freedom of speech for essay

Talk to our experts

1800-120-456-456

• Essay on Freedom of Speech in English Free PDF download

Download Important English Essay on the Topic - Freedom of Speech Free PDF from Vedantu

One of the fundamental rights of the citizens of India is ‘Freedom of Speech’. This is allowed to the citizens by a lot of countries to empower the citizens to share their own thoughts and views. This freedom of speech essay is for students of class 5 and above. The language used in this essay is plain and simple for a better understanding of the students. This freedom of speech essay example will help the students write a paragraph on freedom of speech in their own words easily.

Long Essay on Freedom of Speech

The phrase “Freedom of Speech” has been misinterpreted by some individuals who either do not actually understand the meaning of the phrase completely or have a totally different agenda in mind altogether. Every democratic country gives its citizens this freedom. The same is guaranteed by the Constitution of India too. Irrespective of your gender, religion, caste, or creed, you are guaranteed that freedom as an Indian. The values of democracy in a country are defined by this guaranteed fundamental freedom. The freedom to practice any religion, the freedom to express opinions and disagreeing viewpoints without hurting the sentiments or causing violence is what India is essentially made up of.

Indians stand out for their secularism and for spreading democratic values across the world. Thus, to save and celebrate democracy, enforcing freedom of speech in India becomes a necessity. Freedom of speech is not only about the fundamental rights, it’s also a fundamental duty to be done by every citizen rightfully so as to save the essence of democracy.

In developed democracies like the US, UK, Germany or France, we see a “freedom of speech” that is different from what we see in authoritarian countries like China, Malaysia or Syria and failed democratic countries like Pakistan or Rwanda. These governance systems failed because they lacked freedom of speech. Freedom of press gives us a yardstick to gauge the freedom of speech in a country. A healthy, liberal and strong democracy is reflected by a strong media presence in a country, since they are supposed to be the voice of the common people. A democracy that has a stomach for criticisms and disagreements is taken in a positive way. 

Some governments get very hostile when faced with any form of criticism and so they try to oppress any voices that might stand against them. This becomes a dangerous model of governance for any country. For example, India has more than hundred and thirty crores of population now and we can be sure that every individual will not have the same thought process and same views and opinions about one thing. A true democracy is made by the difference of opinions and the respect people have for each other in the team that is responsible for making the policies.

Before making a choice, all aspects and angles of the topic should be taken into consideration. A good democracy will involve all the people - supporters and critics alike, before formulating a policy, but a bad one will sideline its critics, and force authoritarian and unilateral policies upon all of the citizens.

Sedition law, a British-era law, was a weapon that was used in India to stifle criticism and curb freedom of speech during the pre-independence era. Through section 124A of Indian Penal Code, the law states that if a person with his words, written or spoken, brings hatred, contempt or excites tension towards a government or an individual can be fined or jailed or fined and jailed both. This law was used by the Britishers to stifle the freedom fighters. Today it is being used by the political parties to silence criticism and as a result is harming the democratic values of the nation. 

Many laws in India also protect the people in rightfully exercising their freedom of expression but the implementation of these laws is proving to be a challenge. Freedom of speech cannot be absolute. In the name of freedom of speech, hatred, tensions, bigotry and violence too cannot be caused in the society. It will then become ironically wrong to allow freedom of speech in the first place. Freedom of speech and expression should not become the reason for chaos and anarchy in a nation. Freedom of speech was stifled when article 370 got revoked in Kashmir. Not that the government was trying to go against the democratic values, but they had to prevent the spread of fake news, terrorism or any type of communal tensions in those areas.

Short Essay on Freedom of Speech

Freedom of speech allows the people of our country to express themselves, and share their ideas, views and opinions openly. As a result, the public and the media can comment on any political activity and also express their dissent towards anything they think is not appropriate.

Various other countries too provide freedom of speech to their citizens but they have certain limitations. Different countries have different restrictions on their freedom of speech. Some countries also do not allow this fundamental right at all and the best example being North Korea. There, the media or the public are not allowed to speak against the government. It becomes a punishable offence to criticize the government or the ministers or the political parties.

Key Highlights of the Essay - Freedom of Speech

Every democratic country gives its citizens the Freedom of Speech so as to enable the citizens to freely express their individual views, ideas and concerns. The freedom to be able to practice any religion, to be able to express individual secularism and for spreading democratic values across the world. In order to be able to save and to celebrate democracy, enforcing freedom of speech in India Is essential. Freedom of speech  about fundamental rights is also a fundamental duty of citizens in order to save the essence of democracy.  In a country, a healthy, liberal and strong democracy is always  reflected and can be seen through a strong media presence, as the media are the voice of the common people.  When faced with any form of criticism, we see some governments get very hostile,  and they  try to oppress  and stop any kind of  voices that might go against them. This is not favorable for any country. 

A good democracy involves all the people - all their various  supporters and critics alike, before they begin formulating any policies. India had the Sedition law, a British-era law that is used to stifle criticism and curb freedom of speech during the pre-independence era. The section 124A of Indian Penal Code, this law of sedition stated that if a person with his words, written or spoken, brings hatred, contempt or excites tension towards a government or an individual, then he can be fined or jailed or both. Using  freedom of speech, people spread hatred, unnecessary tensions, bigotry and some amount of violence too in the society. Ironically  in such cases, it will be wrong to allow freedom of speech. The reasons for chaos and anarchy in a nation should not be due to  Freedom of speech and expression. This law was stifled when article 370 got revoked in Kashmir, in order to prevent the spread of fake news, terrorism or any type of communal tensions in those areas.

Freedom of speech gives people of our country, the freedom to express themselves, to be able to share their ideas, views and opinions openly, where the public and the media can express and comment on any political activities and can also be able to express their dissent towards anything they think is not appropriate. Different countries have different restrictions on their freedom of speech. And it is not proper to comment on that .In Fact, there are some countries which does not allow this fundamental right , for example, North Korea where neither the media nor the public have any right to speak against or even for the government and it is a punishable offense to openly criticize the government or the or anyone in particular.

While freedom of speech lets the society grow it could have certain negative outcomes. It should not be used to disrespect or instigate others. The media too should not misuse it. We, the people of this nation, should act responsibly towards utilizing its freedom of speech and expression. Lucky we are to be citizens of India. It’s a nation that respects all its citizens and gives them the rights needed for their development and growth.

A fundamental right of every citizen of India, the  ‘Freedom of Speech’ allows citizens to share their individual thoughts and views.

FAQs on Essay on Freedom of Speech in English Free PDF download

1. Mention five lines for Freedom of Speech Essay?

i) A fundamental right that is guaranteed to citizens of a country to be able to express their opinions and points of view without any kind of censorship.

ii) A democracy’s health depends on the extent of freedom of expression of all its citizens.

iii) Freedom of speech is never absolute in nature.

iv) New Zealand, USA or UK rank  high in terms of freedom of speech by its citizens.

v) A fundamental right in the Indian constitution is the Freedom of Speech and Expression.

2. Explain Freedom of Speech?

A fundamental right of every citizen of India, Freedom Of Speech allows every citizen the freedom and the right to express all their views, concerns, ideas and issues relating to anything about their country. Freedom of Speech is never actual in nature  and has its limits too. It cannot be used for any kind of illegal purposes.The health of a democracy depends on the extent of freedom of expression of its citizens.

3. What happens when there is no Freedom of Speech?

A country will become a police and military state with no democratic and humanitarian values in it if there is no freedom of speech. Freedom of Speech is a fundamental right for all citizens, and a failure to not being able to express one’s ideas, beliefs, and thoughts will result in a non authoritarian and non democratic country.  Failure to have freedom of speech in a country would mean that the rulers or the governments of those countries have no respect for its citizens.

4. Where can we get study material related to essay writing ?

It is important to practice some of the important questions in order to do well. Vedantu.com offers these important questions along with answers that have been formulated in a well structured, well researched, and easy to understand manner. Various essay writing topics, letter writing samples, comprehension passages are all available at the online portals today. Practicing and studying with the help of these enable the students to measure their level of proficiency, and also allows them to understand the difficult questions with ease. 

You can avail all the well-researched and good quality chapters, sample papers, syllabus on various topics from the website of Vedantu and its mobile application available on the play store. 

5. Why should students choose Vedantu for an essay on the topic 'Freedom of Speech’?

Essay writing is important for students   as it helps them increase their brain and vocabulary power. Today it is important to be able to practice some important topics, samples and questions to be able to score well in the exams. Vedantu.com offers these important questions along with answers that have been formulated in a well structured, well researched, and easy to understand manner. The NCERT and other study material along with their explanations are very easily accessible from Vedantu.com and can be downloaded too. Practicing with the help of these questions along with the solutions enables the students to measure their level of proficiency, and also allows them to understand the difficult questions with ease. 

6. What is Freedom of Speech?

Freedom of speech is the ability to express our opinions without any fear.

7. Which country allows the highest level of Freedom of Speech to its citizens?

The USA is at the highest with a score of 5.73.

8. Is Freedom of Speech absolute?

No, freedom of speech cannot be absolute. It has limitations.

• Table of Contents
• Random Entry
• Chronological
• Editorial Information
• About the SEP
• Editorial Board
• How to Cite the SEP
• Special Characters
• Advanced Tools
• Support the SEP
• PDFs for SEP Friends
• Make a Donation
• SEPIA for Libraries
• Entry Contents

Bibliography

Academic tools.

• Friends PDF Preview
• Author and Citation Info
• Back to Top

Freedom of Speech

[ Editor’s Note: The following new entry by Jeffrey W. Howard replaces the former entry on this topic by the previous author. ]

Human beings have significant interests in communicating what they think to others, and in listening to what others have to say. These interests make it difficult to justify coercive restrictions on people’s communications, plausibly grounding a moral right to speak (and listen) to others that is properly protected by law. That there ought to be such legal protections for speech is uncontroversial among political and legal philosophers. But disagreement arises when we turn to the details. What are the interests or values that justify this presumption against restricting speech? And what, if anything, counts as an adequate justification for overcoming the presumption? This entry is chiefly concerned with exploring the philosophical literature on these questions.

The entry begins by distinguishing different ideas to which the term “freedom of speech” can refer. It then reviews the variety of concerns taken to justify freedom of speech. Next, the entry considers the proper limits of freedom of speech, cataloging different views on when and why restrictions on communication can be morally justified, and what considerations are relevant when evaluating restrictions. Finally, it considers the role of speech intermediaries in a philosophical analysis of freedom of speech, with special attention to internet platforms.

1. What is Freedom of Speech?

2.1 listener theories, 2.2 speaker theories, 2.3 democracy theories, 2.4 thinker theories, 2.5 toleration theories, 2.6 instrumental theories: political abuse and slippery slopes, 2.7 free speech skepticism, 3.1 absoluteness, coverage, and protection, 3.2 the limits of free speech: external constraints, 3.3 the limits of free speech: internal constraints, 3.4 proportionality: chilling effects and political abuse, 3.5 necessity: the counter-speech alternative, 4. the future of free speech theory: platform ethics, other internet resources, related entries.

In the philosophical literature, the terms “freedom of speech”, “free speech”, “freedom of expression”, and “freedom of communication” are mostly used equivalently. This entry will follow that convention, notwithstanding the fact that these formulations evoke subtly different phenomena. For example, it is widely understood that artistic expressions, such as dancing and painting, fall within the ambit of this freedom, even though they don’t straightforwardly seem to qualify as speech , which intuitively connotes some kind of linguistic utterance (see Tushnet, Chen, & Blocher 2017 for discussion). Still, they plainly qualify as communicative activity, conveying some kind of message, however vague or open to interpretation it may be.

Yet the extension of “free speech” is not fruitfully specified through conceptual analysis alone. The quest to distinguish speech from conduct, for the purpose of excluding the latter from protection, is notoriously thorny (Fish 1994: 106), despite some notable attempts (such as Greenawalt 1989: 58ff). As John Hart Ely writes concerning Vietnam War protesters who incinerated their draft cards, such activity is “100% action and 100% expression” (1975: 1495). It is only once we understand why we should care about free speech in the first place—the values it instantiates or serves—that we can evaluate whether a law banning the burning of draft cards (or whatever else) violates free speech. It is the task of a normative conception of free speech to offer an account of the values at stake, which in turn can illuminate the kinds of activities wherein those values are realized, and the kinds of restrictions that manifest hostility to those values. For example, if free speech is justified by the value of respecting citizens’ prerogative to hear many points of view and to make up their own minds, then banning the burning of draft cards to limit the views to which citizens will be exposed is manifestly incompatible with that purpose. If, in contrast, such activity is banned as part of a generally applied ordinance restricting fires in public, it would likely raise no free-speech concerns. (For a recent analysis of this issue, see Kramer 2021: 25ff).

Accordingly, the next section discusses different conceptions of free speech that arise in the philosophical literature, each oriented to some underlying moral or political value. Before turning to the discussion of those conceptions, some further preliminary distinctions will be useful.

First, we can distinguish between the morality of free speech and the law of free speech. In political philosophy, one standard approach is to theorize free speech as a requirement of morality, tracing the implications of such a theory for law and policy. Note that while this is the order of justification, it need not be the order of investigation; it is perfectly sensible to begin by studying an existing legal protection for speech (such as the First Amendment in the U.S.) and then asking what could justify such a protection (or something like it).

But of course morality and law can diverge. The most obvious way they can diverge is when the law is unjust. Existing legal protections for speech, embodied in the positive law of particular jurisdictions, may be misguided in various ways. In other words, a justified legal right to free speech, and the actual legal right to free speech in the positive law of a particular jurisdiction, can come apart. In some cases, positive legal rights might protect too little speech. For example, some jurisdictions’ speech laws make exceptions for blasphemy, such that criminalizing blasphemy does not breach the legal right to free speech within that legal system. But clearly one could argue that a justified legal right to free speech would not include any such exception. In other cases, positive legal rights might perhaps protect too much speech. Consider the fact that, as a matter of U.S. constitutional precedent, the First Amendment broadly protects speech that expresses or incites racial or religious hatred. Plainly we could agree that this is so as a matter of positive law while disagreeing about whether it ought to be so. (This is most straightforwardly true if we are legal positivists. These distinctions are muddied by moralistic theories of constitutional interpretation, which enjoin us to interpret positive legal rights in a constitutional text partly through the prism of our favorite normative political theory; see Dworkin 1996.)

Second, we can distinguish rights-based theories of free speech from non-rights-based theories. For many liberals, the legal right to free speech is justified by appealing to an underlying moral right to free speech, understood as a natural right held by all persons. (Some use the term human right equivalently—e.g., Alexander 2005—though the appropriate usage of that term is contested.) The operative notion of a moral right here is that of a claim-right (to invoke the influential analysis of Hohfeld 1917); it thereby correlates to moral duties held by others (paradigmatically, the state) to respect or protect the right. Such a right is natural in that it exerts normative force independently of whether anyone thinks it does, and regardless of whether it is codified into the law. A tyrannical state that imprisons dissidents acts unjustly, violating moral rights, even if there is no legal right to freedom of expression in its legal system.

For others, the underlying moral justification for free speech law need not come in the form of a natural moral right. For example, consequentialists might favor a legal right to free speech (on, e.g., welfare-maximizing grounds) without thinking that it tracks any underlying natural right. Or consider democratic theorists who have defended legal protections for free speech as central to democracy. Such theorists may think there is an underlying natural moral right to free speech, but they need not (especially if they hold an instrumental justification for democracy). Or consider deontologists who have argued that free speech functions as a kind of side-constraint on legitimate state action, requiring that the state always justify its decisions in a manner that respects citizens’ autonomy (Scanlon 1972). This theory does not cast free speech as a right, but rather as a principle that forbids the creation of laws that restrict speech on certain grounds. In the Hohfeldian analysis (Hohfeld 1917), such a principle may be understood as an immunity rather than a claim-right (Scanlon 2013: 402). Finally, some “minimalists” (to use a designation in Cohen 1993) favor legal protection for speech principally in response to government malice, corruption, and incompetence (see Schauer 1982; Epstein 1992; Leiter 2016). Such theorists need not recognize any fundamental moral right, either.

Third, among those who do ground free speech in a natural moral right, there is scope for disagreement about how tightly the law should mirror that right (as with any right; see Buchanan 2013). It is an open question what the precise legal codification of the moral right to free speech should involve. A justified legal right to freedom of speech may not mirror the precise contours of the natural moral right to freedom of speech. A raft of instrumental concerns enters the downstream analysis of what any justified legal right should look like; hence a defensible legal right to free speech may protect more speech (or indeed less speech) than the underlying moral right that justifies it. For example, even if the moral right to free speech does not protect so-called hate speech, such speech may still merit legal protection in the final analysis (say, because it would be too risky to entrust states with the power to limit those communications).

2. Justifying Free Speech

I will now examine several of the morally significant considerations taken to justify freedom of expression. Note that while many theorists have built whole conceptions of free speech out of a single interest or value alone, pluralism in this domain remains an option. It may well be that a plurality of interests serves to justify freedom of expression, properly understood (see, influentially, Emerson 1970 and Cohen 1993).

Suppose a state bans certain books on the grounds that it does not want us to hear the messages or arguments contained within them. Such censorship seems to involve some kind of insult or disrespect to citizens—treating us like children instead of adults who have a right to make up our own minds. This insight is fundamental in the free speech tradition. On this view, the state wrongs citizens by arrogating to itself the authority to decide what messages they ought to hear. That is so even if the state thinks that the speech will cause harm. As one author puts it,

the government may not suppress speech on the ground that the speech is likely to persuade people to do something that the government considers harmful. (Strauss 1991: 335)

Why are restrictions on persuasive speech objectionable? For some scholars, the relevant wrong here is a form of disrespect for citizens’ basic capacities (Dworkin 1996: 200; Nagel 2002: 44). For others, the wrong here inheres in a violation of the kind of relationship the state should have with its people: namely, that it should always act from a view of them as autonomous, and so entitled to make up their own minds (Scanlon 1972). It would simply be incompatible with a view of ourselves as autonomous—as authors of our own lives and choices—to grant the state the authority to pre-screen which opinions, arguments, and perspectives we should be allowed to think through, allowing us access only to those of which it approves.

This position is especially well-suited to justify some central doctrines of First Amendment jurisprudence. First, it justifies the claim that freedom of expression especially implicates the purposes with which the state acts. There are all sorts of legitimate reasons why the state might restrict speech (so-called “time, place, and manner” restrictions)—for example, noise curfews in residential neighborhoods, which do not raise serious free speech concerns. Yet when the state restricts speech with the purpose of manipulating the communicative environment and controlling the views to which citizens are exposed, free speech is directly affronted (Rubenfeld 2001; Alexander 2005; Kramer 2021). To be sure, purposes are not all that matter for free speech theory. For example, the chilling effects of otherwise justified speech regulations (discussed below) are seldom intended. But they undoubtedly matter.

Second, this view justifies the related doctrines of content neutrality and viewpoint neutrality (see G. Stone 1983 and 1987) . Content neutrality is violated when the state bans discussion of certain topics (“no discussion of abortion”), whereas viewpoint neutrality is violated when the state bans advocacy of certain views (“no pro-choice views may be expressed”). Both affront free speech, though viewpoint-discrimination is especially egregious and so even harder to justify. While listener autonomy theories are not the only theories that can ground these commitments, they are in a strong position to account for their plausibility. Note that while these doctrines are central to the American approach to free speech, they are less central to other states’ jurisprudence (see A. Stone 2017).

Third, this approach helps us see that free speech is potentially implicated whenever the state seeks to control our thoughts and the processes through which we form beliefs. Consider an attempt to ban Marx’s Capital . As Marx is deceased, he is probably not wronged through such censorship. But even if one held idiosyncratic views about posthumous rights, such that Marx were wronged, it would be curious to think this was the central objection to such censorship. Those with the gravest complaint would be the living adults who have the prerogative to read the book and make up their own minds about it. Indeed free speech may even be implicated if the state banned watching sunsets or playing video games on the grounds that is disapproved of the thoughts to which such experiences might give rise (Alexander 2005: 8–9; Kramer 2021: 22).

These arguments emphasize the noninstrumental imperative of respecting listener autonomy. But there is an instrumental version of the view. Our autonomy interests are not merely respected by free speech; they are promoted by an environment in which we learn what others have to say. Our interests in access to information is served by exposure to a wide range of viewpoints about both empirical and normative issues (Cohen 1993: 229), which help us reflect on what goals to choose and how best to pursue them. These informational interests are monumental. As Raz suggests, if we had to choose whether to express our own views on some question, or listen to the rest of humanity’s views on that question, we would choose the latter; it is our interest as listeners in the public good of a vibrant public discourse that, he thinks, centrally justifies free speech (1991).

Such an interest in acquiring justified beliefs, or in accessing truth, can be defended as part of a fully consequentialist political philosophy. J.S. Mill famously defends free speech instrumentally, appealing to its epistemic benefits in On Liberty . Mill believes that, given our fallibility, we should routinely keep an open mind as to whether a seemingly false view may actually be true, or at least contain some valuable grain of truth. And even where a proposition is manifestly false, there is value in allowing its expression so that we can better apprehend why we take it to be false (1859: chapter 2), enabled through discursive conflict (cf. Simpson 2021). Mill’s argument focuses especially on the benefits to audiences:

It is is not on the impassioned partisan, it is on the calmer and more disinterested bystander, that this collision of opinions works its salutary effect. (1859: chapter 2, p. 94)

These views are sometimes associated with the idea of a “marketplace of ideas”, whereby the open clash of views inevitably leads to the correct ones winning out in debate. Few in the contemporary literature holds such a strong teleological thesis about the consequences of unrestricted debate (e.g., see Brietzke 1997; cf. Volokh 2011). Much evidence from behavioral economics and social psychology, as well as insights about epistemic injustice from feminist epistemology, strongly suggest that human beings’ rational powers are seriously limited. Smug confidence in the marketplace of ideas belies this. Yet it is doubtful that Mill held such a strong teleological thesis (Gordon 1997). Mill’s point was not that unrestricted discussion necessarily leads people to acquire the truth. Rather, it is simply the best mechanism available for ascertaining the truth, relative to alternatives in which some arbiter declares what he sees as true and suppresses what he sees as false (see also Leiter 2016).

Note that Mill’s views on free speech in chapter 2 in On Liberty are not simply the application of the general liberty principle defended in chapter 1 of that work; his view is not that speech is anodyne and therefore seldom runs afoul of the harm principle. The reason a separate argument is necessary in chapter 2 is precisely that he is carving out a partial qualification of the harm principle for speech (on this issue see Jacobson 2000, Schauer 2011b, and Turner 2014). On Mill’s view, plenty of harmful speech should still be allowed. Imminently dangerous speech, where there is no time for discussion before harm eventuates, may be restricted; but where there is time for discussion, it must be allowed. Hence Mill’s famous example that vociferous criticism of corn dealers as

starvers of the poor…ought to be unmolested when simply circulated through the press, but may justly incur punishment when delivered orally to an excited mob assembled before the house of a corn dealer. (1859: chapter 3, p. 100)

The point is not that such speech is harmless; it’s that the instrumental benefits of permitting its expressions—and exposing its falsehood through public argument—justify the (remaining) costs.

Many authors have unsurprisingly argued that free speech is justified by our interests as speakers . This family of arguments emphasizes the role of speech in the development and exercise of our personal autonomy—our capacity to be the reflective authors of our own lives (Baker 1989; Redish 1982; Rawls 2005). Here an emphasis on freedom of expression is apt; we have an “expressive interest” (Cohen 1993: 224) in declaring our views—about the good life, about justice, about our identity, and about other aspects of the truth as we see it.

Our interests in self-expression may not always depend on the availability of a willing audience; we may have interests simply in shouting from the rooftops to declare who we are and what we believe, regardless of who else hears us. Hence communications to oneself—for example, in a diary or journal—are plausibly protected from interference (Redish 1992: 30–1; Shiffrin 2014: 83, 93; Kramer 2021: 23).

Yet we also have distinctive interests in sharing what we think with others. Part of how we develop our conceptions of the good life, forming judgments about how to live, is precisely through talking through the matter with others. This “deliberative interest” in directly served through opportunities to tell others what we think, so that we can learn from their feedback (Cohen 1993). Such encounters also offer opportunities to persuade others to adopt our views, and indeed to learn through such discussions who else already shares our views (Raz 1991).

Speech also seems like a central way in which we develop our capacities. This, too, is central to J.S. Mill’s defense of free speech, enabling people to explore different perspectives and points of view (1859). Hence it seems that when children engage in speech, to figure out what they think and to use their imagination to try out different ways of being in the world, they are directly engaging this interest. That explains the intuition that children, and not just adults, merit at least some protection under a principle of freedom of speech.

Note that while it is common to refer to speaker autonomy , we could simply refer to speakers’ capacities. Some political liberals hold that an emphasis on autonomy is objectionably Kantian or otherwise perfectionist, valorizing autonomy as a comprehensive moral ideal in a manner that is inappropriate for a liberal state (Cohen 1993: 229; Quong 2011). For such theorists, an undue emphasis on autonomy is incompatible with ideals of liberal neutrality toward different comprehensive conceptions of the good life (though cf. Shiffrin 2014: 81).

If free speech is justified by the importance of our interests in expressing ourselves, this justifies negative duties to refrain from interfering with speakers without adequate justification. Just as with listener theories, a strong presumption against content-based restrictions, and especially against viewpoint discrimination, is a clear requirement of the view. For the state to restrict citizens’ speech on the grounds that it disfavors what they have to say would affront the equal freedom of citizens. Imagine the state were to disallow the expression of Muslim or Jewish views, but allow the expression of Christian views. This would plainly transgress the right to freedom of expression, by valuing certain speakers’ interests in expressing themselves over others.

Many arguments for the right to free speech center on its special significance for democracy (Cohen 1993; Heinze 2016: Heyman 2009; Sunstein 1993; Weinstein 2011; Post 1991, 2009, 2011). It is possible to defend free speech on the noninstrumental ground that it is necessary to respect agents as democratic citizens. To restrict citizens’ speech is to disrespect their status as free and equal moral agents, who have a moral right to debate and decide the law for themselves (Rawls 2005).

Alternatively (or additionally), one can defend free speech on the instrumental ground that free speech promotes democracy, or whatever values democracy is meant to serve. So, for example, suppose the purpose of democracy is the republican one of establishing a state of non-domination between relationally egalitarian citizens; free speech can be defended as promoting that relation (Whitten 2022; Bonotti & Seglow 2022). Or suppose that democracy is valuable because of its role in promoting just outcomes (Arneson 2009) or tending to track those outcomes in a manner than is publicly justifiable (Estlund 2008) or is otherwise epistemically valuable (Landemore 2013).

Perhaps free speech doesn’t merely respect or promote democracy; another framing is that it is constitutive of it (Meiklejohn 1948, 1960; Heinze 2016). As Rawls says: “to restrict or suppress free political speech…always implies at least a partial suspension of democracy” (2005: 254). On this view, to be committed to democracy just is , in part, to be committed to free speech. Deliberative democrats famously contend that voting merely punctuates a larger process defined by a commitment to open deliberation among free and equal citizens (Gutmann & Thompson 2008). Such an unrestricted discussion is marked not by considerations of instrumental rationality and market forces, but rather, as Habermas puts it, “the unforced force of the better argument” (1992 [1996: 37]). One crucial way in which free speech might be constitutive of democracy is if it serves as a legitimation condition . On this view, without a process of open public discourse, the outcomes of the democratic decision-making process lack legitimacy (Dworkin 2009, Brettschneider 2012: 75–78, Cohen 1997, and Heinze 2016).

Those who justify free speech on democratic grounds may view this as a special application of a more general insight. For example, Scanlon’s listener theory (discussed above) contends that the state must always respect its citizens as capable of making up their own minds (1972)—a position with clear democratic implications. Likewise, Baker is adamant that both free speech and democracy are justified by the same underlying value of autonomy (2009). And while Rawls sees the democratic role of free speech as worthy of emphasis, he is clear that free speech is one of several basic liberties that enable the development and exercise of our moral powers: our capacities for a sense of justice and for the rational pursuit a lifeplan (2005). In this way, many theorists see the continuity between free speech and our broader interests as moral agents as a virtue, not a drawback (e.g., Kendrick 2017).

Even so, some democracy theorists hold that democracy has a special role in a theory of free speech, such that political speech in particular merits special protection (for an overview, see Barendt 2005: 154ff). One consequence of such views is that contributions to public discourse on political questions merit greater protection under the law (Sunstein 1993; cf. Cohen 1993: 227; Alexander 2005: 137–8). For some scholars, this may reflect instrumental anxieties about the special danger that the state will restrict the political speech of opponents and dissenters. But for others, an emphasis on political speech seems to reflect a normative claim that such speech is genuinely of greater significance, meriting greater protection, than other kinds of speech.

While conventional in the free speech literature, it is artificial to separate out our interests as speakers, listeners, and democratic citizens. Communication, and the thinking that feeds into it and that it enables, invariably engages our interests and activities across all these capacities. This insight is central to Seana Shiffrin’s groundbreaking thinker-based theory of freedom of speech, which seeks to unify the range of considerations that have informed the traditional theories (2014). Like other theories (e.g., Scanlon 1978, Cohen 1993), Shiffrin’s theory is pluralist in the range of interests it appeals to. But it offers a unifying framework that explains why this range of interests merits protection together.

On Shiffrin’s view, freedom of speech is best understood as encompassing both freedom of communication and freedom of thought, which while logically distinct are mutually reinforcing and interdependent (Shiffrin 2014: 79). Shiffrin’s account involves several profound claims about the relation between communication and thought. A central contention is that “free speech is essential to the development, functioning, and operation of thinkers” (2014: 91). This is, in part, because we must often externalize our ideas to articulate them precisely and hold them at a distance where we can evaluate them (p. 89). It is also because we work out what we think largely by talking it through with others. Such communicative processes may be monological, but they are typically dialogical; speaker and listener interests are thereby mutually engaged in an ongoing manner that cannot be neatly disentangled, as ideas are ping-ponged back and forth. Moreover, such discussions may concern democratic politics—engaging our interests as democratic citizens—but of course they need not. Aesthetics, music, local sports, the existence of God—these all are encompassed (2014: 92–93). Pace prevailing democratic theories,

One’s thoughts about political affairs are intrinsically and ex ante no more and no less central to the human self than thoughts about one’s mortality or one’s friends. (Shiffrin 2014: 93)

The other central aspect of Shiffrin’s view appeals to the necessity of communication for successfully exercising our moral agency. Sincere communication enables us

to share needs, emotions, intentions, convictions, ambitions, desires, fantasies, disappointments, and judgments. Thereby, we are enabled to form and execute complex cooperative plans, to understand one another, to appreciate and negotiate around our differences. (2014: 1)

Without clear and precise communication of the sort that only speech can provide, we cannot cooperate to discharge our collective obligations. Nor can we exercise our normative powers (such as consenting, waiving, or promising). Our moral agency thus depends upon protected channels through which we can relay our sincere thoughts to one another. The central role of free speech is to protect those channels, by ensuring agents are free to share what they are thinking without fear of sanction.

The thinker-based view has wide-ranging normative implications. For example, by emphasizing the continuity of speech and thought (a connection also noted in Macklem 2006 and Gilmore 2011), Shiffrin’s view powerfully explains the First Amendment doctrine that compelled speech also constitutes a violation of freedom of expression. Traditional listener- and speaker-focused theories seemingly cannot explain what is fundamentally objectionable with forcing someone to declare a commitment to something, as with children compelled to pledge allegiance to the American flag ( West Virginia State Board of Education v. Barnette 1943). “What seems most troubling about the compelled pledge”, Shiffrin writes,

is that the motive behind the regulation, and its possible effect, is to interfere with the autonomous thought processes of the compelled speaker. (2014: 94)

Further, Shiffrin’s view explains why a concern for free speech does not merely correlate to negative duties not to interfere with expression; it also supports positive responsibilities on the part of the state to educate citizens, encouraging and supporting their development and exercise as thinking beings (2014: 107).

Consider briefly one final family of free speech theories, which appeal to the role of toleration or self-restraint. On one argument, freedom of speech is important because it develops our character as liberal citizens, helping us tame our illiberal impulses. The underlying idea of Lee Bollinger’s view is that liberalism is difficult; we recurrently face temptation to punish those who hold contrary views. Freedom of speech helps us to practice the general ethos of toleration in a manner than fortifies our liberal convictions (1986). Deeply offensive speech, like pro-Nazi speech, is protected precisely because toleration in these enormously difficult cases promotes “a general social ethic” of toleration more generally (1986: 248), thereby restraining unjust exercises of state power overall. This consequentialist argument treats the protection of offensive speech not as a tricky borderline case, but as “integral to the central functions of the principle of free speech” (1986: 133). It is precisely because tolerating evil speech involves “extraordinary self-restraint” (1986: 10) that it works its salutary effects on society generally.

The idea of self-restraint arises, too, in Matthew Kramer’s recent defense of free speech. Like listener theories, Kramer’s strongly deontological theory condemns censorship aimed at protecting audiences from exposure to misguided views. At the core of his theory is the thesis that the state’s paramount moral responsibility is to furnish the social conditions that serve the development and maintenance of citizens’ self-respect and respect for others. The achievement of such an ethically resilient citizenry, on Kramer’s view, has the effect of neutering the harmfulness of countless harmful communications. “Securely in a position of ethical strength”, the state “can treat the wares of pornographers and the maunderings of bigots as execrable chirps that are to be endured with contempt” (Kramer 2021: 147). In contrast, in a society where the state has failed to do its duty of inculcating a robust liberal-egalitarian ethos, the communication of illiberal creeds may well pose a substantial threat. Yet for the state then to react by banning such speech is

overweening because with them the system’s officials take control of communications that should have been defused (through the system’s fulfillment of its moral obligations) without prohibitory or preventative impositions. (2021: 147)

(One might agree with Kramer that this is so, but diverge by arguing that the state—having failed in its initial duty—ought to take measures to prevent the harms that flow from that failure.)

These theories are striking in that they assume that a chief task of free speech theory is to explain why harmful speech ought to be protected. This is in contrast to those who think that the chief task of free speech theory is to explain our interests in communicating with others, treating the further issue of whether (wrongfully) harmful communications should be protected as an open question, with different reasonable answers available (Kendrick 2017). In this way, toleration theories—alongside a lot of philosophical work on free speech—seem designed to vindicate the demanding American legal position on free speech, one unshared by virtually all other liberal democracies.

One final family of arguments for free speech appeals to the danger of granting the state powers it may abuse. On this view, we protect free speech chiefly because if we didn’t, it would be far easier for the state to silence its political opponents and enact unjust policies. On this view, a state with censorial powers is likely to abuse them. As Richard Epstein notes, focusing on the American case,

the entire structure of federalism, divided government, and the system of checks and balances at the federal level shows that the theme of distrust has worked itself into the warp and woof of our constitutional structure.

“The protection of speech”, he writes, “…should be read in light of these political concerns” (Epstein 1992: 49).

This view is not merely a restatement of the democracy theory; it does not affirm free speech as an element of valuable self-governance. Nor does it reduce to the uncontroversial thought that citizens need freedom of speech to check the behavior of fallible government agents (Blasi 1977). One need not imagine human beings to be particularly sinister to insist (as democracy theorists do) that the decisions of those entrusted with great power be subject to public discussion and scrutiny. The argument under consideration here is more pessimistic about human nature. It is an argument about the slippery slope that we create even when enacting (otherwise justified) speech restrictions; we set an unacceptable precedent for future conduct by the state (see Schauer 1985). While this argument is theoretical, there is clearly historical evidence for it, as in the manifold cases in which bans on dangerous sedition were used to suppress legitimate war protest. (For a sweeping canonical study of the uses and abuses of speech regulations during wartime, with a focus on U.S. history, see G. Stone 2004.)

These instrumental concerns could potentially justify the legal protection for free speech. But they do not to attempt to justify why we should care about free speech as a positive moral ideal (Shiffrin 2014: 83n); they are, in Cohen’s helpful terminology, “minimalist” rather than “maximalist” (Cohen 1993: 210). Accordingly, they cannot explain why free speech is something that even the most trustworthy, morally competent administrations, with little risk of corruption or degeneration, ought to respect. Of course, minimalists will deny that accounting for speech’s positive value is a requirement of a theory of free speech, and that critiquing them for this omission begs the question.

Pluralists may see instrumental concerns as valuably supplementing or qualifying noninstrumental views. For example, instrumental concerns may play a role in justifying deviations between the moral right to free communication, on the one hand, and a properly specified legal right to free communication, on the other. Suppose that there is no moral right to engage in certain forms of harmful expression (such as hate speech), and that there is in fact a moral duty to refrain from such expression. Even so, it does not follow automatically that such a right ought to be legally enforced. Concerns about the dangers of granting the state such power plausibly militate against the enforcement of at least some of our communicative duties—at least in those jurisdictions that lack robust and competently administered liberal-democratic safeguards.

This entry has canvassed a range of views about what justifies freedom of expression, with particular attention to theories that conceive free speech as a natural moral right. Clearly, the proponents of such views believe that they succeed in this justificatory effort. But others dissent, doubting that the case for a bona fide moral right to free speech comes through. Let us briefly note the nature of this challenge from free speech skeptics , exploring a prominent line of reply.

The challenge from skeptics is generally understood as that of showing that free speech is a special right . As Leslie Kendrick notes,

the term “special right” generally requires that a special right be entirely distinct from other rights and activities and that it receive a very high degree of protection. (2017: 90)

(Note that this usage is not to be confused from the alternative usage of “special right”, referring to conditional rights arising out of particular relationships; see Hart 1955.)

Take each aspect in turn. First, to vindicate free speech as a special right, it must serve some distinctive value or interest (Schauer 2015). Suppose free speech were just an implication of a general principle not to interfere in people’s liberty without justification. As Joel Feinberg puts it, “Liberty should be the norm; coercion always needs some special justification” (1984: 9). In such a case, then while there still might be contingent, historical reasons to single speech out in law as worthy of protection (Alexander 2005: 186), such reasons would not track anything especially distinctive about speech as an underlying moral matter. Second, to count as a special right, free speech must be robust in what it protects, such that only a compelling justification can override it (Dworkin 2013: 131). This captures the conviction, prominent among American constitutional theorists, that “any robust free speech principle must protect at least some harmful speech despite the harm it may cause” (Schauer 2011b: 81; see also Schauer 1982).

If the task of justifying a moral right to free speech requires surmounting both hurdles, it is a tall order. Skeptics about a special right to free speech doubt that the order can be met, and so deny that a natural moral right to freedom of expression can be justified (Schauer 2015; Alexander & Horton 1983; Alexander 2005; Husak 1985). But these theorists may be demanding too much (Kendrick 2017). Start with the claim that free speech must be distinctive. We can accept that free speech be more than simply one implication of a general presumption of liberty. But need it be wholly distinctive? Consider the thesis that free speech is justified by our autonomy interests—interests that justify other rights such as freedom of religion and association. Is it a problem if free speech is justified by interests that are continuous with, or overlap with, interests that justify other rights? Pace the free speech skeptics, maybe not. So long as such claims deserve special recognition, and are worth distinguishing by name, this may be enough (Kendrick 2017: 101). Many of the views canvassed above share normative bases with other important rights. For example, Rawls is clear that he thinks all the basic liberties constitute

essential social conditions for the adequate development and full exercise of the two powers of moral personality over a complete life. (Rawls 2005: 293)

The debate, then, is whether such a shared basis is a theoretical virtue (or at least theoretically unproblematic) or whether it is a theoretical vice, as the skeptics avow.

As for the claim that free speech must be robust, protecting harmful speech, “it is not necessary for a free speech right to protect harmful speech in order for it to be called a free speech right” (Kendrick 2017: 102). We do not tend to think that religious liberty must protect harmful religious activities for it to count as a special right. So it would be strange to insist that the right to free speech must meet this burden to count as a special right. Most of the theorists mentioned above take themselves to be offering views that protect quite a lot of harmful speech. Yet we can question whether this feature is a necessary component of their views, or whether we could imagine variations without this result.

3. Justifying Speech Restrictions

When, and why, can restrictions on speech be justified? It is common in public debate on free speech to hear the provocative claim that free speech is absolute . But the plausibility of such a claim depends on what is exactly meant by it. If understood to mean that no communications between humans can ever be restricted, such a view is held by no one in the philosophical debate. When I threaten to kill you unless you hand me your money; when I offer to bribe the security guard to let me access the bank vault; when I disclose insider information that the company in which you’re heavily invested is about to go bust; when I defame you by falsely posting online that you’re a child abuser; when I endanger you by labeling a drug as safe despite its potentially fatal side-effects; when I reveal your whereabouts to assist a murderer intent on killing you—across all these cases, communications may be uncontroversially restricted. But there are different views as to why.

To help organize such views, consider a set of distinctions influentially defended by Schauer (from 1982 onward). The first category involves uncovered speech : speech that does not even presumptively fall within the scope of a principle of free expression. Many of the speech-acts just canvassed, such as the speech involved in making a threat or insider training, plausibly count as uncovered speech. As the U.S. Supreme Court has said of fighting words (e.g., insults calculated to provoke a street fight),

such utterances are no essential part of any exposition of ideas, and are of such slight social value as a step to truth that any benefit that may be derived from them is clearly outweighed by the social interest in order and morality. ( Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire 1942)

The general idea here is that some speech simply has negligible—and often no —value as free speech, in light of its utter disconnection from the values that justify free speech in the first place. (For discussion of so-called “low-value speech” in the U.S. context, see Sunstein 1989 and Lakier 2015.) Accordingly, when such low-value speech is harmful, it is particularly easy to justify its curtailment. Hence the Court’s view that “the prevention and punishment of [this speech] have never been thought to raise any Constitutional problem”. For legislation restricting such speech, the U.S. Supreme Court applies a “rational basis” test, which is very easy to meet, as it simply asks whether the law is rationally related to a legitimate state interest. (Note that it is widely held that it would still be impermissible to selectively ban low-value speech on a viewpoint-discriminatory basis—e.g., if a state only banned fighting words from left-wing activists while allowing them from right-wing activists.)

Schauer’s next category concerns speech that is covered but unprotected . This is speech that engages the values that underpin free speech; yet the countervailing harm of the speech justifies its restriction. In such cases, while there is real value in such expression as free speech, that value is outweighed by competing normative concerns (or even, as we will see below, on behalf of the very values that underpin free speech). In U.S. constitutional jurisprudence, this category encompasses those extremely rare cases in which restrictions on political speech pass the “strict scrutiny” test, whereby narrow restrictions on high-value speech can be justified due to the compelling state interests thereby served. Consider Holder v. Humanitarian Law Project 2010, in which the Court held that an NGO’s legal advice to a terrorist organization on how to pursue peaceful legal channels were legitimately criminalized under a counter-terrorism statute. While such speech had value as free speech (at least on one interpretation of this contested ruling), the imperative of counter-terrorism justified its restriction. (Arguably, commercial speech, while sometimes called low-value speech by scholars, falls into the covered but unprotected category. Under U.S. law, legislation restricting it receives “intermediate scrutiny” by courts—requiring restrictions to be narrowly drawn to advance a substantial government interest. Such a test suggests that commercial speech has bona fide free-speech value, making it harder to justify regulations on it than regulations on genuinely low-value speech like fighting words. It simply doesn’t have as much free-speech value as categories like political speech, religious speech, or press speech, all of which trigger the strict scrutiny test when restricted.)

As a philosophical matter, we can reasonably disagree about what speech qualifies as covered but unprotected (and need not treat the verdicts of the U.S. Supreme Court as philosophically decisive). For example, consider politically-inflected hate speech, which advances repugnant ideas about the inferior status of certain groups. One could concur that there is substantial free-speech value in such expression, just because it involves the sincere expression of views about central questions of politics and justice (however misguided the views doubtlessly are). Yet one could nevertheless hold that such speech should not be protected in virtue of the substantial harms to which it can lead. In such cases, the free-speech value is outweighed. Many scholars who defend the permissibility of legal restrictions on hate speech hold such a view (e.g., Parekh 2012; Waldron 2012). (More radically, one could hold that such speech’s value is corrupted by its evil, such that it qualifies as genuinely low-value; Howard 2019a.)

The final category of speech encompasses expression that is covered and protected . To declare that speech is protected just is to conclude that it is immune from restriction. A preponderance of human communications fall into this category. This does not mean that such speech can never be regulated ; content-neutral time, place, and manner regulations (e.g., prohibiting loud nighttime protests) can certainly be justified (G. Stone 1987). But such regulations must not be viewpoint discriminatory; they must apply even-handedly across all forms of protected speech.

Schauer’s taxonomy offers a useful organizing framework for how we should think about different forms of speech. Where does it leave the claim that free speech is absolute? The possibility of speech that is covered but unprotected suggests that free speech should sometimes be restricted on account of rival normative concerns. Of course, one could contend that such a category, while logically possible, is substantively an empty set; such a position would involve some kind of absoluteness about free speech (holding that where free-speech values are engaged by expression, no countervailing values can ever be weighty enough to override them). Such a position would be absolutist in a certain sense while granting the permissibility of restrictions on speech that do not engage the free-speech values. (For a recent critique of Schauer’s framework, arguing that governmental designation of some speech as low-value is incompatible with the very ideal of free speech, see Kramer 2021: 31.)

In what follows, this entry will focus on Schauer’s second category: speech that is covered by a free speech principle, but is nevertheless unprotected because of the harms it causes. How do we determine what speech falls into this category? How, in other words, do we determine the limits of free speech? Unsurprisingly, this is where most of the controversy lies.

Most legal systems that protect free speech recognize that the right has limits. Consider, for example, international human rights law, which emphatically protects the freedom of speech as a fundamental human right while also affirming specific restrictions on certain seriously harmful speech. Article 19 of the International Covenant of Civil and Political Rights declares that “[e]veryone shall have the right to freedom of expression; this right shall include freedom to seek, receive and impart information and ideas of all kinds”—but then immediately notes that this right “carries with it special duties and responsibilities”. The subsequent ICCPR article proceeds to endorse legal restrictions on “advocacy of national, racial or religious hatred that constitutes incitement to discrimination, hostility or violence”, as well as speech constituting “propaganda for war” (ICCPR). While such restrictions would plainly be struck down as unconstitutional affronts to free speech in the U.S., this more restrictive approach prevails in most liberal democracies’ treatment of harmful speech.

Set aside the legal issue for now. How should we think about how to determine the limits of the moral right free speech? Those seeking to justify limits on speech tend to appeal to one of two strategies (Howard and Simpson forthcoming). The first strategy appeals to the importance of balancing free speech against other moral values when they come into conflict. This strategy involves external limits on free speech. (The next strategy, discussed below, invokes free speech itself, or the values that justify it, as limit-setting rationales; it thus involves internal limits on free speech.)

A balancing approach recognizes a moral conflict between unfettered communication and external values. Consider again the case of hate speech, understood as expression that attacks members of socially vulnerable groups as inferior or dangerous. On all of the theories canvassed above, there are grounds for thinking that restrictions on hate speech are prima facie in violation of the moral right to free speech. Banning hate speech to prevent people from hearing ideas that might incline them to bigotry plainly seems to disrespect listener autonomy. Further, even when speakers are expressing prejudiced views, they are still engaging their autonomous faculties. Certainly, they are expressing views on questions of public political concern, even false ones. And as thinkers they are engaged in the communication of sincere testimony to others. On many of the leading theories, the values underpinning free speech seem to be militate against bans on hate speech.

Even so, other values matter. Consider, for example, the value of upholding the equal dignity of all citizens. A central insight of critical race theory is that public expressions of white supremacy, for example, attack and undermine that equal dignity (Matsuda, Lawrence, Delgado, & Crenshaw 1993). On Jeremy Waldron’s view (2012), hate speech is best understood as a form of group defamation, launching spurious attacks on others’ reputations and thereby undermining their standing as respected equals in their own community (relatedly, see Beauharnais v. Illinois 1952).

Countries that ban hate speech, accordingly, are plausibly understood not as opposed to free speech, but as recognizing the importance that it be balanced when conflicting with other values. Such balancing can be understood in different ways. In European human rights law, for example, the relevant idea is that the right to free speech is balanced against other rights ; the relevant task, accordingly, is to specify what counts as a proportionate balance between these rights (see Alexy 2003; J. Greene 2021).

For others, the very idea of balancing rights undermines their deontic character. This alternative framing holds that the balancing occurs before we specify what rights are; on this view, we balance interests against each other, and only once we’ve undertaken that balancing do we proceed to define what our rights protect. As Scanlon puts it,

The only balancing is balancing of interests. Rights are not balanced, but are defined, or redefined, in the light of the balance of interests and of empirical facts about how these interests can best be protected. (2008: 78)

This balancing need not come in the form of some crude consequentialism; otherwise it would be acceptable to limit the rights of the few to secure trivial benefits for the many. On a contractualist moral theory such as Scanlon’s, the test is to assess the strength of any given individual’s reason to engage in (or access) the speech, against the strength of any given individual’s reason to oppose it.

Note that those who engage in balancing need not give up on the idea of viewpoint neutrality; they can accept that, as a general principle, the state should not restrict speech on the grounds that it disapproves of its message and dislikes that others will hear it. The point, instead, is that this commitment is defeasible; it is possible to be overridden.

One final comment is apt. Those who are keen to balance free speech against other values tend to be motivated by the concern that speech can cause harm, either directly or indirectly (on this distinction, see Schauer 1993). But to justify restrictions on speech, it is not sufficient (and perhaps not even necessary) to show that such speech imposes or risks imposing harm. The crucial point is that the speech is wrongful (or, perhaps, wrongfully harmful or risky) , breaching a moral duty that speakers owe to others. Yet very few in the free speech literature think that the mere offensiveness of speech is sufficient to justify restrictions on it. Even Joel Feinberg, who thinks offensiveness can sometimes be grounds for restricting conduct, makes a sweeping exception for

[e]xpressions of opinion, especially about matters of public policy, but also about matters of empirical fact, and about historical, scientific, theological, philosophical, political, and moral questions. (1985: 44)

And in many cases, offensive speech may be actively salutary, as when racists are offended by defenses of racial equality (Waldron 1987). Accordingly, despite how large it looms in public debate, discussion of offensive speech will not play a major role in the discussion here.

We saw that one way to justify limits on free speech is to balance it against other values. On that approach, free speech is externally constrained. A second approach, in contrast, is internally constrained. On this approach, the very values that justify free speech themselves determine its own limits. This is a revisionist approach to free speech since, unlike orthodox thinking, it contends that a commitment to free speech values can counterintuitively support the restriction of speech—a surprising inversion of traditional thinking on the topic (see Howard and Simpson forthcoming). This move—justifying restrictions on speech by appealing to the values that underpin free speech—is now prevalent in the philosophical literature (for an overview, see Barendt 2005: 1ff).

Consider, for example, the claim that free speech is justified by concerns of listener autonomy. On such a view, as we saw above, autonomous citizens have interests in exposure to a wide range of viewpoints, so that they can decide for themselves what to believe. But many have pointed out that this is not autonomous citizens’ only interest; they also have interests in not getting murdered by those incited by incendiary speakers (Amdur 1980). Likewise, insofar as being targeted by hate speech undermines the exercise of one’s autonomous capacities, appeal to the underlying value of autonomy could well support restrictions on such speech (Brison 1998; see also Brink 2001). What’s more, if our interests as listeners in acquiring accurate information is undermined by fraudulent information, then restrictions on such information could well be compatible with our status as autonomous; this was one of the insights that led Scanlon to complicate his theory of free speech (1978).

Or consider the theory that free speech is justified because of its role in enabling autonomous speakers to express themselves. But as Japa Pallikkathayil has argued, some speech can intimidate its audiences into staying silent (as with some hate speech), out of fear for what will happen if they speak up (Pallikkathayil 2020). In principle, then, restrictions on hate speech may serve to support the value of speaker expression, rather than undermine it (see also Langton 2018; Maitra 2009; Maitra & McGowan 2007; and Matsuda 1989: 2337). Indeed, among the most prominent claims in feminist critiques of pornography is precisely that it silences women—not merely through its (perlocutionary) effects in inspiring rape, but more insidiously through its (illocutionary) effects in altering the force of the word “no” (see MacKinnon 1984; Langton 1993; and West 204 [2022]; McGowan 2003 and 2019; cf. Kramer 2021, pp. 160ff).

Now consider democracy theories. On the one hand, democracy theorists are adamant that citizens should be free to discuss any proposals, even the destruction of democracy itself (e.g., Meiklejohn 1948: 65–66). On the other hand, it isn’t obvious why citizens’ duties as democratic citizens could not set a limit to their democratic speech rights (Howard 2019a). The Nazi propagandist Goebbels is said to have remarked:

This will always remain one of the best jokes of democracy, that it gave its deadly enemies the means by which it was destroyed. (as quoted in Fox & Nolte 1995: 1)

But it is not clear why this is necessarily so. Why should we insist on a conception of democracy that contains a self-destruct mechanism? Merely stipulating that democracy requires this is not enough (see A. Greene and Simpson 2017).

Finally, consider Shiffrin’s thinker-based theory. Shiffrin’s view is especially well-placed to explain why varieties of harmful communications are protected speech; what the theory values is the sincere transmission of veridical testimony, whereby speakers disclose what they genuinely believe to others, even if what they believe is wrongheaded and dangerous. Yet because the sincere testimony of thinkers is what qualifies some communication for protection, Shiffrin is adamant that lying falls outside the protective ambit of freedom of expression (2014) This, then, sets an internal limit on her own theory (even if she herself disfavors all lies’ outright prohibition for reasons of tolerance). The claim that lying falls outside the protective ambit of free speech is itself a recurrent suggestion in the literature (Strauss 1991: 355; Brown 2023). In an era of rampant disinformation, this internal limit is of substantial practical significance.

Suppose the moral right (or principle) of free speech is limited, as most think, such that not all communications fall within its protective ambit (either for external reasons, internal reasons, or both). Even so, it does not follow that laws banning such unprotected speech can be justified all-things-considered. Further moral tests must be passed before any particular policy restricting speech can be justified. This sub-section focuses on the requirement that speech restrictions be proportionate .

The idea that laws implicating fundamental rights must be proportionate is central in many jurisdictions’ constitutional law, as well as in the international law of human rights. As a representative example, consider the specification of proportionality offered by the Supreme Court of Canada:

First, the measures adopted must be carefully designed to achieve the objective in question. They must not be arbitrary, unfair, or based on irrational considerations. In short, they must be rationally connected to the objective. Second, the means, even if rationally connected to the objective in this first sense, should impair “as little as possible” the right or freedom in question[…] Third, there must be a proportionality between the effects of the measures which are responsible for limiting the Charter right or freedom, and the objective which has been identified as of “sufficient importance” ( R v. Oakes 1986).

It is this third element (often called “proportionality stricto sensu ”) on which we will concentrate here; this is the focused sense of proportionality that roughly tracks how the term is used in the philosophical literatures on defensive harm and war, as well as (with some relevant differences) criminal punishment. (The strict scrutiny and intermediate scrutiny tests of U.S. constitutional law are arguably variations of the proportionality test; but set aside this complication for now as it distracts from the core philosophical issues. For relevant legal discussion, see Tsesis 2020.)

Proportionality, in the strict sense, concerns the relation between the costs or harms imposed by some measure and the benefits that the measure is designed to secure. The organizing distinction in recent philosophical literature (albeit largely missing in the literature on free speech) is one between narrow proportionality and wide proportionality . While there are different ways to cut up the terrain between these terms, let us stipulatively define them as follows. An interference is narrowly proportionate just in case the intended target of the interference is liable to bear the costs of that interference. An interference is widely proportionate just in case the collateral costs that the interference unintentionally imposes on others can be justified. (This distinction largely follows the literature in just war theory and the ethics of defensive force; see McMahan 2009.) While the distinction is historically absent from free speech theory, it has powerful payoffs in helping to structure this chaotic debate (as argued in Howard 2019a).

So start with the idea that restrictions on communication must be narrowly proportionate . For a restriction to be narrowly proportionate, those whose communications are restricted must be liable to bear their costs, such that they are not wronged by their imposition. One standard way to be liable to bear certain costs is to have a moral duty to bear them (Tadros 2012). So, for example, if speakers have a moral duty to refrain from libel, hate speech, or some other form of harmful speech, they are liable to bear at least some costs involved in the enforcement of that duty. Those costs cannot be unlimited; a policy of executing hate speakers could not plausibly be justified. Typically, in both defensive and punitive contexts, wrongdoers’ liability is determined by their culpability, the severity of their wrong, or some combination of the two. While it is difficult to say in the abstract what the precise maximal cost ceiling is for any given restriction, as it depends hugely on the details, the point is simply that there is some ceiling above which a speech restriction (like any restriction) imposes unacceptably high costs, even on wrongdoers.

Second, for a speech restriction to be justified, we must also show that it would be widely proportionate . Suppose a speaker is liable to bear the costs of some policy restricting her communication, such that she is not wronged by its imposition. It may be that the collateral costs of such a policy would render it unacceptable. One set of costs is chilling effects , the “overdeterrence of benign conduct that occurs incidentally to a law’s legitimate purpose or scope” (Kendrick 2013: 1649). The core idea is that laws targeting unprotected, legitimately proscribed expression may nevertheless end up having a deleterious impact on protected expression. This is because laws are often vague, overbroad, and in any case are likely to be misapplied by fallible officials (Schauer 1978: 699).

Note that if a speech restriction produces chilling effects, it does not follow that the restriction should not exist at all. Rather, concern about chilling effects instead suggests that speech restrictions should be under-inclusive—restricting less speech than is actually harmful—in order to create “breathing space”, or “a buffer zone of strategic protection” (Schauer 1978: 710) for legitimate expression and so reduce unwanted self-censorship. For example, some have argued that even though speech can cause harm recklessly or negligently, we should insist on specific intent as the mens rea of speech crimes in order to reduce any chilling effects that could follow (Alexander 1995: 21–128; Schauer 1978: 707; cf. Kendrick 2013).

But chilling effects are not the only sort of collateral effects to which speech restrictions could lead. Earlier we noted the risk that states might abuse their censorial powers. This, too, could militate in favor of underinclusive speech restrictions. Or the implication could be more radical. Consider the problem that it is difficult to author restrictions on hate speech in a tightly specified way; the language involved is open-ended in a manner that enables states to exercise considerable judgment in deciding what speech-acts, in fact, count as violations (see Strossen 2018). Given the danger that the state will misuse or abuse these laws to punish legitimate speech, some might think this renders their enactment widely disproportionate. Indeed, even if the law were well-crafted and would be judiciously applied by current officials, the point is that those in the future may not be so trustworthy.

Those inclined to accept such a position might simply draw the conclusion that legislatures ought to refrain from enacting laws against hate speech. A more radical conclusion is that the legal right to free speech ought to be specified so that hate speech is constitutionally protected. In other words, we ought to give speakers a legal right to violate their moral duties, since enforcing those moral duties through law is simply too risky. By appealing to this logic, it is conceivable that the First Amendment position on hate speech could be justified all-things-considered—not because the underlying moral right to free speech protects hate speech, but because hate speech must be protected for instrumental reasons of preventing future abuses of power (Howard 2019a).

Suppose certain restrictions on harmful speech can be justified as proportionate, in both the narrow and wide senses. This is still not sufficient to justify them all-things-considered. Additionally, they must be justified as necessary . (Note that some conceptions of proportionality in human rights law encompass the necessity requirement, but this entry follows the prevailing philosophical convention by treating them as distinct.)

Why might restrictions on harmful speech be unnecessary? One of the standard claims in the free speech literature is that we should respond to harmful speech not by banning it, but by arguing back against it. Counter-speech—not censorship—is the appropriate solution. This line of reasoning is old. As John Milton put it in 1644: “Let [Truth] and Falsehood grapple; who ever knew Truth put to the worse in a free and open encounter?” The insistence on counter-speech as the remedy for harmful speech is similarly found, as noted above, throughout chapter 2 of Mill’s On Liberty .

For many scholars, this line of reply is justified by the fact that they think the harmful speech in question is protected by the moral right to free speech. For such scholars, counter-speech is the right response because censorship is morally off the table. For other scholars, the recourse to counter-speech has a plausible distinct rationale (although it is seldom articulated): its possibility renders legal restrictions unnecessary. And because it is objectionable to use gratuitous coercion, legal restrictions are therefore impermissible (Howard 2019a). Such a view could plausibly justify Mill’s aforementioned analysis in the corn dealer example, whereby censorship is permissible but only when there’s no time for counter-speech—a view that is also endorsed by the U.S. Supreme Court in Brandenburg v. Ohio 395 U.S. 444 (1969).

Whether this argument succeeds depends upon a wide range of further assumptions—about the comparable effectiveness of counter-speech relative to law; about the burdens that counter-speech imposes on prospective counter-speakers. Supposing that the argument succeeds, it invites a range of further normative questions about the ethics of counter-speech. For example, it is important who has the duty to engage in counter-speech, who its intended audience is, and what specific forms the counter-speech ought to take—especially in order to maximize its persuasive effectiveness (Brettschneider 2012; Cepollaro, Lepoutre, & Simpson 2023; Howard 2021b; Lepoutre 2021; Badano & Nuti 2017). It is also important to ask questions about the moral limits of counter-speech. For example, insofar as publicly shaming wrongful speakers has become a prominent form of counter-speech, it is crucial to interrogate its permissibility (e.g., Billingham and Parr 2020).

This final section canvasses the young philosophical debate concerning freedom of speech on the internet. With some important exceptions (e.g., Barendt 2005: 451ff), this issue has only recently accelerated (for an excellent edited collection, see Brison & Gelber 2019). There are many normative questions to be asked about the moral rights and obligations of internet platforms. Here are three. First, do internet platforms have moral duties to respect the free speech of their users? Second, do internet platforms have moral duties to restrict (or at least refrain from amplifying) harmful speech posted by their users? And finally, if platforms do indeed have moral duties to restrict harmful speech, should those duties be legally enforced?

The reference to internet platforms , is a deliberate focus on large-scale social media platforms, through which people can discover and publicly share user-generated content. We set aside other entities such as search engines (Whitney & Simpson 2019), important though they are. That is simply because the central political controversies, on which philosophical input is most urgent, concern the large social-media platforms.

Consider the question of whether internet platforms have moral duties to respect the free speech of their users. One dominant view in the public discourse holds that the answer is no . On this view, platforms are private entities, and as such enjoy the prerogative to host whatever speech they like. This would arguably be a function of them having free speech rights themselves. Just as the free speech rights of the New York Times give it the authority to publish whatever op-eds it sees fit, the free speech rights of platforms give them the authority to exercise editorial or curatorial judgment about what speech to allow. On this view, if Facebook were to decide to become a Buddhist forum, amplifying the speech of Buddhist users and promoting Buddhist perspectives and ideas, and banning speech promoting other religions, it would be entirely within its moral (and thus proper legal) rights to do so. So, too, if it were to decide to become an atheist forum.

A radical alternative view holds that internet platforms constitute a public forum , a term of art from U.S. free speech jurisprudence used to designate spaces “designed for and dedicated to expressive activities” ( Southeastern Promotions Ltd., v. Conrad 1975). As Kramer has argued:

social-media platforms such as Facebook and Twitter and YouTube have become public fora. Although the companies that create and run those platforms are not morally obligated to sustain them in existence at all, the role of controlling a public forum morally obligates each such company to comply with the principle of freedom of expression while performing that role. No constraints that deviate from the kinds of neutrality required under that principle are morally legitimate. (Kramer 2021: 58–59)

On this demanding view, platforms’ duties to respect speech are (roughly) identical to the duties of states. Accordingly, if efforts by the state to restrict hate speech, pornography, and public health misinformation (for example) are objectionable affronts to free speech, so too are platforms’ content moderation rules for such content. A more moderate view does not hold that platforms are public forums as such, but holds that government channels or pages qualify as public forums (the claim at issue in Knight First Amendment Institute v. Trump (2019).)

Even if we deny that platforms constitute public forums, it is plausible that they engage in a governance function of some kind (Klonick 2018). As Jack Balkin has argued, the traditional model of free speech, which sees it as a relation between speakers and the state, is today plausibly supplanted by a triadic model, involving a more complex relation between speakers, governments, and intermediaries (2004, 2009, 2018, 2021). If platforms do indeed have some kind of governance function, it may well trigger responsibilities for transparency and accountability (as with new legislation such as the EU’s Digital Services Act and the UK’s Online Safety Act).

Second, consider the question of whether platforms have a duty to remove harmful content posted by users. Even those who regard them as public forums could agree that platforms may have a moral responsibility to remove illegal unprotected speech. Yet a dominant view in the public debate has historically defended platforms’ place as mere conduits for others’ speech. This is the current position under U.S. law (as with 47 U.S. Code §230), which broadly exempts platforms from liability for much illegal speech, such as defamation. On this view, we should view platforms as akin to bulletin boards: blame whoever posts wrongful content, but don’t hold the owner of the board responsible.

This view is under strain. Even under current U.S. law, platforms are liable for removing some content, such as child sexual abuse material and copyright infringements, suggesting that it is appropriate to demand some accountability for the wrongful content posted by others. An increasing body of philosophical work explores the idea that platforms are indeed morally responsible for removing extreme content. For example, some have argued that platforms have a special responsibility to prevent the radicalization that occurs on their networks, given the ways in which extreme content is amplified to susceptible users (Barnes 2022). Without engaging in moderation (i.e., removal) of harmful content, platforms are plausibly complicit with the wrongful harms perpetrated by users (Howard forthcoming).

Yet it remains an open question what a responsible content moderation policy ought to involve. Many are tempted by a juridical model, whereby platforms remove speech in accordance with clearly announced rules, with user appeals mechanisms in place for individual speech decisions to ensure they are correctly made (critiqued in Douek 2022b). Yet platforms have billions of users and remove millions of pieces of content per week. Accordingly, perfection is not possible. Moving quickly to remove harmful content during a crisis—e.g., Covid misinformation—will inevitably increase the number of false positives (i.e., legitimate speech taken down as collateral damage). It is plausible that the individualistic model of speech decisions adopted by courts is decidedly implausible to help us govern online content moderation; as noted in Douek 2021 and 2022a, what is needed is analysis of how the overall system should operate at scale, with a focus on achieving proportionality between benefits and costs. Alternatively, one might double down and insist that the juridical model is appropriate, given the normative significance of speech. And if it is infeasible for social-media companies to meet its demands given their size, then all the worse for social-media companies. On this view, it is they who must bend to meet the moral demands of free speech theory, not the other way around.

Substantial philosophical work needs to be done to deliver on this goal. The work is complicated by the fact that artificial intelligence (AI) is central to the processes of content moderation; human moderators, themselves subjected to terrible working conditions at long hours, work in conjunction with machine learning tools to identify and remove content that platforms have restricted. Yet AI systems notoriously are as biased as their training data. Further, their “black box” decisions are cryptic and cannot be easily understood. Given that countless speech decisions will necessarily be made without human involvement, it is right to ask whether it is reasonable to expect users to accept the deliverances of machines (e.g., see Vredenburgh 2022; Lazar forthcoming a). Note that machine intelligence is used not merely for content moderation, narrowly understood as the enforcement of rules about what speech is allowed. It is also deployed for the broader practice of content curation, determining what speech gets amplified — raising the question of what normative principles should govern such amplification; see Lazar forthcoming b).

Finally, there is the question of legal enforcement. Showing that platforms have the moral responsibility to engage in content moderation is necessary to justifying its codification into a legal responsibility. Yet it is not sufficient; one could accept that platforms have moral duties to moderate (some) harmful speech while also denying that those moral duties ought to be legally enforced. A strong, noninstrumental version of such a view would hold that while speakers have moral duties to refrain from wrongful speech, and platforms have duties not to platform or amplify it, the coercive enforcement of such duties would violate the moral right to freedom of expression. A more contingent, instrumental version of the view would hold that legal enforcement is not in principle impermissible; but in practice, it is simply too risky to grant the state the authority to enforce platforms’ and speakers’ moral duties, given the potential for abuse and overreach.

Liberals who champion the orthodox interpretation of the First Amendment, yet insist on robust content moderation, likely hold one or both of these views. Yet globally such views seem to be in the minority. Serious legislation is imminent that will subject social-media companies to burdensome regulation, in the form of such laws as the Digital Services Act in the European Union and the Online Safety Bill in the UK. Normatively evaluating such legislation is a pressing task. So, too, is the task of designing normative theories to guide the design of content moderation systems, and the wider governance of the digital public sphere. On both fronts, political philosophers should get back to work.

• Alexander, Larry [Lawrence], 1995, “Free Speech and Speaker’s Intent”, Constitutional Commentary , 12(1): 21–28.
• –––, 2005, Is There a Right of Freedom of Expression? , (Cambridge Studies in Philosophy and Law), Cambridge/New York: Cambridge University Press.
• Alexander, Lawrence and Paul Horton, 1983, “The Impossibility of a Free Speech Principle Review Essay”, Northwestern University Law Review , 78(5): 1319–1358.
• Alexy, Robert, 2003, “Constitutional Rights, Balancing, and Rationality”, Ratio Juris , 16(2): 131–140. doi:10.1111/1467-9337.00228
• Amdur, Robert, 1980, “Scanlon on Freedom of Expression”, Philosophy & Public Affairs , 9(3): 287–300.
• Arneson, Richard, 2009, “Democracy is Not Intrinsically Just”, in Justice and Democracy , Keith Dowding, Robert E. Goodin, and Carole Pateman (eds.), Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 40–58.
• Baker, C. Edwin, 1989, Human Liberty and Freedom of Speech , New York: Oxford University Press.
• –––, 2009, “Autonomy and Hate Speech”, in Hare and Weinstein 2009: 139–157 (ch. 8). doi:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199548781.003.0009
• Balkin, Jack M., 2004, “Digital Speech and Democratic Culture: A Theory of Freedom of Expression for the Information Society”, New York University Law Review , 79(1): 1–55.
• –––, 2009, “The Future of Free Expression in a Digital Age Free Speech and Press in the Digital Age”, Pepperdine Law Review , 36(2): 427–444.
• –––, 2018, “Free Speech Is a Triangle Essays”, Columbia Law Review , 118(7): 2011–2056.
• –––, 2021, “How to Regulate (and Not Regulate) Social Media”, Journal of Free Speech Law , 1(1): 71–96. [ Balkin 2021 available online (pdf) ]
• Barendt, Eric M., 2005, Freedom of Speech , second edition, Oxford/New York: Oxford University Press. doi:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199225811.001.0001
• Barnes, Michael Randall, 2022, “Online Extremism, AI, and (Human) Content Moderation”, Feminist Philosophy Quarterly , 8(3/4): article 6. [ Barnes 2022 available online ]
• Beauharnais v. Illinois 343 U.S. 250 (1952).
• Billingham, Paul and Tom Parr, 2020, “Enforcing Social Norms: The Morality of Public Shaming”, European Journal of Philosophy , 28(4): 997–1016. doi:10.1111/ejop.12543
• Blasi, Vincent, 1977, “The Checking Value in First Amendment Theory”, American Bar Foundation Research Journal 3: 521–649.
• –––, 2004, “Holmes and the Marketplace of Ideas”, The Supreme Court Review , 2004: 1–46.
• Brettschneider, Corey Lang, 2012, When the State Speaks, What Should It Say? How Democracies Can Protect Expression and Promote Equality , Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.
• Brietzke, Paul H., 1997, “How and Why the Marketplace of Ideas Fails”, Valparaiso University Law Review , 31(3): 951–970.
• Bollinger, Lee C., 1986, The Tolerant Society: Free Speech and Extremist Speech in America , New York: Oxford University Press.
• Bonotti, Matteo and Jonathan Seglow, 2022, “Freedom of Speech: A Relational Defence”, Philosophy & Social Criticism , 48(4): 515–529.
• Brandenburg v. Ohio 395 U.S. 444 (1969).
• Brink, David O., 2001, “Millian Principles, Freedom of Expression, and Hate Speech”, Legal Theory , 7(2): 119–157. doi:10.1017/S1352325201072019
• Brison, Susan J., 1998, “The Autonomy Defense of Free Speech”, Ethics , 108(2): 312–339. doi:10.1086/233807
• Brison, Susan J. and Katharine Gelber (eds), 2019, Free Speech in the Digital Age , Oxford: Oxford University Press. doi:10.1093/oso/9780190883591.001.0001
• Brown, Étienne, 2023, “Free Speech and the Legal Prohibition of Fake News”, Social Theory and Practice , 49(1): 29–55. doi:10.5840/soctheorpract202333179
• Buchanan, Allen E., 2013, The Heart of Human Rights , Oxford: Oxford University Press. doi:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199325382.001.0001
• Cepollaro, Bianca, Maxime Lepoutre, and Robert Mark Simpson, 2023, “Counterspeech”, Philosophy Compass , 18(1): e12890. doi:10.1111/phc3.12890
• Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire 315 U.S. 568 (1942).
• Cohen, Joshua, 1993, “Freedom of Expression”, Philosophy & Public Affairs , 22(3): 207–263.
• –––, 1997, “Deliberation and Democratic Legitimacy”, in Deliberative Democracy: Essays on Reason and Politics , James Bohman and William Rehg (eds), Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 67–92.
• Dworkin, Ronald, 1981, “Is There a Right to Pornography?”, Oxford Journal of Legal Studies , 1(2): 177–212. doi:10.1093/ojls/1.2.177
• –––, 1996, Freedom’s Law: The Moral Reading of the American Constitution , Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.
• –––, 2006, “A New Map of Censorship”, Index on Censorship , 35(1): 130–133. doi:10.1080/03064220500532412
• –––, 2009, “Forward.” In Extreme Speech and Democracy , ed. J. Weinstein and I. Hare, pp. v-ix. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
• –––, 2013, Religion without God , Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.
• Douek, Evelyn, 2021, “Governing Online Speech: From ‘Posts-as-Trumps’ to Proportionality and Probability”, Columbia Law Review , 121(3): 759–834.
• –––, 2022a, “Content Moderation as Systems Thinking”, Harvard Law Review , 136(2): 526–607.
• –––, 2022b, “The Siren Call of Content Moderation Formalism”, in Social Media, Freedom of Speech, and the Future of Our Democracy , Lee C. Bollinger and Geoffrey R. Stone (eds.), New York: Oxford University Press, 139–156 (ch. 9). doi:10.1093/oso/9780197621080.003.0009
• Ely, John Hart, 1975, “Flag Desecration: A Case Study in the Roles of Categorization and Balancing in First Amendment Analysis”, Harvard Law Review , 88: 1482–1508.
• Emerson, Thomas I., 1970, The System of Freedom of Expression , New York: Random House.
• Epstein, Richard A., 1992, “Property, Speech, and the Politics of Distrust”, University of Chicago Law Review , 59(1): 41–90.
• Estlund, David, 2008, Democratic Authority: A Philosophical Framework , Princeton: Princeton University Press.
• Feinberg, Joel, 1984, The Moral Limits of the Criminal Law Volume 1: Harm to Others , New York: Oxford University Press. doi:10.1093/0195046641.001.0001
• –––, 1985, The Moral Limits of the Criminal Law: Volume 2: Offense to Others , New York: Oxford University Press. doi:10.1093/0195052153.001.0001
• Fish, Stanley Eugene, 1994, There’s No Such Thing as Free Speech, and It’s a Good Thing, Too , New York: Oxford University Press.
• Fox, Gregory H. and Georg Nolte, 1995, “Intolerant Democracies”, Harvard International Law Journal , 36(1): 1–70.
• Gelber, Katharine, 2010, “Freedom of Political Speech, Hate Speech and the Argument from Democracy: The Transformative Contribution of Capabilities Theory”, Contemporary Political Theory , 9(3): 304–324. doi:10.1057/cpt.2009.8
• Gilmore, Jonathan, 2011, “Expression as Realization: Speakers’ Interests in Freedom of Speech”, Law and Philosophy , 30(5): 517–539. doi:10.1007/s10982-011-9096-z
• Gordon, Jill, 1997, “John Stuart Mill and the ‘Marketplace of Ideas’:”, Social Theory and Practice , 23(2): 235–249. doi:10.5840/soctheorpract199723210
• Greenawalt, Kent, 1989, Speech, Crime, and the Uses of Language , New York: Oxford University Press.
• Greene, Amanda R. and Robert Mark Simpson, 2017, “Tolerating Hate in the Name of Democracy”, The Modern Law Review , 80(4): 746–765. doi:10.1111/1468-2230.12283
• Greene, Jamal, 2021, How Rights Went Wrong: Why Our Obsession with Rights Is Tearing America Apart , Boston: Houghton Mifflin Harcourt.
• Gutmann, Amy and Dennis Thompson, 2008, Why Deliberative Democracy? Princeton: Princeton University Press.
• Habermas, Jürgen, 1992 [1996], Faktizität und Geltung: Beiträge zur Diskurstheorie des Rechts und des demokratischen Rechtsstaats , Frankfurt am Main: Suhrkamp. Translated as Between Facts and Norms: Contributions to a Discourse Theory of Law and Democracy , William Rehg (trans.), (Studies in Contemporary German Social Thought), Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1996.
• Hare, Ivan and James Weinstein (eds), 2009, Extreme Speech and Democracy , Oxford/New York: Oxford University Press. doi:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199548781.001.0001
• Hart, H. L. A., 1955, “Are There Any Natural Rights?”, The Philosophical Review , 64(2): 175–191. doi:10.2307/2182586
• Heinze, Eric, 2016, Hate Speech and Democratic Citizenship , Oxford: Oxford University Press. doi:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780198759027.001.0001
• Heyman, Steven J., 2009, “Hate Speech, Public Discourse, and the First Amendment”, in Hare and Weinstein 2009: 158–181 (ch. 9). doi:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199548781.003.0010
• Hohfeld, Wesley, 1917, “Fundamental Legal Conceptions as Applied in Judicial Reasoning,” Yale Law Journal 26(8): 710–770.
• Holder v. Humanitarian Law Project 561 U.S. 1 (2010).
• Hornsby, Jennifer, 1995, “Disempowered Speech”, Philosophical Topics , 23(2): 127–147. doi:10.5840/philtopics199523211
• Howard, Jeffrey W., 2019a, “Dangerous Speech”, Philosophy & Public Affairs , 47(2): 208–254. doi:10.1111/papa.12145
• –––, 2019b, “Free Speech and Hate Speech”, Annual Review of Political Science , 22: 93–109. doi:10.1146/annurev-polisci-051517-012343
• –––, 2021, “Terror, Hate and the Demands of Counter-Speech”, British Journal of Political Science , 51(3): 924–939. doi:10.1017/S000712341900053X
• –––, forthcoming a, “The Ethics of Social Media: Why Content Moderation is a Moral Duty”, Journal of Practical Ethics .
• Howard, Jeffrey W. and Robert Simpson, forthcoming b, “Freedom of Speech”, in Issues in Political Theory , fifth edition, Catriona McKinnon, Patrick Tomlin, and Robert Jubb (eds), Oxford: Oxford University Press.
• Husak, Douglas N., 1985, “What Is so Special about [Free] Speech?”, Law and Philosophy , 4(1): 1–15. doi:10.1007/BF00208258
• Jacobson, Daniel, 2000, “Mill on Liberty, Speech, and the Free Society”, Philosophy & Public Affairs , 29(3): 276–309. doi:10.1111/j.1088-4963.2000.00276.x
• Kendrick, Leslie, 2013, “Speech, Intent, and the Chilling Effect”, William & Mary Law Review , 54(5): 1633–1692.
• –––, 2017, “Free Speech as a Special Right”, Philosophy & Public Affairs , 45(2): 87–117. doi:10.1111/papa.12087
• Klonick, Kate, 2018, “The New Governors”, Harvard Law Review 131: 1589–1670.
• Knight First Amendment Institute v. Trump 928 F.3d 226 (2019).
• Kramer, Matthew H., 2021, Freedom of Expression as Self-Restraint , Oxford: Oxford University Press.
• Lakier, Genevieve, 2015, “The Invention of Low-Value Speech”, Harvard Law Review , 128(8): 2166–2233.
• Landemore, Hélène, 2013, Democratic Reason: Politics, Collective Intelligence, and the Rule of the Many , Princeton/Oxford: Princeton University Press.
• Langton, Rae, 1993, “Speech Acts and Unspeakable Acts”, Philosophy & Public Affairs , 22(4): 293–330.
• –––, 2018, “The Authority of Hate Speech”, in Oxford Studies in Philosophy of Law (Volume 3), John Gardner, Leslie Green, and Brian Leiter (eds.), Oxford: Oxford University Press: ch. 4. doi:10.1093/oso/9780198828174.003.0004
• Lazar, Seth, forthcoming, “Legitimacy, Authority, and the Public Value of Explanations”, in Oxford Studies in Political Philosophy (Volume 10), Steven Wall (ed.), Oxford: Oxford University Press.
• –––, forthcoming, Connected by Code: Algorithmic Intermediaries and Political Philosophy, Oxford: Oxford University Press.
• Leiter, Brian, 2016, “The Case against Free Speech”, Sydney Law Review , 38(4): 407–439.
• Lepoutre, Maxime, 2021, Democratic Speech in Divided Times , Oxford/New York: Oxford University Press.
• MacKinnon, Catharine A., 1984 [1987], “Not a Moral Issue”, Yale Law & Policy Review , 2(2): 321–345. Reprinted in her Feminism Unmodified: Discourses on Life and Law , Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1987, 146–162 (ch. 13).
• Macklem, Timothy, 2006, Independence of Mind , Oxford/New York: Oxford University Press. doi:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199535446.001.0001
• Maitra, Ishani, 2009, “Silencing Speech”, Canadian Journal of Philosophy , 39(2): 309–338. doi:10.1353/cjp.0.0050
• Maitra, Ishani and Mary Kate McGowan, 2007, “The Limits of Free Speech: Pornography and the Question of Coverage”, Legal Theory , 13(1): 41–68. doi:10.1017/S1352325207070024
• Matsuda, Mari J., 1989, “Public Response to Racist Speech: Considering the Victim’s Story Legal Storytelling”, Michigan Law Review , 87(8): 2320–2381.
• Matsuda, Mari J., Charles R. Lawrence, Richard Delgado, and Kimberlè Williams Crenshaw, 1993, Words That Wound: Critical Race Theory, Assaultive Speech, and the First Amendment (New Perspectives on Law, Culture, and Society), Boulder, CO: Westview Press. Reprinted 2018, Abingdon: Routledge. doi:10.4324/9780429502941
• McGowan, Mary Kate, 2003, “Conversational Exercitives and the Force of Pornography”, Philosophy & Public Affairs , 31(2): 155–189. doi:10.1111/j.1088-4963.2003.00155.x
• –––, 2019, Just Words: On Speech and Hidden Harm , Oxford: Oxford University Press. doi:10.1093/oso/9780198829706.001.0001
• McMahan, Jeff, 2009, Killing in War , (Uehiro Series in Practical Ethics), Oxford: Clarendon Press. doi:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199548668.001.0001
• Milton, John, 1644, “Areopagitica”, London. [ Milton 1644 available online ]
• Meiklejohn, Alexander, 1948, Free Speech and Its Relation to Self-Government , New York: Harper.
• –––, 1960, Political Freedom: The Constitutional Powers of the People , New York: Harper.
• Mill, John Stuart, 1859, On Liberty , London: John W. Parker and Son. [ Mill 1859 available online ]
• Nagel, Thomas, 2002, Concealment and Exposure , New York: Oxford University Press.
• Pallikkathayil, Japa, 2020, “Free Speech and the Embodied Self”, in Oxford Studies in Political Philosophy (Volume 6), David Sobel, Peter Vallentyne, and Steven Wall (eds.), Oxford: Oxford University Press, 61–84 (ch. 3). doi:10.1093/oso/9780198852636.003.0003
• Parekh, Bhikhu, 2012, “Is There a Case for Banning Hate Speech?”, in The Content and Context of Hate Speech: Rethinking Regulation and Responses , Michael Herz and Peter Molnar (eds.), Cambridge/New York: Cambridge University Press, 37–56. doi:10.1017/CBO9781139042871.006
• Post, Robert C., 1991, “Racist Speech, Democracy, and the First Amendment Free Speech and Religious, Racial, and Sexual Harassment”, William and Mary Law Review , 32(2): 267–328.
• –––, 2000, “Reconciling Theory and Doctrine in First Amendment Jurisprudence Symposium of the Law in the Twentieth Century”, California Law Review , 88(6): 2353–2374.
• –––, 2009, “Hate Speech”, in Hare and Weinstein 2009: 123–138 (ch. 7). doi:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199548781.003.0008
• –––, 2011, “Participatory Democracy as a Theory of Free Speech: A Reply Replies”, Virginia Law Review , 97(3): 617–632.
• Quong, Jonathan, 2011, Liberalism without Perfection , Oxford/New York: Oxford University Press. doi:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199594870.001.0001
• R v. Oakes , 1 SCR 103 (1986).
• Rawls, John, 2005, Political Liberalism , expanded edition, (Columbia Classics in Philosophy), New York: Columbia University Press.
• Raz, Joseph, 1991 [1994], “Free Expression and Personal Identification”, Oxford Journal of Legal Studies , 11(3): 303–324. Collected in his Ethics in the Public Domain: Essays in the Morality of Law and Politics , Oxford: Clarendon Press, 146–169 (ch. 7).
• Redish, Martin H., 1982, “Value of Free Speech”, University of Pennsylvania Law Review , 130(3): 591–645.
• Rubenfeld, Jed, 2001, “The First Amendment’s Purpose”, Stanford Law Review , 53(4): 767–832.
• Scanlon, Thomas, 1972, “A Theory of Freedom of Expression”, Philosophy & Public Affairs , 1(2): 204–226.
• –––, 1978, “Freedom of Expression and Categories of Expression ”, University of Pittsburgh Law Review , 40(4): 519–550.
• –––, 2008, “Rights and Interests”, in Arguments for a Better World: Essays in Honor of Amartya Sen , Kaushik Basu and Ravi Kanbur (eds), Oxford: Oxford University Press, 68–79 (ch. 5). doi:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199239115.003.0006
• –––, 2013, “Reply to Wenar”, Journal of Moral Philosophy 10: 400–406
• Schauer, Frederick, 1978, “Fear, Risk and the First Amendment: Unraveling the Chilling Effect”, Boston University Law Review , 58(5): 685–732.
• –––, 1982, Free Speech: A Philosophical Enquiry , Cambridge/New York: Cambridge University Press.
• –––, 1985, “Slippery Slopes”, Harvard Law Review , 99(2): 361–383.
• –––, 1993, “The Phenomenology of Speech and Harm”, Ethics , 103(4): 635–653. doi:10.1086/293546
• –––, 2004, “The Boundaries of the First Amendment: A Preliminary Exploration of Constitutional Salience”, Harvard Law Review , 117(6): 1765–1809.
• –––, 2009, “Is It Better to Be Safe than Sorry: Free Speech and the Precautionary Principle Free Speech in an Era of Terrorism”, Pepperdine Law Review , 36(2): 301–316.
• –––, 2010, “Facts and the First Amendment”, UCLA Law Review , 57(4): 897–920.
• –––, 2011a, “On the Relation between Chapters One and Two of John Stuart Mill’s On Liberty ”, Capital University Law Review , 39(3): 571–592.
• –––, 2011b, “Harm(s) and the First Amendment”, The Supreme Court Review , 2011: 81–111. doi:10.1086/665583
• –––, 2015, “Free Speech on Tuesdays”, Law and Philosophy , 34(2): 119–140. doi:10.1007/s10982-014-9220-y
• Shiffrin, Seana Valentine, 2014, Speech Matters: On Lying, Morality, and the Law (Carl G. Hempel Lecture Series), Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.
• Simpson, Robert Mark, 2016, “Defining ‘Speech’: Subtraction, Addition, and Division”, Canadian Journal of Law & Jurisprudence , 29(2): 457–494. doi:10.1017/cjlj.2016.20
• –––, 2021, “‘Lost, Enfeebled, and Deprived of Its Vital Effect’: Mill’s Exaggerated View of the Relation Between Conflict and Vitality”, Aristotelian Society Supplementary Volume , 95: 97–114. doi:10.1093/arisup/akab006
• Southeastern Promotions Ltd., v. Conrad , 420 U.S. 546 (1975).
• Sparrow, Robert and Robert E. Goodin, 2001, “The Competition of Ideas: Market or Garden?”, Critical Review of International Social and Political Philosophy , 4(2): 45–58. doi:10.1080/13698230108403349
• Stone, Adrienne, 2017, “Viewpoint Discrimination, Hate Speech Laws, and the Double-Sided Nature of Freedom of Speech”, Constitutional Commentary , 32(3): 687–696.
• Stone, Geoffrey R., 1983, “Content Regulation and the First Amendment”, William and Mary Law Review , 25(2): 189–252.
• –––, 1987, “Content-Neutral Restrictions”, University of Chicago Law Review , 54(1): 46–118.
• –––, 2004, Perilous Times: Free Speech in Wartime from the Sedition Act of 1798 to the War on Terrorism , New York: W.W. Norton & Company.
• Strauss, David A., 1991, “Persuasion, Autonomy, and Freedom of Expression”, Columbia Law Review , 91(2): 334–371.
• Strossen, Nadine, 2018, Hate: Why We Should Resist It With Free Speech, Not Censorship , New York: Oxford University Press
• Sunstein, Cass R., 1986, “Pornography and the First Amendment”, Duke Law Journal , 1986(4): 589–627.
• –––, 1989, “Low Value Speech Revisited Commentaries”, Northwestern University Law Review , 83(3): 555–561.
• –––, 1993, Democracy and the Problem of Free Speech , New York: The Free Press.
• –––, 2017, #Republic: Divided Democracy in the Age of Social Media , Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.
• Tadros, Victor, 2012, “Duty and Liability”, Utilitas , 24(2): 259–277.
• Turner, Piers Norris, 2014, “‘Harm’ and Mill’s Harm Principle”, Ethics , 124(2): 299–326. doi:10.1086/673436
• Tushnet, Mark, Alan Chen, and Joseph Blocher, 2017, Free Speech beyond Words: The Surprising Reach of the First Amendment , New York: New York University Press.
• Volokh, Eugene, 2011, “In Defense of the Marketplace of Ideas/Search for Truth as a Theory of Free Speech Protection Responses”, Virginia Law Review , 97(3): 595–602.
• Vredenburgh, Kate, 2022, “The Right to Explanation”, Journal of Political Philosophy , 30(2): 209–229. doi:10.1111/jopp.12262
• Waldron, Jeremy, 1987, “Mill and the Value of Moral Distress”, Political Studies , 35(3): 410–423. doi:10.1111/j.1467-9248.1987.tb00197.x
• –––, 2012, The Harm in Hate Speech (The Oliver Wendell Holmes Lectures, 2009), Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.
• Weinstein, James, 2011, “Participatory Democracy as the Central Value of American Free Speech Doctrine”, Virginia Law Review , 97(3): 491–514.
• West Virginia State Board of Education v. Barnette 319 U.S. 624 (1943).
• Whitten, Suzanne, 2022, A Republican Theory of Free Speech: Critical Civility , Cham: Palgrave Macmillan. doi:10.1007/978-3-030-78631-1
• Whitney, Heather M. and Robert Mark Simpson, 2019, “Search Engines and Free Speech Coverage”, in Free Speech in the Digital Age , Susan J. Brison and Katharine Gelber (eds), Oxford: Oxford University Press, 33–51 (ch. 2). doi:10.1093/oso/9780190883591.003.0003
• West, Caroline, 2004 [2022], “Pornography and Censorship”, The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Winter 2022 edition), Edward N. Zalta and Uri Nodelman (eds.), URL = < https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/win2022/entries/pornography-censorship/ >.

How to cite this entry . Preview the PDF version of this entry at the Friends of the SEP Society . Look up topics and thinkers related to this entry at the Internet Philosophy Ontology Project (InPhO). Enhanced bibliography for this entry at PhilPapers , with links to its database.

• International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR) , adopted: 16 December 1966; Entry into force: 23 March 1976.
• Free Speech Debate
• Knight First Amendment Institute at Columbia University
• van Mill, David, “Freedom of Speech”, Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Winter 2023 Edition), Edward N. Zalta & Uri Nodelman (eds.), URL = < https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/win2023/entries/freedom-speech/ >. [This was the previous entry on this topic in the Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy – see the version history .]

ethics: search engines and | hate speech | legal rights | liberalism | Mill, John Stuart | Mill, John Stuart: moral and political philosophy | pornography: and censorship | rights | social networking and ethics | toleration

Acknowledgments

I am grateful to the editors and anonymous referees of this Encyclopedia for helpful feedback. I am greatly indebted to Robert Mark Simpson for many incisive suggestions, which substantially improved the entry. This entry was written while on a fellowship funded by UK Research & Innovation (grant reference MR/V025600/1); I am thankful to UKRI for the support.

Copyright © 2024 by Jeffrey W. Howard < jeffrey . howard @ ucl . ac . uk >

• Accessibility

Support SEP

Mirror sites.

View this site from another server:

• Info about mirror sites

The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy is copyright © 2024 by The Metaphysics Research Lab , Department of Philosophy, Stanford University

Library of Congress Catalog Data: ISSN 1095-5054

• History Classics
• Your Profile
• Find History on Facebook (Opens in a new window)
• Find History on Twitter (Opens in a new window)
• Find History on YouTube (Opens in a new window)
• Find History on Instagram (Opens in a new window)
• Find History on TikTok (Opens in a new window)
• This Day In History
• History Podcasts
• History Vault

Freedom of Speech

By: History.com Editors

Updated: July 27, 2023 | Original: December 4, 2017

Freedom of speech—the right to express opinions without government restraint—is a democratic ideal that dates back to ancient Greece. In the United States, the First Amendment guarantees free speech, though the United States, like all modern democracies, places limits on this freedom. In a series of landmark cases, the U.S. Supreme Court over the years has helped to define what types of speech are—and aren’t—protected under U.S. law.

The ancient Greeks pioneered free speech as a democratic principle. The ancient Greek word “parrhesia” means “free speech,” or “to speak candidly.” The term first appeared in Greek literature around the end of the fifth century B.C.

During the classical period, parrhesia became a fundamental part of the democracy of Athens. Leaders, philosophers, playwrights and everyday Athenians were free to openly discuss politics and religion and to criticize the government in some settings.

First Amendment

In the United States, the First Amendment protects freedom of speech.

The First Amendment was adopted on December 15, 1791 as part of the Bill of Rights—the first ten amendments to the United States Constitution . The Bill of Rights provides constitutional protection for certain individual liberties, including freedoms of speech, assembly and worship.

The First Amendment doesn’t specify what exactly is meant by freedom of speech. Defining what types of speech should and shouldn’t be protected by law has fallen largely to the courts.

In general, the First Amendment guarantees the right to express ideas and information. On a basic level, it means that people can express an opinion (even an unpopular or unsavory one) without fear of government censorship.

It protects all forms of communication, from speeches to art and other media.

Flag Burning

While freedom of speech pertains mostly to the spoken or written word, it also protects some forms of symbolic speech. Symbolic speech is an action that expresses an idea.

Flag burning is an example of symbolic speech that is protected under the First Amendment. Gregory Lee Johnson, a youth communist, burned a flag during the 1984 Republican National Convention in Dallas, Texas to protest the Reagan administration.

The U.S. Supreme Court , in 1990, reversed a Texas court’s conviction that Johnson broke the law by desecrating the flag. Texas v. Johnson invalidated statutes in Texas and 47 other states prohibiting flag burning.

When Isn’t Speech Protected?

Not all speech is protected under the First Amendment.

Forms of speech that aren’t protected include:

• Obscene material such as child pornography
• Plagiarism of copyrighted material
• Defamation (libel and slander)
• True threats

Speech inciting illegal actions or soliciting others to commit crimes aren’t protected under the First Amendment, either.

The Supreme Court decided a series of cases in 1919 that helped to define the limitations of free speech. Congress passed the Espionage Act of 1917, shortly after the United States entered into World War I . The law prohibited interference in military operations or recruitment.

Socialist Party activist Charles Schenck was arrested under the Espionage Act after he distributed fliers urging young men to dodge the draft. The Supreme Court upheld his conviction by creating the “clear and present danger” standard, explaining when the government is allowed to limit free speech. In this case, they viewed draft resistant as dangerous to national security.

American labor leader and Socialist Party activist Eugene Debs also was arrested under the Espionage Act after giving a speech in 1918 encouraging others not to join the military. Debs argued that he was exercising his right to free speech and that the Espionage Act of 1917 was unconstitutional. In Debs v. United States the U.S. Supreme Court upheld the constitutionality of the Espionage Act.

Freedom of Expression

The Supreme Court has interpreted artistic freedom broadly as a form of free speech.

In most cases, freedom of expression may be restricted only if it will cause direct and imminent harm. Shouting “fire!” in a crowded theater and causing a stampede would be an example of direct and imminent harm.

In deciding cases involving artistic freedom of expression the Supreme Court leans on a principle called “content neutrality.” Content neutrality means the government can’t censor or restrict expression just because some segment of the population finds the content offensive.

Free Speech in Schools

In 1965, students at a public high school in Des Moines, Iowa , organized a silent protest against the Vietnam War by wearing black armbands to protest the fighting. The students were suspended from school. The principal argued that the armbands were a distraction and could possibly lead to danger for the students.

The Supreme Court didn’t bite—they ruled in favor of the students’ right to wear the armbands as a form of free speech in Tinker v. Des Moines Independent School District . The case set the standard for free speech in schools. However, First Amendment rights typically don’t apply in private schools.

What does free speech mean?; United States Courts . Tinker v. Des Moines; United States Courts . Freedom of expression in the arts and entertainment; ACLU .

Sign up for Inside History

Get HISTORY’s most fascinating stories delivered to your inbox three times a week.

By submitting your information, you agree to receive emails from HISTORY and A+E Networks. You can opt out at any time. You must be 16 years or older and a resident of the United States.

More details : Privacy Notice | Terms of Use | Contact Us

Home — Essay Samples — Social Issues — Freedom of Speech — The Significance of Freedom of Speech

The Significance of Freedom of Speech

• Categories: Freedom of Speech

About this sample

Words: 541 |

Published: Jan 29, 2024

Words: 541 | Page: 1 | 3 min read

Table of contents

Definition of freedom of speech, importance of freedom of speech, limitations on freedom of speech, controversial cases and debates, freedom of speech in the digital age, counterarguments and rebuttal.

• United Nations. "Universal Declaration of Human Rights." United Nations, 1948.
• Shapiro, David L. "Freedom of Speech: History , Ideas, and Legal Due Process." New York University Press, 2005.
• Matal, Michael (ed). "Freedom of Speech." Oxford University Press, 2017.

Cite this Essay

Let us write you an essay from scratch

• 450+ experts on 30 subjects ready to help
• Custom essay delivered in as few as 3 hours

Get high-quality help

Dr Jacklynne

Verified writer

• Expert in: Social Issues

+ 120 experts online

By clicking “Check Writers’ Offers”, you agree to our terms of service and privacy policy . We’ll occasionally send you promo and account related email

No need to pay just yet!

Related Essays

2 pages / 1064 words

2 pages / 953 words

2 pages / 849 words

2 pages / 1011 words

Remember! This is just a sample.

You can get your custom paper by one of our expert writers.

121 writers online

Still can’t find what you need?

Browse our vast selection of original essay samples, each expertly formatted and styled

Related Essays on Freedom of Speech

Freedom of speech is a foundational pillar of democratic societies and a fundamental human right. It serves as the bedrock of open and inclusive societies, allowing individuals to express their thoughts, opinions, and ideas [...]

The Turner v Driver case has been an important and highly controversial legal battle that has sparked heated debates regarding freedom of speech, privacy rights, and the responsibilities of social media platforms. This case [...]

In recent years, social media has become an integral part of our daily lives, with billions of users globally. It serves as a platform for people to connect with friends and family, share information, and engage in discussions. [...]

Eric Foner, a prominent historian and author, explores the concept of American freedom in his book, "The Story of American Freedom." In this work, Foner delves into the complexities of freedom in America, examining its evolution [...]

In music, censorship can be defined as ‘the suppression or prohibition’, of any parts of music ‘that are considered obscene or politically unacceptable’ (Oxford University Press, 2019). This includes the editing of musical and [...]

The First Amendment of the United States Constitution gives us the right to freedom of speech and freedom of press. In my opinion, these rights have been abused in such a manner that the freedom of press has been pushed beyond [...]

Related Topics

By clicking “Send”, you agree to our Terms of service and Privacy statement . We will occasionally send you account related emails.

Where do you want us to send this sample?

By clicking “Continue”, you agree to our terms of service and privacy policy.

Be careful. This essay is not unique

This essay was donated by a student and is likely to have been used and submitted before

Download this Sample

Free samples may contain mistakes and not unique parts

Sorry, we could not paraphrase this essay. Our professional writers can rewrite it and get you a unique paper.

Please check your inbox.

We can write you a custom essay that will follow your exact instructions and meet the deadlines. Let's fix your grades together!

Get Your Personalized Essay in 3 Hours or Less!

We use cookies to personalyze your web-site experience. By continuing we’ll assume you board with our cookie policy .

• Instructions Followed To The Letter
• Deadlines Met At Every Stage
• Unique And Plagiarism Free

First Amendment – Freedom of Speech

The First Amendment allows citizens to express and to be exposed to a wide range of opinions and views. It was intended to ensure a free exchange of ideas even if the ideas are unpopular. Freedom of speech encompasses not only the spoken and written word, but also all kinds of expression (including non-verbal communications, such as sit-ins, art, photographs, films and advertisements).

1735 Truth Is A Defense Against Libel Charge

New York printer John Peter Zenger is tried on charges of seditious libel for publishing criticism of the royal governor. English law – asserting that the greater the truth, the greater the libel – prohibits any published criticism of the government that would incite public dissatisfaction with it. Zenger’s lawyer, Andrew Hamilton, convinces the jury that Zenger should be acquitted because the articles were, in fact, true, and that New York libel law should not be the same as English law. The Zenger case is a landmark in the development of protection of freedom of speech and the press.

1787 Federalist Papers’ Publication Starts

The first of 85 essays written under the pen name Publius by Alexander Hamilton, James Madison and John Jay begin to appear in the New York Independent Journal. The essays, called the Federalist Papers, support ratification of the Constitution approved by the Constitutional Convention on Sept. 17, 1787. In Federalist Paper No. 84, Hamilton discusses “liberty of the press.”

1791 First Amendment Is Ratified

The First Amendment is ratified when Virginia becomes the 11th state to approve the first 10 amendments to the Constitution, known as the Bill of Rights. The amendment, drafted primarily by James Madison, guarantees basic freedoms for citizens: freedom of speech, press, religion, assembly and petition.

1798 Alien And Sedition Acts Signed Into Law

While the nation’s leaders believe an outspoken press was justified during the war for independence, they take a different view when they are in power. The Federalist-controlled Congress passes the Alien and Sedition Acts. Aimed at quashing criticism of Federalists, the Sedition Act makes it illegal for anyone to express “any false, scandalous and malicious writing” against Congress or the president.

The United States is in an undeclared war with France, and Federalists say the law is necessary to protect the nation from attacks and to protect the government from false and malicious words. Republicans argue for a free flow of information and the right to publicly examine officials’ conduct.

1836 Efforts To Stifle Debate About Slavery Unsuccessful

As abolitionists develop the tactic of submitting many antislavery petitions to Congress, proslavery members of the U.S. House of Representatives adopt “gag” rules that bar such petitions from being introduced and debated. In 1844, former President John Quincy Adams, then a representative from Massachusetts, leads the effort to repeal these rules.

1859 ‘On Liberty’ Is Published

British philosopher John Stuart Mill publishes the essay On Liberty , arguing that only through the free exchange of ideas, even offensive ones or ones held by a minority of individuals, can society find “truth.”

1864 Lincoln Orders Two Newspapers Shut

President Abraham Lincoln orders Union Gen. John Dix to stop publication of the New York Journal of Commerce and the New York World after they publish a forged presidential proclamation calling for another military draft. The editors also are arrested. After the authors of the forgery are arrested, the newspapers are allowed to resume publication.

1873 Circulation Of Birth Control Information Outlawed

An “Act of the Suppression of Trade in, and Circulation of, Obscene Literature and Articles of Immoral Use” is passed by Congress. The act, more commonly known as the Comstock Act – after anti-obscenity activist Anthony Comstock – makes it a crime to publish, distribute or possess information about contraception or abortion, or to distribute or possess devices or medications used for those purposes.

Lawmakers were responding to increasing concern about abortion, the institution of marriage, and the changing role of women in society.

1917 Congress Passes Espionage Act Of 1917

With World War I being fought, President Woodrow Wilson proposes the Espionage Act of 1917 to protect the country from internal warfare propaganda. Congress passes the act, which makes it a crime to intentionally interfere with military forces, recruiting or enlistment or “cause or attempt to cause insubordination, disloyalty, mutiny, or refusal of duty, in the military or naval forces of the United States.” Punishment is a maximum fine of $10,000, a maximum jail term of 20 years, or both. The act also bans any mailings urging treason.

1918 Sedition Act Of 1918 Punishes Critics Of WWI

An amendment to the Espionage Act of 1917, the Sedition Act is passed by Congress. It goes much further than its predecessor, imposing severe criminal penalties on all forms of expression that are critical of the government, its symbols, or its mobilization of resources for World War I. Ultimately, about 900 people will be convicted under the law. Hundreds of noncitizens will be deported without a trial; 249 of them, including anarchist Emma Goldman, will be sent to the Soviet Union.

1919 ‘Clear And Present Danger’ Exception Established

In Schenck v. United States , the U.S. Supreme Court, in an opinion by Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes, upholds the conviction of Socialist Charles Schenck for conspiracy to violate the Espionage Act by attempting to distribute thousands of antiwar leaflets to U.S. servicemen. While acknowledging that the First Amendment under normal circumstances might protect Schenck’s activities, the Court holds that in special circumstances, such as wartime, speech that poses a “clear and present danger” can be restricted. The Court likens the ideas expressed in Schenck’s leaflets to “falsely shouting fire in a theatre and causing a panic.”

A few days later, in another opinion by Holmes, the Court will uphold Socialist Eugene V. Debs’ conviction, finding that his speech also poses a “clear and present danger” of undermining war recruitment and is not protected by the First Amendment.

1919 ‘Marketplace Of Ideas’ Concept Defined

In his dissent from the majority opinion in Abrams v. United States (upholding the Espionage Act convictions of a group of antiwar activists), U.S. Supreme Court Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes coins his famous “marketplace of ideas” phrase to explain the value of freedom of speech. He said that “the ultimate good desired is better reached by free trade in ideas … the best test of truth is the power of the thought to get itself accepted in the competition of the market.”

Over the years, Holmes’ “marketplace” concept, and the idea that more is better when it comes to competing ideas, has been a consistent theme in First Amendment cases.

1925 Court: First Amendment Applies To States’ Laws

In Gitlow v. New York , the U.S. Supreme Court concludes that the free speech clause of the First Amendment applies not just to laws passed by Congress, but also to those passed by the states.

1926 Mencken Arrested For ‘Indecent Literature’

H.L. Mencken is arrested in Boston for distributing copies of his American Mercury magazine, which contains a story with a prostitute as a central character. Censorship groups in Boston say the magazine is obscene and order Mencken’s arrest for selling “indecent literature.”

1927 Criminal Syndicalism Law Constitutional

In Whitney v. California , the U.S. Supreme Court rules that California’s criminal syndicalism law is constitutional. A member of the state’s Communist Labor Party was prosecuted under the law, which barred advocating, teaching or aiding the commission of a crime, including “terrorism” as a way to achieve change in industrial ownership or political change. The Court says that freedom of speech is not an absolute right.

1931 Court: Symbolic Expression Of Ideas Also Protected

In Stromberg v. California , the U.S. Supreme Court invalidates the state court conviction of a 19-year-old member of the Young Communist League for displaying a red flag as “an emblem of opposition to the United States government.” The Court rules that the woman’s nonverbal, symbolic expression of her antigovernment opinions is protected just as are any words that she might write or speak to express those opinions.

1931 Prior Restraint Ruled Unconstitutional

Near v. Minnesota is the first U.S. Supreme Court decision to invoke the First Amendment’s press clause. A Minnesota law prohibited the publication of “malicious, scandalous, and defamatory” newspapers. It was aimed at the Saturday Press, which had run a series of articles about corrupt practices by local politicians and business leaders. The justices rule that prior restraints against publication violate the First Amendment, meaning that once the press possesses information that it deems newsworthy, the government can seldom prevent its publication. The Court also says the protection is not absolute, suggesting that information during wartime or obscenity or incitement to acts of violence may be restricted.

1937 Court: First Amendment Protects ‘Peaceable Assembly’

In De Jonge v. Oregon , the U.S. Supreme Court overturns the conviction of Dirk De Jonge for participating in a Communist Party political meeting, holding that “peaceable assembly for lawful discussion cannot be made a crime.” That right, the Court finds, is not dependent upon whether one agrees with the ideas being discussed by the people assembled.

1940 Ban On Religious Solicitation Struck Down

In Cantwell v. Connecticut , the U.S. Supreme Court holds that two Jehovah Witnesses’ rights of free speech and free exercise of religion were violated when they were arrested for proselytizing in a Catholic neighborhood. The Court says the solicitation law, which allows a state official to refuse a permit based on religious grounds, is unconstitutional. The Court also overturns a breach of peace conviction, saying the pair’s message was protected religious speech. The case is the first to extend the free exercise of religion clause to the states and to establish the ‘time, manner and place’ rule, which says the state can regulate the free exercise right to ensure it is practiced in a reasonable time, manner and place.

1940 Flag Salute Requirement Is Upheld

In Minersville School District v. Gobitis , the U.S. Supreme Court upholds a Pennsylvania flag-salute law after a challenge by a Jehovah’s Witness family whose two children were expelled for refusing to salute the flag. They believe the salute is forbidden by biblical commands. The Court says the flag is a symbol of national unity, which is the “basis of national security.”

1942 ‘Fighting Words’ Exception Established

In Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire , the U.S. Supreme Court upholds the conviction of a Jehovah’s Witness who had called a police officer a “damned fascist.” The Court rules that there are certain words that “by their very utterance inflict injury” and are of “such slight social value” that they are not welcome in the marketplace of ideas. This category of speech, named “fighting words” by the Court, is not protected by the First Amendment. Consequently, the speaker may be prosecuted.

1943 Court: Required Flag Salute Violates First Amendment

In West Virginia State Board of Education v. Barnette , the U.S. Supreme Court overrules its decision in Minersville School District v. Gobitis and decides that a West Virginia law requiring students to salute the American flag violates the free speech clause of the First Amendment. “Compulsory unification of opinion,” the Court says, is “antithetical to First Amendment values.”

1947 Hatch Act Upheld; Dissent Says It Violates 17th Amendment

In United Public Workers v. Mitchell , the U.S. Supreme Court finds that the Hatch Act, a federal law that prohibits federal employees from participating in many electoral activities does not violate the First Amendment. In a strong dissent, Justice Hugo Black argues that the law muzzles several million citizens and threatens popular government, because it deprives citizens of the right to participate in the political process.

Such limitations, he argues, would be inconsistent with the First Amendment’s guarantee of freedom of speech, press, assembly and petition. Moreover, Black finds that the Hatch Act would violate, or come dangerously close to violating, Article I and the 17th Amendment, which protect the right of the people to vote for their representatives in the House and Senate and to have their votes counted.

1949 Scope Of ‘Fighting Words’ Doctrine Limited

In Terminiello v. Chicago , the U.S. Supreme Court overturns the conviction of Father Arthur Terminiello for disturbing the peace. He was convicted after giving a controversial speech that criticized various racial and political groups. Several disturbances by protesters occurred after the speech. The Court says “fighting words” can be restricted only when they are “likely to produce a clear and present danger.” Justice William O. Douglas writes that free speech may “best serve its high purpose when it induces a condition of unrest, creates dissatisfaction with conditions as they are, or even stirs people to anger.”

1952 Justices Uphold Group Libel Law

In Beauharnais v. Illinois , the U.S. Supreme Court upholds the conviction of a white supremacist for passing out leaflets that characterized African Americans as dangerous criminals. The “group libel” law under which Joseph Beauharnais was prosecuted makes it a crime to make false statements about people of a particular “race, color, creed or religion” for no other reason than to harm that group. The Court rules that libel against groups, like libel against individuals, has no place in the marketplace of ideas.

1957 Obscenity Exception To First Amendment Established

In Roth v. United States , the U.S. Supreme Court decides that it is not a violation of the First Amendment for the government to regulate, or even criminalize, speech that is “obscene,” because, just like libel and “fighting words,” obscene speech is “utterly without redeeming social importance.” The Court says that in defining obscenity, the government must consider “contemporary community standards.” What was “obscene” 50 years ago may not be in today’s society.

1958 Court Protects ‘Free Association’ In NAACP Case

In NAACP v. Alabama , the U.S. Supreme Court holds that when Alabama state officials demanded that the NAACP hand over its membership list, the members’ right of “free association” was violated. Although no such right is specifically included in the First Amendment, the Court says it is a necessary extension of the rights to free speech and free assembly: “It is beyond debate that freedom to engage in association for the advancement of beliefs and ideas is an inseparable aspect of the ‘liberty’ assured by the due process clause of the 14th Amendment, which embraces freedom of speech.”

1959 No Protection From Congressional Inquiry

The U.S. Supreme Court finds professor Lloyd Barenblatt’s First Amendment rights were not violated when he was convicted of contempt of Congress for refusing to answer questions about his religious and political beliefs before the House Un-American Activities Committee. In Barenblatt v. United States , the Court says that such questions are legitimate when the investigation’s goal is to “aid the legislative process” and to protect important government interests.

1961 Symbolic Speech Of Civil Rights Protesters Protected

In Garner v. Louisiana , the U.S. Supreme Court overturns the convictions of 16 African American demonstrators for disturbing the peace in three lunch counter sit-ins at all-white restaurants in Baton Rouge, La., to protest segregation. The cases were consolidated under Garner v. Louisiana. Referring to earlier court opinions protecting symbolic speech, Justice John Harlan explains that a sit-in demonstration “is as much a part of the free trade of ideas as is verbal expression.”

1964 Court Establishes ‘Actual Malice’ Standard

In New York Times Co. v. Sullivan , the U.S. Supreme Court establishes the “actual malice” standard when it reverses a civil libel judgment against the New York Times. The newspaper was sued for libel by Montgomery, Ala.’s police commissioner after it published a full-page ad that criticized anti-civil rights activities in Montgomery. The court rules that debate about public issues and officials is central to the First Amendment. Consequently, public officials cannot sue for libel unless they prove that a statement was made with “actual malice,” meaning it was made “with knowledge that it was false or with reckless disregard of whether it was false or not.”

1966 Loyalty Oath Is Struck Down

In Elfbrandt v. Russell , the U.S. Supreme Court invalidates an Arizona law requiring state employees to take a loyalty oath. Anyone who took the oath and then became a member of the Communist Party or any other group that advocated the violent overthrow of the government could be prosecuted for perjury and fired. The Court says the law violates the due process clause by infringing on the right of free association. The Court holds that the law is too broad by punishing a person who joins a group that has both legal and illegal purposes but does not subscribe to the illegal purpose.

1966 Smith Act Is Found Constitutional

In Dennis v. United States , the U.S. Supreme Court upholds the convictions of 12 Communist Party leaders who were convicted under the Smith Act of 1940, formally known as the Alien Registration Act. The law makes it illegal to teach or advocate the overthrow or destruction of the U.S. government, or publish any materials or organize a group that endorses such action. The majority writes that the “existence of the conspiracy” creates “a clear and present danger.”

1968 Limits Placed On Symbolic Speech Right

In United States v. O’Brien , the U.S. Supreme Court lets stand the conviction of an activist who burned his draft card to protest the Vietnam War. Although the Court admits that the law against destroying a draft card does limit speech, it rules that the limit is acceptable because it serves an important government interest (i.e., the smooth operation of the draft during wartime) and is “content-neutral,” meaning that it is not meant to punish any particular point of view or opinion.

1968 Teacher’s Free Speech Right Upheld

The U.S. Supreme Court decides that a public school teacher’s free speech right was violated when he was fired for writing a letter to the newspaper criticizing how money was divided between athletics and academics. The justices say in Pickering v. Board of Education that public school teachers are entitled to some First Amendment protection and that the teacher was speaking out more as a citizen than as a public employee when he wrote the letter.

1969 Students’ Right To Symbolic Speech Upheld

In Tinker v. Des Moines Independent Community School District , the U.S. Supreme Court rules that the school board was wrong to suspend three students who wore black armbands to school to protest the Vietnam War. The Court finds that the students’ passive protest posed no risk of disrupting school activities. “It can hardly be argued that either students or teachers shed their constitutional rights to freedom of speech or expression at the schoolhouse gate,” the Court’s opinion says.

1969 Private Ownership Of Obscene Material Protected

In Stanley v. Georgia , the U.S. Supreme Court finds unconstitutional a Georgia obscenity law that prohibits the possession of such material. The Court rules that the Constitution “protects the right to receive information and ideas, regardless of their social worth, and to be generally free from governmental intrusions into one’s privacy and control of one’s thoughts.”

1969 Advocacy Of Violence Is Protected Speech Except In Rare Circumstances

In Brandenburg v. Ohio , the U.S. Supreme Court reverses the conviction of a Ku Klux Klan leader under an Ohio law prohibiting speech that calls for crime or violence as a way of winning political change. The Court holds that unless the speaker incites his listeners to “imminent lawless action,” the speech is protected by the First Amendment.

1971 Antiwar Expression Is Ruled Protected Speech

In Cohen v. California , the U.S. Supreme Court overturns the conviction of a man convicted of disturbing the peace for wearing a jacket bearing a vulgarism about the draft. The Court concludes that the expression, however crude, did not pose enough of a risk of inciting disobedience to override his First Amendment right to express his opposition to the Vietnam War.

1971 Newspapers Win Pentagon Papers Case

The New York Times and the Washington Post obtain secret Defense Department documents that detail U.S. involvement in Vietnam in the years leading up to the Vietnam War. Citing national security, the U.S. government gets temporary restraining orders to halt publication of the documents, known as the Pentagon Papers. But, acting with unusual haste, the U.S. Supreme Court finds in New York Times v. United States that prior restraint on the documents’ publication violates the First Amendment. National security concerns are too speculative to overcome the “heavy presumption” in favor of the First Amendment’s guarantee of freedom of the press, the Court says.

1972 Court: No Reporter’s Privilege Before Grand Juries

Branzburg v. Hayes is a landmark decision in which the U.S. Supreme Court rejects First Amendment protection for reporters called before a grand jury to reveal confidential information or sources. Reporters argued that if they were forced to identify their sources, their informants would be reluctant to provide information in the future. The Court decides reporters are obliged to cooperate with grand juries just as average citizens are. The justices do allow a small exception for grand jury investigations that are not conducted or initiated in good faith.

1973 Court: States Can Regulate Obscene Exhibits

In Paris Adult Theatre I v. Slaton , the U.S. Supreme Court upholds a Georgia injunction against the showing of allegedly obscene films at an adult movie theater that allowed only patrons at least 21 years old. The Court finds that “legitimate state interests,” such as preserving quality of life and public safety, are at stake in regulating commercialized obscenity even if the exhibits are limited to consenting adults.

1973 Definition Of Obscenity Is Clarified

In Miller v. California , the U.S. Supreme Court establishes a new definition of obscenity, setting out a three-part test for judging whether material is obscene: (a) whether the average person, applying contemporary community standards, would find that the work, taken as a whole, appeals to the prurient interest (b) whether the work depicts or describes, in a patently offensive way, sexual conduct; and (c) whether the work, taken as a whole, lacks serious literary, artistic, political or scientific value.

1976 Money Spent In Political Campaigns Considered Speech

When Congress tries to limit expenditures in political campaigns, the U.S. Supreme Court, in Buckley v. Valeo , invalidates provisions that restrict candidates’ ability to spend their own money on a campaign, limit campaign expenditures by an outside group, and limit total campaign spending. The Court compares spending restrictions with restrictions on “political speech.” The majority reasons that discussion of public issues and political candidates are integral to the U.S. political system under the Constitution. The Court says government-imposed limits on the amount of money a person or group can spend on political communication reduces “the quantity of expression by restricting the number of issues discussed, the depth of their exploration, and the size of the audience reached.”

1976 Justices Protect Commercial Speech

In Virginia State Board of Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizens Consumer Council , the U.S. Supreme Court strikes down a state law that forbids pharmacists from including the prices of prescription drugs in their ads because it is unprofessional conduct. Although such information does not convey an idea other than proposing that a purchase be made, the Court finds that commercial speech enjoys the same First Amendment protection as noncommercial speech.

1977 Court Allows Publication Of Juvenile’s Identity

In Oklahoma Publishing Company v. District Court , the U.S. Supreme Court finds that when a newspaper obtains the name and photograph of a juvenile involved in a juvenile court proceeding, it is unconstitutional to prevent publication of the information, even though the juvenile has a right to confidentiality in such proceedings. A similar ruling will be made by the court two years later, in Smith v. Daily Mail Publishing Company , when the Court finds that a newspaper’s First Amendment right takes precedence over a juvenile’s right to anonymity.

1978 Nazis Permitted To March In Skokie, Ill.

The 7th U.S. Circuit Court of Appeals invalidates a city law passed in Skokie, Ill., home to 5,000 Holocaust survivors, to prevent a neo-Nazi group from holding a march there. The Court rules in Collin v. Smith that the group should be permitted to march in their uniforms, distribute anti-Semitic leaflets and display swastikas. The court does not deny the group’s symbols are offensive to many observers, but concludes that “public expression of ideas may not be prohibited merely because the ideas are themselves offensive to some of their hearers.” The U.S. Supreme Court will refuse to review the case.

1978 FCC Can Regulate Indecent Speech

The U.S. Supreme Court, in FCC v. Pacifica Foundation , allows the Federal Communications Commission to regulate indecent speech broadcast over the air. The Court says the FCC can channel broadcasts that contain indecent language to late-night hours, when children are less likely to be listening.

1980 Court Establishes Commercial Speech Test

In Central Hudson Gas & Electric Corp. v. Public Service Commission , the U.S. Supreme Court decides that a state ban on promotional advertising by the electric utility is unconstitutional. The ruling sets up a four-part test to decide when commercial speech can or cannot be regulated: (1) It must not be misleading or involve illegal activity (2) The government interest advanced by the regulation must be significant (3) The regulation must directly advance the government interest (4) The regulation must be limited to serving the asserted government interest.

1982 School Board Cannot Ban Library Books

In Board of Education v. Pico , the U.S. Supreme Court rules that a school board’s decision to remove books from the school library based simply on their content violates the First Amendment’s free speech right. The Court says the First Amendment protects the right to receive information and ideas. The justices allow that books that are “pervasively vulgar” or educationally unsuitable can be removed.

1982 Justices Rule Child Porn Not Protected

In New York v. Ferber , the U.S. Supreme Court holds that the First Amendment does not protect child pornography. Child pornography joins certain categories of speech – libel, “fighting words,” words that present a “clear and present danger” of violence, and obscene material – that are considered to have such negative consequences that it is acceptable for the government to restrict them.

1983 Public Employees’ Free Speech Right Defined

In Connick v. Myers , a landmark free-speech ruling for public employees, the U.S. Supreme Court says that an assistant district attorney’s free speech right was not violated when she was fired for distributing a questionnaire about internal office practices to fellow prosecutors. At least one of Myers’ questions related to a matter of public concern: whether assistant prosecutors felt pressured to work in political campaigns. But, relying on its 1968 Pickering ruling, the Court decides that the employer’s interest in a disruption-free workplace outweighs the employee’s right to comment on an issue of public concern.

1985 Anti-Pornography Law Is Struck Down

In American Booksellers Association v. Hudnut , the 7th U.S. Circuit Court of Appeals strikes down an Indianapolis anti-pornography law. The law had not used the court’s guidelines for deciding what is “obscene” material. The court finds that the law unconstitutionally targeted a certain viewpoint and allowed the government to decide which ideas are good or bad.

1986 Court: Student’s Lewd Speech Not Protected

In Bethel School District v. Fraser , the U.S. Supreme Court decides that a high school senior’s free speech right was not violated when he was disciplined for making a lewd speech at an assembly. Previously, in Tinker v. Des Moines Independent Community School District , the justices had said students do not “shed their constitutional rights” at the schoolhouse door. Chief Justice Warren E. Burger writes that schools can prohibit lewd speech because it is inconsistent with the “fundamental values of public school education.”

1988 Court Allows Censorship Of School Publications

In Hazelwood School District v. Kuhlmeier , the U.S. Supreme Court rules that public school administrators can censor speech by students in publications (or activities) that are funded by the school – such as a yearbook, newspaper, play, or art exhibit – if they have a valid educational reason for doing so.

1989 Court: Flag Burning Is Protected Symbolic Speech

In Texas v. Johnson , the U.S. Supreme Court rules that burning an American flag is protected symbolic speech. Gregory Lee Johnson burned the flag outside Dallas City Hall to protest Reagan administration policies. The justices find that his actions fall into the category of expressive conduct and have a political nature. Speech cannot be prohibited simply because an audience takes offense to certain ideas, the Court says.

1990 Flag Protection Act Ruled Unconstitutional

In U.S. v. Eichman , the U.S. Supreme Court decides that the 1989 Flag Protection Act is unconstitutional. The law provided penalties of up to one year in jail and a $1,000 fine for anyone who “knowingly mutilates, physically defiles, burns, maintains on the floor or ground, or tramples upon” any U.S. flag. The justices rule that the right to free expression supersedes protection of the flag as a national symbol. Justice William J. Brennan writes: “Punishing desecration of the flag dilutes the very freedom that makes this emblem so revered, and worth revering.”

1991 Media Coverage Limited In Gulf War

The Pentagon imposes rules for media coverage of the war in the Persian Gulf, citing the possibility that some news – including information on downed aircrafts, specific troop numbers, and names of operations – may endanger lives or jeopardize U.S. military strategy. Nine news organizations file a lawsuit questioning the constitutionality of limiting media access to the battleground. But a court rules the question moot when the war ends before the case is decided.

1991 Son Of Sam Law Is Struck Down

The U.S. Supreme Court strikes down New York’s Son of Sam law aimed at preventing convicted criminals or those accused of crimes from profiting from the sale of any work discussing their crimes. In Simon & Schuster Inc. v. New York State Crime Victims Board , the Court says the law violates the First Amendment because it singles out earnings from speech or writing.

1992 Court Strikes Down Hate Crime Law

In R.A.V. v. The City of St. Paul , the U.S. Supreme Court reverses the juvenile conviction of a 14-year-old white boy who burned a cross on the lawn of an African American family. The boy was prosecuted under a law prohibiting the placement of certain symbols that were “likely to arouse anger, alarm, or resentment on the basis of race, religion, or gender.” The Court finds that because the law punishes certain conduct only because of the ideas behind it – however offensive those ideas may be – it violates the First Amendment’s free speech clause.

1993 Justices Allow Tougher Hate Crime Penalties

In Wisconsin v. Mitchell , the U.S. Supreme Court upholds a Wisconsin law that increases the penalty for assault if the offender purposely picks his victim “because of the race, religion, color, disability, sexual orientation or national origin or ancestry of that person.” The Court rules that the increased penalty does not violate the offender’s free speech rights because the Wisconsin law is aimed at the offender’s actions.

1994 Justices Uphold Buffer Zones At Abortion Clinics

In Madsen v. Women’s Health Center , the U.S. Supreme Court affirms a Florida court’s ruling that abortion protesters could not demonstrate within 36 feet of an abortion clinic, make loud noises within earshot of the clinic, or make loud noises within 300 feet of a clinic employee’s home. (These distance requirements are known as buffer zones.) Although the Court acknowledges that the ruling restricts the protesters’ speech, it finds the restrictions “necessary to serve a significant government interest” of providing needed health care.

1995 Communications Decency Act Passed

As part of the Telecommunications Act of 1996, Congress enacts the Communications Decency Act. The law is intended primarily to protect minors using the internet by criminalizing the placement of “obscene” and “patently offensive” material on the Web. The Communications Decency Act is almost immediately challenged by a diverse coalition of health-care providers, sex educators and pornographers on the grounds that the law violates the right to free speech.

1996 Child Pornography Prevention Act Passed

The Child Pornography Prevention Act expands the definition of child pornography – which, unlike most pornography involving adult subjects, does not enjoy First Amendment protection and can be criminalized – to include computer-generated depictions of children engaging in sexual activity. The act is challenged on First Amendment grounds by a variety of civil liberties and artistic groups.

1997 ‘Floating’ Buffer Zones At Clinics Struck Down

In Schenck v. Pro-Choice Network of Western New York , the U.S. Supreme Court upholds a 15-foot buffer zone around an abortion clinic’s entrances and driveways, but strikes down a “floating” buffer zone that requires protesters to stay 15 feet away from all cars and patients as they enter and exit the clinic. The Court finds that, in contrast to the “fixed” buffer zone around the clinic, the “floating” zone risks silencing protesters: “Leafletting and commenting on matters of public concern are classic forms of speech that lie at the heart of the First Amendment, and speech in public areas is at its most protected on public sidewalks, a prototypical example of a traditional public forum.”

1997 Equal Access For Military Recruiters Is Upheld

The Solomon Amendment requires institutions of higher education to provide military recruiters with the same access to students as other potential employers. If the school does not, it loses certain federal funds. Members of an association of law schools and law faculties wanted to restrict military recruiting because they objected to the military’s policy on LGBT+ recruits. The U.S. Supreme Court unanimously says that the Solomon Amendment does not place an unconstitutional condition on the receipt of federal funds. The Court says the First Amendment does not prevent Congress from directly imposing the equal access requirement because the Solomon Amendment limits conduct, not speech.

1997 Court Ruling Backs Free Speech On Internet

In Reno v. American Civil Liberties Union , the U.S. Supreme Court gives broad support to free speech on the Internet. The justices rule that the Communications Decency Act violates the First Amendment by criminalizing many kinds of material on the internet that are not obscene or offensive, such as medical information or artistic depictions of the human body.

1998 Court: Public TV Can Exclude Candidates

The U.S. Supreme Court decides that public television stations can exclude minor-party candidates from their debates as long as the decision is not based on the candidates’ views and the debates are not designed as public forums. The decision, in Arkansas Educational Television Commission v. Forbes , strikes down an appeals court ruling that a state-owned TV network is obliged under the First Amendment to allow any candidate who has qualified for the ballot access to a debate.

1998 Decency Test On Arts Grants Is Upheld

In National Endowment for the Arts v. Finley , the U.S. Supreme Court rules that the NEA, the government’s art-funding agency, can include “decency” standards among its criteria for awarding government grants for artists’ work without violating the First Amendment.

1999 Giuliani Targets Publicly Funded Art

Infuriated by a planned exhibit at the Brooklyn Museum of Art that features an image of the Virgin Mary decorated with elephant dung, New York City Mayor Rudy Giuliani threatens to cut all city funding to the museum, evict the museum from its building, and remove the Board of Directors. A subsequent First Amendment lawsuit between the museum and the city will be settled the following year, with the city agreeing to pay an additional $5.8 million in repairs to the museum over the next two years.

2000 Boy Scouts Can Bar LGBT+ Leaders

In Boy Scouts of America v. Dale , the U.S. Supreme Court says the Boy Scouts organization has the right to bar gay people from serving as troop leaders. Assistant scoutmaster James Dale contended that the Boy Scouts had violated a New Jersey statute banning discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation in places of public accommodation. The justices said the law violated the Boy Scouts’ First Amendment right to expressive association.

2000 Court Revisits ‘Floating’ Buffer Zones At Clinics

In Hill v. Colorado , the U.S. Supreme Court upholds a Colorado law that prohibits abortion protesters from “knowingly approaching” within eight feet of a person entering or exiting an abortion clinic. The Court says that, unlike the “floating” 15-foot buffer zone that it struck down in Schenck , the buffer zone in the Colorado law is small, so protesters are still able to exercise their free speech right.

2000 Children’s Internet Protection Act Passed

Congress passes the Children’s Internet Protection Act. The law requires public libraries that receive certain federal funds to use a portion of those funds to buy internet programs for their computer terminals to filter out material that is “harmful to minors.” The American Library Association and the ACLU both bring lawsuits challenging the law on First Amendment grounds.

2002 Ban On ‘Virtual’ Child Porn Struck Down

In Ashcroft v. Free Speech Coalition , the U.S. Supreme Court rules that the Child Pornography Prevention Act’s criminalization of computer-generated depictions of children engaging in sexual activity violates the First Amendment. The Court finds that the law goes further than existing child pornography laws (which ban material involving actual children) to potentially cover many kinds of images that are not pornographic.

2003 Law To Protect Children Passed

The Prosecutorial Remedies and Other Tools to end the Exploitation of Children Today Act, or the PROTECT Act, includes numerous provisions intended to protect children from exploitation, kidnapping, and other crimes. It increases penalties for creating child pornography and strengthens penalties for “virtual” child pornography. Modern technology makes it easier for individuals to produce child pornography without involving “real” children. This law takes steps to prevent that practice. The law also encourages increased cooperation of internet service providers to report suspected child pornography.

2003 Court Rules On Cross-Burning Law

In Virginia v. Black , the U.S. Supreme Court rules that a law prohibiting cross burning could, in theory, be allowed under the First Amendment if it targets only cross burnings that are specifically “intended to intimidate.” Nevertheless, the Court strikes down the Virginia law because it outlaws all cross burnings, including those intended to express a political view.

2003 Law On Library Internet Filters Upheld

In United States v. American Library Association , the U.S. Supreme Court rules that the Children’s Internet Protection Act (CIPA) of 2000, requiring public libraries that receive certain federal funds to buy internet filters for their computers to weed out material that is “harmful to minors,” does not violate the First Amendment. The Court says that Congress has broad authority to attach restrictions to its funding, and that the CIPA restrictions are consistent with library rules that limit children’s access to only age-appropriate materials. The Court says that libraries are allowed to disable the “blocking” software for adults.

2003 Justices Uphold Campaign Finance Law

The Bipartisan Campaign Finance Reform Act of 2002, known as the McCain-Feingold Bill, is an effort to change the way money is raised and spent by political campaigns. Key parts are a ban on unrestricted (“soft money”) donations to political parties (often by corporations and unions) and restrictions on TV ads sponsored by unions, corporations and nonprofit groups up to 60 days before elections. The plaintiffs, including unlikely allies such as the National Rifle Association and the ACLU, say these provisions violate their rights to free speech and association. The U.S. Supreme Court upholds the provisions, finding that they are justified by the government’s interest in preventing corruption or the appearance of corruption that might result.

2004 Child Online Protection Act Struck Down

After the Child Online Protection Act became law, the ACLU sued to stop its enforcement, saying the law violated the right to free speech. The U.S. District Court and the Third U.S. Circuit Court of Appeals both agree with the ACLU. In 2002, however, the U.S. Supreme Court orders the Third Circuit to reevaluate the case, saying the decision was based on insufficient reasoning.

In 2003, the appeals court again finds the law unconstitutional, based on different grounds from the first ruling. The justices agree to rehear the case and, in Ashcroft v. American Civil Liberties Union , strike down the law. Justice Anthony Kennedy writes that children can be protected from inappropriate material by other, less restrictive ways and that the law could prevent adults from accessing information they have a right to view.

2004 Patriot Act Provision Ruled Unconstitutional

A federal judge for the Southern District of New York rules unconstitutional a Patriot Act provision that allows the FBI to demand information about internet users but does not hold the FBI subject to public review or judicial oversight for its actions. The provision also forbids internet service providers from revealing that such information has been requested. Judge Victor Marrero rules that this provision violates the free speech right by prohibiting internet service providers from ever speaking about such FBI requests.

2006 Court Rejects Vermont Campaign Finance Law

Vermont’s Act 64 stringently limits the amounts that candidates for state office may spend on their campaigns and the amounts that individuals, organizations, and political parties may contribute. In Randall v. Sorrell , the U.S. Supreme Court reaffirms its 1976 ruling in Buckley v. Valeo that rejected limits on how much candidates could spend on their own campaigns. Regarding Vermont’s contribution limits, the Court says they are so low that they pose a constitutional risk to the electoral process. Challengers may be unable to mount an effective challenge to better-financed incumbents.

2007 Court Strikes Down Ad Limits In Campaign Law

The U.S. Supreme Court creates an exemption to advertisement restrictions set out in the 2002 McCain-Feingold campaign finance law. In Federal Election Commission v. Wisconsin Right to Life , Chief Justice John G. Roberts Jr. writes that only ads that make specific appeals to vote for or against a candidate can be prohibited in the period covered by the law – 30 days before a primary election and 60 days before a general election. The Court says limits on TV ads sponsored by corporations or unions in that period amount to censorship of political speech, which is protected under the First Amendment.

2007 Justices Restrict Students’ Free Speech Right

In Morse v. Frederick , the U.S. Supreme Court affirms that free speech rights for public school students are not as extensive as those for adults. In this case, a student held up a banner with the message “Bong Hits 4 Jesus,” a slang reference to marijuana use, at a school-supervised event across from the campus. The principal removed the banner and suspended the student for 10 days. The majority opinion says that although students have some right to political speech, it does not include pro-drug messages that may undermine the school’s mission to educate against illegal drug use.

2009 City’s Refusal Of Religious Monument Upheld

The U.S. Supreme Court decides unanimously in Pleasant Grove City v. Summum that a Utah city did not violate the Summum church’s free speech right by refusing a donation of a monument reflecting its beliefs. The church argued that the park, which had a Ten Commandments monument, was a public forum and that the city could not discriminate among speakers. The Court said permanent monuments were government speech and did not have the same free speech protection as speakers or leaflets in a public forum.

2010 Court Lifts Limits On Corporate Election Spending

In Citizens United v. FEC , the U.S. Supreme Court rules, 5-4, to remove limits on corporate spending on elections. Corporations and unions still cannot directly give money to federal candidates or national party committees. The majority opinion says the First Amendment right of free speech extended to corporations. The landmark decision overturns decades of rules that governed the campaign finance and sparked fears that a flood of money into politics would dramatically alter campaigns.

2010 Corporate Spending Limit Rejected

The U.S. Supreme Court decides, 5-4, in Citizens United v. Federal Election Commission , that the government cannot regulate political speech — political spending — by corporations in elections. “If the First Amendment has any force,” Justice Anthony M. Kennedy writes for the majority, “it prohibits Congress from fining or jailing citizens, or associations of citizens, for simply engaging in political speech.” The dissenters warn of the consequences if a flood of corporate money is unleashed in elections. Justice John Paul Stevens says corporate speech should not be treated the same as that of people. The ruling overturns two precedents about the free speech rights of corporations: Austin v. Michigan Chamber of Commerce , a 1990 ruling that upheld restrictions on corporate spending to support or oppose political candidates, and McConnell v. Federal Election Commission , a 2003 decision that upheld the part of the Bipartisan Campaign Reform Act of 2002 that restricted campaign spending by corporations and unions.

2011 First Amendment Protects Funeral Protests

“Speech is powerful. It can stir people to action, move them to tears of both joy and sorrow, and — as it did here — inflict great pain.” Those are Chief Justice John G. Roberts Jr.’s words when the Supreme Court rules in Snyder v. Phelps that the First Amendment’s right to free speech protects hateful protests at military funerals. Members of the Westboro Baptist Church — which believes God is punishing the U.S. for its tolerance of homosexuality — had appeared at the funeral of a Marine who died in Iraq. Albert Snyder, the Marine’s father, sued the protesters for, among other things, intentional infliction of emotional distress. Roberts suggests that laws creating buffer zones around funerals would be a better response than punishing unpopular speech. He says that the nation’s commitment to free speech demands protection of “even hurtful speech on public issues to ensure that we do not stifle public debate.”

2012 Person’s Right To Lie Is Protected

The U.S. Supreme Court strikes down the Stolen Valor Act, a federal law that made it illegal for individuals to claim to have won or to wear military medals or ribbons that they didn’t earn. The Court, in a 6-3 ruling, says that the First Amendment protects the right to lie about medals and military service. Justice Anthony M. Kennedy says freedom of speech “protects the speech we detest as well as the speech we embrace.” The government had argued that such lies “inhibit the government’s efforts to ensure that the armed services and the public perceive awards as going only to the most deserving few.”

2012 U.S. Can’t Require Graphic Warnings On Cigarette Packs

The U.S. Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit rules that the federal Food and Drug Administration cannot require tobacco companies to place large graphic health warnings on cigarette packages to show the effects of smoking. The appeals court upholds a lower court’s decision that the requirement violates the First Amendment’s free speech right. Some of the largest tobacco companies sued the government, arguing that the warnings were not just factual information but advocated against smoking.

2015 States May Limit Judicial Candidates’ Fund-Raising Requests

The U.S. Supreme Court rules, 5-4, in Williams-Yulee v. Florida Bar , No. 13-1499 that states may ban judicial candidates from personally asking their supporters for money. Twenty-nine other states also prohibit personal solicitations, which they say threaten the integrity of the judicial branch and public confidence in the system.

2015 Intent Cited in Online Threats Case

In a social media case, Elonis v. United States , the U.S. Supreme Court reverses the conviction of a Pennsylvania man who had used violent language against his wife on Facebook. The majority opinion says prosecutors failed to prove the defendant’s intent when he published threatening lyrics about his wife on Facebook. The decision makes it harder to prosecute people for threats made on social media.

2015 Court Says Texas May Reject License Plate Design

The U.S. Supreme Court decides in Walker v. Texas Division, Sons of Confederate Veterans, Inc. , 5-4, that Texas may refuse to make a specialty license plate with the Confederate flag. The Sons of Confederate Veterans sued the state when it refused to make such a plate. The group said its First Amendment right to free speech had been violated. The majority opinion says that because license plates “constitute government speech,” Texas could choose which designs to produce.

2015 Town Ordinance On Signs Struck Down

In Reed v. Town of Gilbert, Ariz., the U.S. Supreme Court unanimously strikes down a town law that treated a church’s signs differently from other signs, such as political ads. Unlike other signs, the church signs were limited in size and allowed to be in place for only a certain number of house. The majority opinion says that the town ordinance was based on the content of the sign’s message, which violates the First Amendment’s free speech right.

2019 Federal Ban on ‘Immoral,’ ‘Scandalous’ Trademarks Struck Down

The U.S. Supreme Court rules, 6-3, that the federal government’s ban on registering “immoral” and “scandalous” trademarks violates the First Amendment of the Constitution. The dissenters express concern that the majority opinion goes too far and that the trademark office would be forced to register trademarks containing “the most vulgar, profane, or obscene words and images imaginable.” In the case, Iancu v. Brunetti, a Los Angeles artist, Erik Brunetti, sued the government for refusing to register the trademark for his “subversive” clothing line.

2021 Court Backs Catholic Agency Over Refusal To Work With Same-Sex Couples

The U.S. Supreme Court sides with a Catholic foster care agency that was cut off by the City of Philadelphia from receiving foster care referrals because it refused to work with same-sex couples. The agency believes marriage is between a man and a woman. The Court unanimously rules in Fulton v. City of Philadelphia that the city was wrong to end its foster care contract with Catholic Social Services. Chief Justice John G. Roberts Jr., writing for six of the justices, said the city’s refusal to contract with the foster care agency unless it agreed to certify same-sex couples as foster parents violated the First Amendment.

2021 Court Sides With Cheerleader In Off-Campus Speech

The U.S. Supreme Court rules 8-1 in Mahony Area School District v. B.L. in favor of a Pennsylvania cheerleader who lost her place on the squad because of a profane off-campus rant posted on social media. Although the Court said the punishment violated her First Amendment right of free speech, it declined to say schools never have a role in disciplining students for off-campus speech.

2022 Censure of Politician Is Constitutional, High Court Says

The U.S. Supreme Court unanimously decides in House Community College System v. Wilson that elected bodies do not violate the First Amendment’s free speech clause when they censure a member. Justice Neil M. Gorsuch wrote: “In this country, we expect elected representatives to shoulder a degree of criticism about their public service from their constituents and their peers — and to continue exercising their free speech rights when the criticism comes.”

2022 High Court Rules Against Boston On Christian Flag

The U.S. Supreme Court unanimously rules in Shurtleff v. City of Boston that the City of Boston violated the First Amendment when it refused to let a private group raise a Christian flag in front of its City Hall. One of three flagpoles is occasionally made available to groups seeking to celebrate their backgrounds or to promote causes like gay pride. In a 12-year period, the city approved 284 requests to raise flags and rejected only one, from Camp Constitution, which says it seeks “to enhance understanding of our Judeo-Christian moral heritage.” The city’s refusal to let the group fly its flag based on its religious viewpoint violated the free speech clause of the First Amendment, the majority opinion said.

Related Resources

• Book: First Amendment (1791)
• Handout: Freedom of Speech: Finding the Limits
• Book: Chapter 6: The Right to Freedom of Speech
• Video: A Conversation on the Constitution with Justices Stephen Breyer, Anthony Kennedy and Sandra Day O'Connor: Freedom of Speech
• Book: Chapter 8: The Latitude and Limits of Free Speech
• Book: Chapter 10: The Flag-Salute Cases
• Book: Chapter 18: Freedom of Speech in Public Schools

• Knowledge Base
• Popular Essay Topics

Freedom of Speech Essay

• Author StudySaurus
• Category Popular Essay Topics

Disclaimer: This paper has been submitted by a student. This is not a sample of the work written by professional academic writers.

Any opinions, findings, conclusions or recommendations expressed in this work are those of the authors and do not necessarily reflect the views of StudySaurus.

Topic: What freedom of speech means to me

Freedom of speech is one of the most fundamental rights we have in this great nation today. Our founding fathers came from a tyrannical rule and kept that in mind while framing the constitution we follow today. It was freedom of speech that allowed some of the greatest voices in history to get us to our free and prosperous country.

It is people like Bob Moses, Martin Luther King Jr., Lola Hendricks, Will Roscoe, Gloria Steinem and many other American activists that exercised this right to free speech to demand change in our now free and prosperous country. These names and many more have left their mark on this country, and for the better, I should add. You might not see it but everyday you, me, your friends, my friends, and people you don’t even know around the country are graciously enjoying this right. This leads me to my next subject on this matter. How do we have this right?

Many people exercise this right but not many people put much thought into how we are able to enjoy it in our homes, schools, and other environments in America. The answer to this is other people. We have a very large military that has stood strong for our rights for generations prior and many generations to come. These people, whether you recognize it or not, risk their lives, give everything up, leave their friends and families for long periods of time with the knowledge in their mind they might not come back, to fight for us. Not only for people they know but for everyone.

People don’t know even exist, but they do it anyway because they’re some of the bravest people on this planet. Freedom of speech to me is freedom itself. Without this right, I dare say we shouldn’t be considered free at all. It is the ability to make a change, the ability to love and to hate, to express anger or happiness. Freedom of speech is freedom itself.

Was this material helpful?

Related essays, about studysaurus, community. knowledge. success..

StudySaurus is run by two uni-students that still get a kick out of learning new things. We hope to share these experiences with you.

Ideas ,  concepts ,  tutorials,   essay papers  – everything we would’ve liked to have known, seen or heard during our high-school & UNI years, we want to bring to YOU.

Privacy & Cookies Policy Terms and Conditions DMCA Request

Human Nature and the Freedom of Speech in Different Countries Analytical Essay

Introduction, importance of freedom of speech, freedom of speech, limitations to freedom of speech, works cited.

Freedom of speech is the freedom that citizens are constitutionally granted by their country to allow the citizens to speak without limitations or censorship of what they say.

This freedom varies from country to country depending on levels of democracy and political situations. Freedom of speech is always advocated for and governments urged to constitutionally protect their citizens’ freedom of speech to enable people discuss issues that affect them.

There have also been views of negative effects of unmonitored freedom of speech calling for a balance between the freedom of speech and its limitations. This paper seeks to discuss freedom of speech. The paper will look at the human nature that necessitates speech and expression, freedom of speech as applied in different countries and limitations that freedom of speech faces.

The nature of human beings to coexist with one another and developments that have led to democratic government systems have made speech and interactions fundamental elements in every society.

Developments of government systems and establishment of democracies have played a role in enlisting the participation of citizens in government processes in order to uphold the already established democratic levels in societies. It is this need to retain or even further develop democratic systems that has in the past led to the fight for freedom of speech.

The same reason still plays an important role in ensuring that provisions of freedom of speech are correctly implemented to take care of the intentions that were originally considered during formulations of such policies that governs freedom of speech. The nature of human beings to interact and communicate with one another is another element that necessitates freedom of speech.

Economic, political and even social aspects of life require an ultimate decision regarding a course of action to be taken regarding any particular issue. Matters that affect a large mass of people such as politics and national economic matters have been regarded as public aspects that are determined collectively (Mediainst 1).

Citizens therefore find it necessary to participate in such discussions pertaining to these public issues with the aim of checking and putting to task leaders and representatives to ensure that the interest of the people are looked into. Interactive forums also help people to be informed on current and developing issues in a society.

Freedom of speech, therefore, allows for transfer of information that helps different category of people in decision making. Effective decisions regarding election of political leaders, management of business activities and even personal and family decisions depends on information.

Information about government economic policies and trends in a country will, for example, affect small scale business established in a given township. Freedom of speech and access to information is therefore critical to citizens in their daily lives (Mediainst 1).

Freedom of speech is an element that is occasionally protected by laws of various countries. In the United States, for example, freedom of speech is strictly protected by the country’s first amendment.

According to the first amendment, freedom of speech is protected from manipulation by selfish individuals such as politicians who could be in power and intend to undermine criticisms from the general public.

For this reason, the first amendment of the United States constitution provided protection of the freedom of speech from legislative institutions such as the congress. Freedom of speech has also been liberalized in the United States to include non verbal expressions, motions and symbols that includes dressing codes (Camp 1).

Xinyi Wang explained the elements of the United States’ first amendment, which clearly, or as one would think it does, expresses the sanctity of freedom of speech in the United States. The constitution expressly states that the congress is prohibited from making legislations that would touch on the freedom of speech.

The first amendment also included other elements that are related to freedom of speech such as issues pertaining to the press and the fact that Americans were allowed to converge and share opinions in a peaceful manner and to stand and question their government in case the citizens felt aggrieved by the government (Xinyi 1).

In its application, freedom of speech protects subjects from liability to whatever they say, provided that the subject statements uttered by an individual are under the protection of freedom of speech as provided by a particular country.

Freedom of speech enjoyed by legislators in their course of legislation for example protects them from any liability emanating from anything that the legislatures say while in their legislative process.

The constitution of Canada for example provides that “no legislative councilor or member of the legislative assembly shall be liable to any action, arrest, or imprisonment, or damages” (Canadian constitution 69) as long as subject commission were undertaken in a process of conducting legislative duties in the premises for such duties (Canadian constitution 69).

In Britain, legislatures are only protected from speech uttered in their process of legislation. A similar application of the freedom of speech is applicable to other citizens.

Provisions are made by constitutions in different countries regarding freedoms that citizens are accorded with regard to speech and measures are then taken to ensure that subject to constitutional provisions, no citizens are held liable to any utterance that is made within constitutional provisions of freedom of speech (Canadian constitution 69).

Even though freedom of speech is expressly stated in a number of countries’ constitutions, and provisions made that freedom of speech shall be utterly protected by constitutions, a review of application of law by judicial systems reveals that constitutional provisions of freedom of speech have under certain circumstances been overridden by other factors.

When freedom of speech is not applicable, for whatever legal reason, then it means that constitutional provisions on the freedom have limitations with respect to interpretation and application. In the United States, for example, matters such as: “national security, justice or personal safety-overrides freedom of speech” (Freedomforum 1).

This means that an individual’s freedom of speech will be overlooked if any or all of these three issues are involved. A person whose speech threatens such issues like national security or infringes rights of other citizens might not be protected by freedom of speech.

The judicial system in the United States has, for example, established over time that utterances that: poses a threat to causing danger or violence, undermine “social value” and “conflict with other legitimate social or government interests” (Freedomforum 1) are not protected by freedom of speech (Freedomforum 1).

Limitations in the freedom of speech are also propagated by international bodies such as the United Nations. According to the United Nations resolution in its 1948 general assembly, it was agreed upon that as much as people had to be accorded freedom of expression, countries and states were not prevented from establishing measures that can possibly regulate parties in their process of disseminating information.

It was resolved that freedom of speech and freedom of expression calls for a level of responsibility on the parts of citizens and entities and thus governments were not restricted by the resolution from “requiring the licensing of broadcasting, television or cinema enterprises” (Whitmore 1).

The resolution at the United Nations assembly also stated that freedom of speech was subjected matters that are fundamental to “democratic society, interest of national security, territorial integrity or public safety, for the prevention of disorder or crime, for protection of health or morals” (Whitmore 1) among other factors.

This resolution thus recognizes territorial sovereignty in legislations that limits freedom of speech of an individual when it is considered to undermine sensitive public issues (Whitmore 1).

There are a number of limitations which have been imposed on freedom of speech within the United States. Obscenity has, for example, been expressly excluded from freedom of speech by the judicial system of the United States.

Other limitations on freedom of speech and press in the United States include “child pornography, defamation, speech harmful to children, compelled speech” (Cohen 26) among others. The need for limitation of freedom of speech is also expressed by Sadurski Wojciech in an argument that “self fulfillment” should be accompanied by self-control (Sadurski 18).

Freedom of speech is considered to bring satisfaction to individuals and for this reason, people must ensure that their freedom does not harm the fulfillment that other people wants to enjoy. Limitations are therefore necessary to ensure that every citizen enjoys his or her freedom (Sadurski 18).

Freedom of speech is important in a democratic nation and is internationally recognized and advocated for. It has been entrenched in a number of national constitutions and over time enhanced due to movements of human rights activists.

The provision and protection of freedom of speech by national constitutions is however at the same time limited by the same constitutions subject to rights of other citizens and national interests.

Camp, Julie. Freedom of expression . California State University , 2005. Web.

Canadian constitution. The Canadian constitution . Canada: UAP archive. Print.

Cohen, Henry. Freedom of speech and press: exceptions to the first amendment . FAS, 2009. Web.

Freedomforum. Education for freedom . Freedom Forum. Web.

Mediainst. Importance of freedom of speech . Medianst. Web.

Sadurski, Wojciech. Freedom of speech and its limits . New York, NY: Springer, 2001. Print.

Whitmore Marc. Freedom of speech, restrictions on . Idebate Organization, 2009. Web.

Xinyi, Wang. Freedom of speech in the United States constitution . Perspectives. Web.

• Chicago (A-D)
• Chicago (N-B)

IvyPanda. (2022, March 17). Human Nature and the Freedom of Speech in Different Countries. https://ivypanda.com/essays/freedom-of-speech/

"Human Nature and the Freedom of Speech in Different Countries." IvyPanda , 17 Mar. 2022, ivypanda.com/essays/freedom-of-speech/.

IvyPanda . (2022) 'Human Nature and the Freedom of Speech in Different Countries'. 17 March.

IvyPanda . 2022. "Human Nature and the Freedom of Speech in Different Countries." March 17, 2022. https://ivypanda.com/essays/freedom-of-speech/.

1. IvyPanda . "Human Nature and the Freedom of Speech in Different Countries." March 17, 2022. https://ivypanda.com/essays/freedom-of-speech/.

Bibliography

IvyPanda . "Human Nature and the Freedom of Speech in Different Countries." March 17, 2022. https://ivypanda.com/essays/freedom-of-speech/.

• Express Terms in a Contract
• US Constitutional Amendments: Procedures Changes
• Judicial Review: History of Origin, Process, Consequences
• Faith Integration: 1 Peter 5:1-4
• Contract and Agency Law: Overview and Analysis
• The Case Study of Knarles: Contract
• Validity of the Contract Importance in Doing Business
• Should Employees Have an Expectation of Privacy?
• The Basic Concept of Culture in America
• The Davis-Moore Thesis on Social Stratification
• Crime and Deviance
• Importance of Adopting Children
• Stereotypes of American Citizens
• The Problems of Abortion in Modern Society
• Undocumented workers in the United States

• Search Menu
• Browse content in Arts and Humanities
• Browse content in Archaeology
• Anglo-Saxon and Medieval Archaeology
• Archaeological Methodology and Techniques
• Archaeology by Region
• Archaeology of Religion
• Archaeology of Trade and Exchange
• Biblical Archaeology
• Contemporary and Public Archaeology
• Environmental Archaeology
• Historical Archaeology
• History and Theory of Archaeology
• Industrial Archaeology
• Landscape Archaeology
• Mortuary Archaeology
• Prehistoric Archaeology
• Underwater Archaeology
• Urban Archaeology
• Zooarchaeology
• Browse content in Architecture
• Architectural Structure and Design
• History of Architecture
• Residential and Domestic Buildings
• Theory of Architecture
• Browse content in Art
• Art Subjects and Themes
• History of Art
• Industrial and Commercial Art
• Theory of Art
• Biographical Studies
• Byzantine Studies
• Browse content in Classical Studies
• Classical Literature
• Classical Reception
• Classical History
• Classical Philosophy
• Classical Mythology
• Classical Art and Architecture
• Classical Oratory and Rhetoric
• Greek and Roman Papyrology
• Greek and Roman Archaeology
• Greek and Roman Epigraphy
• Greek and Roman Law
• Late Antiquity
• Religion in the Ancient World
• Digital Humanities
• Browse content in History
• Colonialism and Imperialism
• Diplomatic History
• Environmental History
• Genealogy, Heraldry, Names, and Honours
• Genocide and Ethnic Cleansing
• Historical Geography
• History by Period
• History of Emotions
• History of Agriculture
• History of Education
• History of Gender and Sexuality
• Industrial History
• Intellectual History
• International History
• Labour History
• Legal and Constitutional History
• Local and Family History
• Maritime History
• Military History
• National Liberation and Post-Colonialism
• Oral History
• Political History
• Public History
• Regional and National History
• Revolutions and Rebellions
• Slavery and Abolition of Slavery
• Social and Cultural History
• Theory, Methods, and Historiography
• Urban History
• World History
• Browse content in Language Teaching and Learning
• Language Learning (Specific Skills)
• Language Teaching Theory and Methods
• Browse content in Linguistics
• Applied Linguistics
• Cognitive Linguistics
• Computational Linguistics
• Forensic Linguistics
• Grammar, Syntax and Morphology
• Historical and Diachronic Linguistics
• History of English
• Language Evolution
• Language Reference
• Language Variation
• Language Families
• Language Acquisition
• Lexicography
• Linguistic Anthropology
• Linguistic Theories
• Linguistic Typology
• Phonetics and Phonology
• Psycholinguistics
• Sociolinguistics
• Translation and Interpretation
• Writing Systems
• Browse content in Literature
• Bibliography
• Children's Literature Studies
• Literary Studies (Romanticism)
• Literary Studies (American)
• Literary Studies (Modernism)
• Literary Studies (Asian)
• Literary Studies (European)
• Literary Studies (Eco-criticism)
• Literary Studies - World
• Literary Studies (1500 to 1800)
• Literary Studies (19th Century)
• Literary Studies (20th Century onwards)
• Literary Studies (African American Literature)
• Literary Studies (British and Irish)
• Literary Studies (Early and Medieval)
• Literary Studies (Fiction, Novelists, and Prose Writers)
• Literary Studies (Gender Studies)
• Literary Studies (Graphic Novels)
• Literary Studies (History of the Book)
• Literary Studies (Plays and Playwrights)
• Literary Studies (Poetry and Poets)
• Literary Studies (Postcolonial Literature)
• Literary Studies (Queer Studies)
• Literary Studies (Science Fiction)
• Literary Studies (Travel Literature)
• Literary Studies (War Literature)
• Literary Studies (Women's Writing)
• Literary Theory and Cultural Studies
• Mythology and Folklore
• Shakespeare Studies and Criticism
• Browse content in Media Studies
• Browse content in Music
• Applied Music
• Dance and Music
• Ethics in Music
• Ethnomusicology
• Gender and Sexuality in Music
• Medicine and Music
• Music Cultures
• Music and Media
• Music and Culture
• Music and Religion
• Music Education and Pedagogy
• Music Theory and Analysis
• Musical Scores, Lyrics, and Libretti
• Musical Structures, Styles, and Techniques
• Musicology and Music History
• Performance Practice and Studies
• Race and Ethnicity in Music
• Sound Studies
• Browse content in Performing Arts
• Browse content in Philosophy
• Aesthetics and Philosophy of Art
• Epistemology
• Feminist Philosophy
• History of Western Philosophy
• Metaphysics
• Moral Philosophy
• Non-Western Philosophy
• Philosophy of Language
• Philosophy of Mind
• Philosophy of Perception
• Philosophy of Action
• Philosophy of Law
• Philosophy of Religion
• Philosophy of Science
• Philosophy of Mathematics and Logic
• Practical Ethics
• Social and Political Philosophy
• Browse content in Religion
• Biblical Studies
• Christianity
• East Asian Religions
• History of Religion
• Judaism and Jewish Studies
• Qumran Studies
• Religion and Education
• Religion and Health
• Religion and Politics
• Religion and Science
• Religion and Law
• Religion and Art, Literature, and Music
• Religious Studies
• Browse content in Society and Culture
• Cookery, Food, and Drink
• Cultural Studies
• Customs and Traditions
• Ethical Issues and Debates
• Hobbies, Games, Arts and Crafts
• Lifestyle, Home, and Garden
• Natural world, Country Life, and Pets
• Popular Beliefs and Controversial Knowledge
• Sports and Outdoor Recreation
• Technology and Society
• Travel and Holiday
• Visual Culture
• Browse content in Law
• Arbitration
• Browse content in Company and Commercial Law
• Commercial Law
• Company Law
• Browse content in Comparative Law
• Systems of Law
• Competition Law
• Browse content in Constitutional and Administrative Law
• Government Powers
• Judicial Review
• Local Government Law
• Military and Defence Law
• Parliamentary and Legislative Practice
• Construction Law
• Contract Law
• Browse content in Criminal Law
• Criminal Procedure
• Criminal Evidence Law
• Sentencing and Punishment
• Employment and Labour Law
• Environment and Energy Law
• Browse content in Financial Law
• Banking Law
• Insolvency Law
• History of Law
• Human Rights and Immigration
• Intellectual Property Law
• Browse content in International Law
• Private International Law and Conflict of Laws
• Public International Law
• IT and Communications Law
• Jurisprudence and Philosophy of Law
• Law and Society
• Law and Politics
• Browse content in Legal System and Practice
• Courts and Procedure
• Legal Skills and Practice
• Primary Sources of Law
• Regulation of Legal Profession
• Medical and Healthcare Law
• Browse content in Policing
• Criminal Investigation and Detection
• Police and Security Services
• Police Procedure and Law
• Police Regional Planning
• Browse content in Property Law
• Personal Property Law
• Study and Revision
• Terrorism and National Security Law
• Browse content in Trusts Law
• Wills and Probate or Succession
• Browse content in Medicine and Health
• Browse content in Allied Health Professions
• Arts Therapies
• Clinical Science
• Dietetics and Nutrition
• Occupational Therapy
• Operating Department Practice
• Physiotherapy
• Radiography
• Speech and Language Therapy
• Browse content in Anaesthetics
• General Anaesthesia
• Neuroanaesthesia
• Clinical Neuroscience
• Browse content in Clinical Medicine
• Acute Medicine
• Cardiovascular Medicine
• Clinical Genetics
• Clinical Pharmacology and Therapeutics
• Dermatology
• Endocrinology and Diabetes
• Gastroenterology
• Genito-urinary Medicine
• Geriatric Medicine
• Infectious Diseases
• Medical Toxicology
• Medical Oncology
• Pain Medicine
• Palliative Medicine
• Rehabilitation Medicine
• Respiratory Medicine and Pulmonology
• Rheumatology
• Sleep Medicine
• Sports and Exercise Medicine
• Community Medical Services
• Critical Care
• Emergency Medicine
• Forensic Medicine
• Haematology
• History of Medicine
• Browse content in Medical Skills
• Clinical Skills
• Communication Skills
• Nursing Skills
• Surgical Skills
• Medical Ethics
• Browse content in Medical Dentistry
• Oral and Maxillofacial Surgery
• Paediatric Dentistry
• Restorative Dentistry and Orthodontics
• Surgical Dentistry
• Medical Statistics and Methodology
• Browse content in Neurology
• Clinical Neurophysiology
• Neuropathology
• Nursing Studies
• Browse content in Obstetrics and Gynaecology
• Gynaecology
• Occupational Medicine
• Ophthalmology
• Otolaryngology (ENT)
• Browse content in Paediatrics
• Neonatology
• Browse content in Pathology
• Chemical Pathology
• Clinical Cytogenetics and Molecular Genetics
• Histopathology
• Medical Microbiology and Virology
• Patient Education and Information
• Browse content in Pharmacology
• Psychopharmacology
• Browse content in Popular Health
• Caring for Others
• Complementary and Alternative Medicine
• Self-help and Personal Development
• Browse content in Preclinical Medicine
• Cell Biology
• Molecular Biology and Genetics
• Reproduction, Growth and Development
• Primary Care
• Professional Development in Medicine
• Browse content in Psychiatry
• Addiction Medicine
• Child and Adolescent Psychiatry
• Forensic Psychiatry
• Learning Disabilities
• Old Age Psychiatry
• Psychotherapy
• Browse content in Public Health and Epidemiology
• Epidemiology
• Public Health
• Browse content in Radiology
• Clinical Radiology
• Interventional Radiology
• Nuclear Medicine
• Radiation Oncology
• Reproductive Medicine
• Browse content in Surgery
• Cardiothoracic Surgery
• Gastro-intestinal and Colorectal Surgery
• General Surgery
• Neurosurgery
• Paediatric Surgery
• Peri-operative Care
• Plastic and Reconstructive Surgery
• Surgical Oncology
• Transplant Surgery
• Trauma and Orthopaedic Surgery
• Vascular Surgery
• Browse content in Science and Mathematics
• Browse content in Biological Sciences
• Aquatic Biology
• Biochemistry
• Bioinformatics and Computational Biology
• Developmental Biology
• Ecology and Conservation
• Evolutionary Biology
• Genetics and Genomics
• Microbiology
• Molecular and Cell Biology
• Natural History
• Plant Sciences and Forestry
• Research Methods in Life Sciences
• Structural Biology
• Systems Biology
• Zoology and Animal Sciences
• Browse content in Chemistry
• Analytical Chemistry
• Computational Chemistry
• Crystallography
• Environmental Chemistry
• Industrial Chemistry
• Inorganic Chemistry
• Materials Chemistry
• Medicinal Chemistry
• Mineralogy and Gems
• Organic Chemistry
• Physical Chemistry
• Polymer Chemistry
• Study and Communication Skills in Chemistry
• Theoretical Chemistry
• Browse content in Computer Science
• Artificial Intelligence
• Computer Architecture and Logic Design
• Game Studies
• Human-Computer Interaction
• Mathematical Theory of Computation
• Programming Languages
• Software Engineering
• Systems Analysis and Design
• Virtual Reality
• Browse content in Computing
• Business Applications
• Computer Games
• Computer Security
• Computer Networking and Communications
• Digital Lifestyle
• Graphical and Digital Media Applications
• Operating Systems
• Browse content in Earth Sciences and Geography
• Atmospheric Sciences
• Environmental Geography
• Geology and the Lithosphere
• Maps and Map-making
• Meteorology and Climatology
• Oceanography and Hydrology
• Palaeontology
• Physical Geography and Topography
• Regional Geography
• Soil Science
• Urban Geography
• Browse content in Engineering and Technology
• Agriculture and Farming
• Biological Engineering
• Civil Engineering, Surveying, and Building
• Electronics and Communications Engineering
• Energy Technology
• Engineering (General)
• Environmental Science, Engineering, and Technology
• History of Engineering and Technology
• Mechanical Engineering and Materials
• Technology of Industrial Chemistry
• Transport Technology and Trades
• Browse content in Environmental Science
• Applied Ecology (Environmental Science)
• Conservation of the Environment (Environmental Science)
• Environmental Sustainability
• Environmentalist Thought and Ideology (Environmental Science)
• Management of Land and Natural Resources (Environmental Science)
• Natural Disasters (Environmental Science)
• Nuclear Issues (Environmental Science)
• Pollution and Threats to the Environment (Environmental Science)
• Social Impact of Environmental Issues (Environmental Science)
• History of Science and Technology
• Browse content in Materials Science
• Ceramics and Glasses
• Composite Materials
• Metals, Alloying, and Corrosion
• Nanotechnology
• Browse content in Mathematics
• Applied Mathematics
• Biomathematics and Statistics
• History of Mathematics
• Mathematical Education
• Mathematical Finance
• Mathematical Analysis
• Numerical and Computational Mathematics
• Probability and Statistics
• Pure Mathematics
• Browse content in Neuroscience
• Cognition and Behavioural Neuroscience
• Development of the Nervous System
• Disorders of the Nervous System
• History of Neuroscience
• Invertebrate Neurobiology
• Molecular and Cellular Systems
• Neuroendocrinology and Autonomic Nervous System
• Neuroscientific Techniques
• Sensory and Motor Systems
• Browse content in Physics
• Astronomy and Astrophysics
• Atomic, Molecular, and Optical Physics
• Biological and Medical Physics
• Classical Mechanics
• Computational Physics
• Condensed Matter Physics
• Electromagnetism, Optics, and Acoustics
• History of Physics
• Mathematical and Statistical Physics
• Measurement Science
• Nuclear Physics
• Particles and Fields
• Plasma Physics
• Quantum Physics
• Relativity and Gravitation
• Semiconductor and Mesoscopic Physics
• Browse content in Psychology
• Affective Sciences
• Clinical Psychology
• Cognitive Psychology
• Cognitive Neuroscience
• Criminal and Forensic Psychology
• Developmental Psychology
• Educational Psychology
• Evolutionary Psychology
• Health Psychology
• History and Systems in Psychology
• Music Psychology
• Neuropsychology
• Organizational Psychology
• Psychological Assessment and Testing
• Psychology of Human-Technology Interaction
• Psychology Professional Development and Training
• Research Methods in Psychology
• Social Psychology
• Browse content in Social Sciences
• Browse content in Anthropology
• Anthropology of Religion
• Human Evolution
• Medical Anthropology
• Physical Anthropology
• Regional Anthropology
• Social and Cultural Anthropology
• Theory and Practice of Anthropology
• Browse content in Business and Management
• Business Ethics
• Business History
• Business Strategy
• Business and Technology
• Business and Government
• Business and the Environment
• Comparative Management
• Corporate Governance
• Corporate Social Responsibility
• Entrepreneurship
• Health Management
• Human Resource Management
• Industrial and Employment Relations
• Industry Studies
• Information and Communication Technologies
• International Business
• Knowledge Management
• Management and Management Techniques
• Operations Management
• Organizational Theory and Behaviour
• Pensions and Pension Management
• Public and Nonprofit Management
• Strategic Management
• Supply Chain Management
• Browse content in Criminology and Criminal Justice
• Criminal Justice
• Criminology
• Forms of Crime
• International and Comparative Criminology
• Youth Violence and Juvenile Justice
• Development Studies
• Browse content in Economics
• Agricultural, Environmental, and Natural Resource Economics
• Asian Economics
• Behavioural Finance
• Behavioural Economics and Neuroeconomics
• Econometrics and Mathematical Economics
• Economic History
• Economic Methodology
• Economic Systems
• Economic Development and Growth
• Financial Markets
• Financial Institutions and Services
• General Economics and Teaching
• Health, Education, and Welfare
• History of Economic Thought
• International Economics
• Labour and Demographic Economics
• Law and Economics
• Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics
• Microeconomics
• Public Economics
• Urban, Rural, and Regional Economics
• Welfare Economics
• Browse content in Education
• Adult Education and Continuous Learning
• Care and Counselling of Students
• Early Childhood and Elementary Education
• Educational Equipment and Technology
• Educational Strategies and Policy
• Higher and Further Education
• Organization and Management of Education
• Philosophy and Theory of Education
• Schools Studies
• Secondary Education
• Teaching of a Specific Subject
• Teaching of Specific Groups and Special Educational Needs
• Teaching Skills and Techniques
• Browse content in Environment
• Applied Ecology (Social Science)
• Climate Change
• Conservation of the Environment (Social Science)
• Environmentalist Thought and Ideology (Social Science)
• Natural Disasters (Environment)
• Social Impact of Environmental Issues (Social Science)
• Browse content in Human Geography
• Cultural Geography
• Economic Geography
• Political Geography
• Browse content in Interdisciplinary Studies
• Communication Studies
• Museums, Libraries, and Information Sciences
• Browse content in Politics
• African Politics
• Asian Politics
• Chinese Politics
• Comparative Politics
• Conflict Politics
• Elections and Electoral Studies
• Environmental Politics
• European Union
• Foreign Policy
• Gender and Politics
• Human Rights and Politics
• Indian Politics
• International Relations
• International Organization (Politics)
• International Political Economy
• Irish Politics
• Latin American Politics
• Middle Eastern Politics
• Political Behaviour
• Political Economy
• Political Institutions
• Political Theory
• Political Methodology
• Political Communication
• Political Philosophy
• Political Sociology
• Politics and Law
• Public Policy
• Public Administration
• Quantitative Political Methodology
• Regional Political Studies
• Russian Politics
• Security Studies
• State and Local Government
• UK Politics
• US Politics
• Browse content in Regional and Area Studies
• African Studies
• Asian Studies
• East Asian Studies
• Japanese Studies
• Latin American Studies
• Middle Eastern Studies
• Native American Studies
• Scottish Studies
• Browse content in Research and Information
• Research Methods
• Browse content in Social Work
• Addictions and Substance Misuse
• Adoption and Fostering
• Care of the Elderly
• Child and Adolescent Social Work
• Couple and Family Social Work
• Developmental and Physical Disabilities Social Work
• Direct Practice and Clinical Social Work
• Emergency Services
• Human Behaviour and the Social Environment
• International and Global Issues in Social Work
• Mental and Behavioural Health
• Social Justice and Human Rights
• Social Policy and Advocacy
• Social Work and Crime and Justice
• Social Work Macro Practice
• Social Work Practice Settings
• Social Work Research and Evidence-based Practice
• Welfare and Benefit Systems
• Browse content in Sociology
• Childhood Studies
• Community Development
• Comparative and Historical Sociology
• Economic Sociology
• Gender and Sexuality
• Gerontology and Ageing
• Health, Illness, and Medicine
• Marriage and the Family
• Migration Studies
• Occupations, Professions, and Work
• Organizations
• Population and Demography
• Race and Ethnicity
• Social Theory
• Social Movements and Social Change
• Social Research and Statistics
• Social Stratification, Inequality, and Mobility
• Sociology of Religion
• Sociology of Education
• Sport and Leisure
• Urban and Rural Studies
• Browse content in Warfare and Defence
• Defence Strategy, Planning, and Research
• Land Forces and Warfare
• Military Administration
• Military Life and Institutions
• Naval Forces and Warfare
• Other Warfare and Defence Issues
• Peace Studies and Conflict Resolution
• Weapons and Equipment

• < Previous
• Next chapter >

Introduction

• Published: January 2021
• Cite Icon Cite
• Permissions Icon Permissions

Freedom of speech is a central commitment of political liberalism, a principle of positive constitutional law in virtually all modern constitutions and a principle of international human rights law. 1 Close Although among the most widely agreed upon and celebrated legal and constitutional principles of modern times, it is also the source of enduring and intense disagreement. We cannot fail to notice, moreover, that this Handbook is to be published at a time of some controversy about the power of freedom of speech in the face of new threats to democracy 2 Close and the challenges of the digital economy. 3 Close At worst, freedom of speech might even be part of the problem—a principle weaponized against the ideals from which it sprang. 4 Close

In this tumultuous context, this Handbook provides a comprehensive exploration of freedom of speech both as a political idea and as a legal principle. It is arranged in three parts: The chapters in Part I focus on freedom of speech as a political idea and upon the ideas and rationales that underlie it; the chapters in Part II focus on distinctive features of freedom of speech as a legal principle. In Part III the Handbook, the chapters focus on a range of controversies that have arisen in constitutional systems throughout the world and which illustrate and elaborate upon the general themes of Parts I and II .

A. Fundamental Questions and Perspectives

Part I begins with the most fundamental questions about the nature of freedom of speech: its history and rationales. Although a form of freedom of speech was evident in ancient times, 5 Close it is Enlightenment thinking that is usually credited with the decisive influence on modern conceptions. 6 Close Its influence is especially well documented by scholars of the First Amendment to the Constitution of the United States. In Chapter 2 , Vincent Blasi, in a subtle exploration of the classic arguments for freedom of speech, traces the first comprehensive argument for freedom of speech as a limiting principle of government to John Milton’s Areopagitica , a polemic against censorship by a requirement of prior licensing in which Milton develops an argument for the pursuit of truth through exposure to false and heretical ideas rather than the passive reception of orthodoxy. 7 Close

Despite Milton’s belief in the advancement of understanding through free inquiry, he was far from liberal in the modern sense of that term and he did not, for instance, extend the tolerance he advocated to Catholic religious texts. The most famous and influential exposition of a liberal theory of freedom of speech is found in the work of John Stuart Mill. 8 Close Mill’s argument for freedom of speech, commonly understood as based on freedom of speech as a facilitator of the search for truth and knowledge, 9 Close is central to Chapters 1 and 3 . In Chapter 1 , Christopher Macleod reminds us of the precise nature of Mill’s claim. Three especially important points come to the fore. First, Mill’s argument turns on the fallibility of human knowledge and his belief in the consequent value in subjecting ideas to contradiction. Second, while in constitutional law the focus has been on interference with freedom of speech by the state, Mill was as much concerned with ‘moral reproach’ that arises from social intolerance and social pressure. Finally, by virtue of its focus on the pursuit of truth, the Millian argument is focused on discussion rather than expression more broadly and therefore has little obvious application to non-propositional expression found in instrumental music and abstract art. (A theme later taken up by others, 10 Close including Mark Tushnet who, in Chapter 23 , explores the problem of incorporating music and art into a theory of freedom of speech without also including a far wider range of human activities.)

The complexities of the truth justification for freedom of speech are further explored by William Marshall in Chapter 3 . Marshall identifies its many flaws: the implausibility of the claim that freedom of speech is a mechanism for producing truth; the problems of public irrationality and apathy in a ‘post-truth’ age; and, most fundamentally, the difficulties in identifying the normative appeal of truth itself, especially in circumstances in which it causes harm. Abandoning these traditional arguments for truth, Marshall appeals to truth as an ideal serving a narrative function ‘akin to the role played by myth in religion’. 11 Close

The argument from truth is one of three prominent lines of thought evident in an extensive philosophical literature on freedom of expression. Each of these lines of argument are explored in chapters in Part I . A second line of argument relies on the connection between freedom of speech and autonomy. Freedom of speech is said to protect (or to be integral to) individual autonomy by allowing individuals to form their own opinions about their beliefs and actions or by enabling ‘self-development’; or because respecting freedom of speech accords (or is constitutive of) dignity, equal concern and respect due to all individuals. In Chapter 4 , Catriona Mackenzie and Denise Meyerson explore the autonomy argument generally, and in Chapter 6 , Dieter Grimm explores the argument from dignity.

The third line of argument, perhaps the most widely influential in the constitutional law of freedom of speech, relies upon the connection between freedom of speech and democratic self-government. Ashutosh Bhagwat and James Weinstein explore the argument from democracy in Chapter 5 .

These three lines of argument—something of a ‘classic trio’ of justifications for freedom of speech—are the usual starting point of philosophical inquiry. But each gives rise to complex problems. Some are common to each rationale. In an echo of some arguments made against the truth rationale, arguments from autonomy are criticized for their failure to focus on the conditions necessary for the realization of autonomy. This line of thought has been especially prominent in feminist analysis of freedom of speech. In their chapter, Mackenzie and Meyerson explore a number of ways in which the problem has been addressed, from Susan Brison’s forthright critique of the autonomy justification for permitting hate speech 12 Close and for failing adequately to distinguish autonomous speech from non-speech forms of autonomy, 13 Close to Susan Williams’s idea of relational autonomy. 14 Close

Another kind of challenge for these arguments arises from the complexity of the ideas that underscore each rationale. This emerges clearly in Bhagwat and Weinstein’s chapter on the democracy justification. As they show, it is well recognized that freedom of speech performs an essential informing function, enabling the people to vote and participate in public discourse, and informs representatives of the views of the people. In addition, free speech also serves a legitimating function because law’s legitimacy requires that the people are free to take part in the public deliberations through which public opinion, and ultimately laws, are formed. Distinctively, Bhagwat and Weinstein take the legitimating function of freedom of speech to be crucial not just to the legal system as a whole but also to the legitimacy of individual laws and posit that laws banning hate speech may render other laws (such as anti-discrimination laws) illegitimate.

Equally, however, Bhagwat and Weinstein show that the nature of a right of freedom of speech will depend upon which conception of democracy, among the multiple and competing conceptions, dominates. For instance, where democracy is representative rather than direct, or where it prizes public deliberation over the aggregation of pre-existing interests, greater emphasis will be placed on public discourse. In such democracies, freedom of speech is likely to cover a broader range of public discussion beyond that required for the process of voting and law making. 15 Close

An important distinction, which illuminates matters taken up in later parts of the book, lies in the distinction between relatively thick (or substantive) understandings of democracies over relatively thin, proceduralist accounts. Of these two conceptions, the thicker idea of democracy provides a basis for more extensive limits on freedom of speech. Where democracy is taken to be instrumental to certain ends, freedom of speech can be limited where it makes little contribution to (or even frustrates) such ends. At this point, the long debate about the regulation of hate speech enters the picture again. Substantive conceptions of democracy (which usually entail that a democratic polity will ‘demonstrate tolerance, mutual respect, and an embrace of diversity’) provides a foundation for arguments that ‘the state not only need not tolerate, but to the contrary has a positive obligation to suppress hate speech’ 16 Close (a matter of which Weinstein and Bhagwat are evidently sceptical).

The idea that democracy is instrumental to a more fundamental value is evident in Dieter Grimm’s chapter ‘Freedom of Speech and Human Dignity’. Writing from within the German constitutional tradition, in which dignity is a foundational value receiving explicit constitutional protection, Grimm writes: 17 Close

We do not have freedom of speech for democracy’s sake, but we have democracy because it is the form of political rule best compatible with the dignity and autonomy of the individual.

The dignity-based conception of freedom of speech requires that the principle extends well beyond political speech. Speech is valuable because it allows humans to form social relationships and develop their personality—matters integral to human dignity. However, dignitarian arguments also justify limits on freedom of speech where that speech violates human dignity. Thus Grimm shows how dignity may furnish an argument for the regulation of hate speech where that speech: 18 Close

attempts to deny human beings individual personhood, to strip them from all rights (or from the right to have rights), to classify certain individuals as such or because of their group membership as life not being worth lived, to claim that by their behaviour they have forfeited any claim to respect.

Dignity’s role as both a justification for freedom of speech and for limiting it, points to a more general dynamic. Where freedom of speech is taken to be instrumental to a more fundamental value, it will usually be the case that the underlying value—equality, autonomy, dignity—will in some circumstances be deployed as an argument for freedom of speech and in others in support of a limitation. This ‘double-sidedness’ of freedom of speech is a particularly perplexing feature of free speech argumentation. 19 Close It means, as Alon Harel shows in his chapter on hate speech and as Gautam Bhatia shows in his chapter on religious speech, that many arguments about freedom of speech are not a defence of a liberal ideal against illiberalism. 20 Close Rather, many free speech arguments occur within liberalism and their resolution depends upon a quite precise rendering of the relationship between freedom of speech and its underlying values.

As the chapters so far mentioned demonstrate, there is a rich philosophical literature about freedom of speech. A final contribution in this vein from Wojciech Sadurski shows the power of philosophical argument to illuminate even most seemingly technical aspects of free speech. 21 Close The chapter explores the salience of the Rawlsian idea of public reason for freedom of speech. Sadurski argues that the idea helps explain the focus in free speech law in a number of countries on the distinction between content-based and content-neutral laws (and relatedly on viewpoint-based and viewpoint-neutral laws). Public reason analysis explains this focus, and reveals as potentially illegitimate laws based on reasons that are non-endorsable by reasonable persons to whom they apply.

Contributions from other disciplines to scholarship on freedom of speech have been more limited. In an important exception to this trend, Daniel Hemel, in Chapter 7 , explores the potential for economic analysis to illuminate freedom of speech. Information economics, he argues, has the potential to explain failures in the ‘marketplace of ideas’. Just as information asymmetry in the market for goods and services allows low-quality goods and services to drive high-quality goods and services out of the marketplace, there is reason to think that ‘bad speech’ will tend to drive out the ‘good’. For good information to compete in the market, readers and listeners must be able to tell the difference between good and bad information—an idea with particular resonance in the age of ‘fake news’, and with potential implications for the design of free speech laws. 22 Close

B. Freedom of Speech as a Legal Idea

Part II of the volume turns from general questions about the nature of and justifications for freedom of speech to an examination of pervasive issues that arise with particular clarity when freedom of speech is applied as a legal principle.

The focus of most of these chapters is on freedom of speech as a principle of constitutional law, which in turn provides the basis for an individual to challenge the law. However, there are many ways in which a free speech principle might operate in law: it may guide the interpretation of statutes and other instruments; in common law systems at least, it may influence the development of case law; and it is a principle of international law (as canvassed by Michael Hamilton in Chapter 11 ).

Conceived at a high level of generality, the framework for the determination of legal free speech claims is remarkably similar across a wide range of legal systems. As Stephen Gardbaum shows in his close but broadly comparative analysis in Chapter 12 , the nature and extent of a free speech right depends upon a number of legal components: (1) the legal source of the right (in common law, statute or a constitution) and the force of the right having regard to how it is enforced, and whether and how it can be superseded; (2) the subject of the right (citizens, natural or legal persons); (3) the scope of the right; (4) the kind of obligation it imposes on others (a negative prohibition or a positive obligation); (5) who is bound to respect a right of freedom of expression and against whom the right may be asserted; and (6) whether and how a free speech right might be limited. 23 Close

The first two chapters in Part II take up two of these elements in detail. Tracing the distinction in free speech law between ‘coverage’ and ‘protection’ influentially illuminated in his work, Schauer, in Chapter 9 , addresses the question acts or behaviour a principle of freedom of speech applies. 24 Close

This question of coverage (or in Gardbaum’s terms ‘scope’) can be invisible in legal analysis especially if it is abundantly clear that the activity concerned is ‘speech’ within the accepted meaning of the word or if techniques of legal interpretation (text, history, and precedent, for instance) provide a ready answer. But, as Schauer shows, in many cases neither speech nor the common alternative ‘expression’ adequately capture the activity to which the principle applies. The only coherent way to approach the question of coverage is by reference to the underlying rationale or rationales for freedom of speech. In this light, the question of ‘coverage’ turns out to be highly revealing of some fundamental features of freedom of speech, namely that it is a complex ideal resting on multiple justifications.

The question of ‘protection’ (which corresponds to Gardbaum’s final component, whether and to what extent the free speech right may be limited) goes to the weight or strength of the protection from regulation conferred on that which is covered. In the context of constitutional law, it is reflected in legal doctrines formulated by courts. The protection question brings to the fore the much-noted ‘US exceptionalism’ with respect to freedom of speech in constitutional law. As is well known, First Amendment law is characterized by a conceptual or categorial approach that applies relatively specific, rule-like limitations, as compared with the more flexible approach of ‘structured proportionality’ that dominates the rest of the world.

The relative merits of these approaches are the subject of an enormous literature in which proportionality analysis is usually lauded for its flexibility and context-sensitivity, as well as the transparency it purportedly brings to judicial reasoning. Some of its more influential expositions—including the seminal work of Robert Alexy—make the even more ambitious claim that proportionality is necessary or inevitable 25 Close or that it frees courts of difficult and contested decisions. 26 Close In Chapter 10 , ‘Proportionality and Limitations on Freedom of Speech’, Grégoire Webber mounts a critique of these claims on behalf of proportionality, and a defence of approaches that treat freedom of speech as absolute, at least in the sense as not subject to exception within its scope.

In Chapter 13 , ‘Positive Free Speech: A Democratic Freedom’, Andrew Kenyon then takes up Gardbaum’s fourth component, the kind of obligations imposed, arguing that an effective free speech right must necessarily be conceived as including positive obligations on the state.

The final chapter in Part II , ‘Speaking Back’, turns to the question of remedies and responses. In it, Katharine Gelber interrogates the common claim that the remedy for falsehoods and other forms of ‘bad speech’ is ‘more speech, not enforced silence’. 27 Close Applied indiscriminately, the idea of ‘speaking back’ is ‘fanciful at best and harmful at worst’ but Gelber defends it in some contexts, especially if—echoing Kenyon’s chapter—freedom of speech is conceived of as requiring the state to empower ‘speaking back’. 28 Close

The notion of state-backed ‘speaking back’ is picked up, again, in Caroline West’s chapter on pornography. If certain pornography perpetuates or legitimates harmful sexist messages, West sees a role for state-backed ‘speaking back’; specifically, public education aimed at countering harmful sexist messaging. But, she cautions, there are also reasons to doubt its likely effectiveness. Harmful effects of pornography on its consumers may not be fully ‘mentally intermediated’, and so not amenable to rational revision in response to counter-speech. 29 Close

C. Contexts and Controversies

The chapters in Part III focus on particular contexts and controversies that have proved especially important and interesting for the application of free speech principles. The chapters are all rich with insights on the particular controversies they cover, and the themes explored in the first two parts. For example, question of ‘coverage’ is addressed in particular contexts by Frederick Schauer’s chapter on commercial advertising, 30 Close Mark Tushnet’s chapter on art, 31 Close Caroline West’s chapter on pornography, 32 Close and Alon Harel’s chapter on hate speech. 33 Close

Similarly, the democracy justification is revisited and elaborated upon in chapters by Joo-Cheong Tham and Keith Ewing on elections, 34 Close Andrew Kenyon on defamation of public officials, 35 Close Christoph Bezemek on public insult, 36 Close and Timothy Zick on parades, picketing, and demonstrations. 37 Close It is also addressed in Cynthia Estlund’s chapter on the workplace, which explores the implications for democratic government of employment-based limitations on freedom of speech. 38 Close

These chapters are complemented by a pair of chapters that consider the challenges and complications arising from the nature of mass communication in the traditional media 39 Close and the digital economy. 40 Close

The ‘double-sidedness’ of freedom of speech is revisited in a group of chapters which focuses on the particular harms that may be caused by speech. Geoffrey Stone revisits the question of speech causing unlawful conduct, 41 Close a general theme picked upon in the contemporary context of terrorism by Eliza Bechtold and Gavin Phillipson. 42 Close Alon Harel’s chapter on hate speech, 43 Close Gautam Bhatia’s chapter on religious speech, 44 Close Caroline West’s chapter on pornography, 45 Close and Ioanna Tourkochoriti’s chapter on privacy 46 Close focus on harms of a different kind which implicate other fundamental rights like dignity, equality, religious freedom, and privacy.

Among these chapters, First Amendment exceptionalism is evident again. As these chapters show, First Amendment law has had enormous influence on the development of free speech law globally, reflecting the comparatively long history of judicial review of the First Amendment, and the volume of case law and secondary literature it has produced. But as these chapters also show, many substantive aspects of First Amendment law are unique and, on questions as diverse as electoral funding, advocacy of illegality, 47 Close commercial advertising, 48 Close defamation and hate speech, 49 Close most democracies have taken a different path. 50 Close

The intellectual influence but substantive exceptionalism of First Amendment law is especially evident in chapters by Andrew Kenyon, Christoph Bezemek, and Joo-Cheong Tham and Keith Ewing. Each of these chapters takes an iconic First Amendment case and shows both how it illuminates freedom of speech and how it has been departed from elsewhere. Andrew Kenyon places New York Times v Sullivan 51 Close in the context of defamation law generally, noting how courts in other countries have been influenced by and yet departed from its approach. The exceptionalism of Sullivan , he argues, depends both on a relatively thin conception of the value of reputation and on a particular understanding of the idea of public debate. Christoph Bezemek takes the closely related question of ‘fighting words’ and the US Supreme Court’s decision in Chaplinsky v New Hampshire 52 Close as his centrepiece for a discussion of public insult. Chaplinsky is, of course, something of an ‘orphan’ in the First Amendment canon. 53 Close It is tempting to think that while its ‘fighting words’ exception has withered in the United States, it had found a home in Europe where insult laws are widely accepted both by the European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR) and in domestic jurisdictions. But Bezemek shows that the approach of the ECtHR is structurally different, turning not on a narrowly defined categorical exception but upon case-by-case proportionality analysis of a kind that the US Supreme Court would eschew. Turning to the closely related question of insult to public officials (also discussed by Kenyon), Bezemek focuses again on structural differences in doctrine. Expanding his focus to include the Inter-American Court of Human Rights and the African Court on Human and Peoples’ Rights, he shows that each proceeds on a rather different conception of ‘public figure’.

Joo-Cheong Tham and Keith Ewing, in the most critical of these three chapters, take Citizens United v Federal Electoral Commission 54 Close as the centrepiece of their critique of First Amendment law. They identify the First Amendment’s core non-redistributive principle as based on a uniquely US mistrust of government regulation of speech and laissez-faire attitude to the distorting power of private wealth. The European social-democratic model, by contrast, is premised on equality as a foundation of a just electoral system and, because the state is viewed less negatively, permits more government intervention in pursuit of that equality.

Their critique introduces a second theme: the problems that that arise from the exercise of private power. Classically, freedom of speech is conceived of as a negative right that operates to restrain government power, leaving private relations untouched. But, as Cynthia Estlund shows, unrestrained power of employers to interfere with the speech rights of employees would make public discourse impossible. Similarly, an unrestrained power to regulate speech activity on private property would prevent the collective action necessary for civic engagement that is central to ‘cultural identification, acts of resistance, and … political contention in a democracy’. 55 Close In Estlund’s chapter on the workplace, and Zick’s chapter on parades, picketing, and demonstrations, the assessment of First Amendment law is somewhat hopeful. Estlund traces the way that US courts have, over the last century, carved out exceptions to the rights of employers to respect employees’ freedom of speech, and detects a strand of ‘neo-republican thought’ in First Amendment law, sensitive to the dominating power of employers. 56 Close Timothy Zick shows how the US Supreme Court, relying on the concept of the ‘public forum’, built an ‘expressive topography’, a doctrinal categorization of public places that limits powers of regulation in these spaces. 57 Close

Nonetheless, Estlund concludes that the protection of freedom of speech in the workplace remains normatively deficient. Indeed the ‘weaponization critique’ mentioned at the outset, and pervasive in the commentary on the protection of commercial advertising, is traceable, at least in that language, to Justice Kagan’s dissent in a labour law case, Janus v AFSCME, in which the majority held that requiring public sector employees to pay union dues was invalid on First Amendment ‘compelled speech’ grounds. 58 Close Turning to public forums, the exclusion of private property has always meant that some places (privately-owned airports, shopping centres, malls, and plazas) where citizens seek to gather for free speech purposes may be excluded from the public forum doctrine. But the problem is much exacerbated by the increasing privatization of public space.

Outside First Amendment law, attitudes towards private power are quite different and the problems posed by private actors restricting freedom of speech or distorting public discourse can be dealt with in a more straightforward fashion. Three features of free speech law are especially pertinent to this difference. First, as Ioanna Tourkochoriti explains in her chapter on privacy, other systems of law (in her chapter—Germany and France) allow for the ‘horizontal’ application of free speech rights against private individuals. 59 Close By comparison, the ‘verticalist’ position usually taken to be exemplified by the First Amendment, applies free speech rights only against the state, reflecting an assumption that threats to freedom of expression are characterized as arising principally or only from the state. The line between these two positions can be blurry and may be less important in practice if there is a sufficiently capacious ‘state action’ doctrine. 60 Close The distinction between horizontal and vertical applications of rights, however, is indicative of a markedly different understanding of the role of constitutional rights. Second, in most other legal systems, the mistrust of government that characterizes First Amendment law is moderated and the state is more likely to be regarded as a positive actor in pursuit of legitimate goals. 61 Close This moderation of mistrust of government gives governments greater scope to address harms caused by private actors, notably on matters like hate speech and electoral funding.

Finally, in some systems, the problem of private power is addressed through positive obligations imposed upon the state. In his chapter on media, 62 Close Dieter Grimm explains Germany’s broadcast jurisprudence as a means to address the problems of private power in public discourse. Under the German Basic Law, the German state is under a ‘double obligation’. It must not unduly interfere with the freedom of media, but it is also required to act to protect the media against attempts of private actors that may lead to distortion of public discourse or dysfunction within the media.

D. The Changing Context

Grimm’s chapter introduces our final theme: the changing nature and significance of the forums in which speech occurs. The most compelling development is the rise of the digital economy, which radically changes the dynamics of freedom of speech. The Internet is the subject of Gregory Magarian’s chapter, 63 Close although the many complications posed by the Internet as a speech forum are explored in other chapters, including those on pornography, hate speech, media freedom, and international law.

As Magarian shows, the Internet offers huge opportunities for realizing the social benefits of freedom of speech—making powerful contributions to political movements and promoting art, science, and commerce—but by the same token this new medium amplifies the possibilities for harm and poses a distinct set of challenges.

For example, the ease of communication and vast increase in the quantity of available information has led to the breakdown of the traditional media and the ‘gatekeeping’ function they performed. That, combined with anonymity and the highly manipulable nature of digital imagery, makes it very difficult to assess the credibility of information before us. Ordinary citizens can disguise themselves as credible news sources; political operatives and agents of foreign governments can be made to look like ordinary citizens; images and even video can be faked. The result is a torrent of low-quality information, much of it worthless or worse, deliberately spread to serve disruptive and nefarious interests, foreign and domestic. Such speech may proliferate more readily, rapidly, and to a wider audience, amplifying its potential harm.

These challenges run especially deep because the shape of a solution is very unclear. The devolved and transnational architecture of the Internet poses real barriers to regulation even pursuant to horizontal and positive conceptions of freedom of speech. The problem of the Internet will require creative regulatory solutions and to which constitutional rights of freedom of speech will need to adapt. 64 Close At the same time, creative and novel regulatory solutions to harmful online speech may also have unintended adverse consequences. As Bechtold and Phillipson observe in their chapter, there is a risk that regulations aimed at swiftly and cost-effectively stemming the proliferation of harmful material online can be excessively broad and speech-restrictive, shift the burden of regulation onto transnational corporations, and lack adequate safeguards, scrutiny, and attention to rights. 65 Close

This leads us to a closing reflection on the changing nature of the subject of this volume. It is barely more than a century since the US Supreme Court began seriously to expound free speech norms; only seventy years since the end of World War II inspired the global rise of human rights, and only thirty years since democratic constitutionalism—and with it constitutional rights of freedom of speech—became a truly global phenomenon. Yet in this time, the nature of public discourse has transformed radically. Today, vast swathes of ordinary human communication occur in previously unrecognizable ways.

Freedom of speech will be a treasured norm at least for as long as democracies persist, but beyond that simple fact, perhaps all that can be counted upon is that the fundamental and difficult questions which are the subject of this volume, and these chapters, will remain a source of contestation in law and politics.

E. With Thanks

Fittingly, given freedom of speech’s transnational reach, this volume was a transnational effort and was both enabled—and at times challenged—by communication across the Internet. As editors, we express our thanks to the authors for their commitment to this project; their willingness to revise chapters during the editing process and to keep to the necessary word limit. We are delighted to have brought such a talented group of scholars together in these pages.

Adrienne Stone wishes to thank colleagues at Melbourne Law School in the Centre for Comparative Constitutional Studies and the Laureate Program on Comparative Constitutional Law for their assistance. Aftab Hussain and Gabrielle Dalsasso in their respective roles as Centre Administrator and Project Manager for the Laureate Program ensured the smooth running of other aspects of academic life, freeing time to work on this volume. Four talented and hardworking research assistants—Joshua Quinn-Watson, Colette Mintz, Anne Carter, and Gary Hansell—performed important research and editorial tasks that greatly improved the Handbook. Their work and Adrienne Stone’s contribution was generously supported by the Australian Research Council through an Australian Laureate Fellowship.

We are finally very grateful to Oxford University Press and its editorial staff for initiating the project and for their expertise and patience through all stages of its production. We are proud and delighted to have made a contribution to the very fine Handbook series.

Freedom of speech is used here interchangeably with ‘freedom of expression’, though on the relationship between these concepts, see Frederick Schauer ‘What is Speech? The Question of Coverage’ Chapter 9 in this volume.

Mark Graber, Sanford Levinson, and Mark Tushnet, (eds), Constitutional Democracy in Crisis? (OUP, 2018).

Tim Wu, ‘Is the First Amendment Obsolete?’ (2018) 117 Mich L Rev 547, 568.

Janus v AFSCME, Council 31 , 138 S Ct 2448, 3501 (2018). See also Cynthia Estlund, ‘Freedom of Expression in the Workplace’, Chapter 22 in this volume.

DM Carter, ‘Citizen Attribute, Negative Right: A Conceptual Difference between Ancient and Modern Ideas of Freedom of Speech’ in Ineke Sluiter and Ralph Rosen (eds), Free Speech in Classical Antiquity (Brill 2004).

Elizabeth Powers (ed), Freedom of Speech: The History of an Idea (Bucknell UP 2011).

John Milton, Areopagitica: A Speech for the Liberty of Unlicensed Printing, to the Parliament of England (JC Suffolk ed, University Tutorial P 1968).

John Stuart Mill, On Liberty (David Spitz ed, WW Norton 1975).

An alternative understanding of Mill sees On Liberty as less about the search for truth and more about the development of certain virtues of intellectual character. See Vincent Blasi, ‘Shouting “Fire!” in a Theater and Vilifying Corn Dealers’ (2011) 39 Cap U L Rev 535.

See also Frederick Schauer, ‘What is “Speech”? The Question of Coverage’, Chapter 9 in this volume.

William P Marshall, ‘The Truth Justification for Freedom of Speech’, Chapter 3 in this volume, p. 57.

See Catriona Mackenzie and Denise Meyerson, ‘Autonomy and Free Speech’, Chapter 4 in this volume, p. 78.

Susan Brison, ‘The Autonomy Defense of Free Speech’ (1998) 108 Ethics 312.

See Catriona Mackenzie and Denise Meyerson, ‘Autonomy and Free Speech’, Chapter 4 in this volume, p. 74. See also Catriona Mackenzie and Natalie Stoljar (eds), Relational Autonomy: Feminist Perspectives on Autonomy, Agency and the Social Self (OUP 2000).

Ashutosh Bhagwat and James Weinstein, ‘Freedom of Expression and Democracy’, Chapter 5 in this volume.

Ibid p. 102.

Dieter Grimm, ‘Freedom of Speech and Human Dignity’, Chapter 6 in this volume, p. 110.

Ibid p. 114.

Adrienne Stone, ‘Viewpoint Discrimination, Hate Speech Laws, and the Double-Sided Nature of Freedom of Speech’ (2017) 32 Const Comment 687.

Alon Harel, ‘Hate Speech’, Chapter 25 in this volume; Gautam Bhatia ‘Religious Speech’, Chapter 27 in this volume.

Wojciech Sadurski, ‘Freedom of Speech and Public Reason’, Chapter 8 in this volume.

Daniel Hemel, ‘Economic Perspectives on Free Speech’, Chapter 7 in this volume.

Stephen Gardbaum, ‘The Structure of a Free Speech Right’, Chapter 12 in this volume.

Frederick Schauer, ‘What is “Speech”? The Question of Coverage’, Chapter 9 in this volume.

Robert Alexy, A Theory of Constitutional Rights (Julian Rivers tr, OUP 2002) 66–9.

David Beatty, The Ultimate Rule of Law (OUP 2004).

Whitney v California , 274 US 357 (1927) 377.

Katharine Gelber, ‘Speaking Back’, Chapter 14 in this volume, p. 262.

Caroline West, ‘Pornography’, Chapter 26 in this volume, p. 497.

Frederick Schauer, ‘Free Speech and Commercial Advertising’, Chapter 24 in this volume.

Mark Tushnet, ‘Music and Art’, Chapter 23 in this volume.

Caroline West, ‘Pornography’, Chapter 26 in this volume.

Alon Harel, ‘Hate Speech’, Chapter 25 in this volume.

Joo-Cheong Tham and Keith Ewing, ‘Free Speech and Elections’, Chapter 17 in this volume.

Andrew T Kenyon, ‘Defamation Law, Sullivan , and the Shape of Free Speech’, Chapter 15 in this volume.

Christoph Bezemek, ‘Insult of Public Officials, Chapter 21 in this volume.

Timothy Zick ‘Parades, Picketing, and Demonstrations’, Chapter 20 in this volume.

Cynthia Estlund ‘Freedom of Expression in the Workplace’, Chapter 22 in this volume.

Dieter Grimm, ‘Freedom of Media’, Chapter 29 in this volume.

Gregory P Magarian, ‘The Internet and Social Media’, Chapter 19 in this volume.

Geoffrey R Stone, ‘When is Speech That Causes Unlawful Conduct Protected byFreedom of Speech? The Case of the First Amendment’, Chapter 18 in this volume.

Eliza Bechtold and Gavin Phillipson, ‘Glorifying Censorship? Anti-Terror Law, Speech, and Online Regulation’, Chapter 28 in this volume.

Gautam Bhatia, ‘Religious Speech’, Chapter 27 in this volume.

Ioanna Tourkochoriti, ‘Privacy and Speech’, Chapter 16 in this volume.

Eliza Bechtold and Gavin Phillipson, ‘Glorifying Censorship? Anti-Terror Law, Speech and Online Regulation’, Chapter 28 in this volume.

Frederick Schauer, ‘The Exceptional First Amendment’ in Michael Ignatieff (ed), American Exceptionalism and Human Rights (Princeton UP 2005) 29.

New York Times v Sullivan , 376 US 254 (1964).

Chaplinsky v New Hampshire , 315 US 568, 570 (1942).

The Supreme Court has never since upheld a conviction on the basis of the ‘fighting words’ exception that Chaplinsky apparently establishes. See Erwin Chemerinsky, The First Amendment (Wolters Kluwer 2018) 159.

Citizens United v Federal Electoral Commission , 558 US 310 (2010).

Timothy Zick ‘Parades, Picketing, and Demonstrations’, Chapter 20 in this volume, p. 369.

Cynthia Estlund ‘Freedom of Expression in the Workplace’, Chapter 22 in this volume, p. 413.

Timothy Zick ‘Parades, Picketing and Demonstrations’, Chapter 20 in this volume, p. 376.

Janus v AFSCME, Council 31 , 138 S Ct 2448, 2501 (2018) (Kagan J, dissenting).

But see also Constitution of South Africa: 4 February 1997 (‘South African Constitution’), s 8(2); Constitution of Colombia: 4 July 1991 (‘Colombian Constitution’), art 86; Constitution of Ireland: 29 December 1937 (as amended to 4 October 2013) (‘Irish Constitution’), s 40(3), and Meskell v CIE [1973] IR 121.

There is also a third position—‘indirect horizontal action’—which allows for the invocation of constitutional rights in private actions under the general law, see Stephen Gardbaum, ‘The Structure of a Free Speech Right’, Chapter 12 in this volume, p. 224.

As in Canada, see Adrienne Stone, ‘Canadian Constitutional Law of Freedom of Expression’, in Richard Albert and David R Cameron (eds), Canada in the World: Comparative Perspectives on the Canadian Constitution (CUP 2017).

See Jack Balkin, ‘Free Speech Is a Triangle’ (2012) 118 Colum L Rev 2011; see also Tim Wu, ‘Is the First Amendment Obsolete?’ (2018) 117 Mich L Rev 547. 568.

• About Oxford Academic
• Publish journals with us
• University press partners
• What we publish
• New features  
• Open access
• Institutional account management
• Rights and permissions
• Get help with access
• Accessibility
• Advertising
• Media enquiries
• Oxford University Press
• Oxford Languages
• University of Oxford

Oxford University Press is a department of the University of Oxford. It furthers the University's objective of excellence in research, scholarship, and education by publishing worldwide

• Copyright © 2024 Oxford University Press
• Cookie settings
• Cookie policy
• Privacy policy
• Legal notice

This Feature Is Available To Subscribers Only

Sign In or Create an Account

This PDF is available to Subscribers Only

For full access to this pdf, sign in to an existing account, or purchase an annual subscription.

Research & Learn

Table of contents, free speech essay contest.

The Details

The contest may return in 2024. Check back for updates.

Eligibility

Open to juniors and seniors in U.S. high schools, including home-schooled students, as well as U.S. citizens attending high school overseas. Additional questions regarding eligibility may be emailed to [email protected] .

Word Length

Students must submit an essay between 700 and 900 words on the provided topic below.

FIRE must receive all entries by 11:59 EST, December 31, 2021. Winners will be announced by February 15, 2022.

Scholarship Prizes

One $10,000 first prize, one $5,000 second prize, three $1,000 third place prizes and four $500 prizes will be awarded.

Before You Start

Get to know us! The mission of FIRE is to defend and sustain individual rights at America’s colleges and universities. These rights include freedom of speech , legal equality, due process, religious liberty, and sanctity of conscience—the essential qualities of individual liberty and dignity. In addition to defending the rights of students and faculty, FIRE works to educate students and the general public on the necessity of free speech and its importance to a thriving democratic society.

The freedom of speech, enshrined in the First Amendment to the Constitution, is a foundational American right. Nowhere is that right more important than on our college campuses, where the free flow of ideas and the clash of opposing views advance knowledge and promote human progress. It is on our college campuses, however, where some of the most serious violations of free speech occur, and where students are regularly censored simply because their expression might offend others.

We also encourage you to take advantage of our other educational resources , including our First Amendment Library , our continually-updated Newsdesk , our K-12 Video Library , and our many publications , including our Guide to Free Speech on Campus .

In a persuasive letter or essay, convince your peers that free speech is a better idea than censorship.

Your letter or essay must be between 700-900 words. We encourage you to draw from current events, historical examples, our free speech comic , other resources on FIRE’s website , and/or your own personal experiences.

Note: While there is no required format for your submission, many entrants use MLA guidelines. Successful entries will show an understanding of the importance of free speech and the pitfalls of censorship. You may use in-text citations, and do not need to include a References or Works Cited page. Essays that do not address the prompt question or fail to meet the word-count requirements will not be considered. View the essays of some of our past winners here !

Entering this essay contest constitutes agreement to having your name and essay published on FIRE's website if you are selected as a winner. FIRE reserves the right to make minor edits to winning essays before publication on our website.

• Share this selection on Twitter
• Share this selection via email

FREEDOM OF EXPRESSION

Your voice matters. You have the right to say what you think, share information and demand a better world. You also have the right to agree or disagree with those in power, and to express these opinions in peaceful protests.

Exercising these rights – without fear or unlawful interference – is central to living in an open and fair society; one in which people can access justice and enjoy their human rights.

Yet governments around the world routinely imprison people – or worse – for speaking out, even though almost every country’s constitution refers to the value of ‘free speech’.

Governments have a duty to prohibit hateful, inciteful speech but many abuse their authority to silence peaceful dissent by passing laws criminalizing freedom of expression. This is often done in the name of counterterrorism, national security or religion. More recently, freedom of expression has come under threat by authorities clamping down on activists, NGOs and individuals helping refugees and migrants.

How governments tolerate unfavourable views or critical voices is often a good indication of how they treat human rights generally.

Amnesty International supports people who speak out peacefully for themselves and for others – whether a journalist reporting on violence by security forces, a trade unionist exposing poor working conditions or an indigenous leader defending their land rights against big business. We would similarly defend the right of those who support the positions of big business, the security forces and employers to express their views peacefully.

We consider anyone put in prison solely for exercising their right to free speech peacefully to be a prisoner of conscience and call for their immediate and unconditional release.

Why is freedom of expression important?

The right to freedom of expression is enshrined in Article 19 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, which sets out in broad terms the human rights that each of us has. It was later protected legally by a raft of international and regional treaties.

Defending freedom of expression has always been a core part of Amnesty International’s work and is vital in holding the powerful to account. Freedom of expression also underpins other human rights such as the right to freedom of thought, conscience and religion – and allows them to flourish.

It is also closely linked to freedom of association – the right to  form and join clubs, societies, trade unions or political parties with anyone you choose; and freedom of peaceful assembly – the right to take part in a peaceful demonstration or public meeting.

However, these very freedoms come under regular attack by governments that want to stifle criticism.

For example, in  Egypt  it is currently extremely dangerous to criticize the government. Over the course of 2018, the authorities arrested at least 113 individuals citing a host of absurd reasons including satire, tweeting, supporting football clubs, denouncing sexual harassment, editing movies and giving interviews.

Those arrested have been accused of “membership of terrorist groups” and “disseminating false news”. Detained without trial for months, those who eventually faced trial were sentenced by military courts, even though military trials of civilians, in Egypt as elsewhere, are inherently unfair.

Press freedom

A free press reporting on the issues that interest us and shape our lives is a key building block of any rights-respecting society. Yet in Azerbaijan, Türkiye and Venezuela to name just a few countries, journalists face repression and attacks.

In June 2019,  Tanzania’s parliament  fast-tracked the passing of the Written Laws Bill, which would entrench censorship, among other violations. Journalists in the country already operate within the tight confines of a media law that requires media houses to “broadcast or publish news or issues of national importance as government may direct”.  

In July 2019, the libel trial began in the Philippines against  Maria Ressa , the executive editor of online news outlet Rappler. Ressa, a prominent critic of President Rodrigo Duterte, was arrested in February 2019 on trumped up libel charges after Rappler published detailed investigations into some of the thousands of extrajudicial executions committed by police and unknown armed persons, with Duterte’s explicit encouragement, during drugs-related operations. Her case is widely seen as an attack by the government on press freedom.

During conflict, repression can get worse, such as in  Myanmar  where journalists investigating the killing of Rohingya men and boys by security forces in Rakhine State were arrested and jailed, before being freed under international pressure.

Freedom of speech

Freedom of speech, or freedom of expression, applies to ideas of all kinds, including those that may be deeply offensive. While international law protects free speech, there are instances where speech can legitimately restricted under the same law – such as when it violates the rights of others, or, advocates hatred and incites discrimination or violence.

However, any restrictions on freedom of expression must be provided by law, protect certain public interests or the rights of others and, be clearly necessary for that purpose. .

In 2018, Amnesty International published research that found that  Twitter is a platform where violence and abuse against women flourish , often with little accountability. Instead of the platform being a place where women can express themselves freely and where their voices are strengthened, Twitter leads women to self-censor what they post and limit their interactions. As a company, Twitter is failing its responsibility to respect women’s rights online by inadequately investigating and responding to reports of violence and abuse in a transparent manner.

The digital frontier

The digital world gives many more of us access to the information we need, including to challenge governments and corporations. Information is power and the internet has the potential to significantly empower the world’s seven billion people.

But freedom of expression today still often depends on wealth, privilege and our place in society. Those who are rich and powerful are seldom restricted in expressing their views.. Similarly, those who have their own laptops with broadband, have far greater access to information than those who have to walk miles to an internet café.

Increasingly, some states try to build firewalls around digital communications, or in the case of Egypt, Sudan and Zimbabwe among others, respond to mass street protests with an internet shutdown. Iran, China and Viet Nam have all tried to develop systems that enable them to control access to digital information. In India’s northern Kashmir region, mobile Internet and communications are suspended in response to any unrest. At Amnesty International, we are continually finding new ways to stop our website being blocked in China.

Governments are also using dangerous and sophisticated technologies to read activists and journalists’ private emails and remotely turn on their computers’ camera or microphone to secretly record their activities. In 2014, Amnesty and a coalition of human rights and technology organizations launched ‘ Detekt ’ – a simple tool that allows activists to scan their devices for surveillance spyware.

What is Amnesty doing to protect the freedom of expression?

Case study: poland and the right to protest.

Amnesty International has documented how people in  Poland  have taken to the streets to express their opinions despite restrictive legislation combined with heavy-handed policing, surveillance, harassment and prosecution which threaten to strangle the right to peaceful protest.

Since 2016, tens of thousands of people have protested against repressive legislation aimed at curbing women’s rights and undermining the independence of the judiciary. Protesters have routinely been met with a show of force and restrictive measures that infringe their right to be seen and heard. Hundreds have found themselves in police custody and facing lengthy court proceedings.

In parallel with tightening the laws affecting the exercise of the right to freedom of peaceful assembly, the government has vastly expanded the surveillance powers of law enforcement agencies with evidence that these expanded powers have been used against people engaged in organizing and participating in peaceful protests.

Case study: Surge in Vietnamese prisoners of conscience

In 2019 ,  Amnesty released shocking research showing that the number of prisoners of conscience unjustly jailed across  Viet Nam  had sharply risen by a third in signs of a growing crackdown on peaceful activism by lawyers, bloggers, human rights defenders, environmental activists and pro-democracy campaigners.

The prisoners’ detention conditions remain appalling with evidence of people being tortured and otherwise ill-treated, routinely held incommunicado and in solitary confinement, kept in squalid conditions and denied medical care, clean water and fresh air.

Many prisoners of conscience were jailed for comments made on social media platforms and were targeted using the vague and overly broad provisions of the penal code.

One prisoner of conscience is Tran Hoang Phuc. A pro-democracy and environmental activist, he was arrested in June 2017. Tried and convicted on charges of ‘conducting propaganda against the state’ for making and sharing videos perceived to be critical of the government on social media, he was sentenced to six years in prison, followed by four years under house arrest.

The Solution: What is Amnesty calling for?

• Prisoners of conscience around the world should be released immediately and unconditionally.
• All laws criminalizing people who speak out or protest peacefully, should be struck off the law books.
• Laws against hate speech or other incitement to discrimination and violence must not be used to repress peaceful dissent.
• People should have access to information, and the power of governments and companies to obtain information about individuals and organisations must be restricted.

Learn more about Freedom of Expression

Take our Human Rights Academy course, Speaking out for Freedom of Expression, to learn more and take action.

Related Content

Understanding the long roots of violence in the occupied palestinian territories and israel    , tunisia: authorities’ targeting of lawyers undermines access to justice, eswatini: authorities must stop harassment and intimidation of tanele maseko, egypt must immediately and unconditionally release anti-torture protester mahmoud hussein, saudi arabia: detained football fans could face up to five years in prison for chanting during match.

Essay on Freedom of Speech for Children and Students

Table of Contents

Essay on Freedom of Speech: Freedom of speech is one of the fundamental rights of the citizens of India. Many countries around the world allow freedom of speech to its citizens to empower them to share their thoughts and views.

Fill Out the Form for Expert Academic Guidance!

Please indicate your interest Live Classes Books Test Series Self Learning

Verify OTP Code (required)

I agree to the terms and conditions and privacy policy .

Fill complete details

Target Exam ---

The government of India and many other countries provide freedom of speech to their citizens. This is especially so in the countries with democratic government. Here are essays of varying lengths on the topic Freedom of Speech to help you with the same in your exam. You can select any Freedom of Speech essay as per your need:

Long and Short Essay on Freedom of Speech in English

We have provided below short and long essay on freedom of speech in English. These essay have been written in simple English to let you easily remember the main points and present them whenever required.

These freedom of speech essay will brief you about the right to freedom of speech under the Constitution and what is its significance.

You can use these freedom of speech essays in your school’s/college’s essay writing, speech or debate competitions. You can also use these essays while having normal discussions with your family and friends.

Freedom of Speech Essay 1 (200 words)

Freedom of Speech is one of the fundamental rights provided to the citizens of India. It allows the citizens of our country to express their ideas and share their opinions freely. It allows the general public as well as the media to comment on any of the political activities and even show discontentment against the ones they find inappropriate.

Just like India many other countries also provide the Freedom of Speech and Expression to its citizens but with some limitations. The restrictions put on the Freedom of Speech vary from country to country. There are also many countries that do not allow this basic human right. The general public and the media in such countries are refrained from commenting on the activities carried out by the government. Criticism of government, political parties or ministers is a punishable offense in such countries.

While Freedom of Speech is essential for the overall growth of the society it may have certain negative repercussions too. People must not use it to disrespect or instigate others. The media must also act responsibly and not misuse the Freedom of Speech.

I am lucky to have born in India – a country that respects its citizens and provides them with all the rights that are needed for their growth and development.

Freedom of Speech Essay 2 (300 words)

Introduction.

Freedom of speech is one of the basic rights given to the citizens of most of the countries across the globe. It enables the people residing in those countries to speak their mind without the fear of being punished by the law.

Origin of Freedom of Speech

The concept of freedom of speech originated long back. England’s Bill of Rights 1689 adopted freedom of speech as a constitutional right and it is still in effect. The French revolution in 1789 adopted the Declaration of Rights of Man and of the Citizen. This further affirmed the Freedom of Speech as an undeniable right. The Declaration of Freedom of Speech and Expression in Article 11 states:

“The free communication of ideas and opinions is one of the most precious of the rights of man. Every citizen may, accordingly, speak, write, and print with freedom, but shall be responsible for such abuses of this freedom as shall be defined by law”.

The Universal Declaration of Human Rights that was adopted in the year 1948 also states that everyone should have the freedom to express their ideas and opinions. Freedom of Speech and Expression has now formed a part of the international and regional human rights law.

Freedom of Speech – The Basis of Democracy

A democratic government gives various rights to its people including the right to elect the government of their country. Freedom of speech and expression is known to form the basis of a democratic nation. Merely electing the government is no use if the citizens do not have the right to voice their opinion in case they feel that the elected government is not performing as per the standards set by it initially. This is why right to freedom of speech is an essential right in the democratic nations. It forms the basis of democracy.

Freedom of speech empowers the people to share their ideas and bring about positive changes in the society.

Freedom of Speech Essay 3 (400 words)

Freedom of Speech is considered to be a basic right that every person must be entitled to. It is among the seven fundamental rights given to the citizens of India by the Indian constitution. It forms a part of the Right to Freedom that includes the freedom of speech and expression, right to life and liberty, freedom of movement, freedom of residence, right to practice any profession, freedom to form unions, associations or cooperatives, protection in regard to conviction in offences and protection against arrest in some cases.

Why is Freedom of Speech Essential?

Freedom of speech is essential for the all round growth and development of a person as well as a nation as a whole. Imposing restriction on what one speaks or hears can hamper the development of a person. It can even create discomfort and dissatisfaction that leads to stress. A nation filled with people full of discontent can never grow in the right direction.

Freedom of Speech gives way to open discussions that helps in exchange of ideas which is essential for the growth of the society. It is also essential to express one’s opinion about the political system of the country. When the government knows that it monitored and can be challenged or criticized for the steps it is taking, it acts more responsibly.

Freedom of Speech – Closely Related to Other Rights

Freedom of Speech is closely related to the other rights. It is mainly required to protect the other rights given to the citizens.Freedom of Speech is only when people have the right to express and speak freely they can raise their voice against anything that goes wrong. It enables them to take an active part in democracy rather than just being involved in the election process. Similarly, they can guard other rights such as the Right to Equality, Right to Freedom of Religion, Right against Exploitation and Right to Privacy only when they have the Freedom to Speech and Expression.

It is also closely related to the Right to Fair Trial. Freedom of Speech and Expression enables a person to put across his point freely during a trial which is extremely essential.

Freedom of speech gives the power to raise voice against any kind of injustice happening around. The governments of the countries that offer Right to Information and Opinion and Freedom of Speech and Expression must also welcome the opinions and ideas of their citizens and be receptive to change.

Freedom of Speech Essay 4 (500 words)

Freedom of Speech and Expression is one of the basic rights guaranteed to the citizens of India. It comes under the Right to Freedom which is among the seven fundamental rights included in the Indian constitution. The other rights include Right to Equality, Right to Freedom of Religion, Cultural and Educational Rights, Right to Privacy, Right against Exploitation and Right to Constitutional Remedies.

Freedom of Speech in India

The constitution of India provides Freedom of Speech to every citizen however with some restrictions. This means that the people can freely express their views about others as well as the government, political system, policies and bureaucracy. However, speech can restricted on moral grounds, security and provocation. Under the Right to Freedom in the Indian constitution, the citizens of the country have the following rights:

• Freedom to speak and express ideas and opinions freely
• to assemble peacefully without any arms and ammunitions
• Freedom to form groups, unions and associations
• to move freely in any part of the country
• Freedom to settle in any part of the country
• to practice any profession
• Freedom to indulge in any kind of business or trade provided it is not unlawful.

India known as a democratic country in true sense. The people here have the right to information and can give their opinion on anything even the activities of the government. Freedom of Speech empowers the media to share all that is going on in the country as well as around the world. This makes the people more aware and also keeps them updated with the latest happenings from around the world.

Downside of Freedom of Speech

While the Freedom of Speech allows an individual to share his thoughts and ideas and contribute towards the betterment of his society and fellow citizens, there many disadvantages attached to it too. Many people misuse this freedom. They do not just express their views but also impose them on others. They instigate people and form groups to conduct unlawful activities. Media is also free to express its ideas and opinions. At times, the information shared by them creates panic amongst the general public. Certain news such as that related to the activities of different communal groups has even given rise to communal riots in the past. This disrupts the peace and harmony of the society.

Internet has augmented the Freedom of Speech and Expression. The advent of social media platforms has furthered it all the more. People these days are eager to give their views on anything and everything whether they have knowledge about the same or not. They write hateful comments without caring if they are hurting someone’s feelings or intruding in someone’s personal space. This can certainly termed as the misuse of this freedom and must stopped.

Every country must provide the Freedom of Speech and Expression to its citizens. However, it must defined clearly so that it only helps in bringing about positive changes in the individuals as well as the society and does not disrupt its normal functioning.

Freedom of Speech Essay 5 (600 words)

Freedom of Speech given to citizens of most countries to enable them to share their ideas and provide their opinion on different matters. It considered to be essential for the growth of an individual as well as the society. While most countries provide this freedom to its citizens, many refrain from it.

Many Countries Offer Freedom of Speech

Not only India many countries around the world offer Freedom of Speech and Expression to their citizens. The United Nations Universal Declaration of Human Rights incorporated in the year 1948 states:

“Everyone has the right to freedom of opinion and expression; this right includes freedom to hold opinions without interference and to seek, receive and impart information and ideas through any media and regardless of frontiers”.

South Africa, Sudan, Pakistan, Tunisia, Hong Kong, Iran, Israel, Malaysia, Japan, Philippines, South Korea, Saudi Arabia, United Arab Emirates, Thailand, New Zealand, Europe, Denmark, Finland and Republic of China are among some of the countries that offer Freedom of Speech and Expression to their citizens.

Now, while these countries have given the Right to Freedom of Speech and Expression to their citizens however the degree to which this right rendered to the general public and media differs from country to country.

Countries that Do Not Have Freedom of Speech

There are countries that do not give the right to Freedom of Speech to their citizens to maintain absolute control. Here is a look at some of these countries:

• North Korea :

The country does not provide Freedom of Speech and Expression to its citizens as well as the media. Thus, the government does not only hold the freedom to express ones ideas and opinions but also holds information from its citizens.

The government of Syria known for its tyranny. People here deprived of their basic human right that is the right to Freedom of Speech and Expression.

Yet another country that doesn’t provide Freedom of Speech to its citizens. The citizens of Cuba not allowed to pass any negative comment on the activities of the government or any political party. The government here has even put restriction on internet usage so that people do not get a chance to express anything via the same.

This is another country that does not offer Freedom of Speech and Expression. People cannot voice their opinions or criticize the work of the government. Criticism of the government or any political minister is a criminal offense here.

The citizens of Iran are not aware what it is like to express their opinion and share their ideas freely in the public. Nobody can express any kind of discontentment against the public laws or Islamic standards.

The government of Burma is of the opinion that the Freedom of Speech and Expression is unnecessary. The citizens asked not to express their ideas or opinions particularly if they are against any leader or political party. The media in this country run by the government.

Most people in this country do not even know as to what Freedom of Speech and Expression really is. The government of Libya known for oppressing its citizens. In the age of internet, people around the world are free to express their views on any matter but not in this country. Many people in the country have arrested for criticizing the government on the internet.

Freedom of Speech and Expression is a basic human right that must given to the citizens of each country. However it is sad to see the way the governments of certain countries do not provide even this essential human right to its citizens and oppresses them to fulfil their own selfish motives.

Related Information:

• Essay on India
• Democracy in India
• Essay on Fundamental Rights
• Nationalism
• Slogans on Newspaper
• Speech on Newspaper
• Essay on Social Media

Related content

Talk to our academic expert!

Language --- English Hindi Marathi Tamil Telugu Malayalam

Get access to free Mock Test and Master Class

Register to Get Free Mock Test and Study Material

Offer Ends in 5:00

The Volokh Conspiracy

Mostly law professors | Sometimes contrarian | Often libertarian | Always independent

• Editorial Independence
• Volokh Daily Email

Voices for Liberties Papers on Freedom of Speech, Civil Rights, and Social Progress

David Bernstein | 4.1.2024 8:20 AM

I am the Executive Director of the Scalia Law School's Law & Liberty Center. Our most significant current project at the Center is "Voices for Liberty," which our website describes as follows: "While some view freedom of speech as detrimental to minority groups, others champion it as a necessary condition for protecting underrepresented voices. The  Liberty & Law Center's Voices for Liberty Initiative examines this intersection, considering the role free speech has played and continues to play in advancing civil rights in America, particularly for historically disadvantaged and/or socially marginalized groups. Our program includes significant research and scholarship, a nationwide speakers bureau, and numerous public events."

I thought I would share the research papers we have sponsored so far:

PAPER:  " First Amendment Rights on Trial: A Critique of the Time, Place, and Manner Doctrine " PUBLISHED:  SSRN (October 2023) AUTHOR:   Alec Greven , J.D. Candidate at the University of Chicago Law School ABSTRACT:  This article argues that the current First Amendment time, place, and manner doctrine needs to be reformed because it grants excessive deference to government authorities to regulate speech they disfavor by modifying the channels in which speech can be presented, burdening speech in places disproportionately used by certain social groups, and selectively enforcing these regulations. Several solutions are proposed to ensure a robust right to assemble and enable groups to speak freely and drive social progress.

PAPER:  " Free Speech for All or None: Mobs, Abolitionists, and Democrats and the Public Constitutional Fights over the First Amendment During the American Civil War " PUBLISHED:  SSRN (October 2023) AUTHOR:   Nicholas Mosvick , Buckley Legacy Project Manager at the National Review Institute ABSTRACT:  This paper discusses the issues of free speech in the Civil War North by examination of partisan newspapers and other popular accounts in order to understand the popular constitutional discourse around the First Amendment during the war. The paper considers many episodes which resulted in public constitutional discourse, including riots, private and military attacks upon newspaper presses, and the arrest and military trial of one of President Abraham Lincoln's greatest critics, Ohio Congressman Clement Vallandigham.

PAPER:  " Free Speech Culture as an Anticipatory 'Reasonable Accommodation' for People with Psycho-social Disabilities and Neurodiverse People " PUBLISHED:  SSRN (October 2023) AUTHOR:   Reuben Kirkham , Lecturer, Monash University & Free Speech Union of Australia ABSTRACT:  This paper begins a conversation about the relationship between disability rights and free speech. Drawing upon the circumstances of a people with a range of psychosocial disabilities and neurodiverse conditions, it explores how a lack of a free speech culture amounts to a failure to make reasonable accommodations for a broad range of disabled people.

PAPER:  " Section 230 as Civil Rights Statute " PUBLISHED:  SSRN (September 2023);  Cincinnati Law Review  (forthcoming) AUTHOR:   Enrique Armijo , Professor of Law at the Elon University School of Law ABSTRACT:  Many of our most pressing discussions about justice, progress, and civil rights have moved online. But the convergence of mobility, connectivity, and technology is not the only reason why. Thanks to Section 230 of the Communications Decency Act's immunity for online platforms, websites, and their hosts, speakers can engage in speech about protest, equality, and dissent without fear of collateral censorship from governments, authorities, and others in power who hope to silence them.

We held a symposium last year featuring discussions of each of these papers. You can find the videos here .

And here are the papers we currently have under development:

PAPER:  "Religious Minorities and Secular Rights" AUTHOR:   Josh McDaniel , Visiting Assistant Clinical Professor of Law, Harvard Law School

PAPER:  "Myra Bradwell and the Chicago Legal News: speech as a prerequisite to equal rights" AUTHOR:   Anastasia P. Boden , Director, Robert A. Levy Center for Constitutional Studies, Cato Institute

PAPER:  "The Black-Controlled Town of Mound Bayou As A Bridgehead for Free Speech in Jim Crow Mississippi" AUTHOR:   David T. Beito , Research Fellow at the Independent Institute and Professor Emeritus at the University of Alabama

PAPER:  "Free Speech, Fighting Faiths, and 'Nones': How Robust Free Speech Protections Helped Atheists, Humanists, and Freethinkers to Become Visible Participants in American Culture" AUTHOR:   Katie McKerall , Senior Staff Attorney, American Humanist Association

PAPER:  "The Jewish Dilemma in Supporting Free Speech and Countering Antisemitism on American College Campuses" AUTHOR:   David L. Bernstein , Founder, Jewish Institute for Liberal Values

PAPER:  "Does Free Speech Promote Racial Tolerance Across Countries?" AUTHOR:  Claudia Williamson Kramer , Probasco Chair of Free Enterprise, UTC Gary W. Rollins College of Business

Turkey's Strongman Had a No Good, Very Bad Weekend

Matthew Petti | 4.1.2024 3:10 PM

Judge Quashes Felony Murder Charges Against Former Houston Cop Whose Lies Led to a Deadly 2019 Drug Raid

Jacob Sullum | 4.1.2024 1:25 PM

Harvard Global Cooling Geoengineering Experiment Halted

Ronald Bailey | 4.1.2024 1:05 PM

Defending Pornography on Feminist Grounds: A Q&A With Nadine Strossen

Elizabeth Nolan Brown | 4.1.2024 11:45 AM

Abortion Fallout

Liz Wolfe | 4.1.2024 9:30 AM

Recommended

• Share full article

Advertisement

Supported by

The Debate Over Free Speech, Disinformation and Censorship

More from our inbox:, senator ted cruz responds, talking to children about cancer, why we keep our landlines, internet access.

To the Editor:

Re “ Trump Allies Are Winning War Over Disinformation ” (front page, March 17):

The U.S. Supreme Court put limits on free speech, saying you can’t falsely shout “fire” in a crowded theater. Fundamental to our democracy is an informed electorate. Yet our courts seem to be OK with a flood of lies and propaganda masquerading as news and aimed at burning down our democracy.

This should concern every American for several reasons, including the surge of social media sites that contain much misinformation, the closure of many local newspapers, a decline in the number of real journalists, and an increase in the amount of misinformation spread by adversaries like Russia and China in an attempt to affect the outcome of our elections.

Richard Dickinson Richmond Hill, Ga.

In the same way that semiautomatic guns and bump stocks were never foreseen by the founding fathers when establishing the Second Amendment, social media and A.I. escaped their prescience when it came to issues of free speech.

The commerce of ideas as they addressed it consisted primarily of public discourse via the printed or spoken word at social, political and religious gatherings. The idea that citizens would someday own portable electronic devices that facilitated both the easy manufacture and distribution of subjective realities certainly surpassed anything imagined in the Sedition Act.

America must now address two pressing questions that Madison, Hamilton and others were spared. How do we prevent the yelling of “fire” in a crowded theater when there is neither an actual theater nor an assembled crowd? And how do we stop domestic and foreign profiteers who would embrace the resultant turmoil?

Anthony Nannetti Philadelphia

There is a difference between supporting the First Amendment and hiding behind it. A presidential campaign that uses disinformation to subvert a fair and legal election is undermining the very democracy for which free speech is a bulwark.

Louis Greenstein Pleasantville, N.J.

A Supreme Court decision preventing the Biden administration from deciding what can and cannot be said on social media would also prevent a potential future Trump administration from deciding what can and cannot be said on social media.

Ronald J. DeFelice Irvine, Calif.

Re “ An Islamophobic Smear Campaign Is Dividing Democrats ,” by Lydia Polgreen (column, March 21):

Ms. Polgreen blames Islamophobia for Adeel Abdullah Mangi’s difficulty in getting confirmed to the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit, and she accuses me of conducting “bad faith ambushes” because I asked Mr. Mangi during a Senate Judiciary hearing if he condemns Hamas’s Oct. 7 attack on Israel.

The reason I asked Mr. Mangi this question — which Ms. Polgreen fails to mention — is that Mr. Mangi has refused to denounce statements by the director of Rutgers’s Law School Center for Security, Race and Rights in which the director referred to Israel as an “occupying force” and accused Israel of engaging in “settler colonialism.” Mr. Mangi donated to the center and served for years on its board of advisers.

Ms. Polgreen also fails to note that the Senate confirmed another nominee, Zahid Quraishi, who, like Mr. Mangi, is Muslim and Pakistani American, with 81 votes — one of the highest vote totals for any judicial nominee of the Biden presidency.

The White House and Senate Democrats don’t want to defend Mr. Mangi on the merits of his record, so they instead accuse his critics of Islamophobia. That is a shameful attack.

Ted Cruz Houston The writer is a Republican senator from Texas.

Re “ How to Talk to Children About Cancer ,” by Talya Minsberg (Live, nytimes.com, March 22):

We were saddened to learn that Catherine, Princess of Wales, has been diagnosed with cancer. Our thoughts as therapists immediately turned to her children and the challenge of having difficult conversations. We agree with Ms. Minsberg’s recommendations.

No one can provide better care than a parent as their child experiences emotional trials. Illness is inevitable, and caring for a child through a family illness is an inevitable part of parenting. This affects the parent, too, but they can be most effective in helping a child by attending to their own feelings first; then they can fully focus on their child’s needs.

We believe that being honest with a child is always best. Tell the truth, but only the amount that a child can hear and digest at any given moment. Take the lead from what a child asks, making sure the tone and the answer align with where a child is. This conversation is an ongoing one that will be elaborated on over time.

We believe that the best antidote to the fear and pain of loss is togetherness. As Catherine said : “Please do not lose faith or hope. You are not alone.”

Elena Lister Michael Schwartzman New York The writers, a psychiatrist and a psychologist, respectively, are co-authors of “Giving Hope: Conversations With Children About Illness, Death and Loss.”

Re “ Speaking Out for Landlines in Digital Age ” (front page, March 17):

My wife and I are on the high side of 65, and we pay for a landline only as a lifeline as we deal with the never-ending onslaught of power outages wrought by National Grid in Massachusetts, some as long as 10 days in our years here.

We also live in a mobile phone dead zone. So our mobile phones must depend on internet Wi-Fi for all calls. When the electricity goes out, so does the internet, hence our lifeline to the outside world in times of crisis.

We plug in two touch-tone phones to replace cordless phones when there is no juice from National Grid. Whether AT&T, Verizon and others like it or not, plain old telephone service (POTS) is as close to 100 percent reliable as you can get. But now they want to tear out the copper, forcing us to unreliable telephone service.

Ben Myers Harvard, Mass.

You’ll have to pry my landline phone from my cold, dead hands.

I find it absolutely ridiculous and user-unfriendly to hold a screen to my ear, as well as to then hold the phone back where I can see the screen in order to find the keypad, while missing the spoken conversation.

Claire Albahae Brewster, N.Y.

Re “ Millions Are Set to Lose Internet Access Subsidies ” (news article, March 24):

During our history, Americans brought mail service, electrification and telephone service to all corners of the country. Why the lessons learned from these experiences can’t be used to solve the challenge of similarly providing residential internet access coast to coast as well is a damning indictment of our broken national politics.

Gary Rucinski Newton, Mass.

You are using an outdated browser. Please upgrade your browser to improve your experience.

Event Types

• Annual Lectures

Current Topics

• Has Video Recording
• Has Audio Recording

Free Speech, the First Amendment, and Parrhesia

• Share on Facebook
• Share on Twitter
• Share on LinkedIn
• Send by E-mail

• iCalendar (Apple)
• Google Calendar
• Outlook Online
• Yahoo! Calendar

No one has done more to shape legal interpretation of the first amendment than Floyd Abrams. Yet when Abrams litigated Citizens United, some proponents of free speech thought that this just gave big money the biggest voice. By contrast in ancient democratic Athens, parrhesia , free and frank speech, was thought to give voice to citizens who lacked power. Join Floyd Abrams , Matt Landauer and Yael Melamede in a conversation about the value of public speech and the relationship between free speech, equality and power, then and now. We will be screening excerpts from Yael Melamede’s 2023 documentary Floyd Abrams: Speaking Freely.

Organized by the Center for Hellenic Studies and the department of the Classics, Harvard University.

• Center for Hellenic Studies, Harvard University
• Department of Classics, Harvard University

Challenges of Ethically Regulating Free Speech on College Campuses

By shoellis

By: Olivia Welsh, Ethics and Policy Intern

Each day, headlines highlight the ongoing questions we have about the role of universities in public discourse. These conversations center on questions surrounding political neutrality, what is considered “appropriate” speech from students and faculty, and how to protect university community members from harm. These are not new questions, but the escalation of the Israel-Palestine conflict, from everyday campus protests to Ivy League president resignations, has brought the issue of free speech on college campuses to a boiling point.

A university or higher-education institution is inherently a setting where intellectual and ideological disagreement will occur – and should even be encouraged. The challenge is where and how do we draw the line. What type of speech is so harmful to members of the community that it must be restricted? Who gets to decide the line between right and wrong? What is a university’s responsibility to speak out about the social and political issues of the day?

Being uncomfortable is a necessary part of growth. Being unsafe is not. This is the balance that colleges and universities are trying to strike every day. Can there ever be an institution that gets it exactly right in the eyes of all?

The background of college campus free speech

In the 1960s, free speech on college campuses was at the forefront of higher education discussions. The University of Chicago made its first attempt at taking an official stance by publishing the Kalven Report. This 1967 statement, still in use today, argues that institutions should remain socially and politically neutral while fostering lively debate among their members. The authors of the Kalven Report believed that a university should not suppress any viewpoints or change its corporate activities to foster social or political values.

“The university is the home and sponsor of critics; it is not itself the critic. […] To perform its mission in society, a university must sustain an extraordinary environment of freedom of inquiry and maintain an independence from political fashions, passions, and pressures” [5].

In short, the report states that a university should be a place to discuss all possible perspectives without censorship. The members of a university community can come to their own conclusions and act independently of the institution itself. The Kalven Report pushes back at anyone who might consider such a choice to not weigh in on the topics of the day as cowardly or uncaring:

“The neutrality of the university as an institution arises then not from a lack of courage nor out of indifference and insensitivity. It arises out of respect for free inquiry and the obligation to cherish a diversity of viewpoints. And this neutrality as an institution has its complement in the fullest freedom for its faculty and students as individuals to participate in political action and social protest.” [5]

In 2014, the University of Chicago decided to make another statement amidst an onslaught of various free speech lawsuits against universities nationwide. The resulting Chicago Principles delineate a clear and longstanding commitment to free speech and allow a wide diversity of ideas to be discussed in the University setting. The Chicago Principles reiterate the sentiment of the Kalven Report, calling debate and deliberation essential to higher education, even if the ideas discussed are viewed as “offensive, unwise, immoral, or wrong-headed” [8]. It guarantees “the broadest possible latitude to speak, write, listen, challenge, and learn,” provided that such behavior does not interfere with the core functioning of the university [8]. Furthermore, the Chicago Principles demand that all community members not obstruct or otherwise interfere with others’ freedom of speech. The Chicago Principles conclude by arguing that “without a vibrant commitment to free and open inquiry, a university ceases to be a university” [8].

These are the positions that the University of North Carolina System (“UNC System”) adopted in 2017, as endorsed by the University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill’s (“UNC-Chapel Hill”) Faculty Council and Board of Trustees [10] [3]. The UNC System schools are among over 100 other colleges and universities nationwide that have adopted the Chicago Principles, including several of our peer institutions [4]. In 2022, the UNC-Chapel Hill Board of Trustees took a further step in protecting free speech by adopting the Kalven Report [2].

“The mission of The University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill is advanced by our commitment to the aspirational principles that guide our public conversation no matter how unsettling […] At Carolina, we have long known that light and liberty are the essential tools that allow problems to be seen, ideas to be tested, and solutions to be found,” the Faculty Council states [10].

Of course, both the UNC System and UNC-Chapel Hill have policies regulating free speech, which forbid defamation, unlawful harassment, true threats, unjust invasions of privacy, and more (see the UNC System Policy and the UNC-Chapel Hill Policy ). However, these policies leave several unanswered questions. For example, it is not always clear what speech falls under the category of a “true threat,” especially because that might mean different things to different people.

When does protecting free speech interfere with a university’s teaching mission and functioning? Do institutions have a different obligation to protect historically marginalized groups compared to historically well-represented groups? What is a university’s responsibility in addressing social and political issues? There are no “right” answers, but some views on these questions are explored below.

When does protecting free speech inhibit a university’s functioning?

The Kalven Report, the Chicago Principles, and the UNC policies all indicate that it is appropriate to restrict free speech when it interferes with the necessary functioning of the university, with safety concerns being of utmost importance. Beyond cases like riots that would physically disallow classes from taking place and endanger members of the university, disruptions like exclusionary speech could also be viewed as interfering with a university’s core functioning by hindering equal access to education. If it is a university’s mission to educate all its students, but a particular group feels unreasonably ostracized due to the free speech of others and feels unable to attend or participate in class, then one could argue that speech is interfering with the necessary functioning of the university.

Say that, while not violating any laws, an anti-Black Lives Matter (“BLM”) speaker comes to campus and delivers a scathing condemnation of the BLM movement. However, the speaker’s remarks and student participation in the event make Black students feel unwelcome on campus, and therefore, these students find it harder to benefit from their education. Does this qualify as speech that interferes with the university’s functioning? And if so, should it not be welcomed on campus?

On the flip side, does inhibiting a challenging viewpoint negatively impact the educational environment? Students should have the opportunity to grapple with difficult ideas and the controversies of the day – that is part of what is so valuable about a liberal arts education. Colleges are not full of fragile students who cannot stand to hear free speech, and they should not be portrayed as such. The key is creating an environment where the needs of all students remain supported even during protests, controversial speakers, and difficult discussions. However, it is not easy to prescribe a single policy for handling free speech since circumstances vary dramatically from institution to institution [1].

Is there a different obligation to protect historically marginalized groups at a university?

Continuing with this hypothetical of an anti-BLM speaker on campus, how might appropriate free-speech regulation differ based on context? According to UNC System data, just over 8% of UNC-Chapel Hill’s undergraduate student body identifies as Black/African American [11]. In the context of having such a significant minority, is it justified to more strictly regulate free speech that makes Black students feel unwelcome and further marginalized at the university?

One might think that free speech should be fully protected regardless because any university member in opposition has an equal right to free speech in response. However, just because someone has the right to free speech does not mean they feel reasonably empowered to use it. This highlights the important distinction between equality, which treats everyone the same, and equity, which recognizes that creating a level playing field often means allocating more or less resources to particular individuals or groups based on their specific circumstances. Giving all campus community members the same right to free speech is equal, but equitable free speech would amplify and protect minority groups.

The teaching mission of a university relies on an inclusive climate. Institutional attention is necessary to ensure that all students in diverse classrooms are comfortable being involved in the learning experience. Because it is important to include ALL students in an environment of free inquiry, there is an argument that free speech that specifically marginalizes an already minority group must be more strictly regulated than controversial speech that makes a majority group uncomfortable [1].

This is where context is important because, unlike UNC-Chapel Hill, Howard University (“Howard”) has a very strong majority of Black students. At Howard, Black students would likely not feel as threatened by an anti-BLM speaker; therefore, students could more comfortably engage in rigorous debate and grapple with differing viewpoints, which is essential in higher education.

What is a university’s responsibility to govern speech on campus about social and political issues?

This past November, a speaker unaffiliated with UNC-Chapel Hill made remarks on campus that sympathized with the violence perpetrated by Hamas against Israeli citizens on October 7th, 2023 [7]. Such tolerance for violence (which killed over a thousand Israeli citizens) is clearly alarming and certainly falls under the category of speech seen as “offensive, unwise, immoral, or wrong-headed.” But remember that, in the spirit of free inquiry and true academia, the Chicago Principles protect such speech. The remarks did not include a threat or any other banned speech.

Then-Chancellor Kevin Guskiewicz strongly condemned the remarks, as did the Dean of the College of Arts and Sciences and many others at UNC-Chapel Hill. Months later, the Faculty Council, the same one that originally endorsed the Chicago Principles, considered a resolution to “strongly condemn the antisemitic statements at the event.” The group decided to indefinitely postpone the resolution, avoiding taking a side on its merits. While some did feel strongly that the remarks were antisemitic, others viewed this as a mislabeling since the comments contained no mention of the Jewish religion or people and only directly criticized the actions of the Israeli state .

There is another tricky consideration – if the Faculty Council passes a resolution condemning antisemitism, must it follow this up with a condemnation of Islamophobia to ensure neutrality and inclusivity? Does this set a precedent by which the Faculty Council must condemn any speech it regards as harmful, even if the speech does not violate the UNC System or UNC-Chapel Hill free speech policies? Who decides what should and should not be condemned, and where is the line drawn regarding what warrants a comment?

Certainly, this is not to say that members of an institution cannot or should not speak up against violence or perceived hate. Still, at the institutional level, there are significant policy ramifications to consider in protecting free speech and thorough education [7]. Starting to weigh in on social and political issues is a slippery slope for universities because it creates an expectation of doing so for all issues. The authors of the Kalven Report anticipated this and promoted institutional neutrality, trying to make a university a simple facility where lively debates on the day’s topics can occur.

This is a perfectly reasonable argument, but there is another drastically different viewpoint. Is institutional neutrality just a convenient excuse for universities to stay silent and take the “easy way out?” [12]. At Indiana University (“IU”), administrators recently caused an uproar when they canceled a scheduled art exhibition by a Palestinian-American artist. IU administration cited security concerns as the reason for the cancellation. However, the artist, members of the IU community, and outside organizations speculate that the real reason is a reaction to comments by an Indiana congressman who threatened to withhold federal funding from IU if it failed to address perceived antisemitism concerns adequately [6].

Walking a political tightrope does not seem to be a legitimate reason for censorship at a public university. Institutional neutrality that allows for all viewpoints to be expressed is very different than a restrictive “institutional neutrality” that prohibits any viewpoints from being expressed. Universities risk establishing an orthodox view on campus by making statements or taking actions regulating free speech, thereby ostracizing alternative thinkers [9]. While a university might not be responsible for acting on social and political issues (the substance for a whole different debate), it does have a responsibility to facilitate an environment that considers social and political issues and equips its students to handle these difficult or delicate issues once they graduate.

Between a rock and a hard place

There are still so many unanswered questions regarding free speech on campus, and it is doubtful that a satisfactory solution will ever be reached. Any policy on free speech must consider legal constraints, institutional missions, and the feelings of students, faculty, and staff. With so many stakeholders to satisfy, it makes sense that the issue of free speech on campus keeps coming up.

During controversial times, it is helpful to remember that heated moments subside, and history reflects that. “Right answers” are hard to come by, but at the end of the day, a university that can keep its campus community safe and facilitate productive conversations is doing its job pretty well.

• Side Hustles
• Power Players
• Young Success
• Save and Invest
• Become Debt-Free
• Land the Job
• Closing the Gap
• Science of Success
• Pop Culture and Media
• Psychology and Relationships
• Health and Wellness
• Real Estate
• Most Popular

Related Stories

• Founder Effect Crumbl Cookies started as a ‘fun side   hustle’—now it brings in $1 billion a year
• Work 27-year-old quit her job to become a   TikTok star, brought in $1M last year
• Work How 27-year-old whose business brought in   $1 million avoids lifestyle creep
• Six-Figure Side Hustle 24-year-old barista's side hustle earns   $9,000 a month—it takes 8 hours a week
• Spend I shopped the same grocery list online   and in-store—one was much cheaper

TikTok creators worry about free speech and income streams if ban succeeds: 'My livelihood is at stake'

On March 13, the House of Representatives passed the Protecting Americans From Foreign Adversary Controlled Applications Act , calling for Chinese tech company ByteDance to divest from TikTok. If it does not, the app would be effectively banned in the U.S.

The bill has since headed to the Senate.

There are tens of thousands of influencers on the app, according to Statista . They earn money through brand partnerships, by using their page as advertising for their business and by monetizing their content directly. Their profits vary: Some make thousands of dollars per year. Others make millions.

Some creators worry they will lose the boost in income the platform provides if the ban becomes law. Others worry they'll lose access to conversations that have been critical to their understanding of the world. Here's what a few influencers are worried about, specifically.

'TikTok has allowed my business to keep our doors open'

A ban on TikTok could have dire effects on some creators' bottom lines.

Emily Swift runs Darkslide Film Lab in Bridgeport, Connecticut, where she develops film by hand in a traditional black-and-white darkroom. She uses TikTok, where she has 67,000 followers , to post videos of the process; it helps her make as much as an extra $6,000 per month .

Of her last 250 orders, more than half, 166, came from people who found her on the platform, she says.

"TikTok has allowed my business to keep our doors open, and the ban threatens my ability to continue to do so," Swift says. "My livelihood is at stake."

Other influencers make the bulk of their income through monetizing content, and the ban wouldn't necessarily force them to shut their doors. It would force them to pivot their content-creating efforts, though.

Some are already preparing for the shift. "I've put a lot of time and effort into growing our other platforms like on Facebook, Instagram in particular and YouTube," says Hannah Williams , who runs Salary Transparent Street with her husband. The TikTok page, where she started the company, has 1.3 million followers.

Altogether, Williams' business brought in more than $1 million in 2023. Most of that revenue comes from brand partnerships, which take place cross-platform. (The company signs NDAs that legally bar them from disclosing the details of those varied partnerships.)

Since 2023, Salary Transparent Street has made about $8,770 from TikTok directly through its Creator Rewards Program . If TikTok is banned, "it would just be a matter of redistributing some of our deliverables, adding more content to different platforms," says Williams.

"Let's say brands are allocating $50,000 a month for influencer marketing," says Brandon Edelman , a full-time content creator whose handle, bran__flakezz, has 615,000 followers , "and they're spending $40,000 on TikTok. That $40,000 goes back into the pot. And they might say, 'Okay, we might not give all of that back to influencer marketing. But we might take $20,000 of that and then focus that onto our Instagram strategy.'"

Many major TikTok stars have been diversifying their income streams as well — some beginning long before the potential ban.

Charli D'Amelio 's page, which boasts 152 million followers, has led to numerous other ventures. In 2023, she made $17.5 million from her clothing brand, Hulu show and partnerships with brands like Dunkin', according to Forbes . She's currently working to bring her family's online shoe store to brick-and-mortar locations.

"You have to remember that social media comes and goes," she said in an interview with CNBC at Shopify's D'Amelio Footwear Pop-Up in New York in March.

'I've learned so much from this app in the last two years'

For many creators, a ban would mean much more than a potential loss of income. It would mean audiences would lose access to a vital source of information.

" I think TikTok has really become Gen Z's version of Google," Edelman says. "Rather than Googling a mac and cheese recipe, type it in on TikTok and you could actually watch the recipe being made for you."

The platform has become a way for people to hear a wider range of perspectives. "I've learned so much from this app in the last two years," said user Alex Pearlman, whose page has 2.6 million followers , in an impassioned video. "And the biggest thing is to stop judging my fellow Americans."

Williams believes the ban "sets a really dangerous precedent to freedom of information and freedom of speech." Some legal experts have agreed .

For now though, TikTok is "still the best platform to grow," says Edelman. "It still has the highest organic reach."

His current advice for fellow influencers is simple: "Use it for as long as you can."

Want to land your dream job in 2024? Take CNBC's new online course How to Ace Your Job Interview to learn what hiring managers are really looking for, body language techniques, what to say and not to say, and the best way to talk about pay. CNBC Make It readers can save 25% with discount code 25OFF.