essay about nationalism in the philippines

Recherche en sciences humaines sur l’Asie du Sud-Est

Home Issues 20 Notes The Insufficiency of Filipino Nat...

The Insufficiency of Filipino Nationhood

This essay is an exercise in the histoire des mentalités that traces the evolution of the characteristic ethos in relation to State and nation in the Philippines. Whereas State-propagated nationalism and associated rituals are inescapably present, these fail to evoke the sense of belonging to a shared civil world. It seems as if the public sphere of the State and the private sphere of everyday life do not articulate, which is practically enhanced by the systematic exclusion of the ordinary citizen from the oligarchic political process. As it is often expected that a civil society rooted in the emerging middle classes has the potential of bridging the gap and of providing the cultural leadership that moulds the nation, the evolution of their members’ ideas, from militant idealism to current self-centred morality, will be brought into focus against the dynamics of the political economy and of a culture that is increasingly divorced from the practice of everyday life.

Cet essai relève de « l’histoire des mentalités » et trace l’évolution du génie spécifique liant l’état et la nation aux Philippines. Tout en étant bien présents, le nationalisme diffusé par l’état et les rituels associés sont incapables de renvoyer à un sentiment d’appartenance à un monde civil partagé. Tout se passe comme si la sphère publique de l’état et la sphère privée de la vie quotidienne n’étaient pas coordonnées, ce qui – en pratique – est renforcé par l’exclusion systématique du citoyen ordinaire d’un processus politique de type oligarchique. Comme il est souvent attendu qu’une société civile enracinée dans les classes moyennes émergentes ait le potentiel de combler l’écart et de produire le leadership culturel modelant la nation, l’évolution des idées des membres de celle-ci – d’un idéalisme militant à l’actuelle moralité nombriliste – sera mise au grand jour, à l’opposé de la dynamique de l’économie politique ainsi que d’une culture de plus en plus séparée de la vie quotidienne.

Index terms

Mots-clés : , keywords: .

1 According to Gomperts et al. , Indonesia’s pre-war nationalist leaders understood the need of historic symbols for legitimating a nation-state’s cultural and national identity. Since they were fully aware of the emotional appeal of Majapahit, they claimed it as the forerunner of a united Indonesia. Next to this, the authors even assert that no nation can survive without knowledge of its historical past (2010). If this is so, history has been most parsimonious in giving the Philippines its share, as the first state on its soil was the result of Spanish imperialism. Even so, the colonial history of the Islands must be deeply understood if we want to appreciate the present, distinctive Filipino ( Pinoy ) way of life, and the festering problem of nationhood.

The problem of nationhood

2 The depth of American cultural imperialism is demonstrated by the listlessness of nation-building. In a country like Indonesia, the erasure of the humiliation of the colonial past was not so much a priority as a matter of course, and it is inconceivable that Indonesians would invoke Dutch imperialism to explain the history and shape of their present nation-state. In the Philippines, however, the Grant of Independence is still celebrated with the lowering of a conspicuous American flag on the current hundred-peso bill, and the names of Taft, Harrison, Lawton and the like live on. Even so, many places have been renamed after certain national heroes and many more after not-so-heroic presidents, among whom the name of Quezon leads the pack in obfuscating the history of provinces, towns, villages, and streets.

3 Who cares? The very cultural imperialism that thwarts nation-building also destroyed historical continuity, and so the sense of Philippine becoming was erased. As a “modern”, American-educated nation, people should face forward and be progress-oriented, basically agreeing with Henry Ford’s dictum “history is bunk.” Even so, with or without history, certain circles recognised that the depth of the colonial impact had led to the “mis-education of the Filipino” (Constantino 1966) and a “colonial mentality” that kept inferiority feelings alive while blindly accepting the superiority of anything Stateside. As a result, in 1972 the Marcos dispensation proclaimed the Educational Development Decree that, among other things, should remedy the “problem of nationhood.”

4 Subsequently, school teaching became bilingual, the soft subjects, such as social studies, history, and civics henceforward to be taught in the vernaculars and Filipino, and arithmetic, mathematics, and natural science in English. At the same time, textbooks were developed that should instil self-conscious pride in being Filipino (e.g., Mulder 2000: ch. 3). Since then, first graders must study the legal complexities of citizenship, the panoply of national symbols, and a long list of beauty spots and other geographical features of the country. The teaching of history should emphasize 19th century nationalism and the Revolution against the oppressive Spaniards, even as the American rape of the First Republic has to compete with the new coloniser’s munificence. Thanks to Mother America, Filipinos became literate, healthy, democrats, and citizens of the modern world. Upon counting these blessings follow the Freedom Missions, the Commonwealth, and the Grant of Independence in 1946, to which it is typically observed that the Grant came at a time that the country lay in ruins, was wallowing in poverty, and had no identity as a free nation.

5 Under the rule of Marcos, school education apparently did not succeed in instilling a sense of nationhood, and so, in 1987, Senator Leticia Ramos-Shahani proposed to conduct research into “the weaknesses of the character of the Filipino with a view to strengthen the nation’s moral fibre.” It resulted in a report, Building a People, Building a Nation , in which a panel of prominent intellectuals, among other things, concluded that Filipinos show a deficiency of patriotism and appreciation of their own country, and are not in sympathy with their government. As a result and similar to the appeal of the Educational Development Decree, they proposed that schools be tasked to propagate such values. Subsequently, in 1989, Values Education became part of the national curriculum.

6 Regardless of social scientists holding values to be conclusions of experience and practising teachers knowing that “values are caught, not taught”, schools are still supposed to convince their wards that they should be proud of being Filipinos, love their country, appreciate the good work of their government, and be willing to sacrifice for the common welfare. Preferably, they should be law-abiding, too. At the same time, the experience of poverty, injustice, and ineffective governance drives many people away from their native soil.

Nationalism

7 As many columnists, educators and officials have it, the absence of vigorous nationalism is at the root of all sorts of problems, and so, over the years, the phrase, however often repeated, has got a hollow ring to it. The evocation of “nationalism” as a blame-all could be related to the fact that in native Tagalog-Filipino the idea is inherently vague. Consulting Fr. English’s Tagalog-English Dictionary , we find the equivalence of nasyonalismo and pagkamakabayan , pagkamakabansa , diwang-makabansa , pag-ibig sa bayang-tinubuan o inang-bayan . Because love for country is often thought to be love of its state, one may find the equivalency of estado and bansa , bayan , and pamahalaan , and with this hotchpotch we may have come to the source of the convenient vagueness of the term.

8 Roughly translated, the aforementioned notions of nationalism may be rendered as “to be pro-country”, “to be pro-nation”, “to be pro-nation-spirited”, “to love one’s native soil” or “to love mother-land”; at the same time, state becomes people/nation, country, and regime/government. Such equivalences bedevil the subject, even as it would not take a sociology sophomore much effort to disentangle the mess. When a movement in the southern Philippines calls itself Bangsa Moro , it clearly sees itself as the spokesman for the Moro Nation, that is, a grouping of people on the basis of the idea of sharing history and identity. In brief, bangsa or bansa refers to Anderson’s felicitous term “imagined community” (1983). Naturally, the Bangsa Moro movement aspires to run its people’s own affairs in their homeland or bayan .

9 It is not that Tagalog-Filipino totally ignores such shades of meaning as it refers to nationality as kabansaan or “sharing in a fellow bansa ”, at the same time that pagkamamamayan refers to belonging to a certain place ( bayan ), and thus means citizenship. Next to these, we have the idea of “state”, that is, of a territory ( bayan ) under a government that holds sway over the people ( bansa ) living there. This very condition of lordship, however, tells us nothing about people’s loyalty to that state or about their eventual identification with it.

10 Historically, nationalism as identification with the state is a recent phenomenon that was consciously fostered in 19th century Europe as a means of building the strength of the state through popular identification with its regime. Subsequently, it became possible to mobilize the populace to celebrate their state and to wage war in its name for whatever reason, because “right or wrong, my country. ” At bottom, such blind loyalty to the state has nothing “natural” to it, but is the result of the propaganda of the owners of the state. For such nationalism to arise, it needs to be propagated and taught, but if people distrust the message and do not accept it wholeheartedly, the citizens will not identify with state or regime, and their loyalty cannot be expected.

11 In order to impress on first-graders their belonging to the nation-state, they have, in step with the American example, to study an array of national symbols. Whereas the flag is a powerful one among these, emblems such as the bangus (milkfish) as the national fish fail to arouse positive emotions. More amazing is it to claim the lechon (roast pig) as the national food, as it arrogantly excludes the Moslems, and the poor, to boot. Next to these identity markers, we find the endless repetition of certain ceremonies. Schooldays begin with raising the flag (that in many cases was struck half-an-hour earlier), singing the anthem (right hand on the heart), and reciting the nationalistic vow. Following in this track, all sorts of meetings, from a social of the tennis club to the deliberations of the Senate, go through this ritual, in which obligatory prayer takes the place of the nationalistic vow. Depending on their schedule, people may have to endure this rigmarole up to five times a day, and so one wonders whether its deeper meaning has not worn thin. In the place of my research, the flag was up day and night at the town hall, and so it was at the provincial high school. This apathy corresponds with the disinterest in national days, such as Bonifacio Day, Rizal Day, Heroism or Bataan Day, Independence Day, National Heroes Day, etc., that merely remind people of the closure of banks, schools and offices, and the leisure to clean the house. For all that, most are happily unaware that such days have been created to celebrate the State and evoke the spirit of nationalism.

The Filipino way

12 The lack of enthusiasm for celebrating the nation-state contrasts with the days that express Filipino-ness and exemplify Pinoy civilisation. The days in mind are Christmas, Holy Week, Flores de Mayo , All Saints’ Day, and the town fiesta, and special occasions, such as the common outpouring of grief at Corazón Aquino’s demise (2009), the massive sympathetic mourning after Flor Contemplacion’s execution in 1995 in Singapore (Rafael 2000: 212-27), or when world-class boxer Manny “Pacman” Pacquiao defends his title; then roads are deserted and everybody is glued to the box. These are the real national days that, like Pacman’s victories, evoke identification with the nation or bansa . A state that commemorates itself stages a military parade; national community, however, is expressed through pride in sporting events or the victory of a beauty queen, and the emotions sparked by popular religious observances. Then people spontaneously express their belonging to each other and their way of life.

13 The problem is not, as ever so often stated, that Filipinos do not love their native land or are reluctant to identify with its people. They do, much the same as almost everybody in this world. They are willing to sacrifice themselves for its welfare as overseas’ workers in the “prison without bars” of the Middle-East. Sure, they do not do so for the Republic, however often the latter hails them as “heroes of the nation”, but in order to keep their loved ones afloat in a country that does not offer any prospects. In brief, it is not a shortage of love for the native land, but a deficit of confidence in the State and the class that runs it. So, when a regime is distrusted, schools may propagate all the national symbols they can muster, but, in the absence of credible national leadership, to no avail.

14 As a result, Filipino-ness is expressed in its “little-traditional” forms, and not in symbols that stand for history and nation-state. Filipino-ness belongs to home and community. It is there that one finds the shared and distinctive representations of the Filipino ethos; these emblems belong to individual families and communities, such as the diplomas on the wall, graduation pictures, the cute Santo Niño, the serene Lady of Lourdes or the stark Mother of Perpetual Help, the plaza with its diminutive Rizal statue, the town hall and church, the basketball court, the band, the bus waiting shed, the fiesta and processions. All of these do not refer to an exemplary centre; they refer to nothing more than themselves. Up to the present, therefore, Filipino civilisation is expressed in a concrete style of life rather than in the abstract sense of an encompassing nation-state.

15 Naturally, this “little-traditional” scope is reflected in the principles of social construction of the lowlanders who trace descent bilaterally and whose religious imagination mirrors their kinship organisation (Mulder 1997: ch. 2). In their view, the social arrangement is a moral edifice based on family ties, the “sacred” position of parents, hierarchy and the essential inequality of individuals who are obliged (or not) to each other through “debts of gratitude” that spell their tangible life world. In the absence of an alternative, sociological understanding, they experience their moral inequality as a matter-of-course. As a result, the social studies-curriculum is devoid of a discussion of the concepts of civil society and democratisation, other than vague statements about the equality of citizens according to the Constitution that is repeatedly invoked as the Mariang Makiling- or Godot-like saviour of the nation (Mojares 2002: 1-19).

16 Experience-near existence shades off into the not-morally-obliging space that appears as the property of others, of politicians, officials, landlords and economic power-holders. Whereas this area may be seen as “public in itself”, it is not experienced as “of the public” or “for itself”. It is the vast territory where “men of prowess” (Wolters: 1999: 18-9) compete for power as the highly admired social good (King 2008: 177). For the vast majority, however, the public domain is an anarchy of impersonal and thus a-moral relationships where one ventures—if at all—to serve one’s political and economic well-being. It is the area reported about in the newspaper and other mass media that provide the ephemeral images and scandals by which it is, often deceptively, substantiated.

17 In this time of mass media, with a television set in almost every home, it is the pseudo culture of simulacra à la Baudrillard (1988) that pervasively dominates the media. Even as politics hold the pride of place, it is consumed as a kind of spectator sport that offers no serious competition to the lowest-common-denominator programmes broadcast country-wide. Hence, everyday culture radiating from the centre offers little to hold on to. Through the interminable bombardment of fleeting symbols and messages, people are anaesthetized against nationalism and identification with the State, against the ideals of active citizenship, and against the hope for the rule of law. They know that politics is too much talk and little substance, so why waste one’s time through speculating about the desirable state of affairs? As a result, people feel that they had better focus on survival, the safety of their family, and the consolation of religion.

18 At this point, it may be appropriate to note that religion, as a keystone of individual identity, has been patently prospering in Southeast Asia, and so in the Philippines, since the 1960s, and promises to be going strong for a long time to come (Mulder 2003: ch. 9; Willford et al. 2005: introduction). Even as this religious drive is individual-centred in confirming a person’s moral worth, such religiously driven righteousness can also exert not to be underestimated pressure on those who hold political power. It was the Church’s appeal that played an important role in the mass demonstrations against Presidents Marcos and Estrada, similar to religion being the driving force that ousted the Shah in 1978, and a key factor in President Suharto’s resignation in 1998 and the subsequent ascendancy of Moslem leader Abdurrahman Wahid. In Thailand, the neo-Buddhist Major-General Chamlong Srimuang of the Force of Righteousness Party brought down Prime Minister General Suchinda Khraprayoon in 1992, and possibly protesting Buddhist monks are more effective than Aung San Suu Kyi in undermining the Burmese junta.

Changing middle stratum

19 Whatever the changes in lifestyles and world view of the members of the educated middle classes, we should bear in mind that they are exemplary to the rest of the populace. They are the producers, disseminators, and consumers of mainstream and alternative ideas; they are the mainstay of public opinion, and their milieu is the matrix of ideas about the desirable order of society. For a while, in the 1960s and during the late-Marcos and early-Aquino years, progressive and nationalist ideas emanating from their quarters appeared to fire the public imagination. Nowadays, however, in a globalizing world, the nation seems to have been lost sight of, at the same time that primordial and professional bonds give reason to behaviour.

20 If we compare with the long period of the gestation of the idea of “our nation-state” in neighbouring Indonesia—pertinently present as of 1900, then institutionalising in the 1910s and 1920s in the Budi Utomo and Sarekat Islam associations, and from the 1920s onward in political platforms—then post-colonial nationalism in the Philippines has been no more than a flash in the pan. In 1946, when “sovereignty” was granted, the country was willingly more dependent on the USofA than during pre-war days. Whereas, in the 1950s, this was emphatically protested by politicians like Claro M. Recto and Lorenzo v. Tañada, the historian Teodoro A. Agoncillo, and the social-activist author Amado v. Hernandez, their nationalism was not widely understood, even as toward the end of the decade then President Carlos P. Garcia initiated a “Filipino-First” economic policy. Altogether, these early stirrings resulted in the efflorescence of nationalistic, social-emancipatory, and anti-authoritarian movements in the 1960s that went underground after the declaration of Martial Law on the 21st of September 1972.

21 Following the assassination of Benigno “Ninoy” Aquino on 23 August 1983, the ideas of the sixties resounded again throughout society. As the former students had meanwhile become professional, this was most vociferously the case in their demonstrations in the business heart of Makati City and in the ever more audacious opposition press. When Marcos’s shenanigans came to a head that catapulted Ninoy’s widow Corazon to the presidency in February 1986, it seemed as if social reconstruction was within arm’s reach. It didn’t last, and if people on the progressive side were still in doubt, the Mendiola massacre of peasant demonstrators toward the end of January 1987 made it abundantly clear that the now-restored oligarchy called the shots. Even so, the formers’ intellectual heritage lived on through the early nineties in a lively NGO scene and the alternative press, but politically the idealists had been marginalized and henceforward their ideas were irrelevant to the public agenda.

22 Meanwhile, they have been replaced by a vast generation of professionals who, as Martial Law babies, went to school under the dictatorship. As this was a time of state developmentalism, it induced a career-orientation in the students that has continued into the present. Their formal education was and is precariously low on social science and humanities content; at best they are oriented to future progress, resulting in generations that tend to be socially inattentive and devoid of a sense of history. This runs parallel to the sea change in technology that has overwhelmed their experience of life. As McLuhan commented in now far-off 1964, the medium is the message, and new media, new “extensions of man», new sources of power, production, and efficiency irreversibly change the world and with it, mentality.

23 If momentarily concentrating on these media, we note that, in the wake of the idealistic 1960s, television intruded into every home, and as it did, it banished books. Gradually, the calculator and, later, the bar-code expelled mental arithmetic. In the early 1980s, the computer came of age and revolutionised information and communication technology, at the same time that stereo and, later, videoke, drove out the guitar; in the 1990s, the internet and e-mail picked up, and since it has become rare to see someone lick a postage stamp. From the early 2000s on, people have become cell-phone addicts. When we reflect on the effects of these changing media on the way we live and imagine life to be, we’ll realise that it is an abyss that separates the 1960s with its belief in social constructability from the present.

24 In those recent olden days of the 1960s, it appeared as if there was some integrity between the Filipino way of life and the way it was thought to be. Nowadays, however, the outside world seems to have been disconnected from experience as people have to go by industrially and foreign produced images. With television and its illusions, they entered a pseudo-reality in which it becomes increasingly problematic to separate the real from the fantastic. As a result, people stick to their identity-confirming inner circle and hold on to their career, as all of us are finally experiencing Buddha’s truth that life out there is maya , delusory, indeed.

Civil society?

25 Ever since, in the 1920s, Filipinos got leeway to run their affairs, the public sphere has been the arena of traditional or money politics, presided over by, first, the colonial and, later, the neo-colonial oligarchy. The members of this class regard the country as their private preserve and exploit it to their advantage; consequently, they have and had no interest in creating a vibrant public of participating citizens. As a result, ideas about the public or common welfare miss a broad social basis, at the same time that the public realm is perceived as the field of contest of political and economic interests. For most people, therefore, it is a sphere to defend oneself against or to take advantage of, as one’s real life and identity belong elsewhere.

26 This concurs with the experience of contemporary mass society in which people do not actively participate; they are simply there, much as one is in a forest without participating in nature. In contrast with the activist student generation of the 1960s, the new urban middle stratum is not eager to be involved in “public” affairs. Besides, these days such affairs are obfuscated by the permanent bombardment of messages that emphasize the importance of individual lifestyles and consumption. So, whereas the mass demonstrations that finished Presidents Marcos and Estrada evoked the image of a vigilant civil society, deeper analysis shows that it were hegemonic interests that engineered public opinion. Accordingly, occasional popular mobilisation occurs “in the name of civil society” rather than as its product (Hedman 2006).

27 Apart from this, where would a vigorous civil society hail from? In the 1980s and 1990s, with the efflorescence of all sorts of cause-oriented groups and NGOs, people were easily led to believe in the vitality of civic consciousness, at the same time that the very proliferation of such groups demonstrated their basic flaw, often joked about as, “Two Filipinos is two NGOs. ” To get people to stick to a cause or a program, even when it is clearly to their advantage, is almost impossible as long as they remain leading-personality oriented and as perennial interpersonal rivalries keep them from making common cause. No need to say that this quality easily reduces them to playthings of power-holders and their divide-and-rule tactics.

28 There is more to this. A vigorous civil society as a watchdog against political horse-play and economic manipulation can only flourish if it has a vast recruitment base of well-educated and critical people. Even as there are quite a few of such citizens, we should realise, as Anderson cautioned in 1988, that the educated middle stratum of Philippine society is being haemorrhaged through emigration, mostly to the USA, and so fails to develop into a significant competitor of the oligarchy (1998: 212).

29 Ergo , in the absence of a significant civil opponent, the Philippine State is hostage to the political and business interests of oligarchs that have no stake in strengthening it; on the contrary, through loop holing the Constitution and a highly personalised political system, corruption has consciously been built in (Villacorte 1987). As a result, politics is held in low esteem at the same time that public life is subject to interests over and against which the citizens feel powerless.

Individual-centeredness

30 In view of this situation, there is little cause for wonder that most people doggedly pursue their own course irrespective of others ( kanya-kanya ). In a way, this agrees with the propagation of consumerism that stimulates people to acquire the status symbols that mark their individuality. In other words, where society is lost sight of, its component members come to the fore, and so the focus of public life is on outstanding, single individuals, rather than on the impersonal “generalised other” or something as intangible as the public interest.

31 At present, the social life of the nation is appreciably open to the world, and has become part of a post-national global environment that is not subject to any ideology or ethical system other than the rules of political and economic expediency. Because of people’s dependence on it for survival and advancement, it intrudes into private life, which may give cause to frustration. Subsequently, they express their grumbling in newspaper columns and letters to the editor, in values education courses, in sermons and exhortatory speeches that all emphasize decency, sacrifice, and personal virtue as the well-springs of good society. This self-centred orientation leads away from legal or ideological attempts to come to grips with the public world that remains hidden in vagueness. It is there to watch, not to actively participate in. As a result, only minimal demands on the state and economy can be expected to emanate from the new urban middle stratum.

32 This moral self-centeredness dovetails conveniently with the interests of the state-owning class. Its introduction of values education in order to improve the quality of public life seamlessly connected with its roots in family and person-centred morals. Later on, this thinking resounded in the repeated appeals for moral reform that emanated from then President Arroyo. Whereas suchlike social imagination necessarily fails to come to grips with society-in-the-abstract, it may be soothing to the individual soul. One may even argue that it comes timely in a borderless world that leaves the person thrown back on the comprehensible, identity confirming areas of experience, such as family and religion.

Culture of the ruling class

33 In establishing their dominion, the Spaniards were successful in co-opting the former chieftains ( datu ) and the upper echelon of freemen ( maharlika ) of the disparate communities ( baranggay ). Through creating this privileged stratum of native principalía as their henchmen and the old wisdom of divide and rule, the separation of the political class from the common people evolved from early colonial times. Through the imperial policy of gathering the population “under the bells”, these original principalía became the kernel of urban, i.e., of pueblo society.

34 A separate class of people that evolved in and around Manila were the Chinese who were attracted by the opportunities the colonial emporium held in store. Many of them took native Christian wives, so that by the time the Chinese were expelled from the Islands (1766), a considerable number of Chinese-Filipino mestizos could step into their fathers’ shoes. Entrepreneurially minded, they came to dominate the retail trade of the Islands and seized on the opportunities—just as exponents of the principalía did—the commercialisation of agriculture and the opening up of the country to world trade offered.

35 Since a measure of political clout and money attract each other, the two classes fused and, as the 19th century proceeded, their intermixture gave birth to the identifiable ancestors of the current state-owning elite (Simbulan 2005). In the last quarter of the century, this highly successful middle class had begun to send some of its male offspring to the venues of higher education in the colony and the mother country, giving rise to a stratum of Hispanicized intellectuals, the so-called ilustrados , who matured as the vanguard of Filipino nationalism.

36 If these “enlightened ones” would have had it their way, and if the Americans had not betrayed the Revolution, it could have been that their incipient cultural leadership would have created a transcendent national ideology that could unite Filipinos as a nation. What comes to mind in this respect are the works of José Rizal, the ruminations on the State of Apolinario Mabini, the ideas of Pedro Paterno, T.H. Pardo de Tavera, and Isabelo de los Reyes as “the brains of the nation” (Mojares 2006), Lope K. Santos’s dream of social justice as unfolded in his then widely-read Banaag at Sikat (“from early dawn to full brilliance”, 1906), the authors of the hugely popular nationalistic or “seditious” theatre plays, and the establishment of the schismatic Iglesia Filipina Independiente .

37 It would not be. We noted the emergence of a hybrid native middle class and should be aware of the pettiness of its political position. Hence, when this bourgeoisie joined Aguinaldo’s Revolution, most of its members did so in the hope of combining their economic acumen with political influence; at the same time, the majority of them was not interested in ilustrado idealism. As the realists they were, they would soon accommodate to the new American overlord who was, in fact, generous in dispensing political opportunity. When, in the 1920s, the lease to the new master was relaxed, they stormed ahead in plundering the country’s resources, as if they had never heard of the idea of the common welfare (Anderson 1998: 202-3). If there was such an idea at all, it was the Commonwealth with the United States that beckoned.

38 With the Grant of Independence in 1946, we witness the, at least for South-East Asia, curious spectacle of a privileged class that had always been subservient to its masters becoming the tutelary heir to the latter’s power. As a colonial creation, it is colonial history that legitimizes the present oligarchy that has long lost its roots among the ordinary folks. Largely mestizo and culturally oriented to the world of the West, its members do not feel to have more in common with the ordinary people than the vernacular to give orders in. As a consolidated, privileged class, whose power has been used to protect its landed and other interests, it stands in opposition to those its members refer to as the “common tao ” (people).

39 In other words, if there is a problem of nationhood or an absence of identification with the common weal, the problem should be pinned on the country’s oligarchy. Repeatedly, the ordinary people have expressed their desire to partake in the country’s course and destiny. Think of the efflorescence of the Katipunan that initiated the Revolution of 1896, the socialist and communist movements of the American period, the popularity of the Democratic Alliance (1945), the hope of the masa expressed in the elections of Magsaysay (1954) and Cory Aquino (1986), the landslide victory of “Erap” Estrada (1998), and his 30% of the vote in 2010, but whatever the hopes of the ordinary folk, they would persistently be betrayed by the state-owning class that is averse to their emancipation and nationalism. Let everybody in the land express their belonging through watching a glorious Pacquiao, but the humble “common tao ” should stay clear of politics and the affairs of State, even as they are allowed to cast their vote.

40 With the elite’s power of determining the contents of the mandatory curriculum, school teaching keeps it this way. The course outline of the subject of “History and Government” is political through and through, and should build up to having an independent state with sovereignty, three branches of government, and foreign relations. To anticipate this situation and long before contact with Spain, primordial communities are said to be ánd Filipino ánd to possess all of these, which implies that there was nothing to learn or that the continuous process of change and becoming does not apply in the Islands. People there had a high civilisation, even wrote down [some of] their laws as the baranggay chieftain ( datu ) lorded it over the thirty to one hundred families of his jurisdiction. So, long before Montesquieu formulated the Trias Politica (1748), the datu is said to be invested with legislative, executive and juridical power, at the same time that he is the head of the armed forces. This is very much in the image of the absolute monarch who proclaimed “ l’état, c’est moi ” (the state, that’s me) or of somebody like Marcos, the usurper of freedom and rights, and ordinary dictator.

41 The school’s approach to history and government is crammed with this type of a-historical and irresponsible statements, at the same time that it keeps the becoming of the state-owning class meticulously out of sight. Instead of presenting the cultural history of the slow evolution of a potential nation—an endeavour that would connect the past to the present—political chronology takes over. Through chopping up in seemingly unconnected episodes, such as the Spanish colonial State, the Revolution of 1896, the Philippine-American War, the blessings of American colonialism and the Commonwealth, the Japanese Occupation, Liberation, and Independence, continuity and becoming are lost sight of. As if to highlight this rape of history, the last period is presented through individual presidential reigns, Martial Law, New Republic, the EDSA demonstrations of 1986 that undid Marcos, more reigns, the EDSA demonstrations of 2001 that ousted Estrada, and President Arroyo’s administration.

42 Because this periodisation highlights transient affairs, observations on the period of Independence read like a newspaper. Some texts are adamant that politics is powered by opportunism, corruption and shady deals—in which sense the picture of a rotten society is no different from that in the mandatory course of Values Education. In spite of such occasional realism, all texts must enumerate every president’s noble intentions that, alas, invariably come to naught, even as it is never explained why this is so.

43 On the basis of so much “legitimate symbolic violence” (Bourdieu, Passeron 1977: 13-5, 24-5), it becomes well-nigh impossible to understand social life, let alone to identify with the nation and its past. So, if, theoretically, school should foster a sense of self that comes to include the wider community, we may safely conclude that the way it shapes this demand makes it impossible to imagine that one, as a student, is personally involved. Besides, at the same time that much attention is devoted to the birth of ilustrado and popular nationalism in the period preceding the Revolution, the present invocation of Rizal, Bonifacio, and Mabini is no better than evoking phantoms of the past that are safely on the far side of the watershed event of the American occupation. Ironically, current Indonesian school texts still refer to Rizal, the Revolution and the First Republic as exemplary for the awakening of (anti-colonial) nationalism in Asia.

National transcendence?

44 In spite of all the phraseology about “nationhood”, “moral recovery”, and the underdevelopment of “nationalism”, there is nothing that reminds of a national doctrine other than silly lists of national symbols and beauty spots, and ever-repeated anthem singing and flag-raising. The contrast with Indonesia’s Panca Sila ideology and Thailand’s theory of The Three Institutions is striking, as these teachings clearly evoke an exemplary centre that lends legitimacy to the institutions of the State and that sets certain parameters within which national discourses can thrive. They also eventuated in Indonesians and Thai identifying with their nation-states as matters-of-course.

45 As far as the Philippines goes, it is a could-have-been, as the institution of the State has never been held in great esteem. Colonial in its origins, its contempt for and exploitation of the populace couldn’t lend it much legitimacy. If anything, the State was something to stay away from or to take advantage of. Accordingly, its local representatives, the principalía , developed a political culture of artfulness and deceit in balancing the demands of a powerful overlord with their own interests (Corpuz 1989: xii-iii). When they were finally put to the task of organizing the State on their own, they duly wrote the foundational ideas of People’s Sovereignty, Justice, Separation of Powers, Popular Representation, and (quality) Education in its charter. However, since all or most of these are no better than figments of a foreign imagination, they were never taken seriously, and so, when Marcos’s remarkable predecessor, Commonwealth President Manuel L. Quezon, established himself as a virtual dictator, he held no scruples about editing the 1935 Constitution to his liking (McCoy 1989).

46 Since then, a perennial deficit of popular endorsement, poor performance, and political manipulation prevented the institutions of the State, such as the President, Congress, and the Supreme Court, to develop into shining, transcendent centres of the nation. As a result, there is little high-cultural substance to overarch the little-traditional way of life of the general public. The only nation-wide institution that could possibly qualify is the Church, but few are those who would point to the Catholic Bishops Conference of the Philippines as an authoritative centre, not only because it dirties its hands in politics or because of its unpopular position regarding reproductive health, but most particularly because church-life belongs to the parish and its local traditions.

47 Arguably, History is the great institution of a nation-state for sanctioning its identity. It is the source of emotive symbols that lend pride and reason to the present as the presumptive continuation of a semi-mythic past. Even so, whereas the Indonesians have their Majapahit and the Thai their Sukhothai, American imperialism cheated the Philippines of the glory of being the first Asian nation to defeat, seven years ahead of Japan, a Western power—an event that inspired nationalists from Sun Yat Sen to Sukarno. Unfortunately, the Americans kept the humiliation of being a colony alive at the same time that they were over-eager to denigrate the country’s cultural past and relegate it to the dustbin of irrelevance. Through creating, in Nick Joaquin’s metaphor, a lettered generation of people without fathers and grandfathers, or, in the colonial trope, Little Brown Brothers, culture and history were aborted, and with it confidence and pride in identity and continuity. In brief, American aggression and tutelage brought about a cultural calamity.

48 The history of the Philippines begins with the Spanish conquista , and if we keep our focus on this political event, history has given the Filipinos a bad deal. Political history, however, is ephemeral; it is like the events of the day in the newspaper that serves to wrap salted fish the day after. If we want history to cohere, we have to be aware of the spirit of the times, of intentions and motivations. Since these constitute the gist of history, we had better follow Febvre’s call for tracing the evolution of the ways of thinking and experiencing of the common man, the elite and other relevant groups (1973). When we follow this advice, we will find the relevance of the past to understanding current existence. What began with the introduction of the plough and new crops, the wheel and the horse, Catholicism and the printing press, and the opening of the country to Asia and the world, had its repercussions on mentality and eventually aroused the spirits of popular, ilustrado and elitist nationalisms, the idea of Filipino identity, and ideas on how to give these shape in a free country.

49 It is regrettable to note that already in the days of the successful Revolution against Spain, the nationalist potential of all and sundry imagining to belong together was effectively debilitated. Firstly, through the liquidation of the popular Katipunan leader Andres Bonifacio soon after the petty bourgeois leadership of Aguinaldo had effectively taken over. Then, through the blatant self-serving nature of most members of the leading class (e.g., Guerrero 1982). Thirdly, through the explicit exclusion of the common people when the principalía set up their Malolos Republic (1898-99) that, fourthly, lorded it over the populace so abusively that many became nostalgic of the Spanish past ( ib. : 175-79). No wonder that at the time the Republic was fighting the Americans, many of the ordinary citizens turned their back on it and even offered organised resistance, such as the Guardia de Honor in Pangasinan. As a result, there is no cause for wonder that, in 1902, the peasantry of Palanan, Isabela, had no scruples in delivering the Republic’s President Aguinaldo to the Americans after he had sought refuge there (Joaquin 1988: ch. 10).

50 Apart from the endemic split between the haves and the have-nots, the equally endemic opportunism of most of the erstwhile republican leadership made them side with the Americans as soon as they recognised which side their bread was buttered on. Whereas popularly based pockets of resistance against the new supremacy held out until 1912, the Americans had little trouble in dousing the principalía ’s nationalist impetus, firstly through opening up political and economic opportunity, then through saturating the privileged class with American-style modernity and school education.

51 What remained, in spite of the American steamroller, was and is the Pinoy way of life with its multitude of distinctive features, in which we recognize and the deep past, and Spanish cuisine and Catholicism, American fast-food, coke and historical obfuscation, and the inescapable onslaught of ever new media. Even so, in spite of these vicissitudes, there is much more continuity in the epic of Philippine becoming over the last 500 years than between the heyday of Majapahit and present-day Indonesia. This continuity demonstrates a certain national transcendence and a culturally colonial past that can usefully serve to create the sense of nation, such as plausibly pioneered by Corpuz, Joaquin, and Zialcita.

52 When we train our attention on the history of the political-economy, however, we’ll see that, under whatever regime, a consolidated, privileged class developed whose interests are opposed to those of the common people. As the modern day principalía , they have no interest in providing the cultural leadership an imagined community needs to refer to. In this they are supported by a social imagination that is myopically focussed on the immediate experience of life and media that almost exclusively centre on political personalities.

The insufficiency of nationhood

53 The insufficiency of Filipino nationhood lies in its failure to mould the population into an organic whole or an encompassing moral order in which people imagine that they belong together. In the absence of a shared narrative of collective emancipation that ties private life to an authoritative centre of nationhood, we find two nations in the independent Philippine State, that is to say, the largely mestizo elite and the “common tao .” Since these “nations” cannot articulate, it keeps all and sundry—inclusive of the members of the new middle classes—from identifying with the whole and prevents them from developing into a nation of responsible citizens. As a result, nation building remains a task stretching way into the future.

Wolters , O.W., 1999, History, Culture and Religion in Southeast Asian Perspectives , Singapore: Institute for Southeast Asian Studies (rev. ed. of 1982 orig.).

Zialcita , Fernando N., 2005, Authentic though not Exotic; Essays on Filipino Identity , Quezon City: Ateneo de Manila University Press.

Bibliography

Anderson, Benedict, 1983, Imagined Communities: Reflections on the Origin and Spread of Nationalism , London: Verso.

Anderson , Benedict, 1998, “ Cacique Democracy in the Philippines,” The Spectre of Comparisons. Nationalism, Southeast Asia, and the World , London, New York: Verso.

Baudrillard , Jean, 1988, “Simulacra and Simulations,” in Selected Writings , M. Poster, éd., Oxford, London: Polity Press.

Bourdieu , Pierre, & Jean-Claude Passeron, 1977, Reproduction in Education, Society and Culture , London: Sage Puplications.

Building a People, Building a Nation. A Moral Recovery Program , 1988, Quezon City: Instructional Materials Corporation.

Constantino , Renato, 1966, “The Mis-education of the Filipino,” in The Filipinos in the Philippines and Other Essays , Renato Constantino, éd., Quezon City: Malaya Books.

Corpuz , O.D., 1989, The Roots of the Filipino Nation. I, II , Quezon City: Aklahi Fnd.

English , Leo J., 1986, Tagalog-English Dictionary , Metro Manila: National Book Store.

Febvre , Lucien, 1973, “Sensibility and history: How to reconstitute the emotional life of the past,” in A New Kind of History from the Writings of Lucien Febvre , P. Burke, éd., New York: Harper and Row, p. 12-26.

Gomperts , Amrit, Arnoud Haag & Peter Carey, 2010, “Rediscovering the royal capital of Majapahit,” The Newsletter , 53: 12-13.

Guerrero , Milagros C., 1982, “The Provincial and municipal elites of Luzon during the Revolution, 1998-1902,” in Philippine Social History: Global Trade and Local Transformations , Alfred W. McCoy, Ed. C. de Jesus, ed., Quezon City: Ateneo de Manila University Press, p. 155-190.

Hedman , Eva-Lotta E., 2006, In the Name of Civil Society: From Free Election Movements to People Power in the Philippines , Honolulu: University of Hawaii Press.

Joaquin , Nick, 1988, Culture and History. Occasional Notes on the Process of Philippine Becoming , Metro Manila: Solar Publishing Corp.

King , Victor T., 2008, The Sociology of Southeast Asia: Transformations in a Developing Region , Copenhagen: NIAS Press.

McCoy , Alfred W., 1989, “Quezon’s Commonwealth: The emergence of Philippine authoritarianism,” in Philippine Colonial Democracy , Ruby R. Paredes, ed., Quezon City: Ateneo de Manila University Press.

McLuhan , M., 1964, Understanding Media: The Extensions of Man , New York: McGraw Hill.

Mojares , Resil B., 2002, Waiting for Mariang Makiling: Essays in Philippine Cultural History , Quezon City: Ateneo de Manila University Press.

Mojares , Resil. B., 2006, Brains of the Nation: Pedro Paterno, T.H. Pardo de Tavera, Isabelo de los Reyes and the Production of Modern Knowledge , Quezon City: Ateneo de Manila University Press.

Montesquieu , 1748, L’Esprit des lois , Genève : Barillot & Fils.

Mulder , Niels, 1997, Inside Philippine Society. Interpretations of Everyday Life , Quezon City: New Day Publishers.

Mulder , Niels, 2000, Filipino Images; Culture of the Public World , Quezon City: New Day Publishers.

Mulder , Niels, 2003, Southeast Asian Images; Toward Civil Society? , Chiang Mai: Silkworm Books.

Rafael , Vicente L., 2000, White Love and Other Events in Filipino History , Quezon City: Ateneo de Manila University Press.

Simbulan , Dante C., [1965] 2005, The Modern Principalia; The Historical Evolution of the Philippine Ruling Oligarchy , Quezon City: University of the Philippines Press.

Villacorta , Wilfrido v., 1987, “The Dynamics and Process of Writing the 1987 Constitution”, Praxis , 2, 1.

Willford , Andrew C. & Kenneth M. George, éd., 2005, Spirited Politics: Religion and Public Life in Contemporary Southeast Asia , Ithaca: Cornell Southeast Asia Program Publications.

Bibliographical reference

Niels Mulder , “ The Insufficiency of Filipino Nationhood ” ,  Moussons , 20 | 2012, 183-196.

Electronic reference

Niels Mulder , “ The Insufficiency of Filipino Nationhood ” ,  Moussons [Online], 20 | 2012, Online since 27 November 2012 , connection on 10 April 2024 . URL : http://journals.openedition.org/moussons/1690; DOI : https://doi.org/10.4000/moussons.1690

About the author

Niels mulder.

Niels Mulder has retired to the southern slope of the mystically potent Mt. Banáhaw, Philippines, where he stays in touch through [email protected] .

By this author

• The Philippine Enigma [Full text] L’énigme philippine Published in Moussons , 28 | 2016

The text only may be used under licence CC BY-NC-ND 4.0 . All other elements (illustrations, imported files) are “All rights reserved”, unless otherwise stated.

Full text issues

• 42 | 2023 After Migration. Trajectories, Transmission, Belongings of People from Southeast Asia
• 41 | 2023 The Scale of the Dragon’s Shadow. China’s Aid and Investment in Southeast Asia (2000-2022)
• 40 | 2022 Social Science Research on Southeast Asia
• 39 | 2022 Social Science Research on Southeast Asia
• 38 | 2021 Biomedicine in Southeast Asia. Appropriation of Knowledge, Practices and Technologies
• 37 | 2021 Non-Market Transfers in Southeast Asia and Beyond. Diversity of Exchange and Dynamics of Social Relations
• 36 | 2020 The Heritage Field and its Urban-Making Process in Southeast Asia
• 35 | 2020 Social Science Research on Southeast Asia
• 34 | 2019 Risk Perception and Management in Southeast Asia
• 33 | 2019 Social Science Research on Southeast Asia
• 32 | 2018 Social Science Research on Southeast Asie
• 31 | 2018 Social Science Research on Southeast Asia
• 30 | 2017 Heritage in Cambodia: Ancient Rituals, New Practices and Issues of Appropriation
• 29 | 2017 Sexual Trade in Southeast Asia. Multidisciplinary Approaches
• 28 | 2016 Social Science Research on Southeast Asia
• 27 | 2016 The Sea Beyond all Borders: The Link between Southeast Asian Countries
• 26 | 2015 Biographical Landscapes of Asian Migrants
• 25 | 2015 Social Science Research on Southeast Asia
• 24 | 2014 The “Conveyors”. Portrait of group of Vietnamese intellectuals in the Franco-Vietnamese Century (1858-1954)
• 23 | 2014 Learned and Reflected Knowledges
• 22 | 2013 Recherche en sciences humaines sur l'Asie du Sud-Est
• 21 | 2013 Lectures anthropologiques de l'éthique entrepreneuriale
• 20 | 2012 Social Science Research on Southeast Asia
• 19 | 2012 Rituels, territoires et pouvoirs dans les marges sino-indiennes
• 18 | 2011 La ville thaïe กรุงเทพฯ [Krungthep, etc.]
• 17 | 2011 The “Moving” Frontiers of Burma
• 16 | 2010 Social Science Research on Southeast Asia
• 15 | 2010 La santé : miroir des sociétés d'Asie du Sud-Est
• 13-14 | 2009 Vietnam : Histoire et perspectives contemporaines
• 12 | 2008 Social Science Research on Southeast Asia
• 11 | 2007 Indonesia
• 9-10 | 2006 Agriculture in Southeast Asia: an update
• 8 | 2005 Social Science Research on Southeast Asia
• 7 | 2004 Social Science Research on Southeast Asia
• 6 | 2002 Social Science Research on Southeast Asia
• 5 | 2002 Social Science Research on Southeast Asia
• 4 | 2001 Social Science Research on Southeast Asia
• 3 | 2001 Social Science Research on Southeast Asia
• 2 | 2000 Social Science Research on Southeast Asia
• 1 | 2000 Social Science Research on Southeast Asia
• 99 | 1999 Recherche en sciences humaines sur l’Asie du Sud-Est
• Présentation
• Comités et rédaction
• Politique éditoriale
• Conseils aux auteurs
• Instructions to the authors
• Historique des rédactions en chef et des comités éditoriaux

Informations

• Affichage des polices de caractères asiatiques
• Abonnements et commande
• Mentions légales & crédits
• Publishing policies

Appels à contribution

• Appels en cours
• Appels clos

Newsletters

• OpenEdition Newsletter

In collaboration with

• Journal supported by the Institut des sciences humaines et sociales (InSHS) of the CNRS, 2023-2024

Electronic ISSN 2262-8363

Read detailed presentation  

Site map  – Syndication

Privacy Policy  – About Cookies  – Report a problem

OpenEdition Journals member  – Published with Lodel  – Administration only

You will be redirected to OpenEdition Search

• Search Menu
• Advance Articles
• Author Guidelines
• Submission Site
• Open Access Policy
• Self-Archiving Policy
• About Policy and Society
• Editorial Board
• Advertising & Corporate Services
• Journals on Oxford Academic
• Books on Oxford Academic

Article Contents

Whither nationalism in the philippines the political challenge of the globalising age.

• Article contents
• Figures & tables
• Supplementary Data

Kathleen Weekley, Whither Nationalism in the Philippines? The Political Challenge of the Globalising Age, Policy and Society , Volume 15, Issue 1, June 1998, Pages 1–22, https://doi.org/10.1080/10349952.1998.11876676

• Permissions Icon Permissions

This article argues that twentieth century modernist nationalism can no longer be a political strategy for the Filipino left because it rests on the obliteration of differences. Rethinking old-style anti-imperialism will force the left to recognise the state as a key site of political struggle and also to understand that ethnic, class and other social cleavages are not transcended via a ‘national’ imaginary except through the use of violence. Moreover, in the 1990s as states band together in regional blocs, critics of contemporary capitalism in the Asia-Pacific would do well to pursue a radical democratic rather than nationalist agenda. I argue that the Philippine state's relative historical lack of success in hegemonic nation-building, along with a recently reinvigorated democratic impulse, offer the Filipino left a unique opportunity to lead a popular campaign for a new regional identity—one committed to democratic principles rather than exclusivist notions of ‘national belonging.’ Such popular interpretations are necessary to subvert other putative transnational discourses such as ‘Asian values.’

Agoncillo , T.   1969 . A Short History of the Philippines . New York : Mentor .

Google Scholar

Google Preview

Anderson , B.   1991 . Imagined Communities . 2nd ed.   London : Verso .

Balweg , Fr. C.   1986 . Interview in Diliman Review , Vol. 35 (5 & 6).

Bello , W.   1997 . ‘Democratic Expansion and Democratic Deepening in Southeast Asia: the Fateful Connection’ , Focus-on-Security , Vol. 1 ( 1 ), August 26. Electronic bulletin of Focus on the Global South Website: http://focusweb.org .

Casipe , R.   1996 . ‘Fallacies Against Human Rights’ , Pingkian, A Journal of the Philippine Left . Vol. 1 ( 1 ), July.

Castles , S.   1997 . ‘Citizenship and the Other in the Age of Migration.’   Paper presented to Paper presented to the UNRISD/Swinbume University of Technology Globalisation and Citizenship conference, Melbourne, May.

Citizens' Alternative Party . 1996 . Draft Documents . Quezon City: Unpublished papers.

Clammer , J.   1993 . ‘Deconstructing Values: the Establishment of a National Ideology and its Implications for Singapore's Political Future.’   In Singapore Changes Guard , ed. G.   Rodan . New York : St. Martin's Press .

Constantino , R.   1978 . Neocolonial Identity and Counter-Consciousness . London : Merlin .

Coronel Ferrer , M.   1995 . ‘ Regional Governance: Are We Ready? ’ Kasarinlan , Vol. 10 ( 3 ) 1st Quarter.

Dacanay , M. L.   1997 . ‘Citizenship, Globalization and Sustainable Development: The View From the Philippines’ Paper presented to the UNRISD/Swinburne University of Technology Globalisation and Citizenship conference, Melbourne , May.

Davidson , A.   1994 . ‘The Citizen who does not Belong: Multiculturalism, Citizenship and Democracy.’ Paper presented to ‘Ethics of Democracy’ conference, Lisbon.

Davidson , A.   1996 . ‘Expansionary Citizenship; the European Experience.’   Paper presented to the UNRISD Globalisation and Citizenship: An International Conference . Geneva , December.

Davidson , A.   1997 . From Subject to Citizen . Cambridge University Press , Cambridge .

Diokno , M.   1997 . ‘The Democratizing Function of Citizenship in a MultiCultural Milieu.’   Paper presented to the UNRISD/Swinburne University of Technology Globalisation and Citizenship Conference , Melbourne , May.

Guerrerro , A. (pseudonym), [ 1971 ] 1979 . Philippine Society and Revolution . Reprint. International Association of Filipino Patriots : Oakland .

Hindess , B.   1997 . ‘Divide and Rule: The International Character of Modern Citizenship.’   In Australasian Political Studies 1997 Volume Two. Proceedings of the 1997 Annual Conference . Adelaide : Australasian Political Studies Association .

Horsman , M. and A.   Marshall .   1994 . After the Nation-State . London : Harper Collins .

Ileto , R.   1979 . Pasyon and Revolution Popular Movements in the Philippines, 1840–1910 . Quezon City : Ateneo de Manila University Press .

Kerkvliet , B.   1979 . The Huk Rebellion: A Study of Peasant Revolt in the Philippines . Berkeley : University of California Press .

McCoy , A. ‘Introduction: The Social History of an Archipelago.’ In Philippine Social History Global Trade and Local Transformations , eds. A.   McCoy and E.   de Jesus , Quezon City : Ateneo de Manila University Press in Cooperation with Asian Studies Association of Australia .

Malay , P. C.   1992 . Translator's Note to S V Alvarez, The Katipunan and the Revolution: Memoirs of a General . Quezon City : Ateneo de Manila University Press .

Manila Times 23 September 1997 .

McDonald , C.   1995 . ‘Indigenous Peoples of the Philippines: Between Segregation and Integration.’   In Indigenous Peoples of Asia , eds. R.H   Barnes  et al.    Michigan : Association of Asian Studies Monograph and Occasional Paper Series, #48.

Neary , I.   1997 . ‘Burakumin in Contemporary Japan.’ In M.   Weiner (ed.) , Japan's Minorities . London : Routledge .

Paredes , R.   1992 . ‘Introduction: Revolutionary as Historian.’   In The Katipunan and the Revolution: Memoirs of a General . Quezon City : Ateneo de Manila University .

Soysal , Y.   1997 . ‘Changing Parameters of Citizenship and Claims-Making: organised Islam in European Public Spheres.’   Paper presented to the UNRISD/Swinburne University of Technology Globalisation and Citizenship conference , Melbourne , May.

Taira , K.   1997 . ‘Troubled National Identity.’   In Japan's Minorities , ed. M.   Weiner . London : Routledge .

Weekend Australian , 13 – 14 September 1997 .

Weekley . K.   1996 . ‘From Vanguard to Rearguard: the Communist Party of the Philippines 1969–1993.’ University of Sydney : Unpublished PhD manuscript.

Email alerts

Citing articles via.

• Advertising & Corporate Services
• Journals Career Network

Affiliations

• Online ISSN 1839-3373
• Print ISSN 1449-4035
• Copyright © 2024 Darryl S. Jarvis and M. Ramesh
• About Oxford Academic
• Publish journals with us
• University press partners
• What we publish
• New features  
• Open access
• Institutional account management
• Rights and permissions
• Get help with access
• Accessibility
• Advertising
• Media enquiries
• Oxford University Press
• Oxford Languages
• University of Oxford

Oxford University Press is a department of the University of Oxford. It furthers the University's objective of excellence in research, scholarship, and education by publishing worldwide

• Copyright © 2024 Oxford University Press
• Cookie settings
• Cookie policy
• Privacy policy
• Legal notice

This Feature Is Available To Subscribers Only

Sign In or Create an Account

This PDF is available to Subscribers Only

For full access to this pdf, sign in to an existing account, or purchase an annual subscription.

Example Of Nationalism In The Philippines

This essay sample on Example Of Nationalism In The Philippines provides all necessary basic info on this matter, including the most common “for and against” arguments. Below are the introduction, body and conclusion parts of this essay.

————————————————- Filipino nationalism Filipino Nationalism is an upsurge of patriotic sentiments and nationalistic ideals in the Philippines of the 19th century that came consequently as a result of more than two centuries of Spanish rule[1] and as an immediate outcome of the Filipino Propaganda Movement (mostly in Europe) from 1872 to 1892.

It served as the backbone of the first nationalist revolution inAsia, the Philippine Revolution of 1896. [2] ————————————————-

The Creole Age (1780s-1872) The term “Filipino” in its earliest sense referred to Spaniards born in the Philippines or Insulares (Creoles) and from which Filipino Nationalism began. Spanish-born Spaniards or mainland Spaniards residing in the Philippines were referred to as Peninsulares.

The indigenous peoples of the Philippines were referred to as Indios. Those of mixed ancestry were referred to asMestizos. Traditionally, the Creoles had enjoyed various government and church positions—composing mainly the majority of the government bureaucracy itself. 3] The decline of Galleon Tradebetween Manila and Acapulco and the growing sense of economic insecurity in the later years of the 18th century led the Creoles to turn their attention to agricultural production. The Creoles gradually changed from a very government-dependent class into capital-driven entrepreneurs.

Proficient in: Asia

“ Rhizman is absolutely amazing at what he does . I highly recommend him if you need an assignment done ”

Their turning of attention towards guilded soil caused the rise of the large privatehaciendas. Various government and church positions were transferred to the roles of the Peninsulares who were characterized mostly in the 19th century Philippine history as corrupt bureaucrats.

What Makes A True Filipino Essay

The earliest signs of Filipino Nationalism could be seen in the writings of Luis Rodriguez Varela, a Creole educated in liberal France and highly exposed to the romanticism of the age. Knighted under the Order of Carlos III, Varela was perhaps the only Philippine Creole who was actually part of European nobility. The court gazette in Madrid announced that he was to become a Conde and from that point on proudly called himself Conde Filipino. He championed the rights of Filipinos in the islands and slowly made the term pplicable to anyone born in the Philippines. However, by 1823 he was deported together with other Creoles [allegedly known as Los Hijos del Pais (English: The Children of the Country)], after being associated with a Creole revolt in Manila led by the Mexican Creole Andres Novales. [4] Varela would then retire from politics but his nationalism was carried on by another Creole Padre Pelaez, who campaigned for the rights of Filipino priests (Creoles, Mestizos and Indios) and pressed for secularization of Philippine parishes.

The Latin American revolutions and decline of friar influence in Spain resulted in the increase of the regular clergy (Peninsular friars) in the Philippines. Filipino priests (Creoles, Mestizos and Indios) were being replaced by Spanish friars (Peninsulares) and Pelaez demanded explanation as to the legality of replacing asecular with regulars—which is in contradiction to the Exponi nobis. Pelaez brought the case to the Vatican almost succeeded if not for an earthquake that cut his career short and the ideology would be carried by his more militant disciple, Jose Burgos.

Burgos in turn died after the infamous Cavite Mutiny, which was pinned on Burgos as his attempt to start a Creole Revolution and make himself president or Rey Indio. The death of Jose Burgos, and the other alleged conspirators Mariano Gomez and Jacinto Zamora, seemingly ended the entire Creole movement in 1872. [4] Governor-General Rafael de Izquierdo y Gutierrez unleashed his reign of terror in order to prevent the spread of the Creole ideology—Filipino nationalism. ————————————————- ————————————————- ———————————————— Spread of Filipino Nationalism (1872-1892) But the Creole affair was seen by the other natives (Mestizos and Indios) as a simple family affair—Spaniards born in Spain (Peninsulares) against Spaniards born in the Philippines (Creoles). The events of 1872 however invited the other colored section of the Ilustrados (English: Intellectually Enlightened Class) to at least do something to preserve the Creole ideals. Seeing the impossibility of a revolution against Izquierdo and the

Governor-General’s brutal reign convinced the Ilustrados to get out of the Philippines and continue propaganda in Europe. This massive propaganda upheaval from 1872 to 1892 is now known as the Propaganda Movement. Through their writings and orations, Marcelo H. del Pilar, Graciano Lopez Jaena andJose Rizal sounded the trumpets of Filipino nationalism and brought it to the level of the masses. Rizal’s Noli me tangere and El filibusterismo rode the increasing anti-Spanish (anti-Peninsulares) sentiments in the islands and was pushing the people towards revolution. 5] By July 1892, an Ilustrado mass man in the name of Andres Bonifacio established a revolutionary party based on the Filipino nationalism that started with Los Hijos del Pais–Katipunan ng mga Anak ng Bayan. Ideology turned into revolution and gave Asia its first anti-imperialist/nationalist revolution by the last week of August 1896. ————————————————- Philippine nationalism Philippine nationalism is an upsurge of patriotic sentiments and nationalism|nationalistic ideals in the Philippines of the late 1800s that came as a result of the Filipino Propaganda Movement from 1872 to 1892.

It became the main ideology of the first Asian nationalist revolution, the Philippine Revolution of 1896. ————————————————- Spain in the Philippines Spain already ruled the Philippines for at least 300 years before Philippine nationalism was developed. Towards the 19th century, the bureaucratic centralized government established inManila had caused widespread discontent in the entire archipelago, but there was yet no united front against the Spanish Regime.

Many revolts were caused due to Spanish impositions, but most of these revolts were caused by either personal discontent or territorial defense. From Diego Silang’s revolt in Luzon to Francisco Dagohoy’s revolt in Visayas, no united and conscious effort was made against the colonial master. Patriotism was limited to regionalistic tendencies. ————————————————- Development of native patriotism The belated development of Philippine nationalism was caused by the natives’ tendency to be regionalistic. The geography of the Philippines did not help.

The Philippines is insular and the people were divided by waters. In fact, the term “Filipino” originally means Spaniards born in the Philippines and not the native inhabitants. But certain events eventually led to the development of native patriotism. Things that happened which transcended the cultural and geographical boundaries that had been barriers to the unification of the inhabitants of the archipelago. The first break happened in the early 1830s when Spain, highly influenced by the revolutions in Europe and in Latin America, opened the Philippines to international trade.

This led to the rise of a Middle Class from which came the ilustrado elites that soon became the main agitators against the Spanish Regime. The liberalism of Europe arrived through books and other literature. Jean Jacques Rousseau’s Social Contract and John Locke’s Second Treatise on Civil Government became the primary sources for the development of nationalistic ideals. Such ideals were mostly understood by the ilustrados–some became the future leaders of the Philippine Revolution. In 1869, following a liberal victory in Spain, Carlos Ma. de la Torre was assigned as the Governor-General of the Philippines.

He became loved by the people because of his liberal reforms in the government, which include the giving of privileges to military personnel exempting them from forced labor, taxes, and tributes. De la Torre (1869-1871) became the most-loved Spanish Governor-General of the Philippines. His liberal regime gave the natives a point of comparison between a liberal government and the conservative absolutist government (Political absolutism|absolutism) of the past. During de la Torre’s regime, the native clergy, who were waging a struggle for the Filipinization of the Philippine Church became an ally of the Governor-General.

Headed by Father Jose Burgos, the native clergy wanted to rid the Philippine church of Spanish friars. The Filipinization Controversy was deeply seeded on Spanish racial prejudice against the native priests. The Spanish friars, agitated by Burgos, wanted Burgos out of the picture; but they were not yet presented with an opportunity. The opportunity came when dela Torre was recalled back to Spain in 1871. He was replaced by the brutish, Gov. Gen. Rafael Izquierdo. Izquierdo took back all the privileges and reforms that de la Torre instituted.

As a response, the military personnel, headed by a certain Sergeant La Madrid, of the Cavite arsenal staged a mutiny by 1872. The Spanish friars had their chance. They convinced Izquierdo that it was Burgos, together with Fathers Mariano Gomez and Jacinto Zamora, who masterminded the mutiny. Months later, the three priests were executed. The execution of the Gomburza became a spark among the educated ilustrados. That same year, native patriotism was born and the ilustrados launched in Europe the Propaganda Movement. ————————————————- edit] Propaganda Movement and Philippine nationalism The development of native patriotism that resulted from the execution of Fathers Gomez, Burgos and Zamora also began the unconsicous formation of the ideological side of patriotism–nationalism. The Propaganda Movement (1872-1892) called for the assimilation of the Philippines as a province of Spain so that the same laws will be applied in the Philippines and that the inhabitants of the Philippines will experience the same civil liberties and rights as that of a Spanish citizen. Men like Marcelo H. el Pilar, Graciano Lopez Jaena, and Jose Rizal bombarded both the Spanish and Filipino public with nationalist literature. Rizal’s novels Noli Me Tangere and El Filibusterismo became the bibles of Philippine nationalism. This time, the term Pilipino was not only for Spaniards born in the Philippines but was generically applied to every inhabitants born in the Philippine Islands. The movement ended in a failure, but the literature that resulted from it became the source of what came to be Philippine nationalism. ————————————————- Katipunan and the Revolution

As the movement was failing in Europe, Jose Rizal returned to the Philippines and created his La Liga Filipina in 1892. It also failed after his arrest a just few days after the creation of the group. The group split into two: the ilustrado elites formed their own Cuerpo de Compromisarios, while the lowly ilustrados formed the revolutionary Katipunan. The former disappeared into oblivion, while the latter started the Philippine Revolution (1896-1898) by 1896, culminating both the formation of patriotic sentiment and nationalistic ideals. ————————————————- ———————————————— ————————————————- ————————————————- Moro nationalism The Philippine nationalism that emerged after the Propaganda Movement and the Philippine Revolution was only limited to the people of Visayas to Luzon, and may be to some extent, northern portions of Mindanao. Generally, the islands of Sulu, Palawan, and Mindanao had a different story. These islands had been once dominated by two powerful Muslim Sultanates prior to the arrival of the Spaniards: the Sultanate of Sulu and the Sultanate of Maguindanao.

Never did the Spaniards take sufficient control of these islands and the people came to clearly distinguish themselves from those from Visayas and Mindanao. For more than three centuries, the people in these islands waged war against the Spanish Empire. Their nationalism is different since it is deeply rooted in their religion–Islam. ————————————————- Decadence of Philippine nationalism and the “Limited Filipino” The United States of America replaced Spain in the Philippines after the Treaty of Paris of December 10, 1898.

The period 1901 to 1910 became known as, what Teodoro Agoncillo called, the period of suppressed nationalism. The Filipinos were to be americanized through education. Nationalist essays and literature were suppressed. The raising of the Philippine flag was banned. Any utterances against the Americans and about Philippine nationalism was considered an act of sedition. The nationalism that emerged after this period is a nationalism trapped behind the rhetorics of party-politics. The Filipino that emerged were, in Renato Constantino’s words, “Limited Filipinos”.

Filipinos by name, Spanish-American by heart. Cultural by form, yet a damaged culture by substance. This is what by some is called the decadence, by some the tragedy of Philippine nationalism. ————————————————- Present struggle for revival and the “True Filipino” Modern-day Philippine nationalism is highly conceptualized by revolutionary historians. Teodoro Agoncillo emphasized the role of the people in making their own history. Renato Constantino emphasized the revolutionary theoretical groundwork for the making of new “True Filipino”.

Someone who can transcend the cultural and geographical boundaries that had been the cause for disunity. Someone who can shed away his western soul and create the New Filipino identity. Other historians, like Rudy B. Rodil, work for the destruction of the boundaries between Moros and Filipinos–suggesting that a True Filipino does not live in the prejudices of religious belief. One common theme among all is the recognition of the threat of American intervention and Globalization. As long as there will be no strong leader to help in the development of a new Philippine nationalism, then it can be considered dead, for now.

Cite this page

Example Of Nationalism In The Philippines. (2019, Dec 07). Retrieved from https://paperap.com/paper-on-philippine-nationalism/

"Example Of Nationalism In The Philippines." PaperAp.com , 7 Dec 2019, https://paperap.com/paper-on-philippine-nationalism/

PaperAp.com. (2019). Example Of Nationalism In The Philippines . [Online]. Available at: https://paperap.com/paper-on-philippine-nationalism/ [Accessed: 9 Apr. 2024]

"Example Of Nationalism In The Philippines." PaperAp.com, Dec 07, 2019. Accessed April 9, 2024. https://paperap.com/paper-on-philippine-nationalism/

"Example Of Nationalism In The Philippines," PaperAp.com , 07-Dec-2019. [Online]. Available: https://paperap.com/paper-on-philippine-nationalism/. [Accessed: 9-Apr-2024]

PaperAp.com. (2019). Example Of Nationalism In The Philippines . [Online]. Available at: https://paperap.com/paper-on-philippine-nationalism/ [Accessed: 9-Apr-2024]

• German nationalism change between 1815 and 1919 Pages: 6 (1715 words)
• Chapter 19 Industrialization and Nationalism Pages: 2 (446 words)
• Nationalism in 20th Century Europe Pages: 4 (1138 words)
• Pros And Cons Of Nationalism Pages: 2 (590 words)
• Expansionist Nationalism Pages: 4 (934 words)
• Cosmopolitanism Vs Nationalism Pages: 4 (1181 words)
• What is Nationalism And Patriotism Pages: 2 (430 words)
• Muslim Representation: Nationalism in India Pages: 2 (417 words)
• The role of Gandhi in the development of Indian nationalism Pages: 10 (2997 words)
• Historicism and Nationalism in Brave Heart by Mel Gibson Pages: 5 (1305 words)

Select Chapter:

The philippines:a century hence.

Rizal’s “Filipinas Dentro De Cien Años”

Rizal’s “Filipinas Dentro De Cien Años” (translated as “The Philippines within One Hundred Years” or “The Philippines A Century Hence”) is an essay meant to forecast the future of the country within a hundred years. This essay, published in La Solidaridad of Madrid, reflected Rizal’s sentiments about the glorious past of the Philippines, the deterioration of the Philippine economy, and exposed the foundations of the native Filipinos’ sufferings under the cruel Spanish rule. More importantly, Rizal, in the essay, warned Spain as regards the catastrophic end of its domination – a reminder that it was time that Spain realizes that the circumstances that contributed to the French Revolution could have a powerful effect for her on the Philippine islands. Part of the purpose in writing the essay was to promote a sense of nationalism among the Filipinos – to awaken their minds and hearts so they would fight for their rights.

La Solidaridad, the newspaper which serialized Rizal’s Filipinas Dentro De Cien Años

Causes of miseries, 1. spain’s implementation of her military laws.

Because of such policies, the Philippine population decreased significantly. Poverty became more widespread, and f armlands were left to wither. The family as a unit of society was neglected, and overall, every aspect of the life of the Filipino was retarded.

2. Deterioration and disappearance of Filipino indigenous culture

When Spain came with the sword and the cross, it began the gradual destruction of the native Philippine culture. Because of this, the Filipinos started losing confidence in their past and their heritage, became doubtful of their present lifestyle, and eventually lost hope in the future and the preservation of their race. The natives began forgetting who they were – their valued beliefs, religion, songs, poetry, and other forms of customs and traditions.

3. Passivity and submissiveness to the Spanish colonizers

One of the most powerful forces that influenced a culture of silence among the natives were the Spanish friars. Because of the use of force and intimidation, unfairly using God’s name, the Filipinos learned to submit themselves to the will of the foreigners.

Rizal's Forecast

What will become of the Philippines within a century? Will they continue to be a Spanish Colony? Spain was able to colonize the Philippines for 300 years because the Filipinos remained faithful during this time, giving up their liberty and independence, sometimes stunned by the attractive promises or by the friendship offered by the noble and generous people of Spain. Initially, the Filipinos see them as protectors but sooner, they realize that they are exploiters and executers. So if this state of affair continues, what will become of the Philippines within a century? One, the people will start to awaken and if the government of Spain does not change its acts, a revolution will occur. But what exactly is it that the Filipino people like? 1) A Filipino representative in the Spanish Cortes and freedom of expression to cry out against all the abuses; and 2) To practice their human rights. If these happen, the Philippines will remain a colony of Spain, but with more laws and greater liberty. Similarly, the Filipinos will declare themselves ’independent’. Note that Rizal only wanted liberty from Spaniards and not total separation. In his essay, Rizal urges to put freedom in our land through peaceful negotiations with the Spanish Government in Spain. Rizal was confident as he envisioned the awakening of the hearts and opening of the minds of the Filipino people regarding their plight. He ‘prophesied’ that the Philippines will be successful in its revolution against Spain, winning their independence sooner or later. Though lacking in weapons and combat skills, the natives waged war against the colonizers and in 1898, the Americans wrestled with Spain to win the Philippines. Years after Rizal’s death, the Philippines attained its long-awaited freedom — a completion of what he had written in the essay, does not record in its archives any lasting domination by one people over another of different races, of diverse usages and customs, of opposite and divergent ideas. One of the two had to yield and succumb.” Indeed, the essay, The Philippines a Century Hence is as relevant today as it was when it was written over a century ago. Alongside Noli Me Tangere and El Filibusterismo, Rizal shares why we must focus on strengthening the most important backbone of the country – our values, mindsets, and all the beliefs that had shaped our sense of national identity. Additionally, the essay serves as a reminder that we, Filipinos, are historically persevering and strong-minded. The lessons learned from those years of colonization were that all those efforts to keep people uneducated and impoverished, had failed. Nationalism eventually thrived and many of the predictions of Rizal came true. The country became independent after three centuries of abusive Spanish rule and five decades under the Americans.

SOBRE LA INDOLENCIA DE LOS FILIPINOS (The Indolence of the Filipinos)

This is said to be the longest essay written by Rizal, which was published in five installments in the La Solidaridad, from July 15 to September 15, 1890. The essay was described as a defense against the Spaniards who charged that the Filipinos are inherently lazy or indolent. The Indolence of the Filipinos is said to be a study of the causes why the people did not, as was said, work hard during the Spanish regime. Rizal pointed out that long before the coming of the Spaniards, the Filipinos were industrious and hardworking. The Spanish reign brought about a decline in economic activities because of the following causes: First, the establishment of the Galleon Trade cut-off all previous associations of the Philippines with other countries in Asia and the Middle East. As a result, business was only conducted with Spain through Mexico. Because of this, the small businesses and handicraft industries that flourished during the pre-Spanish period gradually disappeared. Second, Spain also extinguished the natives’ love of work because of the implementation of forced labor. Because of the wars between Spain and other countries in Europe as well as the Muslims in Mindanao, the Filipinos were compelled to work in shipyards, roads, and other public works, abandoning agriculture, industry, and commerce. Third, Spain did not protect the people against foreign invaders and pirates. With no arms to defend themselves, the natives were killed, their houses burned, and their lands destroyed. As a result of this, the Filipinos were forced to become nomads, lost interest in cultivating their lands or in rebuilding the industries that were shut down, and simply became submissive to the mercy of God. Fourth, there was a crooked system of education, if it was to be considered an education. What was being taught in the schools were repetitive prayers and other things that could not be used by the students to lead the country to progress. There were no courses in Agriculture, Industry, etc., which were badly needed by the Philippines during those times. Fifth, the Spanish rulers were a bad example to despise manual labor. The officials reported to work at noon and left early, all the while doing nothing in line with their duties. The women were seen constantly followed by servants who dressed them and fanned them – personal things which they ought to have done for themselves. Sixth, gambling was established and widely propagated during those times. Almost everyday there were cockfights, and during feast days, the government officials and friars were the first to engage in all sorts of bets and gambles. Seventh, there was a crooked system of religion. The friars taught the naïve Filipinos that it was easier for a poor man to enter heaven, and so they preferred not to work and remain poor so that they could easily enter heaven after they died. Lastly, the taxes were extremely high, so much so that a huge portion of what they earned went to the government or to the friars. When the object of their labor was removed and they were exploited, they were reduced to inaction. Rizal admitted that the Filipinos did not work so hard because they were wise enough to adjust themselves to the warm, tropical climate. “An hour’s work under that burning sun, in the midst of pernicious influences springing from nature in activity, is equal to a day’s labor in a temperate climate.” He explained, “violent work is not a good thing in tropical countries as it would be parallel to death, destruction, annihilation.” It can clearly be deduced from the writing that the cause of the indolence attributed to our race is Spain: When the Filipinos wanted to study and learn, there were no schools, and if there were any, they lacked sufficient resources and did not present more useful knowledge; when the Filipinos wanted to establish their businesses, there was not enough capital nor protection from the government; when the Filipinos tried to cultivate their lands and establish various industries, they were made to pay enormous taxes and were exploited by the foreign rulers.

LETTER TO THE YOUNG WOMEN OF MALOLOS

Jose Rizal’s legacy to Filipino women is embodied in his famous essay entitled, “To the Young Women of Malolos,” where he addresses all kinds of women – mothers, wives, the unmarried, etc. and expresses everything that he wishes them to keep in mind. On December 12, 1888, a group of 20 women of Malolos petitioned Governor-General Weyler for permission to open a night school so that they may study Spanish under Teodor Sandiko. Fr. Felipe Garcia, a Spanish parish priest in Malolos objected. But the young women courageously sustained their agitation for the establishment of the school. They then presented a petition to Governor Weyler asking that they should be allowed to open a night school (Capino et al, 1977). In the end, their request was granted on the condition that Señorita Guadalupe Reyes should be their teacher. Praising these young women for their bravery, Marcelo H. del Pilar requested Rizal to write a letter commending them for their extraordinary courage. Originally written in Tagalog, Rizal composed this letter on February 22, 1889 when he was in London, in response to the request of del Pilar. We know for a fact that in the past, young women were uneducated because of the principle that they would soon be wives and their primary career is to take care of the home and their children. In this letter, Rizal yearns that women should be granted the same opportunities given to men in terms of education. The salient points contained in this letter are as follows: 1. The rejection of the spiritual authority of the friars – not all of the priests in the country that time embodied the true spirit of Christ and His Church. Most of them were corrupted by worldly desires and used worldly methods to effect change and force discipline among the people. 2. The defense of private judgment 3. Qualities Filipino mothers need to possess – as evidenced by this portion of his letter, Rizal is greatly concerned of the welfare of the Filipino children and the homes they grow up in. 4. Duties and responsibilities of Filipino mothers to their children 5. Duties and responsibilities of a wife to her husband - Rizal states in this portion of his letter how Filipino women ought to be as wives, in order to preserve the identity of the race. 6. Counsel to young women on their choice of a lifetime partner

QUALITIES MOTHERS HAVE TO POSSESS

Rizal enumerates the qualities Filipino mothers have to possess: 1. Be a noble wife - that women must be decent and dignified, submissive, tender and loving to their respective husband. 2. Rear her children in the service of the state – here Rizal gives reference to the women of Sparta who embody this quality. Mothers should teach their children to love God, country and fellowmen. 3. Set standards of behavior for men around her - three things that a wife must instill in the mind of her husband: activity and industry; noble behavior; and worthy sentiments. In as much as the wife is the partner of her husband’s heart and misfortune, Rizal stressed on the following advices to a married woman: aid her husband, share his perils, refrain from causing him worry; and sweeten his moments of affliction.

RIZAL’S ADVICE TO UNMARRIED MEN AND WOMEN

Jose Rizal points out to unmarried women that they should not be easily taken by appearances and looks, because these can be very deceiving. Instead, they should take heed of men’s firmness of character and lofty ideas. Rizal further adds that there are three things that a young woman must look for a man she intends to be her husband: 1. A noble and honored name 2. A manly heart 3. A high spirit incapable of being satisfied with engendering slaves.

In summary, Rizal’s letter “To the Young Women of Malolos,” centers around five major points (Zaide &Zaide, 1999): 1. Filipino mothers should teach their children love of God, country and fellowmen. 2. Filipino mothers should be glad and honored, like Spartan mothers, to offer their sons in defense of their country. 4. Filipino women should educate themselves aside from retaining their good racial values. 5. Faith is not merely reciting prayers and wearing religious pictures. It is living the real Christian way with good morals and manners.

Academia.edu no longer supports Internet Explorer.

To browse Academia.edu and the wider internet faster and more securely, please take a few seconds to  upgrade your browser .

Enter the email address you signed up with and we'll email you a reset link.

• We're Hiring!
• Help Center

Multiple Nationalisms and Historical Discourses in the Philippines’ ‘Identity Crisis’

This project explores the multiple forms of nationalism which are employed in Philippine online print media from 1 May to 14 June 2014 in relation to the Philippines’ alleged ‘identity crisis’. This project also examines the employment of historical motifs. This period includes the Philippine celebrations of Flag Day and Independence Day. Articles were analysed according to a newly developed form of critical discourse analysis which incorporates the discourse historical approach and mediated discourse analysis. The project concludes that there are three dominant and distinct forms of nation-building strategies adopted within the print media – state-led nationalism, anti-colonial nationalism and postnationalism. Each strategy conceptualises Filipino nationalism and negotiates the ‘identity crisis’ in significantly different ways, and each are adopted by different groups within Philippine society. Key Terms Nationalism, the Philippines, Identity Crisis, state-led nationalism, anti-colonial nationalism, postnationalism.

Related Papers

Philippine Studies: Historical and Ethnographic Viewpoints

Lisandro E. Claudio

This article examines instances in Philippine historiography where nationalism, as a unitary end, has been used to elide and obscure class difference. It begins with a partial explanation of the lacunae in antinationalist thinking in the Philippines, and then proceeds to a critique of contemporary nationalist historiography. Using historians Zeus Salazar and Reynaldo Ileto as case studies, it examines how nationalist historiography can serve as means to implicitly justify localized acts of class oppression. The works of these scholars, while crucial in forwarding critiques of colonialism and neocolonialism, privilege nationalist unity over thoroughexaminations of disjunctures produced by class difference.

Loreto Camiloza

Suri: Official Journal of the Philosophical Association of the Philippines

Michael Roland Hernandez

The claim about Europe's and the West's spiritual indefensibility puts forth a critique of the western colonial project as informed by a subtle duplicity anchored on the employment of a techno-scientific and economic-capitalist rationality working under the illusion of a God-given mission civilisatrice. To combat this ideology, present postcolonial discourses, notably in Asia, tend to create a rupture within this linear view of global politics and history by employing discursive strategies of decentralization and destabilization from the perspective of an identity-politics by the marginalized colonial ―other.‖ Within the Philippine context, I claim that this obsessive-compulsive tendency to look for collective identities as basis for anti-colonial struggle is itself contained within that inescapable cycle of colonial violence and oppression. Using Gayatri Chakravorty Spivak's notion of epistemic violence, I argue that the insistence on the privilege of a discovered, achieved, or constructed Filipino identity by nationalist discourses, be it from the Ilustrado elite or the hastily generalized and abstract Filipino masses, render them susceptible to becoming subtle—though unwitting—arms of the colonial machinery itself. To insist on a certain Filipino identity as an ideal of who or what a Filipino is or Filipino-ness is to be implicated within discursive complicity, i.e., a process that implicates the anti-colonial struggle within the homogenizing ―identity-trap‖ laid down by the colonial processes themselves and simulates the struggle for a Philippine nationalist liberation as a worse—because more subtle—form of colonial hegemony. I illustrate my claim by describing how historical injustice is propagated and perpetuated through the distorted interpretations of historical data by nationalist historiographies that only solidify the horrible heritage of the Philippine colonial experience.

Erika Angeles

Almond Aguila

Defining Filipinoness has been problematic throughout history. Previous studies have focused on the persistent impact of the colonial experience on Filipinos (Bernad, 1971; Constantino, 1977; Enriquez, 1992; Yacat, 2005). Some scholars have framed their understanding vis-a-vis the search for a national consciousness resulting in a unif ied Filipino identity (Anderson, 1983; Constantino, 1969). But in the age of globalization, statehood and nationhood have become questionable concepts (Adamson & Demetriou, 2007; Ahmad & Eijaz, 2011; Guéhenno, 1995; Omae, 1995). Who has the Filipino become amid a modern-day diaspora? I propose an analysis of history not as archival and disconnected from the present but as part of an ongoing story of identity formation. Recognition is given to kapwa, a view of self-and-other as one. This indigenous ontology offers a postmodern lens to understand the complexities of being Filipino through time and space. For contemporary Filipinos, identity formation may involve a continuing resistance against colonialism now set amid the diaspora in the digital age. This article further presents an alternative view of Filipinoness by arguing that diasporics remain Filipino despite physical estrangement from the Philippines. An essential point echoed from other scholars is how cultural identity should not be seen as singular and unchanging (Hall, 1990; Said, 1993/2012). Rather, Filipinoness may refer to evolving, varied and fluid Filipino identities. This evolution involves a past that folds into the present and impacts the future in locations around the world.

Rolando M Gripaldo

This paper presents a conditional argument. If Filipinos want the Philippines to become a First World country in the 21st century, like Japan, England, America, or upcoming South Korea, then what are they supposed to do? It argues that they must go for economic development—for superindustrialization—with nationalism (a sense of nationhood) as its ideological driving force. While there is a need to modify the political system, there is also a need to make changes in the Filipino character itself.

Humanities Research

Ana P . Labrador

Erron C . Medina

In almost every society, the role of young people, or the youth, in nation-building is a formidable one. In the Philippines, a clear manifestation of this social responsibility can be seen from Emilio Jacinto's generation to the First Quarter Storm movement in 1970s. From a probable observation, the young people of today will be the citizens of the future simply because they will be the inheritors of the political and social system. In this simple relationship, one cannot disregard the contribution of behavioralist approach in emphasizing and analyzing the importance of political socialization—transferring of political values and attitudes—of Filipino youth as a means to integrate this young generation to the political arena of collective and social life (Faulks 1999, 107). With respect to political socialization, there are a lot of socializing agents such as the family, school, church/ religion, and media. This paper would like to explore on the works that visit the interplay between media and politics in general. A more direct question, where this material would like to focus, is that how much force the social media or the internet exerts in widening entertainment and economic opportunities that may limit or even lessen the nationalist perspective among the youth. Clearly, the variables that will be under scrutiny are the Filipino youth, social media usage, and level of nationalism. As a result of this review, the writer found out that there is little investigation on nationalism in relation to social media.

Ana Maria Theresa P . Labrador

Surveying and critiquing the projects that was played out for the Philippines' centenary in 1998, Labrador observes the mainly literal and hackneyed renderings of nationalism and national identity. While the larger programs supported the national narrative, it was possible to find in narrower spaces made available to fringe groups the possibilities of constructing images but of plural Filipino identities.

Cynthia Jose

Filipino Americans are a force to contend with in the United States and their entry has spanned generations. Today most Fil-Ams are second and third generation who went to the US at a young age or American-born to Filipino immigrants. With their growing numbers, a new phenomenon of symbolic and mediated ethnicity has emerged among them. Grounded on Herbert Gans’ theory of symbolic ethnicity, this essay draws mainly on the works of Yen Le Espiritu, E. David and Kevin Nadal, and Brandon Oreiro on Filipino immigrants’ ethnicity and colonial context to articulate the student’s view that the seeming wave of nationalism is largely mediated and symbolic.

RELATED PAPERS

American Economic Review

Paul Courant

Hennie Van Coller

Nascif Abousalh-Neto

Julia Ropelato Floriani

Procedia - Social and Behavioral Sciences

Ria Soemitro

Journal of Mathematical Analysis and Modeling

Jamshed Nasir

Cogent Chemistry

atmanand Bagoji

Muhammad Irfan Habib

Elsa Marmursztejn

Journal of Behavior Therapy and Experimental Psychiatry

Jorg Huijding

Portal de la Ciencia

Josue David Pullas Medina

Town Planning Review: Volume ahead-of-print

Journal of Abnormal Psychology

Richard Zinbarg

Comparative Biochemistry and Physiology Part C: Comparative Pharmacology

Christopher Kemp

László Demeter

Information Sciences

Manoj Mandal

Journal of Cognitive Sciences and Human Development

afnan mustapha

Fordham Int'l LJ

Eleanor Fox

Proceedings of the International Conference on Business, Economic, Social Science and Humanities (ICOBEST 2018)

dewi triwahyuni

Revista Brasileira de Paleontologia

Mariela Castro

Zenodo (CERN European Organization for Nuclear Research)

Ana Carolina Ronda

Macedonian Journal of Animal Science

Evgeni Petkov

klara giertz

Alpara eBooks

Catherine Metzger

See More Documents Like This

RELATED TOPICS

•   We're Hiring!
•   Help Center
• Find new research papers in:
• Health Sciences
• Earth Sciences
• Cognitive Science
• Mathematics
• Computer Science
• Academia ©2024

• How-To Guides
• Philippine Guides, Trivia, and Laws
• Filipino History, Culture, and Traditions
• About Homebased Pinoy

How to Show Nationalism and Patriotism in the Philippines

• by Amiel Pineda
• March 16, 2023 February 11, 2024

As a student in the Philippines, showing patriotism involves a combination of understanding the country’s history, embracing its culture, and actively participating in its development. Here are synthesized key points on how students can express their love for their country:

• Learn Philippine History and Culture : Gain knowledge about the Philippines’ rich history, national symbols, and cultural practices. This includes studying the country’s past, recognizing important historical figures, and understanding the significance of national symbols like the flag and the anthem.
• Support Local : Show support for Filipino products and industries. This can be done by buying locally made goods and promoting them to others, which helps strengthen the local economy and fosters national pride.
• Engage in Local Tourism : Explore the beauty of the Philippines by visiting local tourist spots. This not only supports the tourism industry but also deepens one’s appreciation for the country’s natural wonders.
• Appreciate Filipino Entertainment : Watch Filipino movies and engage with local art to celebrate and understand the country’s creative expressions.
• Participate in the Political Process : Be an active citizen by staying informed about current events, voting, and possibly volunteering in political campaigns or polling areas. Understanding the political landscape is crucial for contributing to the country’s progress.
• Respect National Symbols : Always show respect for the Philippine flag and anthem. Sing the anthem with pride and understand the meaning behind its words.
• Volunteer and Donate : Engage in volunteer work and donate to causes that help improve the lives of fellow Filipinos. This demonstrates a commitment to the welfare of the nation.
• Use and Promote the Filipino Language : Communicate in Filipino when possible and encourage its use in blogging and other forms of media. This helps preserve the language and fosters a sense of unity.
• Celebrate National Holidays : Participate in the celebration of Philippine holidays, understanding their historical significance and reflecting on the country’s journey.
• Be Environmentally Conscious : Take care of the environment and encourage others to do the same. This shows respect for the country’s natural resources and contributes to a sustainable future.
• Practice Generosity and Sacrifice : Share your blessings with others and be willing to sacrifice personal interests for the greater good of the country. This builds a sense of community and shared responsibility.
• Challenge Inequality and Discrimination : Actively work against social injustices like racism and homophobia. Promoting equality and respect for all Filipinos is a powerful way to show patriotism.
• Think Collectively : Adopt a ‘we’ versus ‘me’ mindset, prioritizing the needs of the nation and its people over individual desires.

By integrating these practices into daily life, students can demonstrate their patriotism and contribute to the Philippines’ growth and unity.

Meaning of Nationalism and Patriotism

Nationalism and patriotism are two closely related concepts that are often used interchangeably. Nationalism refers to a feeling of pride or loyalty to one’s country or nation, while patriotism is the love, devotion, and loyalty towards one’s own country.

Importance of showing Nationalism and Patriotism

It is essential to show nationalism and patriotism in the Philippines because these values help promote unity, a sense of belongingness, and national identity among Filipinos. These values also foster respect for national symbols such as the Philippine flag and inspire individuals to work towards the betterment of their country. 

By showing nationalism and patriotism, Filipinos can help create a positive image of their country globally. In conclusion, demonstrating nationalism and patriotism is vital in fostering a sense of unity among citizens while promoting pride in Filipino heritage and culture.

Understanding Nationalism and Patriotism In The Philippines

Filipino nationalism is a sense of pride and loyalty towards the Philippines as a nation-state. It involves recognizing and valuing the unique cultural heritage, history, and identity of the Filipino people.

Patriotism refers to the love and devotion one has towards their country, which translates into actions that promote its welfare and development.

These two concepts are intertwined because they share a common goal: promoting the welfare, progress, and prosperity of the Philippines. 

Nationalism serves as the foundation for patriotism by instilling values such as love for one’s country, respect for national symbols, and recognition of our shared history as Filipinos. 

Patriotism then manifests through concrete actions like volunteering for community service projects or supporting local businesses that help uplift our economy.

In essence, it is essential to understand these two concepts in the Philippine context because they play a crucial role in shaping our nation’s future by inspiring individuals to work together towards achieving common goals while preserving our rich cultural heritage.

Reflection on Nationalism and Patriotism in The Philippines

Reflecting upon the history of the Philippines as a nation allows us to appreciate the struggles and sacrifices made by our ancestors in fighting for our country’s independence. The Philippines has a long and complex history as a nation-state, marked by centuries of colonization, revolution, and political upheaval.

Role in Shaping Philippine History

Nationalism and patriotism played significant roles in shaping Philippine history, particularly during times of struggle against oppressive forces. For instance, during the Spanish colonial period, nationalist leaders such as Jose Rizal and Andres Bonifacio inspired Filipinos to rise up against their oppressors through their writings and revolutionary actions.

Similarly, during World War II, Filipinos demonstrated remarkable courage and patriotism by joining Allied forces in defeating Japanese invaders.

Today, nationalism and patriotism continue to shape Philippine society by inspiring citizens to work towards building a better future for themselves and their countrymen. 

By reflecting upon our country’s past struggles and triumphs, we can gain a deeper appreciation for the value of these ideals while understanding how they have contributed to shaping our national identity over time.

Importance of Nationalism and Patriotism In The Philippines

Nationalism and patriotism are essential values for Filipinos because they promote unity, foster national identity, and inspire individuals to work towards the common good.

Nationalism instills pride in Filipino culture, heritage, and identity while encouraging citizens to work towards the betterment of their country . It promotes a sense of belongingness among Filipinos by recognizing our shared history and cultural traditions .

Patriotism, on the other hand, inspires individuals to take action towards improving their country through various means such as volunteer work or supporting local businesses that help uplift our economy .

These values also help create a positive image of the Philippines globally by showcasing our rich cultural heritage and promoting national progress. By demonstrating nationalism and patriotism, we can inspire others to take pride in their own countries while fostering stronger relationships between nations.

How To Show Nationalism And Patriotism In The Philippines: 10 Ways 

• Displaying respect for national symbols is one way of showing nationalism and patriotism in the Philippines . This includes properly displaying the Philippine flag and singing the national anthem with respect.
• Using products made in the Philippines is another way of demonstrating patriotism while supporting local businesses and industries.
• Learning about Philippine history can help individuals gain a deeper understanding of our country’s struggles and triumphs, inspiring them to work towards building a better future for themselves and their fellow Filipinos.
• Participating in community service activities such as volunteering at local charities or participating in disaster relief efforts demonstrates a willingness to help improve our communities.
• Promoting cultural awareness and acceptance fosters unity among Filipinos by recognizing our shared cultural heritage while celebrating our differences.
• Learning to speak Filipino (Tagalog) not only helps promote national unity but also serves as a practical skill for communicating with other Filipinos from different regions.
• Supporting local businesses helps uplift our economy by promoting entrepreneurship, creating jobs, and keeping wealth within our country.
• Participating in environmental protection programs shows concern for the welfare of our planet while preserving natural resources for future generations.
• Voting responsibly during elections ensures that we have competent leaders who will work towards improving the lives of Filipinos.
• Joining patriotic organizations like the Boy Scouts or Girl Scouts inspires individuals to work towards building a better future for themselves and their fellow citizens through various means such as volunteer work or fundraising initiatives.

How Can You Show Nationalism And Patriotism As A Student?

• Students can demonstrate their love for their country by learning about Philippine history and culture, participating in community service activities, supporting local businesses, promoting environmental awareness, and joining patriotic organizations.
• Some specific ways students can show nationalism and patriotism include attending national celebrations such as Independence Day or National Heroes Day, volunteering for disaster relief efforts or other community service projects, and participating in campus organizations that promote Filipino culture and values.
• Students can support local businesses by purchasing products made in the Philippines or supporting small enterprises run by fellow Filipinos.
• Promoting environmental awareness is another way of showing love for one’s country by preserving its natural resources and protecting it from environmental degradation.
• Joining patriotic organizations such as the Boy Scouts or Girl Scouts can inspire students to work towards building a better future for themselves while promoting national unity among young Filipinos.

Discussing Nationalism And Patriotism In Philippines

Nationalism and patriotism have been depicted in various forms of popular culture such as literature, art, music, and film.

For instance, Jose Rizal’s novels “Noli Me Tangere” and “El Filibusterismo” are classic examples of literature that promote Filipino nationalism by exposing the injustices committed by Spanish colonial authorities against Filipinos.

Artistic expressions like paintings and sculptures often depict themes related to Philippine history or culture, such as Fernando Amorsolo’s paintings of rural life in the Philippines or Guillermo Tolentino’s monuments celebrating national heroes.

Music has played a vital role in promoting national unity through patriotic songs like “Bayan Ko” or “Lupang Hinirang,” which inspire Filipinos to love their country and work towards its betterment.

Films like “Heneral Luna” or “Jose Rizal” showcase historical figures who embody values of nationalism and patriotism while inspiring viewers to take pride in Philippine heritage and culture.

Nationalism and patriotism are important values in the Philippines as they promote a sense of unity and pride among Filipinos. Nationalism refers to a love for one’s country and a desire to promote its well-being, while patriotism refers to a willingness to defend one’s country against enemies. 

These values have played a significant role in the country’s history, particularly in the struggle for independence from foreign powers. Today, nationalism and patriotism continue to be important in promoting national unity and identity, as well as in addressing social and economic issues facing the country.

Embracing nationalism and patriotism can have a positive impact on individuals and society as a whole. By valuing and promoting love for one’s country, Filipinos can foster a sense of community and shared identity, which can help to promote social cohesion and cooperation. 

Embracing these values can inspire individuals to work towards the betterment of their country, whether it be through civic engagement, volunteer work, or other forms of community service. Ultimately, by embracing nationalism and patriotism, Filipinos can help to build a stronger, more united, and more prosperous Philippines for future generations.

Essay: Becoming Indian

Create an FP account to save articles to read later and in the FP mobile app.

ALREADY AN FP SUBSCRIBER? LOGIN

• World Brief
• Editors’ Picks
• Africa Brief
• China Brief
• Latin America Brief
• South Asia Brief
• Situation Report
• Flash Points
• War in Ukraine
• Israel and Hamas
• U.S.-China competition
• Biden's foreign policy
• Trade and economics
• Artificial intelligence
• Asia & the Pacific
• Middle East & Africa

The Crisis in Haiti

The new idea of india, ones and tooze, foreign policy live.

Spring 2024 Issue

Print Archive

FP Analytics

• In-depth Special Reports
• Issue Briefs
• Power Maps and Interactive Microsites
• FP Simulations & PeaceGames
• Graphics Database

Her Power 2024

The atlantic & pacific forum, principles of humanity under pressure, fp global health forum 2024, fp @ unga79.

By submitting your email, you agree to the Privacy Policy and Terms of Use and to receive email correspondence from us. You may opt out at any time.

Your guide to the most important world stories of the day

Essential analysis of the stories shaping geopolitics on the continent

The latest news, analysis, and data from the country each week

Weekly update on what’s driving U.S. national security policy

Evening roundup with our editors’ favorite stories of the day

One-stop digest of politics, economics, and culture

Weekly update on developments in India and its neighbors

A curated selection of our very best long reads

Becoming Indian

A novelist considers how his sense of national identity has changed..

This article appears in the Spring 2024 print issue of FP. Read more from the issue.

This article appears in the Spring 2024 issue of Foreign Policy. Subscribe now to read every story from the issue.

I was born and grew up in India, and I’m trying to remember when I became Indian.

In the summer of 1986, a police constable on a bicycle came to my home in the city of Patna to conduct an inquiry. This visit was in response to my application for a passport. Two weeks later, my passport was ready. I was 23 years old, preparing to come to the United States to attend a graduate program in literature. Did I first become Indian when I acquired my passport?

If so, it would be paradoxical that I became Indian at the very moment I was most eager to get away from India.

But there must have been earlier occasions.

I was 8 when Bangladesh was liberated with the help of the Indian Army in December 1971. I had a vague sense that the Indian armed forces, and Prime Minister Indira Gandhi, had beaten the Pakistanis and that they had also outfoxed the rotund man with thick glasses in newspaper photographs, Henry Kissinger. Maybe it was then that I adopted my nascent national identity?

When I was a little older, my father’s job took us to Bokaro, a city in eastern India where the Russians had helped build a steel factory. One day, I met the Russian engineers and their families at an event where they were giving out gifts, including pins with Vladimir Lenin’s head on them. This first real encounter with foreigners, maybe this was the day when I thought of myself as Indian?

I’m forgetting something.

From my early childhood, my family would travel from our ancestral village in Champaran to a nearby town across the border in Nepal. This was in pre-liberalization India, when markets were closed to foreign products. In Nepal, we could buy Chinese and Japanese products. For our trip back, women hid new chiffon sarees under their garments. In my pockets, I would have anything from a new transistor radio to a sleek camera or just a pack of peppermint-flavored Wrigley’s gum. My first typewriter, a red portable Brother, was bought during one of these trips not long after I had entered college.

Passports were not required during these visits to Nepal. The cycle rickshaws we hired trundled past the customs crossing without rigorous checks. But what I want to say is that the knowledge that I was breaking the law (smuggling!) weighed on me more than the issue of national difference.

Now that I think about it, a sense of a self and the idea of this self also inhabiting a particular place, a place as large as a country, only came to me when I saw the outlines of a national literature, that is, when I had grasped the notion of a body of literature that told our stories. In other words, sometime during my late teens I became Indian because I had acquired a complex language—a gift given by writers who had come before me—that described the people and places around me.

Join FP Live for a discussion about the magazine’s India issue on Tuesday, April 16, at 11 a.m. EDT. Subscriber questions are encouraged. Register here .

I admired the grasp that Khushwant Singh, Dom Moraes, Anita Desai, Nayantara Sahgal, Ved Mehta, and a young Salman Rushdie had on a broad but also intimate language that established them as Indian, one that embraced history, landscape, people, and their mixed identities. Singh’s 1956 novel, Train to Pakistan , in particular was instructive about the history of Hindus, Muslims, and Sikhs having lived together peaceably and then, caught in the cataclysm of history, transforming into each other’s murderers. Even V.S. Naipaul, born in distant Trinidad, was Indian because he had so accurately, if dyspeptically, depicted the spaces in which was staged the drama of our large and untidy collective identity.

I should clarify that I wasn’t at all fluent in that language myself. In fact, I felt quite inadequate. In the 1980s, when I entered my 20s, India saw riots, a huge industrial disaster in Bhopal, and the assassination of Indira Gandhi and the killings of Sikhs that followed it. But it was as if I was looking at these events standing mutely behind thick glass. More years would pass before I could employ a vocabulary to communicate in that language of national belonging and translate that trauma onto the page in hopes of a reckoning.

A planned effort by an organized, ultranationalist party had unleashed the demon of hatred in Indian society.

By the time a Hindu mob destroyed the old mosque in the city of Ayodhya on Dec. 6, 1992, I was ready to speak out. I recognized that a planned effort by an organized, ultranationalist party had unleashed the demon of hatred in Indian society. I was finishing my doctoral studies at the time and saw zealots from my own Hindu community in the United States donating gold bricks for the construction of a temple on the disputed site. In the books I wrote over the ensuing decade, Passport Photos and then Bombay-London-New York , I argued that in the Indian diaspora, the soft emotion of nostalgia had been turned into the hard emotion of fundamentalism.

In the early 1990s, I was also training to be a scholar of postcolonial literature—a term describing, for the most part, the literature of countries in Africa and Asia that had achieved freedom from colonialism. My peers included people from Ethiopia, Ireland, South Africa, Sri Lanka, and Pakistan. When we read, say, Rushdie or Jamaica Kincaid, Nadine Gordimer or Ngugi wa Thiong’o, Edward Said or Nawal El Saadawi, we were focusing on critiques of colonialism and its lingering history.

The freedom struggles of our own countries had been carried out under the flag of nationalism. But decades after independence, it was difficult to ignore the actions of our own governments run by the privileged and the powerful. We faulted our own postcolonial states for having produced parodies of nationalism.

But this produced a peculiar problem. If one said anything negative about India, for instance, one invited the charge of representing the “colonial mindset.” There was the criticism of writing in English, also that of living abroad. All variety of narrow nationalists accused my field of postcolonial studies of being inauthentic, a prisoner of the Western mentality that had traditionally looked down on the countries of the East. This situation was rich with irony.

In 2002, riots in the state of Gujarat killed, by official count, 790 Muslims and 254 Hindus, though other estimates place the total number killed as high as 2,000. The chief minister of Gujarat at that time was Narendra Modi, and his Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP) was also in power in New Delhi. In the aftermath of the riots, I reported from Ahmedabad’s relief camps for Muslim refugees and carried on my investigations into religious violence elsewhere, including in various parts of Kashmir. My writings earned me a place on a “hit list” run by Hindu ultranationalists in the United States, and BJP supporters accused me of being anti-Hindu and anti-India. India’s right wing saw me as a foreigner.

We faulted our own postcolonial states for having produced parodies of nationalism.

The Nobel Prize-winning poet Rabindranath Tagore, a part of whose song “Bharoto Bhagyo Bidhata” was adopted as India’s national anthem, wrote in a 1917 essay that “nationalism is a great menace.” The sense of a national identity always relies on the idea of an “other” who is the enemy; in the case of India, it is not only a traditional rival such as Pakistan but also the enemy within, the non-Hindu, most commonly the Muslim. Since the BJP’s rise to power under Modi in 2014, Muslims have been fixed as that dirty, undesirable “other.” In the nationalist consciousness, they are the true non-Indians.

Tagore was warning us against what he called “social slavery” that “impels us to make the life of our fellow-beings a burden to them where they differ from us even in such a thing as their choice of food.” More than a century after Tagore wrote his essay, his words appear like grim prophecy when mobs have lynched Muslims in different parts of India on the suspicion of eating beef. In 2014, Modi supporters attempted to send prominent writer U.R. Ananthamurthy a ticket for a flight to Pakistan when he expressed strong opposition to the election of Modi and the BJP that year. The Hindu ultra- nationalists would like to send to Pakistan—alongside India’s Muslims—all those Indian citizens who dare dissent and whom they call “anti-nationals.”

This year’s inauguration of the Ram temple at the site of the demolished mosque in Ayodhya, with the prime minister administering the rites, achieved the BJP’s goal of deifying the Indian nationalist identity as Hindu. The frenzied state-aided celebrations, the kowtowing in the media, and the establishment of a mythical history as a near-constitutional fact put the seal of majoritarianism on everyday life.

The recent events represent the culmination of a process that has upended all that was meant by “postcolonial.” For me and many others, to be postcolonial was to share a sense of historical kinship with others who had suffered under the lash of colonialism. Chinua Achebe spoke to us, and Kincaid was recognizable to us, because they were witnesses to what our countries, too, had experienced. To be postcolonial also entailed the right to critique our current regimes, because our tainted present wasn’t what we had been promised, and this mandated a fight for greater equality and the rule of law. Yet Hindu ultranationalists no longer talk of British rule as colonial conquest. Instead, for them, it is the arrival of Mughal armies 500 years ago, and the Islamic dynasty they established, that signals the onset of colonialism.

This is a cunning strategy on the part of the BJP and its increasing ranks of faithful followers. By painting the Muslim as the enemy, the Hindu right succeeds in consolidating the Hindu vote across caste and class lines, all unified in opposition to ever more marginalized minorities. Prices, unemployment, and economic inequality are all rising, but we need not address those problems because our leaders have told us that the real danger is 14.2 percent of India’s population.

Am I Indian? Yes, if it means finding the common cause of freedom across religious lines. No, if it means the idolatry of a nation built around a singular religious identity and the cult worship of a single leader.

Amitava Kumar is a professor of English at Vassar College and a Cullman fellow at the New York Public Library. He is the author of, most recently, the novel My Beloved Life .

Join the Conversation

Commenting on this and other recent articles is just one benefit of a Foreign Policy subscription.

Already a subscriber? Log In .

Subscribe Subscribe

View Comments

Join the conversation on this and other recent Foreign Policy articles when you subscribe now.

Not your account? Log out

Please follow our comment guidelines , stay on topic, and be civil, courteous, and respectful of others’ beliefs.

Change your username:

I agree to abide by FP’s comment guidelines . (Required)

Confirm your username to get started.

The default username below has been generated using the first name and last initial on your FP subscriber account. Usernames may be updated at any time and must not contain inappropriate or offensive language.

More from Foreign Policy

Nobody actually knows what russia does next.

The West’s warnings about Vladimir Putin’s future plans are getting louder—but not any more convincing.

China Is Gaslighting the Developing World

Beijing’s promises of equality are a guise for hegemony.

Post-Erdogan Turkey Is Finally Here

Last weekend’s elections offer a first glimpse of a political future beyond the reigning strongman.

How the United States Lost Niger

Growing Russian, Chinese, and Iranian influence in the Sahel is testing Washington’s clout in an increasingly strategic continent.

Ukraine’s Cheap Drones Are Decimating Russia’s Tanks

How a culture shift in the israeli military helps explain gaza’s death toll, is india really the next china, it’s too soon for biden and kishida to take a victory lap, china won’t change tack on economic policy, swiss women win landmark climate victory, israel is facing an iraq-like quagmire, everyone is on edge for south korea’s legislative elections.

Sign up for World Brief

FP’s flagship evening newsletter guiding you through the most important world stories of the day, written by Alexandra Sharp . Delivered weekdays.

Strong Taiwan Quake Kills 9, Injures Hundreds

The earthquake was the most powerful to hit the island in 25 years. Dozens of people remained trapped, and many buildings were damaged, with the worst centered in the city of Hualien.

• Share full article

• Hualien, Taiwan A landslide after the quake. Lam Yik Fei for The New York Times
• New Taipei City, Taiwan Books flew off shelves as a home shook. @Abalamindo via Storyful
• Taipei, Taiwan Passengers waiting at a train station as some services were suspended. Chiang Ying-Ying/Associated Press
• Hualien, Taiwan People are rescued from a building that had partially collapsed. TVBS via Associated Press
• Hualien, Taiwan Firefighters rescuing trapped residents from a building. CTI News via Reuters
• Taipei, Taiwan Students evacuated to a school courtyard after the earthquake. Lam Yik Fei for The New York Times
• Guishan Island, Taiwan Rocks tumbling down one side of an island popular for hiking. Lavine Lin via Reuters
• Hualien, Taiwan A building leaned to one side after the quake. Randy Yang via Associated Press
• Ishigaki, Okinawa, Japan Watching news on a rooftop of a hotel after a tsunami warning. Chang W. Lee/The New York Times
• Hualien, Taiwan Motorbikes damaged in the quake. TVBS via Associated Press
• New Taipei City, Taiwan Damage in an apartment Fabian Hamacher/Reuters
• New Taipei City, Taiwan Water cascading down a building during the quake. Wang via Reuters

Meaghan Tobin and Victoria Kim

Here’s what you need to know about the earthquake.

Taiwan was rocked Wednesday morning by the island’s strongest earthquake in a quarter century, a magnitude 7.4 tremor that killed at least nine people, injured more than 800 others and trapped dozens of people.

The heaviest damage was in Hualien County on the island’s east coast, a sleepy, scenic area prone to earthquakes. Footage from the aftermath showed a 10-story building there partially collapsed and leaning heavily to one side, from which residents emerged through windows and climbed down ladders, assisted by rescuers. Three hikers were killed after being hit by falling rocks on a hiking trail in Taroko National Park, according to the county government.

By late afternoon, officials said rescue efforts were underway to try to rescue 127 people who were trapped, many of them on hiking trails in Hualien.

One building in Changhua County, on the island’s west coast, collapsed entirely. The quake was felt throughout Taiwan and set off at least nine landslides, sending rocks tumbling onto Suhua Highway in Hualien, according to local media reports. Rail services were halted at one point across the island.

The earthquake, with an epicenter off Taiwan’s east coast, struck during the morning commute, shortly before 8 a.m. Taiwanese authorities said by 3 p.m., more than 100 aftershocks, many of them stronger than magnitude 5, had rumbled through the area.

In the capital, Taipei, buildings shook for over a minute from the initial quake. Taiwan is at the intersection of the Philippine Sea tectonic plate and the Eurasian plate, making it vulnerable to seismic activity. Hualien sits on multiple active faults, and 17 people died in a quake there in 2018.

Here is the latest:

The earthquake hit Taiwan as many people there were preparing to travel for Tomb Sweeping Day, a holiday across the Chinese-speaking world when people mourn the dead and make offerings at their graves. Officials warned the public to stay away from visiting tombs in mountain areas as a precaution, especially because rain was forecast in the coming days.

TSMC, the world’s biggest maker of advanced semiconductors, briefly evacuated workers from its factories but said a few hours later that they were returning to work. Chip production is highly precise, and even short shutdowns can cost millions of dollars.

Christopher Buckley

Lai Ching-te, Taiwan’s vice president, who is also its president-elect, visited the city of Hualien this afternoon to assess the destruction and the rescue efforts, a government announcement said. Mr. Lai, who will become president in May, said the most urgent tasks were rescuing trapped residents and providing medical care. Next, Mr. Lai said, public services must be restored, including transportation, water and power. He said Taiwan Railway’s eastern line could be reopened by Thursday night.

Meaghan Tobin

Taiwan’s fire department has updated its figures, reporting that nine people have died and 934 others have been injured in the quake. Fifty-six people in Hualien County remain trapped.

Shake intensity

Taiwan’s fire department reports that nine people have died and 882 others have been injured in Taiwan. In Hualien County, 131 people remain trapped.

Agnes Chang

Footage shows rocks tumbling down one side of Guishan Island, a popular spot for hiking known as Turtle Island, off the northeast coast of Taiwan. Officials said no fishermen or tourists were injured after the landslide.

The death toll has risen to nine, according to Taiwan government statistics.

Meaghan Tobin, Siyi Zhao

Officials in Taiwan warned residents to not visit their relatives' tombs, especially in the mountains, this weekend during the holiday, known as Ching Ming, meant to honor them. There had already been 100 aftershocks and the forecast called for rain, which could make travel conditions on damaged roads more treacherous.

Crews are working to reach people trapped on blocked roads. As of 1 p.m. local time, roads were impassable due to damage and fallen rock in 19 places, according to the Ministry of Transportation. At least 77 people remain trapped. A bridge before Daqingshui Tunnel appeared to have completely collapsed.

Taiwan’s worst rail disaster in decades — a train derailment in 2021 that killed 49 people — took place on the first day of the Tomb Sweeping holiday period that year, in the same region as the earthquake.

The earthquake hit Taiwan as many people here were preparing to travel for Tomb Sweeping Day, or Ching Ming, a day across the Chinese-speaking world when people mourn their dead, especially by making offerings at their graves. Now those plans will be disrupted for many Taiwanese.

The holiday weekend would typically see a spike in travel as people visit family across Taiwan. Currently, both rail transport and highways are blocked in parts of Hualien, said Transport Minister Wang Guo-cai. Work is underway to restore rail transportation in Hualien, and two-way traffic is expected to be restored at noon on Thursday, he said.

Taiwan’s preparedness has evolved in response to past quakes.

Taiwan’s earthquake preparedness has evolved over the past few decades in response to some of the island’s largest and most destructive quakes .

In the years after a 7.6 magnitude earthquake in central Taiwan killed nearly 2,500 people in 1999, the authorities established an urban search-and-rescue team and opened several emergency medical operation centers, among other measures .

And in 2018, after a quake in the eastern coastal city of Hualien killed 17 people and caused several buildings to partially collapse, the government ordered a wave of building inspections .

Taiwan has also been improving its early warning system for earthquakes since the 1980s. And two years ago, it rolled out new building codes that, among other things, require owners of vulnerable buildings to install ad-hoc structural reinforcements.

So how well prepared was Taiwan when a 7.4 magnitude quake struck near Hualien on Wednesday morning, killing at least seven people and injuring hundreds more?

Across the island, one building collapsed entirely, 15 others were in a state of partial collapse and another 67 were damaged, the island’s fire department said on Wednesday afternoon . Structural engineers could not immediately be reached for comment to assess that damage, or the extent to which building codes and other regulations might have either contributed to it or prevented worse destruction.

As for search-and-rescue preparedness, Taiwan is generally in very good shape, said Steve Glassey, an expert in disaster response who lives in New Zealand.

“ The skill sets, the capabilities, the equipment, the training is second to none,” said Dr. Glassey, who worked with Taipei’s urban search-and-rescue team during the response to a devastating 2011 earthquake in Christchurch, New Zealand. “They’re a very sharp operation.”

But even the best urban search-and-rescue team will be stretched thin if an earthquake causes multiple buildings to collapse, Dr. Glassey said.

Taiwan has options for requesting international help with search-and-rescue efforts. It could directly ask another country, or countries, to send personnel. And if multiple teams were to get involved, it could ask the United Nations to help coordinate them, as it did after the 1999 earthquake.

Pierre Peron, a spokesman for the United Nations, said on Wednesday afternoon that no such request had yet been made as a result of the latest earthquake.

Meaghan Tobin contributed reporting.

At least seven people have died and 736 have been injured as a result of the earthquake, according to Taiwan’s fire department. Another 77 people remained trapped in Hualien County, many of them on hiking trails. Search and rescue operations are underway, said the fire department.

Aftershocks of magnitudes between 6.5 and 7 were likely to occur over the next three or four days, said Wu Chien-fu, director of the Taiwanese Central Weather Administration’s Seismology Center, at a news conference.

As of 2 p.m., 711 people had been injured across Taiwan, the fire department said, and 77 people in Hualien County remained trapped. The four who were known to have died were in Hualien.

Victoria Kim

Hualien County is a quiet and scenic tourist destination.

Hualien County on Taiwan’s east coast is a scenic, sleepy tourist area tucked away from the island’s urban centers, with a famous gorge and aquamarine waters. It also happens to sit on several active faults , making it prone to earthquakes.

The county has a population of about 300,000, according to the 2020 census, about a third of whom live in the coastal city of Hualien, the county seat. It is one of the most sparsely populated parts of Taiwan. About three hours by train from the capital, Taipei, the city describes itself as the first place on the island that’s touched by the sun.

Hualien County is home to Taroko National Park, one of Taiwan’s most popular scenic areas. Visitors come to explore the Taroko Gorge, a striated marble canyon carved by the Liwu River, which cuts through mountains that rise steeply from the coast. The city of Hualien is a popular destination as a gateway to the national park.

According to the state-owned Central News Agency, three hikers were trapped on a trail near the entrance to the gorge on Wednesday, after the quake sent rocks falling. Two of them were found dead, the news agency said. Administrators said many roads within the park had been cut off by the earthquake, potentially trapping hikers, according to the report.

Earthquakes have rattled Hualien with some regularity. In 2018, 17 people were killed and hundreds of others injured when a magnitude 6.5 quake struck just before midnight, its epicenter a short distance northeast of the city of Hualien.

Many of the victims in that quake were in a 12-story building that was severely tilted, the first four floors of which were largely crushed, according to news reports from the time. The next year, the area was shaken by a 6.1-magnitude earthquake that injured 17 people.

The area has some of the highest concentrations of Taiwan’s aboriginal population, with several of the island’s Indigenous tribes calling the county home .

The county government in Hualien released a list of people that had been hospitalized with injuries, which stood at 118 people as of midday Wednesday.

Across Taiwan, one building fell down entirely, in Changhua County on the west coast, and 15 buildings partially collapsed, Taiwan’s fire department said. Another 67 buildings were damaged. One of the partially collapsed structures was a warehouse in New Taipei City where four people were rescued, according to Taiwan’s Central News Agency. Another 12 were rescued at a separate New Taipei City building where the foundation sank into the ground.

Peggy Jiang, who manages The Good Kid, a children’s bookstore down the street from the partially collapsed Uranus Building in Hualien, said it was a good thing they had yet to open when the quake struck. The area is now blocked off by police and rescue vehicles. “Most people in Hualien are used to earthquakes,” she said. “But this one was particularly scary, many people ran in the street immediately afterward.”

Lin Jung, 36, who manages a shop selling sneakers in Hualien, said he had been at home getting ready to take his 16-month-old baby to a medical appointment when the earthquake struck. He said it felt at first like a series of small shocks, then “suddenly it turned to an intense earthquake shaking up and down.” The glass cover of a ceiling lamp fell and shattered. “All I could do was protect my baby.”

Chris Buckley ,  Paul Mozur ,  Meaghan Tobin and John Yoon

The earthquake damaged buildings and a highway in Hualien.

The magnitude 7.4 earthquake that struck Taiwan on Wednesday damaged many buildings and a major highway in Hualien, a city on the eastern coast, and it knocked out power as it rocked the island.

Across Taiwan, the quake and its aftershocks caused one building to completely collapse and 15 others to partially collapse, according to Taiwan’s fire department. Sixty-seven other buildings sustained damage.

Two tall buildings in Hualien that sustained particularly extensive damage were at the center of the rescue efforts there. Most damage across the city was not life-threatening, said Huang Hsuan-wan, a reporter for a local news site.

Where buildings were reported damaged in Hualien City

“A lot of roads were blocked off. There are a lot of walls toppled over onto cars,” Derik du Plessis, 44, a South African resident of Hualien, said shortly after the earthquake. He described people rushing around the city to check on their houses and pick up their children. One of his friends lost her house, he said.

One of the damaged buildings in Hualien, a 10-story structure called the Uranus Building that housed a mix of homes and shops, was tilted over and appeared to be on the verge of collapse. Many of its residents managed to flee, but some were missing, said Sunny Wang, a journalist based in the city. Rescuers were trying to reach the basement, concerned that people might be trapped there.

Photographs of the initial damage in Hualien showed another building, a five-story structure, leaning to one side, with crushed motorcycles visible at the ground-floor level. Bricks had fallen off another high-rise, leaving cracks and holes in the walls.

The quake also set off at least nine landslides on Suhua Highway in Hualien, according to Taiwan’s Central News Agency, which said part of the road had collapsed.

Taiwan’s fire department said four people had been killed in the earthquake.

Across Taiwan, 40 flights have been canceled or delayed because of the earthquake, according to Taiwan’s Central Emergency Operation Center.

President Tsai Ing-wen visited Taiwan’s national emergency response center this morning, where she was briefed about the response efforts underway by members of the ministries of defense, transportation, economic affairs and agriculture, as well as the fire department.

A look at Taiwan’s strongest earthquakes.

The magnitude 7.4 earthquake that hit Taiwan on Wednesday morning was the strongest in 25 years, the island’s Central Weather Administration said.

At least four people died after the quake struck off Taiwan’s east coast, officials said.

Here’s a look back at some of the major earthquakes in modern Taiwanese history:

Taichung, 1935

Taiwan’s deadliest quake registered a magnitude of 7.1 and struck near the island’s west coast in April 1935, killing more than 3,200 people, according to the Central Weather Administration. More than 12,000 others were injured and more than 50,000 homes were destroyed or damaged.

Tainan, 1941

A magnitude 7.3 earthquake in December 1941, which struck southwestern Taiwan, caused several hundred deaths, the United States Geological Survey said.

Chi-Chi, 1999

A 7.6 magnitude earthquake in central Taiwan killed nearly 2,500 people in September 1999. The quake, which struck about 90 miles south-southwest of Taipei, was the second-deadliest in the island’s history, according to the U.S.G.S. and the Central Weather Administration. More than 10,000 people were injured and more than 100,000 homes were destroyed or damaged.

Yujing, 2016

A 6.4 magnitude earthquake in February 2016 caused a 17-story apartment complex in southwestern Taiwan to collapse, killing at least 114 people . The U.S.G.S. later said that 90 earthquakes of that scale or greater had occurred within 250 kilometers, or 155 miles, of that quake’s location over the previous 100 years.

Advertisement