write a case study on bhopal gas tragedy

• School Guide
• Class 8 Syllabus
• Maths Notes Class 8
• Science Notes Class 8
• History Notes Class 8
• Geography Notes Class 8
• Civics Notes Class 8
• NCERT Soln. Class 8 Maths
• RD Sharma Soln. Class 8
• Math Formulas Class 8

Bhopal Gas Tragedy : Causes, effects and aftermath

The Bhopal gas tragedy occurred at midnight of December 2nd- 3rd December 1984 at the Union Carbide India Ltd (UCIL) pesticide facility in Bhopal, Madhya Pradesh. This catastrophe affected around 500,000 people along with many animals. People who were exposed are still suffering as a result of the gas leak’s long-term health impacts. Chronic eye difficulties and respiratory problems were some issues due to it. Children who have been exposed have stunted growth and cognitive impairments. 

Table of Content

Bhopal Gas Tragedy

Bhopal gas tragedy case study, causes of bhopal gas tragedy, effects of bhopal gas tragedy, aftermath of bhopal gas tragedy.

Union Carbide was an American company that produced pesticides. MIC – methyl isocyanide, a dangerous poisonous gas began to leak at midnight on 2nd December 1984 from the Union Carbide factory. This MIC caused the Bhopal gas tragedy. The Bhopal gas tragedy was a fatal accident. It was one of the world’s worst industrial accidents. 

UCIL was a pesticide manufacturing plant that produced the insecticide carbaryl. Carbaryl was discovered by the American company Union Carbide Corporation, which owned a significant share in UCIL. As an intermediary, UCIL produced carbaryl using methyl isocyanate (MIC). Other techniques for producing the ultimate product are available, but they are more expensive. The very toxic chemical MIC is extremely dangerous to human health. Residents of Bhopal in the area of the pesticide plant began to feel irritated by the MIC and began fleeing the city.

Bhopal UCIL constructed three underground MIC storage tanks which were named E610, E611, and E619. On October 1984, E610 was not able to maintain its nitrogen gas pressure and so the liquid which is present inside the tank would not pump out, because of which 42 tons of MIC in E610 was wasted. The chemical in E610 was left unpumped as they were not able to re-establish its pressure, which later became responsible for Bhopal Gas Tragedy.

The main causes of Bhopal Gas Tragedy are as follows:

• During the buildup to the spill, the plant’s safety mechanisms for the highly toxic MIC were not working. The alarm off tanks of the plant had not worked properly.
• Many valves and lines were in disrepair, and many vent gas scrubbers were not working, as was the steam boiler that was supposed to clean the pipes.
• The MIC was stored in three tanks, with tank E610 being the source of the leak. This tank should have held no more than 30 tonnes of MIC, according to safety regulations.
• Water is believed to have entered the tank through a side pipe as technicians were attempting to clear it late that fatal night.
• This resulted in an exothermic reaction in the tank, progressively raising the pressure until the gas was ejected through the atmosphere.

The main effects of the Bhopal Gas Tragedy are as follows:

• Thousands had died as a result of choking, pulmonary edema, and reflexogenic circulatory collapse.
• Neonatal death rates increased by 200 percent.
• A huge number of animal carcasses have been discovered in the area, indicating the impact on flora and animals. The trees died after a few days. Food supplies have grown scarce due to the fear of contamination. 
• Fishing was also prohibited.
• In March 1985, the Indian government established the Bhopal Gas Leak Accident Act, giving it legal authority to represent all victims of the accident, whether they were in India or abroad.
• At least 200,000 youngsters were exposed to the gas.
• Hospitals were overcrowded, and there was no sufficient training for medical workers to deal with MIC exposure.

In the United States, UCC was sued in federal court. In one action, the court recommended that UCC pay between $5 million and $10 million to assist the victims. UCC agreed to pay a $5 million settlement. The Indian government, however, rejected this offer and claimed $3.3 billion. In 1989, UCC agreed to pay $470 million in damages and paid the cash immediately in an out-of-court settlement.

Warren Anderson, the CEO and Chairman of UCC was charged with manslaughter by Bhopal authorities in 1991. He refused to appear in court and the Bhopal court declared him a fugitive from justice in February 1992. Despite the central government’s efforts in the United States to extradite Anderson, nothing happened. Anderson died in 2014 without ever appearing in a court of law.

Bhopal Gas Tragedy continues to be an important warning sign for industrialization, for developing countries and in particular India, with human, environmental, and economic pitfalls. The economy of India is growing at a fast rate but at the cost of environmental health as well as public safety.

Frequently Asked Questions

What were the reasons behind bhopal gas tragedy.

The reasons behind Bhopal gas tragedy was a large volume of water had been introduced into the MIC tank and has caused a chemical reaction which did force the pressure release valve, which allowed the gas to leak.

What is the name of Bhopal gas case law?

The name is Union Carbide Corporation v.

Which gas was leaked in the Bhopal Gas Tragedy?

The gas which was leaked in the Bhopal Gas Tragedy is methyl isocyanate.

Was Bhopal gas tragedy an accident or experiment?

Bhopal gas tragedy was the world’s most worst industrial accident.

How many people died in the Bhopal Gas?

A total of 3,787 deaths were registered related to the gas release in case of Bhopal Gas Tragedy.

What were the four main demands of the Bhopal Gas victims?

The 4 demands of Bhopal Gas victims include: Proper medical treatment. Adequate compensation. Fixation of criminal responsibility Steps for prevention of such disasters in future.

How was Bhopal Gas Tragedy fixed?

Bhopal Gas Tragedy was fixed with construction of a secure landfill for holding the wastes from the two on-site solar evaporation ponds.

Please Login to comment...

Similar reads.

• School Learning
• School Polity
• Social Science
• Political Science-Class-8

Improve your Coding Skills with Practice

What kind of Experience do you want to share?

• History & Society
• Science & Tech
• Biographies
• Animals & Nature
• Geography & Travel
• Arts & Culture
• Games & Quizzes
• On This Day
• One Good Fact
• New Articles
• Lifestyles & Social Issues
• Philosophy & Religion
• Politics, Law & Government
• World History
• Health & Medicine
• Browse Biographies
• Birds, Reptiles & Other Vertebrates
• Bugs, Mollusks & Other Invertebrates
• Environment
• Fossils & Geologic Time
• Entertainment & Pop Culture
• Sports & Recreation
• Visual Arts
• Demystified
• Image Galleries
• Infographics
• Top Questions
• Britannica Kids
• Saving Earth
• Space Next 50
• Student Center

• What are the oldest known civilizations of India?
• What are the major holidays and festivals of India?

Bhopal disaster

Our editors will review what you’ve submitted and determine whether to revise the article.

• The University of New Mexico - The Bhopal Disaster of 1984
• University of Massachusetts Amherst - Bhopal Plant Disaster
• National Center for Biotechnology Information - PubMed Central - The Bhopal disaster and its aftermath: a review
• University College London - The Bhopal gas tragedy 1984 to? The evasion of corporate responsibility
• The New York Times - The Bhopal Disaster: How it happened
• The Guardian - 'Bhopal’s tragedy has not stopped': the urban disaster still claiming lives 35 years on
• Academia - The Bhopal Disaster and Its Ramifications: A Brief Overview

What was the Bhopal disaster?

The Bhopal disaster was a chemical leak that occurred on December 3, 1984, in the Indian city of Bhopal. It killed an estimated 15,000 to 20,000 people. At the time, it was the worst industrial accident in history.

What was the cause of the Bhopal disaster?

The Bhopal disaster occurred when about 45 tons of the gas methyl isocyanate escaped from a plant owned by a subsidiary of the U.S.-based Union Carbide Corporation. Investigations later established that substandard operating and safety procedures at the understaffed plant had led to the catastrophe.

What was the aftermath of Bhopal disaster?

An estimated 15,000 to 20,000 people died as a result of the Bhopal disaster, and some 500,000 survivors suffered respiratory problems, blindness, and other health problems. In 2010 several former executives of the company that operated the Bhopal plant—all Indian citizens—were convicted of negligence.

Recent News

Bhopal disaster , chemical leak in 1984 in the city of Bhopal , Madhya Pradesh state, India . At the time, it was called the worst industrial accident in history.

On December 3, 1984, about 45 tons of the dangerous gas methyl isocyanate escaped from an insecticide plant that was owned by the Indian subsidiary of the American firm Union Carbide Corporation . The gas drifted over the densely populated neighbourhoods around the plant, killing thousands of people immediately and creating a panic as tens of thousands of others attempted to flee Bhopal. The final death toll was estimated to be between 15,000 and 20,000. Some half a million survivors suffered respiratory problems, eye irritation or blindness, and other maladies resulting from exposure to the toxic gas; many were awarded compensation of a few hundred dollars. Investigations later established that substandard operating and safety procedures at the understaffed plant had led to the disaster . In 1998 the former factory site was turned over to the state of Madhya Pradesh .

In the early 21st century more than 400 tons of industrial waste were still present on the site. Despite continued protests and attempts at litigation, neither the Dow Chemical Company , which bought out the Union Carbide Corporation in 2001, nor the Indian government had properly cleaned the site. Soil and water contamination in the area was blamed for chronic health problems and high instances of birth defects in the area’s inhabitants. In 2004 the Indian Supreme Court ordered the state to supply clean drinking water to the residents of Bhopal because of groundwater contamination. In 2010 several former executives of Union Carbide’s India subsidiary—all Indian citizens—were convicted by a Bhopal court of negligence in the disaster.

• Open access
• Published: 10 May 2005

The Bhopal disaster and its aftermath: a review

• Edward Broughton 1  

Environmental Health volume  4 , Article number:  6 ( 2005 ) Cite this article

450k Accesses

226 Citations

758 Altmetric

Metrics details

On December 3 1984, more than 40 tons of methyl isocyanate gas leaked from a pesticide plant in Bhopal, India, immediately killing at least 3,800 people and causing significant morbidity and premature death for many thousands more. The company involved in what became the worst industrial accident in history immediately tried to dissociate itself from legal responsibility. Eventually it reached a settlement with the Indian Government through mediation of that country's Supreme Court and accepted moral responsibility. It paid $470 million in compensation, a relatively small amount of based on significant underestimations of the long-term health consequences of exposure and the number of people exposed. The disaster indicated a need for enforceable international standards for environmental safety, preventative strategies to avoid similar accidents and industrial disaster preparedness.

Since the disaster, India has experienced rapid industrialization. While some positive changes in government policy and behavior of a few industries have taken place, major threats to the environment from rapid and poorly regulated industrial growth remain. Widespread environmental degradation with significant adverse human health consequences continues to occur throughout India.

Peer Review reports

December 2004 marked the twentieth anniversary of the massive toxic gas leak from Union Carbide Corporation's chemical plant in Bhopal in the state of Madhya Pradesh, India that killed more than 3,800 people. This review examines the health effects of exposure to the disaster, the legal response, the lessons learned and whether or not these are put into practice in India in terms of industrial development, environmental management and public health.

In the 1970s, the Indian government initiated policies to encourage foreign companies to invest in local industry. Union Carbide Corporation (UCC) was asked to build a plant for the manufacture of Sevin, a pesticide commonly used throughout Asia. As part of the deal, India's government insisted that a significant percentage of the investment come from local shareholders. The government itself had a 22% stake in the company's subsidiary, Union Carbide India Limited (UCIL) [ 1 ]. The company built the plant in Bhopal because of its central location and access to transport infrastructure. The specific site within the city was zoned for light industrial and commercial use, not for hazardous industry. The plant was initially approved only for formulation of pesticides from component chemicals, such as MIC imported from the parent company, in relatively small quantities. However, pressure from competition in the chemical industry led UCIL to implement "backward integration" – the manufacture of raw materials and intermediate products for formulation of the final product within one facility. This was inherently a more sophisticated and hazardous process [ 2 ].

In 1984, the plant was manufacturing Sevin at one quarter of its production capacity due to decreased demand for pesticides. Widespread crop failures and famine on the subcontinent in the 1980s led to increased indebtedness and decreased capital for farmers to invest in pesticides. Local managers were directed to close the plant and prepare it for sale in July 1984 due to decreased profitability [ 3 ]. When no ready buyer was found, UCIL made plans to dismantle key production units of the facility for shipment to another developing country. In the meantime, the facility continued to operate with safety equipment and procedures far below the standards found in its sister plant in Institute, West Virginia. The local government was aware of safety problems but was reticent to place heavy industrial safety and pollution control burdens on the struggling industry because it feared the economic effects of the loss of such a large employer [ 3 ].

At 11.00 PM on December 2 1984, while most of the one million residents of Bhopal slept, an operator at the plant noticed a small leak of methyl isocyanate (MIC) gas and increasing pressure inside a storage tank. The vent-gas scrubber, a safety device designer to neutralize toxic discharge from the MIC system, had been turned off three weeks prior [ 3 ]. Apparently a faulty valve had allowed one ton of water for cleaning internal pipes to mix with forty tons of MIC [ 1 ]. A 30 ton refrigeration unit that normally served as a safety component to cool the MIC storage tank had been drained of its coolant for use in another part of the plant [ 3 ]. Pressure and heat from the vigorous exothermic reaction in the tank continued to build. The gas flare safety system was out of action and had been for three months. At around 1.00 AM, December 3, loud rumbling reverberated around the plant as a safety valve gave way sending a plume of MIC gas into the early morning air [ 4 ]. Within hours, the streets of Bhopal were littered with human corpses and the carcasses of buffaloes, cows, dogs and birds. An estimated 3,800 people died immediately, mostly in the poor slum colony adjacent to the UCC plant [ 1 , 5 ]. Local hospitals were soon overwhelmed with the injured, a crisis further compounded by a lack of knowledge of exactly what gas was involved and what its effects were [ 1 ]. It became one of the worst chemical disasters in history and the name Bhopal became synonymous with industrial catastrophe [ 5 ].

Estimates of the number of people killed in the first few days by the plume from the UCC plant run as high as 10,000, with 15,000 to 20,000 premature deaths reportedly occurring in the subsequent two decades [ 6 ]. The Indian government reported that more than half a million people were exposed to the gas [ 7 ]. Several epidemiological studies conducted soon after the accident showed significant morbidity and increased mortality in the exposed population. Table 1 . summarizes early and late effects on health. These data are likely to under-represent the true extent of adverse health effects because many exposed individuals left Bhopal immediately following the disaster never to return and were therefore lost to follow-up [ 8 ].

Immediately after the disaster, UCC began attempts to dissociate itself from responsibility for the gas leak. Its principal tactic was to shift culpability to UCIL, stating the plant was wholly built and operated by the Indian subsidiary. It also fabricated scenarios involving sabotage by previously unknown Sikh extremist groups and disgruntled employees but this theory was impugned by numerous independent sources [ 1 ].

The toxic plume had barely cleared when, on December 7, the first multi-billion dollar lawsuit was filed by an American attorney in a U.S. court. This was the beginning of years of legal machinations in which the ethical implications of the tragedy and its affect on Bhopal's people were largely ignored. In March 1985, the Indian government enacted the Bhopal Gas Leak Disaster Act as a way of ensuring that claims arising from the accident would be dealt with speedily and equitably. The Act made the government the sole representative of the victims in legal proceedings both within and outside India. Eventually all cases were taken out of the U.S. legal system under the ruling of the presiding American judge and placed entirely under Indian jurisdiction much to the detriment of the injured parties.

In a settlement mediated by the Indian Supreme Court, UCC accepted moral responsibility and agreed to pay $470 million to the Indian government to be distributed to claimants as a full and final settlement. The figure was partly based on the disputed claim that only 3000 people died and 102,000 suffered permanent disabilities [ 9 ]. Upon announcing this settlement, shares of UCC rose $2 per share or 7% in value [ 1 ]. Had compensation in Bhopal been paid at the same rate that asbestosis victims where being awarded in US courts by defendant including UCC – which mined asbestos from 1963 to 1985 – the liability would have been greater than the $10 billion the company was worth and insured for in 1984 [ 10 ]. By the end of October 2003, according to the Bhopal Gas Tragedy Relief and Rehabilitation Department, compensation had been awarded to 554,895 people for injuries received and 15,310 survivors of those killed. The average amount to families of the dead was $2,200 [ 9 ].

At every turn, UCC has attempted to manipulate, obfuscate and withhold scientific data to the detriment of victims. Even to this date, the company has not stated exactly what was in the toxic cloud that enveloped the city on that December night [ 8 ]. When MIC is exposed to 200° heat, it forms degraded MIC that contains the more deadly hydrogen cyanide (HCN). There was clear evidence that the storage tank temperature did reach this level in the disaster. The cherry-red color of blood and viscera of some victims were characteristic of acute cyanide poisoning [ 11 ]. Moreover, many responded well to administration of sodium thiosulfate, an effective therapy for cyanide poisoning but not MIC exposure [ 11 ]. UCC initially recommended use of sodium thiosulfate but withdrew the statement later prompting suggestions that it attempted to cover up evidence of HCN in the gas leak. The presence of HCN was vigorously denied by UCC and was a point of conjecture among researchers [ 8 , 11 – 13 ].

As further insult, UCC discontinued operation at its Bhopal plant following the disaster but failed to clean up the industrial site completely. The plant continues to leak several toxic chemicals and heavy metals that have found their way into local aquifers. Dangerously contaminated water has now been added to the legacy left by the company for the people of Bhopal [ 1 , 14 ].

Lessons learned

The events in Bhopal revealed that expanding industrialization in developing countries without concurrent evolution in safety regulations could have catastrophic consequences [ 4 ]. The disaster demonstrated that seemingly local problems of industrial hazards and toxic contamination are often tied to global market dynamics. UCC's Sevin production plant was built in Madhya Pradesh not to avoid environmental regulations in the U.S. but to exploit the large and growing Indian pesticide market. However the manner in which the project was executed suggests the existence of a double standard for multinational corporations operating in developing countries [ 1 ]. Enforceable uniform international operating regulations for hazardous industries would have provided a mechanism for significantly improved in safety in Bhopal. Even without enforcement, international standards could provide norms for measuring performance of individual companies engaged in hazardous activities such as the manufacture of pesticides and other toxic chemicals in India [ 15 ]. National governments and international agencies should focus on widely applicable techniques for corporate responsibility and accident prevention as much in the developing world context as in advanced industrial nations [ 16 ]. Specifically, prevention should include risk reduction in plant location and design and safety legislation [ 17 ].

Local governments clearly cannot allow industrial facilities to be situated within urban areas, regardless of the evolution of land use over time. Industry and government need to bring proper financial support to local communities so they can provide medical and other necessary services to reduce morbidity, mortality and material loss in the case of industrial accidents.

Public health infrastructure was very weak in Bhopal in 1984. Tap water was available for only a few hours a day and was of very poor quality. With no functioning sewage system, untreated human waste was dumped into two nearby lakes, one a source of drinking water. The city had four major hospitals but there was a shortage of physicians and hospital beds. There was also no mass casualty emergency response system in place in the city [ 3 ]. Existing public health infrastructure needs to be taken into account when hazardous industries choose sites for manufacturing plants. Future management of industrial development requires that appropriate resources be devoted to advance planning before any disaster occurs [ 18 ]. Communities that do not possess infrastructure and technical expertise to respond adequately to such industrial accidents should not be chosen as sites for hazardous industry.

Following the events of December 3 1984 environmental awareness and activism in India increased significantly. The Environment Protection Act was passed in 1986, creating the Ministry of Environment and Forests (MoEF) and strengthening India's commitment to the environment. Under the new act, the MoEF was given overall responsibility for administering and enforcing environmental laws and policies. It established the importance of integrating environmental strategies into all industrial development plans for the country. However, despite greater government commitment to protect public health, forests, and wildlife, policies geared to developing the country's economy have taken precedence in the last 20 years [ 19 ].

India has undergone tremendous economic growth in the two decades since the Bhopal disaster. Gross domestic product (GDP) per capita has increased from $1,000 in 1984 to $2,900 in 2004 and it continues to grow at a rate of over 8% per year [ 20 ]. Rapid industrial development has contributed greatly to economic growth but there has been significant cost in environmental degradation and increased public health risks. Since abatement efforts consume a large portion of India's GDP, MoEF faces an uphill battle as it tries to fulfill its mandate of reducing industrial pollution [ 19 ]. Heavy reliance on coal-fired power plants and poor enforcement of vehicle emission laws have result from economic concerns taking precedence over environmental protection [ 19 ].

With the industrial growth since 1984, there has been an increase in small scale industries (SSIs) that are clustered about major urban areas in India. There are generally less stringent rules for the treatment of waste produced by SSIs due to less waste generation within each individual industry. This has allowed SSIs to dispose of untreated wastewater into drainage systems that flow directly into rivers. New Delhi's Yamuna River is illustrative. Dangerously high levels of heavy metals such as lead, cobalt, cadmium, chrome, nickel and zinc have been detected in this river which is a major supply of potable water to India's capital thus posing a potential health risk to the people living there and areas downstream [ 21 ].

Land pollution due to uncontrolled disposal of industrial solid and hazardous waste is also a problem throughout India. With rapid industrialization, the generation of industrial solid and hazardous waste has increased appreciably and the environmental impact is significant [ 22 ].

India relaxed its controls on foreign investment in order to accede to WTO rules and thereby attract an increasing flow of capital. In the process, a number of environmental regulations are being rolled back as growing foreign investments continue to roll in. The Indian experience is comparable to that of a number of developing countries that are experiencing the environmental impacts of structural adjustment. Exploitation and export of natural resources has accelerated on the subcontinent. Prohibitions against locating industrial facilities in ecologically sensitive zones have been eliminated while conservation zones are being stripped of their status so that pesticide, cement and bauxite mines can be built [ 23 ]. Heavy reliance on coal-fired power plants and poor enforcement of vehicle emission laws are other consequences of economic concerns taking precedence over environmental protection [ 19 ].

In March 2001, residents of Kodaikanal in southern India caught the Anglo-Dutch company, Unilever, red-handed when they discovered a dumpsite with toxic mercury laced waste from a thermometer factory run by the company's Indian subsidiary, Hindustan Lever. The 7.4 ton stockpile of mercury-laden glass was found in torn stacks spilling onto the ground in a scrap metal yard located near a school. In the fall of 2001, steel from the ruins of the World Trade Center was exported to India apparently without first being tested for contamination from asbestos and heavy metals present in the twin tower debris. Other examples of poor environmental stewardship and economic considerations taking precedence over public health concerns abound [ 24 ].

The Bhopal disaster could have changed the nature of the chemical industry and caused a reexamination of the necessity to produce such potentially harmful products in the first place. However the lessons of acute and chronic effects of exposure to pesticides and their precursors in Bhopal has not changed agricultural practice patterns. An estimated 3 million people per year suffer the consequences of pesticide poisoning with most exposure occurring in the agricultural developing world. It is reported to be the cause of at least 22,000 deaths in India each year. In the state of Kerala, significant mortality and morbidity have been reported following exposure to Endosulfan, a toxic pesticide whose use continued for 15 years after the events of Bhopal [ 25 ].

Aggressive marketing of asbestos continues in developing countries as a result of restrictions being placed on its use in developed nations due to the well-established link between asbestos products and respiratory diseases. India has become a major consumer, using around 100,000 tons of asbestos per year, 80% of which is imported with Canada being the largest overseas supplier. Mining, production and use of asbestos in India is very loosely regulated despite the health hazards. Reports have shown morbidity and mortality from asbestos related disease will continue in India without enforcement of a ban or significantly tighter controls [ 26 , 27 ].

UCC has shrunk to one sixth of its size since the Bhopal disaster in an effort to restructure and divest itself. By doing so, the company avoided a hostile takeover, placed a significant portion of UCC's assets out of legal reach of the victims and gave its shareholder and top executives bountiful profits [ 1 ]. The company still operates under the ownership of Dow Chemicals and still states on its website that the Bhopal disaster was "cause by deliberate sabotage". [ 28 ].

Some positive changes were seen following the Bhopal disaster. The British chemical company, ICI, whose Indian subsidiary manufactured pesticides, increased attention to health, safety and environmental issues following the events of December 1984. The subsidiary now spends 30–40% of their capital expenditures on environmental-related projects. However, they still do not adhere to standards as strict as their parent company in the UK. [ 24 ].

The US chemical giant DuPont learned its lesson of Bhopal in a different way. The company attempted for a decade to export a nylon plant from Richmond, VA to Goa, India. In its early negotiations with the Indian government, DuPont had sought and won a remarkable clause in its investment agreement that absolved it from all liabilities in case of an accident. But the people of Goa were not willing to acquiesce while an important ecological site was cleared for a heavy polluting industry. After nearly a decade of protesting by Goa's residents, DuPont was forced to scuttle plans there. Chennai was the next proposed site for the plastics plant. The state government there made significantly greater demand on DuPont for concessions on public health and environmental protection. Eventually, these plans were also aborted due to what the company called "financial concerns". [ 29 ].

The tragedy of Bhopal continues to be a warning sign at once ignored and heeded. Bhopal and its aftermath were a warning that the path to industrialization, for developing countries in general and India in particular, is fraught with human, environmental and economic perils. Some moves by the Indian government, including the formation of the MoEF, have served to offer some protection of the public's health from the harmful practices of local and multinational heavy industry and grassroots organizations that have also played a part in opposing rampant development. The Indian economy is growing at a tremendous rate but at significant cost in environmental health and public safety as large and small companies throughout the subcontinent continue to pollute. Far more remains to be done for public health in the context of industrialization to show that the lessons of the countless thousands dead in Bhopal have truly been heeded.

Fortun K: Advocacy after Bhopal. 2001, Chicago , University of Chicago Press, 259.

Chapter   Google Scholar  

Shrivastava P: Managing Industrial Crisis. 1987, New Delhi , Vision Books, 196.

Google Scholar  

Shrivastava P: Bhopal: Anatomy of a Crisis. 1987, Cambridge, MA , Ballinger Publishing, 184.

Accident Summary, Union Carbide India Ltd., Bhopal, India: December 3, 1984. Hazardous Installations Directorate. 2004, Health and Safety Executive

MacKenzie D: Fresh evidence on Bhopal disaster. New Scientist. 2002, 19 (1):

Sharma DC: Bhopal: 20 Years On. Lancet. 2005, 365 (9454): 111-112. 10.1016/S0140-6736(05)17722-8.

Article   Google Scholar  

Cassells J: Sovereign immunity: Law in an unequal world. Social and legal studies. 1996, 5 (3): 431-436.

Dhara VR, Dhara R: The Union Carbide disaster in Bhopal: a review of health effects. Arch Environ Health. 2002, 57 (5): 391-404.

Kumar S: Victims of gas leak in Bhopal seek redress on compensation. Bmj. 2004, 329 (7462): 366-10.1136/bmj.329.7462.366-b.

Castleman B PP: Appendix: the Bhopal disaster as a case study in double standards. The export of hazards: trans-national corporations and environmental control issues. Edited by: Ives J. 1985, London , Routledge and Kegan Paul, 213-222.

Mangla B: Long-term effects of methyl isocyanate. Lancet. 1989, 2 (8654): 103-10.1016/S0140-6736(89)90340-1.

Article   CAS   Google Scholar  

Varma DR: Hydrogen cyanide and Bhopal. Lancet. 1989, 2 (8662): 567-568. 10.1016/S0140-6736(89)90695-8.

Anderson N: Long-term effects of mthyl isocyanate. Lancet. 1989, 2 (8662): 1259-10.1016/S0140-6736(89)92347-7.

Chander J: Water contamination: a legacy of the union carbide disaster in Bhopal, India. Int J Occup Environ Health. 2001, 7 (1): 72-73.

Tyagi YK, Rosencranz A: Some international law aspects of the Bhopal disaster. Soc Sci Med. 1988, 27 (10): 1105-1112. 10.1016/0277-9536(88)90305-X.

Carlsten C: The Bhopal disaster: prevention should have priority now. Int J Occup Environ Health. 2003, 9 (1): 93-94.

Bertazzi PA: Future prevention and handling of environmental accidents. Scand J Work Environ Health. 1999, 25 (6): 580-588.

Dhara VR: What ails the Bhopal disaster investigations? (And is there a cure?). Int J Occup Environ Health. 2002, 8 (4): 371-379.

EIA: India: environmental issues. Edited by: energy D. [ http://www.eia.doe.gov/emeu/cabs/indiaenv.html ]

CIA: The world factbook: India. [ http://www.cia.gov/cia/publications/factbook/geos/in.html#Econ ]

Rawat M, Moturi MC, Subramanian V: Inventory compilation and distribution of heavy metals in wastewater from small-scale industrial areas of Delhi, India. J Environ Monit. 2003, 5 (6): 906-912. 10.1039/b306628b.

Vijay R, Sihorwala TA: Identification and leaching characteristics of sludge generated from metal pickling and electroplating industries by Toxicity Characteristics Leaching Procedure (TCLP). Environ Monit Assess. 2003, 84 (3): 193-202. 10.1023/A:1023363423345.

Karliner J: The corporate planet. 1997, San Francisco , Sierra Club Books, 247.

Bruno KKJ: Earthsummit,biz:The corporate takeover of sustainable development. 2002, Oakland, Ca , First Food Books, 237.

Power M: The poison stream: letter from Kerala. Harper's. 2004, August, 2004: 51-61.

Joshi TK, Gupta RK: Asbestos in developing countries: magnitude of risk and its practical implications. Int J Occup Med Environ Health. 2004, 17 (1): 179-185.

Joshi TK, Gupta RK: Asbestos-related morbidity in India. Int J Occup Environ Health. 2003, 9 (3): 249-253.

Union Carbide: Bhopal Information Center. wwwbhopalcom/ucshtm. 2005

Corporate Watch UK: DuPont: A corporate profile. [ http://www.corporatewatch.org.uk/profiles/dupont/dupont4.htm ]

Beckett WS: Persistent respiratory effects in survivors of the Bhopal disaster. Thorax. 1998, 53 Suppl 2: S43-6.

Misra UK, Kalita J: A study of cognitive functions in methyl-iso-cyanate victims one year after bhopal accident. Neurotoxicology. 1997, 18 (2): 381-386.

CAS   Google Scholar  

Irani SF, Mahashur AA: A survey of Bhopal children affected by methyl isocyanate gas. J Postgrad Med. 1986, 32 (4): 195-198.

Download references

Acknowledgements

J. Barab, B. Castleman, R Dhara and U Misra reviewed the manuscript and provided useful suggestions.

Author information

Authors and affiliations.

Columbia University, Mailman School of Public Health, 600 W, 168th St., New York, NY, 10032, USA

Edward Broughton

You can also search for this author in PubMed   Google Scholar

Corresponding author

Correspondence to Edward Broughton .

Additional information

Competing interests.

The author(s) declare that they have no competing interests.

Authors’ original submitted files for images

Below are the links to the authors’ original submitted files for images.

Authors’ original file for figure 1

Rights and permissions.

Reprints and permissions

About this article

Cite this article.

Broughton, E. The Bhopal disaster and its aftermath: a review. Environ Health 4 , 6 (2005). https://doi.org/10.1186/1476-069X-4-6

Download citation

Received : 21 December 2004

Accepted : 10 May 2005

Published : 10 May 2005

DOI : https://doi.org/10.1186/1476-069X-4-6

Share this article

Anyone you share the following link with will be able to read this content:

Sorry, a shareable link is not currently available for this article.

Provided by the Springer Nature SharedIt content-sharing initiative

• Gross Domestic Product
• Indian Government
• Storage Tank
• Union Carbide Corporation

Environmental Health

ISSN: 1476-069X

• General enquiries: [email protected]

•   OAKTrust Home
• Colleges and Schools
• Texas A&M University at Qatar
• Student Research

Show simple item record

Bhopal gas Tragedy: A safety case study

Files in this item

This item appears in the following Collection(s)

Featured Articles

Lesson from bhopal gas tragedy (1983-84).

Dr. Rhyddhi Chakraborty Programme Leader (Health and Social Care), London Churchill College, UK Email: [email protected]

Introduction and Background

Bhopal, the capital city of the Indian state of Madhya Pradesh, is the administrative headquarter of Bhopal district and Bhopal division. Around 500m above sea level, geographically Bhopal lies at the centre of India and is surrounded by hills, forests, and fields. The Bhopal Municipality covers about 285 sq km with two large dams formed in the structure of the lakes. In 1984, in the north of the dams housed the Old Town mainly with poor people and, on the South, was the villa quarters and modern building complexes. In 1970, in the North adjacent to the slums and railway station, a pesticide plant has been set up by the Union Carbide India Limited (UCIL). From late 1977, the plant started manufacturing Sevin (Carbaryl) by importing primary raw materials, viz. alpha-naphtol and methyl isocyanate (MIC) in stainless steel drums from the Union Carbide's MIC plant in USA. However, from early 1980, the Bhopal plant itself started manufacturing MIC using the know-how and basic designs supplied by Union Carbide Corporation, USA (UCC). The plant at Bhopal also produced carbon monoxide (CO) and phosgene (COCI2) as intermediate required for the production of MIC.The manufacturing process for Sevin involves the reaction of a slight excess of alpha-naphtol with MIC in the presence of a catalyst in carbon tetrachloride solvent. The chemical process employed in the Bhopal plant had methylamine reacting with phosgene to form MIC, which was then reacted with 1-naphthol to form the final product, carbaryl. The Bhopal UCIL facility housed three underground 68,000 litres liquid MIC storage tanks: E610, E611, and E619 and was claimed to ensure all the safety from leakage.

Occupational Hazards of UCIL

Soon after the plant was set up, the plant has been in news. 1976: Local trade unions complained of pollution within the plant. 1980: A worker was reported to have accidentally splashed with phosgene while carrying out a regular maintenance job of the plant's pipes. 1982 (January): A phosgene leak exposed 24 workers, all of whom were admitted to a hospital. Investigation revealed that none of the workers had been ordered to wear protective masks. 1982 (February): An MIC leak affected 18 workers. 1982 (August): A chemical engineer came into contact with liquid MIC, resulting in burns over 30 percent of his body. 1982 (October): In attempting to stop the leak, the MIC supervisor suffered severe chemical burns and two other workers were severely exposed to the gases. 1983-1984: There were leaks of MIC, chlorine, monomethylamine, phosgene, and carbon tetrachloride, sometimes in combination.

Oversighted Causes

In early December 1984, most of the Bhopal plant's MIC related safety systems were not functioning and many valves and lines were in poor condition. In addition, several vent gas scrubbers had been out of service as well as the steam boiler, intended to clean the pipes. For the major maintenance work, the MIC production and Sevin were stalled in Bhopal plant since Oct. 22,1984 and the major regular maintenance was ordered to be done during the weekdays’ day shifts. The Sevin plant, after having been shut down for some time, had been started up again during November but was still running at far below normal capacity. To make the pesticide, carbon tetrachloride is mixed with methyl isocyanate and alpha-naphthol, a coffee-coloured powder that smells like mothballs. The methyl isocyanate, or MIC, was stored in the three partly buried tanks, each with a 15,000-gallon capacity.

During the late evening hours of 2 December 1984, whilst trying to unclog, water was believed to have entered a side pipe and into Tank E610 containing 42 tons of MIC that had been there since late October. Introduction of water into the tank began a runaway exothermic reaction, which was accelerated by contaminants, high ambient temperatures and other factors, such as the presence of iron from corroding non-stainless steel pipelines.

The Fateful December Night, 1984

December 2, 2:45 pm: It was a typical Sunday afternoon and the open-air market in the city was bustling with vendors, sellers. Across the street from the factory, children were playing outside their slum huts. In the factory, about 100 workers reported for duty on the eight-hour shift. The workers expected the day to be slow to go. The problem arose when the workers had not been able to use the methyl isocyanate in the tank, No. 610, to make the pesticide, for, more than a week they could not get the chemical out of the tank. Every time they tried to push it out and into the Sevin plant by pumping in nitrogen, the nitrogen leaked out somewhere, the location which was untraced of. The workers informed the supervisor who started his duty in the second shift.

December 2, 9:15 pm: The supervisor telephoned one of the MIC operators, asked him to come to the MIC area of the plant and clean a pipe. The pipe, about 25 feet long and 8 feet off the ground, led from a device that filtered crude methyl isocyanate before it went into the storage tanks. Inside the pipe there was a valve claimed to have been closed.

December 2, 9:30 pm: The MIC operator noticed that the closed valve had not been sealed with a slip blind, a metal disc that is inserted into pipes to make sure that water does not leak through the valve. The MIC operator and the supervisor left the area, while the pipe was being cleaned. Unattended, water flowed into the pipe, out pipe drains and onto the floor, where it entered a floor drain. The water continued to flow for about three hours. According to the MIC operator, it was the only pipe in the MIC unit being washed during the second shift of the day.

December 2, 10:30 pm: The workers on duty prepared for the change in shifts in about 15 minutes. Before leaving, they logged the pressure indicated on the gauge in the control room for MIC tank No. 610 which was normal at the time. Operators, however, did not record the temperature of the tank, for, there was no column to record it in the log books.

December 2,11 pm: Two staff noticed that the pressure gauge for Tank 610 read 10 pounds per square inch - five times what it had been half an hour earlier. However, considering one of the readings as faulty, they undermined any probability of the accident in the plant.

December 2,11:30 pm: Workers in the MIC area realized that there was a MIC leak somewhere as their eyes began to tear. The workers began to look for the source of the leak. One of the workers spotted a small but a continuous drip of liquid about 50 feet off the ground and observed some yellowish-white gas accompanying the drip. He went by himself to inform the MIC operator, while the other workers kept looking at it.

December 2, 11:45 pm: MIC operator, on being informed, affirmed that he would deal with the leak after the next tea break, scheduled at 12:15 am. and the workers continued to inspect the area.

December 3, 12:15 am: All the workers had tea together in the control room about 100 feet away from the storage tanks. The workers kept on discussing about the leak, among other things, over tea.

December 3, 12:40 am: A worker, while investigating the leak, stood on a concrete slab above three large, partly buried storage tanks holding the chemical MIC. The slab suddenly began to vibrate beneath him and he witnessed at least 6 inches thick crack on the slab and heard a loud hissing sound. As he prepared to escape from the leaking gas, he saw gas shoot out of a tall stack connected to the tank, forming a white cloud that drifted over the plant and toward nearby neighbourhoods where thousands of residents were sleeping. In short span of time, the leak went out of control.

December 3, 12:45 am: The workers were aware of the enormity of the accident. They began to panic both because of the choking fumes, they said, and because of their realization that things were out of control; the concrete over the tanks crack as MIC turned from liquid to gas and shot out the stack, forming a white cloud. Part of it hung over the factory, the rest began to drift toward the sleeping neighbourhoods nearby.

The supervisor ordered all water sources in the area to be shut off and ordered water sprayed on the leak to break down the MIC. The effect of the MIC became more pronounced by the minute - workers eyes began to hurt and tear more excessively; some began to cough, they said. Someone sounded an alarm by breaking its glass. The operator made an announcement on the factory loudspeaker that there was a large MIC leak and that people should leave. Workers ran around in panic, shouting ''massive MIC leak. Within a minute or so, the fire brigade arrived on trucks and turned on several hydrants to put a water curtain around the escaping gas but the curtain reached only about 100 feet high while the gas was escaping from the top of a stack 120 feet high and was shooting another 10 feet into the air.

December 3, 12:50 am: The public siren briefly sounded and was quickly turned off, as per company procedure meant to avoid alarming the public around the factory over tiny leaks. Workers, meanwhile, evacuated the UCIL plant. The control room operator then turned on the vent gas scrubber, a device designed to neutralize escaping toxic gas. The scrubber had been under maintenance; the flow meter indicated there was no caustic soda flowing into the device. He was not clear to him whether there was actually no caustic soda in the system or whether the meter was broken. Broken gauges were not unusual at the factory. In fact, the gas was not being neutralized but was shooting out the vent scrubber stack and settling over the plant. Inside the factory, the white cloud of methyl isocyanate engulfed the production plant and started wafting toward the control room. Nearly all members of the plant staff began to leave. Those fleeing looked at the wind direction indicator, a large sock on a pole, and ran into the win. Four buses were parked by the road on which workers ran to escape. There was a provision for drivers to man the vehicles and drive them to the nearby neighbourhood, loading some residents aboard and having the rest follow, workers said. But the buses stood idle, for everybody was busy running away.

December 3, 1 am: The supervisor called the assistant factory manager. He said to turn on the flare tower, which is designed to burn off escaping gas. The supervisor gave the instruction to workers and the control room operator reminded the supervisor that turning on the flare with all that gas in the air would cause a huge explosion. The workers considered other alternatives, such as dumping the escaping gas into a spare storage tank. One of the three tanks, No. 619, was supposed to be empty, but it was not; it also contained MIC, as did No. 611. The workers started grabbing their oxygen masks and tanks.

Bhopal's superintendent of police was informed by telephone, by a town inspector, that residents of the neighbourhood of Chola (about 2 km from the plant) were fleeing a gas leak. About 25,000 people were crammed into Hamidia Hospital. The floor was splattered with blood and vomit.

The railway station lay close to the factory and smack in the path of the gas cloud. The deputy chief power controller, risked his life by staying on, while his wife and 14-year-old son died in the neighbouring railway colony. The control room which monitors movements of all trains on this vital trunk route, was, however, in a mess: vomit and human excreta scattered all around, files and registers in disorder, chairs knocked down. After midnight, the 116 Up Gorakhpur-Bombay Express rolled in but its passengers miraculously escaped death, presumably because they kept their windows closed because of the cold night, but also because station superintendent risked his life to wave the train on to safety. The super, who was found dead later, also alerted all the nearby stations to stop trains from coming into Bhopal.

December 3, 1: 15- 1:30 am: At Bhopal’s 1,200-bed Hamidia Hospital, the first patient with eye trouble reported. Within five minutes, there were a thousand patients. Calls to the UCIL plant by police were twice assured that "everything is OK", and on the last attempt made, "we don't know what has happened, sir". In the plant, meanwhile, MIC began to engulf the control room and the adjoining offices.

December 3, 2 am: The pressure and temperature gauges were still off the top of their scales. Public siren was again switched on. Minutes later, after the public siren sounded, a UCIL employee walked to a police control room to both inform them of the leak (their first acknowledgement that one had occurred at all), and that "the leak had been plugged."

December 3, 2:30 am: The gas that had begun shooting out of the stack nearly two hours earlier had stopped coming out. Meanwhile, 4,000 people suffering from not just eye ailments but also from respiratory problems were in the Hamida hospital. The hospital staff’s first response was of shock and bewilderment. Nobody knew what to do and Union Carbide was not volunteering any useful information. Several staff members at Hamidia, about three km from the factory, were soon overwhelmed by the gas themselves. They had to be replaced by a fresh medical team. When journalists visited the hospital, they saw only one doctor, and he had no medicine to treat patients with.

December 3, 2.45 am: The army had sent a fleet of vehicles and started a systematic search of houses for people trapped within. The effort was made for continuous evacuation channel to the Military Hospital as well as the Hamidia Hospital all through the night.

December 3, 3:00 am: The factory manager, arrived at the plant and sent a man to tell the police about the accident because the phones were out of order. The police were not told earlier because the company management had an informal policy of not involving the local authorities in gas leaks. Meanwhile, people were dying by the hundreds outside the factory. Some died in their sleep. Others ran into the cloud, breathing in more and more gas and dropping dead in their tracks.

December 3, 7:30 am: The major station of Bhopal remained to be cut off from the rest of the world. Hundreds of sick and writhing people were found all around, on platforms, on staircases, in the office rooms and even on the railway tracks. On the roads and footpaths around the station were the bodies of poor beggars and urchins. Those who could not flee made their way to the hospitals.

December 3, 9 am: At the Hindu cremation grounds, about 15 pyres were lit at a time. The crematoriums soon ran out of firewood and trucks had to be marshalled to bring in more. To save time, money, energy and manpower, five to ten persons were cremated on each pyre. As per Hindu rites, the children and infants were buried. At the Muslim burial ground, too, there was not enough space to bury the bodies coming in. Rescue workers dug graves each holding 11 bodies. When there was no more space left, old tombs were opened and 100-year old bones displaced to make room. The head priest of the Muslim clergy in Bhopal had to issue a fatwa to allow the digging up of old graves.

Immediate Consequences

• With the lack of timely information exchange between UCIL and Bhopal authorities, the city's Hamidia Hospital was first told that the gas leak was suspected to be ammonia, then phosgene. They were then told that it was "MIC", which hospital staff had never heard of, had no antidote for, and received no immediate information about. Apart from MIC, based on laboratory simulation conditions, the gas cloud most likely also contained chloroform, dichloromethane, hydrogen chloride, methyl amine, dimethylamine, trimethylamine and carbon dioxide, that was either present in the tank or was produced in the storage tank when MIC, chloroform and water reacted. The gas cloud, composed mainly of materials denser than air, stayed close to the ground and spread in the southeasterly direction affecting the nearby communities. The chemical reactions may have produced a liquid or solid aerosol.

• Most city residents who were exposed to the MIC gas were first made aware of the leak by exposure to the gas itself. The initial effects of exposure were coughing, severe eye irritation and a feeling of suffocation, burning in the respiratory tract, blepharospasm, breathlessness, stomach pains and vomiting. People awakened by these symptoms fled away from the plant. Those who ran inhaled more than those who had a vehicle to ride. Owing to their height, children and other people of shorter stature inhaled higher concentrations.

• Thousands of people had died by the following morning. Primary causes of deaths were choking, reflexogenic circulatory collapse and pulmonary oedema. Findings during autopsies revealed changes not only in the lungs but also cerebral oedema, tubular necrosis of the kidneys, fatty degeneration of the liver and necrotising enteritis.

• By the time the sun rose, hundreds, some even say thousands, lay dead, many on the roads and many at home under their tattered quilts: corpses with distended bellies were beginning to rot, attracting vultures and dogs.

• Within a few days, trees in the vicinity became barren and bloated animal carcasses had to be disposed of. 170,000 people were treated at hospitals and temporary dispensaries; 2,000 buffalo, goats, and other animals were collected and buried. Supplies, including food, became scarce owing to suppliers' safety fears. Fishing was prohibited causing further supply shortages.

Subsequent legal action

• Formal statements were issued that air, water, vegetation and foodstuffs were safe, but warned not to consume fish. The number of children exposed to the gases was at least 200,000. Within weeks, the State Government established a number of hospitals, clinics and mobile units in the gas-affected area to treat the victims.

• Legal proceedings involving UCC, the United States and Indian governments, local Bhopal authorities, and the disaster victims started immediately after the catastrophe. The Indian Government passed the Bhopal Gas Leak Act in March 1985, allowing the Government of India to act as the legal representative for victims of the disaster, leading to the beginning of legal proceedings.

• Initial lawsuits were generated in the United States federal court system in April 1985. Eventually, in an out-of-court settlement reached in February 1989, Union Carbide agreed to pay US$470 million for damages caused in the Bhopal disaster. The amount was immediately paid.

• Throughout 1990, the Indian Supreme Court heard appeals against the settlement. In October 1991, the Supreme Court upheld the original $470 million, dismissing any other outstanding petitions that challenged the original decision. The Court ordered the Indian government "to purchase, out of settlement fund, a group medical insurance policy to cover 100,000 persons who may later develop symptoms" and cover any shortfall in the settlement fund. It also requested UCC and its subsidiary UCIL "voluntarily" fund a hospital in Bhopal, at an estimated $17 million, to specifically treat victims of the Bhopal disaster. The company agreed to this.[32]

Post-settlement activity

UCC chairman and CEO Warren Anderson was arrested and released on bail by the Madhya Pradesh Police in Bhopal on 7 December 1984. Anderson was taken to UCC's house after which he was released six hours later on $2,100 bail and flown out on a government plane. Anderson, eight other executives and two company affiliates with homicide charges to appear in Indian court. In response, Union Carbide said the company is not under Indian jurisdiction. In 1991, the local Bhopal authorities charged Anderson, who had retired in 1986, with manslaughter, a crime that carries a maximum penalty of 10 years in prison. He was declared a fugitive from justice by the Chief Judicial Magistrate of Bhopal on 1 February 1992 for failing to appear at the court hearings in a culpable homicide case in which he was named the chief defendant. Orders were passed to the Government of India to press for an extradition from the United States. From 2014, Dow is a named respondent in a number of ongoing cases arising from Union Carbide’s business in Bhopal.

In 2004, the Indian Supreme Court ordered the Indian government to release any remaining settlement funds to victims. And in September 2006, the Welfare Commission for Bhopal Gas Victims announced that all original compensation claims and revised petitions had been "cleared".

In June 2010, seven former employees of UCIL, all Indian nationals and many in their 70s, were convicted of causing death by negligence. They were each sentenced to two years imprisonment and fined Rs.100,000 (US$2,124). All were released on bail shortly after the verdict.

US Federal class action litigation, Sahu v. Union Carbide and Warren Anderson, had been filed in 1999 under the U.S. Alien Torts Claims Act (ATCA), which provides for civil remedies for "crimes against humanity."[34] It sought damages for personal injury, medical monitoring and injunctive relief in the form of clean-up of the drinking water supplies for residential areas near the Bhopal plant. The lawsuit was dismissed in 2012 and subsequent appeal denied.[35] Anderson died in 2014.

Long-term health effects

• A total of 36 wards were marked by the authorities as being "gas affected," affecting a population of 520,000. Of these, 200,000 were below 15 years of age, and 3,000 were pregnant women. The official immediate death toll was 2,259, and in 1991, 3,928 deaths had been officially certified. The government of Madhya Pradesh confirmed a total of 3,787 deaths related to the gas release.

• Later, the affected area was expanded to include 700,000 citizens. A government affidavit in 2006 stated the leak caused 558,125 injuries including 38,478 temporary partial injuries and approximately 3,900 severely and permanently disabling injuries.

Studied and reported long term health effects are:

• Eyes: Chronic conjunctivitis, scars on cornea, corneal opacities, early cataracts
• Respiratory tracts: Obstructive and/or restrictive disease, pulmonary fibrosis, aggravation of TB and chronic bronchitis, irritation to the lungs, causing coughing and/or shortness of breathing. Higher exposure caused build up of fluids (pulmonary enema), caused asthma.
• Neurological system: Impairment of memory, finer motor skills, numbness etc.
• Psychological problems: Post traumatic stress disorder (PTSD)
• Children’s health: Peri- and neonatal death rates increased. Failure to grow, intellectual impairment, etc.
• Cancer Hazard: Caused mutation( genetic changes).
• Milk Contamination: Traces of toxins were found in the breast milk of mothers and were in turn transmitted to the recipient babies.

Affect on Soil and Water: Lead, Nickel, Copper, Chromium, hexachlorocyclophexane and chlorobenzenes were found in soil samples. Mercury was found to be between 20,000 to 6,000,000 times the standard level in soil.

Health care

• The Government of India had focused primarily on increasing the hospital-based services for gas victims thus hospitals had been built after the disaster.
• When UCC wanted to sell its shares in UCIL, it was directed by the Supreme Court to finance a 500-bed hospital for the medical care of the survivors. Thus, Bhopal Memorial Hospital and Research Centre (BMHRC) was inaugurated in 1998 and was obliged to give free care for survivors for eight years. BMHRC was a 350-bedded super speciality hospital where heart surgery and hemodialysis were done.
• Sambhavna Trust is a charitable trust, registered in 1995, that gives modern as well as ayurvedic treatments to gas victims, free of charge.

Environmental rehabilitation

• In 1982 tubewells in the vicinity of the UCIL factory had to be abandoned and tests in 1989 performed by UCC's laboratory revealed that soil and water samples collected from near the factory and inside the plant were toxic to fish.
• Several other studies had also shown polluted soil and groundwater in the area. Reported polluting compounds include 1-naphthol, naphthalene, Sevin, tarry residue, mercury, toxic organochlorines, volatile organochlorine compounds, chromium, copper, nickel, lead, hexachloroethane, hexachlorobutadiene, and the pesticide HCH.

Occupational and habitation rehabilitation

• It was estimated that 50,000 persons need alternative jobs, and that less than 100 gas victims had found regular employment under the government's scheme.
• The government also planned 2,486 flats in two- and four-story buildings in what is called the "widow's colony" outside Bhopal. The water did not reach the upper floors and it was not possible to keep cattle which were their primary occupation.

Economic rehabilitation

• Relief measures commenced in 1985 when food was distributed for a short period along with ration cards.
• By the end of October 2003, according to the Bhopal Gas Tragedy Relief and Rehabilitation Department, compensation had been awarded to 554,895 people for injuries received and 15,310 survivors of those killed. The average amount to families of the dead was $2,200.
• On 24 June 2010, the Union Cabinet of the Government of India approved a ₹12,650 million (US$190 million) aid package which would be funded by Indian taxpayers through the government.

Other impacts

In 1985, Henry Waxman, a California Democrat, called for a U.S. government inquiry into the Bhopal disaster, which resulted in U.S. legislation regarding the accidental release of toxic chemicals in the United States.

Ethical Negligence

The "corporate negligence" argument:  This point of view argues that management (and to some extent, local government) underinvested in safety, which allowed for a dangerous working environment to develop.

Safety audits:  In September 1984, an internal UCC report on the West Virginia plant in the USA revealed a number of defects and malfunctions. It warned that "a runaway reaction could occur in the MIC unit storage tanks, and that the planned response would not be timely or effective enough to prevent catastrophic failure of the tanks". This report was never forwarded to the Bhopal plant, although the main design was the same.

Causes of the disaster: the "disgruntled employee sabotage" case:  Now owned by Dow Chemical Company, Union Carbide maintains a website dedicated to the tragedy and claims that the incident was the result of sabotage, stating that sufficient safety systems were in place and operative to prevent the intrusion of water.

References 1. The Bhopal Disaster. Health, India’s Environment-1984-85; 206-232. Available at https://web.archive.org/web/20160528042900/http://www.cseindia.org/userfiles/THE%20BHOPAL%20DISASTER.pdf (28 May 2018). 2. Diamond, Staurt. 1985. SPECIAL TO THE NEW YORK TIMES THE DISASTER IN BHOPAL: WORKERS RECALL HORROR. Available at https://www.nytimes.com/1985/01/30/world/the-disaster-in-bhopal-workers-recall-horror.html (Accessed on 19 August 2018) 3. Dr. S. Varadarajan et al. 1985. REPORT ON SCIENTIFIC STUDIES ON THE FACTORS RELATED TO BHOPAL TOXIC GAS LEAKAGE Available at https://bhopalgasdisaster.files.wordpress.com/2014/12/csir-report-on-scientific-studies-december-1985.pdf (Accessed 28 May 2018).

 --------------------------

Your comments are invited on some or all of the following. As part of your analysis include information as appropriate on the stakeholders and how they are impacted both positively and negatively.

• What knowledge and skills are needed to implement sophisticated, appropriate and workable solutions to the complex global problems facing the world today?
• What interdisciplinary perspectives would help identify innovative and non-obvious solutions?
• What insights can you articulate, based your culture and other cultures with which you are familiar, to help understand your worldview and enable greater civic engagement?
• What is your position on the right thing(s) to do?

You need to be a member of The Ethical Engineer to add comments!

Hello, you need to enable JavaScript to use The Ethical Engineer.

Please check your browser settings or contact your system administrator.

An official website of the United States government

The .gov means it’s official. Federal government websites often end in .gov or .mil. Before sharing sensitive information, make sure you’re on a federal government site.

The site is secure. The https:// ensures that you are connecting to the official website and that any information you provide is encrypted and transmitted securely.

• Publications
• Account settings

Preview improvements coming to the PMC website in October 2024. Learn More or Try it out now .

• Advanced Search
• Journal List
• Environ Health

The Bhopal disaster and its aftermath: a review

Edward broughton.

1 Columbia University, Mailman School of Public Health, 600 W 168th St. New York, NY 10032 USA

This is an Open Access article distributed under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution License ( http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/2.0 ), which permits unrestricted use, distribution, and reproduction in any medium, provided the original work is properly cited.

On December 3 1984, more than 40 tons of methyl isocyanate gas leaked from a pesticide plant in Bhopal, India, immediately killing at least 3,800 people and causing significant morbidity and premature death for many thousands more. The company involved in what became the worst industrial accident in history immediately tried to dissociate itself from legal responsibility. Eventually it reached a settlement with the Indian Government through mediation of that country's Supreme Court and accepted moral responsibility. It paid $470 million in compensation, a relatively small amount of based on significant underestimations of the long-term health consequences of exposure and the number of people exposed. The disaster indicated a need for enforceable international standards for environmental safety, preventative strategies to avoid similar accidents and industrial disaster preparedness.

Since the disaster, India has experienced rapid industrialization. While some positive changes in government policy and behavior of a few industries have taken place, major threats to the environment from rapid and poorly regulated industrial growth remain. Widespread environmental degradation with significant adverse human health consequences continues to occur throughout India.

December 2004 marked the twentieth anniversary of the massive toxic gas leak from Union Carbide Corporation's chemical plant in Bhopal in the state of Madhya Pradesh, India that killed more than 3,800 people. This review examines the health effects of exposure to the disaster, the legal response, the lessons learned and whether or not these are put into practice in India in terms of industrial development, environmental management and public health.

In the 1970s, the Indian government initiated policies to encourage foreign companies to invest in local industry. Union Carbide Corporation (UCC) was asked to build a plant for the manufacture of Sevin, a pesticide commonly used throughout Asia. As part of the deal, India's government insisted that a significant percentage of the investment come from local shareholders. The government itself had a 22% stake in the company's subsidiary, Union Carbide India Limited (UCIL) [ 1 ]. The company built the plant in Bhopal because of its central location and access to transport infrastructure. The specific site within the city was zoned for light industrial and commercial use, not for hazardous industry. The plant was initially approved only for formulation of pesticides from component chemicals, such as MIC imported from the parent company, in relatively small quantities. However, pressure from competition in the chemical industry led UCIL to implement "backward integration" – the manufacture of raw materials and intermediate products for formulation of the final product within one facility. This was inherently a more sophisticated and hazardous process [ 2 ].

In 1984, the plant was manufacturing Sevin at one quarter of its production capacity due to decreased demand for pesticides. Widespread crop failures and famine on the subcontinent in the 1980s led to increased indebtedness and decreased capital for farmers to invest in pesticides. Local managers were directed to close the plant and prepare it for sale in July 1984 due to decreased profitability [ 3 ]. When no ready buyer was found, UCIL made plans to dismantle key production units of the facility for shipment to another developing country. In the meantime, the facility continued to operate with safety equipment and procedures far below the standards found in its sister plant in Institute, West Virginia. The local government was aware of safety problems but was reticent to place heavy industrial safety and pollution control burdens on the struggling industry because it feared the economic effects of the loss of such a large employer [ 3 ].

At 11.00 PM on December 2 1984, while most of the one million residents of Bhopal slept, an operator at the plant noticed a small leak of methyl isocyanate (MIC) gas and increasing pressure inside a storage tank. The vent-gas scrubber, a safety device designer to neutralize toxic discharge from the MIC system, had been turned off three weeks prior [ 3 ]. Apparently a faulty valve had allowed one ton of water for cleaning internal pipes to mix with forty tons of MIC [ 1 ]. A 30 ton refrigeration unit that normally served as a safety component to cool the MIC storage tank had been drained of its coolant for use in another part of the plant [ 3 ]. Pressure and heat from the vigorous exothermic reaction in the tank continued to build. The gas flare safety system was out of action and had been for three months. At around 1.00 AM, December 3, loud rumbling reverberated around the plant as a safety valve gave way sending a plume of MIC gas into the early morning air [ 4 ]. Within hours, the streets of Bhopal were littered with human corpses and the carcasses of buffaloes, cows, dogs and birds. An estimated 3,800 people died immediately, mostly in the poor slum colony adjacent to the UCC plant [ 1 , 5 ]. Local hospitals were soon overwhelmed with the injured, a crisis further compounded by a lack of knowledge of exactly what gas was involved and what its effects were [ 1 ]. It became one of the worst chemical disasters in history and the name Bhopal became synonymous with industrial catastrophe [ 5 ].

Estimates of the number of people killed in the first few days by the plume from the UCC plant run as high as 10,000, with 15,000 to 20,000 premature deaths reportedly occurring in the subsequent two decades [ 6 ]. The Indian government reported that more than half a million people were exposed to the gas [ 7 ]. Several epidemiological studies conducted soon after the accident showed significant morbidity and increased mortality in the exposed population. Table ​ Table1. 1 . summarizes early and late effects on health. These data are likely to under-represent the true extent of adverse health effects because many exposed individuals left Bhopal immediately following the disaster never to return and were therefore lost to follow-up [ 8 ].

Health effects of the Bhopal methyl isocyanate gas leak exposure [8, 30-32].

Immediately after the disaster, UCC began attempts to dissociate itself from responsibility for the gas leak. Its principal tactic was to shift culpability to UCIL, stating the plant was wholly built and operated by the Indian subsidiary. It also fabricated scenarios involving sabotage by previously unknown Sikh extremist groups and disgruntled employees but this theory was impugned by numerous independent sources [ 1 ].

The toxic plume had barely cleared when, on December 7, the first multi-billion dollar lawsuit was filed by an American attorney in a U.S. court. This was the beginning of years of legal machinations in which the ethical implications of the tragedy and its affect on Bhopal's people were largely ignored. In March 1985, the Indian government enacted the Bhopal Gas Leak Disaster Act as a way of ensuring that claims arising from the accident would be dealt with speedily and equitably. The Act made the government the sole representative of the victims in legal proceedings both within and outside India. Eventually all cases were taken out of the U.S. legal system under the ruling of the presiding American judge and placed entirely under Indian jurisdiction much to the detriment of the injured parties.

In a settlement mediated by the Indian Supreme Court, UCC accepted moral responsibility and agreed to pay $470 million to the Indian government to be distributed to claimants as a full and final settlement. The figure was partly based on the disputed claim that only 3000 people died and 102,000 suffered permanent disabilities [ 9 ]. Upon announcing this settlement, shares of UCC rose $2 per share or 7% in value [ 1 ]. Had compensation in Bhopal been paid at the same rate that asbestosis victims where being awarded in US courts by defendant including UCC – which mined asbestos from 1963 to 1985 – the liability would have been greater than the $10 billion the company was worth and insured for in 1984 [ 10 ]. By the end of October 2003, according to the Bhopal Gas Tragedy Relief and Rehabilitation Department, compensation had been awarded to 554,895 people for injuries received and 15,310 survivors of those killed. The average amount to families of the dead was $2,200 [ 9 ].

At every turn, UCC has attempted to manipulate, obfuscate and withhold scientific data to the detriment of victims. Even to this date, the company has not stated exactly what was in the toxic cloud that enveloped the city on that December night [ 8 ]. When MIC is exposed to 200° heat, it forms degraded MIC that contains the more deadly hydrogen cyanide (HCN). There was clear evidence that the storage tank temperature did reach this level in the disaster. The cherry-red color of blood and viscera of some victims were characteristic of acute cyanide poisoning [ 11 ]. Moreover, many responded well to administration of sodium thiosulfate, an effective therapy for cyanide poisoning but not MIC exposure [ 11 ]. UCC initially recommended use of sodium thiosulfate but withdrew the statement later prompting suggestions that it attempted to cover up evidence of HCN in the gas leak. The presence of HCN was vigorously denied by UCC and was a point of conjecture among researchers [ 8 , 11 - 13 ].

As further insult, UCC discontinued operation at its Bhopal plant following the disaster but failed to clean up the industrial site completely. The plant continues to leak several toxic chemicals and heavy metals that have found their way into local aquifers. Dangerously contaminated water has now been added to the legacy left by the company for the people of Bhopal [ 1 , 14 ].

Lessons learned

The events in Bhopal revealed that expanding industrialization in developing countries without concurrent evolution in safety regulations could have catastrophic consequences [ 4 ]. The disaster demonstrated that seemingly local problems of industrial hazards and toxic contamination are often tied to global market dynamics. UCC's Sevin production plant was built in Madhya Pradesh not to avoid environmental regulations in the U.S. but to exploit the large and growing Indian pesticide market. However the manner in which the project was executed suggests the existence of a double standard for multinational corporations operating in developing countries [ 1 ]. Enforceable uniform international operating regulations for hazardous industries would have provided a mechanism for significantly improved in safety in Bhopal. Even without enforcement, international standards could provide norms for measuring performance of individual companies engaged in hazardous activities such as the manufacture of pesticides and other toxic chemicals in India [ 15 ]. National governments and international agencies should focus on widely applicable techniques for corporate responsibility and accident prevention as much in the developing world context as in advanced industrial nations [ 16 ]. Specifically, prevention should include risk reduction in plant location and design and safety legislation [ 17 ].

Local governments clearly cannot allow industrial facilities to be situated within urban areas, regardless of the evolution of land use over time. Industry and government need to bring proper financial support to local communities so they can provide medical and other necessary services to reduce morbidity, mortality and material loss in the case of industrial accidents.

Public health infrastructure was very weak in Bhopal in 1984. Tap water was available for only a few hours a day and was of very poor quality. With no functioning sewage system, untreated human waste was dumped into two nearby lakes, one a source of drinking water. The city had four major hospitals but there was a shortage of physicians and hospital beds. There was also no mass casualty emergency response system in place in the city [ 3 ]. Existing public health infrastructure needs to be taken into account when hazardous industries choose sites for manufacturing plants. Future management of industrial development requires that appropriate resources be devoted to advance planning before any disaster occurs [ 18 ]. Communities that do not possess infrastructure and technical expertise to respond adequately to such industrial accidents should not be chosen as sites for hazardous industry.

Following the events of December 3 1984 environmental awareness and activism in India increased significantly. The Environment Protection Act was passed in 1986, creating the Ministry of Environment and Forests (MoEF) and strengthening India's commitment to the environment. Under the new act, the MoEF was given overall responsibility for administering and enforcing environmental laws and policies. It established the importance of integrating environmental strategies into all industrial development plans for the country. However, despite greater government commitment to protect public health, forests, and wildlife, policies geared to developing the country's economy have taken precedence in the last 20 years [ 19 ].

India has undergone tremendous economic growth in the two decades since the Bhopal disaster. Gross domestic product (GDP) per capita has increased from $1,000 in 1984 to $2,900 in 2004 and it continues to grow at a rate of over 8% per year [ 20 ]. Rapid industrial development has contributed greatly to economic growth but there has been significant cost in environmental degradation and increased public health risks. Since abatement efforts consume a large portion of India's GDP, MoEF faces an uphill battle as it tries to fulfill its mandate of reducing industrial pollution [ 19 ]. Heavy reliance on coal-fired power plants and poor enforcement of vehicle emission laws have result from economic concerns taking precedence over environmental protection [ 19 ].

With the industrial growth since 1984, there has been an increase in small scale industries (SSIs) that are clustered about major urban areas in India. There are generally less stringent rules for the treatment of waste produced by SSIs due to less waste generation within each individual industry. This has allowed SSIs to dispose of untreated wastewater into drainage systems that flow directly into rivers. New Delhi's Yamuna River is illustrative. Dangerously high levels of heavy metals such as lead, cobalt, cadmium, chrome, nickel and zinc have been detected in this river which is a major supply of potable water to India's capital thus posing a potential health risk to the people living there and areas downstream [ 21 ].

Land pollution due to uncontrolled disposal of industrial solid and hazardous waste is also a problem throughout India. With rapid industrialization, the generation of industrial solid and hazardous waste has increased appreciably and the environmental impact is significant [ 22 ].

India relaxed its controls on foreign investment in order to accede to WTO rules and thereby attract an increasing flow of capital. In the process, a number of environmental regulations are being rolled back as growing foreign investments continue to roll in. The Indian experience is comparable to that of a number of developing countries that are experiencing the environmental impacts of structural adjustment. Exploitation and export of natural resources has accelerated on the subcontinent. Prohibitions against locating industrial facilities in ecologically sensitive zones have been eliminated while conservation zones are being stripped of their status so that pesticide, cement and bauxite mines can be built [ 23 ]. Heavy reliance on coal-fired power plants and poor enforcement of vehicle emission laws are other consequences of economic concerns taking precedence over environmental protection [ 19 ].

In March 2001, residents of Kodaikanal in southern India caught the Anglo-Dutch company, Unilever, red-handed when they discovered a dumpsite with toxic mercury laced waste from a thermometer factory run by the company's Indian subsidiary, Hindustan Lever. The 7.4 ton stockpile of mercury-laden glass was found in torn stacks spilling onto the ground in a scrap metal yard located near a school. In the fall of 2001, steel from the ruins of the World Trade Center was exported to India apparently without first being tested for contamination from asbestos and heavy metals present in the twin tower debris. Other examples of poor environmental stewardship and economic considerations taking precedence over public health concerns abound [ 24 ].

The Bhopal disaster could have changed the nature of the chemical industry and caused a reexamination of the necessity to produce such potentially harmful products in the first place. However the lessons of acute and chronic effects of exposure to pesticides and their precursors in Bhopal has not changed agricultural practice patterns. An estimated 3 million people per year suffer the consequences of pesticide poisoning with most exposure occurring in the agricultural developing world. It is reported to be the cause of at least 22,000 deaths in India each year. In the state of Kerala, significant mortality and morbidity have been reported following exposure to Endosulfan, a toxic pesticide whose use continued for 15 years after the events of Bhopal [ 25 ].

Aggressive marketing of asbestos continues in developing countries as a result of restrictions being placed on its use in developed nations due to the well-established link between asbestos products and respiratory diseases. India has become a major consumer, using around 100,000 tons of asbestos per year, 80% of which is imported with Canada being the largest overseas supplier. Mining, production and use of asbestos in India is very loosely regulated despite the health hazards. Reports have shown morbidity and mortality from asbestos related disease will continue in India without enforcement of a ban or significantly tighter controls [ 26 , 27 ].

UCC has shrunk to one sixth of its size since the Bhopal disaster in an effort to restructure and divest itself. By doing so, the company avoided a hostile takeover, placed a significant portion of UCC's assets out of legal reach of the victims and gave its shareholder and top executives bountiful profits [ 1 ]. The company still operates under the ownership of Dow Chemicals and still states on its website that the Bhopal disaster was "cause by deliberate sabotage". [ 28 ].

Some positive changes were seen following the Bhopal disaster. The British chemical company, ICI, whose Indian subsidiary manufactured pesticides, increased attention to health, safety and environmental issues following the events of December 1984. The subsidiary now spends 30–40% of their capital expenditures on environmental-related projects. However, they still do not adhere to standards as strict as their parent company in the UK. [ 24 ].

The US chemical giant DuPont learned its lesson of Bhopal in a different way. The company attempted for a decade to export a nylon plant from Richmond, VA to Goa, India. In its early negotiations with the Indian government, DuPont had sought and won a remarkable clause in its investment agreement that absolved it from all liabilities in case of an accident. But the people of Goa were not willing to acquiesce while an important ecological site was cleared for a heavy polluting industry. After nearly a decade of protesting by Goa's residents, DuPont was forced to scuttle plans there. Chennai was the next proposed site for the plastics plant. The state government there made significantly greater demand on DuPont for concessions on public health and environmental protection. Eventually, these plans were also aborted due to what the company called "financial concerns". [ 29 ].

The tragedy of Bhopal continues to be a warning sign at once ignored and heeded. Bhopal and its aftermath were a warning that the path to industrialization, for developing countries in general and India in particular, is fraught with human, environmental and economic perils. Some moves by the Indian government, including the formation of the MoEF, have served to offer some protection of the public's health from the harmful practices of local and multinational heavy industry and grassroots organizations that have also played a part in opposing rampant development. The Indian economy is growing at a tremendous rate but at significant cost in environmental health and public safety as large and small companies throughout the subcontinent continue to pollute. Far more remains to be done for public health in the context of industrialization to show that the lessons of the countless thousands dead in Bhopal have truly been heeded.

Competing interests

The author(s) declare that they have no competing interests.

Acknowledgements

J. Barab, B. Castleman, R Dhara and U Misra reviewed the manuscript and provided useful suggestions.

• Fortun K. Advocacy after Bhopal. Chicago , University of Chicago Press; 2001. p. 259. [ Google Scholar ]
• Shrivastava P. Managing Industrial Crisis. New Delhi , Vision Books; 1987. p. 196. [ Google Scholar ]
• Shrivastava P. Bhopal: Anatomy of a Crisis. Cambridge, MA , Ballinger Publishing; 1987. p. 184. [ Google Scholar ]
• Hazardous Installations Directorate. Health and Safety Executive; 2004. Accident Summary, Union Carbide India Ltd., Bhopal, India: December 3, 1984. [ Google Scholar ]
• MacKenzie D. Fresh evidence on Bhopal disaster. New Scientist. 2002; 19 [ Google Scholar ]
• Sharma DC. Bhopal: 20 Years On. Lancet. 2005; 365 :111–112. doi: 10.1016/S0140-6736(05)17722-8. [ PubMed ] [ CrossRef ] [ Google Scholar ]
• Cassells J. Sovereign immunity: Law in an unequal world. Social and legal studies. 1996; 5 :431–436. [ Google Scholar ]
• Dhara VR, Dhara R. The Union Carbide disaster in Bhopal: a review of health effects. Arch Environ Health. 2002; 57 :391–404. [ PubMed ] [ Google Scholar ]
• Kumar S. Victims of gas leak in Bhopal seek redress on compensation. Bmj. 2004; 329 :366. doi: 10.1136/bmj.329.7462.366-b. [ PMC free article ] [ PubMed ] [ CrossRef ] [ Google Scholar ]
• Castleman B PP. Appendix: the Bhopal disaster as a case study in double standards. In: Ives J, editor. The export of hazards: trans-national corporations and environmental control issues. London , Routledge and Kegan Paul; 1985. pp. 213–222. [ Google Scholar ]
• Mangla B. Long-term effects of methyl isocyanate. Lancet. 1989; 2 :103. doi: 10.1016/S0140-6736(89)90340-1. [ PubMed ] [ CrossRef ] [ Google Scholar ]
• Varma DR. Hydrogen cyanide and Bhopal. Lancet. 1989; 2 :567–568. doi: 10.1016/S0140-6736(89)90695-8. [ PubMed ] [ CrossRef ] [ Google Scholar ]
• Anderson N. Long-term effects of mthyl isocyanate. Lancet. 1989; 2 :1259. doi: 10.1016/S0140-6736(89)92347-7. [ PubMed ] [ CrossRef ] [ Google Scholar ]
• Chander J. Water contamination: a legacy of the union carbide disaster in Bhopal, India. Int J Occup Environ Health. 2001; 7 :72–73. [ PubMed ] [ Google Scholar ]
• Tyagi YK, Rosencranz A. Some international law aspects of the Bhopal disaster. Soc Sci Med. 1988; 27 :1105–1112. doi: 10.1016/0277-9536(88)90305-X. [ PubMed ] [ CrossRef ] [ Google Scholar ]
• Carlsten C. The Bhopal disaster: prevention should have priority now. Int J Occup Environ Health. 2003; 9 :93–94. [ PubMed ] [ Google Scholar ]
• Bertazzi PA. Future prevention and handling of environmental accidents. Scand J Work Environ Health. 1999; 25 :580–588. [ PubMed ] [ Google Scholar ]
• Dhara VR. What ails the Bhopal disaster investigations? (And is there a cure?) Int J Occup Environ Health. 2002; 8 :371–379. [ PubMed ] [ Google Scholar ]
• EIA . In: India: environmental issues. energy D, editor. http://www.eia.doe.gov/emeu/cabs/indiaenv.html [ Google Scholar ]
• CIA The world factbook: India http://www.cia.gov/cia/publications/factbook/geos/in.html#Econ
• Rawat M, Moturi MC, Subramanian V. Inventory compilation and distribution of heavy metals in wastewater from small-scale industrial areas of Delhi, India. J Environ Monit. 2003; 5 :906–912. doi: 10.1039/b306628b. [ PubMed ] [ CrossRef ] [ Google Scholar ]
• Vijay R, Sihorwala TA. Identification and leaching characteristics of sludge generated from metal pickling and electroplating industries by Toxicity Characteristics Leaching Procedure (TCLP) Environ Monit Assess. 2003; 84 :193–202. doi: 10.1023/A:1023363423345. [ PubMed ] [ CrossRef ] [ Google Scholar ]
• Karliner J. The corporate planet. San Francisco , Sierra Club Books; 1997. p. 247. [ Google Scholar ]
• Bruno KKJ. Earthsummit,biz:The corporate takeover of sustainable development. Oakland, Ca , First Food Books; 2002. p. 237. [ Google Scholar ]
• Power M. The poison stream: letter from Kerala. Harper's. 2004; August, 2004 :51–61. [ Google Scholar ]
• Joshi TK, Gupta RK. Asbestos in developing countries: magnitude of risk and its practical implications. Int J Occup Med Environ Health. 2004; 17 :179–185. [ PubMed ] [ Google Scholar ]
• Joshi TK, Gupta RK. Asbestos-related morbidity in India. Int J Occup Environ Health. 2003; 9 :249–253. [ PubMed ] [ Google Scholar ]
• Union Carbide Bhopal Information Center. wwwbhopalcom/ucshtm. 2005.
• Corporate Watch UK. DuPont: A corporate profile. http://www.corporatewatch.org.uk/profiles/dupont/dupont4.htm
• Beckett WS. Persistent respiratory effects in survivors of the Bhopal disaster. Thorax. 1998; 53 Suppl 2 :S43–6. [ PMC free article ] [ PubMed ] [ Google Scholar ]
• Misra UK, Kalita J. A study of cognitive functions in methyl-iso-cyanate victims one year after bhopal accident. Neurotoxicology. 1997; 18 :381–386. [ PubMed ] [ Google Scholar ]
• Irani SF, Mahashur AA. A survey of Bhopal children affected by methyl isocyanate gas. J Postgrad Med. 1986; 32 :195–198. [ PubMed ] [ Google Scholar ]

• International
• Today’s Paper
• 🇮🇳 I-Day SALE
• Express Shorts
• Mini Crossword
• Health & Wellness

Bhopal Gas Tragedy after 38 years: Why the govt is demanding compensation now

In october, the government told the supreme court that it is “keen to pursue” a petition for additional compensation in the bhopal gas tragedy case, saying it “cannot abandon” the people. what is the case about, and what does the petition demand.

On the night of December 2, 1984, one of the biggest industrial disasters to ever take place began unfolding in Bhopal, Madhya Pradesh. Harmful Methyl isocyanate (MIC) gas started leaking from a nearby Union Carbide pesticide plant, eventually resulting in the Bhopal Gas tragedy, where an estimated 3,000 people died within the first few days. Over time, similarly horrifying numbers of those who suffered life-long health issues would become known.

For the first time in India, the case led to a focus on the need for protecting people and the environment from industrial accidents, with new laws introduced by the government afterwards. But those who suffered the effects firsthand have continued insisting that the company at the centre of it all – Union Carbide, now a part of Dow Jones – has not fulfilled its responsibility in terms of providing just compensation.

Around 19 years after compensation was agreed upon, the Indian government filed a curative petition in 2010 to seek additional compensation from Dow, of more than ten times the amount it gave in 1989. Last month, the government told the Supreme Court that it is “keen to pursue” it, saying it “cannot abandon” the people.

How did the industrial disaster occur, and what is the recent demand for compensation? We explain.

The night of December 2, 1984

Union Carbide (India) Ltd. (UCIL) was a subsidiary of the Union Carbide Corporation (UCC), a US corporation. The UCIL pesticide manufacturing factory was located on the outskirts of Bhopal . On December 2, highly toxic MIC gas escaped the plant. People living in nearby areas reported a burning sensation in their eyes and difficulties in breathing, with many also losing consciousness.

Its effects were such that apart from killing thousands of people in a short span of time, it led to disease and other long-term problems for many who inhaled the gas. The scale of environmental pollution also became clearer only later. For example, the sources of water around the factory were deemed unfit for consumption and many handpumps were sealed. To date, the reproductive health of many of Bhopal’s women has been affected, and children born to those exposed to the gas have faced congenital health problems.

• Can Sheikh Hasina be extradited to Bangladesh? What are India’s options?
• Super Blue Moon on Raksha Bandhan: What is it and how will it be different?
• UPSC issues ad for lateral entry into bureaucracy: What is the policy?

The aftermath

A 2019 report by the UN’s International Labour Organization (ILO) said at least 30 tonnes of the poisonous gas affected more than 600,000 workers and nearby inhabitants. It added the disaster was among the world’s “major industrial accidents after 1919”.

Multiple analyses have alleged that the leak was a result of general laxity in safety rules, and in the training of the workers, most of whom were unaware of the MIC’s dangers. Dr S Varadarajan, director general of the Government’s Council of Scientific and Industrial Research (CSIR), said at the time that the MIC gas in its plant was being handled without adequate safety measures or plans for emergencies.

The incident also pointed to the lack of specific laws in India at the time for handling such matters. As a PRS Legislative Research article points out, this changed after Bhopal. Major laws passed since 1984 include the Environment (Protection) Act, 1986, which authorised the central government to take relevant measures and regulate industrial activity for environmental and public safety.

The Public Liability Insurance Act of 1991, which provides public liability insurance for providing immediate relief to the persons affected by an accident occurring while handling any hazardous substance, was also passed.

The demand for compensation

After the disaster, the Bhopal Gas Leak Disaster (Processing of Claims) Act was passed in 1985, giving certain powers to the Indian government for settling claims. It said the Central Government would have the “exclusive right” to represent, and act in place of every person connected with the claims.

A case was lodged against Union Carbide. Warren Anderson, the Chairman of UC, was arrested when he visited India but was shortly released on bail, after which he left the country. Other high-level executives were also released on bail.

The case was also in a US court for some time but was later transferred to India. By December 1987, the CBI filed a charge sheet against Anderson. Two years later, a non-bailable warrant of arrest against Warren Anderson was issued, for repeatedly ignoring summons. Anderson never returned to India and died in 2014.

In February 1989, the Indian government and Union Carbide struck an out-of-court deal and compensation of $470 million was given by UC. The Supreme Court also upheld it in a judgement. Over the years, the government gradually released the money, but the delay led to frequent protests by those affected.

Many of those people continued petitioning on the matter. The CBI, in 2010, sought reconsideration of a 1996 Supreme Court judgement, which had whittled down the charge against the company to ‘causing death due to rash and negligent act’.

The new petition

With the billion-dollar corporation Dow Jones taking control of Union Carbide in 1999, it became the focus of proceedings. It has opposed the reopening of compensation claims. “Dow has long maintained that it has no connection to the incident and does not belong in any legal proceeding involving Bhopal,” it said.

It emphasised the SC’s earlier judgements, claiming since the government agreed to the earlier compensation there is no case now. It has said of the 2010 petition, “The Government’s ill-advised action puts at peril the image of India as a nation committed to promoting and adhering to accepted legal principles and the rule of law, with the inevitable result that confidence in investing in India will be undermined.”

Attorney General R Venkataramani told a five-judge bench in October 2022 that he had looked into examples elsewhere and has considerable literature on where the courts have gone beyond the already conducted settlement. But a delay of many years since the judgment was passed has reduced the chances of any change in the status quo. As University of Warwick Law professor Upendra Baxi wrote in The Indian Express , a “heroic effort” would be needed to enforce any ultimate result.

'Lateral entry' ad row: BJP chooses caution, with hurt from Subscriber Only

Kolkata rape-murder case: Why it’s not enough to hold protests Subscriber Only

Protests, suspensions to Chomsky: Decline of South Asian University Subscriber Only

Why PM Modi’s I-Day speech this year was uninspiring Subscriber Only

UPSC Key | Mpox outbreak, Global Development Compact, Lateral entry Subscriber Only

Why Bangladesh’s Mujib-focused history came under attack Subscriber Only

IMD rain forecasts for Mumbai wrong by 42% in July. Subscriber Only

China & supply of electronic components for ‘made in India’ Subscriber Only

After Hasina, the road ahead for Bangladesh Subscriber Only

All that freedom has given us Subscriber Only

• 1984 Bhopal gas tragedy
• Express Explained

The Forest Department is taking action to train Hula party members on handling elephants and provide them with necessary equipment. However, two members were arrested for killing a pregnant elephant, leading to backlash against the Minister. The Hula party members are paid Rs 350/day but do not receive regular training.

More Explained

Best of Express

EXPRESS OPINION

Aug 21: Latest News

• 01 Kolkata doctor’s rape-murder: Strike by doctors to continue in Maharashtra
• 02 Azerbaijan applies to join BRICS, alongside India, Russia and China
• 03 Govt orders review of school safety panels, sets new compliance deadline
• 04 Ahead of Haryana polls, first rebellion: I will contest from Rania, BJP apna dekh le, says minister Ranjit Chautala
• 05 Badlapur sexual assault: School had done no background check of accused, no CCTV, says MSCPCR chairperson
• Elections 2024
• Political Pulse
• Entertainment
• Movie Review
• Newsletters
• Web Stories

Academia.edu no longer supports Internet Explorer.

To browse Academia.edu and the wider internet faster and more securely, please take a few seconds to  upgrade your browser .

Enter the email address you signed up with and we'll email you a reset link.

• We're Hiring!
• Help Center

BHOPAL GAS TRAGEDY: CASE STUDY

Related Papers

Kamarul Nizam Mahmood

Frank Pearce

This ebook provides an exploration of the nature and consequences of of the nature and extent of the Bhopal Gas Disaster of 1984 which has been responsible for over 25,000 deaths. It also assigns responsibility for this event which was the outcome of irresponsible decisions by the officers of Union Carbide Corporation (UCC) and its subsidiary Union Carbide of india Limited (UCIL). These were facilitated, encouraged even required by the routine operations of the globalised corporate capitalist economic system and its legal regime.

habiba bawa

daoud almousilly

mukta singh

Sagar Dhara

The causes for Bhopal gas leak from the Union Carbide plant in 1984 can be traced to low product sales that made the company disinvest in safety and environmental systems. Events that panned out after the accident—government apathy, poor health and economic rehabilitation effort, no spill cleanup, Carbide’s doublespeak and liability dodging—tantamount to denial of care and justice for the accident victims and are a consequence of low value of life in India and the US, and difference in price of life in the two countries. To achieve the same standard of social justice for all humans, we need to fight for a uniform high value of life, as a fundamental human right, throughout the world.

Musthafa Ahmed

The case study under consideration is regarding chemical plant spillage (pesticide plant) which was situated in Bhopal (India) .Basically, Methyl Isocyanate plant got installed for the production of pesticide named Carbaryl by Union Carbide Corporation, a subsidiary of American corporation. The raw material (phosgene & Mono Methyl Amine) to form MIC were brought from other parts of India and were mixed at the plant site .It happened because one of the toxic compound, Methyl isocyanate, which was used in making of the pesticide named carbaryl (sevin) got spilled due to numerous reasons stated below and got mixed with water. Due to exothermic behavior of compound (if MIC is mixed with water, exothermic is initiated and if not controlled can cause great deal of destruction) and nature of the reaction the poisonous gas spilled resulted in an explosion. Although the gas was heavy enough to settle after travelling some distance but supported weather conditions like air dispersal in the direction of town and mixing of aerosol, which allowed gas cloud to dilute and travel furthermore. It took lives of more than 3000 innocent souls and emerged as one of the deadliest chemical spillage disaster in history. INTRODUCTION The explosion at the Bhopal Union Carbide Factory in 1984 is the world's most fatal industrial disaster till date. It is well established that in its immediate aftermath there were spontaneous deaths, death toll raised up to 3000 just by inhaling poisonous gas. A large proportion of these deaths were probably due to acute respiratory damage. The existence, nature and extent of chronic respiratory disease in the survivors are far less established. The result of the case study described above strongly suggest that such disease exist independently of background .Although, the immediate health effects of the Bhopal gas disaster are undisputed (the deaths of many thousand of citizens) the long term sequel are poorly understood. This term paper is to study the little history of plant, its disaster and its harmful affects to environment and people [1][19]

raagya zadu

RSIS International

The Bhopal Gas Disaster, of 2nd-3rd December, 1984, caused by a “run-away chemical reaction” of Methyl IsoCyanate stored in a Stainless Steel Tank, of UCIL (Union Carbide of India Ltd) Factory, is undoubtedly the worst chemical disaster of the world. The sheer magnitude of the industrial catastrophe has aroused the conscience of the world. The incriminated Tank 610 E of the „Pesticide Plant‟ of Union Carbide Corporation (UCC) in Bhopal was maintained by its Indian counterpart, Union Carbide India Limited (UCIL). Unlike minor accidents in their US Plants, immediately following the chemical run-away reaction of Methyl IsoCyanate (MIC) in Bhopal, there was a massive release of toxic gases into the atmosphere which spread rapidly over a densely populated area of Bhopal City, the capital of Madhya Pradesh, India. In this paper, we present and analyse various aspects of the leak of toxic gas from the Union Carbide Plant at Bhopal, India in December 1984. The physicochemical properties of the deadly methyl isocyanate (MIC) and its biological activity, as well as the probable causes of the accident, are discussed. The role of meteorology and topography with regard to the dispersion process is also documented. The Mechanical and Human both errors considered in these study. By the Toxic simulation study rectify the results. For the Simulation ALOHA (AREAL LOCATIONS OF HAZARDOUS ATMOSPHERES,5.4.4) software is used, developed by National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration, USA which is available on the respected sites. The model output gives an estimate of the ground level concentration and the approximate time of arrival of the plume front in the various affected localities. Dry deposition and the aqueous phase conversion of MIC with the humid atmosphere were also featured in the model. The model results seem to be fairly well correlated with the scantily available mortality distribution records. The Bhopal Gas Leak shows us the complexity of the chemical society we live in today. The fact is, that we do not know which compounds we might be exposed to from chemical plants, and we do not know in what way and to which degree these compounds are harmful to us, in the short-term and in the long-term. The NGOs and trade unions usually fight for what is best for human beings. But we must realise that this is not the primary goal of a company. What is good for a company is not always good for the people. For the people, and for public health, it is good with small income differences, strong working rights legislation, protection of water and ground, manpower-rich companies and the making of strong demands on the company concerning the work environment and the environment as a whole. For the companies it is good to have few employees, ease in exchanging the labourers, an unsafe labour market which leads to the employed working hard and keeping silent and low demands on the work environment and environment.

Loading Preview

Sorry, preview is currently unavailable. You can download the paper by clicking the button above.

RELATED PAPERS

hamza hamza

Elias Ahmadi

Hershey H Friedman

Yunenthiran Rajendran

Undercurrents

Reena Shadaan , Maya Nye

Journal of Ethnopharmacology

Narender Gautam

Mandal, B. B. and Srivastava, A. K. (2006) ‘Mechanisation, vibration and the Indian workforce’, Asian Pacific Newsletter on occupational safety and health, 13(2), pp. 38-40.

Dr. B B Mandal

kartika dewi

IRJET Journal

Stephen Kazomba

ebrahim anoosha

Journal of Loss Prevention in The Process Industries

Faisal Khan

Shalini Sharma

Rojan Thomas Joseph

Nehal A. Patel

Greenpeace Research …

David Santillo

Justin O Johnston

Safiq Islam

Laurent Vogel

Jinda Sandbhor

Yuvraj Siddharth

raana sriram

JOHN MOHAN RAZU

Maurizio Murru

Rahul Mukherjee

Alyssa L. Firman

Interventions: International Journal of Postcolonial Studies

Rebecca S Oh

Engobo Emeseh

… International Conference of …

Jose Sarriegi

ic.ucsc.edu

sneha samaddar

•   We're Hiring!
•   Help Center
• Find new research papers in:
• Health Sciences
• Earth Sciences
• Cognitive Science
• Mathematics
• Computer Science
• Academia ©2024

• Aug 13, 2021

Bhopal Gas Tragedy: The Unfolding of an Economic and Environmental Disaster

By Unnati Tolani, Edited by Amogh Sangewar

On the night of 2nd of December 1984, the geographical heart of India, Bhopal, the city well known for its rich culture, artificial lakes, and lush environment, fell prey to one of the most disastrous industrial mishaps in the world, globally known as "The Bhopal Gas Tragedy". December 2020 marked the thirty-sixth anniversary of the massive toxic gas leak from Union Carbide Corporation's chemical plant in Madhya Pradesh, Bhopal, which killed over 3,800 people. The tragedy proved to be an industrial disaster having a long-term impact on the environment and health of people in Bhopal.

Source: https://blog.ipleaders.in/wp-content/uploads/2019/06/Bhopal-gas-Tragedy-696x457.jpg

The Disaster in a Nutshell: Statistics and Empirical Evidence

Bhopal faced the wrath of two tragedies: a disaster that released immediate effects onto the public and another that lingers till the present. The industrial oversight in the pesticide plant of Union Carbide Corporation (UCC) massacred almost 3000 people within 2 hours. As thousands of men, women, and children succumbed to their injuries in the succeeding years, the Indian Medical Research Council set the long-term death toll at 531,w. This is an appalling figure considering the population before the disaster was about 894,539. The residents who survived attained severe injuries; 95% of the distressed population was diagnosed with at least one physical or neurological illness. Around 100,000 suffered from chronic respiratory diseases due to exposure. The neonatal mortality rate rose to 200%, and the stillbirth rate increased to an alarming 300%.

Aftermath: Was the economy stalled by this mega tragedy?

The gas leak has had a significant negative impact on income, transportation, and other essentials. Seventy-five percent of Bhopalis are only capable of working for a few hours at a period. Economically, it is essential that the population ‘works’ or ‘earns’ for a livelihood. However, since people weren’t able to work due to adverse situations, the economy suffered. People who are unable to work do not have enough income to afford extravagance or even necessities. Banks frequently grant loans at exorbitant interest rates. Citizens are forced to accept the terms because they have no other option, perpetuating the vicious cycle of poverty.

Considering the extent of damage, the meagre compensation of Rs 2 and 3 lacs to the affected families, and the UCC paid about $470 million for the disaster. While the union carbide mill provided jobs to nearly a thousand people and supported the incomes of those who worked for it, the compensation money paid out to victims eventually made its way back into the economy. It was not enough for the local economy to grow. Before this catastrophe, the government of Madhya Pradesh had successfully mitigated floods and cyclones with the execution of comprehensive escape plans and diplomatic damage control. But that was not enough to alleviate the tensions brewing in the wake of the gas disaster, the remnants of which continue to the present date.

Environmental impact

The environmental effect of the gas leak can be broken down into the immediate effect that led to the poisoning of the air following the leak of the deadly gas that took a toll on thousands of lives and the effect on the groundwater, soil, and even breast milk. The tragedy led to the intoxication of the air in the city.

While the immediate impact was evident with the death of thousands as they choked on these poisonous gases, the leak had severe long-term effects. The toxic gases have affected the groundwater in the city as well as the soil. They have systematically entered the food chain leading to some harmful effects on the health of the individuals in the city. According to several reports, the groundwater levels are reported to have toxicity levels around 40% higher than the Indian safety standards and even higher than the standards specified by the World Health Organization. The pollutants are carcinogenic, which highlights the gravity of the situation that the government has largely ignored. And the fact that the people have no alternative source of drinking water makes the situation worse, leaving thousands of people vulnerable to extreme levels of polluted water sources that can cause deadly diseases. The clutter around the industrial plant is still home to chemical pollutants, including mercury and other heavy metals. This is the cause of the release of toxic fumes. Thousands of the people in the makeshift houses are exposed to such a toxic environment. Therefore, the immediate and long-term environmental impact is inseparable from the tragedy's legal, social, and economic impact.

Healthcare: Long term Impact

Following the gas leak, there has been an increase in the morbidity rate and mortality rate. There have been signs of reproductive disorders amongst the people who were exposed to the gas. Pregnant women with their unborn children were exposed to toxic fumes. There are signs of growth retardation amongst the children whose parents were exposed to the toxic gas. The inhaling of the poisonous gas leak has had a severe long-term effect on an individual's immune system, liver, and lungs. There is no count of the number of people who are now victims of innumerable respiratory diseases. Much developed cancer in later years. However, such long-term effects are hardly accounted for.

Disaster management: Is there a ‘solution’?

Awareness and activism about environment protection rapidly increased after the devastating Bhopal gas tragedy on the 3rd of December 1984. The government has laid quite a few laws to ensure that such an event doesn't occur again. One of the most prominent acts that the government passed was the " Environment Protection Act" in 1986. According to NDMA ( National Disaster Management Authority), around 130 chemical accidents that included around 259 deaths and 563 serious injuries were reported till 2013, which tells about the effectiveness and efficiency of the laws imposed after the Bhopal gas tragedy. In 1991, The " Public Liability Insurance Act" was also passed, which stated to provide insurance to immediately achieve relief for the people affected by any incidents involving the handling of hazardous substances. In 2008, the government passed The "National Green Tribunal Act," which provides immediate and instant compensation and relief for the damages done to the property and the people.

Economists commonly consider the Bhopal Gas Tragedy as a Market Failure, wherein the people of Bhopal bore the horrendous cost for something they did not intend. Due to the absence of stricter laws, The Union Carbide Corporation did not bear any costs and did not compensate for the environmental and health loss fully. The tragedy indeed proved to be an environmental disaster that currently has contaminated groundwater quality in Bhopal and is responsible for long-term health issues that continue generation after generation.

Further Readings

Bhopal Gas Tragedy – A Social, Economic, Legal and Environmental Analysis by Malini Nair :: SSRN

https://www.epw.in/tags/bhopal-gas-tragedy

• Unnati Tolani

Recent Posts

Neobanks- Alternatives to Traditional Banking?

Electricity in Ethiopia: A Case Study

What are Bad Banks and how do they function?

An official website of the United States government

The .gov means it’s official. Federal government websites often end in .gov or .mil. Before sharing sensitive information, make sure you’re on a federal government site.

The site is secure. The https:// ensures that you are connecting to the official website and that any information you provide is encrypted and transmitted securely.

• Publications
• Account settings
• My Bibliography
• Collections
• Citation manager

Save citation to file

Email citation, add to collections.

• Create a new collection
• Add to an existing collection

Add to My Bibliography

Your saved search, create a file for external citation management software, your rss feed.

• Search in PubMed
• Search in NLM Catalog
• Add to Search

Bhopal Gas Tragedy: review of clinical and experimental findings after 25 years

Affiliation.

• 1 Bhopal Memorial Hospital & Research Centre, Bhopal, India. [email protected]
• PMID: 19819837
• DOI: 10.2478/v10001-009-0028-1

The Bhopal gas tragedy is undoubtedly one of the worst industrial disasters in the history of mankind resulting in mortality of 2500-6000 and debilitating over 200 000 people. Inhabitants in the township were exposed to different degrees and there are more than 500 000 registered victims that survived the tragedy. Clinical studies have shown chronic illnesses such as pulmonary fibrosis, bronchial asthma, chronic obstructive pulmonary disease (COPD), emphysema, recurrent chest infections, keratopathy and corneal opacities in exposed cohorts. Survivors continue to experience higher incidence of reported health problems including febrile illnesses, respiratory, neurologic, psychiatric and ophthalmic symptoms. In-utero exposure to methyl isocyanate in the first trimester of pregnancy caused a persistent immune system hyper-responsiveness, which was in an evident way genetically linked with the organic exposure. Recent experimental studies have provided mechanistic understanding of methyl isocyanate exposure at a molecular level. Immunotoxic implications, toxico-genomic effect, inflammatory response, elicitation of mitochondrial oxidative stress, chromosomal and microsatellite instability have been studied comprehensively in cultured mammalian cells. Besides providing a framework for understanding potential mechanisms of toxicity of a host of other exposures, these studies may also uncover unique abnormalities thereby stimulating efforts to design newer and effective diagnostic and therapeutic strategies. The authors recommend long-term monitoring of the affected area and use of appropriate methods of investigation that include well-designed cohort studies, case-control studies for rare condition, characterization of personal exposure and accident analysis to determine the possible elements of the gas cloud.

PubMed Disclaimer

Similar articles

• In utero exposure to methyl isocyanate in the Bhopal gas disaster: evidence of persisting hyperactivation of immune system two decades later. Mishra PK, Dabadghao S, Modi GK, Desikan P, Jain A, Mittra I, Gupta D, Chauhan C, Jain SK, Maudar KK. Mishra PK, et al. Occup Environ Med. 2009 Apr;66(4):279. doi: 10.1136/oem.2008.041517. Occup Environ Med. 2009. PMID: 19295137 No abstract available.
• On the long-term effects of methyl isocyanate on cell-mediated immunity in Bhopal gas-exposed long-term survivors and their offspring. Senthilkumar CS, Sah NK, Ganesh N. Senthilkumar CS, et al. Toxicol Ind Health. 2017 Apr;33(4):318-331. doi: 10.1177/0748233716645480. Epub 2016 Jul 9. Toxicol Ind Health. 2017. PMID: 27226017
• Molecular surveillance of hepatitis and tuberculosis infections in a cohort exposed to methyl isocyanate. Mishra PK, Bhargava A, Pathak N, Desikan P, Maudar KK, Varshney S, Shrivastava R, Jain A. Mishra PK, et al. Int J Occup Med Environ Health. 2011 Mar;24(1):94-101. doi: 10.2478/s13382-011-0006-2. Epub 2011 Feb 16. Int J Occup Med Environ Health. 2011. PMID: 21468906
• Health effects of the Bhopal gas leak: a review. Dhara R. Dhara R. Epidemiol Prev. 1992 Sep;14(52):22-31. Epidemiol Prev. 1992. PMID: 1306166 Review.
• A retrospective review of cytogenetic studies on methyl isocyanate with special reference to the Bhopal gas tragedy: is the next generation also at risk? Samarth RM, Gandhi P, Maudar KK. Samarth RM, et al. Int J Occup Med Environ Health. 2013 Jun;26(3):324-36. doi: 10.2478/s13382-013-0110-6. Epub 2013 Jul 15. Int J Occup Med Environ Health. 2013. PMID: 23857370 Review.
• Survival Analysis for Cohort of Bhopal Gas Disaster Victims during 1985-2015. Singh S, Raj D, Sabde Y, Kalyanasundaram M, Tiwari RR. Singh S, et al. Indian J Occup Environ Med. 2023 Jul-Sep;27(3):219-225. doi: 10.4103/ijoem.ijoem_190_22. Epub 2023 Jul 14. Indian J Occup Environ Med. 2023. PMID: 38047177 Free PMC article.
• Evaluation of Cytogenetic Alterations in Patients of Chronic Kidney Disease. Samarth RM, Tiwari RR, Modi G, Soni KK, Banjare ML, Ul Hasan S, Jain S. Samarth RM, et al. Indian J Nephrol. 2023 Jul-Aug;33(4):259-263. doi: 10.4103/ijn.ijn_130_22. Epub 2023 Mar 7. Indian J Nephrol. 2023. PMID: 37781554 Free PMC article.
• Trigeminal Function in Sino-Nasal Health and Disease. Shusterman D. Shusterman D. Biomedicines. 2023 Jun 21;11(7):1778. doi: 10.3390/biomedicines11071778. Biomedicines. 2023. PMID: 37509418 Free PMC article. Review.
• Long-term health and human capital effects of in utero exposure to an industrial disaster: a spatial difference-in-differences analysis of the Bhopal gas tragedy. McCord GC, Bharadwaj P, McDougal L, Kaushik A, Raj A. McCord GC, et al. BMJ Open. 2023 Jun 13;13(6):e066733. doi: 10.1136/bmjopen-2022-066733. BMJ Open. 2023. PMID: 37311631 Free PMC article.
• Differential modulation of lung aquaporins among other pathophysiological markers in acute (Cl 2 gas) and chronic (carbon nanoparticles, cigarette smoke) respiratory toxicity mouse models. Bhattacharya SS, Yadav B, Yadav E, Hus A, Yadav N, Kaur P, Rosen L, Jandarov R, Yadav JS. Bhattacharya SS, et al. Front Physiol. 2022 Sep 28;13:880815. doi: 10.3389/fphys.2022.880815. eCollection 2022. Front Physiol. 2022. PMID: 36246134 Free PMC article.
• Search in MeSH

Related information

• PubChem Compound
• PubChem Compound (MeSH Keyword)
• PubChem Substance
• Citation Manager

NCBI Literature Resources

MeSH PMC Bookshelf Disclaimer

The PubMed wordmark and PubMed logo are registered trademarks of the U.S. Department of Health and Human Services (HHS). Unauthorized use of these marks is strictly prohibited.