flashbulb memory essay

25 Best Flashbulb Memory Examples

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The term flashbulb memory (FBM) refers to the memory of when a person learned of an event that was shocking and of significant personal relevance .

A flashbulb memory is extremely vivid and detailed, seemingly stored in long-term memory like a photograph, hence the term “flashbulb.”

What is a Flashbulb Memory?

Brown and Kulik (1977) coined the term flashbulb memory and provided an initial framework for its main characteristics.

In their paper, simply titled Flashbulb Memories , Brown and Kulik (1977) define the concept:

“memories for the circumstances in which one first learned of a very surprising and consequential (or emotionally arousing) event” (p. 73).

A key distinction between a flashbulb memory and regular memory is that the FBM focuses on the details surrounding the event being remembered, such as its time and location (Hirst & Phelps, 2016).

Individuals often have high confidence in the accuracy of their flashbulb memories and can remember the context of discovering the event very vividly. Nonetheless, studies indicate that being confident doesn’t always mean the memory is accurate (Talarico & Rubin, 2008; Day & Ross, 2014).

Similar But Different: Collective Memories

Flashbulb Memory Examples

Although research has found support for and against many of the initial conditions postulated as necessary by Brown and Kulik (1977), the examples below will surely result in an FBM.

• September 11 th 2001: The terrorist attack on the World Trade Center and Pentagon are among the most often cited examples of FBMs in the United States. It was a shocking event that received a tremendous amount of news coverage in every country around the globe.
• Death of Princess Diana: In the early morning hours of August 31, 1997, Princess Diana died of injuries sustained in a car crash in the Pont de l’Alma tunnel in Paris, France. News coverage around the world was extensive and lasted for weeks, undoubtedly creating an enduring FBM in the minds of billions of people.
• Assassination of Martin Luther King, Jr.: April 4 th , 1968 has gone down in U. S. history as one of the most shocking events in the country’s existence. When he was shot on that day in Memphis, Tennessee, it seemed as though the Civil Rights Movement might also pass. Most Americans that were alive on that day can tell you exactly when and where they heard the tragic news.
• The Passing of a Beloved Grandparent: Not all FBMs are created as a result of a public event that affects an entire society. The passing of a beloved grandparent can be traumatic enough to be ingrained in an individual’s memory for a lifetime.   
• A Marriage Proposal: A proposal for marriage is usually a very private, intimate moment; quite the opposite of a public event. However, it fits many of the conceptual conditions for an FBM, including being personally significant, distinct, unexpected, and involving strong emotions. 
• A Medical Diagnosis: Learning the outcome of an important medical exam can be a traumatic event. Although it may not have consequences for a society or general public, it will more than likely produce an FBM for the individual receiving the news.
• Pregnancy Test Results: The moment a couple discovers they will have a baby might be one of the most memorable events in their lives. Although the event itself can be anticipated and planned for, it is still dramatic enough to produce an FBM that may endure for a lifetime.
• Receiving a University Acceptance Notification: Opening a college admissions letter or going online to see if one’s name is listed as being admitted is a moment that can be ingrained in the mind of the individual for as long as they live. The consequences can be enduring and significant. The implications for one’s life far-reaching, and the emotional impact as strong as one may ever experience.  
• Winning an Olympic Medal : Although this event might be highly publicized in the winner’s country, it might only create an FBM in the recipient and their extended family. That FBM will undoubtedly last forever and be as vivid as the day it was won.  
• Winning the Lottery: Winning millions of dollars will most likely create an FBM, not just for the winner, but for those in their inner circle as well. The event is distinctive, consequential for sure, and probably completely unexpected.
• Being Drafted in the NFL: These days the NFL draft has become an event that is televised all over the United States. The moment the young man receives that phone call from the team that will select him will be one of the most memorable in their lifetime.
• Challenger Space Shuttle Disaster: On January 28, 1986, the entire world was glued to their television screens as the Challenger, a space shuttle, exploded shortly after launch. This tragedy that took the lives of seven individuals, including a civilian teacher, turned into a flashbulb memory for many amidst the shock and collective grief.
• Fall of the Berlin Wall: The unexpected downfall of the Berlin Wall on November 9, 1989, signifies an FBM for those who witnessed the monumental event, marking a turning point in global history. It captured the essence of freedom and united a divided Germany.
• Hiroshima and Nagasaki bombings: The devastating bombings of Hiroshima and Nagasaki in Japan on August 6 and 9, 1945, respectively, were such traumatic events, they produced intense and enduring FBMs in the minds of survivors and the global community.
• First moon landing: On July 20, 1969, millions witnessed the historic moment when Neil Armstrong set foot on the moon. This achievement in human history undoubtedly created a flashbulb memory, particularly for those who recall the historic words, “That’s one small step for man, one giant leap for mankind.”
• End of World War II: The announcement of World War II’s end on September 2, 1945, served as a flashbulb memory moment for many. People who experienced the relief and joy of that day likely remember vividly where they were and what they were doing when they heard the news.
• The Release of Nelson Mandela: On February 11, 1990, Nelson Mandela walked free after 27 years of imprisonment. This historic moment of triumph over apartheid caused a surge of emotions worldwide, creating a powerful FBM for people who witnessed this milestone event.
• The Assassination of John F. Kennedy: The tragic news of U.S. President John F. Kennedy’s assassination on November 22, 1963, razed the nation, making it an FBM for those who remember the time, place, and emotional reaction to the event.
• Election of Barack Obama: When Barack Obama was declared the 44th President of the U.S. on November 4, 2008, becoming the first African American to achieve this feat, the moment served an FBM for many who saw it as a pivotal moment in racial history.
• The Indian Ocean Tsunami: The horrifying occurrence of the Boxing Day Tsunami in the Indian Ocean on December 26, 2004, invoking massive destruction and loss, morphed into an FBM for both survivors and the global public.
• First Job Offer : The moment someone receives their first job offer can forge an intense FBM, whether it’s over the phone or through a missive, given the personal significance and emotional impact of this event in their professional journey.
• Graduation Day: A vivid FBM for many students would be their graduation day. The mixed feelings of accomplishment, anticipation, and apprehension are dramatic enough to etch this moment in their lifelong memory.
• Birth of First Child: The birth of a first child is a private yet intense occasion for parents that typically etches a long-standing FBM thanks to its unmatched emotional depth and significance.
• A Near-Death Experience: Such experiences heighten a person’s awareness and emotional response, and can leave a powerful FBM that lasts a lifetime.
• The Death of Steve Jobs: On October 5, 2011, the passing of Apple co-founder Steve Jobs shocked the world and created an FBM for his admirers who remember the profound loss of this technological visionary.

Flashbulb memories are specific memories surrounding unexpected and impactful news events. People can often recall where they were, their actions, and the time when they heard the news (Mackay & Bluck, 2010). Major historical moments, like the assassination of prominent figures, serve as prime examples of these memories. While initial theories about flashbulb memories suggested certain conditions must be met for their formation, subsequent research challenges these ideas. For instance, the event doesn’t necessarily need to be surprising or carry personal significance.

Studies have also shown that these memories aren’t particularly more accurate, consistent, enduring, or vivid than other significant memories in one’s life. Due to these findings, some scholars believe that flashbulb memories aren’t distinct from other vivid personal memories, questioning the need for a separate memory framework.

Brown, R., & Kulik, J. (1977). Flashbulb memories. Cognition , 5 (1), 73-99.

Day, M. V., & Ross, M. (2014). Predicting confidence in flashbulb memories. Memory , 22 (3), 232-242.

Hirst, W., & Phelps, E. A. (2016). Flashbulb memories. Current Directions in Psychological Science , 25 (1), 36–41. https://doi.org/10.1177/0963721415622487

Mackay, M. M., & Bluck, S. (2010). Meaning-making in memories: A comparison of memories of death-related and low point life experiences. Death studies , 34 (8), 715-737.

Talarico, J. M., & Rubin, D. C. (2003). Confidence, not consistency, characterizes flashbulb memories. Psychological science , 14 (5), 455-461.

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Flashbulb Memory In Psychology: Definition & Examples

Ayesh Perera

B.A, MTS, Harvard University

Ayesh Perera, a Harvard graduate, has worked as a researcher in psychology and neuroscience under Dr. Kevin Majeres at Harvard Medical School.

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Saul McLeod, PhD

Editor-in-Chief for Simply Psychology

BSc (Hons) Psychology, MRes, PhD, University of Manchester

Saul McLeod, PhD., is a qualified psychology teacher with over 18 years of experience in further and higher education. He has been published in peer-reviewed journals, including the Journal of Clinical Psychology.

Olivia Guy-Evans, MSc

Associate Editor for Simply Psychology

BSc (Hons) Psychology, MSc Psychology of Education

Olivia Guy-Evans is a writer and associate editor for Simply Psychology. She has previously worked in healthcare and educational sectors.

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Exceptionally clear memories of emotionally significant events are called flashbulb memories. They’re called so because they are typically very vivid and detailed, much like a photograph , and often pertain to surprising, consequential, and emotionally arousing events, such as hearing about a national tragedy or experiencing a personal milestone.

Key Takeaways

• A flashbulb memory is a highly vivid and detailed ‘snapshot’ of a moment in which a consequential, surprising, and emotionally arousing piece of news was learned.
• Roger Brown and James Kulik introduced the term ‘flashbulb memory’ in 1977 in their study of individuals’ ability to recall consequential and surprising events.
• Debate centers on whether they are a special case (resistant to forgetting over time) or the same as other memories.
• The photographic model, the comprehensive model, and the emotional-integrative model are some models which have been employed to study the phenomenon of flashbulb memory.
• The vividness and accuracy of flashbulb memories can vary across age and culture.
• The amygdala seems to play a key role in the formation and retrieval of flashbulb memories.
• Relatively little evidence for flashbulb memories as a distinct memory process. They ‘feel’ accurate (we are confident in recall) but are just as prone to forgetting & change as other episodic memories.

A flashbulb memory is an accurate and exceptionally vivid long-lasting memory for the circumstances surrounding learning about a dramatic event. Flashbulb Memories are memories that are affected by our emotional state.

The analogy of a flashbulb describes how we can often remember where you were, what you were doing, how you were informed, and how you reacted as if the whole scene had been “illuminated” by a flashbulb.

Roger Brown and James Kulik coined the term ‘flashbulb memory’ in 1977. While the term ‘flashbulb memory’ implies shock, illumination, brevity, and detail, a memory of this type is far from complete.

Moreover, the fundamental characteristics of a flashbulb memory are informant (who broke the news), own affect (how they felt), aftermath (importance of the event), another affect (how others felt), ongoing activity (what they were doing) and place (where they where when the event happened).

Examples of Flashbulb Memory

Flashbulb memories are often associated with important historical or autobiographical events. Typical ‘flashbulb’ events are dramatic, unexpected, and shocking.

Here are several real-life examples of flashbulb memories:

• Remembering where you were and what you were doing when you heard about the 9/11 terrorist attacks.
• The moment you heard about the death of a beloved public figure like Princess Diana or Michael Jackson.
• Recalling the exact circumstances when you learned about a significant world event, such as the election of the first Black U.S. president, Barack Obama.
• Remembering the moment you were informed about a family member’s sudden and unexpected death.
• Recalling where you were and what you were doing when the World Health Organization declared COVID-19 as a pandemic in 2020.

Why do Flashbulb Memories Occur

Brown and Kulik (1977) constructed the special-mechanism hypothesis, which supposedly demonstrated the existence of a distinct special neural mechanism for flashbulb memories.

This mechanism was named “now print”, because it was as if the whole episode was a snapshot and imprinted in memory as such.

Brown and Kulik argued that experiences and events which exceeded the critical levels of consequentiality and surprise caused this mechanism of neural memory to register a permanent record of the event. Surprise refers to not anticipating the event and consequentiality refers to the level of importance of the event.

Notably, however, they held that while flashbulb memories are fixed, they are not always necessarily accessible from long-term memory (Cohen, McCloskey & Wible, 1990).

The special-mechanism hypothesis of Brown and Kulik further held that the features of flashbulb memories are distinct from those of ordinary mechanisms of memory (Brown & Kulik, 1977).

Detail, vividness, accuracy, and resistance to forgetting were initially identified as the distinct properties of flashbulb memories. However, over time, the validity of these properties has been debated, and several models have been subsequently developed to understand and explain the phenomenon of flashbulb memory (Er, 2003).

The Photographic Model

The photographic model posits that a stimulus experience can engender a flashbulb memory only with a significant amount of shock, emotional arousal, and consequentiality (Brown & Kulik, 1977). The element of surprise initially helps register an event in memory, and the event’s importance would subsequently trigger emotional arousal.

The consequentiality of the memory may be determined by the event’s impact on one’s own life. Finally, the properties of surprise, emotional arousal, and consequentiality would impact the frequency of rehearsal of a certain flashbulb memory, thereby possibly strengthening or weakening the associations to and accounts of the experience.

The Comprehensive Model

The comprehensive model emphasizes upon the importance of incorporating a larger sample of subjects from a greater diversity of backgrounds (Conway, Anderson, Larsen, Donnelly, McDaniel, McClelland, Rawles & Logie, 1994).

Additionally, unlike the photographic model, which follows a sequential process in the development of a flashbulb account, the comprehensive model incorporates the interconnected nature of the pertinent variables.

For instance, interest in and knowledge of the experience may impact the level of consequentiality, which in turn, may affect one level of emotional arousal.

All these factors would impact the frequency of rehearsal, and finally, their aggregate impact would influence the strength of the associations.

The Emotional-Integrative Model

The emotional-integrative model incorporates elements of the photographic model and the comprehensive model (Finkenauer, Luminet, Gisle, El-Ahmadi, Van Der Linden & Philippot, 1998).

Like the photographic model, this model posits that the degree of shock constitutes the initial registration of the event.

Moreover, according to this model, the elements of surprise and consequentialism, as well as one’s attitude, can trigger an emotional state which directly helps create a flashbulb memory.

Furthermore, this emotional state, in turn, contributes to the rehearsal of the event, thereby strengthening the association and forming a flashbulb memory.

Herein, the formation of the flashbulb memory is significantly influenced by the individual’s emotional relationship to the particular event (Curci & Luminet, 2009).

What Research Suggests

A common approach seems to characterize studies of flashbulb memory. Researchers generally conduct their studies of flashbulb memory following a surprising and consequential public event (Neisser, 1982).

Initially, the participants are tested via interview or survey questions immediately after the event. Herein, the subjects are often expected to describe their personal relationship to the event.

Afterward, the participants would be divided into different groups and tested for a second time—each group at a different time.

For instance, one group may be tested 12 months later, while another group may be tested 18 months after the event (Schmolck, Buffalo & Squire, 2000). This approach can expose memory decay and the rate of accuracy of the relevant flashbulb memories.

Brown and Kulik (1977) found that participants tended to have vivid memories of political assassinations: 75% of black people who were asked about the assassination of Martin Luther King could recall it, compared to only 33% of white people. This shows the importance of relevance.

Several studies imply that although flashbulb memories may be recollected with great confidence and vividness, they might not be as accurate as most people expect them to be.

For instance, a study conducted among 54 Duke University students in the aftermath of the 9/11 terrorist attacks suggests that the accuracy of retrieval declines over time for flashbulb memories in the same way as it does for everyday memories (Talarico & Rubin, 2003).

Moreover, a study that examined the flashbulb memories of the Challenger Space Shuttle explosion showed that despite the participants’ high level of confidence in their recollection of the event, their actual recollections were not accurate three years after the tragedy (Neisser & Harsh, 1992).

Thus, it is possible that flashbulb memories rank higher not necessarily in their accuracy but in their perceived accuracy. However, there are other research findings that suggest that flashbulb memories are more accurate than everyday memories because consequentiality, personal involvement, distinction, and proximity can enhance recall (Sharot, Delgado & Phelps, 2004).

Neurology Related to Flashbulb Memory

Studies have shown that emotional arousal engenders neurohormonal changes which impact the amygdala (Dolcos, Labar & Cabeza, 2005). The amygdala , thus, seems to play a role in encoding and retrieving the memories of significant public events.

The amygdala’s function in memory is related to the increase in arousal caused by an experience (McGaugh, 2004).

This suggests that what influences arousal possibly impacts the nature of memories. Moreover, as the amygdala’s involvement with episodic memory is explicitly linked to physiological arousal, the intensity of the arousal may differ based on an individual’s personal relationship to an event (Phelps et al., 2006).

Individual Differences

Younger adults in general, are more likely to form flashbulb memories than older ones (Cohen, Conway & Maylor, 1993). Moreover, younger adults and their older counterparts recall flashbulb memories for different reasons.

For instance, among the younger ones, the chief predictor was emotional connectedness to an experience. Among the older adults, however, the reliance on rehearsal seemed to be the more salient determining factor. Additionally, older adults demonstrated a greater tendency to forget the context of the experience.

However, if older adults had been severely affected by the relevant event, then they would be able to form flashbulb memories that are as detailed as the flashbulb memories formed by their younger counterparts (Kvavilashvili, Mirani, Schlagman, Erskine & Kornbrot, 2010) (Conway, Skitka, Hemmerich & Kershaw, 2009).

For instance, older adults who were directly affected by the 9/11 attacks recollected memories that, in detail, resembled the recollections of younger adults. Additionally, older adults also tend to have an enhanced recollection of experiences from their early adulthood and adolescence.

This phenomenon is described as the ‘reminiscence bump’. As a result of the ‘reminiscence bump,’ older adults can retain flashbulb memories from their adolescence and early adulthood better than flashbulb memories from the recent past (Denver, Lane & Cherry, 2010).

In general, the factors which impact flashbulb memories are considered to be independent of cultural variation. Proximity to an event and personal involvement are generally regarded as the chief determining factors in memory formation.

However, some research suggests that the vividness of flashbulb memories may be influenced by cultural factors (Kulkofsky, Wang, Conway, Hou, Aydin, Johnson & Williams, 2011).

For instance, a study that evaluated the formation of flashbulb memories in China, the United States, Germany, Turkey, and the United Kingdom showed a notable variation in retrieval.

The participants from the United Kingdom and the United States were able to report more memories within the allotted time span than the participants from Turkey, China, and Germany.

Moreover, the Chinese participants were less impacted by factors associated with personal involvement and proximity. Additionally, the effects of surprise and emotional intensity too varied across the countries.

Relationship to Autobiographical Memory

Flashbulb memory has long been classified as a subset of autobiographical memory. Autobiographical memory involves’ one’s everyday life experiences (Davidson & Glisky, 2002).

However, the memory of neutral autobiographical experiences such as an exam or a picnic is considered not as accurate as an emotionally arousing flashbulb memory involving one’s experiences closely tied to an issue of public concern or a national calamity.

Moreover, a comparative analysis of flashbulb memories and non-flashbulb memories demonstrates that while the former are encoded incidentally, the latter can be encoded specifically (Kvavilashvili, Mirani, Schlagman, Erskine & Kornbrot, 2010).

It has also been observed that although vividness accompanies both these types of memory, the vividness of non-flashbulb memories decreases over time—unlike that of flashbulb memories.

Additionally, while ordinary autobiographical memories involve a dimensional structure containing every level of autobiographical information, flashbulb memories stem apparently from a more densely integrated area of autobiographical information (Lanciano & Curci, 2012).

Additionally, while flashbulb memories require episodic memories , everyday memories are semantic recollections (Curci & Lanciano, 2009).

Why are flashbulb memories so vivid?

Flashbulb memories are so vivid because they are often associated with highly emotional events, which can heighten attention and deepen memory encoding. They involve strong emotional reactions, typically from surprise or shock, which stimulate the amygdala, a brain structure involved in emotion and memory, enhancing the recall of the event’s details.

Brown, A. (1987). Metacognition, executive control, self-regulation, and other more mysterious mechanisms. Metacognition, motivation, and understanding .

Cohen, G., Conway, M. A., & Maylor, E. A. (1994). Flashbulb memories in older adults . Psychology and Aging, 9 (3), 454.

Cohen, N. J., McCloskey, M., & Wible, C. G. (1990). Flashbulb memories and underlying cognitive mechanisms: Reply to Pillemer.

Conway, A. R., Skitka, L. J., Hemmerich, J. A., & Kershaw, T. C. (2009). Flashbulb memory for 11 September 2001 . Applied Cognitive Psychology: The Official Journal of the Society for Applied Research in Memory and Cognition, 23 (5), 605-623.

Conway, M. A., Anderson, S. J., Larsen, S. F., Donnelly, C. M., McDaniel, M. A., McClelland, A. G., … & Logie, R. H. (1994). The formation of flashbulb memories . Memory & Cognition, 22 (3), 326-343.

Curci, A., & Lanciano, T. (2009). Features of autobiographical memory: Theoretical and empirical issues in the measurement of flashbulb memory . The Journal of General Psychology, 136 (2), 129-152.

Curci, A., & Luminet, O. (2009). Flashbulb memories for expected events: a test of the emotional‐integrative model . Applied Cognitive Psychology: The Official Journal of the Society for Applied Research in Memory and Cognition, 23 (1), 98-114.

Davidson, P. S., & Glisky, E. L. (2002). Is flashbulb memory a special instance of source memory? Evidence from older adults . Memory, 10 (2), 99-111.

Denver, J. Y., Lane, S. M., & Cherry, K. E. (2010). Recent versus remote: Flashbulb memory for 9/11 and self-selected events from the reminiscence bump . The International Journal of Aging and Human Development, 70 (4), 275-297.

Dolcos, F., LaBar, K. S., & Cabeza, R. (2005). Remembering one year later: role of the amygdala and the medial temporal lobe memory system in retrieving emotional memories . Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences, 102 (7), 2626-2631.

Er, N. (2003). A new flashbulb memory model applied to the Marmara earthquake . Applied Cognitive Psychology: The Official Journal of the Society for Applied Research in Memory and Cognition, 17(5) , 503-517.

Finkenauer, C., Luminet, O., Gisle, L., El-Ahmadi, A., Van Der Linden, M., & Philippot, P. (1998). Flashbulb memories and the underlying mechanisms of their formation: Toward an emotional-integrative model . Memory & cognition, 26 (3), 516-531.

Kulkofsky, S., Wang, Q., Conway, M. A., Hou, Y., Aydin, C., Mueller-Johnson, K., & Williams, H. (2011). Cultural variation in the correlates of flashbulb memories: An investigation in five countries . Memory, 19 (3), 233-240.

Kvavilashvili, L., Mirani, J., Schlagman, S., Erskine, J. A., & Kornbrot, D. E. (2010). Effects of age on phenomenology and consistency of flashbulb memories of September 11 and a staged control event . Psychology and Aging, 25 (2), 391.

Lanciano, T., & Curci, A. (2012). Type or dimension? A taxometric investigation of flashbulb memories . Memory, 20 (2), 177-188.

McGaugh, J. L. (2004). The amygdala modulates the consolidation of memories of emotionally arousing experiences. Annu. Rev. Neurosci., 27 , 1-28.

Neisser, U., & Harsch, N. (1992). Phantom flashbulbs: False recollections of hearing the news about Challenger .

Neisser, U. (1982). Snapshots or benchmarks. Memory observed: Remembering in natural contexts , 43-48.

Phelps, E. A. (2006). Emotion and cognition: insights from studies of the human amygdala . Annu. Rev. Psychol., 57 , 27-53.

Schmolck, H., Buffalo, E. A., & Squire, L. R. (2000). Memory distortions develop over time: Recollections of the OJ Simpson trial verdict after 15 and 32 months. Psychological Science, 11 (1), 39-45.

Sharot, T., Delgado, M. R., & Phelps, E. A. (2004). How emotion enhances the feeling of remembering . Nature neuroscience, 7 (12), 1376-1380.

Talarico, J. M., & Rubin, D. C. (2003). Confidence, not consistency, characterizes flashbulb memories . Psychological science, 14 (5), 455-461.

Further Information

McCloskey, M., Wible, C. G., & Cohen, N. J. (1988). Is there a special flashbulb-memory mechanism?. Journal of Experimental Psychology: General, 117 (2), 171.

Phelps, E. A., & Sharot, T. (2008). How (and why) emotion enhances the subjective sense of recollection. Current Directions in Psychological Science, 17 (2), 147-152.

Hirst, W., Phelps, E. A., Meksin, R., Vaidya, C. J., Johnson, M. K., Mitchell, K. J., … & Olsson, A. (2015). A ten-year follow-up of a study of memory for the attack of September 11, 2001: Flashbulb memories and memories for flashbulb events. Journal of Experimental Psychology: General, 144 (3), 604

Flashbulb Memories and Their Effect Essay

• To find inspiration for your paper and overcome writer’s block
• As a source of information (ensure proper referencing)
• As a template for you assignment

The phenomenon of human memory includes various factors to be considered and can be observed from many different angles. This paper focuses mainly on such aspects of it as flashbulb memories that seem to be a remarkably engaging and well-researched issue. The phenomenon of flashbulb memories is closely linked to other types of memory and represents a mixture of feelings and emotions depending on particular shocking news (Luminet & Curci, (2017), p. 18). That is why it is considered interesting to make some assumptions based on scientific data and to analyze a personal example.

Firstly, it seems significant to define the notions of memory and flashbulb memories in particular. According to Feldman (2019), memory can be comprehended as “the process by which we encode, store, and retrieve information” (p. 202). In other words, human memory is a mixture of processes that happen to the information which people consumed at some point in their past and consume during their life.

As for flashbulb memories (or FBMs), they are special memories that a person has according to the moment in that they found out about shocking and consequential news or event (Mushtaq & Riaz, (2019), p. 773). Such type of memories is often compared with a snapshot – one recalls a surprisingly detailed description of what happened to them and what surrounded them in a particular moment when they heard or read some news.

Although flashbulb memories represent many details about a particular time, studies show that these details tend to be rather inaccurate, especially if news or event was emotional. What is more, despite being exceptional for people’s brain, such type of memories was proved to be declining with the same speed as commonplace memories (Hirst & Phelps, (2016), p. 37). In addition, people tend to confuse flashbulb memories with time, so that a person cannot tell precisely the difference between the first and the second times they heard the news. Therefore, it can be accepted that such type of memories has a lot in common with usual memories, yet differ by its nature.

As for a personal example of flashbulb memory, I will focus on my memory connected with the death of my grandfather. In fact, I remember these events not completely vividly, yet I can recall some parts with surprising clarity. To begin with, I was 11 or 12 years old, and I was spending summer holidays at my grandparents’. One morning I was in the bathroom when I heard my grandmother speaking on the phone, I did not pay much attention then. However, the moment I went to the kitchen, I remember tremendously vividly, as I saw my grandmother’s sad face, and her words were simple but not understandable – “something terrible happened.”

I recall thinking even in an irritated manner about what could have happened. Although, when she told me that my grandfather died, it was suddenly for me, and I understand now that I had not realized it entirely until a few days later. The case is I was very close to my grandfather, and the situation was so striking and unbelievable that I remember even my too peaceful time spending like collecting a puzzle the day before the funeral.

Only in the evening did I cry, but it was my strongest and most memorable tears ever. Even now, many years later, I am still able to recall a lot of small details, although I cannot deny that I do not remember everything. Therefore, it is possible to note that flashbulb memories are real and strongly felt, especially if they are connected with some painful events.

All in all, one should note that the phenomenon of flashbulb memories is a considerably interesting part of psychology. Many factors affect the process of formation and deformation of such memories, which is also a remarkable point. From the personal example, it is now understood that not only can flashbulb memories appear as a result of the consumption of public news, but they can also be formed because of deep personal worries about an event in one’s life.

Feldman, R. S. (2019). Understanding psychology . New York, NY: McGraw-Hill Education.

Hirst, W., & Phelps, E. A. (2016). Flashbulb memories. Current Directions in Psychological Science, 25 (1), 36-41.

Luminet, O., & Curci, A. (Eds.). (2017). Flashbulb memories: New challenges and future perspectives . Psychology Press.

Mushtaq, M., & Riaz, M. N. (2019). Development and validation of Flashbulb Memories Scales for mental health patients. Rawal Medical Journal , 44 (4), 773-776.

• The Conceptual Relationship Between Memory and Imagination
• Prisoner’s Dilemma in Examples
• "My Grandfather's Son" by Clarence Thomas: A Memoir
• Dealing With the Death of a Grandfather
• The Best Seat in the House
• The Concept of Cognition and Conditioning
• Applied Cognitive Psychology in the Classroom
• "How Reliable Is Your Memory?" by Elizabeth Loftus
• Self-Esteem and Rejection: It Is Not Personal
• Substance-Induced Depressive Disorder: Psychotherapy
• Chicago (A-D)
• Chicago (N-B)

IvyPanda. (2021, June 23). Flashbulb Memories and Their Effect. https://ivypanda.com/essays/flashbulb-memories-and-their-effect/

"Flashbulb Memories and Their Effect." IvyPanda , 23 June 2021, ivypanda.com/essays/flashbulb-memories-and-their-effect/.

IvyPanda . (2021) 'Flashbulb Memories and Their Effect'. 23 June.

IvyPanda . 2021. "Flashbulb Memories and Their Effect." June 23, 2021. https://ivypanda.com/essays/flashbulb-memories-and-their-effect/.

1. IvyPanda . "Flashbulb Memories and Their Effect." June 23, 2021. https://ivypanda.com/essays/flashbulb-memories-and-their-effect/.

Bibliography

IvyPanda . "Flashbulb Memories and Their Effect." June 23, 2021. https://ivypanda.com/essays/flashbulb-memories-and-their-effect/.

What Are Flashbulb Memories?

What were you doing when you learned that Abraham Lincoln was assassinated? The event was unlikely to have been a significant one for you. It obviously was a significant event for people at the time, though, as evidenced by an 1899 study by psychologist F.W. Colegrove that recorded their experiences. Colegrove found that despite 33 years of distance from the event, people reported their whereabouts including small details of the occasion with great confidence.

Much later, in 1977, Roger Brown and James Kulik asked people to report what they were doing when they heard that John Kennedy was shot in Dallas. They concluded that there is “hardly a man now alive” who cannot recall the circumstances in which they learned that Kennedy was assassinated. Such detailed reports were termed “flashbulb memories” by the investigators, who commented that it was as if a flashbulb had gone off capturing a fine-grained picture of the details surrounding the event.

They proposed that these highly emotional, vivid memories might be caused by a different mechanism from the processes underlying the formation of other autobiographical memories. They labeled the mechanism print now , underscoring the arguably indelible, vivid, and elaborated nature of flashbulb memories. They also suggested that such “flashbulbs” are more likely for events that are personally more consequential. In support of this claim, they found that only 13 of 40 Caucasian participants had a flashbulb memory for hearing that Martin Luther King Jr. had been assassinated, compared to 30 of 40 African American participants.

Psychologist Ulric Neisser cast doubt on the validity of such supposed flashbulb memories by describing one of his own. “For many years I have remembered how I heard the news of the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor, which occurred the day before my 13th birthday,” he wrote. “I recall sitting in the living room of our house — we only lived in that house for one year, but I remember it well — listening to a baseball game on the radio. The game was interrupted by an announcement of the attack, and I rushed upstairs to tell my mother.” He goes on to say that the memory had gone on so long and was so vivid that he never questioned it until he realized its absurdity. In particular, it dawned on him that of course nobody broadcasts baseball games in December, which was the month in which the attack on Pearl Harbor occurred.

More formal evidence suggesting that flashbulb memories may often be invalid was provided by the results of a study by Ulric Neisser and Nicole Harsch on recollections of the space shuttle Challenger explosion in 1986. The morning after the event, first-year college students wrote a description of how they heard the news, and then answered questions based on the categories of experience used by Brown and Kulik, such as: What time was it? How did you hear about it? Where were you? What were you doing? Who told you? How did you feel about it? Two and a half years later, the same students, now seniors, wrote a further description of how they had heard the news and answered the same questions about their experience.

The results revealed large differences between the original and later reports for many of the participants. A group of judges measured the consistency of the reports by estimating the extent of such changes; they found that the consistency was generally low, with a mean score of 2.95 out of a possible 7. Eleven of the 40 participants had a score of 0, having changed their answers to all the questions! Despite the changes, the participants were highly confident in the accuracy of their reports.

The consistency of reported flashbulb memories declined over a 10-year period, but the participants’ confidence in their accuracy remained high.

Flashbulb memories are defined as those related to learning about some shocking event, and a number of studies have compared these memories with “event memories” for the objective details of the occurrence (e.g., that there were four airplanes involved in the 9/11 attack). One such investigation examined flashbulb memories for the 9/11 attack over a 10-year period. Notably, that investigation included 15 coauthors, allowing for the comparison of reports from different geographic regions. As it happened, large differences across geographic areas were not found except that flashbulb memories were more likely in New York City than elsewhere.

The results showed that both flashbulb and event memories declined rapidly across the first year, but did not do so appreciably over the following years. As in other studies, the consistency of reported flashbulb memories declined over a 10-year period, but the participants’ confidence in their accuracy remained high, whereas the confidence for details of event memories declined. The inconsistencies that occurred during reports of flashbulb memories were likely to be repeated in later reports rather than corrected. Inaccurate event memories were quite likely to be corrected, however, possibly as a result of people viewing media reports.

Studies have also attempted to pin down the crucial components of flashbulb memories, with likely candidates including surprise, the distinctiveness of the event, the consequences for the person, and their resulting emotional state. In the words of investigators, “Consistent findings have proven elusive,” but it seems to us that the major recurring characteristics of such memories are surprise and shock, and often an incident concerning some well-known public figure.

Commenting on the nature of flashbulb memories, Neisser wrote that two narratives that are normally kept separate — the course of both history and our lives — are momentarily put into alignment. One widely agreed-on difference between everyday autobiographical memories and flashbulb memories is that confidence in flashbulb memories remains high despite the decline in their consistency, whereas event memories decline in both consistency and confidence over time. The vividness, elaborateness, and ease of retrieval of flashbulb memories likely account in part for the high confidence assigned to them. Again, memory is not indelible although it is sometimes thought to be so.

Fergus Craik taught in the Department of Psychology at the University of Toronto and then worked at the Rotman Research Institute in Toronto until his retirement. He is a Foreign Honorary Member of the American Academy of Arts and Sciences.

Larry Jacoby was a faculty member in the Department of Psychology at Washington University in St. Louis. He is a Member of the American Academy of Arts and Sciences.

This article is excerpted from their book “ Memory ,” in the MIT Press Essential Knowledge series.

Want to create or adapt books like this? Learn more about how Pressbooks supports open publishing practices.

12 Lab 12. Flashbulb Memory: Do you Need a “Flash” to form a Flashbulb Memory?

Classroom Demonstration

Introduction

Remember during the first week of the semester when you were asked to remember an encounter with your roommate? Now, we want to see how much of that information you still remember, several months after that event took place. Before reading any further, answer the questions on the next several pages

Questionnaire

Answer the following questions, and after each rate your confidence in the accuracy of your statement, using the following scale:

1. What was the exact day and time of this meeting?

2. Describe in as much detail as possible where you were when this meeting took place.

3. Describe in as much detail as possible what both you and your roommate were doing when you ran into each other.

4. Which roommate did you see and who else was there when your meeting took place?

5. Describe in as much detail as possible what you and your roommates were wearing when your meeting took place.

6. What were your first thoughts when the meeting took place?

7. How long after your meeting took place did you write down your answers to the first questionnaire?

8. To the best of your ability, try to remember your single most vivid memory from the Saturday before classes started this semester.

How many times would you say you talked about this event to someone? (circle one)

How surprised were you by the recall test given several months after the event?

Last 6 Digits of your ID#

Historical Background

Can you remember what you were doing when you learned about the Sandy Hook Elementary School shooting? How about the Boston Marathon bombing, or when you learned that Michael Jackson had died? For most people, the answer is “yes.” They can tell you not only what happened (the event itself) but what they were doing, who told them the news, maybe even such minute details as who they were with, or what they were wearing. Such memories have been labeled “flashbulb memories” by Brown and Kulik (1977). Their findings demonstrated that those memories are remarkably vivid, unusually resistant to forgetting, and full of seemingly trivial detail. In short, their content is unlike that of most episodic memories. The term “flashbulb memory” even implies the existence of a photograph-like memory, complete with extreme detail.

Brown and Kulik (1977) maintained that not only is the content of such memories special, but so are the mechanisms involved in the formation of those memories. Specifically, they postulated a special kind of neural mechanism that “stamps in” the memories. The triggering of this mechanism hinges upon the recognition of surprise and novelty, and thus is closely tied to the emotion of the event. Because of the circumstances surrounding the event, the memories are preserved almost perfectly, as if a “snapshot” were taken of the event.

Though we still don’t know exactly how memory changes your neurons, we do know that memories, at least normal memories, are not “stamped in,” in the sense meant by Brown and Kulik (1977). Memories are also usually not perfect, or extremely detailed, or highly resistant to forgetting. Most memories are vague and fuzzy, and over time tend to lose a significant portion of their detail and sharpness. Because the memories surrounding events like the Challenger explosion do seem to have many of these qualities (like detail and resistance to forgetting) people naturally began studying flashbulb memories. The basic question researchers have been asking: is there something “special” about flashbulb memory? Is the mechanism that produces these memories different from mechanisms that produce normal memories?

This so-called “special mechanisms hypothesis” received some early support, but has been criticized by a number of investigators (e.g., McCloskey, Wible, & Cohen, 1988)who found that despite impressive retention of such information, the memories do not seem to be so remarkable that ordinary memory mechanisms can be ruled out. The memories are not perfect, and they are subject to forgetting. In short, to borrow a phrase, they are “special, but not so special.”

The debate about the existence of flashbulb memories rages on even today. In a very influential article, McCloskey, Wible and Cohen (1988) argue that the existence of a special memory mechanism is not warranted by the data. They designed their experiment around the tragic events surrounding the explosion of the Challenger in 1986. They asked people a series of questions a week after the event happened, such as whom they were with and what they were doing when the tragedy occurred. Many months later, they asked the same individuals the same set of questions, and compared the two results. Essentially, they found that the most impressive claims surrounding flashbulb memories did not hold true.

They proposed two criteria by which these memories can be judged. The first of these criteria constitute what McCloskey et al. (1988)call the “strong claims” view of flashbulb memory. These “strong claims” would include things like perfect accuracy, total resistance to forgetting, extreme detail, and would not require rehearsal to be encoded. From what we know about “regular” memories, if these strong claims were met, then there would obviously be a need for some special memory mechanism. We know that normal episodic memories do not have the properties described above.

In addition to the “strong claims,” McCloskey et al. (McCloskey et al., 1988) proposed a set of “weak claims” for flashbulb memories. Essentially, these are watered down versions of the “strong claims.” The weaker claims included high (but not perfect) resistance to forgetting, and that the memories be more detailed and accurate than usual–but not necessarily perfect .

While McCloskey et al. (McCloskey et al., 1988) found some support for the weak claims view of flashbulb memory, they found little support for the strong claims view. Given that the strong claims hypothesis was rejected, McCloskey et al. examined whether the weak claims hypothesis of flashbulb memory differed sufficiently from normal, emotional episodic memories as to warrant the existence of a special set of flashbulb memory mechanisms. They found that many of the things that produced vivid non-flashbulb memories also seemed to be important in the formation of flashbulb memories. As a result, they concluded that regular variables that are known to affect memory (like emotionality, uniqueness, and surprise) could also account for relatively vivid and accurate flashbulb memories.

Not all researchers agree. For example, Schmidt and Bohannon (1988) considered the conclusions reached by McCloskey et al. (1988) to be premature. They said that the strong claims view was unrealistically strict, and that McCloskey et al. had ignored the individual differences inherent in things like emotionality. Indeed, Schmidt and Bohannon (1988) conclude that the critical question is, “when subjects report high affect to an experience, is their memory for that experience different from memory for other experiences?” (p. 332). Additionally, Pillemer (1990) argues that we should not close the door on investigations of flashbulb memory just yet.

The real argument boils down to a few simple questions: Are flashbulb memories qualitatively different from normal episodic memories? Are regular memory mechanisms able to account for these findings? We know that the memories aren’t really “flashbulbs”–that is, they are not perfect, and so on. However, they do seem quite impressive in those respects. Still, do we remember the kinds of things during a “flashbulb” memory experience that we cannot normally remember?

One basic question that has not been answered by psychologists is, if individuals really wanted to, how much could they remember about a given event? Could a flashbulb memory be made from an ordinary event? If they could not, then it would seem likely that special mechanisms might be involved. If the event can be remembered several months after the event took place, then it is possible that ordinary memory mechanisms are able to encode this information with none of the special characteristics that flashbulb memories are said to possess. Note that the fact that they may be resistant to normal forgetting doesn’t imply that they have the same causes. It does suggest, though, that while the properties surrounding flashbulb memories are sufficient to cause a special memory, they may not be necessary for those memories to be formed.

During the first week of class you were asked to encode what must have seemed at the time a very trivial event. We asked you to remember in as much detail as possible an ordinary encounter with one of your roommates. What we did, in essence, was try to form an “artificial flashbulb memory.” We wanted to see if you could remember as much detail surrounding this ordinary event as people seem to in a typical “flashbulb memory” situation.

We are going to compare the two questionnaires from the two time periods, to see how similar they are. One of the major problems in studying flashbulb memories is that we have no way of knowing whether what you remember actually happened, or whether the “memory” you report is true. We were not there when the event happened, so we just don’t know. However, we do have the questionnaire that you filled out shortly after your meeting took place. We are going to assume that the event described in the first questionnaire is accurate.

We are going to score these memories using the same criteria used by Christiansen (1989), which is on reserve in the library. He scored the memories using a “lenient” criterion, where the overall gist of the memory was examined, but the details were allowed to vary. He also scored the accuracy of the memory using a “strict” criterion, where the details were scored as correct only if they matched exactly. For example, if you originally said that the meeting with your roommate took place at 3:40 in the afternoon, but on the follow-up questionnaire you said, “sometime between 3:30 and 4:00,” you would be scored as correct using the lenient criterion. However, since the details of the two memories did not match exactly, they would not be scored as correct using the strict criterion. If you said you were wearing a Texas Rangers baseball cap the first time, but upon subsequent recall you just said you were wearing a hat, that would be correct by the lenient criterion but not the strict criterion. If you had said, on the second questioning, you were wearing a Dallas Cowboys hat, it would be correct by neither criteria.

We informed half the class that they would later be asked the same set of questions. This would allow us to see if intentionality played an effect in the formation of these memories. Maybe you could form these memories if you thought you were going to be asked about them later, but under normal circumstances you wouldn’t.

One interesting footnote to this happened the first time I used it, in the Spring of 1991. One the second day of class, I told the students to form the artificial flashbulb memory of the meeting with their roommate. By sheer coincidence, the bombing of Iraq started that very day. 28 Being the opportunistic sort, I quickly prepared a questionnaire to give to the students on the following Friday, to see how much they remembered of the real flashbulb event. They answered both questionnaires again at the end of the semester, three months after the original events. The comparisons are fascinating. I later wrote to these students (many had since graduated) to see how much they remembered about the two events one year later. Astonishingly, I heard back from all but one of the students. When making the comparisons, two things stood out. First, there were almost no differences in how much they remembered about the “real” flashbulb memory compared to the one we staged. Despite the fact that there were no differences in the memory for the two events, there were large differences in the confidence they reported for these memories. They were much more confident in their memory for the Gulf War events than in their personal encounter–but they were no more accurate. I wrote up these results, and the paper was published in the March, 1993 issue of Journal of Experimental Psychology: General .

Questions for Lab 12

1. Do our data support the idea that we can form flashbulb-like memories in the absence of the usual flashbulb memory circumstances? Compare our results to those of Christiansen (Christianson, 1989). How do they differ? How are they similar?

2. There is a famous relationship between emotional arousal and performance that is known as the Yerkes-Dodson law. Basically, the Yerkes-Dodson law says that performance will vary in a U-shaped fashion with arousal. What does the Yerkes-Dodson law have to do with the existence of flashbulb memories, and the conditions under which they might be formed?

3. According to the papers you read, and those we discussed in class, which of the stages of memory (encoding, storage, and retrieval) would be most prominent in forming FB memories? What does your answer to Question #3 say about this issue? Intentionality would most likely affect which stage(s)?

4. It is claimed that the typical events surrounding flashbulb memories may be sufficient to cause these memories, but not necessary. What is meant by that statement? What are the kinds of events that typically surround flashbulb situations?

5. Which variables operate in a flashbulb memory situation that were not present in our memory test? What is the typical effect of those variables on memory?

6. Based upon the experiments here, and the readings you’ve done in class, what conclusions would you draw about the existence of a special mechanism that encodes flashbulb memory? Justify your answer.

7 . One of the criticisms of Weaver (Weaver, 1993) was that the real flashbulb event–the initiation of the bombing–may have made the artificial flashbulb memory somehow more vivid. Compare your data with the “January, 1991” data of Weaver (Weaver, 1993). Did the subjects in that study seem to have higher initial levels of memory of confidence, for the artificial flashbulb memory, than you did? Explain.

8 . What events have transpired in the past few years that might lead to the formation of long-lasting memories?

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Laboratory in Cognition Student Manual Copyright © by Charles Weaver, III. All Rights Reserved.

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Flashbulb Memories (Essays in Cognitive Psychology)

Description.

This book provides a state-of-the-art review and critical evaluation of research into 'flashbulb' memories. The opening chapters explore the 'encoding' view of flashbulb memory formation and critically appraise a number of lines of research that have opposed this view. It is concluded that this research does not provide convincing evidence for the rejection of the encoding view. Subsequent chapters review and appraise more recent work which has generally found in favour of the flashbulb concept. But this research too, does not provide unequivocal support for the encoding view of flashbulb memory formation. Evidence from clinical studies of flashbulb memories, particularly in post-traumatic stress disorder and related emotional disturbances, is then considered. The clinical studies provide the most striking evidence of flashbulb memories and strongly suggest that these arise in response to intense affective experiences. Neurobiological models of memory formation are briefly reviewed and one view suggesting that there may be multiple routes to memory formation is explored in detail. From this research it seems possible that there could be a specific route for the formation of detailed and durable memories associated with emotional experiences. In the final chapter a cognitive account of flashbulb memories is outlined. This account is centred on recent plan-based theories of emotion and proposes that flashbulb memories arise in responses to disruptions of personal and cultural plans. This chapter also considers the wider functions of flashbulb memories and their potential role in the formation of generational identity.

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Flashbulb Memories

William hirst.

New School for Social Research

Elizabeth A. Phelps

New York University

We review and analyze the key theories, debates, findings, and omissions of the existing literature on flashbulb memories (FBMs), including what factors affect their formation, retention, and degree of confidence. We argue that FBMs do not require special memory mechanisms and are best characterized as involving both forgetting and mnemonic distortions, despite a high level of confidence. Factual memories for FBM-inducing events generally follow a similar pattern. Although no necessary and sufficient factors straightforwardly account for FBM retention, media attention particularly shapes memory for the events themselves. FBMs are best characterized in term of repetitions, even of mnemonic distortions, whereas event memories evidence corrections. The bearing of this literature on social identity and traumatic memories is also discussed.

Where were you when you first learned about the assassination of John F. Kennedy, the Challenger explosion, or the attack of September 11, 2001? Variants of this question are often asked, and, usually with great enthusiasm, people reply with vivid, elaborate, and confidently held memories, memories that they claim they will never forget. Brown and Kulik (1977) called such autobiographical memories flashbulb memories (FBMs) in order to capture their impression that people had taken a photograph of themselves while learning of a public, emotionally charged event such as the Kennedy assassination. The avalanche of research on FBMs that followed their now classic paper occurred, in part, because the “flashbulb nature” of FBMs seemed distinctly different from the character of other autobiographical memories (see Curci & Luminet, 2009 , for a collection of papers on FBMs).

We should be clear about our terminology, which builds on Brown and Kulik’s (1977) . The term flashbulb memories refers only to those autobiographical memories that involve the circumstances in which one learned of a public event. They differ from first-hand memories , that is, memories one might form if one actually experienced the event itself, rather than simply learned about it from someone else ( Pillemer, 2009 ). They also differ from memories of the facts concerning the FBM-eliciting event, e.g., with respect to the attack of 9/11, that four planes were involved. Although the term may be misleading, inasmuch as all three types of memories involve events, memories for the relevant facts are often referred to as event memories .

The events eliciting a FBM are, by definition, public, inasmuch as for people to form a memory of the circumstances of learning of an event, an external source must have communicated the news to them. FBM-eliciting events studied to date include assassinations and other politically charged proceedings, major public occasions, such as the World Cup, and national disasters, such as earthquakes (see Luminet & Curci, 2009 , for reviews). Although most studies investigate negative events, positive events can also elicit FBMs, e.g., the fall of the Berlin Wall ( Bohn & Berntsen, 2007 ). The public does not need to be as large as a nation. People can have FBMs of an event experienced within a family setting, such as learning of the death of a parent ( Rubin & Kozin, 1984 ).

Unique memory system?

The seemingly distinctive character of FBMs led Brown and Kulik (1977) to posit that a separate memory mechanism might be involved in their formation and retention, by which we mean a set of encapsulated mental processes that govern the encoding, retention, and retrieval of FBMs and not other autobiographical memories – or any other type of memory. Brown and Kulik labeled the mechanism Print Now! , thereby underscoring the putatively indelible, vivid, and elaborated nature of FBMs.

A substantial body of research has assessed Brown and Kulik’s (1977) claim, contrasting it with the possibility that the same processes involved in the encoding, retention, and retrieval of “everyday” autobiographical memories could also account, somewhat paradoxically, for the distinctive characteristics of FBMs, what we might call the “ordinary” memory mechanism hypothesis . Although Brown and Kulik wrote that FBMs were as “unchanging as the slumbering Rhinegold” (p. 86), they could not assess this claim, in that they simply asked individuals for a FBM. Specifically, they confined their queries to possible FBMs formed several years prior to their study. In their study, they asked for an open narrative of the reception event, followed by questions about canonical features, e.g., when did you hear the news, where were you, what were you doing, how did you find out? They also solicited phenomenological characteristics, e.g., vividness, confidence, and/or elaborateness. Other researchers followed up Brown and Kulik’s claim that FBMs were unchanged, and hence, presumably accurate by employing a test-retest methodology. They obtained recollections as soon after a major, emotionally charged public event occurred as they could, and then after a substantial delay, usually a few months (e.g., Bohannon & Symons, 1992 ; Neisser & Harsh, 1992 ). They then compared the latter recollection with the initial one, often focusing on the canonical features assessed by the probes proposed by Brown and Kulik ( Kızılöz & Tekcan, 2013 ). If the memory collected a few days after the event is fairly accurate, then the comparison between the initial and latter recollections could serve as a measure of accuracy. However, inasmuch as the accuracy of the initial recollection usually declines as the interval between the reception event itself and the initial testing increases (Winningham, Hyman, & Dinnel, 2000, but see Kvavilashvili, Mirani, Schlagman, Foley, & Kornbrot, 2009 ), most researchers acknowledge that the test-retest comparison measures consistency , not accuracy.

Although there are some reports of marked consistency after substantial delays ( Conway et al., 1994 ; Kvavilashvili et al., 2009 ), studies using this test-retest methodology have generally found substantial declines in consistency over time, thereby contradicting Brown and Kulik’s claim (1977) . In line with the bulk of the research reporting inconsistencies, Talarico and Rubin (2003) even showed that, although people may initially remember FBMs better than “everyday” autobiographical memories, the rate of decline was the same for both. Interestingly, once an inconsistency emerges, usually within the first year, it tends to be repeated thereafter ( Hirst et al., 2009 , 2015 ). These memory errors often involve time slice confusions ( Kvavilashvili, et al., 2009 ), that is, the tendency to confuse the second or third time one heard news about the FBM-eliciting event with the first time. Time slice confusions apparently become incorporated into the memory and emerge with each memory report.

On the basis of such results, researchers have concluded that “ordinary” memory processes should be sufficient to account for the distinctive characteristics of FBMs ( McCloskey, Wible, & Cohen, 1988 ; Talarico & Rubin, 2009 ). A caveat is in order, however. Brown and Kulik and researchers employing the test-retest method are discussing two different claims about forgetting . Brown and Kulik treated forgetting as a failure to have a memory, whereas those employing a test-retest methodology treat forgetting as a failure to remember the past consistently. When Brown and Kulik stated that there is no forgetting, they are right, in the sense that most members of the public report having a memory, even after 10 years ( Hirst et al., 2015 ). As the test-retest work indicates, the memory may not be consistent, but it is long lasting.

Factors affecting flashbulb memories

Formation and retention, necessary and sufficient factors.

If ordinary memory mechanisms are enough to account for the distinctive nature of FBMs, are there necessary and/or sufficient factors that could elicit them in such a way that FBMs are formed and retained? Putative factors can be divided into two groups: (1) those focusing on the characteristics of either the FBM-inducing event or the circumstance in which one learned of the event, e.g. the emotions felt upon hearing the news, the degree of surprise when hearing the news, the consequentiality and significance of the event, and the event’s distinctiveness; (2) those focusing on how one processes the event over time, e.g., the extent of rehearsal.

Finkenauer et al. (1998) highlighted three structural-equation models that captured in different ways putative factors bearing on the formation of FBMs: Brown and Kulik (1977) , Conway et al. (1994) , and their own emotional-integrative model (see also Er, 2003 ). The models probably differ, in part, because they involved different public events. Moreover, the models employed different senses of forgetting, with Conway et al’s focusing on consistency scores and Brown and Kulik and Finkenauer investigating simply the report of a FBM. Critically, the emotional-integrative model posits that the effect of emotional feeling state is two-fold: (1) As in the other models, it directly impacts on the presence of FBMs, and (2) unlike other models, it can trigger rehearsal of the memory of the FBM-eliciting event, which, in turn, reinforces the FBM.

Although these models specify which factors might have a greater impact on the formation and retention of a FBM over other factors, they do not tackle the difficult problem of specifying necessary and sufficient ones. At a minimum, for a necessary and/or sufficient feature to occur, test-retest studies should consistently find significant correlations between FBM formation and a candidate factor such as emotional state, distinctiveness or surprise. As yet, such consistent findings have proven elusive. For instance, Talarico and Rubin (2003) and Hirst et al. (2009 , 2015 ) failed to find any correspondence between emotional state and consistency in their studies of FBMs of 9/11. Mahmood, Manier, and Hirst (2004) raised questions about distinctiveness by showing that the phenomenological quality of FBMs of the deaths of friends and lovers from AIDS remained the same whether one experienced multiple deaths or a single death. Surprise also does not seem to be a necessary feature ( Colucca, Bianco, & Brandimonte, 2010 ).

The possible absence of necessary and sufficient factors should not be surprising. There may be a wide range of individual differences in how ordinary mechanisms are brought to bear either when hearing of a public event or in the time that follows. Some people may rehearse the event extensively; others may be taken by its distinctiveness. Emotional reactions to the event may also differ. The reaction could linger over the long-term, be short lived, or only appear after the event’s impact is fully appreciated. In most laboratory settings, experimenters carefully control how participants respond to stimuli, thereby allowing them to study the effects of a particular process on memory. The complex, real-world nature of learning of a public event does not allow for such control (but see, for example, Laciano, Curci, & Semin, 2010 , for attempts to create FBMs in the laboratory).

Consequentiality and Social Identity

Some researchers have suggested that consequentiality may be a necessary feature of a FBM-inducing event (e.g., Talarico & Rubin, 2009 ). However, if, as Brown and Kulik (1977) defined the term, consequentiality refers to the consequences for the personal life of a member of the public, it is unlikely to be a necessary feature. British citizens formed FBMs of the death of Princess Diana ( Kvavilashvili et al., 2003 ), but this death clearly had few consequences for their personal lives. On the other hand, consequentiality could refer to consequences for the community touched by the FBM-elicit event. Several studies suggest that this sense of consequentiality may be critical to the formation of a FBM. For instance, French participants possessed FBMs for the death of French President Mitterrand, whereas French-speaking Belgian participants did not ( Curci, Luminet, Finkenauer, & Gisle, 2001 ), reflecting the consequentiality of Mitterand’s death for French citizens, but not French-speaking Beglians. But even here, there is some possibility for debate. People throughout the world formed FBMs of the 9/11 attack ( Curci & Luminet, 2006 ), though the consequences for their respective communities surely differed. The one seemingly unassailable point is that consequentiality, no matter what its definition, is not a sufficient factor. A correlation between measures of consequentiality and consistency is not always found (e.g., Hirst et al., 2015 ). Moreover, most public, consequential events do not elicit FBMs. It is probably the case that few American women remember the circumstances in which they learned of the confirmation of the first female Supreme Court Justice of the United States, Sandra Day O’Connor, but that event is surely consequential, especially for American women. FBMs are the exception rather than the rule, even for consequential public events.

Nevertheless, on those rare occasions when FBMs are formed, because of their social consequentiality, they can play a substantial role in shaping social identity ( Berntsen, 2009 ; Neisser, 1982 ). They play this role, in part, because they mark those instances during which people feel that they are part of the history of their social group. As Neisser (1982) wrote, one “recalls an occasion where two narratives that we ordinarily keep separate – the course of history and the course of our lives – were momentarily put into alignment….Details are linked between our own history and History….[FBMs] are the places we line up our lives with the source of history itself and say ‘I was there’” (p. 48). In this regard, it is interesting that FBMs formed by members of a social group often reflect the attitudes of this group. Elderly Danes, for instance, are likely to remember the weather as worse than it was for the day of the German invasion in WWII, and better than it was for the day of the German withdrawal ( Berntsen & Thomsen, 2005 ).

Widespread presence

FBMs can influence social identity in part because they are held not just by a few members of the public, but by most members. Why is it that few Americans have trouble recollecting where they were when they learned about the attack of 9/11 ( Hirst et al., 2015 )? The specifics of the FBMs’ content may differ, but everyone has a memory. A partial answer might again focus on the role of consequentiality, at least in its “public” sense. One social group forms a FBM because the associated public event is consequential for the group, whereas another social group does not because the event is inconsequential for them (e.g., Conway et al., 1994 ; Curci et al., 2001 ). From this perspective, even if consequentiality is not a necessary condition for forming FBMs, it may still explain, at least in part, why they are widespread in one social group but not another.

One agreed-upon difference between FBMs and “everyday” autobiographical memories, even those that are rated “important,” is that confidence in FBMs remains high, even as consistency declines, whereas confidence in “everyday” autobiographical memories declines along with consistency (e.g., Talarico & Rubin, 2003 ). What explains this difference? Vividness, elaborateness, and ease of retrieval are thought to influence the judgment that an event occurred ( Johnson, Foley, Suengas, & Raye, 1988 ). They no doubt also account, in part, for the confidence assigned to a FBM, in that these memories tend to be both vivid and elaborate. Metamemory judgments may also play a role. For instance, although both Americans and Germans did not use ease of retrieval when judging their confidence in their FBMs of 9/11 the first six months after the attack, Germans began to use it after a year ( Echterhoff & Hirst, 2006 ) while Americans did not. Just as a son may feel that any inaccuracies in his memory of learning of the death of his mother would reflect negatively on the quality of his relationship with her, so also might Americans, but not Germans, believe that any inaccuracies in their FBMs would reflect poorly on their relationship to their country. As a result, they judge the memory as accurate, regardless of its phenomenological characteristics. Along similar lines, people are more confident in their FBMs if they feel a social bond to the central figure in the FBM-eliciting event ( Day & Ross, 2013 ). Both of these findings underscore the close connection between FBMs and social identity.

Event Memory

Although not as thoroughly studied as FBMs, researchers are beginning to appreciate how event memories, that is, memory for facts about the FBM-inducing event, may be similar or different from FBMs. For instance, event memories are similar to FBMs, in that they also decline over time ( Bohannon & Symons, 1992 ; Hirst et al., 2015 ). But how they are retained — or forgotten — seems to differ ( Tinti, Schmidt, Testa, & Levine, 2014 ). In particular, at least one common factor shaping the accuracy of the event memory may play less of a role for FBMs: the extent of rehearsal attributed to media attention. This factor impacts the public as a group because the media ensures extensive, widespread exposure and, in doing so, may overwhelm any individual differences in the way the event is processed. Not surprisingly, then, we find strong correlations over time between the extent of media coverage and the decline in the accuracies of event memory. Moreover, unlike the repetition of inconsistencies in FBMs over time, corrections of inaccuracies characterize event memories ( Hirst et al, 2009 , 2015 ). These corrections can be attributed to the effect of media. For instance, the public’s memory for President Bush’s location at the time of the attack was quite poor after a year, but suddenly improved after three years. This improvement probably occurred because of the release of Michael Moore’s film Fahrenheit 911 . It showed President Bush hearing the news as he sat in a Florida elementary school classroom, thereby refreshing the public’s memory, especially those members of the public who saw the film ( Hirst et al., 2009 , 2015 ).

FBMs and Trauma

One reason for an interest in FBMs is that their study may help psychologists understand traumatic memories. Their relevance can be seen in two different lines of research. First, epidemiological studies after the attack of 9/11 established that many people in the New York City area who did not directly experience the events at Ground Zero nevertheless experienced symptoms of post-traumatic stress disorder ( Galea et al., 2002 ). Second, brain-imaging studies showed enhanced activity levels of the amygdala after three years for those close to, but not at, Ground Zero ( Sharot, Martorella, Delgado, & Phelps, 2007 ). The amygdala is a brain structure involved in emotional processing and memory. The linkage between FBMs and trauma suggested by this research needs to be approached cautiously, however. The horror of directly experiencing a traumatic event may impact the observer in ways that could not be anticipated by examining those who only learned of the traumatic event.

With this caveat in mind, we would still underscore that, according to the work on FBMs, the confidence that people often have in their traumatic memories may not be fully justified. Moreover, like other autobiographical memories, traumatic memories may be replete with errors of omission and commission, even after a relatively short delay. Finally, persistence of and confidence in a memory is no guarantee of its accuracy. Errors may begin to emerge within weeks and certainly within a year, and once these errors are incorporated into the memory, they can persist and be confidently held for many years, perhaps a lifetime. Of course, these possible inaccurate memories can be changed, either by introducing misleading information or by correcting the erroneous information. But, in many cases, inasmuch as a traumatic event is something experienced by an individual, with few, if any other people privy to it, the memory may remain fairly stable, if inaccurate, for the long-term.

Concluding Remark: A Look into the Future

FBMs are those rare instances in which personal history and History writ large come into alignment. Consequently, they can influence the social identity of a community. The 40 years of research on FBMs and their associated event memories has allowed psychologists to begin to understand the similarity and differences in how people form both FBMs and event memories. The research, however, is skewed heavily towards investigating negative public events, a leaning that links FBMs to traumatic memories. Future research might investigate positive eliciting events. Positive public events, such as, for many, the election of Barack Obama to the US Presidency, also impact both personal history and History writ large ( Koppel et al, 2013 ). An understanding of their formation and retention, as well as how they in turn shape social identity may be as critical as a similar understanding of negative flashbulb memories.

Acknowledgments

Support from the James S. McDonnell Foundation and the National Institutes of Health is gratefully acknowledged.

Contributor Information

William Hirst, New School for Social Research.

Elizabeth A. Phelps, New York University.

Suggested Readings

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Flashbulb Memories (Essays in Cognitive Psychology) 1st Edition

This book provides a state-of-the-art review and critical evaluation of research into 'flashbulb' memories. The opening chapters explore the 'encoding' view of flashbulb memory formation and critically appraise a number of lines of research that have opposed this view. It is concluded that this research does not provide convincing evidence for the rejection of the encoding view. Subsequent chapters review and appraise more recent work which has generally found in favour of the flashbulb concept. But this research too, does not provide unequivocal support for the encoding view of flashbulb memory formation. Evidence from clinical studies of flashbulb memories, particularly in post-traumatic stress disorder and related emotional disturbances, is then considered. The clinical studies provide the most striking evidence of flashbulb memories and strongly suggest that these arise in response to intense affective experiences. Neurobiological models of memory formation are briefly reviewed and one view suggesting that there may be multiple routes to memory formation is explored in detail. From this research it seems possible that there could be a specific route for the formation of detailed and durable memories associated with emotional experiences. In the final chapter a cognitive account of flashbulb memories is outlined. This account is centred on recent plan-based theories of emotion and proposes that flashbulb memories arise in responses to disruptions of personal and cultural plans. This chapter also considers the wider functions of flashbulb memories and their potential role in the formation of generational identity.

• ISBN-10 1138877050
• ISBN-13 978-1138877054
• Edition 1st
• Publication date June 25, 2015
• Part of series Essays in Cognitive Psychology
• Language English
• Dimensions 5.98 x 0.34 x 9.02 inches
• Print length 150 pages
• See all details

Editorial Reviews

About the author, product details.

• Publisher ‏ : ‎ Routledge; 1st edition (June 25, 2015)
• Language ‏ : ‎ English
• Paperback ‏ : ‎ 150 pages
• ISBN-10 ‏ : ‎ 1138877050
• ISBN-13 ‏ : ‎ 978-1138877054
• Item Weight ‏ : ‎ 8 ounces
• Dimensions ‏ : ‎ 5.98 x 0.34 x 9.02 inches

About the author

Martin a. conway.

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Home — Essay Samples — Psychology — Flashbulb Memory — Schema Theory and Flashbulb Memory Theory: An Analysis of Both Theories of Memory

Schema Theory and Flashbulb Memory Theory: an Analysis of Both Theories of Memory

• Categories: Flashbulb Memory

About this sample

Words: 1107 |

Published: Apr 11, 2019

Words: 1107 | Pages: 2 | 6 min read

IB Psychology: Memory Essay

Using at least 3 studies as evidence, which is the most reliable theory of memory: schema theory or flashbulb memory theory.

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