case study china in africa

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China in Africa: between imperialism and partnership in humanitarian development

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Jodie Yuzhou Sun, China in Africa: between imperialism and partnership in humanitarian development, International Affairs , Volume 98, Issue 5, September 2022, Pages 1826–1828, https://doi.org/10.1093/ia/iiac185

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Africa has become a major case-study to analyse and understand China's growing influence in the global South. Since the mid-2000s, research on China's involvement in Africa has generated a large body of scholarship across a variety of disciplines. In this thick volume, Sabella Abidde and Tokunbo Ayoola put forward 15 chapters that deal with three key themes: early contacts and connections, new imperialism (or a new world order) and China's regional footprint.

The foreword sets out what the book is about: ‘China's incursion and unequal engagement’ with Africa (p. xiii). The following section starts from the 1880s Berlin Conference, which seems to imply that China was just another intervening power after European colonizers withdrew. This is disappointing, as it overlooks the earlier history of China–Africa relations, and their deeper and longer-term implications. Similarly, the several chapters shedding light on Cold War-era relations between China and Africa offer a brief and reductionist discussion, before paying lip service to the presence of ongoing changing dynamics. Despite this shortcoming, Alecia D. Hoffman's chapter is welcome, with its focus on a specific historical event: Chinese Premier Zhou Enlai's 1963 visit to Africa. Hoffman's combined use of theories and historical archives, though limited by number and range, is commendable, and helps establish a sequence of events leading up to Zhou's meeting with Egyptian President Gamal Nasser in December 1963. When looking at the policy framework for Sino-Africa relations, Wei Ye's choice of periodization and review largely repeats what has already been written extensively before (pp. 25–68). It would have been useful to expand the discussion of the 1970s. The Tanzania–Zambia Railway has also been mentioned in several chapters but not in sufficient depth.

There has been a recent African ‘agency turn’ in Africa–China studies (see Chris Alden and Daniel Large's New directions in Africa–China studies , Abingdon: Routledge, 2019). Among the many important questions that the book aims to address, the role of African leaders in shaping their countries’ relations with China is the most critical. Some authors are more pessimistic than others. Lawrence Mhandara boldly states that ‘China's relations with Africa have less to do with Africa but the United States’ (p. 70). Kudakwashe Chirambwi hastens to conclude that Africa suffered financial loss due to ‘incompetence and lack of expertise to negotiate contract[s] beneficial to the state[s]’ (p. 99). Abidde characterizes Mao's engagement with Africa as the ‘fifth wave’ of ‘conquest and plunder’, in stark contrast to Hoffman's earlier analysis. This was mainly explained by the contributor's suspicion and distrust of the African political leaders and elites, who ‘are likely to betray their countries’ for ‘monetary and material possession’ (p. 123). Along with the ‘agency turn’ there have been attempts to address the theoretical inadequacy of ‘China in Africa’ frameworks, particularly as it overlooks the role of the continent in power-based theories. Simbo Olorunfemi tries to demonstrate the potential of complex interdependence in explaining the strategic interests of both Africa and China (pp. 139–57). Priye S. Torulagha argues that China has challenged a Machiavellian power politics model that is commonly found in western economic relationships (pp. 159–84).

The conclusion summarizes the editors’ major concerns over Africa's historical and ongoing dependence on external powers, first the West and now China. Abidde and Ayoola are suspicious of the leaders and elites on the continent, whom they largely blame for Africa's over-reliance on great powers. Although the editors name a few countries and their leaders, it is far from clear what standards are used to characterize the examples offered as ‘gullible’ for falling for China (p. 351). Studies of ‘China in Africa’ have been criticized for painting the picture of ‘a monolithic Chinese dragon in an un-variegated African bush stripped of historical and political content’ (see Daniel Large's ‘Beyond “Dragon in the Bush”’, African Affairs 107: 426, January 2008). It is admittedly tempting to use catch-all phrases like imperialism and neo-colonialism in book titles. However, doing so often creates more myths instead of solving existing ones. It not only simplifies a complex nation like China, but also underestimates Africa and its people. Ultimately, future research could undoubtedly benefit from an Africa-centred and in-depth comparative approach, which explores ‘African agency’ from the contrasting perspectives of two states.

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China and Africa: Ethiopia case study debunks investment myths

Researcher, SOAS, University of London

Disclosure statement

Dr Weiwei Chen works in the Department of Development Studies at SOAS,University of London. She is affiliated with Royal African Society. Previously, Weiwei was affiliated with the Ethiopian Investment Commission (EIC) as the Chinese Investment Advisor between Oct 2017 and Sep 2018, and the UNU-WIDER as the PhD Fellow (2019).

SOAS, University of London provides funding as a member of The Conversation UK.

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Common perceptions about Chinese engagement in Africa are that it is one-dimensional and sometimes biased. One common problem with this perception is the seeming acceptance of what’s called ‘methodological nationalism’ – that the national origin of a firm or agency determines outcomes.

In her book The Specter of Global China , sociology professor Ching Kwan Lee points out that:

popular discourse and consciousness do not distinguish between state and private Chinese investors, who were all lumped together as ‘Chinese companies’.

Meanwhile, Africa, a continent with 54 officially recognised states, has often been portrayed as a fragile, vulnerable single entity that has been exploited by China.

In reality, neither the Chinese state nor Chinese businesses can be thought of as homogeneous . As professors Marcus Power, Giles Mohan and May Mullins have emphasised China–Africa relations and interactions are no longer entirely directed by the Chinese.

The way Chinese firms behave in foreign countries largely depends on their local improvisation and ability to bargain with host country states. This is particularly true in the least developing economies.

Despite rampant groundless scepticism, little concrete evidence is available to support or disprove critics . Many questions on investment, aid, employment, governance, companies, sector dynamics and security, among other topics, cannot be answered on the basis of rumours or rapid appraisals.

My PhD research focused on a comparison of the light manufacturing industry and the construction material industry in Ethiopia.

I argue that far from constituting a homogeneous and static group, Chinese private investments in Ethiopia are highly diverse, fluid and complex. Motives and determinants of these firms to invest in Ethiopia differ significantly. This is true both across sectors as well as within the same sector (or same market).

My research shows that there are two other important variables that explain variations. The first is the type of firm (in terms of scale, history and origin of investment). The second is the entrepreneur’s background. This includes family and educational background, business experience and guanxi (connections and relationships).

Context is also key. Both China’s and Ethiopia’s political economy conditions have, to a certain extent, contributed to ‘push’ and ‘pull’ Chinese private firms to invest in Ethiopia. This includes government policies and institutional context at national and sub-national levels.

My findings bring in new field-based evidence that challenges common perceptions. Examples include the supposedly dominant role of state-owned enterprises in Chinese investment in Ethiopia. The findings add evidence to a growing body of research that dismantles the assumption that national origin of investors determines outcomes.

In addition, Ethiopia’s case has profound implications for other African countries. It has, to a certain extent, my research refutes the assertion that African countries are passive or impotent when it comes to outward foreign direct investment. It demonstrates that a landlocked country with limited natural resources can achieve rapid industrialisation and economic growth through proactive industrial policies and committed government.

Common perceptions debunked

My research finds that the Chinese private sector plays a dominant role in manufacturing investment in Ethiopia. This is true by the number of projects and as well as by value.

For instance, investments (stock) (2010-2018) in the manufacturing sector reached ETB 29.17 billion (about US$570million). This accounted for 78.69% of total Chinese investment by value (see Figure3).

The construction sector does not feature prominently in foreign direct investment statistics in Ethiopia. This contrasts with the fact that Chinese construction firms are ubiquitous, especially in infrastructure projects. This is because these firms primarily engaged in the provision of construction services without necessarily creating greenfield investment.

For their part, Chinese state-owned enterprises are indeed playing a predominant role in the construction sector in Ethiopia. But this is mainly through project contracting rather than foreign direct investment.

This means that the private sector has been playing a large role in Chinese foreign direct investment in Ethiopia, mainly in the manufacturing industry. This challenges the common perception of Chinese engagement in Africa being dominated by state owned enterprises in mining and infrastructure construction sectors.

Instead of lumping all private firms into one category my study also identified different types of Chinese firms in Ethiopia. It also teased out their divergent motives and determinants, investment trajectories and the dynamic relations with the Chinese and Ethiopian governments.

It also found that Chinese private capital is not different from global private capital in terms of core motives to enter new markets. Evidence shows that profit-making and market-seeking are common interests for Chinese private firms. But they have distinct characteristics in comparison to global private firms. These include:

small to medium-sized family-owned firms that focus on the domestic market

traditional original equipment manufacturing that focus solely on the export market, and

owner-operated firms in the construction materials sectors.

Professor Yuenyuen Ang, author of How China Escaped the Poverty Trap , has argued that industrial transfer in China initially occurred domestically from wealthy coastal areas into poorer central and western provinces. In line with her argument, my study found that Chinese investment led by private firms in Ethiopia follows a specific sequence of events. Firms from coastal regions ‘go out’ first. Then those from inland China.

It also revealed that most private firms in Ethiopia are from specific coastal regions. These include Zhejiang, Jiangsu and Guangdong provinces. And that the firms have region-specific characteristics.

The drivers

Increasingly, Ethiopia has been seen as an emerging destination for light industry such as textile, apparel and footwear. It has attracted transnational suppliers from middle-income economies, such as China and India as well as global brands, mainly from the global north. Many have relocated their industrial capital there.

My findings showed that that the ‘going out’ strategies of Chinese firms were as a result of increasing costs. This included wage, environmental and late commercial payment costs.

Chinese firms have found that Ethiopia has reasonable productivity levels and, crucially, the potential for higher output. Their entry into Ethiopia was driven mainly by its proactive industrial policies and its committed political leadership which highlights the country’s comparative advantage. Major selling points include low water, electricity and wage costs, a large and young labour force and favourable access to the US and EU markets.

Ethiopia has also infused outward foreign direct investment strategically into its national development and structural transformation agenda.

Dynamic landscape

The nature of Chinese investment in Ethiopia is highly dynamic.

My research focused on Chinese private investment in Ethiopia between 2008 and 2018. But since the completion of my fieldwork in September 2018, significant changes have taken place – in Ethiopia and the world.

Chinese private investment in Ethiopia has been affected by several factors. These include:

the policies of the newly structured Prosperity Party under Dr Abiy Ahmed, which has been in power since 2019

an ongoing and escalating civil war between Tigray People’s Liberation Front and the federal government

increasingly tense Sino–US relations

The US’s termination of the trade agreement-the African Growth and Opportunity Act from Ethiopia on 1 January 2022

the outbreak of COVID-19.

This means that there have to concerted efforts to capture ongoing dynamics. The potential lack of resilience of the emerging sectors and new investors could derail the successful industrialisation process to which many Chinese firms have greatly contributed in Ethiopia.

Addressing economic and investment resilience remains a critical challenge.

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Four Questions on China in Africa. An Interview with Christopher Alden

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Christopher Alden

Professor Chris Alden teaches International Relations at the London School of Economics and Political Science (LSE) and is a Research Associate with the South African Institute of International Affairs (SAIIA). He is the author and editor of numerous books, including China in Africa (Zed 2007), Land, Liberation and Compromise in Southern Africa (Palgrave/Macmillan 2009), The South and World Politics (Palgrave 2010), Foreign Policy Analysis – new approaches 2 nd edition (Routledge 2017), and co-editor of China and Mozambique: From Comrades to Capitalist (Johannesburg: Jacana 2014), China Returns to Africa (Hurst 2008), China and Africa – Building Peace and Security Cooperation on the Continent (Palgrave 2017).

Professor Alden is currently visiting scholar at CERI and has agreed to answer to some of our questions on the China/Africa relationship. Chris Alden has been working on this topic since 1990, when he moved to South Africa to do field work for his PhD on South African foreign policy. While teaching at Wits University in Johannesburg, he set up with a colleague the “East Asia Project” which started the first academic study of this topic based in the region.

What have been the main steps of China’s increasing presence and involvement in Africa and how has China managed to generate such dependency of some African States?

African resources remain the top driver, reflected in the trade data, but also diplomacy of recognition as well as a search for markets for Chinese firms and goods. The ability to provide development finance has played a key role in the rapid growth of the Chinese presence in African economies.

However, least when it comes to debt – there are specific countries like Kenya, Cameroon, Zambia and others which have a very high proportion of their domestic debt owed to China but plenty of others have diversified their borrowing and therefore are not in a dependent position to one country.

What would happen to African economies if the Chinese domestic market continued to drop off?

When oil prices fall or when global growth slows, countries like Angola experience shocks as they did after 2014. Problems like scheduled repayments on loans become difficult and African governments have to find ways of managing their shortfalls.

How far does China interfere in domestic affairs and is there any resistance to the Chinese presence by local population?

China’s involvement in domestic affairs in African countries begins, as it would with any external actor, from the point of putting major investments into the local economy. With an economic stake in place, naturally firms become exposed to the risks and issues of operating there; seeking ways to preserve their interests becomes increasingly important and is mediated in scope by the nature risks they face and complexity of local politics.

Second, It is hard to generalise about something like resistance or security issues that would be faced by Chinese authorities in Africa. African societies have seen the Chinese as sources of new employment and infrastructure in some cases while in others they are experienced as competitors or negatively in areas like illegal logging and wildlife trade.

Investing in Africa is part of a Chinese grand strategy. What could be the next steps in what is commonly called "the Global South"?

The Belt and Road Initiative is the overarching vehicle for Chinese aspirations in the Global South and developing countries have by and large signed up to it. This amounts to a global strategy predicated on development and in that sense is very attractive to the Global South.

Interview by Miriam Perier, CERI

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More From Forbes

What china is really up to in africa.

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Africa has become the fastest urbanizing region of the world , with rural migrants moving into cities a clip that has even surpassed that of China and India, as the continent becomes one of the final frontiers of the forth industrial revolution . This rapid transition presents big challenges but also offers big rewards for countries willing to risk billions in an infrastructure building revolution unlike anything the world has seen before – and no country has answered Africa’s call quite like China.

By 2050, Africa’s 1.1 billion person population is slated to double , with 80% of this growth happening in cities, bringing the continent’s urban headcount up to more than 1.3 billion. The population of Lagos alone is growing by 77 people per hour . According to McKinsey, by 2025 more than 100 cities in Africa will contain over a million people.

With this breakneck pace of urbanization comes many unprecedented economic opportunities. The IMF recently declared Africa the world’s second-fastest growing region , and many are predicting that it is well on its way to becoming a $5 trillion economy , as household consumption is expected to increase at a 3.8% yearly clip to $2.1 trillion by 2025 . The attention of the world is now drifting towards Africa, with comparisons to 1990s-era China are no longer coming off as radical projections.

China has likewise become a central player in Africa’s urbanization push, as a huge percentage of the continent’s infrastructure initiatives are being driven by Chinese companies and/or backed by Chinese funding.

“Right now you could say that any big project in African cities that is higher than three floors or roads that are longer than three kilometers are most likely being built and engineered by the Chinese. It is ubiquitous,” spoke Daan Roggeveen, the founder of MORE Architecture and author of many works on urbanization in China and Africa .

ADDIS ABABA, ETHIOPIA - MARCH 07: Construction site for new building with chinese cooperation, addis ... [+] abeba region, addis ababa, Ethiopia on March 7, 2016 in Addis Ababa, Ethiopia. (Photo by Eric Lafforgue/Art in All of Us/Corbis via Getty Images)

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Even before the Belt and Road was formally announced in 2013, China was making major strides into Africa’s urban development sphere. When the Communist Party of China first came to power in 1949, it was virtually completely unrecognized by pretty much every other country in the world — most of whom favored the Republic of China, the former government that the Red Army chased away to Taiwan. But China began lobbying Africa extensively, getting the People’s Republic recognized one country at a time. Before long, these political commitments were being repaid in concrete and steel, as China started building railroads, hospitals, universities, and stadiums throughout the continent. However, there were other reasons for China’s early partnerships with Africa: even though the colonial powers were largely gone or on the way out, the continent was still the same stockpile of natural resources it’s always been, and China wasted no time stepping into the power vacuum, laying the political and economic inroads that have given Beijing the advanced position it has there today.

China is now Africa’s biggest trade partner , with Sino-African trade topping $200 billion per year . According to McKinsey, over 10,000 Chinese-owned firms are currently operating throughout the African continent, and the value of Chinese business there since 2005 amounts to more than $2 trillion, with $300 billion in investment currently on the table . Africa has also eclipsed Asia as the largest market for China’s overseas construction contracts . To keep this momentum building, Beijing recently announced a $1 billion Belt and Road Africa infrastructure development fund and, in 2018, a whopping $60 billion African aid package , so expect Africa to continuing swaying to the east as economic ties with China become more numerous and robust.

Nothing without infrastructure

A caterpillar erects revetment for the Great Wall of Lagos, to give a sustainable and permanent ... [+] solution to coastal erosion and to protect Eko Atlantic real estate, a multibillion dollars city under construction in Lagos, on October 2015. A delegation of French business confederation MEDEF comprises of fifty companies, both small, medium and large establishments is in Nigeria to explore business opportunities and to source other channels of building strong and sustainable business relationship with their Nigerian counterpart. AFP PHOTO/PIUS UTOMI EKPEI (Photo credit should read PIUS UTOMI EKPEI/AFP/Getty Images)

As Chinese President Xi Jinping once pointed out, “Inadequate infrastructure is believed to be the biggest bottleneck to Africa’s development.” Collectively, the countries of Africa would need to spend $130-170 billion per year to meet their infrastructure needs, but, according to the African Development Bank, they are coming up $68-$108 billion short . Closing Africa’s infrastructure gap has been the obsession of multiple waves of colonists, and China is the next in line to reach into the heart of the continent with railroads, highways, and airports.

“Europeans built infrastructure in Africa at the turn of the century, purportedly also for local economic development, but in essence the projects were used for natural resource extraction. The predecessor of both the Nairobi-Mombasa and Addis Ababa-Djibouti railways can be categorized as such. Both connect inland regions with mineral deposits with major ports on the Indian Ocean,” wrote Xiaochen Su on The Diplomat .

Infrastructure is what Africa needs most and infrastructure is what China is most equipped to provide. It is not lost on many African leaders that hardly 30 years ago China was in a similar place that they are now — a backwater country whose economy made up hardly two percent of global GDP. But over the past few decades China shocked the world in the way that it used infrastructure to propel economic growth, creating a high-speed rail network that now tops 29,000 kilometers, paving over 100,000 kilometers of new expressways, constructing over 100 new airports, and building no less than 3,500 new urban areas — which include 500 economic development zones and 1,000 city-level developments. Over this period of time, China’s GDP has grown more than 10-fold, ranking #2 in the world today.

Chinese and Ivorians technicians work on the construction site of a new container terminal at the ... [+] port of Abidjan on March 27, 2019. - The modernization of Abidjan Port which started in 2012 are led by Chinese engineers and workers whose country finances up to 1,100 billion FCFA (1.67 billion euros). (Photo by ISSOUF SANOGO / AFP) (Photo credit should read ISSOUF SANOGO/AFP/Getty Images)

It is precisely this kind of infrastructure-induced economic growth that Africa is looking for right now, and many African leaders are looking to China to bring their experience to their countries. The central players in many of Africa’s biggest ticket infrastructure projects — including the $12 billion Coastal Railway in Nigeria, the $4.5 billion Addis Ababa–Djibouti Railway, and the $11 billion megaport and economic zone at Bagamoyo — are being developed via Chinese partnerships.

Since 2011, China has been the biggest player in Africa’s infrastructure boom, claiming a 40% share that continues to rise. Meanwhile, the shares of other players are falling precipitously: Europe declined from 44% to 34%, while the presence of US contractors fell from 24% to just 6.7%.

“The Chinese SOEs they are really taking over the market of infrastructure projects in Africa. It's true to say that everywhere you go in East Africa you see Chinese construction teams,” said Zhengli Huang, a research associate at the University of Sheffield who has carried out extensive case studies on urbanization in Nairobi.

The reasons for this ubiquitous presence are rather straight forward, as Roggeveen points out: many African contractors simply don't have the capacity for major development projects, “so if you want to do large-scale construction you either turn to a western firm or to a Chinese firm, but the Chinese firm is always able to undercut you on price.”

Workers from China and Burkina Faso employed by Sinohydro, a Chinese state-owned hydropower ... [+] engineering and construction company, return to their dormitories after a working day on January 31, 2012 in Bata. AFP PHOTO / ABDELHAK SENNA (Photo credit should read ABDELHAK SENNA/AFP/Getty Images)

When we look at Africa, we see many countries chasing dreams of a better economic future while burying themselves in massive amounts of infrastructure-induced debt that they may not be able to actually afford. There have already been warning signs: the $4 Addis Ababa-Djibouti Railway ended up costing Ethiopia nearly a quarter of it’s total 2016 budget, Nigeria had to renegotiate a deal with their Chinese contractor due to their failure to pay, and Kenya’s 80% Chinese-financed railway from Mombasa to Nairobi has already gone four times over budget, costing the country upwards of 6% of it’s GDP . In 2012, the IMF found that China owned 15% of Africa’s external debt , and hardly three years later roughly two-thirds of all new loans were coming from China. This has some analysts issuing warnings about debt traps – with some even going as far as calling what China is doing a new form colonialism.

What does China get out of this?

China needs what Africa has for long-term economic and political stability. Over a third of China's oil comes from Africa, as does 20% of the country’s cotton. Africa has roughly half of the world’s stock of manganese, an essential ingredient for steel production, and the Democratic Republic of the Congo on its own possesses half of the planet’s cobalt. Africa also has significant amounts of coltan, which is needed for electronics, as well as half of the world’s known supply of carbonatites , a rock formation that’s the primary source of rare earths.

However, there is a common misconception that all Chinese projects in Africa have the backing of Beijing. More often than not, Chinese SOEs are operating in Africa on purely for-profit ventures that don’t have the ambitions of their government in mind. However, it can be difficult to separate China’s commercial intentions in Africa from the strategic, as, in many cases, the two inevitably overlap. The internationalization of Chinese construction firms and IT companies as well as the building of infrastructure to better extract and export African resources, are key concerns for Beijing. So while the infrastructure being built on the ground may not necessarily be orchestrated by Beijing it does ultimately play into China’s broader geo-economic interests.

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Dangers and Opportunities as China’s Loans to Africa Come Due

Many African economies are facing a period of serious economic distress with a very different character from the debt crisis of the 1980s and 1990s. This time, the People’s Republic of China (PRC) is a major player, and a dramatic decline in PRC lending has compounded economic shocks in the aftermath of Russia’s invasion of Ukraine—just as the continent tries to recover from the pandemic. From 2001 to 2022, PRC financial institutions provided more than $170 billion in credit, loans, and grants to African nations, primarily to fund infrastructure projects tied to the PRC’s Belt and Road Initiative . But new PRC loans to African governments plummeted from $28.4 billion in 2016 to less than $2 billion in 2020 and have continued to decline. African governments are awakening to the fact that opaque PRC lending practices and problematic loan terms have rendered already fragile economies at an increased risk of default. However, this moment of peril also provides an opportunity for African economies to build resilience by diversifying their economic partnerships and seeking out lenders with better terms and different motivations.

I and other CNA analysts from our China Studies and Strategy and Policy Analysis programs have just completed a series of studies on trends in the involvement of the PRC across major sectors in Africa in the context of global shocks. These include the military, mining , infrastructure, and financial sectors. We recently released the report PRC Lending in Africa: Impacts in a Time of Global Shocks . This component of the series focuses on PRC lending to nine African countries. In some cases, PRC loans helped African nations build or upgrade much-needed infrastructure. However, we also found a wide range of PRC lending practices that have contributed to the financial distress and increased the risk of default for African countries ravaged by the global shocks of the last few years. These practices include high interest rates, unfavorable terms, and uncompetitive contracting, most of which is hidden from the public in opaque contracts. And when African countries struggle to repay those loans, PRC lenders have taken inflexible positions that have delayed and hardened terms in renegotiations.

China’s Unforgiving Lenders

Today’s debt troubles have some of their roots in the loan agreements signed when the PRC was eager to plow its excess savings into foreign loans. Often these agreements made the loans due in just 10 years, compared to up to 35 years for loans from the World Bank . Interest rates are often higher, too. For example, the Export–Import Bank of China charged Djibouti a fully commercial rate for the loan to build the Ethiopia-Djibouti railway, higher than multinational lenders like the World Bank charge for loans. The PRC is Djibouti’s largest creditor, holding approximately $1.4 billion in debt , equal to about 45 percent of the country’s GDP. In January 2023, Djibouti suspended debt payments to the PRC, making it the second African nation—after Zambia—to do so.

Often these agreements require loan recipients to give business to PRC contractors—without competitive bidding. The Export–Import Bank of China contract with Kenya to finance the Standard Gauge Railway connecting the port city of Mombasa to the Great Rift Valley stipulated that most construction materials would be purchased from the PRC. The project ended up much more costly than anticipated, increasing from 220 billion to 327 billion Kenyan shillings over a period of three years. The Kenya Court of Appeal found that “the project’s design was manipulated to inflate costs while construction and supervision charges were also overpriced.” Such agreements have helped make China’s construction firms dominant on the continent. A University of London study found that of the 32 major international contractor companies working major construction projects in Ethiopia in 2017, 80 percent were PRC contractors.

Because PRC loan agreements tend to be opaque, the public is usually not even aware of these loan terms. In the case of the Standard Gauge Railway, the loan with the Export–Import Bank of China was signed in 2014, but details about the terms only became publicly known in 2022, preventing oversight from Kenyan politicians or the public. In some cases, those opaque agreements and unethical business practices may contribute to corruption. The Industrial and Commercial Bank of China funded a dam project in Angola while ignoring various potential red flags, including the involvement of the daughter of Angolan President José Eduardo dos Santos. Isabel dos Santos was awarded the $4.5 billion contract to construct the dam by her father’s government in 2015. As of 2023, Angola holds more PRC debt than any other country in Africa. And the World Bank listed Angola as one of seven African countries that it considered to be at high risk of debt distress in 2020. 

Our research found that when struggling African nations need to renegotiate their loans, PRC lenders have resisted standard loan forgiveness practices and have slowed debt negotiations. The PRC does not follow typical debt negotiation protocols used by multilateral institutions such as the World Bank. Instead, the PRC prefers bilateral negotiations, often behind closed doors, and strongly resists cutting the total principal owed on loans. Rather, PRC lenders favor extending repayment periods or holding infrastructure as collateral on loans. This has an impact on negotiations with other creditors as well, since lenders want concessions to be shared fairly. Recent negotiations to restructure Chad’s debt with a committee of five bilateral creditors took nearly two years. World Bank and IMF officials claimed that lenders from China unnecessarily delayed the debt deal, an accusation that has come up in debt negotiations with other African countries.

In the long run, however, this difficult period could have an upside for African nations. The reduction in PRC loans provides an opportunity for African countries to diversify, considering new economic partnerships on more favorable terms, with greater transparency and good governance. African nations can use multilateral negotiations to seek out lenders operating with different motivations, lenders that can help them build domestic economic strength and resilience for the future.

Timothy Ditter is a Research Scientist in CNA’s China Studies Program.

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The main purpose of the paper is to examine the truth behind allegations of neo-colonialism performed by China toward Africa, which was raised due to the growing relationship between China and Africa that enhanced the debate between supporters of the notion of neo-colonialism or mutual beneficial relationship. In addition to the growing number of arguments are on the dominance of PRC in Africa over the western powers as European Union or United States in the Continent.

Design/methodology/approach

The paper investigates the claims of neo-colonialism practiced by China toward Africa through the lenses of international political economy using the Interdependence theory of neoliberalists. Egypt was selected as a case study due to the emphases that Egypt gives to China as a strategic partner and as rising economic power as well as representing a way of diversifying Egypt's foreign policy and an additional economic partner beside the western ones. The research relied on two interwoven indicators to investigate the main argument: Trade and Development Aid.

The two pillars of analysis indicate that the growing relationship between Egypt and China is a form of interdependent relationship that is expected to get further complex in the future, which is relatively indicated among other things in the synergy Egypt has made between its Vision 2030 and China's Belt and Road Initiative. In reference to development aid, China uses different techniques that is not commonly used by the donors of Official Development Assistance (“ODA”), and due to unpublished actual data on China's aid figures, any indication of dominance is hard to attain regardless a solo incident of debt trap in Africa, the model of China's aid is provided through low-interest loans for development projects that is highly important for developing countries.

Originality/value

The paper tried to engage in the ongoing debate and examine the truth behind the neo-colonial allegations from the perspective of international political economy, which is an added value to the literature in this regard as the data provided are prepared for the present research purpose.

• Neo-colonialism
• International political economy

el-Shafei, A.W. and Metawe, M. (2022), "China drive toward Africa between arguments of neo-colonialism and mutual-beneficial relationship: Egypt as a case study", Review of Economics and Political Science , Vol. 7 No. 2, pp. 137-152. https://doi.org/10.1108/REPS-03-2021-0028

Emerald Publishing Limited

Copyright © 2021, Alyaa Wagdy el-Shafei and Mohamed Metawe

Published in Review of Economics and Political Science . Published by Emerald Publishing Limited. This article is published under the Creative Commons Attribution (CC BY 4.0) licence. Anyone may reproduce, distribute, translate and create derivative works of this article (for both commercial and non-commercial purposes), subject to full attribution to the original publication and authors. The full terms of this licence maybe seen at http://creativecommons.org/licences/by/4.0/legalcode

Introduction

Occupied by the search for new markets and cheap raw materials, emerging international actors such as the People's Republic of China, India or Brazil have tried to compete over Africa. Nevertheless, China economic power was obviously more substantial than other emerging countries ( Grimm and Hackenesch, 2017 ). The Chinese rapid increasing involvement in Africa has awaken the allegations of neocolonialism and drawn a significant attention from European states who accuse China with allegations of performing neo-colonial practices. There are four pieces of evidence support this argument. The first piece of evidence is the fact that the Chinese are using the same tactic of the colonial powers, which is extracting raw materials from the African soil in exchange for cheap prices. The second is the debts that China use as a tool for domination to this relatively new market. Such skeptical view toward Sino-African relations can be traced back to the endorsement of “Going Out” strategy at the beginning of 2000s ( Sun, 2014 ), i.e. the Chinese government encourages corporations to invest overseas, and the following series of visits conducted by the Chinese president Hu Jintao to African states providing loans without political conditions that were interpreted as encouraging corruption and supporting rogue states ( The Guardian, 2007 ). Such allegations were claimed by many prominent figures including senior politicians such as Britain's former foreign secretary Jack Straw “Most of what China has been doing in Africa today is what we did in Africa 150 years ago.” ( Stevenson, 2006 ).

Interestingly to know that during the sixties, a series of conferences held in Accra 1959, Tunisia 1960 and in Cairo 1961 consecutively under the name of “ All Africa People ' s Conference[s] ” (“AAPC”) and were occupied among other things with the fear of fallen under neocolonial practices performed by western imperial powers. Such conferences were then supported by China among other eastern socialist Allies. The third conference held in Cairo 1961 provided the first official recognition on neo-colonialism in its resolution describing it as a status where “The survival of the colonial system in spite of formal recognition of political independence in emerging countries, which become victims of an indirect and subtle form of domination by political, economic, social, military, or technical means” ( Martin, 1985 , p. 191).

The third piece of evidence claims that despite the fact China is technically not occupying any African country, the growing large number of Chinese workers in the continent which in some countries caused the discontent of the African workers, such as those workers in Kenya who protested against the work conditions, wages and the large number of Chinese labor during the implementation of the USD13.8 billion rail project which linked Kenya's Indian Ocean port of Mombasa to the capital Nairobi, then on to Uganda, which is part of a package of deals signed between Kenya and China in 2013 ( Akwiri, 2015 ), sometimes is used as an evidence held against Chinese allegedly hidden intentions toward Africa. The fourth piece of evidence is the Chinese policy of ignoring imposing conditions before providing any assistance to African countries facing accusations of oppression and neglecting human rights ( Zweig and Jianhai, 2005 ).

Against this backdrop, another argument was presented indicating that China is not performing any neo-colonial practices toward countries in Africa. This was clearly illustrated by the Chinese Prime Minister Wen Jiabao when he said “The hat of ‘neo-colonialism’ simply does not fit China” during a press conference in Cairo ( Chinese Premier Wen Jiabao, 2006 ). In order to support this point of view, Chinese officials adopted a rhetoric that defends its intentions toward Africa embracing the de-colonization movements that blossomed in Africa after Second World War as well as emphasizing its stand in supporting reciprocal benefits between China and African countries. In 2015, Wang Yi, China's Foreign Minister, during his tour in Kenya said that China will not follow the steps of former western colonists and “will not sacrifice Africa's ecological environment and long-term interests” ( Harvard Political Review, 2017 ). There are two main pieces of evidence support this argument, the first one refers to the fact that the Chinese expansion is part of China's outward role in pursuing capitalism-policies ( Taylor, 2006 , pp. 937-959), i.e. China is adhering to the market economies through concluding contracts with governments in Africa that rely on demand and supply, generating revenues and searching for energy sources to support the growing internal economic expansion as well. The second piece of evidence refers to the fact that the Chinese multi-dimensional interactions with African countries is part of the modern interdependence relationships among world countries. The Silk Road, which China is working on that links Africa, Asia and Europe into one circle of cooperation proves that it is a mutual-beneficiary relationship.

Africa is a continent that enjoys huge untapped reserves of natural resources and represents a growing large market that place the continent in the core interest of world countries, therefore anticipating the plans and road map of international principal actors from an academic perspective would assist in figuring out the best way to take advantage of these plans domestically and put the continent in general and Egypt in particular on the right sustainable development path.

Research question

Why do some scholars argue that China's drive toward Africa is a form of neo-colonialism, while others perceive it as a mutual beneficial relation?

Research sub-questions

What are the theories that explain the Chinese drive toward Africa?

What are the pieces of evidence of those who argue that China is performing a neo-colonial practices and evidences of their opponents?

Theoretical perspective

Unlike the ascending of hegemonic powers along the history, China as a rising power shall be considered the only power that did not build its own state through a direct military invasion or colonization, rather it executes and promotes the peaceful rise model that is driven by capital, resource acquisition and technology ( Msimango, 2016 ). Therefore, theorizing its gradual rise and its relationships with African countries shall be made depending on modern theories that allow the analysis of such novel peaceful rise and the modern Sino-African relations from the field of international political economy. The research in hand will depend on a neoliberal theory in order to analyze through its lens the arguments under investigation and investigate an interdependent relationship between Egypt and China.

Interdependence theory

Due to many changes in international arena upon the end of Cold War stimulating new readings to the new growing pattern of international relations that concentrated more on economic and technological advances and communications, the theory of interdependence was able to cope with these changes and provide relatively accurate analysis, while attaining to the concept of power as a fundamental concept and extending it as well. Therefore, the theory of interdependence from the international political economy scope is applicable to study China as an active peaceful actor in the African continent.

Interdependence theory was developed by Robert O. Keohane and Joseph S. Nye in their classic book within international relations theory entitled: “Power and Interdependence” in 1989. It provided an adequate understanding to the international changes, the roles of emerging powers, a profound analysis to the relatively decline of military power and the increasing international economic interdependence. The theory explains interdependence in politics as “situations characterized by reciprocal effects among countries or among actors in different countries. These effects often result from international transactions—flows of money, goods, people, and messages across international boundaries” ( Keohane and Nye, 2012 ). Interdependence occurs when reciprocity achieved, where the relationship among involved actors has the shape of asymmetry in dependence and not necessarily represent an evenly balanced mutual dependence.

The theory extended the role of power of international actors, including states, by encompassing two main dimensions, which are sensitivity and vulnerability. Sensitivity concept is relevant to the impact on each actor/country involved in an interdependent relationship as a reflection of imposed changes from outside, for instance the international financial crisis. While vulnerability explains whether a country has the ability to execute alternative policies that limit transaction costs imposed by external effects of economic policies resulting from outside such as boycotts or other trade disruptions ( del Rosío Barajas-Escamilla et al. , 2016 ).

Interdependence as a concept was elaborated by Keohane and Nye to respond to real-life situations, which resembles in most cases the notion of complex interdependence. Complex interdependence is defined through abstracting reality into the most ideal three conditions which are the absence of force, the lack of hierarchy among issues and the presence of proliferation of channels of contact between societies. It is conceived that the actual situation would approximate these ideal conditions to a certain degree. The first condition of force absence entails that control is more accurately be measured through the ability of governments to control the outcomes and ability to adapt to change with minimum costs rather than its military power. The second condition on the difficulty to arrange goals and hierarchy of issues is manifested in that the governments are now responsible for the economic prosperity beside the military security due to the long-evolvement of development of the welfare state. The third condition of the various channels of communication is achieved due to the incredible technological advances and transportation that minimizes distance barriers.

In reference to the three mentioned conditions, Keohane and Nye (2012 , p. 194) elaborated that the notion of states' welfare evolved over time and got more complicated by eliminating the military power as a state priority and equal gains as an indication of reciprocity hence denying neo-colonial practices. Such complication resulted in a pattern of coexistence between international actors and a fluctuation in priorities.

The interdependence theory fits in the analysis of the relationship between Egypt and China. As the military power plays a negligible role in this relationship and the diminished military power between Egypt and China is maintained due to the mutual respect and noninterference agreed upon between both countries.

Moreover, China has plenty of issues on the agenda with Egypt that exceeds the economic relations, where Egypt relations with China are strong on multiple levels of contacts. Trade volume with China is on a constant prominent increase over the years. In addition to the comprehensive strategic agreements that Egypt maintain with China, the relations are strong on the official levels as the notable increasing official conversions with China expressed in the official visits between the two countries and mutual consent on global matters. Being partners, although issues on Egypt–China agenda are more hierarchal and limited in number, but they are on the rise especially after China's BRI. Because it is almost impossible to mapping all aspects of the relationship between both actors, more light will be shed on the applicability of interdependence theory to the most prominent features of the relationship in Chapters One and Two.

Glimpses on China–Africa relationships with regard to the arguments of the study

China has built many projects in Africa, including but not limited to, roads, railways, bridges, dams, and economic zones as a way through which it could penetrate Africa growing markets and wide energy and other resources, as well as to reinforce strong cultural and diplomatic relations. Such cooperation is pro to the mutual-beneficial aspect of the argument ( Dynamic, 2019 ). On the other side, the sustainability of BRI financing, as an example, has enhanced the interrogatives of Chinese neo-colonial practices in Africa, as the sustainability of loans provided to African countries will depend in part on the productivity of the BRI projects themselves. However, the opacity of Chinese policy on its loan disbursements is of concern ( Taylor and Zajontz, 2020 ).

China relationship with Egypt (from 2007 till 2017)

China scramble into Africa to fuel its economic growth by making use of raw materials in the continent and to gain a remarkable share in the African consumer markets has reflected the domestic imperatives of its Going Out strategy started in the nineties. In 1993, China became a net importer of oil, and in 2003, overtook Japan to become the world's second consumer of oil behind United States ( Lanteigne, 2009 ). Such appetite would require, beside new unsaturated markets to its finished products, tightening its economic relations with African resource-rich countries as instruments of energy supplies as well countries on the road of international trade such as UAE.

Relations between China and African countries went relatively through three phases: the period from 1950s to 1970s, the main focus was on political development by adopting open-up and internal reform policies as well emphasizing shared values on anticolonial practices and support of national liberation movements occurring in Africa that started in the sixties; from 1980s till the Cold War, China relied on cooperation that is anchored on principles of equality and reciprocal benefit; upon the end of Cold War, China followed government-sponsored projects to acquire ground in markets and achieving common prosperity in economic side ( Gadallah, 2016 ).

China's increasing economic relations with African counterparts have been backed largely by the Chinese government through its state-owned corporations or in part by its private companies. Such economic relations were highlighted through its Forum on Africa–China Cooperation in 2006. Following the pattern of the present research, the following subsection will provide a thorough analysis of prominent engagement in Trade and Development Aid between China and Egypt.

Trade relations between China and Egypt

Egypt was the first African country to recognize the People's Republic of China in 1956. Before that in 1953 trade was already ongoing between the two countries and accounted at US$11 million; US$10 million for the exports to China and US$600000 for imports from it ( Hatab et al. , 2012 ). Months before Egypt's recognition of PRC, the later had opened its commercial counsellor's office in Cairo early in 1956 ( Cooperation between Egypt and China in Brief, 2004 ). A technical and cooperation agreement was signed in 1964 between China and Egypt; in the agreement China will provide industrial equipment and machinery worth US$80 million and repayment will be spread over ten years starting 1972 with no interest rate; such generosity was not the norm from the Chinese side, therefore critics were likely to interpret such promise within the context of Sino-Soviet competition ( Ogunsanwo, 1974 ). In 1985 a new trade agreement was signed stating that all bilateral trade would be settled with convertible foreign exchange from then on because all the transactions had been settled under clearing agreement for nearly 30 years before this agreement ( Cooperation between Egypt and China in Brief, 2004 ).

In 1995, the two countries signed an economic and trade agreement to replace the 1985 trade agreement that emphasized the development of bilateral trade between the two countries. In August 1997, Egypt and China signed an avoidance of dual taxation and tax evading agreement, followed by signing letter of intent on mutual-beneficial economic and technical cooperation to encourage Chinese enterprises to establish joint ventures in Egypt. In 1999, Egypt was among countries that sign strategic cooperation agreement with China that covered political, economic, parliament and cultural aspects ( Gadallah, 2016 ). By strategic it means, as defined by the Chinese Premier, Wen Jiabao in the ninth China-EU Summit in Finland, cooperation should be long term and stable ( Zongze, 2008 ).

In November 2006, the two countries signed a memorandum of understanding and agreed to enhance all-round cooperation in trade, investment in an effort to elevate bilateral economic ties ( Hatab et al. , 2012 ). In 2009, Egypt was able to host the China–Africa Cooperation Forum signaling a new phase in their economic relation in order to enhance the strategic partnership and sustainable development between the two countries. Such cooperation was resumed even after Egypt uprising of 2011 and the political unrest that marred the political scene at the time, as early indications reflected that Egypt will continue to approach China and to diversify the foreign relations portfolio and considers it as a cornerstone to engage in Asia. Such engagement was mutual as Egypt represented China's third-largest trading partner in Africa in 2011 and considered Egypt as a gateway to the new markets of Africa and the Middle East ( Zambelis, 2013 ). The Sino-Egyptian engagement was resumed following Muslim Brotherhood Party took power in Egypt, even a visit to Beijing was paid as the first official visit by president Morsi in August 2012. In 2013, the two countries maintained close political contact and Egypt relations with China was not affected after ousting Egypt's president, Mohamed Mursi, in 2013 after mass protests. Sound progress in 2013 has occurred on different levels as the bilateral trade volume grew as well as in terms of energy cooperation, where Sinopec International Petroleum Exploration and Production Corporation, a wholly-owned subsidiary of Sinopec, purchased some of the stakes of the assets owned by Apache Corporation of the US in Egypt.

A step forward indicating solid record of mutual cooperation was accomplished in 2014 during a presidential visit to China, the Egyptian president signed a comprehensive strategic partnership with the Chinese counterpart to cover all dimensions of economic cooperation including trade and investment and multiple levels of interactions encompassing people-to-people exchanges, in this partnership One China policy was mentioned, which is not a frequent case in most signed CSPs ( Zhongping and Jing, 2014 ). Interesting to know that partnerships signed between China and world countries do not follow same mechanisms or one identified institutional framework, for example the CSP signed with EU includes dialogue over human rights issues while this was not the case in CSPs with developing world ( Zhongping and Jing, 2014 ). Strategic partnership that is used by the Chinese government is used as an institutionalized diplomatic instrument that serves China's peaceful rise in the global unipolar system. Since 2014, until the current being China has signed four strategic partnerships in North Africa; Morocco, Sudan, Algeria and Egypt, the latter two being at comprehensive level. The Egyptian government officially launched the sustainable development strategy “Egypt Vision 2030” in February 2016 and incorporated more than 70 projects in the vision. Chinese leaders have pointed out on several occasions to fully synergize the development strategy of China “BRI” and that of Egypt “Vision 2030”: the building of infrastructure and cooperation on capacity to make Egypt a supporting country along the “BRI” ( Chen, 2018 ). China has listed Egypt as one of the top five destinations for mergers and acquisition activity under the BRI initiative.

The below figure presents the ratio of trade-to-GDP in Egypt's economy.

In Figure 1 , the ratio reflects trade interdependence between Egypt and China and indicates advance in technological issues, transportation and above all massive increase in communication. It is worth noting that China's external trade-to-GDP-ratio is 60%, which encourages other developing countries willing to prosper to increase such ratio ( Tan et al. , 2015 ).

Beside the imbalance of trade, another obstacle is observed in Sino-Egypt trade relations that is the ill diversification of products either in imports or in exports as shown in the figures. Such obstacles are being addressed by China, for example through hosting the International Import Expo in Shanghai to gather all manufacturers and trading firms around the world into one big event with special focus on SMEs. Figures 2 and 3 present the type of exports and imports between Egypt and China.

As shown in Figure 2 , Egypt is importing from China machinery and transport equipment that constitutes 42% of overall imports followed by manufactured goods 33%, given the fact of the relatively low prices provided by China compared to EU or Western economies in general. While the exports side, as shown in Figure 3 , is even less diversified as the lion share of exports to China is in minerals fuels and related materials constituting 64%, which heavily started since 2008 replacing and surpassing crude materials exports exceeding US$ 445 million in 2017 compared to US$ 36 million for crude materials in the same year.

Pieces of evidence on neo-colonialism or mutual beneficial relationship

The increasing trade relations between the two countries is perceived by neo-liberalists advocates as an economic interdependence and source of power for partner countries regardless the imbalance of trade that exist. It is a sign of interdependence because it coincides with the need of developing countries to such cheap machinery and technology provided by China. On the other side, Egypt abundance of marble and granite has found huge market in China. In 2018 China imported 65.8% of Egypt's exports of marble and granite. Such gradual increase of interdependence over the years, though insignificant if compared to the balance of trade between Egypt and EU, but may at some point in the future bypass EU volume of trade with Egypt as happened in 2012 when China bypassed USA, Egypt's top trading partner, in exports.

If the imbalance continued without any corrective actions from Egypt, trade balance will worsen and get further distorted. In addition, China has a potentially huge market for Egyptian products, which is a good opportunity for Egypt to consider performing extra measures in diversifying the classical destinations of its products beyond EU and USA markets.

Such pattern of trade is relatively consistent with the rest of North African states as well sub-Saharan sphere, where China's export of phosphates has an important portion of trade with Morocco and fertilizers with Tunisia and large energy supply is exported to China from Libya and Algeria. While the largest portion of the Chinese exports to Northern countries of Africa are occupied mainly by manufactured goods and textiles. Moreover, beside Egypt, Algeria has a Comprehensive Strategic Partnership with China since 2014 and Morocco has a Strategic Partnership since 2016.

In order to benefit from such relations, the Chinese manufacturers open new factories in North Africa and sell to EU based on preferential trade agreements signed between EU and northern countries of Africa. Competition in EU markets between locally manufactured light industries like textiles in Africa with those made in China was in favor of the Chinese products to the extent that EU introduced a quota system that restrict importing Chinese garments to EU in 2005 to give opportunity to Tunisian and Moroccan production lines to develop their techniques. This was not the case when the system ended in 2007 where the Tunisian exports fell by 22% because of competition from Chinese exports to EU ( Liste, 2012 ).

The pattern of trade between Egypt and China may not be complex as the trade pattern between Egypt and EU, but more solid relations are on the horizon especially after the BRI initiative of China that encourages countries to be more involved in a complex interdependence relationship.

To sum up, the imbalanced trade relations between Egypt and China that are relatively in favor of China might be perceived from the scope of dependency advocates as an indication of a neo-colonial pattern of relationship rather than mutual benefit, but the mutual respect on the official and non-official levels in addition to the tangible economic benefits emphasize the mutual-benefit side. It is worth noting that in 2018 China–Africa trade volume amounted to US$ 204.2 billion, which indicates the large proportion Chinese trade is occupying in Africa's trade volume.

Development aid between China and Egypt

ODA definition of development aid, which the present paper adopted in Egypt-EU section above, cannot be partly relied upon in this section due to many reasons. First , China is not a member of the Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development-Development Assistance Committee (“OECD-DAC”) and does not report aid figures to DAC and most of figures published in research papers are based on estimates grasped from various sources. Second , are calculated differently from the standard categories adhered to by OECD-DAC, therefore are not comparable. Third , China, though a growing large donor, is listed on OECD data as a development aid recipient, which brings us to the issue raised in the review of literature part that China, though a raising power, yet it is not a fully-fledged hegemon, which might have some positive implications for China and gives it the opportunity to develop without carrying some of the burden of global affairs. Fourth , definition of aid within Chinese circles differs from that adopted by OECD members making crosscut comparisons a challenging task. Fifth , the main official data emanates from white papers that describe overall disbursement without giving details on how much money is directed to what country and its aim.

In pursuing coordination on aspects of interest with African counterparts, China was able to deal bilaterally with African countries without resorting to the guiding principles of aid, including human rights conditions and political interference, that were adopted and developed by western donors over years. China developed its own principles, opposing power politics that dominated international relations for centuries, that emanates from China's five principles of peaceful coexistence developed in fifties.

China started to extend aid beyond socialist countries in 1956 following the Afro-Asian Conference in Bandung, Indonesia in 1955 that paved the way for non-aligned movement few years later and targeted African countries. In 1964, during a visit to Accra, Ghana, then Chinese premier Zhou Enlai unveiled a formalized set of ideas China named the Eight Principles for Economic Aid and Technical Assistance to Other Countries. The most prominent features in the eight principles are: asserting equality and mutual benefit; respecting sovereignty and attaching no political conditions or interfering in internal affairs of recipient countries; assisting countries to self-reliance and achieve independent economic development. In mid-1990s, China coordinated external aid through internal coordination between state organs, including Ministry of Commerce, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, State Administration of Foreign Exchange, Ministry of Education, and Ministry of Agriculture; above all China established two banks in 1994, Export–Import Bank of China and China Development Bank, which subsequently became the pillars of China's foreign aid and development finance ( Cheng, 2019 ). Involving state organs, especially the Ministry of Commerce, in managing development assistant raised critiques against China and accusations of neocolonialism practices through debt trap diplomacy ( Cheng, 2019 ).

The Chinese assistance to Africa started to attract international attention after the country invited African counterparts into its first Forum on China–Africa Cooperation (“FOCAC”) in 2000, which finds its way among well-recognized multilateral arenas of cooperation between China and African countries. FOCAC is considered by some scholars as a vital part of China efforts to operate under the umbrella of a South–South cooperation framework ( Wu, 2012 ).

The first official document, white paper, on foreign aid released by China in 2011 where it introduced itself as a developing country and describing its foreign aid as “a model with its own characteristics” ( China's Foreign Aid, 2011 ). In the paper, China summarized the development it pursues in aid strategies and officially stated the main features of foreign aid that evolved features from the five principles of coexistence and the above-mentioned eight principles.

China divided the types of foreign aid into three main types: grants, interest-free loans and concessional loans, which can be qualify in part within the framework of ODA definition ( Wu, 2012 ). The first two comes from the State while the third one is made through Export–Import Bank of China that provides subsidized loans. Grants are provided to establish schools, water-supply projects and other small and medium projects. Interest-free loans are used to cover the establishment of public facilities where such projects enjoy tenure of 20 years. Concessional loans cover medium- and large-sized projects in infrastructure, energy and resources and communications …etc. The grant element of 25% in development aid provided by OECD donors is not necessarily followed by China as a large proportion of its financial assistance comes within the form of export credit lines and market or close-to-market rate loans, which makes it hard, in the absence of accurate data, to believe that China has pure intentions toward African development ( Dreher et al. , 2017 ). Such main types are performed through many forms: the establishment of complete projects starting from study and ends with trial production before delivery; the provision of experts; the provision of training for personnel and individual exchanges; the provision of medical services through teams and devices; debt relief that was made on high profile occasions such as FOCAC convened in 2000, 2006, 2009 and UN High-Level Meeting on the Millennium Development Goals in 2008 and 2010 where 35 African countries were relieved from debts by the end of 2009 ( China's Foreign Aid, 2011 ).

The second white paper on China's Foreign Aid (2014) identified a remarkable increase in financial resources given to developing countries to reach a total of 89.34 billion Yuan for foreign assistance between 2010 and 2012 compared to 256.29 by the end of 2009 since it started to provide such aid. In the second paper it is noticed that China has increased its concentration on certain projects such as agriculture, education, medical and health services and continued the establishment of prestige projects and trade-related infrastructure projects ( China's Foreign Aid, 2014 ). In China's second Africa policy paper published in 2015, it assures the principles of non-interference and attaching no political conditions or imposing demands on African countries in return for assistance from China. Beside Export–Import Bank of China providing loans, in the second policy paper of 2015 China presented its multi financing platforms such as: The China–Africa Development Fund (under China Development Bank), the Africa Growing Together Fund, China–Africa Industrial Cooperation Fund (under Export–Import Bank of China), and the BRICS' New Development Bank. It is noticed in these policy papers that China promotes its image as a partner not a donor and its aid portfolio is oversaw by complicated network of ministries and policy banks instead of a single aid agency.

Egypt was among the first non-communist countries in Africa to receive aid from China upon Bandung Conference in 1955. In 1956, China though a bit reluctant to support the Egyptian position regarding the nationalization of Suez Canal as it took almost three weeks to announce official support from Beijing, but responded quickly in condemning the aggression and supporting Egypt's position vis-à-vis the aggression from France, England and Israel. China paid Egypt 20 million Swiss francs upon the freezing of Egypt's deposits; donated 170.000 Swiss francs from the Chinese Red Cross; China continued to buy cotton and provided considerable quantities of principal goods ahead of schedule; and established Department of West Asia and Africa in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs in order to adapt to such situation of aggression and its desire to deepen relations with Egypt and countries in the Middle East ( Shichor, 2008 ).

Since then China started to support various Sub-Saharan countries the years to follow such as the huge railway project that connected between Zambia and Tanzania, named “Tan-Zam” in 1976 where the cost exceeded one billion RMB ( Gountin, 2006 ). In this early period China's objectives behind aid were on gaining political recognition vis-à-vis Taiwan and spreading its ideology vis-à-vis the Soviet Union; and benefiting recipient countries because it offers aid in forms of interest-free loans or as grants ( Nowak, 2015 ). Later on China's objectives from the provision of aid changed from political ones into achieving economic prosperity of its economy and supporting the economy of the recipient countries as it ties foreign aid with trade and investments, as well based on its own characteristics and models of assistance. Such Chinese model of assistance was realized in Egypt as China injected almost US$ 20 billion into the Egyptian economy in the form of loans, investments and development projects; such funds were mainly in infrastructure, energy and telecommunications sectors, dedicated to projects such as the development of the Suez Canal Economic Zone, a light rail transit system to connect cities outside of Cairo to the new administrative capital, and solar power stations adjacent to Aswan ( TIMEP, 2019 ). It is worth nothing that Chinese development assistance is usually given in kind for example, the officially exchanged note between the two countries over the provision of 700 vehicles to Egypt in 2011. While the financial assistance is usually given to fund contracts that are implemented by Chinese companies such as the towers in the new administrative capital of Egypt ( Berthelemy, 2011 ).

When it comes to reporting of constant figures across years, China's government considers its international development finance program to be a “state secret” ( Bräutigam, 2009 , p. 2). It does not disclose detailed or comprehensive data about development projects conducted abroad that it finances, nor does it publish a bilateral breakdown of its international development finance activities ( Dreher et al. , 2017 ).

A growing concern over development aid provided by China to African countries lies mainly in the unpublished actual bilateral aid numbers. Concessional loan disbursements or loan repayments that are not published raise concerns of putting developing countries in danger of slipping into major debt crisis. IMF warned recently that Africa is heading towards a new debt crisis and WB classifies 18 states in Africa as at high risk of debt distress as debt-to-GDP ratios transcends 50%, where approximately 20% of external debt of governments in Africa is owed to China ( BBC News, 2018 ). In addition, there are no official data on Chinese loans exist and thus all published figures are estimates and guesses, given the fact that Beijing is not a member of the OECD and it does not take part in the OECD's Creditor Reporting System. In addition, the Chinese state banks seldom release information concerning detailed financing contracts while recipients of such loans invariably fail to completely divulge the information of the finances they are obtaining ( Taylor and Zajontz, 2020 ).

Moreover, the imposition of the concept of One China as a condition of China's cooperation with countries is a type of coercion and neo-colonial practice toward developing countries in Africa. Such attitudes create an area of influence manipulating the ideal aim of development aid, which coincides with the point of view of dependency advocates. In addition, allegations of neo-colonialism are enhanced further because Chinese foreign assistance today is provided mostly on a state-to-state basis, concentrated in physical infrastructure construction and aimed at further access to natural resources and overseas markets.

On the other hand, China's infrastructure provision using concessional loans in the African continent is reflecting its own believe of the unique development bath that each country should follow. By building infrastructure projects in Africa, like roads, dams and telecommunications equipment, China benefits other economic sectors such as trade and industry. Such believe is enhanced through China's adoption of Five Principles of Peaceful Coexistence -which are: mutual respect for each other's territorial integrity and sovereignty, mutual non-aggression, non-interference in each other's internal affairs, equality and mutual benefit and peaceful co-existence- that is considered a cornerstone on its development assistance provided to countries in Africa. China uses these principles to overcome the rhetoric against the claims over neo-colonial practices. In addition to the well-established China's aid programs such as medical teams, technical assistance, and peacekeeping forces sent to countries of need in Africa that China are conducted under the mandate of international organizations such as UN.

In reference to the allegations of China's seizer of national assets in return for repayment of debts, the case of Hanbantota port in Sri Lanka remains the only cited case of China's “predatory lending”. A study by the Centre for Global Development found that the Belt and Road Initiative has not contributed to debt-distress in most of the countries involved in the initiative. Eight out of the sixty eight BRI-involved states were found to be at risk of debt-distress from BRI borrowing. The country of Djibouti is one of these eight at risk, but no evidence of asset seizure or ownership transfer resulting from countries' debt-situation was cited to the author's knowledge, and the Djiboutian government owns the constructed infrastructure ( Chen, 2020 ).

Even the One China policy maintained by China that is translated by neo-colonial advocates as a condition on African counterparts is considered a core principal of China foreign policy that is even exerted with United States, for example the tension occurred when the White House granted visa to the Taiwanese president Lee Teng-Hui in 1995 to visit United States for a non-official purpose.

To conclude, it is early to claim that China is a neo-colonizer, either in the case of Egypt or Africa in general as evidences of this is more of media rhetoric than actual incidents.

The research in hand tried to add to the literature of the constant debate on China's scramble toward the African continent. The main argument was to investigate whether China's approach toward Africa is a sort of neo-colonialism or is based on a mutual benefit between the African countries and China. Egypt was selected as a case study to elaborate such relationship and the timeframe of the research is from 2007 until 2017. The answer to the main question was made through analyzing the relationship between Egypt and China relying on two items: Trade and Development Aid. The study encompasses two sub-questions. The first sub-question investigates the relevant theory that could describe the relationship between China and Africa, Egypt in specific. The second sub-question investigates the evidences on neo-colonialism or evidences on mutual beneficial relationship. In order to answer the first sub-question, Interdependence theory from the international political economy was selected to study the identified pillars of analysis, Trade and Development Aid and to measure the extent of interdependence between the two countries.

In regards to data analysis of the trade aspect, from 2007 until 2017 the trade volume increases between Egypt and China and is enhanced through the pattern of no strings attached between the governments of both countries, which indicates a mutual respect and understanding on the political dimension. The proportion of China volume of trade-to-GDP for Egypt's economy is of great indication to Egypt's openness to diversified international actors rather than the classic actors such as EU or US.

In regard to Development Aid data analysis, China's model of development aid and due to its provision of ODA outside the DAC paradigm that undermines the analysis. Nevertheless, allegations of neo-colonialism minimize the role of countries' will and the institutional framework governing many aid provision schemes with developing countries. The mutual consent between Egypt and China in terms of trade and development aid enhances the relationship and indicates a complex interdependence between the two countries in the future that would transcend to more political synergy, which was emphasized in recent years through the synergy of Egypt sustainable development plan “Vision 2030” made with China “Belt and Road” initiative.

To wrap up, in order to make the relationship between Egypt and China more balanced, on the Egyptian side, Egypt needs to focus more on improving its industrial goods to be able to access and compete in the Chinese huge market and start develop the technological base required for the production. Furthermore, Egypt can provide advantages to the Chinese manufacturers when they establish their business in Egypt and benefit from the bilateral and multilateral trade agreements signed between Egypt and countries in Africa, Middle East, USA and the European Union. Such agreements benefits manufacturers commencing business in Egypt, as they can obtain raw materials, initial and intermediate goods from these countries without customs, or with limited customs. On the Chinese side, China has to give more privileges to the Egyptian products to access China markets. The synergy between Egypt “Vision 2030” and China “Belt and Road” initiative has to be applied effectively to stress on the interdependent and win–win relationship.

Egypt–China trade-to-GDP-ratio from 2007 until 2017

Egypt exports to China in USD million (2007–2017)

Egypt imports from China in USD million (2007–2017)

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Further reading

Bräutigam , D. and Tang , X. ( 2014 ), “ ‘Going global in groups’: structural transformation and China's special economic zones overseas ”, World Development , Vol. 63 , pp. 78 - 91 , doi: 10.1016/j.worlddev.2013.10.010 .

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The Biggest China-aid Project to Egypt in 2011 ( 2011 ), Economic and Commercial Office of the Embassy of the People’s Republic of China in the Arab Republic of Egypt , Chinese Vehicles Project Officially Kick-started, Ministry of Commerce , Beijing .

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Wenyuan , M.A. and Jun , Z.H.A.O. ( 2020 ), China-Egypt Financial Cooperation: Developments and Problems , ResearchGate, Berlin .

Zhang , J. ( 2016 ), How Does Chinese Foreign Assistance Compare to that of Developed Countries , The Brookings Institution , Washington, DC (accessed 8 October 2020) .

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Destination Advertising in the Digital Age

A Study on the Construction of Destination Image for China's County-Level Integrated Media Centers: A Case Study of Four Counties in Fuzhou Provisionally Accepted

• 1 Communication University of China, China
• 2 South China University of Technology, China

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Today, as social media plays an increasingly important role in disseminating destination images, short videos have emerged as the primary channel through which tourists obtain information about their desired destinations. In comparison to traditional methods of using text and pictures, the new media accounts of local government agencies offer a means to convey more comprehensive local news and shape destination images that are more accurate and diverse, leveraging the potential of the short video platform. This study utilizes a combination of manual analysis (subject terms classification) and computer-assisted techniques (key-frame extraction and text mining) to examine the short videos posted on the TikTok (Douyin) platform by the integrated media centers of Minhou County, Yongtai County, Minqing County, and Lianjiang County in Fuzhou City, China. The objective is to explore the shared characteristics and variations in the dimensional aspects of destination images. The findings reveal that the short video contents released by the governmental new media accounts in these four locations primarily highlight three dimensions: stakeholders, urban infrastructures, and regional landscapes. These dimensions are evident in both descriptive texts and visual symbols.However, in terms of the presented destination image, a notable degree of homogeneity is observed, and there is a lack of emphasis on uncovering and presenting the cultural dimensions, thus failing to fully reflect the distinctive local characteristics.Consequently, it is essential for local integrated media centers to thoroughly explore the cultural uniqueness of their respective regions and enhance the development of thematic dimensions in creating short video content. This approach will effectively strengthen tourists' association with and perception of destination images.

Keywords: Short videos, Destination images, TikTok Platform, Governmental New Media, visual symbol

Received: 29 Nov 2023; Accepted: 23 Apr 2024.

Copyright: © 2024 Lin, Wen and Ma. This is an open-access article distributed under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution License (CC BY) . The use, distribution or reproduction in other forums is permitted, provided the original author(s) or licensor are credited and that the original publication in this journal is cited, in accordance with accepted academic practice. No use, distribution or reproduction is permitted which does not comply with these terms.

* Correspondence: Mx. Hanzheng Lin, Communication University of China, Beijing, China

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