not supported extremist Muslim elements in Afghanistan with lavish supplies of arms, then Kashmir would have not been radicalized. This conveniently ignores the large scale supplies of weapons by both Iran and China, and, above all, India’s own mismanagement of Kashmiri politics, especially the imposition of corrupt governments and the absence of free elections.

11. Some elements of the Bharatiya Janata Party have recommended that Kashmir be repopulated with Hindus, once its special constitutional status (Article 370) was eliminated; The Andorra precedent of the 13th century-a treaty between Spain and France guaranteeing Andorra’s internal autonomy-has been discussed by Jean Alphonse Bernard of Paris; Jagmohan, one of the key principles in the most recent crises in Kashmir, has written that the long-term solution rests in a revival of the Indian spirit. See his own record of the crises of Kashmir-and is pivotal role- in My Frozen Turbulence in Kashmir (New Delhi: Allied, 1991.)

12. These impressions are, of course, based on personal experiences; however, in the absence of accurate poll data, serious academic studies, or other objective measures of Indian and Pakistani public opinion this remains the only way to judge public opinion on Kashmir in the two countries. What is astonishing is the absence of serious academic, or even journalistic studies of the shape and intensity of regional public opinion.

13. Not only has bilateral diplomacy collapsed between India and Pakistan, there has been, over the past year, a number of incidents in which the diplomats of both sides have been harrassed, and even beaten, by security forces, and the intelligence services of both countries have harassed ordinary scholars and journalists attending functions in each other’s country. Recent reports indicate that some in Pakistan now see some value in perpetuating the crisis over Siachin, while being “soft” on offers to open up nuclear facilities for inspection, as part of a complex game of getting outsiders, especially the United States, to come down harder still on Delhi. These verbal games are brilliantly played by both sides, but also reveal a lack of interest in achieving a settlement. For a fuller description of these diplomatic stratagems, see the editorial in The Frontier Post, Peshawar, December 17, 1993.

14. For an informative discussion of private third-party involvement see Gennady I. Chufrin and Harold Saunders, “A Public Peace Process,” Negotiation Journal, April, 1993, pp. 155-177.

15. I have outlined a strategy based on the possibility that the United States and other outside powers play a larger role on both the Kashmir and the proliferation issues-which are inextricably linked in many ways. For a presentation of this strategy to an Indian audience see Stephen P. Cohen, “Is there a Road to Peace in South Asia? An American Perspective,” Journal of the United Services Institution of India, April-June, 1993, pp. 146-153.

16. These include the successful transition to more open, competitive economies, the management of their own nuclear arms race (which is linked directly to the amelioration or resolution of the Kashmir problem), and simply coping with the increased demands placed on the struggling Indian and Pakistani states by new regional, economic, ethnic, class, and caste groups.

17. For a discussion of the recent history of private, or Track II diplomacy, including efforts by the business communities of India and Pakistan to foster dialogue, see Sundeep Waslekar, Track-Two Diplomacy in South Asia, Occasional Paper, Program in Arms Control, Disarmament, and International Security, University of Illinois, 1994, especially the Appendix. This includes a list of over thirty recent Track II and confidence-building activities conducted in South Asia.

18. See D. D. Khanna and Kishore Kumar, Dialogue of the Deaf: The India-Pakistan Divide (Delhi: Konarak Publishers, 1992). Khanna and Kumar have one chapter devoted to Kashmir, based largely on interviews in India and Pakistan.

19. In 1993 the Indian Prime Minister, P. V. Narasimha Rao, told a visiting American group that there was no need to worry about incidents on the border leading to a larger conflict between India and Pakistan, since the Pakistanis, at least, were aware of what they were doing, and knew what the consequences would be if they went too far. He described the situation as analogous to the “magic circle” that surrounded Sita: she could not break out, but no one could break in.

20. A view put into print by Seymour Hersh, in a useful, if not always accurate article on the 1990 crisis. See Hersh, “On the Nuclear Edge,” The New Yorker, March 29, 1993.

21. For an overview of regional verification and CBM possibilities see Moonis Ahmar, “Indo-Pakistan Normalization Process: The Role of CBMs in the Post-Cold War Era,” Research Series, Program in Arms Control, Disarmament, and International Security, University of Illinois, October, 1993.

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Ten Potential Solutions to the Kashmir Conflict

• Published: September 2010
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A permanent peaceful resolution to Kashmir's conflict will require solemn diplomatic agreements between India and Pakistan that have the full support of Kashmir's most popular leaders. The most realistic solution to the Kashmir conflict would appear to be acceptance of the current Line of Control that now divides the former princely state of Jammu and Kashmir as the northernmost international border of India and Pakistan. It is also important for Pakistan's elected leaders to control the Al-Qaeda and Taliban militants who inhabit its entire Afghan frontier, and to end the nurturing of suicide bombers bent on killing Indians, Americans, Sri Lankans, or other innocent people the world over. The people of Kashmir must be permitted to choose their own leaders in free and fair elections, as do Indians in every other state in that union, and New Delhi should solemnly commit to supporting Kashmir's provincial autonomy and the human rights of its people, as it does the autonomy and rights of the people of Punjab, Maharashtra, or West Bengal.

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A Short Introduction to the Kashmir Issue

Essay , 2010 , 6 Pages , Grade: A

Autor:in: Arghya Ray (Author)

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This essay seeks to enumerate and examine the events, causes, and developments entailed in the Kashmir issue and reflect on the plight of the common Kashmiris. It is based on the approach of examining related literature and it would also focus on a systemized analysis of the topic covering the most significant points, such as the pre-history of the conflict, causes and the course of Indo-Pakistan confrontations and the current state of the affairs. Kashmir is a mountainous region, which enjoys a very important geo-political situation. It is surrounded by Pakistan in the west and China embraces it in the east. The Indian provinces of Himachal Pradesh and Punjab are in the south. Its northern fringes touch the borders of Afghanistan too. The area is famous for its extra-ordinary natural beauty and resources. Presently, the northern and western sides of the region are occupied by Pakistan while the southern and eastern parts are controlled by the Indian Union. For over six decades, the region has been devastated by confrontations between the two countries. Both India and Pakistan are nuclear powers and in the case of another shooting war between them; the entire subcontinent including Kashmir may be destroyed. Presently, it is at the diplomatic hyper point of the bilateral relationships between the two countries.

Thesis Statement

Kashmir is a disputed region between India and Pakistan, which has vitiated the political environment of the Indian Subcontinent. The Kashmir issue stands as a debacle for nearly six decades and there has been almost no progress in resolving the problem.

Introduction

Kashmir is a mountainous region, which enjoys a very important geo-political situation. It is surrounded by Pakistan in the west and China embraces it in the east. The Indian provinces of Himachal Pradesh and Punjab are in the south. Its northern fringes touch the borders of Afghanistan too. The area is famous for its extra-ordinary natural beauty and resources. Presently, the northern and western sides of the region are occupied by Pakistan while the southern and eastern parts are controlled by the Indian Union. For over six decades, the region has been devastated by confrontations between the two countries. Both India and Pakistan are nuclear powers and in the case of another shooting war between them; the entire subcontinent including Kashmir may be destroyed. Presently, it is at the diplomatic hyper point of the bilateral relationships between the two countries.

Pre-history of the Conflict

The British Indian Empire was formed of hundreds of princely states spread all over the Indian Subcontinent. After the World War II, when the British finally decided to bring their rule to an end, the fate of these princely states was brought under scrutiny. The Princely states were now supposed to join either India or Pakistan after the British authorities leave. In regards of this process of the evolution of India and Pakistan, Jyoti Trehan remarks, “The process of integration of princely states was not without its highs and lows.”(Trehan 201)

Finally in June, 1947, the British accepted Pakistan Plan. But the Hindu Maharajah Sir Hari Singh (the ruling monarch of the erstwhile princely state of Kashmir) was hesitating to join either Pakistan or India. However, the census of 1941 shows that almost 77% of the population of Kashmir was comprised of Muslims (Das 264). Since the Maharajah had acceded to neither side until the formation of India and Pakistan in August, 1947, Pakistan decided to act along communal lines. Being a Muslim dominated state, it decided to ‘liberate’ Kashmir and backed the Azad Kashmir Force. In October, 1947, Pakistan invaded Kashmir and captured its northern and western parts. On the Maharajahs request and accession to India, the authorities in Delhi now reacted by sending troops to the region and Pakistani advances were arrested soon. Thus, the southern and eastern parts of the region were retained in the Indian Union and constituted as the state of Jammu and Kashmir.

Causes of the Conflict

To understand the causes of the conflict, the historic Partition of India has to be referenced. Under the British Rule, Indian Subcontinent was mainly inhabited by the two major religious groups, Hindus and Muslims. The two communities had friendly relationships and they offered a united struggle to achieve independence from the British Rule during the later half of the Nineteenth Century. But undercurrents of tension between the two communities became forceful with the lapse of time. Power politics between All India Muslim League and Indian National Congress (the two major political powers of the undivided India) culminated at widespread communal tension and violence during the 1930s and early 1940s. Consequently, the colossal task of partitioning India became unavoidable. After the Partition in 1947, Pakistan emerged as a Muslim dominated state while India emerged as a secular, democratic country. And the province of Kashmir, which is situated at the border of the two countries, got tangled and entrapped between them.

The Course of Indo-Pak Confrontations

1940 – In the Lahore Resolution, M. A. Jinnah puts forward the Two-nation Theory and the demand of Pakistan is raised.

1946 – Muslim Conference takes on the Azad Kashmir Resolution.

October, 1947 – War breaks out between India and Pakistan over the Kashmir issue.

1965 – Indo-Pak War breaks out again. Pakistan is defeated and the Tashkent Pact is signed.

1971 – Indo-Pak War breaks out once again over the East Pakistan.

1972 – East Pakistan is liberated and the Bangladesh Republic is formed.

1978 – Military Rule in Pakistan. Proxy war with India begins. Pakistan affirms its support for the separatist organizations in Punjab and Kashmir.

1999 – Kargil War takes place between India and the Pakistan backed infiltrators.

2008 – Successful Assembly Elections in the Jammu and Kashmir State in India. National Conference emerges as a major political power in the state.

The Current State of Affairs

With the lapse of time, Pakistan has shown tendencies towards Military Rule and autocratic governance. On several occasions, India has alleged that Pakistan has sponsored the different terrorist organizations in Kashmir. Moreover, India holds Pakistan responsible for several devastating terrorist attacks directed against India. On the other hand, Pakistan affirmatively sticks to its policy of extending ‘moral support’ to the separatists in Kashmir. In such a state of affair, the common Kashmiris are suffering most. The innocent people are being victimized by baneful separatist propaganda. Confrontations between Indian military and armed separatists have caused huge loss of property, money, and lives so far. Moreover, the specter of Al Qaeda and Taliban has made the situation more complicated and dangerous in this part of the world.

Kashmir issue has been the primary cause of diplomatic, political, and military stand off between India and Pakistan. Of late, both the sides are showing interest to begin bilateral talks once again. According to Farah Ibrahim, the solution of the issue lies in a planned conflict Resolution (Ibrahim 289). The way to this conflict resolution lies in the methods of psychological intervention. Psychological perspective of the problem is more propound than its military, political, and diplomatic dimensions and interpretations. Unlike the “sharp rise in the ideal of Hindu nationalism” (Wirsing 163), solution to Kashmir issue lies in the acceptance of the fact that the common Kashmiris deserve to live a normal and peaceful life. India and Pakistan both must come forward to eradicate the terrorist organizations functional in Kashmir, and continue the bilateral talks. The confidence building measures must be initiated meaningfully. In this way, by mutual goodwill, the political authorities of India and Pakistan can bring peace to the doomed province.

Works Cited

Das, Taraknath. "The Kashmir Issue and the United Nations." Political Science Quarterly 65.2 (1950): 264. Print.

Ibrahim, Farah "Peace in Kashmir: A Worldview, Psychological Intervention." International Journal for the Advancement of Counselling 27.2 (2005): 289-297. Print.

Trehan, Jyoti. "Terrorism and the Funding of Terrorism in Kashmir." Journal of Financial Crime 9.3 (2002): 201-211. Print.

Wirsing, Robert "Indian Policy in Jammu and Kashmir." India , Pakistan and the Kashmir Dispute: On Regional Conflict and Its Resolution . New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 1998. 163. Print.

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• Kashmir Issue

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Since the partition of the Indian subcontinent into India and Pakistan in 1947, the Kashmir dispute has been an intractable one between them. They fought three wars over it in1948, 1965, and 1999, but have not been able to resolve it. The partition left the fate of over 550 princely states undecided. They were required to accede to either of the two states on the basis of the geographical location and wishes of their people.

The state of Jammu and Kashmir should have acceded to Pakistan because of its Muslim majority population and geographical location, but this was not happened when Mahraja Hari  Singh seek military assistance from India to resist the Pakistani tribal’s attacks and ultimately signed the ‘Instrument of Accession’ with India. Eventually Indian forces intervened and captured the state of Jammu and Kashmir. From that day Kashmir dispute has been the core issue between both Pakistan and India, which also had kept the security of entire South Asia at stake because of their extensive nuclear capability.

So, the Kashmir issue has been a major bone of contention from the day of independence, resulted in three wars, numerous conflicts between India and Pakistan and severely rigid diplomacy. The United Nations Security Council had tried to resolve the dispute by declaring that the accession of Jammu and Kashmir to India or Pakistan should be decided through the democratic method by holding a free and fair plebiscite but India had rejected any mediation which opposed its claim regarding Kashmir.

Kashmir’s strategic importance lies in the fact that its borders meet with China and Afghanistan and also is close to Russia. Almost all the rivers which flow through Pakistan, originate from Kashmir, that’s why both the countries ignore stepping back claiming of this territory.

The failure of diplomacy to resolve the Kashmir issue attracted international and regional attention to it. After the wars of 1948, 1962 and 1965, determined efforts were made to resolve this issue. In 1948, the United Nations became deeply involved but India didn’t show flexibility. After the India-China border War of 1962, there were intense but fruitless American and British efforts to bridge a gap between India and Pakistan. The end of 1965 war saw Soviet Union as a regional peacemaker. The Soviets did manage to promote a peace treaty at Tashkent, but this could not establish peace in the region and soon Indian involvement in East Pakistan led to her separation in 1970-71.

The most consistent feature of great power influence on the Kashmir problem has been its ineffectiveness. Besides Cold war rivalries, both United States and the Soviet Union have played significant, often parallel and cooperative roles in the subcontinent. Both Washington and Moscow made several inconclusive efforts to mediate the dispute or bring about its peaceful resolution, but were distrustful of anything more. It took the 1990 crisis with its nuclear dimension, to bring the United States back to the region.

Soviet Union, United states and China have different policies towards the Kashmir dispute according to their own interests. In the beginning all of them showed neutrality but with the changing world’s politics and dimensions, they formulate their concerns regarding Kashmir. China‘s Kashmir policy has passed through different stages. In first phase, from 1949 to 1960s, China avoided siding with either India or Pakistan; instead it favored a resolution of the issue through peaceful settlements and also opposed the role of UN and United States to mediate Kashmir issue.

The second phase started from early 1960s and lasted till 1970. Sino-Indian border war of 1962 started hostility between India and China resulted close relations with Pakistan. China stood by Pakistan on Kashmir issue with firm support for the right of self determination. But in 1970s, China adopted neutral policy on Kashmir issue as its relations were normal with India; this was reflected during Kargil conflict and Indo-Pak military possible conflict in 2001-2.

The normal relations between India and Pakistan on Kashmir would bring benefits to the United States. Indo-Pak tensions are especially dangerous because they bring two nuclear states on the brink of war. They divert Pakistan from fighting terrorists and militants on their own soils. India and Pakistan need to engage in combined bilateral talks on all important issues. Continuing tensions over Kashmir will weaken any initiative to bring stability to South Asia as well as bring about the risk of a nuclear war. It will be quite right by assuming that Kashmir is the root cause of much of the militancy in South Asia.

It is necessary for international community to realize that peace and stability in South Asia can only be guaranteed if all outstanding disputes between Pakistan and India, including the Kashmir dispute should be resolved because Pakistan has become a frontline state against the Global War of terrorism.The best solution of the Kashmir dispute could be the right of self determination which should be given to Kashmiris in order to give them the right to decide to whom they want to accede.

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