an essay about envy

Daniel Gordon

Do You Ever Feel Envy? Me Too. This is Why We Feel It—And How to Let it Go

Living envy-free will make us happier by focusing on what matters most..

Bertrand Russel, a philosopher of the twentieth century, wrote that envy is one of the most powerful causes of unhappiness. If we want to live well, we need to know the paths to follow and the paths to avoid. Envy can become a prison we create for ourselves. Why do we feel envy? And how can we break free from it? Or, better yet, escape it in the first place?

I know from my experience that envy can steal my peace. It often arises from comparisons where we see ourselves falling short of others, especially when we think we are just as “worthy” as the people to whom we compare ourselves.

Envy is one of the most powerful causes of unhappiness.

The Ancients on Envy: Sorrow Over Another’s Good

Aristotle writes that envy is sorrow over the good of another ( Rhetoric 2.10).

The targets of our envy usually fall into the following categories:

Someone near us in age.

Someone near us in location.

Someone near us in our profession.

And so, predictably, the professor envies the professor. The musician envies the musician. The painter envies the painter. In other words, we tend to envy people who are like us and who have enjoyed some good fortune in life.

Aristotle in the same text makes a striking observation about envy: we are sorrowful over what another has precisely because we think it should be ours .

There is a sense of injustice that someone else has “made it” and we have not. This feeling of being thwarted can lead to anger and even a desire for vengeance: to take away the good that the other person has—or hope that someone else does —because it is due more to you (or at least as much to you) than it is to them.

The sense of injustice directed at our peer who experiences good fortune is compounded if we perceive ourselves to be just as good or smart or resourceful as they are. And yet, we think, this other person has received the goods that we, apparently, in justice, deserve. The envious person sees this as intolerable.

To take a simple example, imagine someone who buys a house at the bottom of the market. They were fortunate when they needed to move jobs. But you’ve been saving for years and end up buying the same house at the top of the market for twice as much. You might understandably feel a little envious of the person who had the good fortune of buying when they did, especially if you have been more “responsible” in saving but ended up with a less desirable outcome.

Envy works like that, but it can surface in any domain of life: a missed promotion at work, the purchase of your house, the choice of your spouse, the health of your children, the welfare of your country, and the list goes on. These things are personal and can subject us to intense, even embarrassing, feelings of envy.

The Slippery Slope of Envy

To paint the picture a little more starkly, where does envy take us?

Gregory the Great, a theologian and pope (c. 540–604), observes that envy can give rise to a host of other maladies ( Moralia , 31.5). These include gossip, detraction, delight over the misfortunes of others, and even hatred. Think about it:

Gossip . If we feel envious over someone’s good fortune, we might mention how they’re really not so great at what they do, even while using true examples. We knock someone down a peg because that’s where they belong.

Detraction . If that approach is not successful, one might share those shortcomings more publicly, beyond close acquaintances. This would be detraction. Such a tactic takes away some of their reputation that “should” really be ours.

Schadenfreude . If none of that works, one might still hope—as bad as this sounds—that the person experiences a reversal. This is a classic case of schadenfreude, again, cutting them down to size. If the envied person experiences misfortune, one delight in it—because it puts them back where they deserve, as if meting out what is really due to them.

Hatred . Finally, if gossip or detraction or misfortune fail to do their work, the person might become an object of hatred. They become offensive to think about as a reminder of what could have been and “should” have been yours.

All of this can sound a little extreme. And I think some personality types are more prone to envy than others. But you can begin to see how it can be a real obstacle to friendship, charity, and happiness. How can we avoid the trap of envy?

Mimetic Desire: Why We Want What We Want

What makes envy such a strange vice to experience, speaking from my own experience, is that we may not even really want what the other person enjoys!

The French sociologist Rene Girard writes about the phenomenon of mimetic desire: we learn to want what we want because we see other people who want it. Girard writes: “Man is the creature who does not know what to desire, and he turns to others in order to make up his mind. We desire what others desire because we imitate their desires.” (For a good introduction to this phenomenon, see Wolfgang Palaver’s scholarly study Rene Girard’s Mimetic Theory . )

Mimetic desire is triangular: it involves an object of desire, a mediator who presents that desire to you, and the plasticity of your own desire.

For example, your friend (the mediator of desire) gets the latest iPhone (the object of desire) so you now want the latest iPhone. Your co-worker (the mediator of desire) buys a house (the object of desire) so you now want to buy a house. Your roommate (the mediator of desire) is dating a banker (the object of desire) so you now want to date someone in the finance industry (or whatever). Maybe you never thought about the iPhone or the house or the banker. But now you do. Your desire mirrors or imitates the desires of those around you. Desire is mimetic.

Mimetic desire is triangular: it involves an object of desire, a mediator who presents that object to you, and the plasticity of your own desire.

This mirroring is not always bad. We can learn to desire good things by imitating the good things that others desire. But at least some of the time, and perhaps much of the time, mimetic desire can take us off track from our own tasks in life. It leads us to look over our shoulders instead of looking straight ahead.

This can be a strange cause of envy. We want what other people have because other people think that what they have is desirable, even if we ourselves do not really care one way or another. If someone seeks reputation and honor, living for ambition, the shiny prize could be anything—so long as others desire it and only a few can have it! This dynamic can be tricky to see. We need to disentangle our genuine desires from what everyone else wants and thinks we should want.

But if we break free from the ties of mimetic desire, I think a lot of envy would simply dissolve. Envy arises, in large part, from social comparison and imitative desire. The bigger question here is to ask: What do you really want? What is your life ultimately about? What are you aiming to accomplish before you die?

Center on those priorities and then move forward with them. Focus on your page and not on the page of your neighbor next door. This focus allows you to live your life and others to live their lives without making reality into a zero-sum game. True, there only gets to be one Taylor Swift, one Michael Jordan, one John D. Rockefeller, one Alexander the Great (if you can put all those in the same list).

The bigger question here is to ask: What do you really want? What is your life ultimately about? What are you aiming to accomplish before you die?

That is no loss to you! Go ahead and live the life you were made to live, with your interests, talents, passions, and opportunities. Some will be more famous than others. Some will make more money. Some will be more successful. But if we can be grateful for the ones in front of us, we will live happier lives.

Living with Open Hands

So, are we living with our fists clenched? Or with open hands?

A lot of the time, I think, my hands are clenched—holding on to what I have and hoping to make sure that I don’t lose any of it. When I open my hands it is often only to grasp more and more rather than to give away.

Living with open hands is a great cure for envy. It reminds us that what we have is not really ours in the first place. Life and everything that comes along with it is ultimately a gift—something that is given to us, not something that is ours by right. Envy looks at things that, we think, ought to be ours, when they are not.

And one truth of diverse spiritual traditions is this—whatever we have is given to us. Nothing is finally and totally our own. We have life, and all else, on loan for a time unknown to us. Envy dissolves in the face of the recognition that what we have is not our own and what we do have was never “ours” to begin with.

When envy strikes, that is a truth I will remember more.

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Envy is a complex and puzzling emotion. It is, notoriously, one of the seven deadly sins in the Catholic tradition. It is very commonly charged with being (either typically or universally) unreasonable, irrational, imprudent, vicious, or wrong to feel. With very few exceptions, the ample philosophical literature defending the rationality and evaluative importance of emotions explicitly excludes envy and a few other nasty emotions as irredeemable. Indeed, some authors who are prepared to defend even jealousy insist that envy is beyond the pale. Yet there is considerable controversy over what precisely envy is, and the cogency of various specific criticisms of envy depends on what view of that subject is adopted.

In addition to its centrality to discussions in the philosophy of emotions, envy has sparked controversies in political philosophy. Perhaps best known among these is the claim that egalitarian views of justice are motivated by envy. It also receives substantial treatment from John Rawls, who takes pains to argue that envy does not pose a threat to his theory of justice. Each of these topics receives some treatment below.

1.1 Defining Envy

1.2 envy vs. jealousy, 1.3 ‘benign’ and ‘invidious’ envy, 1.4 envy vs. resentment, 2. the rationality of envy, 3.1 egalitarianism and envy, 3.2 envy-free allocations, 3.3 rawls’ problem of envy, other internet resources, related entries, 1. the nature of envy.

This entry follows the widespread assumption that envy is an emotion. [ 1 ] That is not to say that it is a mere feeling. Emotions are generally agreed to be more than feelings. Most emotion theorists could agree on this vague characterization: emotions are syndromes of thoughts, feelings, motivations, and bodily movements, loosely enough bound together that a given emotional episode may not require the occurrence of every element in the syndrome. Most theories of emotion privilege one of these elements as central, or even essential, to emotion. Cognitive theories identify a defining thought or judgment. Feeling theories and Motivational theories respectively take a particular affective experience or a distinctive motivational role as central or essential to a given emotion type.

The specific contours of the emotional syndrome of envy are controversial. It is agreed that envy involves an envier (“Subject”), a party who is envied (“Rival”)—this may be a person or group of persons—and some possession, capacity or trait that the subject supposes the rival to have (the “good”). The good might be something that only one party could possibly possess (the crown jewels, or being the world’s best go player), or it might be something easily duplicated. It is sometimes held that the good may even be utility, happiness, or some psychological state that Subject could attribute to Rival even if there were no material difference in their possessions or capacities. Most philosophers who have sought to define envy agree in treating it as a form of distress experienced by the subject because he does not possess the good and the rival does, and in attributing a desire for the good to Subject. Many, but not all, go on to add that envy involves a desire that the rival not have the good. This disagreement is explored below, [see benign and invidious envy]. Envy is widely but not universally agreed to be a symptom or instance of the human tendency to evaluate one’s well-being comparatively, by assessing how well one is doing in comparison with others. Influential definitions of envy include:

Envy is pain at the good fortune of others. (Aristotle, Rhetoric , Bk II, Chapter 10) Envy is a propensity to view the well-being of others with distress, even though it does not detract from one’s own. [It is] a reluctance to see our own well-being overshadowed by another’s because the standard we use to see how well off we are is not the intrinsic worth of our own well-being but how it compares with that of others. [Envy] aims, at least in terms of one’s wishes, at destroying others’ good fortune. (Kant, The Metaphysics of Morals 6:459) Envy is that passion which views with malignant dislike the superiority of those who are really entitled to all the superiority they possess. (Adam Smith, The Theory of Moral Sentiments , p. 244)

Ordinary language tends to conflate envy and jealousy. The philosophical consensus is that these are distinct emotions.While it is linguistically acceptable to say that one is jealous upon hearing about another’s vacation, say, it has been plausibly argued that one is feeling envy, if either, in such a case. According to Farrell (1980) and Neu (1980), both envy and jealousy are three-place relations; but this superficial similarity conceals an important difference. Jealousy involves three parties, the subject, the rival, and the beloved; and the jealous person’s real locus of concern is the beloved, a person (or being) whose affection he is losing or fears losing. The locus of concern in jealousy is not the rival. Whereas envy is a two party relation, with a third relatum that is a good (albeit a good that could be a particular person’s affections); and the envious person’s locus of concern is the rival.

On this way of distinguishing envy from jealousy there is a difference between them even when the good that the rival has is the affection of another person. [ 2 ] Roughly, for the jealous person the rival is fungible and the beloved is not fungible. So he would be equally bothered if the beloved were consorting with someone else, and would not be bothered if the rival were. Whereas in envy it is the other way around. Because envy is centrally focused on competition with the rival, the subject might well be equally bothered if the rival were consorting with a different (appealing) person, but would not be bothered if the ‘good’ had gone to someone else (with whom the subject was not in competition). Whatever the ordinary meaning of the terms ‘envy’ and ‘jealousy,’ these considerations demonstrate that these two distinct syndromes need to be distinguished.

Many authors posit a distinction between two kinds of envy: a malicious or invidious form, and a benign, emulative, or admiring variety of envy. [ 3 ] Typically, the point of the distinction is to identify a class of cases in which envy is somehow permissible or justifiable and separate them from cases in which it is not. While details differ, the general idea is that invidious envy involves a desire that the rival lose the good, whereas benign envy does not. [ 4 ] But other philosophers claim that benign envy is not envy at all. [ 5 ] Like many disagreements over the nature of emotions, this one threatens to become a merely verbal dispute, but it can be understood as a substantive question about the character of an empirical phenomenon. [ 6 ]

Some of the examples advanced on behalf of the suggested bifurcation threaten to obscure the issue. It will not do, for instance, simply to point out that people commonly say that they envy someone’s skill in cases where it is quite implausible to suppose that they have any desire that the person loses the skill. There is undoubtedly a common tendency to use the term ‘envy’ for any desire for something that is possessed by another. But, given the looseness of natural language noted above, we must not simply assume that these are really cases of the emotional syndrome of envy. Although some discussions of envy seem to treat any desire for [an instance of] what another person has as envy, this threatens to assimilate some cases of envy to admiration. [ 7 ]

Most parties to the debate would grant that not every case in which someone would like something that someone else possesses is a case of genuine envy. First, envy is typically agreed to be a form of pain or distress—an unpleasant emotion. To fancy someone else’s linens is not yet to envy them. So not every such desire should be counted as a case of benign envy. Furthermore, even a painful desire for what someone else possesses might be better described as longing than envy. If you badly (painfully) want the new Mercedes convertible, then you long for it. If you then discover that your neighbor has bought one, does your longing become envy? To avoid turning this into a matter of stipulation or a verbal dispute, it should be a substantive psychological question whether you envy her for it. Envy should not be held to follow as a logical consequence of the conjunction of your painful desire with the belief that she has (an instance of) its object. But then there must be something more to envy than painfully wanting something that (you know) someone else has.

Robert Young suggests that what differentiates envy from mere longing is that, in (even benign) envy, the subject is pained because the rival has the good. But it is questionable whether this proposal succeeds as a defense of benign envy. If the “because” in question is causal-explanatory, this seems insufficient to mark the relevant distinction. After all, ordinary longing may be occasioned by seeing the good in someone else’s possession. Perhaps if your neighbor hadn’t acquired the convertible, it would never have come to your attention. It would then be true that you want it because she has it, yet it seems possible that this is longing, not envy. Suppose that you would have been equally pained by not having it regardless of how you discovered its existence. Then the fact that, as it happens, your longing was caused by seeing it in the neighbor’s driveway does not suffice to make this a case of envy.

But perhaps Young’s “because” offers something like the agent’s reason for being pained, or the content of a thought at which she is pained. In other words, perhaps the point is to emphasize the idea that the subject really is bothered specifically by the difference in possession, not just by his own lack of the good. But if so, more would need to be said to explain how how the envy can be benign. If what pains the subject, or what he evaluates as bad, is really the disparity between the subject and the rival (not just the subject’s lack), it is hard to see how the subject could lack any desire for the rival to lose the comparative advantage. After all, by hypothesis the situation in which the rival loses the good without the subject getting it would be better than the status quo, as far as the subject’s envy is concerned – inasmuch as there would then be no disparity to be bothered by. Of course the subject may not prefer all things considered that the rival lose the good. But if he is only motivated to improve his position, and lacks any desire for the rival to lose the good, then why think that what bothers him is really the disparity, rather than just his own lack?

Sara Protasi (2016) offers a more complex taxonomy of envy which includes a version of benign envy that she calls “emulative envy.” She draws two cross-cutting distinctions: whether the subject is focused upon the good or upon the rival, and whether she perceives the good as obtainable or unobtainable. Focus is understood not in terms of salience or conscious attention, but as a matter of evaluative concern: “what the envier focuses on is whatever she cares about, from a prudential point of view.” (2016, p. 4) In emulative envy, the envier is focused on the good and believes himself capable of obtaining it. She is motivated to improve her standing, not to bring down the rival. But emulative envy is supposed to be distinct from admiration or even longing. It is meant to be a species of envy in general, which Protasi defines as “an aversive reaction to a perceived inferiority to a similar other, with regard to a good that is relevant to the sense of identity of the envier.” (2016, p.2) A question for this account is what role the perceived inferiority to the rival can be playing in emulative envy, if the envier is held to care only about the good, and not the inferiority as such. If it is playing no role, then why think this is a species of envy in general, rather than a (no doubt common and important) emotion of some other sort? But if it is allowed that emulative envy does also include a concern about inferiority as such, distinct from the desire for the good, then the question is how to make that concern compatible with an insistence that there is no desire that the rival lose the good.

Even those who deny that “benign envy” is a kind of envy (hereafter, “deniers”) will grant the existence of cases in which people want to have skills or other traits that are possessed by another person, and are pained by their lack, but in which they have no desire at all for the other person to lose those traits. Call such a state “emulative desire.” Apparently some other languages have a word for that state. [ 8 ] What deniers deny is that emulative desire is an instance of envy (or of “envy proper”, as Rawls puts it). But what is at stake in such a claim? We have already noted that ordinary usage surely permits application of “envy” in such cases, and in others besides, so linguistic propriety is not the issue. One way of understanding the debate concerns which taxonomy of mental states carves emotions at their joints—that is, carves them in ways that reflect psychological kinds that support predictions and explanatory generalizations.

One way to develop the deniers’ position is as follows. [ 9 ] Envy is a distinctive kind of psychological state that is essentially competitive. It is concerned specifically with unfavorable comparisons to others with whom the subject in some ways sees himself as in competition. On this view, the characteristic dissatisfaction of envy supplies or embodies some level of motivation toward whatever would ameliorate the situation: in other words, toward either outdoing or undoing the rival’s advantage Which of those motivations will emerge in action depends on many factors. It depends on what the situation affords, including the probabilities and expected costs and benefits of success at either option. And it depends on other attitudes and desires of the subject, including how much he likes the rival, whether he thinks it would be wrong to deprive him of the good, and how much that wrongness matters to him.

On this view, there can still be cases of genuine envy in which the subject would not take steps to undermine the rival. He would not even push a button to deprive the rival in secret—because he likes the rival, or because that would be a rotten thing to do to anyone. Call such a person a “decent envier.” A decent envier may sincerely believe that he has no desire whatever that the rival lose the good. He will be wrong about this, but it can still be true that he would not act on that desire. The attribution of genuine envy in such a case nonetheless explains some things. It explains why even a decent envier’s pain is prone to go away, along with some of his ambition to achieve the good, if the rival should lose it. Why should envy go away in such cases, if all the envier wanted was to secure the good himself? It also explains why even decent enviers may be more likely to be amused by a story that shows the rival in a negative light, and why they become drawn to other goods that the rival acquires within the scope of the rivalry. And it explains why some previously decent enviers become indecent enviers, or at least become aware of some ambivalence about the rival’s possession of the good, when their efforts to secure the good for themselves prove hopeless.

In cases of emulative desire, on the other hand, presumably none of these things should be expected. So what deniers want to say about benign envy is that either it is not really envy (it’s just emulative desire, or something else in the neighborhood) or it is not really benign. Whether the deniers’ view should be preferred may hinge on what explanatory advantages defenders of benign envy can offer for a taxonomy that includes emulative desire as a species of envy.

Although much of the psychological literature on envy supposes that envy is concerned with matters of perceived injustice, most philosophers reject this suggestion. [ 10 ] The received view is that envy is to be distinguished from resentment. The latter is held to be a moral emotion, whereas the former is not. What makes a given emotion a moral emotion has been glossed in various ways. Roughly, the idea is that moral emotions are ones that somehow embody moral principles or appraisals. Resentment is a moral emotion because a given emotional episode does not qualify as a state of resentment unless the subject holds some moral complaint against the object of the state. The claim that envy is not a moral emotion should be understood as a denial that any moral complaint is part of the nature of envy as such. It is compatible with the possibility of any number of cases in which envious people also hold moral complaints against those they envy. And it is also compatible with the possibility of envying someone for some moral feature.

It seems clear that in many (perhaps even most) cases of envy, the subject is liable to find some moral complaint with which to justify negative feelings toward his rival. This would explain various experimental findings that correlate feelings of envy with complaints of injustice. But, of course, such complaints may be defensive rationalizations of rancorous feelings, rather than elements in envy. Claims about which of the various thoughts that commonly attend a given type of emotion belong in a characterization of that emotion type are best defended within the context of a general theory of how to individuate emotion types, which is beyond the scope of this entry. In any case, some version of the thesis that envy is not a moral emotion seems both plausible and necessary to make sense of the debate over whether egalitarianism is motivated by envy (see section 3.1 below).

Assessments of the rationality of emotions take various forms. It is useful to distinguish the prudential advisability of emotions (whether they are good for the person who has them) from their fittingness (roughly, whether the appraisal of circumstances involved in the emotion is accurate or not). Both of these assessments are to be distinguished from various ethical appraisals of emotions. Most authors who address the issue seem to agree that envy is seldom advisable: insofar as one is able to control or influence one’s emotions, it is best not to be envious, because envy harms those who feel it. This is sometimes urged simply on the grounds that envy is a form of pain, but more often because, in envy, a person’s subjective sense of well-being, self-worth or self-respect is diminished. But if envy involves certain characteristic patterns of motivation, such as a motive to outdo or undo the rival’s advantages, then the advisability of envy may be strongly dependent on the advisability of the actions it motivates. And whether these actions are advisable, in turn, depends upon whether they are efficient means to the ends at which they aim, and whether those ends are themselves in the subject’s interests. Thus an adequate assessment of the prudential advisability of envy may well depend on whether the envious subject’s sense that he is worse off because of his rival’s possession of the good that he lacks is accurate. If it is accurate, then motivation to change the situation may well be beneficial for the Subject. We turn now to issues of accuracy.

It is commonly supposed that emotions, envy included, involve a way of taking the circumstances—a thought, construal, appraisal, or perception of the circumstances—which can then be assessed for fittingness (objective rationality) and/or warrant (subjective rationality). [ 11 ] Thus fear can be unfittingly directed at something that isn’t really dangerous, or fittingly directed at something that is. And it can be unwarrantedly directed at something the subject has good reason to believe poses no danger, or warrantedly directed at what she has good reason to think dangerous—even if that good reason is supplied by misleading evidence, so that the object of the emotion is not, in fact, dangerous. Similarly, in light of the discussion above, we might say that envy involves thinking that the rival has something good that the subject lacks, and negatively evaluating this difference in possession, per se. Each of the various strands in this way of taking the circumstances, then, can be appraised for fittingness and warrant. We will focus on fittingness here, but analogous points can be made in terms of warrant. Envy will be unfitting, for instance, if the rival does not really have the good, or if the ‘good’ isn’t really good—for instance if the envy is directed at some possession that the subject would not really value if he knew its true nature. These suggestions are uncontroversial. A more interesting question concerns the last element in envy’s characteristic appraisal: the negative evaluation of the difference in possession. This too might be thought to be amenable of broadly rational appraisal.

Some philosophers suggest that envy is always or typically irrational, and they seem to have in mind the charge that it is unfitting. [ 12 ] Theirs is a restricted version of the Stoic critique of emotions, according to which (roughly) all emotions are unfitting because they involve taking various worldly things to matter that don’t really matter. Not many contemporary philosophers are attracted to the Stoic view of value, which is embedded in an idiosyncratic ancient cosmology. But perhaps specific emotions can be convicted of the putative mistake, and envy appears to be a likely suspect. If envy involves taking the difference in possession between subject and rival to be bad in itself, then, if such differences are not bad in themselves, envy is systematically unfitting. Developing this charge demands getting clearer about the sense in which envy can be said to involve taking the difference in possession to be bad in itself.

Suppose that envy includes some desire that the rival not have the good. Then envy may be interpreted so as to involve a preference for the situation in which neither subject nor rival have the good to the one in which rival has it and subject does not. [ 13 ] Call this the “envious preference.” The envious preference is invoked as a basis for the claim that envy appraises the former situation as better than the latter. But better in what respect? There are a number of possibilities, and we will consider just two. First, it might be held to be better, from the point of view of the universe (“impersonally better” for short). Secondly, it might be held to be better for the subject.

If envy holds that the situation in which neither has the good is better, impersonally, than the one in which Rival has it, this can be criticized as an axiological mistake. [ 14 ] Surely the world is a better place, ceteris paribus , if someone possesses a given good than if no one does. But this is too quick. First, consider cases in which rival has acquired the good by wrongdoing. Arguably the world is not a better place when the fortunes of some are wrongfully improved. Secondly, an extreme egalitarian may hold that inequalities themselves are prima facie bad, because they are unjust. On that view, it may sometimes be better that neither possesses a given good than that one does. Either of these considerations might then be invoked as a defense of fittingness of envy. Thus, if envy is interpreted as making a claim about impersonal value, it will be difficult to prevent moral considerations from guiding verdicts about its fittingness. [ 15 ] While this does not completely collapse the distinction between envy and resentment, it renders it considerably murkier.

Alternatively, envy can be held to present the difference in possession between subject and rival as bad specifically for Subject. This interpretation of envy’s characteristic appraisal is more plausible, and it jibes better with the doctrine that envy is not a moral feeling. Envy can nonetheless be criticized as irrational, on this interpretation, for taking something to be bad for Subject that is not in fact bad for him. What matters to how well things are going for Subject is a function of what goods Subject has, not what goods his rival has, the critic will suggest. Hence, while the present state of affairs is worse for Subject than a situation in which he has the good and Rival lacks it, it is not worse than a situation in which neither has the good. So there is no self-interested reason for Subject to have the envious preference. Envy is therefore systematically unfitting because it takes something to be bad for the subject that is not in fact bad for him.

The cogency of this argument for the irrationality of envy depends, of course, on the plausibility of its claims about well-being. If people do in fact systematically care about the possessions of others, and regard themselves as worse or better off accordingly as they stack up against their selected comparison class, some subjectivist accounts will license taking this concern as itself a part of these subjects’ well-being—in which case, some envy will be fitting. Whereas most objective accounts of well-being either treat it as a measure of primary goods, or supply content restrictions on the desires whose satisfaction contributes to well-being which would exclude desires like the envious preference. One recent defense of the claim that envy is sometimes fitting relies on the idea that being excellent in various domains of human achievement contributes to well-being and yet is essentially a comparative matter (D’Arms and Jacobson, 2005). If such excellences, or other positional goods, are granted to contribute in themselves to well-being, then it appears that envy will be fitting whenever a rival’s diminution with respect to the relevant positional good improves the Subject’s position.

3. Envy and Justice

A recurring suggestion in the history of philosophical and political thought has been that envy supplies the psychological foundations of the concern for justice, and, especially, of egalitarian conceptions of justice. [ 16 ] Both the proponents of this charge and those who contest it have commonly taken it to be a damaging suggestion for egalitarianism. [ 17 ] It is worth distinguishing genetic versions of the charge from occurrent ones. Genetic versions concern the historical or developmental sources of a concern for equality. Freud, for instance, held that concern with justice is the product of childhood envy of other children leading to concern for equal treatment, and thereby to ‘group spirit’: “If one cannot be the favorite oneself, at all events nobody else shall be the favorite.” (p. 120). Nietzsche can be read as tendering an account of the origins of egalitarian values or ideals in envy in his account of the “slave revolt in morality.” [ 18 ] Whatever their merits, these claims should be distinguished from the claim that those who defend egalitarian views of justice are motivated by occurrent bouts of envy or propensities to them. [ 19 ]

Defense of the charge that egalitarianism is occurrently motivated by envy hinges both on the commitments of egalitarianism and on the nature of envy. The common motif is that egalitarians wish to do away with the advantages of the better off, and that they wish to do this because they are bothered by the very fact that the better off are better off. This is supposed to show that egalitarians are motivated by envy. Whether this is a fair characterization of any prominent egalitarian position is certainly open to question. [ 20 ] But in any case, in light of the distinction between envy and resentment, it is clear that there can be no direct move from the claim that egalitarians are ‘bothered’ by the advantages of the better off to the claim that they are envious. For another possibility is that what they feel is resentment, occasioned by the thought that the present distribution is unjust. [ 21 ] Note that the claim that what is felt is resentment does not depend upon showing that the resentment is fitting—that the distribution really is unjust. It would suffice to show that the response really is a moral evaluation, justified or not.

It seems clear that the occurrent version of the charge is only damaging to egalitarianism if the basic distinction between envy and resentment is accepted. Otherwise, envy could be granted to motivate egalitarianism, but this would not impute any concern aside from concerns with justice to the position. With the distinction in hand, however, the charge is difficult to defend. Envy does not arise in cases where inequalities favor the subject. So defenders of the charge appear to be committed to the falsifiable thesis that egalitarians are inconsistent in their commitment to inequality. [ 22 ] If the charge were true, egalitarians should oppose only the inequalities that are unfavorable to their own interests. To the extent that egalitarians are sincere and consistent in the embrace of their principles, this counts against the charge that their occurrent motivation is envy. [ 23 ]

A different way in which envy might be thought to motivate broadly egalitarian thought is by appeal to the idea of envy-free allocations. A distribution of goods is said to be “envy-free” when no one prefers anyone else’s bundle of resources to her own. [ 24 ] The suggestion here is not that envy is the psychological motivation for the concern with equality, but rather that, where a distribution in fact produces envy, this is grounds to doubt the fairness of the distribution. But ‘envy’ in these contexts is a technical term for any situation in which someone prefers another’s bundles of goods, and does not refer to the emotional syndrome with which this entry is concerned. [ 25 ]

In constructing the “original position” from which deliberators select principles of justice in A Theory of Justice, Rawls assumes that the imagined deliberators are not motivated by various psychological propensities. One of these is the propensity to envy. One justification Rawls offers for this stipulation is that what principles of justice are chosen should not be affected by individual inclinations, which are mere accidents. This rationale is less persuasive if envious concerns are universal in human nature. Another justification is that parties in the original position should be concerned with their absolute level of primary social goods, not with their standing relative to others as such. [ 26 ] He then proceeds in the second part of the argument for the principles of justice to consider whether, in fact, human propensities being what they are, the tendency to envy will undermine the arrangements of a well-ordered society (in which case the principles of justice would have to be reconsidered). The ‘Problem of Envy’ is the possibility that widespread envy might do just this. The reason that Rawls takes this to be a live possibility is that “the inequalities sanctioned by the difference principle may be so great as to arouse envy to a socially dangerous extent.” [ 27 ]

The primary way in which Rawls thinks envy could pose such a threat is if it comes to undermine the self-respect of those who are less well off. It might do this, he thinks, if the differences between the haves and the have-nots are so great that, under existing social conditions, the differences cannot help but cause loss of self-esteem. “For those suffering this hurt,” he continues, “envious feelings are not irrational; the satisfaction of their rancor would make them better off.” (534) He calls this “excusable general envy,” and offers two reasons for doubting that it will be prevalent in a well-ordered society. First, he argues that the liberties and political status of equal citizens encourage self-respect even when one is less well off than others. Second, he suggests that background institutions (including a competitive economy) make it likely that excessive inequalities will not be the rule.

Rawls’ discussion is in some tension with the received view of envy. He supposes that “the main psychological root of our liability to envy is a lack of self-confidence in our own worth combined with a sense of impotence.” This leads him to expect that envy will be more severe the greater the differences between subjects and those they envy. [ 28 ] However most observers of envy, from Aristotle on, have urged that it is most often felt toward those with whom the subject perceives himself as in competition, so that typically very great disparities in well-being are not envied. And there is some empirical evidence to support this claim. [ 29 ] This is usually explained by the hypothesis that the benchmarks against which people measure their comparative well-being are, in some (possibly metaphorical) sense, local. If true, this calls into question whether preventing excessive inequalities is likely to reduce the frequency or intensity of envy. But it also suggests that the phenomenon of general, or class, envy toward which Rawls’ discussion is directed may not pose a substantial threat to the well-ordered society.

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Library of Congress Catalog Data: ISSN 1095-5054

How to Make Envy Work For You

by Utkarsh Amitabh

Summary .

At it’s core, envy is secret admiration — an abrupt emotion that cracks us open and reveals things we truly value or wish for. But is envy good or bad?

Envy can be malicious or benign — the key difference being how it motivates us to act. The former motivates us to be hostile or level down while the latter motivates us to level up and achieve our goals.
Often envy is talked about negatively, but when used productively, envy can be educational, instructive, and even inspiring. Envy can push you to observe your emotions more deeply, empower you to reflect, and help you understand what you really want and why.
If you’re grappling with envy, use the author’s “personal envy lab” model to understand your triggers, what you can do about it, how to make envy productive.

All through my childhood and adolescence, I felt this invisible pressure to shape my career a certain way. I was born into a family of educators and doctors. My parents and the society-at-large had fairly specific ideas about what a “suitable” career looked like. There was a sense that I needed to indulge them before my own curiosities. In India, if you are a reasonably good student, pursuing medicine or engineering is preordained.

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What does Emerson say about self-reliance?

In Emerson's essay “ Self-Reliance ,” he boldly states society (especially today’s politically correct environment) hurts a person’s growth.

Emerson wrote that self-sufficiency gives a person in society the freedom they need to discover their true self and attain their true independence.

Believing that individualism, personal responsibility , and nonconformity were essential to a thriving society. But to get there, Emerson knew that each individual had to work on themselves to achieve this level of individualism.

Today, we see society's breakdowns daily and wonder how we arrived at this state of society. One can see how the basic concepts of self-trust, self-awareness, and self-acceptance have significantly been ignored.

Who published self-reliance?

Ralph Waldo Emerson wrote the essay, published in 1841 as part of his first volume of collected essays titled "Essays: First Series."

It would go on to be known as Ralph Waldo Emerson's Self Reliance and one of the most well-known pieces of American literature.

The collection was published by James Munroe and Company.

What are the examples of self-reliance?

Examples of self-reliance can be as simple as tying your shoes and as complicated as following your inner voice and not conforming to paths set by society or religion.

Self-reliance can also be seen as getting things done without relying on others, being able to “pull your weight” by paying your bills, and caring for yourself and your family correctly.

Self-reliance involves relying on one's abilities, judgment, and resources to navigate life. Here are more examples of self-reliance seen today:

Entrepreneurship: Starting and running your own business, relying on your skills and determination to succeed.

Financial Independence: Managing your finances responsibly, saving money, and making sound investment decisions to secure your financial future.

Learning and Education: Taking the initiative to educate oneself, whether through formal education, self-directed learning, or acquiring new skills.

Problem-Solving: Tackling challenges independently, finding solutions to problems, and adapting to changing circumstances.

Personal Development: Taking responsibility for personal growth, setting goals, and working towards self-improvement.

Homesteading: Growing your food, raising livestock, or becoming self-sufficient in various aspects of daily life.

DIY Projects: Undertaking do-it-yourself projects, from home repairs to crafting, without relying on external help.

Living Off the Grid: Living independently from public utilities, generating your energy, and sourcing your water.

Decision-Making: Trusting your instincts and making decisions based on your values and beliefs rather than relying solely on external advice.

Crisis Management: Handling emergencies and crises with resilience and resourcefulness without depending on external assistance.

These examples illustrate different facets of self-reliance, emphasizing independence, resourcefulness, and the ability to navigate life autonomously.

What is the purpose of self reliance by Emerson?

In his essay, " Self Reliance, " Emerson's sole purpose is the want for people to avoid conformity. Emerson believed that in order for a man to truly be a man, he was to follow his own conscience and "do his own thing."

Essentially, do what you believe is right instead of blindly following society.

Why is it important to be self reliant?

While getting help from others, including friends and family, can be an essential part of your life and fulfilling. However, help may not always be available, or the assistance you receive may not be what you had hoped for.

It is for this reason that Emerson pushed for self-reliance. If a person were independent, could solve their problems, and fulfill their needs and desires, they would be a more vital member of society.

This can lead to growth in the following areas:

Empowerment: Self-reliance empowers individuals to take control of their lives. It fosters a sense of autonomy and the ability to make decisions independently.

Resilience: Developing self-reliance builds resilience, enabling individuals to bounce back from setbacks and face challenges with greater adaptability.

Personal Growth: Relying on oneself encourages continuous learning and personal growth. It motivates individuals to acquire new skills and knowledge.

Freedom: Self-reliance provides a sense of freedom from external dependencies. It reduces reliance on others for basic needs, decisions, or validation.

Confidence: Achieving goals through one's own efforts boosts confidence and self-esteem. It instills a belief in one's capabilities and strengthens a positive self-image.

Resourcefulness: Being self-reliant encourages resourcefulness. Individuals learn to solve problems creatively, adapt to changing circumstances, and make the most of available resources.

Adaptability: Self-reliant individuals are often more adaptable to change. They can navigate uncertainties with a proactive and positive mindset.

Reduced Stress: Dependence on others can lead to stress and anxiety, especially when waiting for external support. Self-reliance reduces reliance on external factors for emotional well-being.

Personal Responsibility: It promotes a sense of responsibility for one's own life and decisions. Self-reliant individuals are more likely to take ownership of their actions and outcomes.

Goal Achievement: Being self-reliant facilitates the pursuit and achievement of personal and professional goals. It allows individuals to overcome obstacles and stay focused on their objectives.

Overall, self-reliance contributes to personal empowerment, mental resilience, and the ability to lead a fulfilling and purposeful life. While collaboration and support from others are valuable, cultivating a strong sense of self-reliance enhances one's capacity to navigate life's challenges independently.

What did Emerson mean, "Envy is ignorance, imitation is suicide"?

According to Emerson, no kernel of nourishing corn can come to you independently, but every person is given a plot of ground to till.

In other words, Emerson believed that a person's main focus in life is to work on oneself, increasing their maturity and intellect, and overcoming insecurities, which will allow a person to be self-reliant to the point where they no longer envy others but measure themselves against how they were the day before.

When we do become self-reliant, we focus on creating rather than imitating. Being someone we are not is just as damaging to the soul as suicide.

Envy is ignorance: Emerson suggests that feeling envious of others is a form of ignorance. Envy often arises from a lack of understanding or appreciation of one's unique qualities and potential. Instead of being envious, individuals should focus on discovering and developing their talents and strengths.

Imitation is suicide: Emerson extends the idea by stating that imitation, or blindly copying others, is a form of self-destruction. He argues that true individuality and personal growth come from expressing one's unique voice and ideas. In this context, imitation is seen as surrendering one's identity and creativity, leading to a kind of "spiritual death."

What are the transcendental elements in Emerson’s self-reliance?

The five predominant elements of Transcendentalism are nonconformity, self-reliance, free thought, confidence, and the importance of nature.

The Transcendentalism movement emerged in New England between 1820 and 1836. It is essential to differentiate this movement from Transcendental Meditation, a distinct practice.

According to the Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, Transcendentalism is characterized as "an American literary, political, and philosophical movement of the early nineteenth century, centered around Ralph Waldo Emerson." A central tenet of this movement is the belief that individual purity can be 'corrupted' by society.

Are Emerson's writings referenced in pop culture?

Emerson has made it into popular culture. One such example is in the film Next Stop Wonderland released in 1998. The reference is a quote from Emerson's essay on Self Reliance, "A foolish consistency is the hobgoblin of little minds."

This becomes a running theme in the film as a single woman (Hope Davis ), who is quite familiar with Emerson's writings and showcases several men taking her on dates, attempting to impress her by quoting the famous line, only to botch the line and also giving attribution to the wrong person. One gentleman says confidently it was W.C. Fields, while another matches the quote with Cicero. One goes as far as stating it was Karl Marx!

Why does Emerson say about self confidence?

Content is coming very soon.

Self-Reliance: The Complete Essay

Ne te quaesiveris extra."

Man is his own star; and the soul that can Render an honest and a perfect man, Commands all light, all influence, all fate ; Nothing to him falls early or too late. Our acts our angels are, or good or ill, Our fatal shadows that walk by us still." Epilogue to Beaumont and Fletcher's Honest Man's Fortune Cast the bantling on the rocks, Suckle him with the she-wolf's teat; Wintered with the hawk and fox, Power and speed be hands and feet.

Ralph Waldo Emerson left the ministry to pursue a career in writing and public speaking. Emerson became one of America's best known and best-loved 19th-century figures. More About Emerson

Ralph Waldo Emerson Self Reliance Summary

The essay “Self-Reliance,” written by Ralph Waldo Emerson, is, by far, his most famous piece of work. Emerson, a Transcendentalist, believed focusing on the purity and goodness of individualism and community with nature was vital for a strong society. Transcendentalists despise the corruption and conformity of human society and institutions. Published in 1841, the Self Reliance essay is a deep-dive into self-sufficiency as a virtue.

In the essay "Self-Reliance," Ralph Waldo Emerson advocates for individuals to trust in their own instincts and ideas rather than blindly following the opinions of society and its institutions. He argues that society encourages conformity, stifles individuality, and encourages readers to live authentically and self-sufficient lives.

Emerson also stresses the importance of being self-reliant, relying on one's own abilities and judgment rather than external validation or approval from others. He argues that people must be honest with themselves and seek to understand their own thoughts and feelings rather than blindly following the expectations of others. Through this essay, Emerson emphasizes the value of independence, self-discovery, and personal growth.

What is the Meaning of Self-Reliance?

I read the other day some verses written by an eminent painter which were original and not conventional. The soul always hears an admonition in such lines, let the subject be what it may. The sentiment they instill is of more value than any thought they may contain. To believe your own thought, to think that what is true for you in your private heart is true for all men, — that is genius.

Speak your latent conviction, and it shall be the universal sense; for the inmost in due time becomes the outmost,—— and our first thought is rendered back to us by the trumpets of the Last Judgment. Familiar as the voice of the mind is to each, the highest merit we ascribe to Moses, Plato, and Milton is, that they set at naught books and traditions, and spoke not what men but what they thought. A man should learn to detect and watch that gleam of light that flashes across his mind from within, more than the luster of the firmament of bards and sages. Yet he dismisses without notice his thought because it is his. In every work of genius, we recognize our own rejected thoughts: they come back to us with a certain alienated majesty.

Great works of art have no more affecting lessons for us than this. They teach us to abide by our spontaneous impression with good-humored inflexibility than most when the whole cry of voices is on the other side. Else, tomorrow a stranger will say with masterly good sense precisely what we have thought and felt all the time, and we shall be forced to take with shame our own opinion from another.

There is a time in every man's education when he arrives at the conviction that envy is ignorance; that imitation is suicide; that he must take himself for better, for worse, as his portion; that though the wide universe is full of good, no kernel of nourishing corn can come to him but through his toil bestowed on that plot of ground which is given to him to till. The power which resides in him is new in nature, and none but he knows what that is which he can do, nor does he know until he has tried. Not for nothing one face, one character, one fact, makes much impression on him, and another none. This sculpture in the memory is not without preestablished harmony. The eye was placed where one ray should fall, that it might testify of that particular ray. We but half express ourselves and are ashamed of that divine idea which each of us represents. It may be safely trusted as proportionate and of good issues, so it be faithfully imparted, but God will not have his work made manifest by cowards. A man is relieved and gay when he has put his heart into his work and done his best; but what he has said or done otherwise, shall give him no peace. It is a deliverance that does not deliver. In the attempt his genius deserts him; no muse befriends; no invention, no hope.

Trust Thyself: Every Heart Vibrates To That Iron String.

Accept the place the divine providence has found for you, the society of your contemporaries, and the connection of events. Great men have always done so, and confided themselves childlike to the genius of their age, betraying their perception that the absolutely trustworthy was seated at their heart, working through their hands, predominating in all their being. And we are now men, and must accept in the highest mind the same transcendent destiny; and not minors and invalids in a protected corner, not cowards fleeing before a revolution, but guides, redeemers, and benefactors, obeying the Almighty effort, and advancing on Chaos and the Dark.

What pretty oracles nature yields to us in this text, in the face and behaviour of children, babes, and even brutes! That divided and rebel mind, that distrust of a sentiment because our arithmetic has computed the strength and means opposed to our purpose, these have not. Their mind being whole, their eye is as yet unconquered, and when we look in their faces, we are disconcerted. Infancy conforms to nobody: all conform to it, so that one babe commonly makes four or five out of the adults who prattle and play to it. So God has armed youth and puberty and manhood no less with its own piquancy and charm, and made it enviable and gracious and its claims not to be put by, if it will stand by itself. Do not think the youth has no force, because he cannot speak to you and me. Hark! in the next room his voice is sufficiently clear and emphatic. It seems he knows how to speak to his contemporaries. Bashful or bold, then, he will know how to make us seniors very unnecessary.

The nonchalance of boys who are sure of a dinner, and would disdain as much as a lord to do or say aught to conciliate one, is the healthy attitude of human nature. A boy is in the parlour what the pit is in the playhouse; independent, irresponsible, looking out from his corner on such people and facts as pass by, he tries and sentences them on their merits, in the swift, summary way of boys, as good, bad, interesting, silly, eloquent, troublesome. He cumbers himself never about consequences, about interests: he gives an independent, genuine verdict. You must court him: he does not court you. But the man is, as it were, clapped into jail by his consciousness. As soon as he has once acted or spoken with eclat, he is a committed person, watched by the sympathy or the hatred of hundreds, whose affections must now enter into his account. There is no Lethe for this. Ah, that he could pass again into his neutrality! Who can thus avoid all pledges, and having observed, observe again from the same unaffected, unbiased, unbribable, unaffrighted innocence, must always be formidable. He would utter opinions on all passing affairs, which being seen to be not private, but necessary, would sink like darts into the ear of men, and put them in fear.

Society everywhere is in conspiracy - Ralph Waldo Emerson

These are the voices which we hear in solitude, but they grow faint and inaudible as we enter into the world. Society everywhere is in conspiracy against the manhood of every one of its members. Society is a joint-stock company, in which the members agree, for the better securing of his bread to each shareholder, to surrender the liberty and culture of the eater. The virtue in most request is conformity. Self-reliance is its aversion. It loves not realities and creators, but names and customs.

Whoso would be a man must be a nonconformist. He who would gather immortal palms must not be hindered by the name of goodness, but must explore if it be goodness. Nothing is at last sacred but the integrity of your own mind. Absolve you to yourself, and you shall have the suffrage of the world. I remember an answer which when quite young I was prompted to make to a valued adviser, who was wont to importune me with the dear old doctrines of the church. On my saying, What have I to do with the sacredness of traditions, if I live wholly from within? my friend suggested, — "But these impulses may be from below, not from above." I replied, "They do not seem to me to be such; but if I am the Devil's child, I will live then from the Devil." No law can be sacred to me but that of my nature. Good and bad are but names very readily transferable to that or this; the only right is what is after my constitution, the only wrong what is against it. A man is to carry himself in the presence of all opposition, as if every thing were titular and ephemeral but he. I am ashamed to think how easily we capitulate to badges and names, to large societies and dead institutions. Every decent and well-spoken individual affects and sways me more than is right. I ought to go upright and vital, and speak the rude truth in all ways. If malice and vanity wear the coat of philanthropy, shall that pass? If an angry bigot assumes this bountiful cause of Abolition, and comes to me with his last news from Barbadoes, why should I not say to him, 'Go love thy infant; love thy wood-chopper: be good-natured and modest: have that grace; and never varnish your hard, uncharitable ambition with this incredible tenderness for black folk a thousand miles off. Thy love afar is spite at home.' Rough and graceless would be such greeting, but truth is handsomer than the affectation of love. Your goodness must have some edge to it, — else it is none. The doctrine of hatred must be preached as the counteraction of the doctrine of love when that pules and whines. I shun father and mother and wife and brother, when my genius calls me. The lintels of the door-post I would write on, Whim . It is somewhat better than whim at last I hope, but we cannot spend the day in explanation. Expect me not to show cause why I seek or why I exclude company. Then, again, do not tell me, as a good man did to-day, of my obligation to put all poor men in good situations. Are they my poor? I tell thee, thou foolish philanthropist, that I grudge the dollar, the dime, the cent, I give to such men as do not belong to me and to whom I do not belong. There is a class of persons to whom by all spiritual affinity I am bought and sold; for them I will go to prison, if need be; but your miscellaneous popular charities; the education at college of fools; the building of meeting-houses to the vain end to which many now stand; alms to sots; and the thousandfold Relief Societies; — though I confess with shame I sometimes succumb and give the dollar, it is a wicked dollar which by and by I shall have the manhood to withhold.

Virtues are, in the popular estimate, rather the exception than the rule. There is the man and his virtues. Men do what is called a good action, as some piece of courage or charity, much as they would pay a fine in expiation of daily non-appearance on parade. Their works are done as an apology or extenuation of their living in the world, — as invalids and the insane pay a high board. Their virtues are penances. I do not wish to expiate, but to live. My life is for itself and not for a spectacle. I much prefer that it should be of a lower strain, so it be genuine and equal, than that it should be glittering and unsteady. Wish it to be sound and sweet, and not to need diet and bleeding. The primary evidence I ask that you are a man, and refuse this appeal from the man to his actions. For myself it makes no difference that I know, whether I do or forbear those actions which are reckoned excellent. I cannot consent to pay for a privilege where I have intrinsic right. Few and mean as my gifts may be, I actually am, and do not need for my own assurance or the assurance of my fellows any secondary testimony.

What I must do is all that concerns me, not what the people think.

This rule, equally arduous in actual and in intellectual life, may serve for the whole distinction between greatness and meanness. It is the harder, because you will always find those who think they know what is your duty better than you know it. The easy thing in the world is to live after the world's opinion; it is easy in solitude to live after our own; but the great man is he who in the midst of the crowd keeps with perfect sweetness the independence of solitude.

The objection to conforming to usages that have become dead to you is, that it scatters your force. It loses your time and blurs the impression of your character. If you maintain a dead church, contribute to a dead Bible-society, vote with a great party either for the government or against it, spread your table like base housekeepers, — under all these screens I have difficulty to detect the precise man you are. And, of course, so much force is withdrawn from your proper life. But do your work, and I shall know you. Do your work, and you shall reinforce yourself. A man must consider what a blindman's-buff is this game of conformity. If I know your sect, I anticipate your argument. I hear a preacher announce for his text and topic the expediency of one of the institutions of his church. Do I not know beforehand that not possibly can he say a new and spontaneous word? With all this ostentation of examining the grounds of the institution, do I not know that he will do no such thing? Do not I know that he is pledged to himself not to look but at one side, — the permitted side, not as a man, but as a parish minister? He is a retained attorney, and these airs of the bench are the emptiest affectation. Well, most men have bound their eyes with one or another handkerchief, and attached themselves to some one of these communities of opinion. This conformity makes them not false in a few particulars, authors of a few lies, but false in all particulars. Their every truth is not quite true. Their two is not the real two, their four not the real four; so that every word they say chagrins us, and we know not where to begin to set them right. Meantime nature is not slow to equip us in the prison-uniform of the party to which we adhere. We come to wear one cut of face and figure, and acquire by degrees the gentlest asinine expression. There is a mortifying experience in particular, which does not fail to wreak itself also in the general history; I mean "the foolish face of praise," the forced smile which we put on in company where we do not feel at ease in answer to conversation which does not interest us. The muscles, not spontaneously moved, but moved by a low usurping wilfulness, grow tight about the outline of the face with the most disagreeable sensation.

For nonconformity the world whips you with its displeasure. And therefore a man must know how to estimate a sour face. The by-standers look askance on him in the public street or in the friend's parlour. If this aversation had its origin in contempt and resistance like his own, he might well go home with a sad countenance; but the sour faces of the multitude, like their sweet faces, have no deep cause, but are put on and off as the wind blows and a newspaper directs. Yet is the discontent of the multitude more formidable than that of the senate and the college. It is easy enough for a firm man who knows the world to brook the rage of the cultivated classes. Their rage is decorous and prudent, for they are timid as being very vulnerable themselves. But when to their feminine rage the indignation of the people is added, when the ignorant and the poor are aroused, when the unintelligent brute force that lies at the bottom of society is made to growl and mow, it needs the habit of magnanimity and religion to treat it godlike as a trifle of no concernment.

The other terror that scares us from self-trust is our consistency; a reverence for our past act or word, because the eyes of others have no other data for computing our orbit than our past acts, and we are loath to disappoint them.

But why should you keep your head over your shoulder? Why drag about this corpse of your memory, lest you contradict somewhat you have stated in this or that public place? Suppose you should contradict yourself; what then? It seems to be a rule of wisdom never to rely on your memory alone, scarcely even in acts of pure memory, but to bring the past for judgment into the thousand-eyed present, and live ever in a new day. In your metaphysics you have denied personality to the Deity: yet when the devout motions of the soul come, yield to them heart and life, though they should clothe God with shape and color. Leave your theory, as Joseph his coat in the hand of the harlot, and flee.

A foolish consistency is the hobgoblin of little minds, adored by little statesmen and philosophers and divines. With consistency a great soul has simply nothing to do. He may as well concern himself with his shadow on the wall. Speak what you think now in hard words, and to-morrow speak what to-morrow thinks in hard words again, though it contradict every thing you said to-day. — 'Ah, so you shall be sure to be misunderstood.' — Is it so bad, then, to be misunderstood? Pythagoras was misunderstood, and Socrates, and Jesus, and Luther, and Copernicus, and Galileo, and Newton, and every pure and wise spirit that ever took flesh. To be great is to be misunderstood.

Do not follow where the path may lead - Ralph Waldo Emerson

I suppose no man can violate his nature.

All the sallies of his will are rounded in by the law of his being, as the inequalities of Andes and Himmaleh are insignificant in the curve of the sphere. Nor does it matter how you gauge and try him. A character is like an acrostic or Alexandrian stanza; — read it forward, backward, or across, it still spells the same thing. In this pleasing, contrite wood-life which God allows me, let me record day by day my honest thought without prospect or retrospect, and, I cannot doubt, it will be found symmetrical, though I mean it not, and see it not. My book should smell of pines and resound with the hum of insects. The swallow over my window should interweave that thread or straw he carries in his bill into my web also. We pass for what we are. Character teaches above our wills. Men imagine that they communicate their virtue or vice only by overt actions, and do not see that virtue or vice emit a breath every moment.

There will be an agreement in whatever variety of actions, so they be each honest and natural in their hour. For of one will, the actions will be harmonious, however unlike they seem. These varieties are lost sight of at a little distance, at a little height of thought. One tendency unites them all. The voyage of the best ship is a zigzag line of a hundred tacks. See the line from a sufficient distance, and it straightens itself to the average tendency. Your genuine action will explain itself, and will explain your other genuine actions. Your conformity explains nothing. Act singly, and what you have already done singly will justify you now. Greatness appeals to the future. If I can be firm enough to-day to do right, and scorn eyes, I must have done so much right before as to defend me now. Be it how it will, do right now. Always scorn appearances, and you always may. The force of character is cumulative. All the foregone days of virtue work their health into this. What makes the majesty of the heroes of the senate and the field, which so fills the imagination? The consciousness of a train of great days and victories behind. They shed an united light on the advancing actor. He is attended as by a visible escort of angels. That is it which throws thunder into Chatham's voice, and dignity into Washington's port, and America into Adams's eye. Honor is venerable to us because it is no ephemeris. It is always ancient virtue. We worship it today because it is not of today. We love it and pay it homage, because it is not a trap for our love and homage, but is self-dependent, self-derived, and therefore of an old immaculate pedigree, even if shown in a young person.

I hope in these days we have heard the last of conformity and consistency. Let the words be gazetted and ridiculous henceforward. Instead of the gong for dinner, let us hear a whistle from the Spartan fife. Let us never bow and apologize more. A great man is coming to eat at my house. I do not wish to please him; He should wish to please me, that I wish. I will stand here for humanity, and though I would make it kind, I would make it true. Let us affront and reprimand the smooth mediocrity and squalid contentment of the times, and hurl in the face of custom, and trade, and office, the fact which is the upshot of all history, that there is a great responsible Thinker and Actor working wherever a man works; that a true man belongs to no other time or place, but is the centre of things. Where he is, there is nature. He measures you, and all men, and all events. Ordinarily, every body in society reminds us of somewhat else, or of some other person. Character, reality, reminds you of nothing else; it takes place of the whole creation. The man must be so much, that he must make all circumstances indifferent. Every true man is a cause, a country, and an age; requires infinite spaces and numbers and time fully to accomplish his design; — and posterity seem to follow his steps as a train of clients. A man Caesar is born, and for ages after we have a Roman Empire. Christ is born, and millions of minds so grow and cleave to his genius, that he is confounded with virtue and the possible of man. An institution is the lengthened shadow of one man; as, Monachism, of the Hermit Antony; the Reformation, of Luther; Quakerism, of Fox; Methodism, of Wesley; Abolition, of Clarkson. Scipio, Milton called "the height of Rome"; and all history resolves itself very easily into the biography of a few stout and earnest persons.

Let a man then know his worth, and keep things under his feet. Let him not peep or steal, or skulk up and down with the air of a charity-boy, a bastard, or an interloper, in the world which exists for him. But the man in the street, finding no worth in himself which corresponds to the force which built a tower or sculptured a marble god, feels poor when he looks on these. To him a palace, a statue, or a costly book have an alien and forbidding air, much like a gay equipage, and seem to say like that, 'Who are you, Sir?' Yet they all are his, suitors for his notice, petitioners to his faculties that they will come out and take possession. The picture waits for my verdict: it is not to command me, but I am to settle its claims to praise. That popular fable of the sot who was picked up dead drunk in the street, carried to the duke's house, washed and dressed and laid in the duke's bed, and, on his waking, treated with all obsequious ceremony like the duke, and assured that he had been insane, owes its popularity to the fact, that it symbolizes so well the state of man, who is in the world a sort of sot, but now and then wakes up, exercises his reason, and finds himself a true prince.

Our reading is mendicant and sycophantic. In history, our imagination plays us false. Kingdom and lordship, power and estate, are a gaudier vocabulary than private John and Edward in a small house and common day's work; but the things of life are the same to both; the sum total of both is the same. Why all this deference to Alfred, and Scanderbeg, and Gustavus? Suppose they were virtuous; did they wear out virtue? As great a stake depends on your private act to-day, as followed their public and renowned steps. When private men shall act with original views, the lustre will be transferred from the actions of kings to those of gentlemen.

The world has been instructed by its kings, who have so magnetized the eyes of nations. It has been taught by this colossal symbol the mutual reverence that is due from man to man. The joyful loyalty with which men have everywhere suffered the king, the noble, or the great proprietor to walk among them by a law of his own, make his own scale of men and things, and reverse theirs, pay for benefits not with money but with honor, and represent the law in his person, was the hieroglyphic by which they obscurely signified their consciousness of their own right and comeliness, the right of every man.

The magnetism which all original action exerts is explained when we inquire the reason of self-trust.

Who is the Trustee? What is the aboriginal Self, on which a universal reliance may be grounded? What is the nature and power of that science-baffling star, without parallax, without calculable elements, which shoots a ray of beauty even into trivial and impure actions, if the least mark of independence appear? The inquiry leads us to that source, at once the essence of genius, of virtue, and of life, which we call Spontaneity or Instinct. We denote this primary wisdom as Intuition, whilst all later teachings are tuitions. In that deep force, the last fact behind which analysis cannot go, all things find their common origin. For, the sense of being which in calm hours rises, we know not how, in the soul, is not diverse from things, from space, from light, from time, from man, but one with them, and proceeds obviously from the same source whence their life and being also proceed. We first share the life by which things exist, and afterwards see them as appearances in nature, and forget that we have shared their cause. Here is the fountain of action and of thought. Here are the lungs of that inspiration which giveth man wisdom, and which cannot be denied without impiety and atheism. We lie in the lap of immense intelligence, which makes us receivers of its truth and organs of its activity. When we discern justice, when we discern truth, we do nothing of ourselves, but allow a passage to its beams. If we ask whence this comes, if we seek to pry into the soul that causes, all philosophy is at fault. Its presence or its absence is all we can affirm. Every man discriminates between the voluntary acts of his mind, and his involuntary perceptions, and knows that to his involuntary perceptions a perfect faith is due. He may err in the expression of them, but he knows that these things are so, like day and night, not to be disputed. My wilful actions and acquisitions are but roving; — the idlest reverie, the faintest native emotion, command my curiosity and respect. Thoughtless people contradict as readily the statement of perceptions as of opinions, or rather much more readily; for, they do not distinguish between perception and notion. They fancy that I choose to see this or that thing. But perception is not whimsical, but fatal. If I see a trait, my children will see it after me, and in course of time, all mankind, — although it may chance that no one has seen it before me. For my perception of it is as much a fact as the sun.

The relations of the soul to the divine spirit are so pure, that it is profane to seek to interpose helps. It must be that when God speaketh he should communicate, not one thing, but all things; should fill the world with his voice; should scatter forth light, nature, time, souls, from the centre of the present thought; and new date and new create the whole. Whenever a mind is simple, and receives a divine wisdom, old things pass away, — means, teachers, texts, temples fall; it lives now, and absorbs past and future into the present hour. All things are made sacred by relation to it, — one as much as another. All things are dissolved to their centre by their cause, and, in the universal miracle, petty and particular miracles disappear. If, therefore, a man claims to know and speak of God, and carries you backward to the phraseology of some old mouldered nation in another country, in another world, believe him not. Is the acorn better than the oak which is its fulness and completion? Is the parent better than the child into whom he has cast his ripened being? Whence, then, this worship of the past? The centuries are conspirators against the sanity and authority of the soul. Time and space are but physiological colors which the eye makes, but the soul is light; where it is, is day; where it was, is night; and history is an impertinence and an injury, if it be anything more than a cheerful apologue or parable of my being and becoming.

Man is timid and apologetic; he is no longer upright; 'I think,' 'I am,' that he dares not say, but quotes some saint or sage. He is ashamed before the blade of grass or the blowing rose. These roses under my window make no reference to former roses or to better ones; they are for what they are; they exist with God today. There is no time to them. There is simply the rose; it is perfect in every moment of its existence. Before a leaf bud has burst, its whole life acts; in the full-blown flower there is no more; in the leafless root there is no less. Its nature is satisfied, and it satisfies nature, in all moments alike. But man postpones or remembers; he does not live in the present, but with reverted eye laments the past, or, heedless of the riches that surround him, stands on tiptoe to foresee the future. He cannot be happy and strong until he too lives with nature in the present, above time.

This should be plain enough. Yet see what strong intellects dare not yet hear God himself, unless he speak the phraseology of I know not what David, or Jeremiah, or Paul. We shall not always set so great a price on a few texts, on a few lives. We are like children who repeat by rote the sentences of grandames and tutors, and, as they grow older, of the men of talents and character they chance to see, — painfully recollecting the exact words they spoke; afterwards, when they come into the point of view which those had who uttered these sayings, they understand them, and are willing to let the words go; for, at any time, they can use words as good when occasion comes. If we live truly, we shall see truly. It is as easy for the strong man to be strong, as it is for the weak to be weak. When we have new perception, we shall gladly disburden the memory of its hoarded treasures as old rubbish. When a man lives with God, his voice shall be as sweet as the murmur of the brook and the rustle of the corn.

And now at last the highest truth on this subject remains unsaid; probably cannot be said; for all that we say is the far-off remembering of the intuition. That thought, by what I can now nearest approach to say it, is this. When good is near you, when you have life in yourself, it is not by any known or accustomed way; you shall not discern the foot-prints of any other; not see the face of man; and you shall not hear any name;—— the way, the thought, the good, shall be wholly strange and new. It shall exclude example and experience. You take the way from man, not to man. All persons that ever existed are its forgotten ministers. Fear and hope are alike beneath it. There is somewhat low even in hope. In the hour of vision, there is nothing that can be called gratitude, nor properly joy. The soul raised over passion beholds identity and eternal causation, perceives the self-existence of Truth and Right, and calms itself with knowing that all things go well. Vast spaces of nature, the Atlantic Ocean, the South Sea, — long intervals of time, years, centuries, — are of no account. This which I think and feel underlay every former state of life and circumstances, as it does underlie my present, and what is called life, and what is called death.

It is easy in the world to live after the world’s opinion - Ralph Waldo Emerson

Life only avails, not the having lived.

Power ceases in the instant of repose; it resides in the moment of transition from a past to a new state, in the shooting of the gulf, in the darting to an aim. This one fact the world hates is that the soul becomes ; for that forever degrades the past, turns all riches to poverty, all reputation to a shame, confounds the saint with the rogue, shoves Jesus and Judas equally aside. Why, then, do we prate of self-reliance? Inasmuch as the soul is present, there will be power, not confidence but an agent. To talk of reliance is a poor external way of speaking. Speak rather of that which relies, because it works and is. Who has more obedience than I masters me, though he should not raise his finger. Round him I must revolve by the gravitation of spirits. We fancy it rhetoric, when we speak of eminent virtue. We do not yet see that virtue is Height, and that a man or a company of men, plastic and permeable to principles, by the law of nature must overpower and ride all cities, nations, kings, rich men, poets, who are not.

This is the ultimate fact which we so quickly reach on this, as on every topic, the resolution of all into the ever-blessed ONE. Self-existence is the attribute of the Supreme Cause, and it constitutes the measure of good by the degree in which it enters into all lower forms. All things real are so by so much virtue as they contain. Commerce, husbandry, hunting, whaling, war, eloquence , personal weight, are somewhat, and engage my respect as examples of its presence and impure action. I see the same law working in nature for conservation and growth. Power is in nature the essential measure of right. Nature suffers nothing to remain in her kingdoms which cannot help itself. The genesis and maturation of a planet, its poise and orbit, the bended tree recovering itself from the strong wind, the vital resources of every animal and vegetable, are demonstrations of the self-sufficing, and therefore self-relying soul.

Thus all concentrates: let us not rove; let us sit at home with the cause. Let us stun and astonish the intruding rabble of men and books and institutions, by a simple declaration of the divine fact. Bid the invaders take the shoes from off their feet, for God is here within. Let our simplicity judge them, and our docility to our own law demonstrate the poverty of nature and fortune beside our native riches.

But now we are a mob. Man does not stand in awe of man, nor is his genius admonished to stay at home, to put itself in communication with the internal ocean, but it goes abroad to beg a cup of water of the urns of other men. We must go alone. I like the silent church before the service begins, better than any preaching. How far off, how cool, how chaste the persons look, begirt each one with a precinct or sanctuary! So let us always sit. Why should we assume the faults of our friend, or wife, or father, or child, because they sit around our hearth, or are said to have the same blood? All men have my blood, and I have all men's. Not for that will I adopt their petulance or folly, even to the extent of being ashamed of it. But your isolation must not be mechanical, but spiritual, that is, must be elevation. At times the whole world seems to be in conspiracy to importune you with emphatic trifles. Friend, client, child, sickness, fear, want, charity, all knock at once at thy closet door, and say, — 'Come out unto us.' But keep thy state; come not into their confusion. The power men possess to annoy me, I give them by a weak curiosity. No man can come near me but through my act. "What we love that we have, but by desire we bereave ourselves of the love."

If we cannot at once rise to the sanctities of obedience and faith, let us at least resist our temptations; let us enter into the state of war, and wake Thor and Woden, courage and constancy, in our Saxon breasts. This is to be done in our smooth times by speaking the truth. Check this lying hospitality and lying affection. Live no longer to the expectation of these deceived and deceiving people with whom we converse. Say to them, O father, O mother, O wife, O brother, O friend, I have lived with you after appearances hitherto. Henceforward I am the truth's. Be it known unto you that henceforward I obey no law less than the eternal law. I will have no covenants but proximities. To nourish my parents, to support my family I shall endeavour, to be the chaste husband of one wife, — but these relations I must fill after a new and unprecedented way. I appeal from your customs that I must be myself. I cannot break myself any longer for you, or you. If you can love me for what I am, we shall be the happier. If you cannot, I will still seek to deserve that you should. I will not hide my tastes or aversions. I will so trust that what is deep is holy, that I will do strongly before the sun and moon whatever inly rejoices me, and the heart appoints. If you are noble, I will love you; I will not hurt you and myself by hypocritical attentions if you are not. If you are true, but not in the same truth with me, cleave to your companions; I will seek my own. I do this not selfishly, but humbly and truly. It is alike your interest, and mine, and all men's, however long we have dwelt in lies, to live in truth. Does this sound harsh today? You will soon love what is dictated by your nature as well as mine, and, if we follow the truth, it will bring us out safe at last. — But so you may give these friends pain. Yes, but I cannot sell my liberty and my power, to save their sensibility. Besides, all persons have their moments of reason, when they look out into the region of absolute truth; then will they justify me, and do the same thing.

The populace think that your rejection of popular standards is a rejection of all standard, and mere antinomianism; and the bold sensualist will use the name of philosophy to gild his crimes. But the law of consciousness abides. There are two confessionals, in one or the other of which we must be shriven. You may fulfil your round of duties by clearing yourself in the direct , or in the reflex way. Consider whether you have satisfied your relations to father, mother, cousin, neighbour, town, cat, and dog; whether any of these can upbraid you. But I may also neglect this reflex standard, and absolve me to myself. I have my own stern claims and perfect circle. It denies the name of duty to many offices that are called duties. But if I can discharge its debts, it enables me to dispense with the popular code. If anyone imagines that this law is lax, let him keep its commandment one day.

And truly it demands something godlike in him who has cast off the common motives of humanity, and has ventured to trust himself for a taskmaster. High be his heart, faithful his will, clear his sight, that he may in good earnest be doctrine, society, law, to himself, that a simple purpose may be to him as strong as iron necessity is to others!

If any man consider the present aspects of what is called by distinction society , he will see the need of these ethics. The sinew and heart of man seem to be drawn out, and we are become timorous, desponding whimperers. We are afraid of truth, afraid of fortune, afraid of death, and afraid of each other. Our age yields no great and perfect persons. We want men and women who shall renovate life and our social state, but we see that most natures are insolvent, cannot satisfy their own wants, have an ambition out of all proportion to their practical force, and do lean and beg day and night continually. Our housekeeping is mendicant, our arts, our occupations, our marriages, our religion, we have not chosen, but society has chosen for us. We are parlour soldiers. We shun the rugged battle of fate , where strength is born.

If our young men miscarry in their first enterprises, they lose all heart.

Men say he is ruined if the young merchant fails . If the finest genius studies at one of our colleges, and is not installed in an office within one year afterwards in the cities or suburbs of Boston or New York, it seems to his friends and to himself that he is right in being disheartened, and in complaining the rest of his life. A sturdy lad from New Hampshire or Vermont, who in turn tries all the professions, who teams it , farms it , peddles , keeps a school, preaches, edits a newspaper, goes to Congress, buys a township, and so forth, in successive years, and always, like a cat, falls on his feet, is worth a hundred of these city dolls. He walks abreast with his days, and feels no shame in not 'studying a profession,' for he does not postpone his life, but lives already. He has not one chance, but a hundred chances. Let a Stoic open the resources of man, and tell men they are not leaning willows, but can and must detach themselves; that with the exercise of self-trust, new powers shall appear; that a man is the word made flesh, born to shed healing to the nations, that he should be ashamed of our compassion, and that the moment he acts from himself, tossing the laws, the books, idolatries, and customs out of the window, we pity him no more, but thank and revere him, — and that teacher shall restore the life of man to splendor, and make his name dear to all history.

It is easy to see that a greater self-reliance must work a revolution in all the offices and relations of men; in their religion; education; and in their pursuits; their modes of living; their association; in their property; in their speculative views.

1. In what prayers do men allow themselves! That which they call a holy office is not so much as brave and manly. Prayer looks abroad and asks for some foreign addition to come through some foreign virtue, and loses itself in endless mazes of natural and supernatural, and mediatorial and miraculous. It is prayer that craves a particular commodity, — anything less than all good, — is vicious. Prayer is the contemplation of the facts of life from the highest point of view. It is the soliloquy of a beholding and jubilant soul. It is the spirit of God pronouncing his works good. But prayer as a means to effect a private end is meanness and theft. It supposes dualism and not unity in nature and consciousness. As soon as the man is at one with God, he will not beg. He will then see prayer in all action. The prayer of the farmer kneeling in his field to weed it, the prayer of the rower kneeling with the stroke of his oar, are true prayers heard throughout nature, though for cheap ends. Caratach, in Fletcher's Bonduca, when admonished to inquire the mind of the god Audate, replies, —

"His hidden meaning lies in our endeavours; Our valors are our best gods."

Another sort of false prayers are our regrets. Discontent is the want of self-reliance: it is infirmity of will. Regret calamities, if you can thereby help the sufferer; if not, attend your own work, and already the evil begins to be repaired. Our sympathy is just as base. We come to them who weep foolishly, and sit down and cry for company, instead of imparting to them truth and health in rough electric shocks, putting them once more in communication with their own reason. The secret of fortune is joy in our hands. Welcome evermore to gods and men is the self-helping man. For him all doors are flung wide: him all tongues greet, all honors crown, all eyes follow with desire. Our love goes out to him and embraces him, because he did not need it. We solicitously and apologetically caress and celebrate him, because he held on his way and scorned our disapprobation. The gods love him because men hated him. "To the persevering mortal," said Zoroaster, "the blessed Immortals are swift."

As men's prayers are a disease of the will, so are their creeds a disease of the intellect . They say with those foolish Israelites, 'Let not God speak to us, lest we die. Speak thou, speak any man with us, and we will obey.' Everywhere I am hindered of meeting God in my brother, because he has shut his own temple doors, and recites fables merely of his brother's, or his brother's brother's God. Every new mind is a new classification. If it prove a mind of uncommon activity and power, a Locke, a Lavoisier, a Hutton, a Bentham, a Fourier, it imposes its classification on other men, and lo! a new system. In proportion to the depth of the thought, and so to the number of the objects it touches and brings within reach of the pupil, is his complacency. But chiefly is this apparent in creeds and churches, which are also classifications of some powerful mind acting on the elemental thought of duty, and man's relation to the Highest. Such as Calvinism, Quakerism, Swedenborgism. The pupil takes the same delight in subordinating everything to the new terminology, as a girl who has just learned botany in seeing a new earth and new seasons thereby. It will happen for a time, that the pupil will find his intellectual power has grown by the study of his master's mind. But in all unbalanced minds, the classification is idolized, passes for the end, and not for a speedily exhaustible means, so that the walls of the system blend to their eye in the remote horizon with the walls of the universe; the luminaries of heaven seem to them hung on the arch their master built. They cannot imagine how you aliens have any right to see, — how you can see; 'It must be somehow that you stole the light from us.' They do not yet perceive, that light, unsystematic, indomitable, will break into any cabin, even into theirs. Let them chirp awhile and call it their own. If they are honest and do well, presently their neat new pinfold will be too strait and low, will crack, will lean, will rot and vanish, and the immortal light, all young and joyful, million-orbed, million-colored, will beam over the universe as on the first morning.

2. It is for want of self-culture that the superstition of Travelling, whose idols are Italy, England, Egypt, retains its fascination for all educated Americans. They who made England, Italy, or Greece venerable in the imagination did so by sticking fast where they were, like an axis of the earth. In manly hours, we feel that duty is our place. The soul is no traveller; the wise man stays at home, and when his necessities, his duties, on any occasion call him from his house, or into foreign lands, he is at home still, and shall make men sensible by the expression of his countenance, that he goes the missionary of wisdom and virtue, and visits cities and men like a sovereign, and not like an interloper or a valet.

I have no churlish objection to the circumnavigation of the globe, for the purposes of art, of study, and benevolence, so that the man is first domesticated, or does not go abroad with the hope of finding somewhat greater than he knows. He who travels to be amused, or to get somewhat which he does not carry, travels away from himself, and grows old even in youth among old things. In Thebes, in Palmyra, his will and mind have become old and dilapidated as they. He carries ruins to ruins.

Travelling is a fool's paradise. Our first journeys discover to us the indifference of places. At home I dream that at Naples, at Rome, I can be intoxicated with beauty, and lose my sadness. I pack my trunk, embrace my friends, embark on the sea, and at last wake up in Naples, and there beside me is the stern fact, the sad self, unrelenting, identical, that I fled from. The Vatican, and the palaces I seek. But I am not intoxicated though I affect to be intoxicated with sights and suggestions. My giant goes with me wherever I go.

3. But the rage of travelling is a symptom of a deeper unsoundness affecting the whole intellectual action. The intellect is vagabond, and our system of education fosters restlessness. Our minds travel when our bodies are forced to stay at home. We imitate, and what is imitation but the travelling of the mind? Our houses are built with foreign taste; Shelves are garnished with foreign ornaments, but our opinions, our tastes, our faculties, lean, and follow the Past and the Distant. The soul created the arts wherever they have flourished. It was in his own mind that the artist sought his model. It was an application of his own thought to the thing to be done and the conditions to be observed. And why need we copy the Doric or the Gothic model? Beauty, convenience, grandeur of thought, and quaint expression are as near to us as to any, and if the American artist will study with hope and love the precise thing to be done by him, considering the climate, the soil, the length of the day, the wants of the people, the habit and form of the government, he will create a house in which all these will find themselves fitted, and taste and sentiment will be satisfied also.

Insist on yourself; never imitate. Your own gift you can present every moment with the cumulative force of a whole life's cultivation, but of the adopted talent of another, you have only an extemporaneous, half possession. That which each can do best, none but his Maker can teach him. No man yet knows what it is, nor can, till that person has exhibited it. Where is the master who could have taught Shakespeare? Where is the master who could have instructed Franklin, or Washington, or Bacon, or Newton? Every great man is a unique. The Scipionism of Scipio is precisely that part he could not borrow. Shakespeare will never be made by the study of Shakespeare. Do that which is assigned you, and you cannot hope too much or dare too much. There is at this moment for you an utterance brave and grand as that of the colossal chisel of Phidias, or trowel of the Egyptians, or the pen of Moses, or Dante, but different from all these. Not possibly will the soul all rich, all eloquent, with thousand-cloven tongue, deign to repeat itself; but if you can hear what these patriarchs say, surely you can reply to them in the same pitch of voice; for the ear and the tongue are two organs of one nature. Abide in the simple and noble regions of thy life, obey thy heart, and thou shalt reproduce the Foreworld again.

To be yourself in a world - Ralph Waldo Emerson

4. As our Religion, our Education, our Art look abroad, so does our spirit of society. All men plume themselves on the improvement of society, and no man improves.

Society never advances. It recedes as fast on one side as it gains on the other and undergoes continual changes; it is barbarous, civilized, christianized, rich and it is scientific, but this change is not amelioration. For everything that is given, something is taken. Society acquires new arts, and loses old instincts. What a contrast between the well-clad, reading, writing, thinking American, with a watch, a pencil, and a bill of exchange in his pocket, and the naked New Zealander, whose property is a club, a spear, a mat, and an undivided twentieth of a shed to sleep under! But compare the health of the two men, and you shall see that the white man has lost his aboriginal strength. If the traveller tell us truly, strike the savage with a broad axe, and in a day or two, the flesh shall unite and heal as if you struck the blow into soft pitch, and the same blow shall send the white to his grave.

The civilized man has built a coach, but has lost the use of his feet. He is supported on crutches, but lacks so much support of muscle. He has a fine Geneva watch, but he fails of the skill to tell the hour by the sun. A Greenwich nautical almanac he has, and so being sure of the information when he wants it, the man in the street does not know a star in the sky. The solstice he does not observe, the equinox he knows as little, and the whole bright calendar of the year are without a dial in his mind. His note-books impair his memory; his libraries overload his wit; the insurance office increases the number of accidents; and it may be a question whether machinery does not encumber; whether we have not lost by refinement some energy, by a Christianity entrenched in establishments and forms, some vigor of wild virtue. For every Stoic was a Stoic, but in Christendom, where is the Christian?

There is no more deviation in the moral standard than in the standard of height or bulk. No greater men are now than ever were. A singular equality may be observed between the great men of the first and of the last ages; nor can all the science, art, religion, and philosophy of the nineteenth century avail to educate greater men than Plutarch's heroes, three or four and twenty centuries ago. Not in time is the race progressive. Phocion, Socrates, Anaxagoras, Diogenes, are great men, but they leave no class. He who is really of their class will not be called by their name, but will be his own man, and, in his turn, the founder of a sect. The arts and inventions of each period are only its costume, and do not invigorate men. The harm of the improved machinery may compensate its good. Hudson and Behring accomplished so much in their fishing boats, as to astonish Parry and Franklin, whose equipment exhausted the resources of science and art. Galileo, with an opera-glass, discovered a more splendid series of celestial phenomena than anyone since. Columbus found the New World in an undecked boat. It is curious to see the periodical disuse and perishing of means and machinery, which were introduced with loud laudation a few years or centuries before. The great genius returns to essential man. We reckoned the improvements of the art of war among the triumphs of science, and yet Napoleon conquered Europe by the bivouac, which consisted of falling back on naked valor and disencumbering it of all aids. The Emperor held it impossible to make a perfect army, says Las Casas, "without abolishing our arms, magazines, commissaries, and carriages, until, in imitation of the Roman custom, the soldier should receive his supply of corn, grind it in his hand-mill, and bake his bread himself."

Society is a wave. The wave moves onward, but the water of which it is composed does not. The same particle does not rise from the valley to the ridge. Its unity is only phenomenal. The persons who make up a nation today, next year die, and their experience with them.

And so the reliance on Property, including the reliance on governments which protect it, is the want of self-reliance. Men have looked away from themselves and at things so long, that they have come to esteem the religious, learned, and civil institutions as guards of property, and they deprecate assaults on these, because they feel them to be assaults on property. They measure their esteem of each other by what each has, and not by what each is. But a cultivated man becomes ashamed of his property, out of new respect for his nature. Especially he hates what he has, if he see that it is accidental, — came to him by inheritance, or gift, or crime; then he feels that it is not having; it does not belong to him, has no root in him, and merely lies there, because no revolution or no robber takes it away. But that which a man is does always by necessity acquire, and what the man acquires is living property, which does not wait the beck of rulers, or mobs, or revolutions, or fire, or storm, or bankruptcies, but perpetually renews itself wherever the man breathes. "Thy lot or portion of life," said the Caliph Ali, "is seeking after thee; therefore, be at rest from seeking after it." Our dependence on these foreign goods leads us to our slavish respect for numbers. The political parties meet in numerous conventions; the greater the concourse, and with each new uproar of announcement, The delegation from Essex! The Democrats from New Hampshire! The Whigs of Maine! the young patriot feels himself stronger than before by a new thousand of eyes and arms. In like manner the reformers summon conventions, and vote and resolve in multitude. Not so, O friends! will the God deign to enter and inhabit you, but by a method precisely the reverse. It is only as a man puts off all foreign support, and stands alone, that I see him to be strong and to prevail. He is weaker by every recruit to his banner. Is not a man better than a town? Ask nothing of men, and in the endless mutation, thou only firm column must presently appear the upholder of all that surrounds thee. He who knows that power is inborn, that he is weak because he has looked for good out of him and elsewhere, and so perceiving, throws himself unhesitatingly on his thought, instantly rights himself, stands in the erect position, commands his limbs, works miracles; just as a man who stands on his feet is stronger than a man who stands on his head.

So use all that is called Fortune. Most men gamble with her, and gain all, and lose all, as her wheel rolls. But do thou leave as unlawful these winnings, and deal with Cause and Effect, the chancellors of God. In the Will work and acquire, and thou hast chained the wheel of Chance, and shalt sit hereafter out of fear from her rotations. A political victory, a rise of rents, the recovery of your sick, or the return of your absent friend, or some other favorable event, raises your spirits, and you think good days are preparing for you. Do not believe it. Nothing can bring you peace but yourself. Nothing can bring you peace but the triumph of principles.

Which quotation from "Self-reliance" best summarizes Emerson’s view on belief in oneself?

One of the most famous quotes from Ralph Waldo Emerson's "Self-Reliance" that summarizes his view on belief in oneself is:

"Trust thyself: every heart vibrates to that iron string."

What does Emerson argue should be the basis of human actions in the second paragraph of “self-reliance”?

In the second paragraph of "Self-Reliance," Emerson argues that individual conscience, or a person's inner voice, should be the basis of human actions. He writes, "Whoso would be a man must be a nonconformist." He believes that society tends to impose conformity and discourage people from following their own inner truth and intuition. Emerson encourages individuals to trust themselves and to act according to their own beliefs, instead of being influenced by the opinions of others. He argues that this is the way to live a truly authentic and fulfilling life.

Which statement best describes Emerson’s opinion of communities, according to the first paragraph of society and solitude?

According to the first paragraph of Ralph Waldo Emerson's " Society and Solitude, " Emerson has a mixed opinion of communities. He recognizes the importance of social interaction and the benefits of being part of a community but also recognizes the limitations that come with it.

He writes, "Society everywhere is in a conspiracy against the manhood of every one of its members." He argues that society can be limiting and restrictive, and can cause individuals to conform to norms and values that may not align with their own beliefs and desires. He believes that it is important for individuals to strike a balance between the benefits of social interaction and the need for solitude and self-discovery.

Which best describes Emerson’s central message to his contemporaries in "self-reliance"?

Ralph Waldo Emerson's central message to his contemporaries in "Self-Reliance" is to encourage individuals to trust in their own beliefs and instincts, and to break free from societal norms and expectations. He argues that individuals should have the courage to think for themselves and to live according to their own individual truth, rather than being influenced by the opinions of others. Through this message, he aims to empower people to live authentic and fulfilling lives, rather than living in conformity and compromise.

Yet, it is critical that we first possess the ability to conceive our own thoughts. Prior to venturing into the world, we must be intimately acquainted with our own selves and our individual minds. This sentiment echoes the concise maxim inscribed at the ancient Greek site of the Delphic Oracle: 'Know Thyself.'

In essence, Emerson's central message in "Self-Reliance" is to promote self-reliance and individualism as the key to a meaningful and purposeful life.

Understanding Emerson: "The American scholar" and his struggle for self-reliance.

Princeton University Press. ISBN 0-691-09982-0

Standford Encyclopedia of Philosophy

Other works from ralph waldo emerson for book clubs, the over-soul.

There is a difference between one and another hour of life, in their authority and subsequent effect. Our faith comes in moments; our vice is habitual.

The American Scholar

An Oration delivered before the Phi Beta Kappa Society, at Cambridge, August 31, 1837

Essays First Series

Essays: First Series First published in 1841 as Essays. After Essays: Second Series was published in 1844, Emerson corrected this volume and republished it in 1847 as Essays: First Series.

Emerson's Essays

Research the collective works of Ralph Waldo Emerson. Read More Essay

Self-Reliance

Emerson's most famous work that can truly change your life. Check it out

Early Emerson Poems

America's best known and best-loved poems. More Poems

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Do You Ever Feel Envious of Others?

What role does envy play in your life? Can the oft-shamed emotion be beneficial?

A photo illustration of two chess pieces, a pawn and a king, side by side on a grassy field. A butterfly is perched on the pawn.

By Jeremy Engle

Do you ever compare yourself with others — peers, friends, family, celebrities, people on social media? Do you ever wish you had something someone else has, such as their status, success or talent?

Envy is one of the seven deadly sins — but can it ever have an upside? Does envy fill you with unhelpful feelings of resentment and despair, or does it motivate you to work harder?

In “ How to Make Envy Work for You ,” Jancee Dunn writes about the benefits of feeling that others have it better than you do:

I have an acquaintance whom I’ve followed for years on social media — even though most of her posts fill me with envy. She always seems to be on a different tropical vacation. How many beaches can a person visit? When I showed my husband her latest post from the dunes, he suggested I unfollow her. “It’s not that easy,” I told him. “It actually is,” he said. Envy, the feeling you get when you perceive that someone is better off than you, is something many of us can recognize, said Robert Leahy, director of the American Institute for Cognitive Therapy and a professor of psychology at Weill Cornell Medical College, who researches envy . But we often feel both shame and guilt, he said. “In pop psychology, people might say you should never have any envy,” Dr. Leahy said. “That’s absurd. You’re human.”

Ms. Dunn talked to experts about how to make the tendency to “compare and despair” work for us. The first strategy she discovered was to “acknowledge it”:

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Home — Essay Samples — Religion — Seven Deadly Sins — The Seven Deadly Sins: An Exploration of Envy

The Seven Deadly Sins: an Exploration of Envy

Categories: Envy Seven Deadly Sins

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Published: Jun 13, 2024

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Introduction, body paragraphs, the nature of envy, manifestations of envy, psychological implications of envy, societal impact of envy.

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Envy: Theory and Research

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For centuries, scholars have argued that envy is the source of much aggressive behavior as well as the root cause of much unhappiness, but it is only recently that there have been attempts to examine the emotion from an empirical perspective. This book is the first of its kind to offer a comprehensive summary of current theoretical and empirical work on envy, provided by scholars from a range of disciplines. The first section of the book focuses on the rich theological, philosophical, and evolutionary foundations of scholarly thinking on envy. The second section covers the social psychological work on envy and includes chapters on social comparison processes, definitional challenges, the link between envy and schadenfreude , inter-group envy, and fear of envy. The third section covers research on envy from organizational psychology, experimental economics, marketing, neuroscience, and anthropology. The fourth section focuses on the implications of understanding envy for physical and mental health, with chapters on psychoanalytic conceptions of envy, health psychology, and the challenges of coping with envy. A final chapter consists of reflective comments on all the chapters, and brings together recurring themes, making suggestions for future research on envy.

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Essay Samples on Envy

A lesson that can be learned by experiencing strong emotions.

I experienced strong emotion when my friends didn't invite me to join their surprise for our friend Janessa. I know that day that it's Janessa's birthday that's why I am expecting that they will come to me to get my contribution for the surprise but...

Friendship and Envy In Novel 'A Separate Peace'

Friendship cannot always be Genuine His accomplishment took root in my mind and grew rapidly in [my mind] darkness where I was forced to hide it” (Knowles). Author John Knowles uses the narrator’s point of view to describe the way he feels about his friend....

A Separate Peace

Envy is a Dangerous Feeling That Destroys a Person

When the word envy comes to mind, we generally think it is a harmless feeling. But when left unaddressed, it can lead to very dangerous consequences. Envy has been experienced by humans since the beginning of time and throughout history there have been many instances...

Seven Deadly Sins

Envy One of the Seven Deadly Sins

Envy the most relatable of the seven deadly sins consumes so many of us on a day to day basis, but what exactly is envy? Envy has many different versions of the definition but the most commonly used is, wanting something that someone else has...

Envy And Jealously Between Woman In Roman Fever

It is generally agreed today that Friendships, who like and dislike the same things, that is indeed true friendship. But it is true? Friendship can share everything but when it comes to what you love most, it seems that friendship is in danger of breaking...

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The Influence of Social Comparison on Envy in People With High Self-Esteem

Social media creates a virtual community for people to follow the lives of each other. Platforms such as Facebook and Twitter are available for all to become users themselves. Individuals can document every moment of the lives on social media through their profiles. For instance,...

Effects of Social Media
Self Esteem

Best topics on Envy

1. A Lesson That Can Be Learned by Experiencing Strong Emotions

2. Friendship and Envy In Novel ‘A Separate Peace’

3. Envy is a Dangerous Feeling That Destroys a Person

4. Envy One of the Seven Deadly Sins

5. Envy And Jealously Between Woman In Roman Fever

6. The Influence of Social Comparison on Envy in People With High Self-Esteem

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> The Philosophy of Envy
> What Is Envy?

Book contents

The Philosophy of Envy
Copyright page
Preface and Acknowledgments
Introduction
Chapter 1 What Is Envy?
Chapter 2 Varieties of Envy
Chapter 3 The Value of Envy
Chapter 4 Love and Envy, Two Sides of the Same Coin
Chapter 5 Political Envy
Appendix In the Beginning Was Phthonos : A Short History of Envy

Chapter 1 - What Is Envy?

Published online by Cambridge University Press: 01 July 2021

Appendix In the Beginning Was Phthonos: A Short History of Envy

Envy is often confused with jealousy, because they are both rivalrous painful emotions, which are directed at a competitor and are concerned with a good. But envy is about the potential or actual lack of the good, while jealousy is about the potential or actual loss of the good. This distinction is not always clear cut, as a section devoted to ambiguous, hybrid, and transitional cases shows. In the end, envy is defined as an aversive response to a perceived inferiority or disadvantage vis-à-vis a similar other, with regard to a good that is relevant to the sense of identity of the envier.

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What Is Envy?
Sara Protasi , University of Puget Sound, Washington
Book: The Philosophy of Envy
Online publication: 01 July 2021
Chapter DOI: https://doi.org/10.1017/9781009007023.003

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Kathryn Chetkovich

‘Why does it hurt only to read good work by the living?’

T his is a story about two writers. A story, in other words, of envy. I met the man at an artists’ colony, and I liked him from the first story I heard him tell, which was about how he’d once been jilted by a blind date, after which he went right out and bought himself some new clothes. He was working on his third book when I met him, but he had no particular interest in talking shop. He read the paper and watched sports on television. He was handsome in a shy, arrogant way, dressed safely but deliberately in his white shirts and black jeans.

He was, I soon learned, struggling.

There may be women out there who do not love this beyond all else in a man, but I’m not one of them.

H e played pool after dinner in the barn-like common room of the colony, and I would watch him through the window of the phone-booth door as I made my nightly call to my parents across the country in California. My father, who was eighty-one and not in good health, had recently fallen. He had damaged his back and shoulder, but he was reluctant to go to the doctor, and my mother was becoming frantic with worry and exhaustion. The anticipation of those ten-minute phone calls—during which I did nothing but listen, and even that not very well—dominated my days.

The booth itself was tiny, barely big enough for its folding chair, shelf, and payphone. The air felt pre-breathed and thick with the molecules of other people’s long-distance calls, of their quarrels and appeasements. A small, squat window was positioned at eye level if you were sitting down, and through it, while my parents’ distress poured into my ear, I could see a slice of the man, a helping from his waist to the middle of his thighs, as he played pool. I watched him set his legs, wiggling them into place. As my mother spoke in the tense, coded voice that signalled that my father was in the room with her, I focused on the cue sliding forward and back across his body like a bow. As long as I kept my eye trained on that cue, I told myself, I would not get sucked through the tiny holes of the receiver.

One afternoon, on the threshold of the building in which we both had bedrooms, I ran into the man and, partly in a bid to keep him talking, told him about my parents and my uncertainty about what I should be doing to help them. His own father had died after a long illness, he told me, so he had some idea what I was going through.

Just then a staff member came by and complimented him on one of his novels, neither of which I’d heard of—a fact that helped to equalize the discrepancy between his two published books and my none.

We both watched her walk away again, awkwardness rushing in to fill the space she left behind. He looked back at me. ‘You have to do your work,’ he said. ‘That’s your first responsibility.’

He meant, of course, my writing, and he spoke with a confidence I had never managed to feel about those hours of daydreaming at my desk, stringing together decorative little sentences to describe small, made-up events. Work to me always meant a job you were paid to do, necessary labour that someone else depended on.

He may have been struggling, but he knew what his work was. That was the first thing I envied about him.

W hen my father, after at last agreeing to see the doctor, was immediately scheduled for major surgery, I made arrangements to fly back to California. I left my computer and most of my belongings behind to ensure my return to the colony, and I bought a copy of the man’s second novel to take with me. Over the next week I read it in various locations—on the plane, in the hospital cafeteria, at my parents’ breakfast table. This life of waiting for what was going to happen in my father’s life now seemed like the only real one to me, and the book like a token I had managed to smuggle out of a dream.

There were moments, reading, where the recognition was so strong, and the life on the page so vivid, I could feel my pulse speed up.

This book is good, I thought with joy—the way you can when it’s the work of someone you don’t really know and expect you never will. Because it’s the very fact of not knowing the writer that gives you that proprietary thrill, that frees up the book to belong to you.

But I did know him, at least a little, so I also felt, intermittently, the stabs of dread familiar to all writers—that here were sentences, paragraphs, whole pages I not only admired but wished I had written.

And I suppose pride was also in the mix, because this man whose perception I envied had possibly liked me. I saw myself reflected, if in an incomplete and distorted way, in that possibility, the way you can see the ghost of yourself in a store window through which you can also see a real woman examining a shoe.

So from the start he was both man and writer, real and something more than real, to me. I had liked him as soon as I met him—a current rippled across my skin when he walked into a room—but something stronger kicked in once I met him on the page, naked and decked out in phrases I would never have thought of.

My father, having undergone a second, unanticipated operation, was still in the hospital when I returned to the colony. I spent four of the five-plus in-flight hours of the trip certain that the plane was going to crash, a conviction that every casual observation—the ominous silence from the cockpit, the flight attendants’ huddled conversations in the galley—seemed only to confirm. Maybe this was just residual anxiety from having been on high alert for the previous few days, or maybe I was not at all sure at that point where I truly belonged and had simply found a colourful way to express that dilemma.

To fend off the guilty suspicion that I was abandoning my father, I reminded myself that I was returning to work, a choice that he, in all his years at the office, had taught me the value of making. But the moment I walked into the colony’s dining room that night and my glance snagged on the man, his white shirt and Oscar Wilde hair, I knew it wasn’t just my work I’d returned for.

I was falling for another writer, and I recognized my descent by its peculiar calling card: the fear of what I wanted. In my remaining week at the colony, confident that nothing would actually ‘happen’ between us there, I engineered as many coincidental meetings with him as I could. Because we lived on opposite sides of the country and would probably never see each other again, I felt crestfallen, and safe.

M y father remained in the hospital, not so much recovering as trading one complication for another, for the next two months. Once I got back home, I visited him every day and never got over the feeling, as I searched for a parking space and walked to the entrance and made my way down the wide squeaky hallway to his open door, that I was pulling myself along like a reluctant dog who might one day slip my collar and make a break for the car. I was afraid of finding some new test under way in my father’s room or some new piece of equipment—evidence of more bad news. When a doctor would come in armed with nothing more ominous than a clipboard, I was afraid of that, too—afraid that my father would not be able to come up with the answers to basic questions like what hospital he was in or who the president was. Even though I routinely have trouble remembering what day of the week it is and can almost never name the date, it terrified me to see my father muddled by this kind of mild confusion. His had always been a sharp and certain mind, an accountant’s mind; ‘sometimes wrong but never in doubt’ was one of his favourite sayings.

One day as my brother and I were leaving my father’s hospital room, I broke into tears—sudden, gulping sobs that overtook me and made it hard to breathe.

My brother put his arm around me and asked me what I was afraid of. Dad was not about to die, he assured me.

‘I’m not afraid he’s going to die,’ I found myself saying. ‘I’m afraid he’s going to live.’

I was afraid that my father was going to get what we all wanted: better enough to go home. And that once there he was going to take the rest of us down with him, starting with my mother.

During that time, the fact that my husband and I had recently separated and I had neither a family of my own nor a full-time job behind which to hide left me exposed to my parents’ needs, which were sizeable. I tried to regard the time I was spending with one or the other of them as a job I would later be glad to have done, but this gladness was often undermined by my resentments and foul moods, by my running tally of the sacrifices I was making and the uncomfortable fact—hard to admit, even to myself—that I wasn’t getting any writing done.

Then one day in my mailbox there was a letter from the man at the colony.

Of course I wrote him back right away, labouring for hours to strike an appropriately offhand tone. I drove my letter to the post office for faster pickup, and began waiting impatiently for a response. Before long we were corresponding, with a double-edged satisfaction that seemed destined to mark everything that happened between us. It was a simple thrill to see an envelope addressed in his hand in my mailbox—and then I would open the letter and begin answering it in my head, and the thrill would get complicated.

In the letters I wrote him, I was compelled to see my life as it must have looked from the outside: a lot of driving and errand-running, a lot of empty, necessary hours at the hospital. Meanwhile, his letters, chronicling his successes and failures at his desk, where he was at work on a novel about family troubles, reminded me of the writer’s life I myself was failing to live.

I knew, from his descriptions of them, that his days were no easier than mine. He was still struggling, throwing away much of what he’d written, and I took a furtive solace in that. But occasionally he would report having had a good day, and I would feel, under my encouraging cheer, the shudder of panic you get when a friend deserts you by joining AA or leaving a bad marriage. It was one thing for him to be sitting down to it every day while I was not; but to hear that he might be getting somewhere made me feel abandoned and ashamed. He was pulling ahead in the great race of life, and he was throwing my own stasis into unbearable relief. Fortunately, over the next two months, such days were rare enough to discount.

Eventually my father came home to a house that had been fitted for his wheelchair-bound return: doors taken off their hinges, rugs rolled up, and a hospital bed installed in the den, with a baby monitor so my mother could hear him call. My reluctance to visit him got worse once he was home. At home bad things might be happening and no expert, no breezy young man with a stethoscope, was there to take charge. There was only my mother, with her fraying nerves, and later a willing but under-qualified aide and a nurse who visited a couple of times a week. In the hospital there had at least been the grim herd comfort of other ill people and other worn out families.

And of course the hospital was a place you could always leave. In the hospital my father was someone else’s responsibility. At home, he was ours.

One night, encouraged by a recent letter and feeling at loose ends at home, I called the man. I was anxious and uncomfortable the whole time we talked, but as soon as we were off the phone I couldn’t wait to talk to him again. We talked periodically after that, but it felt like the sort of dangerous pleasure you eventually have to swear off, and I couldn’t shake the feeling that each conversation brought us closer to the inevitable one in which we would agree to stop talking altogether, so I mostly tried to enjoy the idea of calling him without actually doing it, all the while reminding myself that there was a good chance that we would never speak again and that even if we did, it certainly wasn’t going to lead to anything.

As my father was ostensibly getting better, to the point where he was able to drag himself around the house behind a walker, he was also clearly getting worse. It was hard to get a firm sense of exactly what was wrong, and for a while I was frustrated because he seemed simply unwilling to make the necessary effort. But he couldn’t: he was too tired and discouraged; he was in too much pain. Finally he agreed to go back to the hospital. As soon as he was there, crammed into a corner of the busy emergency room, he looked up at my mother with exhaustion and relief and said, ‘We made the right decision to come back here.’ As if his body had just been waiting for the signal, organ after organ began to shut down over the next few days. Even so, he fought to stay alive. He elected to go on a ventilator, after which he had to be heavily sedated and eventually slipped into unconsciousness. His body by then was wrecked.

Two weeks later we finally decided to disconnect the machine that had been breathing for him. The doctor warned us that it might take him as long as a week to die. The nurse we liked unhooked him from everything except the heart monitor and the morphine drip before she left for the day, and another nurse took over and wheeled him to a temporary room down the hall. My brother and I took the first shift, sitting on opposite sides of the bed and holding his hands. The television was on and we watched it absent-mindedly. After the cramped busyness of the ICU, the room we were in seemed peaceful, in a makeshift way, but my father did not. It seemed to me that he was no more resigned to dying than he had ever been, and I couldn’t bring myself to say the encouraging things that seemed called for, urging him to let go and to trust that everything would be all right. But if he was waiting to hear these, he didn’t wait long; an hour later, he was gone.

I drove to the shopping centre that afternoon under cover of buying groceries and stopped to call the man from a payphone. I think he may have told me the story of the day his own father died, but I don’t remember for certain. What I remember is just my relief that he was home, that when the phone rang, he answered. I remember standing outside a pizza parlour, watching the cars glide in and out of their spaces, listening to his voice.

I had told my mother I would stay with her for a while, so I moved my clothes and books and computer to her house, and began trying to write, without much success, in my father’s study. In the days immediately following his death, my sister and I had sorted and cleared what looked like the most current piles. It felt at the time as though we were working with the determined haste of people trying to beat a storm or nightfall; now night had indeed fallen, my father’s death had become real, and I lacked the courage or energy to examine, much less remove, any of his things. In the centre of his otherwise cluttered desk I cleared a small space for my work, and when I stepped into the room and saw it from a distance, it looked not unlike one of those mysterious crop circles—an emptiness created for no known reason.

I knew this was a strange time for me, living in my parents’ house again for the first time in twenty years, but it was probably even stranger than I realized. I had a sense that my friends were listening in a particular way when we talked, forming opinions. I recognized that attitude of the concerned outsider; I have employed it often enough myself.

The man, too, seemed worried about me and surprised me by inviting me to come and visit him in New York. I still didn’t know him well enough to feel comfortable with him, and I often felt nervous when I picked up the phone to call him. It was odd in one way and not odd at all in another to find myself sitting across the table from him in the apartment he had described to me in his letters. We talked for hours that first night, pushing the words back and forth while each of us tried to figure out what the other was saying underneath them. Finally I took my dishes to the sink and he came up behind me and, after all those months, put his hands on my shoulders.

O ver the next two years, as we visited each other for weeks and then months at a stretch, the man and I settled into a routine that included a lot of satisfying time together and a number of anguished fights.

During the day, imagining him hard at work on his novel, I tried to work myself. My collection of short stories had finally been accepted and published by a university press the fall after my father died, and much as I thought I was prepared for the polite silence that greeted that publication, I must have been more disappointed than I realized, because I now found myself questioning my efforts more ruthlessly than ever. It sometimes took me a whole morning to get to my desk; once there, often I would turn on the computer and distract myself by opening a book or answering email or fussing over a small editorial job. When I did finally manage to turn my attention to writing, I worried that the play I had begun working on was a mistake and that I should go back to writing fiction; on the other hand, I reasoned, if I really wanted to work on a play, a play was what I should work on—but then with every line I saw fresh evidence that I was going down the wrong road, and every step was taking me farther from the one thing I knew how to do: write stories. Except that by now I worried that I had already forgotten what I once knew about that, too. I hadn’t written a story in what seemed a long time, and even though I remembered pretty much always feeling as if I didn’t know what I was doing, even when I was doing it, I could see now that in fact I had known what I was doing, before, and it was only now that I didn’t.

I looked forward to evening, to the sight of the man, who still felt new and mysterious, walking through the door, and I also dreaded that moment because it meant either lying about what I had accomplished or, worse, telling the truth—and it meant having to hear about his day.

Because the man, who had been struggling so agreeably when I met him, had finally found his key, the way in. In the months it took me to produce a drifty fifteen-page story about the end of a marriage, a short play about a woman who sleeps with her best friend’s husband, and seventy pages of a screenplay that had the desperate signs of ‘learning experience’ written all over it, he piled up several hundred pages of his new novel.

It was, alas, good. My own reading told me this, but I had independent verification as well—because as sections were finished they flew almost immediately into print, and just as immediately, the phone would begin to ring with congratulatory messages, comparisons to dead writers and to living writers whose reputations were so established they might as well be dead.

In the middle of this somewhat tense time the man came home one night, feeling frustrated after a couple of hard days, and asked if I would read some pages that were giving him trouble. I was immensely relieved to think that he, too, could produce bad work, and grateful that he was willing to show it to me.

I had the sudden wish to knock him to the floor and hike up my skirt, but I thought I would read the pages first.

He brought me olives and a glass of wine, and I sat down to read. Hoping for the worst and prepared to be encouraging.

‘I don’t understand,’ I said when I finished. ‘This is great.’

‘Do you really think so?’ he asked hopefully. ‘You really think it’s okay?’

‘I think it’s perfect. Funny, true, interesting.’ I managed to shove the words up my throat and out my mouth. I might have wished for it to be bad, but I couldn’t tell him it was if it wasn’t.

‘Thank you. That’s a huge relief. That really really helps. Thank you.’

You want to see bad work, I’ll show you bad work, I thought, even as I was privately vowing never to show him another word I’d written.

I was forty, then forty-one, then forty-two years old. I had no children, the husband I had thought I would be with forever was gone, the father I had always assumed would one day really know me was dead, and I had no career to speak of. And now I was with a man who could do this.

The impulse to make love had passed.

W hen his novel was finally done, the man handed it in, and his editor called every hundred pages or so to say he was loving it, then called to say he was cutting the cheque, and finally called to say he wanted to take the man and me out for a celebratory dinner.

The day of that dinner, after putting in a few unhappy hours at my desk, I went out and bought myself a pair of black slacks and a silk blouse. The evening went well, I thought; the editor seemed to approve, and I felt, as always, gratified by that.

Halfway through the meal, when the editor said something polite about wanting to read some of my work, I did not know what to say, and the man intervened: ‘You did read it, actually. You passed on it.’

In one of those bizarre coincidences that is proof of either the universe’s intelligent plan or its gratuitous randomness, it happened that this editor was, in fact, the one person in New York who, two years earlier, had read and rejected my book before its publication by the university press. I might have thought, until that moment, that this unhappy fact belonged to the category of shameful secrets whose dark power is neutralized when someone actually speaks them aloud, but I saw immediately that it did not.

The editor, an urbane and gracious man, must have said something urbane and gracious then, but I couldn’t hear him over the sound of my own voice in my head: Keep smiling, keep smiling!

Later that night, after the stony silence, the tears, the fury, I had to ask myself: What did I expect the man to do? I wanted it to be his fault, but it wasn’t. I was angry about what he’d said, but I would have been angry about whatever he’d said, even if he’d said nothing—because what I was really angry about was having to go out to dinner with an editor on whom my work had made so little impression that he did not even remember reading it. An editor, it turned out, whom I liked, whom I thought was not just funny and sweet but smart, and who was going to do everything in his power to make sure the man I was with got the notice he deserved.

O ver the next several months, what had at first seemed like a pathologically extreme anticipation of the man’s success on my part began to look like nothing more than a reasonable prediction. Advance copies of his book were released, and suddenly he was being interviewed, photographed, written and talked about by, it seemed, everyone. Clearly his book was on its way to becoming not a book but the book, and every day seemed to bring new evidence that he was on his way to becoming that rare thing, a writer whom people (not just other writers) have heard of.

On September 11, 2001, his book had been out about a week. In the shock of that day, he and I shuttled back and forth between the apartment and the television in the realtor’s office down the hall. I felt the sensation of disaster, the weird chill of fear limned by exhilaration at the possibility that the world and all its fixed routines might have changed in a single day.

As we tried, along with everyone else, to think about what had happened and what would happen next, another question went unasked: what would it mean for the man’s book? I was sure he was wondering this, and I was too, but I let the whole day go by without mentioning it. In those strange hours when anything seemed possible, it seemed not all that unlikely that the book on which the man I loved had spent ten years working might disappear before our eyes—and yet I said nothing.

I told myself that it would be unseemly, even in the privacy of our apartment, to focus on our petty concerns when thousands of people had lost their lives and the fate of the world itself was suddenly uncertain. But the truth is I didn’t mention his book because I didn’t want to. Because for one day, at least, for the first time in what felt like months, he and his work had been eclipsed—and I was relieved.

That was the place envy had delivered me to.

M y friends, trying to be helpful, had this to say: ‘I could never do that, be involved with a writer who was that much more successful than I was.’

But really: why not? Partly, I suppose, because a fellow writer’s success makes it that much harder to console oneself with thoughts of what Virginia Woolf called ‘the world’s notorious indifference’. The world, Woolf said, ‘does not ask people to write poems and novels and histories; it does not need them. It does not care whether Flaubert finds the right word or whether Carlyle scrupulously verifies this or that fact.’ So when the man was merely gifted but not particularly rewarded, I was comfortable; we were in it together, comrades in a world that didn’t care what we had to tell it. But now, what did his success prove, if not that when the gift is prodigious enough, the world does need us, it will pay?

When the subject of his success came up, often enough a friend would say, ‘The great thing is he really deserves it.’ Were they kidding? This was precisely what made it so hard. For once, the gods hadn’t made the stupid mistake of smiling on another no-talent, well-connected charlatan. No, this was a genuinely excellent piece of work by a man who had dedicated his life to doing such work and was now being rewarded for it. Proof that the system was not essentially corrupt and misguided, incapable of recognizing true merit, after all.

Where was the comfort in that?

One morning, unable to focus on whatever I was working on, I suddenly thought of a passage of his. I got up and walked across the room to pull down from the shelf the magazine in which the passage appeared. This was the wrong thing to be doing, I knew. Still, I watched myself do it. Heart knocking like a lunatic on a door that will never open, I flipped through the pages. I found it. It wasn’t as good as I’d remembered. It was better.

I refused to let myself form the question, but I knew it was in there, all the more powerful for going unasked: If I couldn’t do that, what was the point of my doing it at all? With that peculiarly severe egotism of the insecure, I could not believe I would ever be the best, and I could not bear to be anything less.

But why, then, didn’t I feel this when reading Wharton, or Faulkner (who crowed that a writer will not hesitate to rob his mother, ‘Ode on a Grecian Urn’ being worth any number of old ladies)? Why aren’t we all still eating our hearts out over Shakespeare? Why does it hurt only to read good work by the living? Why does the pain increase as the distance narrows between ourselves and those gifted others: those we know, those we know who are our age (or worse, younger), those we know who are our age and our friends? Worst of all, maybe, when the enviable other is someone we share our life with.

According to an appealingly commonsensical theory of human behaviour known as Tesser’s self-evaluation maintenance model, we all want to think well of ourselves, and one of the ways we enhance our own self-esteem is through our interactions with other people who are doing well. In what’s known as the ‘reflective process’, someone else’s success can make us feel better about ourselves; this explains why, for example, we feel good when our favourite sports team—the individual members of which have never met us and probably have no desire to—wins. And it’s probably part of what’s behind the old model of marriage in which a striving, supportive woman was to be found behind every successful man. In addition to whatever material advantages they promised, the man’s achievements were a feather in his wife’s cap: a sign that she had succeeded in marrying well.

But this happy scenario holds only for those cases in which the other person is succeeding in an area outside one’s own domain. When a rival succeeds, the ‘comparison process’ begins: we measure ourselves against the successful other and feel diminished. Fortunately, this competitiveness is limited to a small number of areas. Unfortunately, those areas are extremely important; they’re the ones on which our sense of self are based.

I came home one evening and the man asked about my day, which had been unremarkable. I asked about his and learned that the British rights to his now-famous book had been sold for a whopping figure, higher than anyone had anticipated. It had been a big day, and he was proud and excited. It was the kind of news you want to call home with, and because his mother was no longer alive and he has no sisters, he had called his sister-in-law.

He hadn’t known where to call me, he said, or he would have. But I could see it in his wary, eager face: he wanted to call someone whose enthusiasm he could trust.

The part that was his girlfriend put her arms around him and told him how happy she was, and the other part, the miserable writer within, kept her distance.

Not long after this, we broke up. At the end of a holiday trip to visit family in the west, I told the man I couldn’t imagine going back to New York; it was too hard there. I told him there wasn’t enough air for both of us in that apartment; I told him I was drowning. He asked me to be more specific, and I told him I just didn’t think I was cut out for this life together.

‘What life? What are you talking about?’ It was late; we were arguing in the dark, on a sofa bed in his brother’s house.

‘This life. Where you’re so…big, and I’m so little.’ It made me feel littler just saying it.

‘I don’t think of you as little.’

The fact that I believed this helped not at all. I was drowning; what good did it do to hear that he thought I could swim?

But breaking up, it turned out, was not the answer, either. I still wanted him, and my pride, already inflamed, now fairly throbbed at the idea that it was my own weakness that kept me from having him. I was in pitched battle with myself, and the wrong side was winning.

A few months later, when I persuaded him to try again, I sensed this was our last good chance at being together. I also sensed, despite my recent conversion to the belief that problems are solved by talking, that this one, born of words, was one that words would never fix. The more I talked about it, the more secretive he would become, and the more guilty and resentful we would both feel.

It became, and remains, the thing we don’t talk about.

W hen the man told me stories about his wife—his ex-wife, but she had a fearsome presence that made her more real to me than I sometimes felt to myself—I would feel a cool draught, as though someone had left the door to the future open a crack.

She had been a writer, too. During the happy, lean years of their marriage they would both write eight hours a day, fuelled, in the starving-artist tradition, by a diet of rice and beans and jumbo packs of chicken thighs. They were going to publish together, the story went; their books would find their way to discerning, appreciative audiences. And when his first book made good on their bargain and hers did not, he tried to wait for her to catch up. She moved on to a second book and on to a second house, alone, where she hoped to work better without the distraction of his success. But the second book wouldn’t come together; she couldn’t finish it. It wasn’t until they had finally separated, for good this time, that she gave herself the gift of putting that work away. As far as he knew, she had stopped writing altogether—except for an essay that had just been published in an anthology, which he learned about and bought one day.

In her essay, as I remember it now, his ex-wife wrote about what it felt like when she and her husband separated. I had a hard time reading this; I was simultaneously so curious to know what she thought of their life together and so afraid to find out that the sentences kept shorting out on me. But I got the gist: she not only stopped writing when her marriage to the man dissolved; for a time, she stopped reading.

Well, I was in much better shape than that! On the other hand, he and I were still together. Who knew what I would have given up by the time it was over?

What would have happened, I wondered, if the situation had been reversed, and she had published first? He would have kept on, I’m sure; her success might have been satisfying or frustrating to him— perhaps both—but he would never have given up.

I thought of Alice Munro’s ‘Material’, a story about women and men, writing and envy. In it, a woman comes across a published story written by her ex-husband and discovers in it an affecting, sympathetic portrait of another woman whom, in their real life together, he had mocked and treated callously. ‘How honest this is and how lovely, I had to say as I read… It is an act of magic, there is no getting around it; it is an act, you might say, of a special, unsparing, unsentimental love.’ But when she sits down later, to write him a letter of praise, the words that appear on the page are these: ‘This is not enough, Hugo. You think it is, but it isn’t.’ And then she admits it to herself: she blames him, still; she envies and despises.

I’ve read this story half a dozen times over the years, and when I think of it, I always remember that woman envying her ex, the writer. But when I looked at it again recently, I was surprised to discover that it’s not just him she envies but them —that is, not just her former husband but her current one. Different from each other as they seem, they have both ‘decided what to do about everything they run across in this world, what attitude to take, how to ignore or use things’. What she envies is not something about being a writer, but something about being a man.

My father had been a managing partner—a phrase I had never stopped to consider before—of an accounting firm when I was growing up, and my mother was, therefore, the managing partner’s wife. A corporate first lady whose job, in addition to running the house, was to entertain my father’s business associates and accompany him on trips.

‘Everywhere we went I was his wife,’ she told me recently. We were in what is now her house, standing next to a dresser on which was a smiling picture of my father that neither of us was looking at. ‘He was never my husband. I hated that.’

‘But you weren’t in his field,’ I tried to explain. How could she possibly think that her situation was anywhere near as bad as mine was? ‘You weren’t trying to compete with him.’

‘No, I didn’t even have a field.’

She had the purity, the self-righteousness, of unadulterated resentment. Here was the old-fashioned envy I envied—the clean, sweet fury of a woman who had a man to blame. Their life together had been dedicated to his job, and she had had only one choice: she could have left him. But how could she? She had no income of her own and four kids, the youngest of whom, that good-natured albatross, was me. Whereas I—I!—had had all the advantages, and I still felt resentful. Nothing righteous about that.

I t’s tempting to take comfort in generalizations, and I have. I see myself as belonging to a generation of women who were raised to believe that we could do and be whatever we wanted—by women who, by and large, had not enjoyed that freedom themselves (and who perhaps envied their daughters for it). I grew up still wanting all the old things—to be pretty, to be good, to be liked—and also wanting not to care about such things.

But old habits die hard. Maybe it was no coincidence that when I was feeling most outstripped by the man’s success and talent, when I was reading those pages of his that I wished I had written, I responded by withholding from him the gift of myself. When he was being lauded and invited, the world praising his intelligence and imagination, my way of evening the score was to shy away from him.

As long as he wanted and didn’t quite have me, the logic went, we would be even—and I could stop feeling so outdone by what he had that I wanted. But what did that really mean? That if I could not be happy I was ready to make us both miserable. And that my answer to his work was my self; he had his book to make the world love him, and I had my sex with which to take my revenge.

It reminded me of something that had happened not long before I met the man. I had written a short play, in which six women are doing what my characters always seem to be doing—sitting around talking. I had written it for a class, because at that point I was having trouble writing anything unless it was for a teacher who would tell me it was good. As it happened, the teacher didn’t think this one was particularly good. She thought the stakes weren’t high enough, and nothing much happened, and six people was too many for a play that was only ten minutes long.

Afterward, as I was leaving the room, discouraged but not quite convinced, a man from the class came up to me and told me he’d liked what I’d written.

All his plays were about rodeo men and the half-dressed women who were always crying at kitchen tables after they left. I now realized he had a much more subtle mind than I’d ever given him credit for.

‘Thank you,’ I said.

He suggested that one thing the play might benefit from was the addition of a man, just at the very beginning, to pique the audience’s interest.

I told him I’d consider that.

‘You want to get a drink?’ he asked me.

W hat are we here for, others or ourselves? Grandiose and overstated as it sounds, doesn’t it come down to that? I always thought I would have at least a working answer to that question by this point in my life, but I don’t; and in the absence of that certainty, everything feels provisional.

The last time I saw my mother, she and I talked, over a pleasant restaurant dinner that both of us were happy not to have cooked, about what will happen when she can no longer stay in her house. I love my mother. I want her to be happy and safe, free from worry.

And yet what do I find myself doing? Reassuring her that everything will be fine, leaving my nearby brother to look out for her, flying to the other side of the continent, and writing about the guilt I feel.

Another writer and I talk about some of this one night. Before I really knew her, I used to think of this woman as a relentlessly cheerful and optimistic person, so given to looking on the bright side that she wasn’t even aware that’s what she was doing. Tonight she reassures me, again, about the merits of a draft I’ve shown her, gushing in a way that makes me want simultaneously to embrace her and to run screaming from the room. But it’s a good talk, full of confessed fear and desire, full of the agreement women love. We each order another glass of wine. I tell her, sounding less convinced to myself than I’d thought I was before I started talking, that I’m hopeful that my various crises of confidence may be opening the door to a new, more assured way of working.

When we get to her, she surprises me by revealing that she’s been depressed lately. She feels as though all anyone wants to do these days is exercise furiously to stay in shape, and she wants…something else. She’s losing track of the point of it all.

The next morning, my phone rings and it’s her, telling me that she’s just learned that her sister has inoperable cancer. I can hear the fear and grief in her voice, but I can also hear the mobilizing of forces, the list-making and dinner-cooking, the shoulder pressing gratefully to the wheel. She certainly wouldn’t have wished for it, but she has a job again; it’s clear what it is, it’s clear it must be done, it’s clear she knows how to do it and that she’s good at it. She’s suiting up to do what’s been women’s work since the beginning of time, and it would be hard to argue there’s anything on earth more meaningful.

That’s how I feel sitting here, anyway.

But then I think again of Munro’s story ‘Material’: ‘I envy and despise.’ Isn’t the most important irony of that story the invisible one at its centre—the fact that it was written by a woman, who gave to her gifted male doppelgänger the qualities and perceptions, the easy knowledge of how to ignore or use things, his ex-wife so envies?

L ife, obviously, is about more than this. It’s not as though anyone thinks that being a good writer makes you a good person. But it helps. (Isn’t this perhaps one reason why women, as a whole, are more apt than men to see writing and reading as therapeutic acts? All that private time spent rendering and transforming personal experience on paper is easier to justify if the writer—and, ideally, reader—is healed in the process.) If you’re truly talented, then your work becomes your way of doing good in the world; if you’re not, it’s a self-indulgence, even an embarrassment.

But how do you know you’re good, if not by comparing yourself favourably to others (an essentially un-good activity)? And how many women are comfortable doing that?

Here’s Edith Wharton: ‘If only my work were better, it would be all I need. But my kind of half-talent isn’t much use as an escape.’

Here’s Joan Didion on the subject of her first novel: ‘It’s got a lot of sloppy stuff. Extraneous stuff. Words that don’t work. Awkwardness. Scenes that should have been brought up, scenes that should have been played down. But then Play It As It Lays has a lot of sloppy stuff. I haven’t reread Common Prayer, but I’m sure that does too.’

Or Dorothy Parker: ‘I want so much to write well, though I know I don’t, and that I didn’t make it. But during and at the end of my life, I will adore those who have.’ (Here is perhaps womanly envy in its purest form: one’s own worthlessness worn as a hair-shirt reminder to love those who are better.)

It’s hard to talk about the category of ‘women writers’ or ‘women’s writing’ without feeling that you’re picking at a scab that will never heal as long as you keep picking. On the other hand, vexed as they are, those categories continue to be meaningful, even if we can’t always agree on just what the meaning is.

Most women I know are reluctant to say, ‘I am better than her, and her, and her—okay, I’ll keep going,’ and most men I know rely, when necessary, on some formulation of exactly that. Plus women have not only each other to compete against (in devious and exhausting ways, requiring much track-covering and nice-making as they go) but men to envy; because it’s still the case that women writers are compared to each other, and the big (as opposed to, say, lyrical) literary novel persists as an essentially male category. Women’s books are still not talked about in the same way men’s books are, and women are still sensitive to that.

As I was turning all this over in my mind, I thought again about meeting my boyfriend for the first time. How before I had known anything about him, I had known this would happen—that one day he would write his Big Book, and the world would roll a red carpet to his door. All those months when he was miserably, triumphantly, cranking it out, page by artful page, I had known it—more certainly than I had ever known anything about my own life. (No wonder I had gotten so little of my own work done—I had been so preoccupied with monitoring his.)

Had I been clairvoyant, then? Or was it something more metaphysical: had my fear acted like a cosmic magnet, drawing to itself the object of its obsession (forgetting for a moment that my boyfriend might have had anything to do with his own fate)?

Or had I, in some perverse way, got exactly what I wanted?

I had found a partner who, by being so good—and so successful— at what I wanted to do, had called my bluff. I didn’t want to quit, it turned out. I wanted to find a way to keep writing, whether I could ever be good enough or not.

I did envy his talent—the way he could go off in the morning and come home at night with five smart pages, the way he could expertly tease out a metaphor, nail a character in a sentence, and tackle geopolitics or brain chemistry without breaking a sweat. I envied the fact that in airports and restaurants, strangers—readers!—would come up to him and rave about his book; I envied his easy acceptance at magazines that had been routinely rejecting my work for years.

For all that, though, I was startled to realize that I didn’t wish I’d written his book, any more than I would have wished to wake up tomorrow looking like the beauty from a magazine cover. What I envied were what his talent and success had bestowed on him, a sense of the rightness of what he was doing. I wanted what women always want: permission. But he’d had that before this book was even written; it was, after all, the first thing I’d envied about him. It was arguably what enabled him to write the book in the first place.

I was raised to admire a life of service, and to this day, I do admire it. When I see someone bend to the task of helping another, I think she is doing the work of all, the human job. But someone else’s good deed never stabs my heart the way a good book does. I admire it, but I do not envy it. Whatever else it has done, my envy of the man has helped me see the difference between what I was raised to want, what I wish I could want, and what I do want.

I flatter myself that I’m doing better with it all, that I’m adjusting. The man and I are finally happy and at ease, for the most part, and his book and public stature are a fact of our life together.

But who am I kidding? At home sometimes I don’t want to check the phone messages; when I step into a bookstore and see that stack on the new-book table, I can sometimes feel my heart rattling the bars of its cage. I read the reviews and the interviews, but not all of them; I want them to be good, and then I want to forget them. The book itself, which I’ve read twice, I don’t even want to look at now.

That’s how much better I’m doing.

And yet I am doing better, because something within me has surfaced: another story. In this new story, every ugly impulse and selfish yearning, the whole insecure unlovable mess, has been given wing. There’s no better self to protect any more; the moral high ground has been ceded.

In this story, I don’t do the work I was born to, perhaps not even the work I am best at, but the work I have chosen—incompletely, erratically, often unhappily and uncertainly.

In this new story, I write to refute the ex-wife, and to avenge her. She is my enemy and my friend.

I have met the circumstances that are larger than my capacity to be gracious, it turns out. I have come up against the limits of my goodness: someone I love has what I want, and he probably always will. What else is there to do for it? I might as well work.

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DOI: 10.1017/9781009007023
Corpus ID: 237746267

The Philosophy of Envy

Published 1 July 2021

24 Citations

The aptness of envy.

Highly Influenced

The Viciousness of Envy

An interdisciplinary perspective on the value of envy, envy, jealousy, and class conflict in classical athens: φθόνος and the manipulation of unacceptable emotions, emulative envy and loving admiration, forthcoming in sara protasi (ed.) the moral psychology of envy (rowman and littlefield) please cite final version, envy: differences between the west and africa, envy in logic based therapy, slaying the “venomous beast:” envy in the work of christian ministry and teaching, framing the role of envy in transitional justice, 250 references, the anatomy of envy: a study in symbolic behavior [and comments and reply], excusing economic envy: on injustice and impotence, varieties of envy, invideo et amo: on envying the beloved, envy and its discontents, the envious mind, the moral value of envy, the fragility of goodness: luck and ethics in greek tragedy and philosophy, envy and self-worth: amending aquinas’s definition of envy, envy and its consequences: why it is useful to distinguish between benign and malicious envy, related papers.

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An Interdisciplinary Perspective on the Value of Envy

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Published: 19 April 2021
Volume 15 , pages 403–422, ( 2024 )

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Jens Lange ORCID: orcid.org/0000-0002-5375-3247 1 &
Sara Protasi 2

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The public and scholars alike largely consider envy to be reprehensible. This judgment of the value of envy commonly results either from a limited understanding of the nature of envy or from a limited understanding of how to determine the value of phenomena. Overcoming this state requires an interdisciplinary collaboration of psychologists and philosophers. That is, broad empirical evidence regarding the nature of envy generated in psychological studies must inform judgments about the value of envy according to sophisticated philosophical standards. We conducted such a collaboration. Empirical research indicates that envy is constituted by multiple components which in turn predict diverse outcomes that may be functional for the self and society. Accordingly, the value of envy is similarly nuanced. Sometimes, envy may have instrumental value in promoting prudentially and morally good outcomes. Sometimes, envy may be non-instrumentally prudentially and morally good. Sometimes, envy may be bad. This nuanced perspective on the value of envy has implications for recommendations on how to deal with envy and paves the way toward future empirical and theoretical investigations on the nature and the value of envy.

The Viciousness of Envy

Disentangling the negative effects of envy on moral decision-making

Invideo et amo: on envying the beloved.

Avoid common mistakes on your manuscript.

1 Introduction

Envy is commonly viewed as reprehensible. In the media, writers portray envy as an emotion that humans should ideally suppress or transmute (e.g., Razzetti 2018 ). Similarly, religious leaders, such as pope Francis, see envy as the root of evil (Glatz 2014 ). Pope Francis’ viewpoint is in line with the Christian tradition to explicitly condemn envy as a deadly sin, an emotion responsible for Cain slaying his brother or the Romans torturing and murdering Jesus (Aquaro 2004 ). Beyond folk psychological and religious perspectives, scholarly approaches to envy also cast envy in a negative light. Some sociologists identify envious motives in numerous different kinds of crimes such as assassination, sabotage, and harassment (Schoeck 1969 ). Relatedly, historians and psychologists have identified envy to be a central factor behind persecutions of the Jews by the Nazis, envious of the supposed power and influence they ascribed to them (Glick 2002 ; Smith 2014 ). Extensive early reviews covering broad empirical evidence indeed suggested that envy is fueled by unjust resentment and fosters excessive hostility and personal unhappiness (e.g., Miceli and Castelfranchi 2007 ; Smith and Kim 2007 ), implying the conclusion that envy is, by and large, dispensable from the set of human emotions.

However, such a negative evaluation is dependent on an incomplete understanding of envy’s complex emotional nature. We are going to argue that the mainstream view skewed the evaluation of envy, affecting not only what kind of questions researchers posed, but also how they interpreted evidence (for related discussions see Inbar and Lammers 2012 ; Colombo et al. 2016 ; but see also Mattes 2019 ). That is, folk perceptions and religious prejudices about envy may have steered empirical research into confirming the negative stance, neglecting the nuanced ways in which envy can manifest.

Indeed, a few perspectives diverged from the common view and emphasized that envy can also foster non-hostile behaviors that are acceptable (e.g., Van de Ven 2016 ; Lange et al. 2018a ) or even valuable (e.g., La Caze 2001 ; Thomason 2015 ). In line with these perspectives, we show that envy cannot be fully understood if it is empirically investigated without questioning traditional assumptions about the value of envy. Discarding the entrenched belief that envy is reprehensible provides a new perspective on envy. And a refined perspective on the nature of envy through empirical research in turn updates the common perspective on the value of envy.

We suggest that a comprehensive and successful re-evaluation of the value of envy requires two elements. First, widespread views on envy need to be updated by broad empirical evidence gathered from diverse samples. To achieve this goal, researchers must constantly reconsider their underlying cultural norms, religious beliefs, and linguistic practices, increasing awareness for how socially situated their research is. Second, research on the value of envy ought to be an interdisciplinary collaboration between social scientists and philosophers. Psychologists, anthropologists, and sociologists bring different perspectives to the study of emotions, but they all share a descriptive approach, that is, they aim to study phenomena as they are. Philosophers, ethicists in particular, are interested in normativity, that is, they study how things ought to be. Because of their normative approach, philosophers have developed a more nuanced vocabulary to speak about the value of phenomena. Yet, they often develop their prescriptions in the absence, or with only cursory knowledge, of the empirical evidence that is discussed in the social sciences. Our goal is to engage in precisely this kind of fruitful collaboration, in order to show what the conventional wisdom on the value of envy gets wrong, and why it gets some things right. We hope that an empirically informed and philosophically sophisticated approach to the value of envy can serve as a model for inquiries on other emotions.

2 The Nature of Envy

Some characteristics of envy are uncontroversial. All approaches to envy agree that it involves three elements (for reviews see Heider 1958 ; Miceli and Castelfranchi 2007 ; Smith and Kim 2007 ; D’Arms 2018 ), namely two parties (typically two persons) and a quality, achievement, or possession (i.e., the envy object). One party has the object, putting the other party at a perceived comparative disadvantage. The disadvantaged party (i.e., the envier) experiences negative affect in light of the inferiority vis-à-vis the advantaged party (i.e., the envied person), if the object refers to a domain of high personal relevance to the envier (Salovey and Rodin 1984 ). The difference between the envier and the envied person need not be large. Quite the contrary, as is already discussed by Aristotle ( 1929 ), envy is experienced mostly toward similar others (Henniger and Harris 2015 ), with whom competition is reasonable (Ben-Ze’ev 2002 ), and not towards others who exceed the envier by a large margin. That is, envy is targeted at an object for which the envier can easily imagine a counterfactual world in which the situation had been different (Crusius and Lange in press ; Teigen 1997 ; Coricelli and Rustichini 2009 ; Van de Ven and Zeelenberg 2015 ). Given this easily imaginable alternative reality, the presumed primary goal of the envier is to level the difference between them and the envied person (Sayers 1947 ).

Beyond these agreed-upon characteristics of envy, the nature of envy is part of an ongoing debate. Early contributions in philosophy and psychology emphasized the hostility of envy. For instance, envy was conceptualized as resulting from subjectively undeserved inferiority (Ben-Ze’ev 2002 ), additionally involving hostility and resentment toward the envied person (Smith and Kim 2007 ), as well as hopelessness and ill-will (Miceli and Castelfranchi 2007 ). In line with this theoretical conceptualization, research indicates that envy leads to deception (Moran and Schweitzer 2008 ), social loafing (Duffy and Shaw 2000 ) as well as social undermining in groups (Duffy et al. 2012 ), victimization of high performers (Kim and Glomb 2014 ), a willingness to give up personal resources to reduce the envied person’s resources (Zizzo and Oswald 2001 ), and generalized antisocial (Behler et al. 2020 ) or unethical behavior (Gino and Pierce 2009 ). These outcomes of envy serve to level the difference between the envier and the envied person by harming the envied person’s position.

Despite this focus on hostility in early empirical research on envy, early theoretical contributions in philosophy and psychology already emphasized that envy also relates to self-improvement and emulation of the envied person (e.g., Aristotle 1929 ; Parrott 1991 ). Indeed, research that identified components of envy often found components such as longing, motivation to improve (Parrott and Smith 1993 ), and even somewhat positive thoughts about the envied person (Salovey and Rodin 1986 ). Potentially driven by these components, envy positively predicted performance increments in the work context (Schaubroeck and Lam 2004 ; Cohen-Charash 2009 ), increases in consumption (Belk 2011 ), or desire for the envy object (Crusius and Mussweiler 2012 ). These outcomes of envy serve to level the difference between the envier and the envied person by improving the envier’s position. However, in line with the widespread condemnation of envy, such findings were commonly discarded as not describing envy proper (Smith and Kim 2007 ) but an emotion akin to admiration (Silver and Sabini 1978 ).

2.1 The Multi-Componential Nature of Envy

Recent research refutes the dismissal of non-hostile varieties of envy and supports a more nuanced view of envy. As a starting point, these approaches emphasize that the primary goal of the envier is to level the difference between them and the envied person (for reviews see Van de Ven 2016 ; Crusius and Lange 2017 ; Lange et al. 2018a ). By putting emphasis on the goal that underlies envy, these approaches shift the focus toward a functional perspective on envy and away from a traditional approach influenced by moral condemnation (for an adversarial collaboration discussing previous and recent approaches, see Crusius et al. 2020 ). This shift allows to incorporate components and outcomes of envy that disprove the supposed reprehensive character of envy. A fully developed functional account, therefore, first requires a comprehensive theory of the multi-componential nature of envy.

To unravel the complex nature of envy, the functional perspective disentangles different components of envy (Lange et al. 2018c ). In line with previous conceptualizations (Tai et al. 2012 ), the evidence indicates that envy involves painful feelings . In particular, in response to the social comparison with the envied person, the envier experiences tormenting inferiority and depressive feelings (Lange et al. 2018c ). These painful feelings positively predict two qualitatively independent sets of components: benign and malicious envy .

Benign envy is partly constituted by feelings, cognitions, and motivations directed at improving the envier’s position, and does not involve any hostile feelings (Lange et al. 2018c ). Specifically, benign envy involves desire for the object, motivation to improve, and the intention to emulate the other person. Research shows that benign envy correlates with more positive feelings toward the envied person (Van de Ven et al. 2009 ), attention toward both the envied person and the object as well as means to obtain it (Crusius and Lange 2014 ), and actual performance increases (Van de Ven et al. 2011a ; Lange and Crusius 2015a ; Khan et al. 2017 ; Salerno et al. 2019 ) to such an extent that potential risks are ignored (Kwon et al. 2017 ). Moreover, evidence indicates that people with a higher disposition to experience benign envy accomplish better academic and athletic achievements than people with a lower disposition (Lange and Crusius 2015b ; Sawada and Fujii 2016 ), have higher well-being (Briki 2019 ), and are viewed more positively by their peers (Lange et al. 2016 ). Thus, benign envy primarily reduces the difference between the envier and the envied person by leveling up , that is, by reaching the envied person’s level.

Malicious envy is partly constituted by feelings, cognitions, and motivations directed at harming the envied person’s position (Lange et al. 2018c ). Specifically, malicious envy involves hostile feelings and motivation to be aggressive toward the envied person. Research shows that malicious envy correlates with more negative feelings toward the envied person (Van de Ven et al. 2009 ), attention toward the envied person at the expense of the envy object (Crusius and Lange 2014 ), and actual harming behavior (Lange and Crusius 2015a ; Van de Ven et al. 2015 ; Lange et al. 2018c ; Yusainy et al. 2019 ). Thus, malicious envy primarily reduces the difference between the envier and the envied person by leveling down , that is, by bringing the envied person to the envier’s level.

Even though benign and malicious envy are largely constituted by partly opposing components and their presence predicts different outcomes, they also share various characteristics. Studies that manipulated benign and malicious envy supported the hypothesis that they have the same levels of accompanying negative affect (Crusius and Lange 2014 ; Lange and Crusius 2015b ; Lange and Crusius 2015a ; Lange et al. 2018c ). Moreover, a dispositional inclination to engage in social comparisons predicted higher dispositional benign and malicious envy (Lange and Crusius 2015b ; Lange et al. 2016 ). These characteristics distinguish benign and malicious envy from similar emotions such as admiration and resentment. Admiration is characterized only by positive affect and both admiration and resentment rely less on comparative processes (Van de Ven et al. 2009 ; Crusius and Lange 2014 ; Protasi 2019 ). Furthermore, if benign and malicious envy have partly opposing and partly shared characteristics, this may explain why they are largely uncorrelated at both the state (Lange et al. 2018c ) and trait level (Lange and Crusius 2015b ).

Importantly, this multi-componential perspective on envy was corroborated in a methodologically diverse set of studies. Some studies relied on languages that have different words for benign and malicious envy, such as Dutch, German, or Urdu (Van de Ven et al. 2009 ; Crusius and Lange 2014 ; Khan et al. 2017 ). They showed different response profiles on various defining components of benign and malicious envy, when participants recalled corresponding emotional situations. But also in languages with only one word for envy, such as English or Spanish, responses to various items assessing a diverse set of envy components supported the conclusion that participants’ envy stories include qualitatively different kinds, mapping onto benign and malicious envy (Van de Ven et al. 2009 ; Falcon 2015 ). Other studies analyzed responses to researcher-generated sets of items measuring dispositional or episodic envy and found that two factors explain the data best (Cohen-Charash 2009 ; Lange and Crusius 2015b ; Sterling et al. 2017 ; Kwiatkowska et al. 2018 ). These factors were consistent with conceptualizations of benign and malicious envy. Finally, even when items were not generated by the researchers themselves, but by naïve participants or experts on envy with various backgrounds, analyses of the structure of these items led to multi-componential solutions, including benign and malicious envy, alongside painful feelings as organizing factors (Lange et al. 2018c ).

Whether envy manifests in shades of its benign or malicious form depends on additional variables. Many emotion theories argue that the unfolding of emotion episodes depends on appraisals of the situation (Ellsworth and Scherer 2003 ; Clore and Ortony 2013 ). For envy, research emphasizes the role of perceptions of personal control , that is, subjective beliefs about whether the person can actively change certain aspects of the situation. Theorizing and evidence suggest that when enviers perceive control to obtain the object themselves, envy is more likely to manifest in its benign form (Van de Ven et al. 2012 ; Lange et al. 2016 ; Protasi 2016 ). But also malicious envy may need certain perceptions of control, especially perceptions of control to take the object away from the envied person (Protasi 2016 ). Yet, the correlation with perceptions of control is stronger for benign envy (Lange et al. 2016 ). Perceived lack of control within benign envy itself may also lead to different manifestations of envy, insofar as self-improvement may be conceived as attainable or unattainable (Protasi 2016 ).

Next to control, research emphasizes the role of perceptions of deservingness of the envied person’s advantage. Theorizing and evidence suggest that when enviers appraise the envied person’s advantage as undeserved, envy is more likely to manifest in its malicious form (Van de Ven et al. 2012 ; Lange and Crusius 2015a ; Lange et al. 2016 ). The same studies imply that, to a lesser extent, when enviers appraise the envied person’s advantage as deserved, envy is more likely to manifest in its benign form. Furthermore, other perspectives suggest that perception of deservingness may be mediated by focus of concern , defined as what the envier cares about (Protasi 2016 ; Protasi 2021 ). Specifically, if the envier cares about leveling down the envied person and is thus more concerned with the envied person’s superiority as opposed to obtaining the envy object, then they are likely to see the envied person with hostility and to rationalize their success as undeserved—dislike for the envied person might make an appraisal of undeservingness more likely.

If appraisals of personal control and deservingness play a central role in determining the manifestation of envy, then variables affecting the appraisals should similarly shape envious responses. In line with this hypothesis, variables correlating with higher appraisals of personal control predicted higher dispositional and state benign envy. Examples of such variables are stable self-esteem (Smallets et al. 2016 ; but see also Vrabel et al. 2018 ), assertive facets of narcissism (Lange et al. 2016 ), increased hope for success (Lange and Crusius 2015b ; Lange et al. 2018c ), or envied persons’ signals that their success was based on invested effort (Lange and Crusius 2015a ). Moreover, variables correlating with lower appraisals of deservingness predicted higher dispositional and state malicious envy. Examples of such variables are aggressive facets of narcissism (Lange et al. 2016 ) or envied persons’ signals that their success was based on natural talent (Lange and Crusius 2015a ). Furthermore, fragile self-esteem predicted higher malicious envy (Smallets et al. 2016 ) as did fear of failure (Lange and Crusius 2015b ; Lange et al. 2018c ), which predicted lower perceptions of control to obtain the object. Notably, the evidence regarding the influence of personal control and deservingness is partly mixed, requiring more research on central appraisals shaping benign and malicious envy (Crusius et al. 2020 ), also taking other variables, such as the focus of concern, into account (Protasi 2016 ; Protasi 2021 ).

Thus, research indicates that envy is multi-componential. It is constituted by painful feelings, and the different feelings, cognitions, and motivations that constitute benign and malicious envy. This conclusion is based on methodologically diverse studies from different countries. Moreover, perceptions of personal control and deservingness of the envied person’s advantage contribute to whether envy is more likely to develop into its benign or malicious form. With the multi-componential theory of envy at hand, it is possible to develop a functional approach to envy.

2.2 A Functional Approach to Envy

Emotions contribute to the regulation of social relationships and social hierarchies—they have social functions (Keltner and Haidt 1999 ; Van Kleef 2009 ; Fischer and Manstead 2016 ). The social function of a particular emotion depends on the social-relational goal it motivates the agent to achieve. For instance, anger toward another person motivates to attain a better outcome for the angry person by forcing, for instance, the other person to change. Anger is then socially functional if it causes confrontational behaviors that are successful in accomplishing the goal (Fischer and Roseman 2007 ).

If the goal of envy is indeed to reduce the difference between the envier and the envied person (Sayers 1947 ; Van de Ven et al. 2009 ), it may contribute to the regulation of social hierarchies. Social hierarchies can be based on either prestige —people attain status in the eyes of others by achieving success as well as sharing skills and know-how—or dominance —people attain status in the eyes of others by aggressive intimidation and the elicitation of fear (Henrich and Gil-White 2001 ; Cheng et al. 2013 ; Maner and Case 2016 ). Benign envy may contribute to the regulation of prestige. This is because prestigious others should convey that self-improvement is possible and attaining prestige similarly relies on self-improvement and social skills. Malicious envy may contribute to the regulation of dominance. This is because dominant others typically oppress people, implying that inferior others will hold grudges against them, and attaining dominance requires willingness to engage in hostile action. If the envy forms would indeed serve the social function to regulate the envier’s relative standing, they also solve the envier’s initial problem of an unflattering comparison to another person. That is, the envier no longer has a relatively low status, which should reduce the painful experience elicited by the comparison. Next to being socially functional, envy thereby also serves the intrapersonal function of regulating the painful experience.

Evidence is in line with these hypotheses. Studies support the idea that a superior person who signals prestige elicits the inferior person’s benign envy, and a superior person who signals dominance elicits the inferior person’s malicious envy (Lange and Crusius 2015a ; Lange and Boecker 2019 ). In these studies, the inferior person’s benign envy then led to emulation of the superior person and malicious envy led to relationship-deteriorating effects. Furthermore, people with a higher motivation to attain prestige or dominance tend to have a higher dispositional inclination to experience the respective envy forms and also respond with them in concrete comparison situations (Lange et al. 2019 ). Moreover, facets of narcissism that map onto striving for prestige or dominance similarly correlate with trait and state benign and malicious envy, respectively (Lange et al. 2016 ). The latter study further indicated that inclinations to experience the envy forms correlate with an altered perception of the envier in the eyes of peers. That is, the tendency to experience benign envy correlates with the envier’s social potency as perceived by others (indicative of prestige), and the tendency to experience malicious envy correlates with the envier’s social conflict as perceived by others (indicative of dominance). In line with these findings, benign envy correlates with a higher standing in the occupational hierarchy at work, even if this requires to engage in deceptive strategies such as concealing true intentions, using ingratiation, or telling others what they want to hear to gain their compliance (Lange et al. 2018b ). Thus, envy has a social function in that it contributes to the regulation of social status and it also serves the intrapersonal function of reducing the pain that originally resulted from the unfavorable standing as compared to the other person (Fiske 2010 ; Belk 2011 ; Crusius and Lange 2017 ).

Yet this is not to say that envy will always be functional. Even if emotions can serve social and intrapersonal functions, they may manifest in various ways in specific contexts. Many manifestations of emotions in social and individual situations will probably turn out to be dysfunctional (e.g., Fischer and Manstead 2016 ). For instance, it is easily imaginable that benign envy may activate outcomes that do not lead to eventual success in the long-run, despite the enviers motivation to achieve it. Or malicious envy could lead to outcomes that fail to harm the envied person’s position. Accordingly, the functionality of envy depends on contextual and personal variables.

2.3 Summary of the Nature of Envy

In sum, recent research provides an empirically grounded, nuanced perceptive on the nature of envy. The evidence indicates that envy is best defined as an emotion that involves burdensome pain, as well as feelings, cognitions, and motivations directed at improving the envier (i.e., benign envy) or harming the envied person (i.e., malicious envy). Multiple variables affect how an envy episode unfolds, among them are appraisals of personal control to obtain the object or to take the object from the envied person and appraisals of deservingness of the envied person’s advantage. The manifestations of envy contribute to resolving the original problem that elicited the pain, namely the difference between the envier and the envied person. From a social perspective, envy is functional for leveling status differences in terms of prestige or dominance and improves the envier’s relative standing. However, it may well happen that the outcomes of envy turn out to be dysfunctional in a specific context. The functional perspective on envy is free of inherent value judgments about envy, but it can nevertheless inform a philosophically sophisticated approach to the value of envy. This is where we turn next.

3 The Value of Envy

Just like the nature of envy, the value of envy is part of ongoing debates in philosophy and psychology, while the debates proceeded largely independent of each other. In philosophy, most contributions, historical and contemporary, have argued that envy is morally bad (e.g., Aristotle 1925 ; Roberts 1991 ; D’Arms and Kerr 2008 ), even though it may be a fitting response to a situation (D’Arms and Jacobson 2000 ). Most of the philosophical approaches have thus relied on a conceptualization of envy as primarily malicious. When they have considered the possibility of multiple ways of conceptualizing envy and its variables, they have done so by overlooking relevant empirical evidence, and arguing that non-malicious forms of envy count as envy only superficially (Taylor 2006 ).

A few authors have noticed that envy is not always related to harming intentions. They have argued that envy is potentially morally neutral (Ben-Ze’ev 2002 ), excusable (Bankovsky 2018 ), reasonable (Green 2013 ), or even morally valuable when it concerns envied persons’ undeserved advantages, leads to self-improvement, or addresses social inequalities (La Caze 2001 ), or because it shows that the envier cares about objects that contribute to a worthwhile life, a key responsibility of a moral agent (Thomason 2015 ). But even these more envy-friendly perspectives have not consistently or extensively engaged with the empirical literature, often supporting empirical speculations with only anecdotal evidence.

In psychology, similar standpoints on the value of envy exist. Early theoretical approaches conceptualized envy as an emotion that is constituted by hostility and ill-will, which stem from comparative inferiority for which the envied person is not necessarily responsible (Smith and Kim 2007 ). Therefore, envy was classified as detestable (Miceli and Castelfranchi 2007 ). When research on benign and malicious envy emerged, a common criticism was that the two envy forms simply tease apart the constructive and destructive outcomes of envy (Cohen-Charash and Larson 2017 ). Specifically, the criticism was that benign envy includes only constructive outcomes and is therefore socially desirable and easily admitted to others. In contrast, malicious envy includes only destructive outcomes and is therefore socially undesirable and usually disguised. However, other research shows that benign envy can foster socially undesirable outcomes such as Machiavellian intentions (Lange et al. 2018b ) or overconsumption (Belk 2011 ) and that malicious envy can foster socially desirable outcomes such as outcome-focused goal pursuit (Salerno et al. 2019 ) or social punishment of arrogant high-achievers (Lange and Boecker 2019 ). In light of these findings, research in psychology now largely recommends refraining from value judgments about envy (Crusius et al. 2020 ). Yet, much like a philosophical approach is limited which engages only superficially with empirical evidence, so is a psychological approach which refrains from a thoughtful value assessment.

In sum, even though the debates in philosophy and psychology contributed to research on the value of envy, they are also limited. On the one hand, the debate in philosophy has been informed by sophisticated standards on which to evaluate the value of envy, yet it has lacked empirically grounded research. On the other hand, the debate in psychology has been informed by empirically grounded research, yet it has lacked sophisticated standards on which to evaluate the value of envy. Combining strengths of both approaches can consequentially illuminate the discussion. To achieve this goal, we need to discuss different dimensions on which to judge the value of envy.

3.1 Dimensions for Judging the Value of Envy

The empirically derived functional approach to envy emphasizes that it may primarily help the individual to solve intrapersonal and interpersonal tasks. More specifically, the components of envy are instrumental in triggering certain outcomes that contribute to the envier’s well-being and social relationships. For instance, it may not be helpful to just desire the envy object (e.g., a possession), but this desire can spur various behaviors directed at obtaining the envy object (e.g., buying the possession) and thereby be functional for alleviating the painful inferiority the envier experiences.

In light of envy’s functionality, it may seem straightforward to evaluate envy as instrumentally valuable , but the matter is more complicated for two reasons. First, even though evidence supports the conclusion that envy can be functional under certain conditions, its outcomes may sometimes turn out to be dysfunctional. That is, just because envy predicts efforts to regulate the envier’s social status, this is not to say that all these efforts will always be successful. Therefore, the conditions that can render envy and its outcomes instrumentally good need to be investigated systematically. Relatedly, just because envy will often be functional, this is not to say that all value of envy boils down to instrumental value. Functional benefits are just one facet of the overall experience of envy. Hence, it is certainly possible that envy also has non-instrumental value , which we here define as being valuable for its own sake.

Second, we need to ask: envy is instrumentally valuable to whom ? What is valuable to an individual’s well-being can be detrimental to the well-being of someone else who is affected by the individual’s actions, or by the community as a whole. An evil torturer who feels benign envy toward a more experienced torturer will be motivated to improve their torture skills. According to an amoral perspective which refrains from talking about value, we should say that this kind of envy, which motivates the envier to become better at their job, and thus to ascend in the social hierarchy (e.g., the person gets promoted and allowed to torture more prisoners), is accompanied by a boost in self-esteem and causes a genuine improvement in their material and emotional well-being. But this is a horrific thing to say.

There are at least two dimensions we need to take into account. Specifically, we assume a widely-shared distinction between prudential and moral value. A classical way of making the distinction derives from Henry Sidgwick’s contrast between rational prudence , which aims at one’s personal well-being, and rational benevolence , which takes into account the good of everyone else as much as one’s own. Moral badness and goodness, in this picture, are assessed from “the point of view […] of the universe” (Sidgwick 1967 ; p.382).

This distinction holds beyond rationalist approaches to ethics and can be found in some form or another in very different philosophical traditions. For instance, the sentimentalist David Hume draws a similar distinction between prudence and morality when he writes: “I am more to be lamented than blamed, if I am mistaken with regard to the influence of objects in producing pain or pleasure, or if I know not the proper means of satisfying my desires. No one can ever regard such errors as a defect in my moral character” (Hume 1969 ).

Such a conceptual distinction is maintained even in frameworks where prudence is extensionally conceived of as a subset of morality. For instance, contemporary virtue ethicists would argue that, for the virtuous agent, if something is morally bad, then it is also prudentially bad (e.g., McDowell 1979 ; Hursthouse 1999 ). But even for such theories, distinguishing between the prudential and moral value of envy is possible, and crucial for coping with envy productively.

Prudential and moral value evidently come apart in the torturer case. The torturer’s personal well-being might improve, but the well-being of the victims clearly decreases. Such a distinction may also occur in envy. Therefore, when considering the value of envy, we need to distinguish between prudential and moral value as well as instrumental and non-instrumental value.

3.2 The Value of Envy

We propose to consider the value of envy alongside multiple pathways a person can take. Depending on which dimensions of value one considers and under which conditions one looks at envy and its consequences, the evaluation of envy will change. The structure depicted in Fig. 1 metaphorically represents the possible pathways that lead to different evaluations of envy. Hence, a multi-componential, functional account of envy allows deriving a nuanced perspective on the value of envy.

The pathways of envy that have different value. Pathways that end in dark grey corners represent exemplary outcomes of benign envy and pathways that end in light grey corners represent exemplary outcomes of malicious envy

Along the first pathway, the functional approach to envy predicts that envy may have instrumental value, insofar as it brings about specific outcomes that a person would evaluate to be good in one of three ways. First, envy may have both prudential and moral instrumental value. For benign envy, evidence indicates that it relates to improvement motivation (Lange et al. 2018c ), which may translate into actual improvement (Lange and Crusius 2015b ). Such benignly envious efforts correlate with higher well-being of enviers and increases in flourishing over time (Briki 2019 ; Ng et al. 2020 ). Hence, improvement motivation may have instrumental value for the person because it promotes outcomes that are prudentially good. Moreover, when people acquire skills, this allows them to invest these skills into society, for instance in prestige hierarchies (Henrich and Gil-White 2001 ). Finally, when benign envy is felt with regard to morally good traits and qualities, the envier’s improvement is not only prudentially good, but also valuable for others around them. Hence, social groups may benefit from benignly envious individuals in the long term, which means that benign envy may have instrumental moral value.

For malicious envy, evidence indicates that it triggers schadenfreude when arrogant high-achievers fail, changing the public image of these high-achievers and putting them in their place (Lange and Boecker 2019 ). Because this consequence leads to potentially lasting pleasure for the envier, it is prudentially good (Fletcher 2008 ). Moreover, arrogant high-achievers are widely disliked and spread fear among subordinates (Cheng et al. 2013 ; Maner and Case 2016 ). Therefore, putting such high-achievers in their place may benefit society at large (except for the high-achiever him−/herself) and is accordingly morally good, provided that no other countervailing harm is brought about.

Second, envy may have prudential, but not moral, instrumental value. For benign envy, evidence indicates that it relates to Machiavellian tendencies such as backstabbing (Lange et al. 2018b ). Under certain conditions, these tendencies indeed correlate with higher status, for instance in the workplace (Shultz 1993 ; Hawley 2003 ; Lange et al. 2018b ). High status, in turn, is a strong predictor of higher well-being (Anderson et al. 2015 ) rendering the envy-driven Machiavellian tendencies instrumental in achieving a prudentially good outcome. However, Machiavellian tendencies also relate to various antisocial behaviors that lead to interpersonal conflict (Muris et al. 2017 ). Therefore, under these conditions, the envy-driven Machiavellian tendencies are morally bad.

For malicious envy, there is less evidence in this category. One example may come from studies showing that malicious envy predicts the assignment of rather difficult tasks to an envied person who deservedly outperformed the envier in previous circumstances (Lange and Crusius 2015a ). Under the assumption that these more difficult tasks will undermine the envied person’s chances to continue being successful, assigning a more difficult task may—at least in the short-term—increase the envier’s well-being, rendering such efforts instrumental in promoting an outcome that is prudentially good. However, as the envied person earned the success, moral observers should actually experience pleasure for the envied person (Feather 2006 ). If they instead assign more difficult tasks to these deserving others, doing so is morally bad. Even though the empirical evidence on the prudential benefits of malicious envy may be lacking, it is plausible that there can be several short-term advantages stemming from causing harm to the envied person. If that wasn’t the case, we would expect much fewer cases of cheating, stealing, sabotaging and even murdering, all of which can sometimes be motivated by malicious envy. While these behaviors are socially stigmatized, legally sanctioned, and morally condemned, they do bring prudential benefits at least temporarily. When the envier’s deeds remain undetected and permanently lower the standing of the envied person, it is even imaginable that the prudential benefits last for long periods of time.

Third, envy may have moral, but not prudential, instrumental value. For benign envy, evidence indicates that it leads to persistence, even when the task at hand is extremely difficult or potentially impossible to solve (Lange and Crusius 2015a ). Persistence for impossible tasks will undermine the envier’s well-being, which is prudentially bad. However, general persistence for extremely difficult tasks may produce success that could benefit society (Duckworth et al. 2007 ), rendering persistence instrumental in fostering morally good outcomes.

For malicious envy, evidence indicates that it triggers outcome-focused (i.e., effort-independent) goal-pursuit (Salerno et al. 2019 ), potentially motivating enviers to buy other luxury products similar to the kind that made them envious (Van de Ven et al. 2011b ). Such alternative purchases fail to close the gap in the exact domain that elicited envy and fail to pull the envied person down. Accordingly, malicious enviers may often remain inferior, potentially explaining why malicious envy relates to lower well-being (Briki 2019 ; Ng et al. 2020 ), an outcome that is prudentially bad. However, buying alternative products still propels the economy, which benefits all people in the long-term. Therefore, this goal-pursuit may be instrumental in promoting outcomes that are arguably morally good.

Along a second pathway, envy may have non-instrumental value in that it motivates the envier to pursue some goals for their own sake. Specifically, envy may have non-instrumental prudential and moral value. The central psychological goal underlying both benign and malicious envy is the regulation of social status (e.g., Crusius and Lange 2017 ). Evidence indicates that benign and malicious envy predict status attainment via different strategies (e.g., Lange et al. 2016 ; Lange et al. 2018b ). Social status has diverse advantages for the self and contributes widely to the structuring and flourishing of society (e.g., Anderson et al. 2015 ). While this flourishing may be valuable instrumentally, some of it seems to be good for its own sake: it feels good to be the object of social esteem and approbation. Status is thus a thing that people often pursue for their own sake, as a component of their emotional well-being. As envy—at its core—is concerned with the pursuit and attainment of status, we would argue that envy may have prudential and moral non-instrumental value (for a related argument see La Caze 2001 ; Thomason 2015 ). From a philosophical perspective, dispositional benign envy, if it motivates to self-improve with regard to objectively valuable objects, may be considered a component of a virtuous character (Protasi 2021 ) and thus has prudential and moral non-instrumental value.

Along a third pathway, envy predicts outcomes that are prudentially and morally bad, in line with the common portrayal of envy. In this case, envy lacks value. For benign envy, evidence shows that it relates to overconsumption (Belk 2011 ). Because overconsumption may ruin people financially and also exploit the environment (de Graff et al. 2014 ), outcomes of overconsumption are prudentially and morally bad (see also Morgan-Knapp 2014 ). For malicious envy, evidence shows that it relates to psychopathic tendencies such as erratic and criminal behavior (Lange et al. 2018b ). The same research indicates that these behaviors fail to translate into status, and, accordingly, fail to advance the envier’s well-being longitudinally. Moreover, psychopathic tendencies generally predict negative long-term social effects (LeBreton et al. 2006 ) and interpersonal difficulties (Muris et al. 2017 ). Hence, the outcomes of envy-driven psychopathic behaviors are prudentially and morally bad.

3.3 Summary of the Value of Envy

In sum, components and outcomes of envy derived from a functional perspective allow evaluating the value of envy in a more nuanced manner according to different dimensions. Envy may have instrumental value, as it promotes outcomes that are prudentially and morally good, prudentially good but morally bad, or morally good and prudentially bad. Moreover, envy may have non-instrumental value, being prudentially and morally good itself. However, envy is also often prudentially and morally bad. This more elaborate perspective on the value of envy has a number of implications.

4 Implications of the Nuanced Perspective on the Value of Envy

The current arguments provide a comprehensive perspective on the value of envy. They indicate that envy is not as reprehensible as commonly portrayed in public discourse. Moreover, envy is not, as argued in psychology and philosophy, morally bad (Roberts 1991 ; Miceli and Castelfranchi 2007 ), morally neutral and devoid of moral evaluations (Ben-Ze’ev 2002 ; Crusius et al. 2020 ), or morally good (Thomason 2015 ). Instead, evidence gathered from a functional perspective on envy shows that envy can be all of these things, depending on which dimension of value and which outcome of benign or malicious envy one applies under which conditions. Thus, a nuanced perspective on envy’s nature leads to a nuanced perspective on envy’s value, which in turn can help determine the most appropriate ways of responding to and coping with envy.

Any kind of envy has an important signaling value. That is, envy tells the agent what they might care about, whether they realize it or not (Protasi 2021 ). But, once the envier realizes they are envious, many possible modes of action become available to them (i.e., the different pathways in Fig. 1 ). Sometimes, envy is best coped with indirectly. If overcoming one’s disadvantage is perceived as unlikely, the envier should try to re-evaluate their situation: is the envied good really something to be valued? This need not be an instance of cognitive dissonance or sour grapes syndrome . Instead, sometimes, through reflection, we may realize that we envy people for bad reasons, and we should find more valuable goals. When feeling malicious envy, which is often morally bad, one possibility is to try and see the envied person in a more sympathetic light (Exline and Zell 2008 ). Specifically, perhaps we can bring ourselves to think of the envied person as a model to emulate, and develop feelings of benign envy, which is less likely to give rise to morally bad outcomes under most conditions. Sometimes envy can be so intense and malicious that the only possible ethical option is to repress it or at least to not act on it.

Moreover, the nuanced perspective on the value of envy also has implications for how envy is portrayed at the societal level. As outlined repeatedly, public discourse commonly portrays envy as a deadly sin, an emotion to be avoided. Accordingly, people often feel ashamed for their envy and judge enviers negatively, furthering the negative sentiment towards envy. The nuanced perspective on the value of envy instead implies that such evaluations should be contextualized. Envy need not be condemned unequivocally. Instead, under certain condition, a society may even embrace and nurture envy. A comprehensive discussion of envy’s remedies cannot be pursued here. However, we hope that those who worry about the potential harms brought about by envy, from clinical psychologists and counselors to moral and political philosophers, focus both on the diverse nature of these harms, as much as their potential benefits (for an example see Leahy 2020 ).

Accomplishing such a balanced perspective requires more research on the contextualized nature of the value of envy. For many outcomes of envy, we can only tentatively suggest that envy may have certain kind of value. For instance, we argued that putting arrogant high achievers in their place by expressing schadenfreude is an effect of malicious envy that may be instrumental in producing prudentially and morally good outcomes. Indeed, research indicates that the negative feelings that trigger schadenfreude may be particularly strong when the low-status person resents their own situation (Feather and Nairn 2005 ). Hence, under low deservingness of the own situation, schadenfreude may be an indicator of negative feelings toward oneself, rendering this outcome prudentially bad. Moreover, when the high achiever deserved their initial high status, most people experience sympathy when the high achiever befalls a misfortune (Feather 2006 ). Accordingly, when one low-status person expresses schadenfreude, such an outcome would be regarded as morally bad by other observers. Therefore, the deservingness of the status of all involved persons constitutes an important contextual variable that affects the value of envy. For the other cases we discussed, future research should similarly investigate important boundary conditions.

Finally, we hope that future interdisciplinary research may contribute to further refinement of an axiological theory of envy. Especially the pathway to the instrumental value of envy could become even more nuanced given the functional approach to envy. For instance, the case in which envy is instrumental for promoting outcomes that are prudentially bad but morally good did not receive much empirical investigation in the past. This might be of particular interest to utilitarian approaches to public policy. Perhaps moderate levels of dysfunctional benign envy at the individual level may nonetheless be productive at the societal level. Moreover, we are not aware of much research on malicious envy being instrumental for promoting outcomes that are prudentially good but morally bad. This may turn out not to occur frequently, which would be good news for the moralist. That is, it may be the case that malicious envy is truly the deadly sin that has been traditionally depicted. But it would be worthwhile to find empirical confirmation of this intuition. We urge researchers to investigate these cases further.

5 Conclusions

For a long time, envy has been considered to be reprehensible and therefore dispensable as a human experience. However, descriptions of the nature of envy require a more open-minded and comprehensive interdisciplinary approach. Recent empirical research infused with a philosophically discerning approach to value reveals that envy can be functional or dysfunctional, prudentially or morally good, depending on its variety and the present conditions. We hope that this nuanced perspective on the value of envy paints a more comprehensive picture, facilitating future theoretical and empirical research on envy and other emotions as well as informing public opinion.

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Acknowledgements

Ideas developed in this manuscript originated from a conference on Hostile Emotions hosted by Thiemo Breyer at the Center for Interdisciplinary Research of the University of Bielefeld. We thank Olivia Bailey and Jan Crusius for comments on a previous draft.

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Open Access funding enabled and organized by Projekt DEAL. The research reported in this article was supported by grants from the German Research foundation (DFG; Deutsche Forschungsgemeinschaft) awarded to Jens Lange (LA 4029/1–1, LA 4029/2–1).

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Lange, J., Protasi, S. An Interdisciplinary Perspective on the Value of Envy. Rev.Phil.Psych. 15 , 403–422 (2024). https://doi.org/10.1007/s13164-021-00548-3

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Grammar Guide

Emotion: Envy

By The ProWritingAid Team

When you want to write the emotion envy, it's important to "show" the emotion your character is experiencing through their physical reactions and dialogue, rather than "tell" it. In this article we provide you with inspiration so you can avoid emotion tells and immerse your readers in your story.

Envy is an emotion that arises when we desire something that someone else possesses, whether it be a possession, a quality, or a circumstance. It's the feeling of discontent or bitterness that can arise when we feel that someone else's advantages or successes should have been ours. Envy can be a complex and powerful emotion that can lead to negative thoughts and behaviors if left unchecked. However, it can also be a useful emotion that can motivate us to work towards our own goals and aspirations.

Different Types of Envy

Situations associated with envy, physical reactions to envy, thoughts associated with envy, atmosphere of envy, verbs associated with envy, emotions before envy, emotions after envy, telling envy examples to avoid, practical examples of showing envy, exercises for showing envy.

Here are some different types of envy:

Resentment towards someone who possesses something desirable that the character lacks
Jealousy of someone's achievements, status or possessions
Bitterness towards someone who has received recognition or praise for something that the character believes they deserve
Coveting something that someone else has, whether it be a physical object, relationship, or experience

Here are some situations where a character might experience the emotion of envy:

Witnessing someone else's success or accomplishments
Comparing oneself to others and feeling inferior
Feeling left out or excluded from a group or activity
Feeling like someone else is receiving preferential treatment
Being passed over for a promotion or opportunity
Seeing someone else in a happy relationship or with a loving family
Feeling like someone else has something that the character wants or needs
Being constantly reminded of someone else's achievements or possessions
Feeling like someone else is more talented, attractive, or popular

Here are some physical reactions a character experiencing envy might have:

Facial expressions like scowling, sneering, or rolling the eyes
Clenched fists or jaw
Averting eye contact or staring intently at someone or something
Mimicking the actions or possessions of others
Constantly comparing oneself to others and feeling inadequate
Being overly critical or dismissive of others' achievements or success
Gossiping or spreading rumors about others to bring them down
Sarcasm or passive-aggressive comments aimed at others

Here are some thoughts a character experiencing envy might have:

Why do they get all the attention?
I wish I had what they have.
It's not fair that they have it and I don't.
I've worked so hard, but they have it easy.
I can't stand seeing them succeed.
They don't deserve it as much as I do.
I wish I could be them.
I hate feeling this way, but I can't help it.
I'm not good enough compared to them.

Here are some ways that you might reflect the emotion of envy in the atmosphere of your scene:

Use descriptions of luxurious or extravagant settings to evoke feelings of envy in characters or readers.
Contrast the protagonist's modest surroundings with the opulence of a rival character's environment to create a sense of jealousy or inadequacy.
Describe characters' body language and facial expressions to convey envy, such as a clenched jaw or narrowed eyes.
Use dialogue to reveal characters' jealous thoughts or words, such as sarcastic comments or passive-aggressive remarks.
Incorporate sensory details to immerse readers in the scene and evoke envy, such as the smell of expensive perfume or the taste of a decadent dessert.
Use metaphors or similes that evoke envy, such as comparing a character's home to a palace or describing a rival character as a "golden child."
Use foreshadowing to hint at future events that will trigger envy, such as a character's success or fortune.

Here are some verbs commonly associated with the emotion of envy:

Here are some emotions that may come before a character experiences envy:

Satisfaction
Contentment
Anticipation
Forgiveness
Graciousness

Here are some emotions that may come after a character experiences envy:

Frustration
Discontentment
Inferiority complex

Here are some examples of telling the emotion envy in a sentence. You should avoid things like this:

She was envious of her friend's new car.
He was envious of his coworker's promotion.
She felt envious when she saw her neighbor's beautiful garden.
He was envious of his brother's successful career.
She was envious of her classmate's artistic talents.
He couldn't help but feel envious of his friend's luxurious lifestyle.
She was envious of her sister's happy relationship.
He felt envious of his teammate's athletic abilities.
She was envious of her colleague's popularity in the office.

Here are some examples of showing envy in a sentence:

She couldn't help but stare at her friend's new designer handbag, feeling a pang of envy in her chest.
His eyes lingered on the couple dancing together, wishing he could have a relationship like that, envy boiling inside him.
She scrolled through her social media feed, feeling a surge of envy as she saw her peers' impressive accomplishments.
He watched his colleague get promoted to a higher position, feeling envious of his success and wondering why he hadn't been chosen.

Here are some writing exercises to practice showing envy:

Think of a time when you felt envy towards someone else. Write a short scene in which your character experiences a similar situation.
Develop a backstory for your character that includes a significant experience that led to their envy. Write a short story or scene that illustrates this experience.
Write a character profile that explores your character's personality and traits that are commonly associated with envy, such as jealousy, resentment, and bitterness.
Use sensory details to show how your character reacts physically to their envy. For example, describe their racing heart, clenched fists, or the way their face turns red.
Explore the ways in which your character's envy affects their relationships with others. Write a scene in which your character's envy causes them to act in a way that damages a relationship.
Use dialogue to reveal your character's envy. Write a conversation in which your character expresses their envy to another character.
Consider the consequences of your character's envy. Write a scene that shows how their envy leads them to make a decision that has negative consequences.
Use symbolism to represent your character's envy. For example, use the color green or the image of an eye to represent envy in a scene.
Write a letter from your character to the person they envy. In the letter, have your character express their feelings of envy and the impact it has on them.

Want more help with showing emotion instead of telling? You find more help in our full emotional thesaurus .

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Definition of envy

(Entry 1 of 2)

Definition of envy (Entry 2 of 2)

transitive verb

intransitive verb

Did you know?

Jealousy vs. Envy

Depending on who you ask, jealousy and envy are either exact synonyms, totally different words, or near-synonyms with some degree of semantic overlap and some differences. It is difficult to make the case, based on the evidence of usage that we have, for either of the first two possibilities. Both jealousy and envy are often used to indicate that a person is covetous of something that someone else has, but jealousy carries the particular sense of “zealous vigilance” and tends to be applied more exclusively to feelings of protectiveness regarding one’s own advantages or attachments. In the domain of romance, it is more commonly found than envy . If you were to say “your salt-shaker collection fills me with jealousy,” most people would take it to mean much the same thing as “your salt-shaker collection fills me with envy.” But if someone made a flirtatious comment to your partner, you would likely say that it caused you jealousy, not envy.

covetousness
enviousness
green-eyed monster
invidiousness

Examples of envy in a Sentence

These examples are programmatically compiled from various online sources to illustrate current usage of the word 'envy.' Any opinions expressed in the examples do not represent those of Merriam-Webster or its editors. Send us feedback about these examples.

Word History

Middle English envie , from Anglo-French, from Latin invidia , from invidus envious, from invidēre to look askance at, envy, from in- + vidēre to see — more at wit

13th century, in the meaning defined at sense 1

14th century, in the meaning defined at transitive sense 1

Phrases Containing envy

green with envy
object of envy

Articles Related to envy

Words We're Watching: 'Jelly' (The...

Words We're Watching: 'Jelly' (The Adjective)

When you wish you were there.

Dictionary Entries Near envy

Cite this entry.

“Envy.” Merriam-Webster.com Dictionary , Merriam-Webster, https://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/envy. Accessed 16 Sep. 2024.

Kids Definition

Kids definition of envy.

Kids Definition of envy (Entry 2 of 2)

More from Merriam-Webster on envy

Nglish: Translation of envy for Spanish Speakers

Britannica English: Translation of envy for Arabic Speakers

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