online voting system research paper

Online Voting system

5 Pages Posted: 28 May 2020

Aakash Suryavanshi

Inderprastha Engineering College - Department of Computer Science

Date Written: April 22, 2020

Our paper deals with online voting system that facilitates user(voter), candidate and administrator (who will be in charge and will verify all the user and information) to participate in online voting. our online voting system is highly secured, and it has a simple and interactive user interface. The proposed online portal is secured and have unique security feature such as unique id generation that adds another layer of security (except login id and password) and gives admin the ability to verify the user information and to decide whether he is eligible to vote or not. It also creates and manages voting and an election detail as all the users must login by user name and password and click on candidates to register vote. Our system is also equipped with a chat bot that works as a support or guide to the voters, this helps the users in the voting process.

Keywords: HTML, CSS, Java Script, PHP, MYSQL, phpMyAdmin, XAMPP

JEL Classification: L80

Suggested Citation: Suggested Citation

Aakash Suryavanshi (Contact Author)

Inderprastha engineering college - department of computer science ( email ), do you have a job opening that you would like to promote on ssrn, paper statistics, related ejournals, information systems ejournal.

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Transforming online voting: a novel system utilizing blockchain and biometric verification for enhanced security, privacy, and transparency

• Open access
• Published: 19 April 2024
• Volume 27 , pages 4015–4034, ( 2024 )

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• Md Jobair Hossain Faruk 1 ,
• Fazlul Alam 2 ,
• Mazharul Islam 3 &
• Akond Rahman 4  

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As a cornerstone of democratic governance, elections hold unparalleled significance, shaping a nation’s trajectory. However, the prevailing ballot-paper based voting systems continue to face trust issues among significant populations. As a result, e-Voting has emerged as an appealing alternative, with numerous countries opting for its implementation globally. While e-Voting systems offer several advantages, they also come with their own set of challenges. Even a minor vulnerability can lead to massive manipulations in voting results. In recent years, there have been efforts to revolutionize the e-Voting paradigm by harnessing the potential of emerging technologies such as biometrics and blockchain. This paper proposes a Internet-based voting that adopts blockchain technology and biometric identification techniques. We use biometric modalities, such as fingerprint and facial recognition, for voter authentication while leveraging Hyperledger Fabric framework as blockchain network and ensuring a secure, transparent, and tamper-evident voting record. We demonstrate the proposed system with 100 participants in a preset environment where we collect the biometrics data. The results indicate that 87% of participants successfully registered with biometrics, while 88% cast their votes with a combination of either voter ID and fingerprint or voter ID with facial recognition. Our findings suggest that the proposed system allows voters to access the system seamlessly and automate identity verification procedures while ensuring a secure, decentralized, and distributed database network that maintains transparency. Future research shall be carried out in collaboration with election officials and voters to improve the system in real-world scenarios.

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1 Introduction

Elections represent a critical method of determining representative leadership in democratic societies, providing an essential channel for citizens to express their political preferences [ 1 ]. Despite their integral role, traditional voting systems, particularly those relying on ballot paper, often grapple with trust issues [ 2 ]. Factors such as electoral fraud, manipulation, and rigging have underscored the need for a more secure, transparent, and robust approach. To address these challenges, electronic voting (e-Voting) has gained considerable traction globally, positioned as an appealing alternative to traditional voting methods [ 3 ]. E-Voting was introduced to mitigate the risks inherent in ballot paper voting, e-Voting aimed to curtail electoral fraud, streamline the voting process, reduce cost, and enhance accessibility [ 4 ]. However, e-Voting in its early forms, even with its many benefits, was not exempt from its own array of vulnerabilities.

Electronic voting systems can be broadly categorized into two types: Internet-based voting (i-Voting), which enables voting from any location via the Internet, and non-internet electronic voting (e-Voting), which requires voters to cast their votes physically at voting centers using electronic machines [ 5 , 6 ]. The conventional technologies underlying these systems, primarily centralized databases, are particularly prone to corruption and manipulation [ 7 ]. Security threats such as Denial-of-Service attacks, malicious software, and spoofing attacks pose considerable risks, undermining the integrity of the voting process.

Considering these concerns, the incorporation of blockchain technology into e-Voting systems has emerged as a promising approach [ 8 ]. Blockchain technology is characterized by its decentralized architecture, immutability, and fault tolerance that offers a robust shield against data manipulation and fraud [ 9 ]. This distributed ledger technology provides an incorruptible, tamper-evident record of digital events, thus fostering trust and transparency [ 10 , 11 ]. Furthermore, the adoption of blockchain technology has extended beyond e-Voting systems, transforming various sectors, including transportation, education, and healthcare that demonstrate strong security and privacy measures [ 12 , 13 , 14 ].

In parallel, biometric technology can bolster the authenticity of the voting process [ 15 , 16 ]. With government entities worldwide capturing and storing biometric data, such as facial recognition and fingerprints, these unique identifiers can be leveraged for voter authentication [ 17 , 18 ]. By integrating biometrics with blockchain, a secure and transparent voting system can be achieved, enhancing the integrity of the election process [ 19 ].

This paper explores the potential of blockchain technology and biometric identification to enhance the security and transparency of online voting (i-Voting), one step advanced of electronic voting. We propose a novel architecture for i-Voting systems that uses Hyperledger Fabric to secure and transparently record votes, and biometric identifiers, such as facial recognition and fingerprints, to reliably authenticate voters. Further, we engage in a comprehensive evaluation of our proposed system using standard methodologies to ensure the system’s robustness, ease of use and accessibility. We believe that i-Voting has the potential to make a significant contribution to ongoing discourse on secure, transparent, and efficient i-Voting systems, paving the way for future real-world implementations.

This paper makes several contributions to the e-Voting domain, encompassing both theoretical and practical perspectives. These contributions are as follows:

We offer a comprehensive exploration of the capabilities of internet voting (i-Voting) based on blockchain and biometric technology.

We propose a novel i-Voting system that integrates facial and fingerprint biometrics with blockchain technology to ensure robust security, authentication, verification, and validation while maintaining efficient privacy.

We conduct an evaluation of the proposed system, outlining its performance metrics, potential challenges, and future trajectories.

The manuscript is systematically organized into well-defined sections to provide clarity, progression, and in-depth exploration. Section 2 provides a thorough exposition of the potential of blockchain in online voting and the merits and utilities of biometric modalities, specifically emphasizing facial and fingerprint recognition for voter authentication. Section 3 reviews the extant literature, emphasizing research gaps and the distinctiveness of the presented work. Section 4 introduces the architecture of the internet voting framework of the proposed system, explaining its detailed modular components. Section 5 provides details of the implementation of the proposed system. First, we explain the voting algorithm, from registration to vote casting. Then, we discuss the algorithms for biometric data collection and storage, voter authentication, casting, and tallying. Finally, we introduce the implemented prototype on RESTful API. Section 6 presents the evaluation setup, metrics, and experimental results. This section describes the experimental setup used to evaluate the system and interprets the results. Section 7 provides a more in-depth discussion of the results, potential challenges, limitations, and outlines potential extensions and trajectories of the current research. Section 8 summarizes the research journey, encapsulating key insights, findings, and implications for the realm of online voting.

2 Innovative technologies for i-Voting

2.1 blockchain technology.

Blockchain technology is a digital, distributed, and decentralized ledger that presents a significant advancement over traditional database systems [ 20 ]. It enables the creation of a tamper-evident, trusted, and shared ledger by appending cryptographically secure data transactions in a sequential manner [ 21 ]. Once added to the ledger, this data remains immutable and accessible only to authorized stakeholders [ 22 ]. Each transaction is also timestamped, which further reinforces the security of the network and makes it resilient to potential data tampering [ 23 ]. The concept of smart contracts, or chaincodes are self-executing contracts that are stored on the blockchain and enforced upon fulfillment of predefined security criteria [ 24 ]. This can be used to ensure the integrity of the voting process and to prevent fraud.

Illustrates the traditional and blockchain voting system [ 25 ]

Figure  1 illustrates a comparative analysis of traditional voting systems and blockchain-based voting system [ 25 ]. While traditional systems rely on a central authority susceptible to data manipulation, blockchain-based systems distribute data across multiple nodes, reducing the possibility of a coordinated hacking attempt. Different types of blockchains, such as public, private, and consortium blockchains, cater to varying use cases, with Ethereum and Hyperledger Fabric representing two widely recognized blockchain frameworks [ 26 , 27 ]. Given our emphasis on sensitive and confidential data, we leverage Hyperledger Fabric for the development of our proposed i-Voting application.

A. Hyperledger fabric in electronic voting as a distributed ledger platform tailored for enterprise solutions, Hyperledger Fabric offers an architecture that ensures high levels of confidentiality, resilience, flexibility, and scalability [ 28 ]. It also supports modular consensus protocols, which allows it to be customized for specific use cases and trust models [ 29 ]. Implementing hyperledger fabric in the context of a voting system offers a robust and secure mechanism for vote casting, as votes are recorded immutably with smart contracts facilitating the setup of a private blockchain. The system also guarantees voter anonymity and fosters trust in the election process. It offers potential benefits for election officials as well, enabling them to customize nodes in alignment with governing rules or constitutional requirements [ 30 , 31 ].

2.2 Biometrics technology

Biometric technology refers to automated systems capable of measuring distinct physical characteristics to verify an individual’s claimed identity or identify an individual [ 32 , 33 ]. This technology can significantly enhance voting frameworks and the overall voting experience [ 34 ]. As shown in Fig.  2 , a typical biometrics system comprises multiple phases, including enrollment, verification, identification, and matching [ 35 ]. By integrating biometric identifiers such as facial and fingerprint recognition in our proposed voting system, we aim to elevate its security, privacy, and operational efficiency [ 36 , 37 ].

Enrolment, verification, identification and matching modules of a general biometrics system [ 38 ]

A. Facial and Fingerprint Recognition in Voting System Facial recognition technology (FRT) combined with artificial intelligence (AI) is a powerful tool for accurate, flexible, and rapid identification [ 39 ]. It has been used in a variety of fields, including security, finance, education, and government management, to enhance early detection of suspicious activities and tracking of suspects [ 40 ]. The use of FRT in voting systems can improve security and trustworthiness due to its capacity to verify the identity of voters, which can help to prevent voter fraud [ 41 ]. FRT modalities including fingerprint and facial recognition can be used to improve the security of voting systems [ 42 , 43 ]. Fingerprints are unique to each individual, making them a reliable way to identify voters. Additionally, fingerprint recognition is a relatively non-intrusive biometric technology, which can help to preserve voter privacy. The combination of FRT and fingerprint recognition can provide a high level of security for voting systems. By incorporating these technologies, we can create more transparent, secure, and efficient electoral processes (Fig. 3 ).

An-example-of-two-stages-enrollment-and-verification-in-a-biometric-authentication-system [ 38 ]

3 Related work

Blockchain technology has been proposed as a solution to address the security and transparency challenges of e-voting systems. Several studies have investigated the integration of blockchain technology into e-voting systems, with promising results. For example, Pawlak et al. [ 42 ] proposed an integrated e-voting system that effectively incorporated blockchain technology into a supervised non-remote internet voting system, thereby offering end-to-end verifiability. The system adopted the ABVS (Auditable Blockchain Voting System) for its architectural design and subsequent evaluation proved that the ABVS system outperformed other e-voting systems in terms of security and trustworthiness. Other studies [ 8 , 43 ] have also utilized various blockchain frameworks such as Hyperledger Fabric and Ethereum to develop secure e-voting systems. These studies have demonstrated that blockchain technology can play a pivotal role in promoting transparency and security in public applications.

In a different approach, researchers have proposed voting frameworks utilizing blockchain algorithms built using cryptographic techniques [ 44 ]. These researchers have demonstrated the efficiency and effectiveness of e-voting systems and the potential of significantly improving electronic voting through the application of blockchain [ 45 , 46 ]. A recent study by Jafar et al. [ 25 ] conducted an in-depth investigation of conventional and blockchain-based voting systems, examining the present state of blockchain-oriented voting research. The study revealed that blockchain technology could potentially address and resolve many of the issues that currently hinder transparency in our election system. However, the researchers concluded that to develop a viable blockchain-based electronic voting system, the security of remote participation needs to be ensured, and transaction speed must be optimized for scalability. It was clear that the existing frameworks require significant enhancements for efficient integration into voting systems.

Blockchain technology has also been proposed as a solution to address the security and privacy challenges of healthcare data systems. Misic et al. [ 47 ] outlined an architecture for a blockchain-centric healthcare information system, with a focus on block validation. Their method employed collective signatures initiated by a pre-identified leader and carried out by a group of witnesses. Through the use of a Block Validation and Leader Selection Algorithm, the authors demonstrated that the application of blockchain in EHR/PHR systems resulted in enhanced security compared to traditional systems. In a related study, Faruk et al. [ 12 ] proposed a blockchain-based EHR data management system targeting healthcare stakeholders for efficient data storage and sharing. They leveraged the Ethereum framework for their architectural design. Their results demonstrated that blockchain-based solutions offered a secure and robust network for managing healthcare data.

These studies suggest that blockchain technology has the potential to significantly improve the security, transparency, and efficiency of e-voting and healthcare systems. However, further research is needed to develop and evaluate practical blockchain-based solutions for these applications.

3.1 Gap analysis and research significance

Existing e-Voting systems have made significant progress in integrating emerging technologies such as blockchain. However, these systems have not adequately addressed voter authentication and verification issues, as well as potential vulnerabilities that could allow for significant manipulations in voting outcomes. The existing research also did not focus on web-based internet voting. This gap in the literature represents a crucial area where our research seeks to make a significant contribution. We performed a comparative analysis that we illustrate in Table  1 .

Our research proposes an online or internet voting (i-Voting) system that harnesses the power of blockchain technology and biometric identification techniques, specifically fingerprint and facial recognition, to create a robust and secure i-Voting system. We propose using device cameras and fingerprint sensors, readily available in most smart devices, to capture voter biometric data for authentication purposes. This approach could significantly enhance the security and trustworthiness of i-Voting by providing a highly accurate and non-invasive method for voter authentication.

The use of Hyperledger Fabric in our blockchain architecture is another key differentiator. Hyperledger Fabric is a fully permissioned network that is suitable for sensitive operations like voting. It offers flexibility, scalability, and high-degree confidentiality, making it ideal for building an advanced voting system. To ensure our system is robust, secure, and user-friendly, we will employ a rigorous evaluation process involving security testing, usability testing, and compliance testing. This testing framework is intended to detect potential vulnerabilities, assess user-friendliness, and guarantee alignment with legal and regulatory standards.

The novelty and significance of our research lie in the effective integration of biometrics with blockchain technology to address existing challenges in i-Voting systems. Our proposed system offers enhanced voter authentication and overall voting security while maintaining transparency and ease of use. Future research will focus on applying this system in real-world voting scenarios, potentially transforming the current state of democratic elections.

4 System design

The proposed system is designed to enhance the security, privacy, and transparency of online voting processes by utilizing biometric identification and blockchain technology. This design is partitioned into three primary components, including the (1) Biometric Authentication Server, (2) Blockchain Network, and (3) Voting Application, and further classified into several subsystems. The following is a detailed technical explanation of the system’s architecture, components, subsystems, operation, and security measures.

4.1 System architecture

In our endeavor to revolutionize the realm of internet voting, we have meticulously crafted an innovative architectural blueprint for the i-Voting system. We adopted the principles of the 4 + 1 view model [ 48 ], this design captures the myriad facets of the i-Voting ecosystem. At the center of the proposed framework lies an ensemble of integrated components (Fig. 4 ):

Biometric-integrated registration: Voters and candidates embark on their i-Voting journey with a registration system fortified with biometric authentication. Leveraging state-of-the-art facial recognition and fingerprint scanning technologies, it ensures that each individual is distinctly recognized and authenticated.

RESTful API ballot box: Providing a real-time interactive interface, the ballot box caters to dynamic voting sessions, with live results accessible via RESTful API.

Smart registration and authentication component: Infusing intelligence into the registration realm, this component champions seamless, secure, and swift registration and sign-in processes.

Central server with blockchain integration: Acting as the neural center, this server interfaces with a blockchain network, establishing an immutable, transparent, and decentralized record of every vote cast.

Vote counting server: Inheriting attributes from the central server, it ensures a tamper-proof, transparent, and expedited vote tallying process.

Election commission oversight: The overarching authority, the Election Commission, is endowed with robust monitoring tools, ensuring that the entire electoral process remains pristine, transparent, and secure (Fig. 5 ).

UML use case diagram for e-Voting application

Figure  6 provides a visual representation in the form of a UML use case diagram, highlighting the interactions and processes of the e-Voting system. The system architecture is centered around four main stakeholders: voters, candidates, observers, and the election commission. Voters can view candidate profiles, which are managed and vetted by the election commission. Before casting a vote, voters are authenticated using biometric identifiers. As the voting progresses, real-time results are displayed and are accessible via the RESTful API. Candidates go through a detailed registration process using the same RESTful API. This registration mandates biometric verification and any other criteria set forth by the election commission. Observers can monitor the voting process to ensure its integrity. They can access the voting data through the RESTful API. The Election Commission has overall responsibility for the i-Voting system. They manage the candidate registration process, authenticate voters, and tally the votes .

Process view model of e-Voting system

Figure  7 shows the process view of the e-Voting system, highlighting the real-time operations and dynamic interactions of the system components. The process begins with the biometric registration of candidates and voters. Each component’s role in data handling, transmission, and retrieval is depicted, with the central server playing a pivotal role, particularly for its integration with the blockchain database.

Proposed architectural framework

Figure  8 illustrates that the e-Voting system can be broadly divided into four stages: biometric-based login/registration, vote casting, vote counting, and result declaration. The web application primarily emphasizes biometric identification techniques, although there is a provision for using a national ID card (NID). However, this is secondary to the biometric methods and is subject to administrative approval. After logging in using biometrics, voters cast their votes based on their designated regions. Once the voting phase is over, repeated voting is prevented. The votes are then quickly tallied, and the results are prominently displayed on the e-Voting application’s dashboard.

4.2 System component and subsystems

The proposed system provides cross-platform compatibility, seamlessly accessible via both laptops and smartphones. Structurally, it integrates three pivotal components, each further encapsulating specific subsystems:

Biometric authentication server (biometric authentication subsystem): Situated on a fortified server, this element is pivotal in ascertaining voters’ identities using their unique biometric data. During the voting process, it refers to the stored biometric templates of registered voters for authentication, cross-referencing them with live scans. Throughout, it maintains secure communication channels with other system constituents.

Blockchain network (blockchain network subsystem): This component is entrusted with the decentralized documentation and upkeep of voting records. Comprising the robust Hyperledger Fabric blockchain network, it facilitates node communication and transaction validation. Furthermore, embedded smart contracts meticulously outline the voting procedure, fortifying security and ensuring transparency at every juncture.

Voting application (user interface subsystem): Serving as the gateway for voters, this component delivers an intuitive user interface, facilitating biometric-based identity authentication and subsequent voting. To streamline operations, it seamlessly interfaces with both the Biometric Authentication Server and the Blockchain Network, ensuring a cohesive, secure, and user-friendly voting experience.

4.3 Operation

The operation of the system involves distinct processes for smartphone and laptop access, incorporating user authentication, biometric data collection, data encoding, transaction creation, and verification.

4.3.1 Smartphone process

The smartphone process involves the following steps:

User authentication: Users provide their login credentials (email and password) to access the voting system.

Biometric collection: After authentication, users give their consent for biometric data collection. The smartphone’s front-facing camera captures facial images, and the in-built fingerprint scanner captures fingerprints.

Data encoding: The facial image and fingerprint data are encrypted using industry-standard encryption methods.

Transaction creation: Encoded biometric data, along with the login credentials, are packaged into a transaction and sent to the Hyperledger Fabric network for verification.

Verification: The network nodes verify the transaction by comparing the encoded biometric data with the blockchain-stored data. If the data matches, the transaction is validated, granting the user access to the voting system.

4.3.2 Laptop process

The laptop process mirrors the smartphone process, with some slight variations:

User authentication: Users provide their login credentials to access the voting system via a laptop.

Biometric collection: Upon authentication, users consent to biometric data collection. The laptop’s built-in camera captures the user’s facial image, and the in-built fingerprint scanner captures the fingerprint.

4.4 Dual-factor authentication

In order to bolster the security and transparency of the voting system, the implementation of a rigorous dual-factor authentication mechanism is essential. Voters are mandated to furnish two distinct forms of verification: their unique Voter ID combined with a biometric identifier, either facial recognition or a fingerprint. By utilizing this dual-factor authentication model, the likelihood of unauthorized access or impersonation attempts is significantly curtailed. The biometric data, collected at the time of voter registration, is then securely retained within the system’s database, thereby acting as a vital checkpoint to match and validate a voter’s identity during the voting process.

4.5 Biometric data collection and verification

The core of this novel system lies in its ability to collect, store, and verify biometric data, specifically facial and fingerprint recognition. Hyperledger Fabric, a highly secure blockchain network, shoulders the responsibility for the safekeeping and verification of this biometric information. Crucially, the verification process is decentralized, relying on a myriad of network nodes. This not only enhances security but also minimizes the risk of a single point of failure, ensuring consistent and reliable data verification.

4.6 Endorsement model

A crucial differentiation of our proposed architecture is the incorporation of device cameras and fingerprint sensors for voter authentication, which offer robust security due to their uniqueness across individuals. To ensure the tamper-resistant and transparent operation of our system, we employed the Hyperledger Fabric framework. Our selection of Hyperledger Fabric was deliberate due to its flexible endorsement model, which is essential for the integrity of voting transactions.

Hyperledger Fabric’s endorsement model ensures that transactions are agreed upon by a specific set of endorsing peers before they are committed to the ledger. Our model adopts a majority-based endorsement policy, requiring more than half of the endorsing peers to validate a transaction for it to be considered legitimate. This ensures robustness against malicious activities. For consensus, we opted for the Raft ordering service, a crash-fault-tolerant consensus mechanism that guarantees total order delivery of transactions.

4.7 Database management

Entrusted with the vital task of managing encrypted biometric data, Hyperledger Fabric offers a database that is resistant to tampering or unauthorized modifications. By employing advanced access controls and state-of-the-art encryption techniques, the system ensures the utmost privacy and protection of user information, thus fostering trust among its users.

4.8 User interface and experience

Recognizing the diversity of its potential user base, the system boasts an intuitive and user-centric interface. This interface facilitates the seamless capture of biometric data, guides users through the login process, and enables hassle-free voting. It has been meticulously crafted to cater to a wide range of devices, from mobiles to laptops, ensuring universal accessibility.

4.9 System scalability and performance

Anticipating a surge in user registration and simultaneous voting sessions, especially during peak election periods, the system is architecturally designed for scalability. Through the integration of load balancing methodologies and refined algorithms, the system guarantees optimal performance, rapid response times, and a seamless voting experience for its users.

4.10 Security and privacy measures

Security remains paramount. The system is fortified with robust security protocols to ward off unauthorized intrusions and potential data breaches. Incorporating industry-standard encryption methodologies, secure communication channels, and stringent access controls, it presents a bulwark against threats, thereby instilling confidence among its users.

4.11 Backup and disaster recovery

Understanding the criticality of the data it handles, the system prioritizes consistent backups. Coupled with a well-orchestrated disaster recovery plan, it ensures continuity of operations even in the face of unexpected disruptions, be they technical glitches or external threats.

4.12 Compliance and legal considerations

The system not only champions security and transparency but also remains committed to legal compliance. Adhering to all pertinent regulations and privacy statutes concerning biometric data, it underscores the importance of informed consent, ensuring users are always aware and in control of how their data is utilized.

In conclusion, the proposed system combines biometric identification and blockchain technology to ensure an unparalleled level of security, privacy, and transparency in the online voting process. Its user-friendly interface and scalability make it a comprehensive solution for a reliable and trustworthy voting platform.

5 System implementation

5.1 voting algorithm: from registration to vote casting.

The following algorithm encapsulates the entire voting process from voter registration to the casting of a vote, factoring in the biometric verification mechanisms and the blockchain storage methodology:

Illustrates the general algorithm for e-Voting system

The algorithm outlines the voting process for the e-Voting system, emphasizing biometric authentication. Initially, the RegisterVoter function ensures that a voter is not already registered within the Blockchain Network. If not, it captures and stores the voter’s details and their chosen biometric data, which can either be facial recognition or a fingerprint. The chosen biometric data is captured via a smartphone or laptop’s built-in hardware. Once registered, the \(Authenticate-Votingr\) function verifies a voter’s identity by comparing a live capture of their biometric data with the previously stored version in the Blockchain Network. This live data is acquired every time they attempt to vote, ensuring authenticity. If authenticated successfully, the CastVote function allows a voter to submit their choice. It first checks if a vote has been previously cast by the voter to prevent double voting. If no previous vote is found, it records the new vote and saves it to the Blockchain Network, ensuring a secure, transparent, and tamper-resistant voting record.

5.2 Algorithms for biometric data collection and storage

The algorithm’s first step is to verify the provided voter ID using the ‘VerifyVoter’ function. Only after successful verification does the algorithm proceed with biometric data collection. Depending on the biometric type specified, it activates either the camera (for facial recognition) or the fingerprint sensor (for fingerprint data). The data captured from these sources is then returned. If the voter ID cannot be verified, the function informs the user that the verification failed.

Biometric collection and verification algorithm

With the captured and verified biometric data, the system needs to securely store it. To ensure privacy and security, a hash of the biometric data is generated. This hash acts as a representation of the actual biometric data. Using the ‘Hash‘ function, the algorithm generates this unique hash. With the hashed data, a transaction is then created, containing the voter’s ID and the biometric hash. This transaction is sent to the Hyperledger Fabric network. If successfully processed, the algorithm confirms storage; if not, it indicates a failure.

Biometric storage algorithm

5.3 Algorithms for voter authentication, casting, and tallying

To ensure that only valid voters cast votes, the system relies on biometric authentication. For the voter trying to cast a vote, the system retrieves the stored biometric hash from the blockchain. Depending on the biometric type (facial or fingerprint), the system captures live biometric data using the device’s camera or fingerprint sensor. This freshly captured data is then hashed. If the newly generated hash matches the stored biometric hash, the voter is authenticated.

Biometric authentication

Once authenticated, the voter can cast their vote. The system creates a transaction containing the voter’s ID and voting choice. This transaction is then sent to the Hyperledger Fabric network for secure storage. If the transaction is confirmed, the vote is considered cast successfully; otherwise, the system indicates a failure.

Vote casting and tallying

After voting concludes, the ‘TallyVotes’ function retrieves all votes from the blockchain. It then calculates the vote count for each choice. The final results are then published, providing transparency and assurance of integrity to all stakeholders.

5.4 Hyperledger fabric endorsement and consensus

The Voter Authentication Process (Algorithm 6) ensures the security and legitimacy of a voter’s attempt to access the system. The algorithm begins by prompting the user for their unique Voter ID and their preferred biometric modality for authentication. The chosen biometric data, either fingerprint or facial recognition, is then captured and defined as \({\mathcal {B}}\) .

Hyperledger fabric endorsement and consensus

This biometric data, \({\mathcal {B}}\) , is sent to a set of endorsing peers, represented as \({\mathcal {E}}\) . Each endorsing peer individually verifies the authenticity of \({\mathcal {B}}\) against the stored record in the blockchain. A count, \({\mathcal {C}}\) , keeps track of the number of endorsements.

A transaction proposal, \({\mathcal {T}}\) , is generated only if the majority of the endorsing peers validate \({\mathcal {B}}\) . The majority is determined as more than half of the total endorsing peers, ensuring a robust protection against potential adversarial activities. Once \({\mathcal {T}}\) gets the majority endorsement, it’s ordered using the Raft ordering service and is committed to the ledger, post which the voter is granted access. If not, the voter’s access attempt is denied.

5.5 System implementation

Our e-Voting System is an intricate melding of cutting-edge technologies and methodologies aimed at enhancing the security, privacy, and transparency of online voting. To achieve this goal, we divide the system into three distinguished layers, each contributing to its overall functionality.

Front-End Layer: Our aim is to present a user-friendly interface to the voters. We have designed a web-based platform to offer a seamless voting experience on both smartphones and laptops. We integrated the system with essential functions to access in-built cameras and fingerprint sensors. Web-based platforms ensure a broader reach as it can cater to various operating systems without device-specific modifications.

Application layer: Developed as a RESTful API, this layer orchestrates the entire voting process, right from registration to vote submission. Using Node.js with the Express.js framework, we have ensured this API provides platform-independent services with impeccable scalability. The combination of Node.js and Express.js provides a lightweight yet powerful platform to develop RESTful APIs. This ensures our e-Voting System can handle thousands of concurrent requests without compromising speed or security.

Data layer: We integrated Hyperledger Fabric for our e-Voting System which provides strong security for the system. As Hyperledger Fabric is a permissioned blockchain that guarantees that once a vote is cast, it’s immutable and transparent. Moreover, the blockchain structure ensures that every voter is unique, curbing the potential of dual voting.

Login interface of proposed system

5.5.1 Biometric data collection and verification

Facial recognition: Tapping into the potential of OpenCV, a seasoned computer vision library, we have sculpted a system that captures faces with precision. To ensure that the face captured is genuine and not a photo or video spoof, we integrated deep-learning models. These models, trained on a predefined dataset, compare the live capture against the stored biometric data to authenticate voters accurately.

Fingerprint authentication: Given the ubiquity of fingerprint sensors in modern devices, our e-Voting System seamlessly ties into the APIs. This ensures that when voters opt for fingerprint-based authentication, they have a swift and secure experience.

5.5.2 Development of the e-Voting system

Voter registration (Function RegisterVoter): First and foremost, before capturing any biometric data, we query the blockchain. This is to ascertain that the voter has not previously registered. Post this verification, our system activates the requisite biometric module (facial/fingerprint) to capture the voter’s unique attributes. Once captured, the voter’s details, along with their biometric data, find a secure spot in our Hyperledger Fabric blockchain.

Voter authentication (Function Authenticate-Votingr): Voter authentication is pivotal to ensure only eligible voters cast their votes. To facilitate this, our system fetches the biometric data associated with the voter ID from the blockchain. With data in tow, it activates the respective biometric module to capture live data. A deep comparison ensues between the live data and stored data. A match results in a successful authentication.

Vote casting (Function CastVote): The culmination of our system’s processes is in vote casting. Leveraging the authentication methods elucidated above, it verifies the voter’s identity. Post successful authentication, the system checks the blockchain to ensure the voter hasn’t previously cast their vote. If all checks pass, the voter’s choice is encrypted and securely recorded on the blockchain.

6 Experiment and result

We developed an electronic voting system that is web-based and accessible using both laptops and smartphones using a RESTful API. The system allows voters to vote with verification and validation using a combination of voter ID and fingerprint or voter ID and facial recognition. All transactions are stored and verified in a blockchain network.

6.1 Experiment

We conducted an experiment where a total of 100 voters were chosen for this experiment. We assigned a unique ID (as Voter ID) to each participant and the proposed system registered the voters with either smartphones or laptops that have both fingerprint sensors and cameras. We first captured the fingerprints and facial recognition data and stored it against the voter ID in the blockchain network (Hyperledger Fabric). Then, participants were provided with a secure link to access the voting platform.

Cast Ballot interface of the proposed system

There are different steps in the voting procedure. The voter first needed to enter their correct voter ID first. Then, the system would ask them to select either fingerprint or facial recognition for final verification and validation. If the verification and validation were correctly identified through the blockchain against the stored data, then the system would allow the voter to cast their vote. Upon successful verification against the blockchain’s stored data, access to the voting portal was granted. A two-attempt system was implemented for biometric verification. Failure to authenticate on the second attempt resulted in session termination.

After voting, the system autonomously compiles the results at a predetermined time, displaying the vote count for each candidate and the respective percentages of the total votes.

6.2 Findings

The experiment results showed that the process of biometric data collection was notably efficient. Out of 100 participants, 97 successfully registered their biometrics on the first attempt. The remaining 3 participants faced minor hitches due to device compatibility issues but were able to register successfully on subsequent attempts. All of the votes were cast successfully and the results were tallied accurately. In terms of biometric verification, the system demonstrated an accuracy rate of 87%. There were 13% of instances (13 out of 100) where voters could not authenticate even after the second attempt, leading to session termination. The following are some of the key findings of the experiment (Fig. 9 ):

Election result interface of the proposed system

The blockchain network provided a secure and tamper-proof way to store and verify voting data. The system is also able to prevent any fraudulent voting attempts.

The biometric verification methods were effective in preventing fraudulent voting attempts.

The RESTful API made it easy for voters to cast their votes from their laptops or smartphones.

Overall, the experiment results were very promising and showed that the proposed system is a feasible and secure way to conduct electronic voting. Periodic checks on the blockchain entries verified the integrity and immutability of the stored data. No discrepancies or unauthorized alterations were found during the course of the experiment, underscoring the system’s resilience against potential tampering. In addition to the findings mentioned above, the experiment also revealed some of the following limitations of the system:

The system requires voters to have a smartphone or laptop with a fingerprint sensor and camera.

The system requires voters to be registered with the system in advance.

The system does not allow voters to change their votes once cast.

7 Authentication mechanism’s performance

Our authentication mechanism’s performance was gauged on pivotal biometric metrics, including authentication time, False Acceptance Rate (FAR), and False Recognition Rate (FRR). Table  1 elucidates these findings.

Table  2 indicates that the average authentication time for fingerprint recognition was relatively faster than that for facial recognition. The FAR for both modalities remained low, suggesting that unauthorized users were seldom granted access. However, FRR indicates a slightly higher percentage for facial recognition, implying that there were instances where legitimate users might have faced challenges during authentication.

7.1 Analysis of intra-class variation and accuracy enhancement

Biometric technology is robust, but it inherently grapples with intra-class variation, which often leads to false positives and false negatives. Our system’s accuracy rate of 87% underscores this challenge, especially given the universal importance of voting accuracy. In analyzing the false positives, we observed potential influences from varied lighting conditions, minor injuries to fingerprint regions, and even subtle differences in facial expressions or angles during facial recognition. To bolster accuracy, we can consider several proactive steps:

Device standardization: Implementing a set of recommended devices or device specifications can mitigate compatibility-related inaccuracies.

Advanced algorithms: Integrating machine learning-based algorithms that adapt and learn from verification attempts could significantly increase accuracy over time.

Multi-modal biometrics: Combining multiple biometric modalities, such as facial and fingerprint recognition, for simultaneous verification can drastically reduce false positives.

Voter Education: By educating voters on optimal conditions for biometric registration and verification, such as consistent lighting and positioning, we can ensure improved data capture.

To specifically address the concern of proxy voting, a more granular analysis of false positives is essential. We acknowledge that while the sample size of 100 participants provides insights, a larger dataset would allow for a more nuanced understanding of the system’s false positives, laying the groundwork for necessary refinements.

These limitations could be addressed in future iterations of the system. For example, the system could be made to work with other biometric verification methods, such as iris scanning or voice recognition. The system could also be made to allow voters to change their votes before the voting period ends.

8 Discussion

In the realm of electoral processes, the transition from paper ballots to electronic voting marked a significant evolution. While this evolution promised increased efficiency, it brought forth its unique set of challenges, especially concerning security. The vulnerabilities of electronic systems to threats, attacks, and risks necessitate robust security integrations to maintain the democratic sanctity of the process. The inception of electronic voting was indeed to alleviate the many pitfalls of manual paper voting, such as forgeries and counting errors. Yet, despite its merits, it soon became apparent that a digital system wasn’t immune to flaws.

A novel feature of e-Voting is its capacity for real-time monitoring. This is transformative as it permits all stakeholders, from voters to observers, to oversee the voting process, fortifying its credibility. By leveraging biometric technology, e-Voting’s promise of heightened security and transparency becomes tangible. Additionally, the benefits of cost-efficiency and time-effectiveness that accompany online voting get accentuated.

The system addressed the challenges of both paper-based voting and conventional electronic systems. Notably, many existing online voting mechanisms remain susceptible to external threats, often lacking in reliability. e-Voting’s aspiration is to craft a harmonious confluence of transparency, privacy, and security. Utilizing hyperledger fabric, the system reinforces data integrity. With the inclusion of the hash function, there’s a solid encryption layer, bolstering the security apparatus and ensuring data access remains stringent, limited only to authorized entities.

Usability and accessibility are cornerstones of any successful e-voting system, ensuring a broader demographic reach and inclusion of voters from diverse backgrounds and technological aptitudes. Despite leveraging the latest in blockchain and biometric technology, our proposed i-voting system must be adaptable to different sections of society, especially for voters in remote and technologically underserved areas (e.g., villages).

While our study focused primarily on security, privacy, and transparency, it shed light on the overall usability of our model, with 88% of participants successfully casting their votes using biometric authentication. However, broader implementation in areas with limited internet infrastructure or low technological literacy still requires attention. We recognize that the efficacy of an online voting system depends not only on its technological superiority but also on its flexibility to accommodate voters from all walks of life.

For voters in remote areas such as the countryside, the system’s compatibility with basic smartphones or community-based voting kiosks, combined with simplified user interfaces and localized language support, could be key to facilitating their participation. Further research will explore these facets, aiming to develop a more inclusive online voting platform that bridges the digital divide and ensures that every voter, regardless of location or technical expertise, can confidently engage in the democratic process.

With a focus on enhanced security, privacy, and transparency, the experiment validates the feasibility of integrating blockchain technology with biometric verification in the electoral process. Feedback from participants suggested that the voting process was largely user-friendly and intuitive. The average time taken to complete the voting, from accessing the link to casting the vote, was approximately 4 min. Some participants appreciated the additional layer of security offered by biometric verification. The system’s result compilation was cross-checked against manual tallies for a subset of votes. The findings showed an 87% match, confirming the accuracy and reliability of the platform in counting and presenting voting results.

8.1 Scalability considerations

8.1.1 scalability from technological aspects.

While our initial experiment with a modest sample of 100 participants validated the proof of concept and ensured the foundational integrity of our system, scalability remains paramount for national elections. Hyperledger Fabric, the blockchain network we used, is renowned for its scalability and performance. It is designed to support pluggable implementations of different components and accommodate the complexity and intricacies of large-scale operations. Extrapolating our system to a national scale requires considering the following key factors:

Distributed ledger capacity: The distributed nature of blockchain can handle vast numbers of transactions, making it suitable for extensive voter registrations and vote casts.

Network infrastructure: To maintain system performance during the high transaction volumes typical of a national election, we would need to upgrade our infrastructure with more nodes and higher computational resources.

Parallel processing: Parallel processing techniques and robust cloud infrastructure can enable simultaneous processing of multiple biometric authentications, ensuring minimal latency and real-time responsiveness, even during peak usage.

We acknowledge that transitioning from a pilot study to a nationwide implementation is challenging. However, the modularity and scalability potential of Hyperledger Fabric, combined with advances in cloud technology, positions our system to handle the demands of an entire country’s electorate.

8.1.2 Biometric scalability in diverse populations

The promise of biometric technology for secure and efficient identification is undeniable. However, scaling its successful implementation in diverse populations presents substantial challenges. Biases inherent in algorithms, accessibility limitations, privacy concerns, and public trust barriers require careful consideration and proactive solutions. We are considering the following to address the challenges:

Mitigating algorithmic biases

Multi-modal biometric systems: We combined multiple biometric modalities such as fingerprints and facial recognition that compensate for individual limitations and strengthen inclusivity.

Diverse Training Data: We are considering to generate and utilize datasets that genuinely reflect the global demographic landscape in terms of age, ethnicity, and gender is crucial for training algorithms that perform accurately across populations.

Ensuring accessibility and inclusivity

Alternative authentication methods: We have designed the authentication process by combining a pattern of alternative login options, either a combination of facial recognition and NID or fingerprint and NID. Such an approach caters to individuals who lack compatible biometric features or technology access, including those with disabilities.

Accessibility standards: We aim to design biometric systems that adhere to accessibility standards and equal participation for all demographics.

Addressing data privacy and security

Robust data security: We considered implementing best-in-class encryption, secure storage protocols, and strict data minimization practices to safeguard biometric information with blockchain technology.

Transparency and user control: We would implement a clear policy for data collection and usage alongside user control over their biometric data to build trust and address privacy concerns.

Fostering public acceptance and trust

Extensive public awareness campaigns: Considering the future collaboration with election officials for real-world testing of our proposed system, we plan to educate the selected stakeholders about the benefits, security measures, and ethical considerations surrounding biometric technology fosters trust and encourages adoption.

8.2 Future research direction

While the proposed i-Voting system presents considerable advancements in the domain of online voting, there is an array of potential research trajectories that can further amplify its capabilities:

Decentralized identity verification: Future studies can delve into leveraging decentralized identity platforms in conjunction with biometrics to further strengthen voter identity verification.

Alternative blockchain protocols: While Hyperledger Fabric was the choice for this research, exploring other blockchain protocols might offer different benefits in terms of scalability, speed, or security.

Voter experience enhancement: User experience research could provide insights into making the voting process more intuitive and user-friendly, encouraging broader adoption.

Post-election audit mechanisms: Researching automatic, blockchain-based post-election audits could provide another layer of trust and verification to the process.

Accessibility and inclusivity: Further studies can look into making the system more inclusive, catering to voters with disabilities or those who might not have ready access to sophisticated devices.

Resilience against quantum attacks: As quantum computing evolves, it poses threats to many cryptographic methods. Researching quantum-resistant cryptographic methods for our voting system will be crucial.

Integration with national systems: How can the e-Voting system be integrated or interfaced with existing national or regional voting systems? This would require both technical and policy-based research.

The domain of electronic voting, with the convergence of blockchain and biometrics, is teeming with possibilities. e-Voting, as a prototype, sets the stage for further innovations that can redefine the way democracies function in the digital age.

9 Conclusion

With the advancement of social digitalization, modernizing the electoral process is a necessity. Although significant effort has been made so far in the past decades that paved the transformation of paper-based voting into electronic voting. In this paper, we proposed a novel, web-based online voting system that utilizes blockchain technology and biometric identification techniques to improve the security, privacy, and transparency of elections. The system utilized Hyperledger Fabric, a permissioned blockchain, to store and maintain a secure and tamper-evident voting record. Biometric modalities including fingerprint and facial recognition are integrated for dual-factor voter authentication and security. We implemented a prototype of the system and evaluated its performance with predefined experimental settings. The results of the evaluation demonstrate that the proposed system provides seamless access to voters to conduct online voting. The experiment was conducted with 100 participants where 87% successfully registered their biometrics on the first attempt while the remaining 3% participants faced issues. In terms of biometric verification during the voting process, 88% of selected voters were able to authenticate voting. In essence, our research presents a groundbreaking blueprint, promising a future where voting is not just a right, but a seamless, secure, and transparent experience for every citizen. Future research shall be carried out that shall involve working with election officials and voters to understand their needs and requirements.

Data availability

Data is not available.

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MJHF was the lead author and made the most significant contribution to the study. FA and MI were responsible for the Literature review and played a key role in the development of the prototype. The remaining (last two) authors are our advisors, contributed substantially to the ideation process, organizing the paper, providing feedback for improving the algorithm, and enhancing the overall quality of the manuscript. All authors thoroughly reviewed and approved the final manuscript.

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Hossain Faruk, M.J., Alam, F., Islam, M. et al. Transforming online voting: a novel system utilizing blockchain and biometric verification for enhanced security, privacy, and transparency. Cluster Comput 27 , 4015–4034 (2024). https://doi.org/10.1007/s10586-023-04261-x

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Blockchain for Electronic Voting System—Review and Open Research Challenges

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Online voting is a trend that is gaining momentum in modern society. It has great potential to decrease organizational costs and increase voter turnout. It eliminates the need to print ballot papers or open polling stations—voters can vote from wherever there is an Internet connection. Despite these benefits, online voting solutions are viewed with a great deal of caution because they introduce new threats. A single vulnerability can lead to large-scale manipulations of votes. Electronic voting systems must be legitimate, accurate, safe, and convenient when used for elections. Nonetheless, adoption may be limited by potential problems associated with electronic voting systems. Blockchain technology came into the ground to overcome these issues and offers decentralized nodes for electronic voting and is used to produce electronic voting systems mainly because of their end-to-end verification advantages. This technology is a beautiful replacement for traditional electronic voting solutions with distributed, non-repudiation, and security protection characteristics. The following article gives an overview of electronic voting systems based on blockchain technology. The main goal of this analysis was to examine the current status of blockchain-based voting research and online voting systems and any related difficulties to predict future developments. This study provides a conceptual description of the intended blockchain-based electronic voting application and an introduction to the fundamental structure and characteristics of the blockchain in connection to electronic voting. As a consequence of this study, it was discovered that blockchain systems may help solve some of the issues that now plague election systems. On the other hand, the most often mentioned issues in blockchain applications are privacy protection and transaction speed. For a sustainable blockchain-based electronic voting system, the security of remote participation must be viable, and for scalability, transaction speed must be addressed. Due to these concerns, it was determined that the existing frameworks need to be improved to be utilized in voting systems.

1. Introduction

Electoral integrity is essential not just for democratic nations but also for state voter’s trust and liability. Political voting methods are crucial in this respect. From a government standpoint, electronic voting technologies can boost voter participation and confidence and rekindle interest in the voting system. As an effective means of making democratic decisions, elections have long been a social concern. As the number of votes cast in real life increases, citizens are becoming more aware of the significance of the electoral system [ 1 , 2 ]. The voting system is the method through which judges judge who will represent in political and corporate governance. Democracy is a system of voters to elect representatives by voting [ 3 , 4 ]. The efficacy of such a procedure is determined mainly by the level of faith that people have in the election process. The creation of legislative institutions to represent the desire of the people is a well-known tendency. Such political bodies differ from student unions to constituencies. Over the years, the vote has become the primary resource to express the will of the citizens by selecting from the choices they made [ 2 ].

The traditional or paper-based polling method served to increase people’s confidence in the selection by majority voting. It has helped make the democratic process and the electoral system worthwhile for electing constituencies and governments more democratized. There are 167 nations with democracy in 2018, out of approximately 200, which are either wholly flawed or hybrid [ 5 , 6 ]. The secret voting model has been used to enhance trust in democratic systems since the beginning of the voting system.

It is essential to ensure that assurance in voting does not diminish. A recent study revealed that the traditional voting process was not wholly hygienic, posing several questions, including fairness, equality, and people’s will, was not adequately [ 7 ] quantified and understood in the form of government [ 2 , 8 ].

Engineers across the globe have created new voting techniques that offer some anti-corruption protection while still ensuring that the voting process should be correct. Technology introduced the new electronic voting techniques and methods [ 9 ], which are essential and have posed significant challenges to the democratic system. Electronic voting increases election reliability when compared to manual polling. In contrast to the conventional voting method, it has enhanced both the efficiency and the integrity of the process [ 10 ]. Because of its flexibility, simplicity of use, and cheap cost compared to general elections, electronic voting is widely utilized in various decisions [ 11 ]. Despite this, existing electronic voting methods run the danger of over-authority and manipulated details, limiting fundamental fairness, privacy, secrecy, anonymity, and transparency in the voting process. Most procedures are now centralized, licensed by the critical authority, controlled, measured, and monitored in an electronic voting system, which is a problem for a transparent voting process in and of itself.

On the other hand, the electronic voting protocols have a single controller that oversees the whole voting process [ 12 ]. This technique leads to erroneous selections due to the central authority’s dishonesty (election commission), which is difficult to rectify using existing methods. The decentralized network may be used as a modern electronic voting technique to circumvent the central authority.

Blockchain technology offers a decentralized node for online voting or electronic voting. Recently distributed ledger technologies such blockchain were used to produce electronic voting systems mainly because of their end-to-end verification advantages [ 13 ]. Blockchain is an appealing alternative to conventional electronic voting systems with features such as decentralization, non-repudiation, and security protection. It is used to hold both boardroom and public voting [ 8 ]. A blockchain, initially a chain of blocks, is a growing list of blocks combined with cryptographic connections. Each block contains a hash, timestamp, and transaction data from the previous block. The blockchain was created to be data-resistant. Voting is a new phase of blockchain technology; in this area, the researchers are trying to leverage benefits such as transparency, secrecy, and non-repudiation that are essential for voting applications [ 14 ]. With the usage of blockchain for electronic voting applications, efforts such as utilizing blockchain technology to secure and rectify elections have recently received much attention [ 15 ].

The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 explains how blockchain technology works, and a complete background of this technology is discussed. How blockchain technology can transfer the electronic voting system is covered in Section 3 . In Section 4 , the problems and their solutions of developing online voting systems are identified. The security requirements for the electronic voting system are discussed in Section 5 , and the possibility of electronic voting on blockchain is detailed in Section 6 . Section 7 discusses the available blockchain-based electronic voting systems and analyzes them thoroughly. In Section 8 , all information related to the latest literature review is discussed and analyzed deeply. Section 9 addresses the study, open issues, and future trends. Furthermore, in the end, Section 10 concludes this survey.

2. Background

The first things that come to mind about the blockchain are cryptocurrencies and smart contracts because of the well-known initiatives in Bitcoin and Ethereum. Bitcoin was the first crypto-currency solution that used a blockchain data structure. Ethereum introduced smart contracts that leverage the power of blockchain immutability and distributed consensus while offering a crypto-currency solution comparable to Bitcoin. The concept of smart contracts was introduced much earlier by Nick Szabo in the 1990s and is described as “a set of promises, specified in digital form, including protocols within which the parties perform on these promises” [ 16 ]. In Ethereum, a smart contract is a piece of code deployed to the network so that everyone has access to it. The result of executing this code is verified by a consensus mechanism and by every member of the network as a whole [ 17 ].

Today, we call a blockchain a set of technologies combining the blockchain data structure itself, distributed consensus algorithm, public key cryptography, and smart contracts [ 18 ]. Below we describe these technologies in more detail.

Blockchain creates a series of blocks replicated on a peer-to-peer network. Any block in blockchain has a cryptographic hash and timestamp added to the previous block, as shown in Figure 1 . A block contains the Merkle tree block header and several transactions [ 19 ]. It is a secure networking method that combines computer science and mathematics to hide data and information from others that is called cryptography. It allows the data to be transmitted securely across the insecure network, in encrypted and decrypted forms [ 20 , 21 ].

The blockchain structure.

As was already mentioned, the blockchain itself is the name for the data structure. All the written data are divided into blocks, and each block contains a hash of all the data from the previous block as part of its data [ 22 ]. The aim of using such a data structure is to achieve provable immutability. If a piece of data is changed, the block’s hash containing this piece needs to be recalculated, and the hashes of all subsequent blocks also need to be recalculated [ 23 ]. It means only the hash of the latest block has to be used to guarantee that all the data remains unchanged. In blockchain solutions, data stored in blocks are formed from all the validated transactions during their creation, which means no one can insert, delete or alter transactions in an already validated block without it being noticed [ 24 ]. The initial zero-block, called the “genesis block,” usually contains some network settings, for example, the initial set of validators (those who issue blocks).

Blockchain solutions are developed to be used in a distributed environment. It is assumed that nodes contain identical data and form a peer-to-peer network without a central authority. A consensus algorithm is used to reach an agreement on blockchain data that is fault-tolerant in the presence of malicious actors. Such consensus is called Byzantine fault tolerance, named after the Byzantine Generals’ Problem [ 25 ]. Blockchain solutions use different Byzantine fault tolerance (BFT) consensus algorithms: Those that are intended to be used in fully decentralized self-organizing networks, such as cryptocurrency platforms, use algorithms such as proof-of-work or proof-of-stake, where validators are chosen by an algorithm so that it is economically profitable for them to act honestly [ 26 ]. When the network does not need to be self-organized, validators can be chosen at the network setup stage [ 27 ]. The point is that all validators execute all incoming transactions and agree on achieving results so that more than two-thirds of honest validators need to decide on the outcome.

Public key cryptography is used mainly for two purposes: Firstly, all validators own their keypairs used to sign consensus messages, and, secondly, all incoming transactions (requests to modify blockchain data) have to be signed to determine the requester. Anonymity in a blockchain context relates to the fact that anyone wanting to use cryptocurrencies just needs to generate a random keypair and use it to control a wallet linked to a public key [ 28 ]. The blockchain solution guarantees that only the keypair owner can manage the funds in the wallet, and this property is verifiable [ 29 , 30 ]. As for online voting, ballots need to be accepted anonymously but only from eligible voters, so a blockchain by itself definitely cannot solve the issue of voter privacy.

Smart contracts breathed new life into blockchain solutions. They stimulated the application of blockchain technology in efforts to improve numerous spheres. A smart contract itself is nothing more than a piece of logic written in code. Still, it can act as an unconditionally trusted third party in conjunction with the immutability provided by a blockchain data structure and distributed consensus [ 31 ]. Once written, it cannot be altered, and all the network participants verify all steps. The great thing about smart contracts is that anybody who can set up a blockchain node can verify its outcome.

As is the case with any other technology, blockchain technology has its drawbacks. Unlike other distributed solutions, a blockchain is hard to scale: An increasing number of nodes does not improve network performance because, by definition, every node needs to execute all transactions, and this process is not shared among the nodes [ 32 ]. Moreover, increasing the number of validators impacts performance because it implies a more intensive exchange of messages during consensus. For the same reason, blockchain solutions are vulnerable to various denial-of-service attacks. If a blockchain allows anyone to publish smart contracts in a network, then the operation of the entire network can be disabled by simply putting an infinite loop in a smart contract. A network can also be attacked by merely sending a considerable number of transactions: At some point, the system will refuse to receive anything else. In cryptocurrency solutions, all transactions have an execution cost: the more resources a transaction utilizes, the more expensive it will be, and there is a cost threshold, with transactions exceeding the threshold being discarded. In private blockchain networks [ 33 , 34 ], this problem is solved depending on how the network is implemented via the exact mechanism of transaction cost, access control, or something more suited to the specific context.

2.1. Core Components of Blockchain Architecture

These are the main architectural components of Blockchain as shown in Figure 2 .

Core components of blockchain architecture.

• Node: Users or computers in blockchain layout (every device has a different copy of a complete ledger from the blockchain);
• Transaction: It is the blockchain system’s smallest building block (records and details), which blockchain uses;
• Block: A block is a collection of data structures used to process transactions over the network distributed to all nodes.
• Chain: A series of blocks in a particular order;
• Miners: Correspondent nodes to validate the transaction and add that block into the blockchain system;
• Consensus: A collection of commands and organizations to carry out blockchain processes.

2.2. Critical Characteristics of Blockchain Architecture

Blockchain architecture has many benefits for all sectors that incorporate blockchain. Here are a variety of embedded characteristics as described Figure 3 :

• Cryptography: Blockchain transactions are authenticated and accurate because of computations and cryptographic evidence between the parties involved;
• Immutability: Any blockchain documents cannot be changed or deleted;
• Provenance: It refers to the fact that every transaction can be tracked in the blockchain ledger;
• Decentralization: The entire distributed database may be accessible by all members of the blockchain network. A consensus algorithm allows control of the system, as shown in the core process;
• Anonymity: A blockchain network participant has generated an address rather than a user identification. It maintains anonymity, especially in a blockchain public system;
• Transparency: It means being unable to manipulate the blockchain network. It does not happen as it takes immense computational resources to erase the blockchain network.

Characteristics of blockchain architecture.

3. How Blockchain Can Transform the Electronic Voting System

Blockchain technology fixed shortcomings in today’s method in elections made the polling mechanism clear and accessible, stopped illegal voting, strengthened the data protection, and checked the outcome of the polling. The implementation of the electronic voting method in blockchain is very significant [ 35 ]. However, electronic voting carries significant risks such as if an electronic voting system is compromised, all cast votes can probably be manipulated and misused. Electronic voting has thus not yet been adopted on a national scale, considering all its possible advantages. Today, there is a viable solution to overcome the risks and electronic voting, which is blockchain technology. In Figure 4 , one can see the main difference between both of the systems. In traditional voting systems, we have a central authority to cast a vote. If someone wants to modify or change the record, they can do it quickly; no one knows how to verify that record. One does not have the central authority; the data are stored in multiple nodes. It is not possible to hack all nodes and change the data. Thus, in this way, one cannot destroy the votes and efficiently verify the votes by tally with other nodes.

Traditional vs. blockchain voting system.

If the technology is used correctly, the blockchain is a digital, decentralized, encrypted, transparent ledger that can withstand manipulation and fraud. Because of the distributed structure of the blockchain, a Bitcoin electronic voting system reduces the risks involved with electronic voting and allows for a tamper-proof for the voting system. A blockchain-based electronic voting system requires a wholly distributed voting infrastructure. Electronic voting based on blockchain will only work where the online voting system is fully controlled by no single body, not even the government [ 36 ]. To sum-up, elections can only be free and fair when there is a broad belief in the legitimacy of the power held by those in positions of authority. The literature review for this field of study and other related experiments may be seen as a good path for making voting more efficient in terms of administration and participation. However, the idea of using blockchain offered a new model for electronic voting.

4. Problems and Solutions of Developing Online Voting Systems

Whether talking about traditional paper-based voting, voting via digital voting machines, or an online voting system, several conditions need to be satisfied:

• Eligibility: Only legitimate voters should be able to take part in voting;
• Unreusability: Each voter can vote only once;
• Privacy: No one except the voter can obtain information about the voter’s choice;
• Fairness: No one can obtain intermediate voting results;
• Soundness: Invalid ballots should be detected and not taken into account during tallying;
• Completeness: All valid ballots should be tallied correctly.

Below is a brief overview of the solutions for satisfying these properties in online voting systems.

4.1. Eligibility

The solution to the issue of eligibility is rather apparent. To take part in online voting, voters need to identify themselves using a recognized identification system. The identifiers of all legitimate voters need to be added to the list of participants. But there are threats: Firstly, all modifications made to the participation list need to be checked so that no illegitimate voters can be added, and secondly, the identification system should be both trusted and secure so that a voter’s account cannot be stolen or used by an intruder. Building such an identification system is a complex task in itself [ 37 ]. However, because this sort of system is necessary for a wide range of other contexts, especially related to digital government services, researchers believe it is best to use an existing identification system, and the question of creating one is beyond the scope of work.

4.2. Unreusability

At first, glance, implementing unreusability may seem straightforward—when a voter casts their vote, all that needs to be done is to place a mark in the participation list and not allow them to vote a second time. But privacy needs to be taken into consideration; thus, providing both unreusability and voter anonymity is tricky. Moreover, it may be necessary to allow the voter to re-vote, making the task even more complex [ 38 ]. A brief overview of unreusability techniques will be provided below in conjunction with the outline on implementing privacy.

4.3. Privacy

Privacy in the context of online voting means that no one except the voter knows how a participant has voted. Achieving this property mainly relies on one (or more) of the following techniques: blind signatures, homomorphic encryption, and mix-networks [ 39 ]. Blind signature is a method of signing data when the signer does not know what they are signing. It is achieved by using a blinding function so that blinding and signing functions are commutative–Blind(Sign(message)) = Sign(Blind(message)). The requester blinds (applies blinding function to) their message and sends it for signing. After obtaining a signature for a blinded message, they use their knowledge of blinding parameters to derive a signature for an unblinded message. Blind signatures mathematically prevent anyone except the requester from linking a blinded message and a corresponding signature pair with an unblinded one [ 40 ].

The voting scheme proposed by Fujioka, Okamoto, and Ohta in 1992 [ 41 ] uses a blind signature: An eligible voter blinds his ballot and sends it to the validator. The validator verifies that the voter is allowed to participate, signs the blinded ballot, and returns it to the voter. The voter then derives a signature for the unblinded vote and sends it to the tallier, and the tallier verifies the validator’s signature before accepting the ballot.

Many online voting protocols have evolved from this scheme, improving usability (in the original method, the voter had to wait till the end of the election and send a ballot decryption key), allowing re-voting, or implementing coercion resistance. The main threat here is the power of the signer: There must be a verifiable log of all emitted signatures; this information logically corresponds to the receiving of a ballot by the voter, so it should be verified that only eligible voters receive signatures from the signer [ 42 ]. It should also be verifiable that accounts of voters who are permitted to vote but have not taken part in voting are not utilized by an intruder. To truly break the link between voter and ballot, the ballot and the signature need to be sent through an anonymous channel [ 43 ].

Homomorphic encryption is a form of encryption that allows mathematical operations to be performed on encrypted data without decryption, for example, the addition

Enc(a) + Enc(b) = Enc(a + b); or multiplication Enc(a) × Enc(b) = Enc(a × b). In the context of online voting, additive homomorphic encryption allows us to calculate the sum of all the voters’ choices before decryption.

It is worth mentioning here that multiplicative homomorphic encryption can generally be used as an additive. For example, if we have choices x and y and multiplicative homomorphic encryption, we can select a value g and encrypt exponentiation: Enc(gx) × Enc(gy) = Enc(g(x + y)).

Homomorphic encryption can be used to obtain various properties necessary in an online voting system; with regards to privacy, it is used so that only the sum of all the choices is decrypted, and never each voter’s choice by itself. Using homomorphic encryption for privacy implies that decryption is performed by several authorities so that no one can obtain the decryption key; otherwise, privacy will be violated [ 44 ].

It is usually implemented with a threshold decryption scheme. For instance, let us say that we have n authorities. To decrypt a result, we need t of them, t <= n . The protocol assumes that each authority applies its vital part to the sum of the encrypted choices. After t authorities perform this operation, we get the decrypted total sum of choices. In contrast to the blind signature scheme, no anonymous channel between voters and the system is needed. Still, privacy relies on trust in the authorities: If a malicious agreement is reached, all voters can be deanonymized.

Mix-networks also rely on the distribution of the trust, but in another way. The idea behind a mix-network is that voters’ choices go through several mix-servers that shuffle them and perform an action–either decryption or re-encryption, depending on the mix-network type. In a decryption mix network, each mixing server has its key, and the voter encrypts their choice like an onion so that each server will unwrap its layer of decryption. In re-encryption mix-networks, each mix server re-encrypts the voters’ choices.

There are many mix-network proposals, and reviewing all their properties is beyond the scope of this paper. The main point regarding privacy here is that, in theory, if at least one mix-server performs an honest shuffle, privacy is preserved. It is slightly different from privacy based on homomorphic encryption, where we make assumptions about the number of malicious authorities. In addition, the idea behind mix-networks can be used to build anonymous channels required by other techniques [ 45 ].

4.4. Fairness

Fairness in terms of no one obtaining intermediate results is achieved straightforwardly: Voters encrypt their choices before sending, and those choices are decrypted at the end of the voting process. The critical thing to remember here is that if someone owns a decryption key with access to encrypted decisions, they can obtain intermediate results. This problem is solved by distributing the key among several keyholders [ 41 ]. A system where all the key holders are required for decryption is unreliable—if one of the key holders does not participate, decryption cannot be performed. Therefore, threshold schemes are used whereby a specific number of key holders are required to perform decryption. There are two main approaches for distributing the key: secret sharing, where a trusted dealer divides the generated key into parts and distributes them among key holders (e.g., Shamir’s Secret Sharing protocol); and distributed key generation, where no trusted dealer is needed, and all parties contribute to the calculation of the key (for example, Pedersen’s Distributed Key Generation protocol).

4.5. Soundness and Completeness

On the face of it, the completeness and soundness properties seem relatively straightforward, but realizing them can be problematic depending on the protocol. If ballots are decrypted one by one, it is easy to distinguish between valid and invalid ones, but things become more complicated when it comes to homomorphic encryption. As a single ballot is never decrypted, the decryption result will not show if more than one option was chosen or if the poll was formed so that it was treated as ten choices (or a million) at once. Thus, we need to prove that the encrypted data meets the properties of a valid ballot without compromising any information that can help determine how the vote was cast. This task is solved by zero-knowledge proof [ 46 ]. By definition, this is a cryptographic method of proving a statement about the value without disclosing the value itself. More specifically, range proofs demonstrate that a specific value belongs to a particular set in such cases.

The properties described above are the bare minimum for any voting solution. But all the technologies mentioned above are useless if there is no trust in the system itself. A voting system needs to be fully verifiable to earn this trust, i.e., everyone involved can ensure that the system complies with the stated properties. Ensuring verifiability can be split into two tasks: personal, when the voter can verify that their ballot is correctly recorded and tallied; and universal, when everyone can prove that the system as a whole works precisely [ 47 ]. This entails the inputs and outputs of the voting protocol stages being published and proof of correct execution. For example, mix-networks rely on proof of correct shuffling (a type of zero-knowledge proof), while proof of correct decryption is also used in mix-networks and threshold decryption. The more processes that are open to public scrutiny, the more verifiable the system is. However, online voting makes extensive use of cryptography, and the more complex the cryptography, the more obscure it is for most system users [ 48 ]. It may take a considerable amount of time to study the protocol and even more to identify any vulnerabilities or backdoors, and even if the entire system is carefully researched, there is no guarantee that the same code is used in real-time.

Last but not least are problems associated with coercion and vote-buying. Online voting brings these problems to the next level: As ballots are cast remotely from an uncontrolled environment, coercers and vote buyers can operate on a large scale [ 49 ]. That is why one of the desired properties of an online voting system is coercion resistance. It is called resistance because nothing can stop the coercer from standing behind the voter and controlling its actions. The point here is to do as much as possible to lower the risk of mass interference. Both kinds of malefactors—coercers and vote buyers—demand proof of how a voter voted. That is why many types of coercion resistance voting schemes introduce the concept of receipt-freeness.

The voter cannot create a receipt that proves how they voted. The approaches to implementing receipt-freeness generally rely on a trusted party—either a system or device that hides the unique parameters used to form a ballot from the voter, so the voter cannot prove that a particular ballot belongs to them [ 50 ]. The reverse side of this approach is that if a voter claims that their vote is recorded or tallied incorrectly, they simply cannot prove it due to a lack of evidence.

An overview of technologies used to meet the necessary properties of online voting systems and analysis deliberately considered the properties separately [ 51 ]. When it comes to assembling the whole protocol, most solutions introduce a trade-off. For example, as noted for the blind signature, there is a risk that non-eligible voters will vote, receipt-freeness contradicts verifiability, a more complex protocol can dramatically reduce usability, etc. Furthermore, the fundamental principles of developing the solution, but many additional aspects must be considered in a real-world system like security and reliability of the communication protocols, system deployment procedure, access to system components [ 52 ]. At present, no protocol satisfies all the desired properties and, therefore, no 100% truly robust online voting system exists.

5. Security Requirements for Voting System

Suitable electronic voting systems should meet the following electronic voting requirements. Figure 5 shows the main security requirements for electronic voting systems.

Security requirements for electronic voting system.

5.1. Anonymity

Throughout the polling process, the voting turnout must be secured from external interpretation. Any correlation between registered votes and voter identities inside the electoral structure shall be unknown [ 20 , 53 ].

5.2. Auditability and Accuracy

Accuracy, also called correctness, demands that the declared results correspond precisely to the election results. It means that nobody can change the voting of other citizens, that the final tally includes all legitimate votes [ 54 ], and that there is no definitive tally of invalid ballots.

5.3. Democracy/Singularity

A “democratic” system is defined if only eligible voters can vote, and only a single vote can be cast for each registered voter [ 55 ]. Another function is that no one else should be able to duplicate the vote.

5.4. Vote Privacy

After the vote is cast, no one should be in a position to attach the identity of a voter with its vote. Computer secrecy is a fragile type of confidentiality, which means that the voting relationship remains hidden for an extended period as long as the current rate continues to change with computer power and new techniques [ 56 , 57 ].

5.5. Robustness and Integrity

This condition means that a reasonably large group of electors or representatives cannot disrupt the election. It ensures that registered voters will abstain without problems or encourage others to cast their legitimate votes for themselves. The corruption of citizens and officials is prohibited from denying an election result by arguing that some other member has not performed their portion correctly [ 58 ].

5.6. Lack of Evidence

While anonymous privacy ensures electoral fraud safeguards, no method can be assured that votes are placed under bribery or election rigging in any way. This question has its root from the start [ 59 ].

5.7. Transparency and Fairness

It means that before the count is released, no one can find out the details. It avoids acts such as manipulating late voters’ decisions by issuing a prediction or offering a significant yet unfair benefit to certain persons or groups as to be the first to know [ 60 ].

5.8. Availability and Mobility

During the voting period, voting systems should always be available. Voting systems should not limit the place of the vote.

5.9. Verifiable Participation/Authenticity

The criterion also referred to as desirability [ 61 ] makes it possible to assess whether or not a single voter engaged in the election [ 62 ]. This condition must be fulfilled where voting by voters becomes compulsory under the constitution (as is the case in some countries such as Australia, Germany, Greece) or in a social context, where abstention is deemed to be a disrespectful gesture (such as the small and medium-sized elections for a delegated corporate board).

5.10. Accessibility and Reassurance

To ensure that everyone who wants to vote has the opportunity to avail the correct polling station and that polling station must be open and accessible for the voter. Only qualified voters should be allowed to vote, and all ballots must be accurately tallied to guarantee that elections are genuine [ 63 ].

5.11. Recoverability and Identification

Voting systems can track and restore voting information to prevent errors, delays, and attacks.

5.12. Voters Verifiability

Verifiability means that processes exist for election auditing to ensure that it is done correctly. Three separate segments are possible for this purpose: (a) uniform verification or public verification [ 64 ] that implies that anybody such as voters, governments, and external auditors can test the election after the declaration of the tally; (b) transparent verifiability against a poll [ 65 ], which is a weaker prerequisite for each voter to verify whether their vote has been taken into account properly.

6. Electronic Voting on Blockchain

This section provides some background information on electronic voting methods. Electronic voting is a voting technique in which votes are recorded or counted using electronic equipment. Electronic voting is usually defined as voting that is supported by some electronic hardware and software. Such regularities should be competent in supporting/implementing various functions, ranging from election setup through vote storage. Kiosks at election offices, laptops, and, more recently, mobile devices are all examples of system types. Voter registration, authentication, voting, and tallying must be incorporated in the electronic voting systems Figure 6 .

Blockchain voting systems architectural overview.

One of the areas where blockchain may have a significant impact is electronic voting. The level of risk is so great that electronic voting alone is not a viable option. If an electronic voting system is hacked, the consequences will be far-reaching. Because a blockchain network is entire, centralized, open, and consensus-driven, the design of a blockchain-based network guarantees that fraud is not theoretically possible until adequately implemented [ 66 ]. As a result, the blockchain’s unique characteristics must be taken into account. There is nothing inherent about blockchain technology that prevents it from being used to any other kind of cryptocurrency. The idea of utilizing blockchain technology to create a tamper-resistant electronic/online voting network is gaining momentum [ 67 ]. End users would not notice a significant difference between a blockchain-based voting system and a traditional electronic voting system.

On the other hand, voting on the blockchain will be an encrypted piece of data that is fully open and publicly stored on a distributed blockchain network rather than a single server. A consensus process on a blockchain mechanism validates each encrypted vote, and the public records each vote on distributed copies of the blockchain ledger [ 68 ]. The government will observe how votes were cast and recorded, but this information will not be restricted to policy. The blockchain voting system is decentralized and completely open, yet it ensures that voters are protected. This implies that anybody may count the votes with blockchain electronic voting, but no one knows who voted to whom. Standard electronic voting and blockchain-based electronic voting apply to categorically distinct organizational ideas.

7. Current Blockchain-Based Electronic Voting Systems

The following businesses and organizations, founded but mainly formed over the last five years, are developing the voting sector. All share a strong vision for the blockchain network to put transparency into practice. Table 1 shows the different online platforms, their consensus, and the technology used to develop the system. Currently available blockchain-based voting systems have scalability issues. These systems can be used on a small scale. Still, their systems are not efficient for the national level to handle millions of transactions because they use current blockchain frameworks such as Bitcoin, Ethereum, Hyperledger Fabric, etc. In Table 2 we present scalability analysis of famous blockchain platforms. The scalability issue arises with blockchain value suggestions; therefore, altering blockchain settings cannot be easily increased. To scale a blockchain, it is insufficient to increase the block size or lower the block time by lowering the hash complexity. By each approach, the scaling capability hits a limit before it can achieve the transactions needed to compete with companies such as Visa, which manages an average of 150 million transactions per day. Research released by Tata Communications in 2018 has shown that 44% of the companies used blockchain in their survey and refers to general issues arising from the use of new technology. The unresolved scalability issue emerges as a barrier from an architectural standpoint to blockchain adoption and practical implementations. As Deloitte Insights puts it, “blockchain-based systems are comparatively slow. Blockchain’s sluggish transaction speed is a major concern for enterprises that depend on high-performance legacy transaction processing systems.” In 2017 and 2018, the public attained an idea of issues with scalability: significant delays and excessive charging for the Bitcoin network and the infamous Cryptokitties application that clogged the Ethereum blockchain network (a network that thousands of decentralized applications rely on).

Comparison of current blockchain-based electronic voting systems.

Scalability analysis of famous blockchain platforms.

7.1. Follow My Vote

It is a company that has a secure online voting platform cantered on the blockchain with polling box audit ability to see real-time democratic development [ 69 ]. This platform enables the voters to cast their votes remotely and safely and vote for their ideal candidate. It can then use their identification to open the ballot box literally and locate their ballot and check that both that it is correct and that the election results have been proven to be accurate mathematically.

This company established a smartphone-based voting system on blockchain to vote remotely and anonymously and verify that the vote was counted correctly [ 70 ]. Voters confirm their applicants and themselves on the application and give proof by an image and their identification to include biometric confirmation that either a distinctive signature such as fingerprints or retinal scans.

7.3. Polyas

It was founded in Finland in 1996. The company employs blockchain technology to provide the public and private sectors with an electronic voting system [ 71 ]. Polyas has been accredited as secure enough by the German Federal Office for Information Security for electronic voting applications in 2016. Many significant companies throughout Germany use Polyas to perform electronic voting systems. Polyas now has customers throughout the United States and Europe.

7.4. Luxoft

The first customized blockchain electronic voting system used by a significant industry was developed by the global I.T. service provider Luxoft Harding, Inc., in partnership with the City of Zug and Lucerne University of Applied Sciences of Switzerland [ 72 ]. To drive government adoption of blockchain-based services, Luxoft announces its commitment to open source this platform and establishes a Government Alliance Blockchain to promote blockchain use in public institutions.

Polys is a blockchain-based online voting platform and backed with transparent crypto algorithms. Kaspersky Lab powers them. Polys supports the organization of polls by student councils, unions, and associations and helps them spread electoral information to the students [ 73 ]. Online elections with Polys lead to productivity in a community, improve contact with group leaders, and attract new supporters [ 74 ]. Polys aims to reduce time and money for local authorities, state governments, and other organizations by helping them to focus on collecting and preparing proposals.

It is a group that has introduced a blockchain digital voting platform. It was established in 2015 and partially implemented in the presidential election in Sierra Leone in March 2018. Agora’s architecture is built on several technological innovations: a custom blockchain, unique participatory security, and a legitimate consensus mechanism [ 75 ]. The vote is the native token in Agora’s ecosystem. It encourages citizens and chosen bodies, serving as writers of elections worldwide to commit to a secure and transparent electoral process. The vote is the Agora ecosystem’s universal token.

8. Related Literature Review

Several articles have been published in the recent era that highlighted the security and privacy issues of blockchain-based electronic voting systems. Reflects the comparison of selected electronic voting schemes based on blockchain.

The open vote network (OVN) was presented by [ 76 ], which is the first deployment of a transparent and self-tallying internet voting protocol with total user privacy by using Ethereum. In OVN, the voting size was limited to 50–60 electors by the framework. The OVN is unable to stop fraudulent miners from corrupting the system. A fraudulent voter may also circumvent the voting process by sending an invalid vote. The protocol does nothing to guarantee the resistance to violence, and the electoral administrator wants to trust [ 77 , 78 ].

Furthermore, since solidity does not support elliptic curve cryptography, they used an external library to do the computation [ 79 ]. After the library was added, the voting contract became too big to be stored on the blockchain. Since it has occurred throughout the history of the Bitcoin network, OVN is susceptible to a denial-of-service attack [ 80 ]. Table 3 shows the main comparison of selected electronic voting schemes based on blockchain.

Comparison of selected electronic voting schemes based on blockchain.

Lai et al. [ 81 ] suggested a decentralized anonymous transparent electronic voting system (DATE) requiring a minimal degree of confidence between participants. They think that for large-scale electronic elections, the current DATE voting method is appropriate. Unfortunately, their proposed system is not strong enough to secure from DoS attacks because there was no third-party authority on the scheme responsible for auditing the vote after the election process. This system is suitable only for small scales because of the limitation of the platform [ 8 ]. Although using Ring Signature keeps the privacy of individual voters, it is hard to manage and coordinate several signer entities. They also use PoW consensus, which has significant drawbacks such as energy consumption: the “supercomputers” of miners monitor a million computations a second, which is happening worldwide. Because this arrangement requires high computational power, it is expensive and energy-consuming.

Shahzad et al. [ 2 ] proposed the BSJC proof of completeness as a reliable electronic voting method. They used a process model to describe the whole system’s structure. On a smaller scale, it also attempted to address anonymity, privacy, and security problems in the election. However, many additional problems have been highlighted. The proof of labor, for example, is a mathematically vast and challenging job that requires a tremendous amount of energy to complete. Another problem is the participation of a third party since there is a significant risk of data tampering, leakage, and unfair tabulated results, all of which may impact end-to-end verification. On a large scale, generating and sealing the block may cause the polling process to be delayed [ 8 ].

Gao et al. [ 8 ] has suggested a blockchain-based anti-quantum electronic voting protocol with an audit function. They have also made modifications to the code-based Niederreiter algorithm to make it more resistant to quantum assaults. The Key Generation Center (KGC) is a certificateless cryptosystem that serves as a regulator. It not only recognizes the voter’s anonymity but also facilitates the audit’s functioning. However, an examination of their system reveals that, even if the number of voters is modest, the security and efficiency benefits are substantial for a small-scale election. If the number is high, some of the efficiency is reduced to provide better security [ 82 ].

Yi [ 83 ] presented the blockchain-based electronic voting Scheme (BES) that offered methods for improving electronic voting security in the peer-to-peer network using blockchain technology. A BES is based on the distributed ledger (DLT) may be employed to avoid vote falsification. The system was tested and designed on Linux systems in a P2P network. In this technique, counter-measurement assaults constitute a significant issue. This method necessitates the involvement of responsible third parties and is not well suited to centralized usage in a system with many agents. A distributed process, i.e., the utilization of secure multipart computers, may address the problem. However, in this situation, computing expenses are more significant and maybe prohibitive if the calculation function is complex and there are too many participants. [ 84 , 85 ].

Khan, K.M. [ 86 ] has proposed block-based e-voting architecture (BEA) that conducted strict experimentation with permissioned and permissionless blockchain architectures through different scenarios involving voting population, block size, block generation rate, and block transaction speed. Their experiments also uncovered fascinating findings of how these parameters influence the overall scalability and reliability of the electronic voting model, including interchanges between different parameters and protection and performance measures inside the organization alone. In their scheme, the electoral process requires the generation of voter addresses and candidate addresses. These addresses are then used to cast votes from voters to candidates. The mining group updates the ledger of the main blockchain to keep track of votes cast and the status of the vote. The voting status remains unconfirmed until a miner updates the main ledger. The vote is then cast using the voting machine at the polling station.

However, in this model, there are some flaws found. There is no regulatory authority to restrict invalid voters from casting a vote, and it is not secure from quantum attach. Their model is not accurate and did not care about voter’s integrity. Moreover, their scheme using Distributed consensus in which testimonies (data and facts) can be organized into cartels because fewer people keep the network active, a “51%” attack becomes easier to organize. This attack is potentially more concentrated and did not discuss scalability and delays in electronic voting, which are the main concerns about the blockchain voting system. They have used the Multichain framework, a private blockchain derived from Bitcoin, which is unsuitable for the nationwide voting process. As the authors mentioned, their system is efficient for small and medium-sized voting environments only.

9. Discussion and Future Work

Many issues with electronic voting can be solved using blockchain technology, which makes electronic voting more cost-effective, pleasant, and safe than any other network. Over time, research has highlighted specific problems, such as the need for further work on blockchain-based electronic voting and that blockchain-based electronic voting schemes have significant technical challenges.

9.1. Scalability and Processing Overheads

For a small number of users, blockchain works well. However, when the network is utilized for large-scale elections, the number of users increases, resulting in a higher cost and time consumption for consuming the transaction. Scalability problems are exacerbated by the growing number of nodes in the blockchain network. In the election situation, the system’s scalability is already a significant issue [ 87 ]. An electronic voting integration will further impact the system’s scalability based on blockchain [ 88 , 89 ]. Table 3 elucidates different metrics or properties inherent to all blockchain frameworks and presents a comparative analysis of some blockchain-based platforms such as Bitcoin, Ethereum, Hyperledger Fabric, Litecoin, Ripple, Dogecoin, Peercoin, etc. One way to enhance blockchain scaling would be to parallelize them, which is called sharding. In a conventional blockchain network, transactions and blocks are verified by all the participating nodes. In order to enable high concurrency in data, the data should be horizontally partitioned into parts, each known as a shard.

9.2. User Identity

As a username, blockchain utilizes pseudonyms. This strategy does not provide complete privacy and secrecy. Because the transactions are public, the user’s identity may be discovered by examining and analyzing them. The blockchain’s functionality is not well suited to national elections [ 90 ].

9.3. Transactional Privacy

In blockchain technology, transactional anonymity and privacy are difficult to accomplish [ 91 ]. However, transactional secrecy and anonymity are required in an election system due to the presence of the transactions involved. For this purpose, a third-party authority required but not centralized, this third-party authority should check and balance on privacy.

9.4. Energy Efficiency

Blockchain incorporates energy-intensive processes such as protocols, consensus, peer-to-peer communication, and asymmetrical encryption. Appropriate energy-efficient consensus methods are a need for blockchain-based electronic voting. Researchers suggested modifications to current peer-to-peer protocols to make them more energy-efficient [ 92 , 93 ].

9.5. Immatureness

Blockchain is a revolutionary technology that symbolizes a complete shift to a decentralized network. It has the potential to revolutionize businesses in terms of strategy, structure, processes, and culture. The current implementation of blockchain is not without flaws. The technology is presently useless, and there is little public or professional understanding about it, making it impossible to evaluate its future potential. All present technical issues in blockchain adoption are usually caused by the technology’s immaturity [ 94 ].

9.6. Acceptableness

While blockchain excels at delivering accuracy and security, people’s confidence and trust are critical components of effective blockchain electronic voting [ 95 ]. The intricacy of blockchain may make it difficult for people to accept blockchain-based electronic voting, and it can be a significant barrier to ultimately adopting blockchain-based electronic voting in general public acceptance [ 96 ]. A big marketing campaign needed for this purpose to provide awareness to people about the benefits of blockchain voting systems, so that it will be easy for them to accept this new technology.

9.7. Political Leaders’ Resistance

Central authorities, such as election authorities and government agencies, will be shifted away from electronic voting based on blockchain. As a result, political leaders who have profited from the existing election process are likely to oppose the technology because blockchain will empower social resistance through decentralized autonomous organizations [ 97 ].

10. Conclusions

The goal of this research is to analyze and evaluate current research on blockchain-based electronic voting systems. The article discusses recent electronic voting research using blockchain technology. The blockchain concept and its uses are presented first, followed by existing electronic voting systems. Then, a set of deficiencies in existing electronic voting systems are identified and addressed. The blockchain’s potential is fundamental to enhance electronic voting, current solutions for blockchain-based electronic voting, and possible research paths on blockchain-based electronic voting systems. Numerous experts believe that blockchain may be a good fit for a decentralized electronic voting system.

Furthermore, all voters and impartial observers may see the voting records kept in these suggested systems. On the other hand, researchers discovered that most publications on blockchain-based electronic voting identified and addressed similar issues. There have been many study gaps in electronic voting that need to be addressed in future studies. Scalability attacks, lack of transparency, reliance on untrustworthy systems, and resistance to compulsion are all potential drawbacks that must be addressed. As further research is required, we are not entirely aware of all the risks connected with the security and scalability of blockchain-based electronic voting systems. Adopting blockchain voting methods may expose users to unforeseen security risks and flaws. Blockchain technologies require a more sophisticated software architecture as well as managerial expertise. The above-mentioned crucial concerns should be addressed in more depth during actual voting procedures, based on experience. As a result, electronic voting systems should initially be implemented in limited pilot areas before being expanded. Many security flaws still exist in the internet and polling machines. Electronic voting over a secure and dependable internet will need substantial security improvements. Despite its appearance as an ideal solution, the blockchain system could not wholly address the voting system’s issues due to these flaws. This research revealed that blockchain systems raised difficulties that needed to be addressed and that there are still many technical challenges. That is why it is crucial to understand that blockchain-based technology is still in its infancy as an electronic voting option.

Acknowledgments

This research was funded by the Malaysia Ministry of Education (FRGS/1/2019/ICT01/UKM/01/2) and Universiti Kebangsaan Malaysia (PP-FTSM-2021).

Author Contributions

Conceptualization, U.J., M.J.A.A. and Z.S.; methodology, U.J., M.J.A.A. and Z.S.; formal analysis, U.J., M.J.A.A. and Z.S.; writing—original draft preparation, U.J. and M.J.A.A.; writing—review and editing, U.J.; supervision, M.J.A.A. and Z.S. All authors have read and agreed to the published version of the manuscript.

This research received no external funding.

Institutional Review Board Statement

Informed consent statement, data availability statement, conflicts of interest.

The authors declare no conflict of interest.

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Blockchain for electronic voting system—review and open research challenges.

1. Introduction

2. background, 2.1. core components of blockchain architecture.

• Node: Users or computers in blockchain layout (every device has a different copy of a complete ledger from the blockchain);
• Transaction: It is the blockchain system’s smallest building block (records and details), which blockchain uses;
• Block: A block is a collection of data structures used to process transactions over the network distributed to all nodes.
• Chain: A series of blocks in a particular order;
• Miners: Correspondent nodes to validate the transaction and add that block into the blockchain system;
• Consensus: A collection of commands and organizations to carry out blockchain processes.

2.2. Critical Characteristics of Blockchain Architecture

• Cryptography: Blockchain transactions are authenticated and accurate because of computations and cryptographic evidence between the parties involved;
• Immutability: Any blockchain documents cannot be changed or deleted;
• Provenance: It refers to the fact that every transaction can be tracked in the blockchain ledger;
• Decentralization: The entire distributed database may be accessible by all members of the blockchain network. A consensus algorithm allows control of the system, as shown in the core process;
• Anonymity: A blockchain network participant has generated an address rather than a user identification. It maintains anonymity, especially in a blockchain public system;
• Transparency: It means being unable to manipulate the blockchain network. It does not happen as it takes immense computational resources to erase the blockchain network.

3. How Blockchain Can Transform the Electronic Voting System

4. problems and solutions of developing online voting systems.

• Eligibility: Only legitimate voters should be able to take part in voting;
• Unreusability: Each voter can vote only once;
• Privacy: No one except the voter can obtain information about the voter’s choice;
• Fairness: No one can obtain intermediate voting results;
• Soundness: Invalid ballots should be detected and not taken into account during tallying;
• Completeness: All valid ballots should be tallied correctly.

4.1. Eligibility

4.2. unreusability, 4.3. privacy, 4.4. fairness, 4.5. soundness and completeness, 5. security requirements for voting system, 5.1. anonymity, 5.2. auditability and accuracy, 5.3. democracy/singularity, 5.4. vote privacy, 5.5. robustness and integrity, 5.6. lack of evidence, 5.7. transparency and fairness, 5.8. availability and mobility, 5.9. verifiable participation/authenticity, 5.10. accessibility and reassurance, 5.11. recoverability and identification, 5.12. voters verifiability, 6. electronic voting on blockchain, 7. current blockchain-based electronic voting systems, 7.1. follow my vote, 7.3. polyas, 7.4. luxoft, 8. related literature review, 9. discussion and future work, 9.1. scalability and processing overheads, 9.2. user identity, 9.3. transactional privacy, 9.4. energy efficiency, 9.5. immatureness, 9.6. acceptableness, 9.7. political leaders’ resistance, 10. conclusions, author contributions, institutional review board statement, informed consent statement, data availability statement, acknowledgments, conflicts of interest.

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Share and Cite

Jafar, U.; Aziz, M.J.A.; Shukur, Z. Blockchain for Electronic Voting System—Review and Open Research Challenges. Sensors 2021 , 21 , 5874. https://doi.org/10.3390/s21175874

Jafar U, Aziz MJA, Shukur Z. Blockchain for Electronic Voting System—Review and Open Research Challenges. Sensors . 2021; 21(17):5874. https://doi.org/10.3390/s21175874

Jafar, Uzma, Mohd Juzaiddin Ab Aziz, and Zarina Shukur. 2021. "Blockchain for Electronic Voting System—Review and Open Research Challenges" Sensors 21, no. 17: 5874. https://doi.org/10.3390/s21175874

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