Home — Essay Samples — Government & Politics — Corruption — The Problem of Corruption and Its Examples in Philippines
The Problem of Corruption and Its Examples in Philippines
- Categories: Corruption Political Corruption
About this sample
Words: 979 |
Published: Mar 19, 2020
Words: 979 | Pages: 2 | 5 min read
Cite this Essay
Let us write you an essay from scratch
- 450+ experts on 30 subjects ready to help
- Custom essay delivered in as few as 3 hours
Get high-quality help
Dr. Heisenberg
Verified writer
- Expert in: Government & Politics
+ 120 experts online
By clicking “Check Writers’ Offers”, you agree to our terms of service and privacy policy . We’ll occasionally send you promo and account related email
No need to pay just yet!
Related Essays
4 pages / 1931 words
5 pages / 2353 words
2.5 pages / 1213 words
1 pages / 608 words
Remember! This is just a sample.
You can get your custom paper by one of our expert writers.
121 writers online
Still can’t find what you need?
Browse our vast selection of original essay samples, each expertly formatted and styled
Related Essays on Corruption
Stalking is a pervasive and dangerous form of interpersonal violence that can have devastating effects on victims. According to the National Institute of Justice, stalking is defined as a pattern of repeated and unwanted [...]
Corruption in Kenya is a deeply entrenched and complex issue that has long plagued the nation's development and progress. This essay delves into the intricate layers of corruption, its causes, manifestations, and the efforts [...]
Animal Farm, written by George Orwell, is a classic novel that uses the allegory of farm animals to explore the corrupting influence of power and the dangers of totalitarianism. This essay will provide a moral analysis of Animal [...]
Police corruption is a pervasive issue that undermines the integrity of law enforcement agencies and erodes public trust. Corruption in the police force can manifest in various forms, including bribery, abuse of power, and [...]
The purpose of this argumentative essay is to demonstrate that police brutality and police corruption are correlated. Most discussions on police brutality link it to racism/racial bias. This argument builds on the understanding [...]
It is a necessary ethnical appropriate and a primary leader concerning human then financial improvement on someone u . s . . it no longer only strengthens personal honor but additionally shapes the society between who we live. [...]
Related Topics
By clicking “Send”, you agree to our Terms of service and Privacy statement . We will occasionally send you account related emails.
Where do you want us to send this sample?
By clicking “Continue”, you agree to our terms of service and privacy policy.
Be careful. This essay is not unique
This essay was donated by a student and is likely to have been used and submitted before
Download this Sample
Free samples may contain mistakes and not unique parts
Sorry, we could not paraphrase this essay. Our professional writers can rewrite it and get you a unique paper.
Please check your inbox.
We can write you a custom essay that will follow your exact instructions and meet the deadlines. Let's fix your grades together!
Get Your Personalized Essay in 3 Hours or Less!
We use cookies to personalyze your web-site experience. By continuing we’ll assume you board with our cookie policy .
- Instructions Followed To The Letter
- Deadlines Met At Every Stage
- Unique And Plagiarism Free
By providing an email address. I agree to the Terms of Use and acknowledge that I have read the Privacy Policy .
A look at how corruption works in the Philippines
The Philippines is perceived to be one of the most corrupt countries in the world. Of 180 countries, the Philippines ranked 116 in terms of being least corrupt. This means that the country is almost on the top one-third of the most corrupt countries, based on the Corruption Perceptions Index (CPI) published by Transparency International.
According to CPI, the Philippines scored a total of 33 points out of 100. Even as far back as 2012, it has fluctuated around the same CPI score, with the highest score being 38 points in 2014 and the lowest being 33 points in 2021 and 2022. To further contextualize how low it scored, the regional average CPI score for the Asia-Pacific region is 45, with zero as highly corrupt. And of the 31 countries and territories in the region, the Philippines placed 22nd (tied with Mongolia).
It must be noted, however, that CPI measures perceptions of corruption and is not necessarily the reality of the state of corruption. CPI reflects the views of experts or surveys of business people on a number of corrupt behavior in the public sector (such as bribery, diversion of public funds, nepotism in the civil service, use of public office for private gain, etc.). CPI also measures the available mechanisms to prevent corruption, such as enforcement mechanisms, effective prosecution of corrupt officials, red tape, laws on adequate financial disclosure and legal protection for whistleblowers.
These data are taken from other international organizations, such as the World Bank, World Economic Forum, private consulting companies and think tanks.
Of course, measuring actual corruption is quite difficult, especially as it involves under-the-table activities that are only discovered when they are prosecuted, like in the case of the ill-gotten wealth of the Marcoses, which was estimated to be up to $10 billion based on now-deleted Guinness World Records and cited as the “biggest robbery of a government.” Nevertheless, there still exists a correlation between corruption and corruption perceptions.
4 Syndromes
Corruption does not come in a single form as well. In a 2007 study, Michael Johnston, a political scientist and professor emeritus at Colgate University in the United States, studied four syndromes (categories) of corruption that were predominant in Asia, citing Japan, Korea, China and the Philippines as prime examples of each category.
The first category is Influence Market Corruption, wherein politicians peddle their influence to provide connections to other people, essentially serving as middlemen. The second category is Elite Cartel Corruption, wherein there exist networks of elites that may collude to protect their economic and political advantages. The third form of corruption is the Official Mogul Corruption, wherein economic moguls (or their clients) are usually the top political figures and face few constraints from the state or their competitors.
Finally, there is the form of corruption that the Philippines is familiar with. Oligarch-and-Clan Corruption is present in countries with major political and economic liberalization and weak institutions. Corruption of this kind has been characterized by Johnston as having “disorderly, sometimes violent scramble among contending oligarchs seeking to parlay personal resources into wealth and power.” Other than the Philippines, corruption in Bangladesh, India, Malaysia, Nepal, Pakistan and Sri Lanka falls under the same syndrome.
In the Philippines, Oligarch-and-Clan Corruption manifests itself in the political system. As Johnston noted, in this kind of corruption, there is difficulty in determining what is public and what is private (i.e., who is a politician and who is an entrepreneur). Oligarchs attempt to use their power for their private benefit or the benefit of their families. From the Aquinos, Binays, Dutertes, Roxases and, most notoriously, the Marcoses, the Philippines is no stranger to political families. In a 2017 chart by Todd Cabrera Lucero, he traced the lineage of Philippine presidents and noted them to be either related by affinity or consanguinity.
Corruption in the Philippines by oligarch families is not unheard of. In fact, the most notable case of corruption in the Philippines was committed by an oligarchic family—the Marcos family. The extent of the wealth stolen by former dictator Ferdinand Marcos Sr. and his wife has been well-documented. In fact, several Supreme Court cases clearly show the extent of the wealth that the Marcoses had stolen.
In an Oligarch-and-Clan system of corruption, oligarchs will also leverage whatever governmental authority they have to their advantage. Going back to the Marcos example, despite their convictions, the Marcoses have managed to weasel their way back into power, with Ferdinand Marcos Jr. becoming the 17th President despite his conviction for tax violation. Several politicians have also been convicted of graft and corruption (or have at least been hounded by allegations of corruption) and still remain in politics. As observed by Johnston in his article, though Ferdinand and Imelda Marcos are the popular images of corruption in the Philippines, he also noted other entrenched oligarchs throughout the country.
Finally, factions also tend to be “unstable and poorly disciplined.” The term “balimbing” is often thrown around in local politics but, more than that, the Philippines is also familiar with politically-motivated violence and disorder.
All these features are characteristics of Oligarch-and-Clan corruption, where these oligarchic families continue to hold power and politicians exploit their positions to enrich themselves or their families.
Corruption, no matter what kind, needs to be curbed. It results in loss of government money, which could have been used to boost the economy and help ordinary citizens, especially those from the lower income sectors.
According to the 2007 study, the Office of the Ombudsman had, in 1999, pegged losses arising from corruption at P100 million daily, whereas the World Bank estimates the losses at one-fifth of the national government budget. For relatively more updated figures, former Deputy Ombudsman Cyril Ramos claimed that the Philippines had lost a total of P1.4 trillion in 2017 and 2018. These estimates are in line with the World Bank estimates of one-fifth (or 20 percent) of the national budget.
So grave is the adverse effect of corruption that the international community recognized it as an international crime under the United Nations Convention Against Corruption where perpetual disqualification of convicted officials is recommended.
But the question stands: can corruption be eradicated in developing countries like the Philippines? Many Philippine presidents promised to end corruption in their political campaigning, but none has achieved it so far. If the government truly wants to end corruption, it must implement policies directed against corruption, such as lifting the bank secrecy law, prosecuting and punishing corrupt officials, increasing government transparency and more. INQ
This is part of the author’s presentation at DPI 543 Corruption: Finding It and Fixing It course at Harvard Kennedy School, where he is MPA/Mason fellow.
Subscribe to our daily newsletter
This article reflects the personal opinion of the author and not the official stand of the Management Association of the Philippines or MAP. He is a member of MAP Tax Committee and MAP Ease of Doing Business Committee, co-chair of Paying Taxes on Ease of Doing Business Task Force and chief tax advisor of Asian Consulting Group. Feedback at [email protected] and [email protected] .
Curated business news
Disclaimer: Comments do not represent the views of INQUIRER.net. We reserve the right to exclude comments which are inconsistent with our editorial standards. FULL DISCLAIMER
© copyright 1997-2024 inquirer.net | all rights reserved.
We use cookies to ensure you get the best experience on our website. By continuing, you are agreeing to our use of cookies. To find out more, please click this link.
Advertisement
The Philippines: a social structure of corruption
- Published: 06 February 2024
Cite this article
- Andrew Guth ORCID: orcid.org/0000-0001-6247-4955 1
358 Accesses
1 Altmetric
Explore all metrics
The anticorruption community largely views corruption as a government or development issue. But in the Philippines, corruption is a social structure. The very social bonds and social structures that are good at building civic unity and solidarity are also good at spreading and maintaining corruption, and this is why corruption is so difficult to remove. Patrons use these societal features to implement a ubiquitous social structure of corruption by means of maneuvered friendships that makes it difficult for the masses to know when a patron is acting as a friend or foe. The social structure encompasses the whole of society and corrupts the encircled government, political, and development systems as easily as it infiltrates all other segments of society. It is why oversight and sector-based anticorruption initiatives underperform, and why initiatives must pivot towards addressing this social structure.
This is a preview of subscription content, log in via an institution to check access.
Access this article
Subscribe and save.
- Get 10 units per month
- Download Article/Chapter or eBook
- 1 Unit = 1 Article or 1 Chapter
- Cancel anytime
Price includes VAT (Russian Federation)
Instant access to the full article PDF.
Rent this article via DeepDyve
Institutional subscriptions
Similar content being viewed by others
Anti-corruption Institutions: Some History and Theory
Corruption as a political phenomenon.
International Anti-Corruption Initiatives: a Classification of Policy Interventions
Data availability.
The author’s interview notes generated during and/or analyzed during the current study are not publicly available to help ensure confidentiality of the interviewees, but are available from the corresponding author on reasonable request.
Pronounced ‘leader’ in English, lider is a term used in the Philippines specifically referring to individuals (or leaders) in the community that are sought by candidates to convince the electorate to vote for that particular candidate. Liders are the individuals that perform the physical exchange of money for votes with the electorate.
A barangay is the lowest level of elected government. Each city or municipality is comprised of multiple barangays (villages).
See Appendix for a full list of respondents.
Interviews 2–3, 6, 14–16, 18–20, 22, 25, 39, 41–42, 44–50.
Utang na loob is usually translated as “debt of gratitude.” The literal translation is “debt of inside” or “internal debt.” It can also be translated as “reciprocity” or “lifelong reciprocation.”
Interviews 1,14,21,24,42–44.
The paper uses the term ‘client’ to represent the economically lower-class voters who are in clientelistic relationships with political families/candidates (patrons).
Interviews 1,14,24,42–44.
Clans are a connection of least ten extended families – usually more – where each extended family could have more than a hundred members. Clans then have a minimum of a thousand members and usually much more.
Interviews 2,5–6,9–10,14–51.
Interviews 3–6,9–10,12,14–23,25–26,27–51.
Interviews 3–6, 9–10,12,14–23,25–26,27–51.
Interviews 14–22,25–26,39,47–50.
Interviews 16,22,27–38.
Interviews 14,16,21,24,39,42–44.
Interviews 16,22.
Interview 22.
Interview 23.
Interviews 1,20.
Interviews 2,5,14–23,26,32–39,41,45,47–51.
Interviews 15–16,20,22.
Interviews 27–31.
Interview 24.
Interviews 2,6,10.
Interview 22–23.
Interviews 14,18,32–38.
Interviews 32–38.
Interviews 1,10,18–22,32–38,47–49,50–51.
Interviews 2–4,6,14–15,20,22,40,45–49.
Interview 16.
Interviews 2–3.
Interview 3.
Interviews 1,3–6,10,12,15,50.
Interview 15.
Interviews 2–3,6,15.
BARMM consists of the region formally known as the Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao (ARMM) plus the addition of Cotabato City and villages in northern Cotabato.
Interviews 3–4.
Interview 1.
Interview 3–4,6,10,12.
Interview 7.
Interviews 2–3,6,14–16,18–20,22,25,39,41–42,44–50.
Interviews 1,3–7,10,12,14–15.
Interviews 1,3–4,6,9–10,14,16–18,24.
Interviews 1, 3–4,6,9–10,14,16–18,24.
COMELEC is the Commission on Elections in charge of ensuring fair and free elections.
Interviews 3–4,6–7.
Interview 6.
Interviews 14–15,25–26.
Interviews 14–16,25–26,32–38.
Interviews 14–15,25–26,32–38.
Interviews 14–16,20,22–23,25–38.
Interview 21.
Interview 2.
Interview 14,21,49.
Interviews 2,16,20,22–23,27–31.
Interviews 1,2.
Interviews 52,54–59,61–64,66–67.
Interviews 6,14,16,18–19,21–23,25,50.
Interviews 3–4,18,52,54–59,61–64,66–67.
Interviews 3–4,6–8,52,54–55,56–58,61,64.
Interviews 2–3,6,14–16,18–22,25,39,41–42,44–50.
Alejo, M. J., Rivera, M. E. P., & Valencia, N. I. P. (1996). [De]scribing elections: A study of elections in the lifeworld of San Isidro . Institute for Popular Democracy.
Google Scholar
Andreas, P., & Duran-Martinez, A. (2013). The International Politics of Drugs and Illicit Trade in the Americas (Working Paper No. 2013-05). Brown University: The Watson Institute for International Studies.
Auyero, J. (2000). The logic of clientelism in Argentina: An Ethnographic Account. Latin American Research Review, 35 (3), 55–81.
Article Google Scholar
Auyero, J. (2001). Poor people’s politics: Peronist Survival Networks and the legacy of Evita . Duke University Press.
Bacchus, E. B., & Boulding, C. (2022). Corruption perceptions: Confidence in elections and evaluations of clientelism. Governance, 35 (2), 609–632. https://doi.org/10.1111/gove.12598
Balotol, R. O., Jr. (2021). Ideology in the time of pandemic: A Filipino experience. Discusiones Filosóficas, 22 (38), 31–41. https://doi.org/10.17151/difil.2021.22.38.3
Bardhan, P. (2022). Clientelism and governance. World Development, 152 , 105797. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.worlddev.2021.105797
Benstead, L., Atkeson, L. R., & Shahid, M. A. (2019). Does wasta undermine support for democracy? Corruption, clientelism, and attitudes toward political regimes. Corruption and Informal practices in the Middle East and North Africa . Routledge.
Berenschot, W., & Aspinall, E. (2020). How clientelism varies: Comparing patronage democracies. Democratization, 27 (1), 1–19. https://doi.org/10.1080/13510347.2019.1645129
Bobonis, G. J., Gertler, P. J., Gonzalez-Navarro, M., & Nichter, S. (2019). Government transparency and political clientelism: Evidence from randomized anti-corruption audits in Brazil [workingPaper]. CAF. Retrieved January 16, 2023, from https://cafscioteca.azurewebsites.net/handle/123456789/1463
Boissevain, J. (1966). Patronage in Sicily. Man, 1 (1), 18–33. https://doi.org/10.2307/2795898
Bosworth, J. (2010). Honduras: Organized Crime Gaining Amid Political Crisis (Working Paper Series on Organized Crime in Central America, p. 33). Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars.
Brun, D. A. (2014). Evaluating political clientelism. In L. Diamond, & D. A. Brun (Eds.), Clientelism, Social Policy, and the quality of democracy (pp. 1–14). JHU Press.
Canare, T., & Mendoza, R. U. (2022). Access to Information and other correlates of Vote Buying and Selling Behaviour: Insights from Philippine Data. Journal of Interdisciplinary Economics, 34 (2), 139–161. https://doi.org/10.1177/02601079211034607
Cantú, F. (2019). Groceries for votes: The Electoral returns of vote buying. The Journal of Politics, 81 (3), 790–804. https://doi.org/10.1086/702945
Co, E. A., Lim, M., Jayme-Lao, M. E., & Juan, L. J. (2007). Philippine Democracy Assessment: Minimizing corruption . FES Philippine Office.
Co, E. A., Tigno, J. V., Lao, M. E. J., & Sayo, M. A. (2005). Philippine Democracy Assessment: Free and Fair elections and the democratic role of political parties . Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung (FES).
Coronel, S. (2004). How Representative is Congress? Retrieved November 8, 2013, from http://pcij.org/stories/print/congress.html
Dancel, F. (2005). Chapter V - Utang na Loob (Debt of Goodwill): A Philosophical Analysis. In Filipino Cultural Traits: Claro R. Ceniza Lectures (Vol. 4, pp. 109–128). The Council for Research in Values and Philosophy. Retrieved May 7, 2017, from https://books.google.com/books?hl=en&lr=&id=hXJe6vKMjroC&oi=fnd&pg=PA109&dq=utang+na+loob&ots=IweNAplUNn&sig=PIltD0241NiXFkfyit-XHnsJPVs#v=onepage&q=utang%20na%20loob&f=false
Dressler, W. (2021). Defending lands and forests: NGO histories, everyday struggles, and extraordinary violence in the Philippines. Critical Asian Studies, 53 (3), 380–411. https://doi.org/10.1080/14672715.2021.1899834
Eaton, K. (2006). The downside of decentralization: Armed Clientelism in Colombia. Security Studies, 15 (4), 533–562. https://doi.org/10.1080/09636410601188463
Article MathSciNet Google Scholar
Eaton, K., & Chambers-Ju, C. (2014). Teachers, mayors, and the transformations of Cleintelism in Colombia. In D. A. Brun & L. Diamond (Eds.), Clientelism, Social Policy, and the quality of democracy (pp. 88–113). JHU Press.
Heydarian, R. J. (2018). The rise of Duterte: A Populist revolt against Elite Democracy . Palgrave MacMillan.
Book Google Scholar
Hicken, A. (2011). Clientelism. Annual Review of Political Science, 14 (1), 289–310. https://doi.org/10.1146/annurev.polisci.031908.220508
Hilgers, T. (2011). Clientelism and conceptual stretching: Differentiating among concepts and among analytical levels. Theory & Society, 40 (5), 567–588. https://doi.org/10.1007/s11186-011-9152-6
Hollnsteiner, M. R. (1963). The Dynamics of Power in a Philippine Municipality . Community Development Research Council, University of the Philippines.
Institute of Philippine Culture. (2005). The vote of the poor: Modernity and tradition in people’s views of Leadership and elections . Institute of Philippine Culture, Ateneo de Manila University.
Karhunen, P., Kosonen, R., McCarthy, D. J., & Puffer, S. M. (2018). The darker side of Social Networks in transforming economies: Corrupt Exchange in Chinese Guanxi and Russian Blat/Svyazi. Management and Organization Review, 14 (2), 395–419.
Kerkvliet, B. J., & Mojares, R. B. (Eds.). (1991). From Marcos to Aquino: Local perspectives on political transition in the Philippines . University of Hawaii Press.
Kingston, P. (2001). Patrons, clients and civil society: A Case Study of Environmental politics in Postwar Lebanon. Arab Studies Quarterly, 23 (1), 55.
Kitschelt, H., & Wilkinson, S. (2007). Patrons, clients and policies: Patterns of democratic accountability and political competition . Cambridge University Press.
Klíma, M. (2019). Political parties, clientelism and state capture. Routledge. https://doi.org/10.4324/9780203702031
Krug, E., Dahlberg, L., Mercy, J., Zwi, A., & Lozano, R. (Eds.). (2002). World Report on Violence and Health . WHO.
Krznaric, R. (2006). The limits on Pro-poor Agricultural Trade in Guatemala: Land, Labour and Political Power. Journal of Human Development, 7 (1), 111–135. https://doi.org/10.1080/14649880500502144
Landé, C. H. (1965). Leaders, factions, and parties: The structure of Philippine politics . Southeast Asia Studies, Yale University.
Li, L. (2018). The moral economy of guanxi and the market of corruption: Networks, brokers and corruption in China’s courts. International Political Science Review, 39 (5), 634–646.
Article ADS Google Scholar
Liu, X. X., Christopoulos, G. I., & Hong, Y. (2017). Beyond Black and White: Three decision frames of Bribery. In D. C. Robertson & P. M. Nichols (Eds.), Thinking about Bribery: Neuroscience, Moral Cognition and the psychology of Bribery (pp. 121–122). Cambridge University Press. https://doi.org/10.1017/9781316450765.006
Chapter Google Scholar
Lyne, M. M. (2007). Rethinking economies and institutions: The voter’s dilemma and democratic accountability. In H. Kitschelt & S. I. Wilkinson (Eds.), Patrons, clients and policies: Patterns of democratic accountability and political competition (pp. 159–181). Cambridge University Press.
Magaloni, B., Diaz-Cayeros, A., & Estevez, F. (2007). Clientelism and portfolio diversification: A model of electoral investment with applications to Mexico. In H. Kitschelt, & S. I. Wilkinson (Eds.), Patrons, clients and policies: Patterns of democratic accountability and political competition (pp. 182–205). Cambridge University Press.
Mendoza, R. U., Yap, J. K., Mendoza, G. A. S., Pizzaro, A. L. J., & Engelbrecht, G. (2022). Political dynasties and Terrorism: An empirical analysis using data on the Philippines. Asian Journal of Peacebuilding, 10 (2), 435–459. https://doi.org/10.18588/202210.00a266
Mişcoiu, S., & Kakdeu, L. M. (2021). Authoritarian clientelism: The case of the president’s ‘creatures’ in Cameroon. Acta Politica, 56 (4), 639–657. https://doi.org/10.1057/s41269-020-00188-y
Montiel, C. J. (2014). Philippine Political Culture and Governance . Retrieved June 8, 2016, from http://www.ombudsman.gov.ph/UNDP4/philippine-political-culture-view-from-inside-the-halls-of-power/index.html
Mungiu-Pippidi, A. (2006). Corruption: Diagnosis and treatment. Journal of Democracy, 17 (3), 86–99.
Muno, W. (2010). Conceptualizing and Measuring Clientelism . Retrieved February 25, 2014, from http://www.academia.edu/3024122/Conceptualizing_and_Measuring_Clientelism
Norton, A. R. (2007). The role of Hezbollah in Lebanese domestic politics. The International Spectator, 42 (4), 475–491. https://doi.org/10.1080/03932720701722852
Persson, A., Rothstein, B., & Teorell, J. (2013). Why Anticorruption reforms fail—systemic corruption as a collective action problem. Governance, 26 (3), 449–471. https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1468-0491.2012.01604.x
Persson, A., Rothstein, B., & Teorell, J. (2019). Getting the basic nature of systemic corruption right: A reply to Marquette and Peiffer. Governance, 32 (4), 799–810. https://doi.org/10.1111/gove.12403
Piattoni, S. (2001). Clientelism in historical and compartive perspective. Clientelism, interests, and democratic representation: The European experience in historical and comparative perspective (pp. 1–30). Cambridge University Press.
Pitt-Rivers, J. A. (1954). The people of the Sierra . Criterion Books. Retrieved February 24, 2014, from http://archive.org/details/peopleofthesierr001911mbp
Quah, J. S. T. (2010). Curbing corruption in the Philippines: Is this an impossible dream? Philippine Journal of Public Administration, 54 (1–2), 1–43.
Quah, J. S. T. (2019). Combating police corruption in five Asian countries: A comparative analysis. Asian Education and Development Studies, 9 (2), 197–216. https://doi.org/10.1108/AEDS-06-2019-0100
Quah, J. S. T. (2021). Breaking the cycle of failure in combating corruption in Asian countries. Public Administration and Policy, 24 (2), 125–138. https://doi.org/10.1108/PAP-05-2021-0034
Republic Act 7160: The Local Government Code of the Philippines, & 7160, R. A. (1991). Congress of the Philippines , Book III. Retrieved October 27, 2015, from http://www.dilg.gov.ph/LocalGovernmentCode.aspx
Radeljić, B., & Đorđević, V. (2020). Clientelism and the abuse of power in the Western Balkans. Journal of Balkan and Near Eastern Studies, 22 (5), 597–612. https://doi.org/10.1080/19448953.2020.1799299
Rose-Ackerman, S. (1978). Corruption: A study in Political Economy . Academic Press: Harcourt, Brace, Jovanovich.
Rothstein, B. (2011). Anti-corruption: The indirect ‘big bang’ approach. Review of International Political Economy, 18 (2), 228–250. https://doi.org/10.1080/09692291003607834
Sarkar, R. (2020). Corruption and Its Consequences. In R. Sarkar (Ed.), International Development Law: Rule of Law, Human Rights and Global Finance (pp. 355–418). Springer International Publishing. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-40071-2_8
Schaffer, F. C. (2002). What is Vote Buying? Empirical Evidence . Retrieved March 27, 2017, from http://web.mit.edu/CIS/pdf/Schaffer_2.pdf
Scott, J. C., & Kerkvliet, B. J. (1973). How traditional rural patrons lose legitimacy: A theory with special reference to Southeast Asia . Université catholique de Louvain.
Scott, J. C. (1972). Patron-client politics and political change in Southeast Asia. The American Political Science Review, 66 (1), 91–113. https://doi.org/10.2307/1959280
Sidel, J. (1999). Capital, Coercion, and crime: Bossism in the Philippines . Stanford University Press.
Stokes, S., Dunning, T., Nazareno, M., & Brusco, V. (2013). Brokers, voters, and clientelism: The puzzle of Distributive politics . Cambridge University Press.
Tanaka, M., & Melendez, C. (2014). The future of Peru’s brokered democracy. In L. Diamond & D. A. Brun (Eds.), Clientelism, Social Policy, and the quality of democracy (pp. 1–14). JHU Press.
Thompson, M., & Batalla, E. V. C. (Eds.). (2018). Introduction. Routledge Handbook of the Contemporary Philippines (pp. 26–37). Taylor & Francis.
Transparency International (2023). 2021 Corruption Perceptions Index . Transparency.Org. Retrieved January 15, 2023, from https://www.transparency.org/en/cpi/2021
US Department of State (2022). 2022 International Narcotics Control Strategy Report: Volume I - Drug and Chemical Control (As submitted to Congress) . Retrieved March 30, 2022, from https://www.state.gov/2022-incsr-volume-i-drug-and-chemical-control-as-submitted-to-congress/
Varraich, A. (2014). Corruption: An Umbrella Concept (Working Paper Series 2014: 05 ) . The Quality of Government Institute.
Vuković, V. (2019). Political Economy of Corruption, Clientelism and Vote-Buying in Croatian Local Government. In Z. Petak & K. Kotarski (Eds.), Policy-Making at the European Periphery: The Case of Croatia (pp. 107–124). Springer International Publishing. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-73582-5_6
Weingrod, A. (1968). Patrons, patronage, and political parties. Comparative Studies in Society and History, 10 (4), 377–400.
Weiss, M. (2019). Chapter 8: Patranage Politics and parties in the Philippines: Insights from the 2016 elections. In P. D. Hutchcroft (Ed.), Strong Patronage, weak parties: The Case for Electoral System Redesign in the Philippines . Co Published With World Scientific. Retrieved January 23, 2023, from https://www.worldscientific.com/doi/abs/10.1142/9789811212604_0008
WHO (2014). Global Status Report on Violence Prevention 2014 . World Health Organization. Retrieved November 8, 2017, from https://www.who.int/publications/i/item/9789241564793
Wolf, S. (2009). Subverting democracy: Elite rule and the limits to political participation in post-war El Salvador. Journal of Latin American Studies, 41 (3), 429–465.
Zeidan, D. (2017). Municipal Management and Service Delivery as Resilience Strategies: Hezbollah’s Local Development Politics in South-Lebanon. In Islam in a Changing MIddle East: Local Politics and Islamist Movements (pp. 37–40). The Project on Middle East Political Science (POMEPS). Retrieved December 2, 2018, from https://www.researchgate.net/profile/Melissa_Marschall/publication/320592315_Municipal_Service_Delivery_Identity_Politics_and_Islamist_Parties_in_Turkey/links/59ef4946a6fdccd492871a9f/Municipal-Service-Delivery-Identity-Politics-and-Islamist-Parties-in-Turkey.pdf#page=38
Download references
No funding.
Author information
Authors and affiliations.
College of Overseas Education, Chengdu University, 2025 Chengluo Avenue, Longquanyi District, Chengdu City, Sichuan Province, China
Andrew Guth
You can also search for this author in PubMed Google Scholar
Contributions
The sole author (Dr. Andrew Guth) performed all work for the paper, including conception and design; acquisition, analysis, or interpretation of data; drafting and revising; final approval for publication; and agrees to be accountable for all aspects of the work in ensuring that questions related to the accuracy or integrity of any part of the work are appropriately investigated and resolved.
Corresponding author
Correspondence to Andrew Guth .
Ethics declarations
No prior presentation of the paper.
Ethical approval
Research adheres to the principles and guidance for human subjects research. Research was reviewed by the appropriate ethics committee on human subjects research (i.e., interviews). Committee deemed the research exempt from review.
Informed consent
Informed consent forms were given and discussed with each interviewee, included that there were no benefits to the interviewee other than helping the research and that there were no foreseen risks due to the confidentiality of the interview. Data collection procedures are discussed further in the methods section of the paper.
Human subjects research
All human subjects (interviewees) are protected by confidentiality.
Competing interests
No known conflicts of interest.
Additional information
Publisher’s note.
Springer Nature remains neutral with regard to jurisdictional claims in published maps and institutional affiliations.
Appendix: List of interviews
All identifying markers were removed to help ensure confidentiality. Interviews performed from 2013 to 2015.
Number | Occupation |
---|---|
1 | Executive Director - Pro-democracy NGO |
2 | Professor |
3 | Secretary General - National Pro-democracy NGO |
4 | Chairperson - International Pro-democracy NGO |
5 | Chairperson - National Pro-democracy NGO |
6 | Executive Director - Pro-democracy NGO |
7 | Assistant Professor |
8 | Former Director - Teaching Institution |
9 | Professor |
10 | Professor |
11 | Corporate Secretary - Pro-democracy NGO for Western Mindanao |
12 | President - Pro-democracy NGO for Western Mindanao |
13 | Executive Director - Anticorruption NGO |
14 | Nobel Peace Prize Nominee (former) |
15 | Founder & Director - Development NGO for Western Mindanao |
16 | University President (ret.) |
17 | Congressperson of the Philippines |
18 | Political family member |
19 | Campaign Manager |
20 | Anticorruption Grass Roots Advocate |
21 | Former Candidate for Governor |
22 | City Councilor |
23 | Provincial Judge |
24 |
|
25 | Treasurer / |
26 | Captain |
27 | Farmer |
28 | Farmer |
29 | Farmer |
30 | Farmer |
31 | Farmer |
32 | Farmer |
33 | Farmer |
34 | Farmer |
35 | Farmer |
36 | Farmer |
37 | Farmer |
38 | Farmer |
39 | Student |
40 | Student |
41 | Student |
42 | Student |
43 | Student |
44 | Student |
45 | School Teacher (ret.) |
46 | Farmer |
47 | Restaurant Employee |
48 | Housewife |
49 | Singer/Musician |
50 | Chaplain |
51 | Secretary |
52 | Philippine National Police (PNP) – Chairman Level |
53 | Member of Government Peace Panel for MILF Talks |
54 | Professor |
55 | Professor |
56 | Asian Institute of Management (AIM) Policy Center |
57 | United States Agency of International Development (USAID) |
58 | Assistant Ombudsman |
59 | Former Secretary of the Interior and Local Government – Cabinet Member in charge of Department of Interior and Local Government (DILG) |
60 | Professor |
61 | Professor |
62 | Institute for Popular Democracy (IPD) |
63 | Mayor of a Metro Manila city |
64 | Philippine National Police (PNP) – Deputy Director Level |
65 | Community Development Foundation |
66 | Former Mayor of Metro Manila city |
67 | Asian Development Bank – Director’s Office of Anticorruption and Integrity (OAI) |
Rights and permissions
Springer Nature or its licensor (e.g. a society or other partner) holds exclusive rights to this article under a publishing agreement with the author(s) or other rightsholder(s); author self-archiving of the accepted manuscript version of this article is solely governed by the terms of such publishing agreement and applicable law.
Reprints and permissions
About this article
Guth, A. The Philippines: a social structure of corruption. Crime Law Soc Change (2024). https://doi.org/10.1007/s10611-024-10140-2
Download citation
Accepted : 16 January 2024
Published : 06 February 2024
DOI : https://doi.org/10.1007/s10611-024-10140-2
Share this article
Anyone you share the following link with will be able to read this content:
Sorry, a shareable link is not currently available for this article.
Provided by the Springer Nature SharedIt content-sharing initiative
- Social bonds
- Vote buying
- Clientelism
- Philippines
- Find a journal
- Publish with us
- Track your research
A broken vow: an examination of the cases of Corruption in the Philippines
- Christian Gonzales Isabela State University - Cauayan https://orcid.org/0000-0002-7712-359X
The problem of corruption in the Philippines seems to be humongous as if no solution is available for its cure. This study used a descriptive and qualitative research design. It exposed the anti-corruption laws and the cases decided by the various Philippine courts. It found out that even with the existence of laws as well as the removal or the conviction of several government officials and employees, corrupt practices seem to be undeterred. The continuance of corruption in the country resulted to the promise of President Duterte to be a broken vow.
ABS-CBN. (2016, December 17). Duterte fires 2 immigration deputies in bribery scandal. Retrieved December 4, 2020, from ABS-CBN News: https://news.abs-cbn.com/news/12/16/16/duterte-fires-2-immigration-deputies-in-bribery-scandal
Araja, R. N. (2020, October 28). Ombudsman suspends 44 BI execs over ’pastillas’ scam. Retrieved December 4, 2020, from ManilaStandard.Net: https://manilastandard.net/mobile/article/337994
Aranas, A. G. (2016, May 31). Bureaucracy on Trail: Ethical Standards for Public Officials and Employees. International Journal of Current Research, 32071-32073. Retrieved December 3, 2020, from http://www.journalcra.com/sites/default/files/issue-pdf/14698.pdf
Ballaran, J. (2018, April 6). Aguirre resigned due to public’s loss of trust in him – official. Retrieved December 5, 2020, from Inquirer.Net: https://newsinfo.inquirer.net/980581/aguirre-resigned-due-to-publics-loss-of-trust-in-him-official
Batalla, E. V. (2020, June 10). Grand corruption scandals in the Philippines. Emerald Insight, 23(1), 73-86. doi: https://doi.org/10.1108/PAP-11-2019-0036
Buan, L. (2018, May 8). Ombudsman probes P60-million DOT-Tulfo controversy. Retrieved December 4, 2020, from Rappler: https://www.rappler.com/nation/ombudsman-investigation-wanda-teo-tourism-department-tulfo-controversy
Bueza, M. (2018, June 29). Notable Duterte admin exits and reappointments. Retrieved December 5, 2020, from Rappler: https://specials.rappler.com/newsbreak/videos-podcasts/205964-firing-resignations-reappointments-duterte-administration/index.html
Campanilla, M. B. (2019). Criminal Law Reviewer Volume II. Manila: Rex Printing Company Inc.
Carandang, M. A., & Balboa-Cahig, J. A. (2018). COUNTERING CORRUPTION IN THE PHILIPPINES: PROTOTYPES AND REINFORCING MEASURES. TWELFTH REGIONAL SEMINAR ON GOOD GOVERNANCE FOR SOUTHEAST ASIAN COUNTRIES (pp. 103-113). Tokyo City, Japan: United Nations Asia and Far East Institute for the Prevention of Crime and the Treatment of Offenders. Retrieved November 29, 2020, from https://www.unafei.or.jp/publications/pdf/GG12/21_GG12_CP_Philippines.pdf
CNN Philippines Staff. (2018, May 3). President's office investigating officials involved in P60M DOT-PTV deal controversy. Retrieved December 4, 2020, from CNN Philippines: https://cnnphilippines.com/news/2018/05/03/DOT-Tourism-Wanda-Teo-PTV-4-Tulfo.html
CNN Staff, P. (2017, October 23). Malacañang: Bautista's resignation 'effective immediately. Retrieved November 30, 2020, from CNN Philippines: https://cnnphilippines.com/news/2017/10/23/malcanang-andres-bautista-resignation-effective-immediately.html
Conde, C. H. (2007, October 1). Benjamin Abalos, Filipino elections official, resigns in a scandal that may threaten Arroyo. The New York Times, p. not applicable. Retrieved November 30, 2020, from https://www.nytimes.com/2007/10/01/world/asia/01iht-phils.1.7696723.html
Coronel, S. S., & Kawal-Tirol, L. (2002). Investigating Corruption: A Do-It-Yourself Guide. Manila: Philipine Center for Investigative Journalism.
Corrales, N. (2016, March 20). Duterte: ‘I can’t promise heaven, but I will stop corruption’. Retrieved November 27, 2020, from Inquirer.Net: https://newsinfo.inquirer.net/775352/duterte-i-cant-promise-heaven-but-i-will-stop-corruption
Crimes Committed by Public Officers. (n.d.). Retrieved from Batas Natin: https://batasnatin.com/law-library/criminal-law/crimes-and-penalties/1066-title-seven-revised-penal-code-crimes-committed-by-public-officers.html
Cupin, B. (2018). LOOK: Why the House panel wants to impeach Sereno. Manila: Rappler. Retrieved November 30, 2020, from https://www.rappler.com/nation/sereno-articles-of-impeachment-house
Diaz, J. (2007, September 2008). Abalos faces impeachment. PhilStar Global, p. not applicable. Retrieved November 30, 2020, from https://www.philstar.com/headlines/2007/09/28/16994/abalos-faces-impeachment
EIU. (2001, June 1). The Economist Intelligence Unit. Retrieved November 30, 2020, from The Economist Group: http://country.eiu.com/article.aspx?articleid=1628143747&Country=Philippines&topic=Politics&subtopic=Recent+developments&subsubtopic=The+political+scene:+Merceditas+Gutierrez+resigns+as+ombudsman
Endriga, J. N. (1979, July-October). Historical Notes on Graft and Corruption. Philippine Journal 0/Public Administration, XXIII(3 and 4), 241-254. Retrieved November 28, 2020, from https://pssc.org.ph/wp-content/pssc-archives/Philippine%20Journal%20of%20Public%20Administration/1979/Num%203-4/06_Historical%20Notes%20on%20Graft%20and%20Corruption%20in%20the%20Phils..pdf
Ferrer, E. S., & De Dios, R. D. (2001, January-June). Corruption in the Philippines: Framework and Context. Philippine Journal of Public Policy, 5(1), 1-42. Retrieved November 28, 2020, from https://cids.up.edu.ph/wp-content/uploads/Corruption-in-the-Philippines-vol.5-no.1-Jan-June-2001-2.pdf
Gonzales, C. (2020, February 18). 5 immigration officers sacked over ‘pastillas’ bribery scheme for Pogo workers. Inquirer.Net, p. n/a. Retrieved December 4, 2020, from https://newsinfo.inquirer.net/1230159/5-immigration-officers-relieved-from-posts-due-to-pastillas-scheme
Gotinga, J. (2020, September 22). Drilon calls for reorganization of Bureau of Immigration over ‘pastillas’ bribery scheme. Retrieved December 4, 2020, from Rappler: https://www.rappler.com/nation/drilon-calls-reorganization-bureau-immigration-pastillas-bribery-scheme
Gregorio, X. (2019, July 22). From ‘three to six months’ to three years: Drugs, corruption still among Duterte’s woes. Retrieved from CNN Philippines: https://cnnphilippines.com/news/2019/7/22/SONA-2019-Rodrigo-Duterte-corruption.html?fbclid=lwAR2
Gutierrez, J. (2016, June 30). Rodrigo Duterte inaugurated as Philippines President. CNN World, p. n/a. Retrieved December 4, 2020, from https://edition.cnn.com/2016/06/29/asia/philippines-duterte-inauguration/index.html
History and Origin. (n.d.). Retrieved from Office of the Ombudsman: https://www.ombudsman.gov.ph/about-us/history/
Impeachment: A Political and Historical Guide. (2014). Retrieved from GOV.PH: https://www.gov.ph/documents/20147/233614/ImpeachmentPrimer.pdf/72801f41-71e1-ae60-d5bb-c69dbf622994?version=1.0
Jalea, G., & Peralta, J. (2020, August 4). Whistleblower claims ₱15 billion stolen by PhilHealth execs in fraud schemes. Retrieved December 4, 2020, from CNN Philippines: https://cnnphilippines.com/news/2020/8/4/PhilHealth-P15-billion-stolen-mafia-execs.html
Legaspi, A., & Macas, T. (2017, April 4). Sueno fired from DILG post. Retrieved December 5, 2020, from GMA News Online: https://www.gmanetwork.com/news/news/nation/605738/sueno-fired-from-dilg-post/story/
Lopez, M. L. (2020, September 28). PACC probing 40 names in PhilHealth scandal, filing more cases 'very soon'. Retrieved December 4, 2020, from CNN Philippines: https://www.cnnphilippines.com/news/2020/9/28/PACC-PhilHealth-more-cases-coming.html
Magsambol, B. (2020, August 4). Resigned officer says PhilHealth chief ordered him to 'massage' overpriced testing kits issue. Retrieved December 4, 2020, from Rappler: https://www.rappler.com/nation/ex-philhealth-officer-says-morales-ordered-massage-overpriced-covid-19-testing-kits-issue
Malcolm, G. A. (1926). Philippine Constitutional Law 2nd Edition. Manila: P.I. & Rochester, NY, Lawyers Co-op.
Malversation and Legal Definition. (n.d). Retrieved from US Legal: https://definitions.uslegal.com/m/malversation/
Marcelo, E. (2017, November 25). Ex-CamSur mayor pleads guilty to ethics violation. Philstar Global, p. n/a. Retrieved December 3, 2020, from https://www.philstar.com/nation/2017/11/25/1762384/ex-camsur-mayor-pleads-guilty-ethics-violation
Merez, A., Quintos, P., Reformina, I., & Manabat, J. (2018). Supreme Court ousts Chief Justice Sereno. Manila: ABS-CBN News. Retrieved November 30, 2020, from https://news.abs-cbn.com/news/05/11/18/supreme-court-ousts-chief-justice-sereno
Nachura, A. E. (2016). Outline Reviewer in Political Law. Quezon City: VJ Graphic Arts, Inc.
Nicolas, F. (2016, December 13). Immigration Deputy Commissioners Argosino, Robles: Our integrity is intact. CNN Philippines, p. n/a. Retrieved December 4, 2020, from https://cnnphilippines.com/news/2016/12/13/bureau-of-immigration-commissioners-argosino-robles-justice-secretary-aguirre-jack-lam-sombrero.html
Nolasco, M. C. (2017, May). SMUGGLING OF ILLICIT DRUGS AIDED BY CUSTOMS PLAYERS. WORK PRODUCT OF THE 169TH INTERNATIONAL TRAINING COURSE (pp. 59-62). Tokyo, Japan: United Nations Asia and Far East Institute for the Prevention of Crime and the Treatment of Offenders. Retrieved December 4, 2020, from United Nations Asia and Far East Institute for the Prevention of Crime and the Treatment of Offendeers: https://www.unafei.or.jp/publications/pdf/RS_No106/No106_12_IP_Philippines.pdf
Office of the Ombudsman. (2018, November 30). 2017 National Household Survey on Experience with Corruption in the Philippines. Retrieved December 3, 2020, from www.obudsman.gov.ph: https://www.ombudsman.gov.ph/docs/08%20Resources/2017%20National%20Household%20Survey%20on%20Experience%20with%20Corruption%20in%20the%20Philippines.pdf
Ombudsman. (2017, October 27). OMB indicts immigration commissioners in extortion plot for plunder. Retrieved December 4, 2020, from Office of the Ombudsman: https://www.ombudsman.gov.ph/omb-indicts-immigration-commissioners-in-extortion-plot-for-plunder/
Parpan, L., & Lardizabal, C. (2017, July 31). Senate alleges corruption and incompetence in customs bureau over biggest haul yet of shabu smuggled into PH. Retrieved December 4, 2020, from CNN Philippines: https://cnnphilippines.com/news/2017/07/31/senate-probe-customs-drugs-china-faeldon.html
Press, A. (2017, March 15). Philippine lawmakers kill impeachment case against Duterte. Retrieved November 30, 2020, from USA Today: https://www.usatoday.com/story/news/world/2017/05/15/philippine-lawmakers-kill-impeachment-case-against-duterte/101700122/
Purugganan, J. (2019, May 8). Selective Transparency, Inconsistent Accountability:Unpacking Duterte’s Anti-Corruption Campaign. Retrieved December 5, 2020, from Focus on the Global South: https://focusweb.org/selective-transparency-inconsistent-accountabilityunpacking-dutertes-anti-corruption-campaign/
R.C.C. NO. 40 Saturday, July 26, 1986. (n.d.). Retrieved from Official Gazette: https://www.officialgazette.gov.ph/1986/07/26/r-c-c-no-40-saturday-july-26-1986/
Ranada, P. (2016, June 22). Duterte to gov't employees: One whiff of corruption, you're out. Rappler, p. n/a. Retrieved December 4, 2020, from https://www.rappler.com/nation/duterte-government-employees-corruption
Ranada, P. (2020, October 27). Duterte orders DOJ to probe corruption 'in entire government'. Retrieved from Rappler: https://www.rappler.com/nation/duterte-orders-doj-investigate-corruption-entire-philippine-government
Reyes, R. G. (2020, April 30). A Corona we will never forget. The Manila Times, p. n/a. Retrieved December 3, 2020, from https://www.manilatimes.net/2020/04/30/opinion/columnists/a-corona-we-will-never-forget/720683/
Risk and Compliance Portal. (2020, May ). Retrieved from Gan Integrity: https://www.ganintegrity.com/portal/country-profiles/the-philippines/
Santos, E. P. (2016, December 16). Immigration officials face graft charges over extortion scandal. CNN Philippines, p. n/a. Retrieved December 4, 2020, from https://cnnphilippines.com/news/2016/12/16/Sombero-files-graft-charges-vs.-Immigration-officials.html
Seigel, J. (2003, March 3). Philippine citizens overthrow President Joseph Estrada (People Power II), 2001. Retrieved November 30, 2020, from Global Nonviolent Action Database: https://nvdatabase.swarthmore.edu/content/philippine-citizens-overthrow-president-joseph-estrada-people-power-ii-2001
Tejada, A. P. (2016, February 20). Duterte vows to end criminality in 3 months. Retrieved December 5, 2020, from The Philippine Star: https://www.philstar.com/headlines/2016/02/20/1555349/duterte-vows-end-criminality-3-months
Trading Economics. (2019). Philippines Corruption Rank 1995-2019. Retrieved from https://tradingeconomics.com/philippines/corruption-rank
Transparency International. (2019). Corruption Index Report 2019. Retrieved from Transparency Intertanational The global coalition against corruption: https://www.transparency.org/files/content/pages/2019_CPI_Report_EN.pdf
Uy, J. R., Santos, T. G., & Nonato, V. F. (2017, October 11). House impeaches Comelec chief after he said he was resigning. Inquirer.Net, p. not applicable. Retrieved November 30, 2020, from https://newsinfo.inquirer.net/937198/house-votes-to-impeach-bautista
Valente, C. (2017, September 28). I asked Salalima to resign – Duterte. Retrieved December 5, 2020, from The Manila Times: https://www.manilatimes.net/2017/09/28/news/latest-stories/asked-salalima-resign-duterte/353470/
Villamor, F. (2017, March 16). Philippine Lawmaker Moves to Impeach Duterte. The New York Times, p. not applicable. Retrieved November 30, 2020, from https://www.nytimes.com/2017/03/16/world/asia/philippines-duterte-impeachment-.html
How to Cite
- Endnote/Zotero/Mendeley (RIS)
Copyright (c) 2021 Christian Gonzales
This work is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial-NoDerivatives 4.0 International License .
Make a Submission
Digital preservation.
PRESERVATION:
I4OA Member
Signatory of BOAI
SIJIS is present in SCOPUS
Current Issue
Sapienza: International Journal of Interdisciplinary Studies (SIJIS), e-ISSN: 2675-9780 publications are licensed with Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial-NoDerivatives 4.0 Internacional.
SIJIS also supports initiatives such as the DORA ( Declaration on Research Assessment) declaration, BOAI (Budapest Open Access Initiative), and the I4OA (Initiative for Open Abstracts), reaffirming our commitment to open science.
Starting 2023, we have embraced the ReviewerCredits platform to increase transparency and reliability in our peer review process, while also providing greater recognition for the invaluable contributions of our reviewers
Responsible Publisher:
Sapienza Grupo Editorial
By providing an email address. I agree to the Terms of Use and acknowledge that I have read the Privacy Policy .
The impact of pandemic corruption
The money numbers emerging from the COVID-19 pandemic are mind-boggling. Philippine total debt, largely for pandemic response, was projected to hit P13.42 trillion in 2022, the year President Rodrigo Duterte steps down from office.
To have a picture of how enormous that amount is, let’s pick 1 trillion and think about counting from one to that sum.
Estimates place the amount of time one can finish counting to a trillion at 31,700 years. If one counts 1, 2, 3 … per second up to one trillion, the process will take 31,688 years.
Graphic by Ed Lustan
While it’s no longer necessary to manually count numbers in an era of supercomputers, just imagining the task could show just how mind-numbing those infinitesimal numbers are.
As trillions of pesos pour into government operations, mainly to defeat a pandemic that is bleeding nations everywhere, a few billions lost in leakages or outright theft of funds could appear to be just a microscopic germ.
But one billion is a figure far from being minute.
To count from one to one billion, it’s estimated you would need 30 to 100 years to finish, depending on how quick you do the counting. While not impossible, to count to one billion would require an amount of time longer than that which government thieves would spend in jail for misspending or pocketing outright public funds—if they are found, tried, and convicted at all.
In the current scandal involving the use of funds by the Duterte administration for pandemic response, several sets of numbers have emerged that would be both impossible and easy to count.
Let’s start with money spent already. At least P67 billion in health funds were found by state auditors to have deficiencies in use, or simply that some amounts had not been used properly. Between P3 and P8 billion was spent on PPE, testing kits, and other items with a markup of 100 percent more than market prices.
If it would take 30 to 100 years to count from one to one billion, imagine how much longer it would take to count from one to P3 billion, P8 billion, or P67 billion.
Another set of numbers that has emerged involved the speed with which billions of pesos changed hands—30, the days it took the health department to transfer P42 billion to a division in the budget department to purchase PPE sets at prices up to 100 percent higher than normal.
It would be difficult not to conclude that the suffering of people barely breathing or crawling on all fours to feed selves and families has become the cover for a group of thieves in government to ransack the treasury vault.
That corruption, or the whiff of it, has continued into the pandemic says so much about many things.
One is about tough talk against corruption. Unmatched with action, it is but empty bravado that sounds exactly the same as the braggadocio about asserting Philippine sovereignty aboard a jet ski, which would later be clarified as a joke that only fools would take seriously.
Another is about callousness. While it is already outrageous for government thieves to milk public funds for their luxurious lifestyles during so-called normal times, to see them do so as the nation gasps for air is enraging, to say the least. It conjures images of thieves inside your house with their fingers in a tight grip of your throat as you lay in bed attached to a ventilator.
But briefly, let’s take our mind off the fact that anomalous spending is taking place at a time when it would deserve the capital punishment that current officials are trying to revive.
What could be equally important to ask is, who pays for this leakage or outright theft of public funds?
Is it the so-called oligarchs at whom Mr. Duterte has fired some of his loudest and most colorful expletives? Is it the new cronies that are rising to new heights through their connection to the seat of power? Is it officials whose asset and liability records cannot be examined for unusual or outright ill-gotten wealth because, under this administration, transparency is not a right but a privilege? Is it the political families who had been driven into flight after plundering and bludgeoning the nation, and yet dancing again years later in the halls of power to take advantage of the democratic space they had buried with their kleptocratic ways at the height of their reign?
The answer would come from what could be the most liberal leader emerging from centuries of tradition in the Catholic Church.
“Corruption is paid by the poor,” said Pope Francis.
The capacity of the poor to bear the burden of corruption, however, is not as infinite as the amounts of public money being misused or stolen outright by officials.
In time, people bled dry of their wherewithal to make ends meet will be drawn to do either of two things—just die in place, or rise to their feet clinging to a knife.
Poverty, according to the Greek philosopher Aristotle, is the parent of revolution and crime.
Subscribe to our daily newsletter
Tony Bergonia is a former Inquirer desk editor and reporter.
Fearless views on the news
Disclaimer: Comments do not represent the views of INQUIRER.net. We reserve the right to exclude comments which are inconsistent with our editorial standards. FULL DISCLAIMER
© copyright 1997-2024 inquirer.net | all rights reserved.
We use cookies to ensure you get the best experience on our website. By continuing, you are agreeing to our use of cookies. To find out more, please click this link.
Home / Essay Samples / Social Issues / Corruption / The Cause And Impact Of Corruption On The Philippines
The Cause And Impact Of Corruption On The Philippines
- Category: Social Issues , Life , World
- Topic: Corruption , Impact , Philippines
Pages: 1 (514 words)
Views: 3028
- Downloads: -->
--> ⚠️ Remember: This essay was written and uploaded by an--> click here.
Found a great essay sample but want a unique one?
are ready to help you with your essay
You won’t be charged yet!
Pride Essays
Paris Essays
Texas Essays
California Essays
Canada Essays
Related Essays
We are glad that you like it, but you cannot copy from our website. Just insert your email and this sample will be sent to you.
By clicking “Send”, you agree to our Terms of service and Privacy statement . We will occasionally send you account related emails.
Your essay sample has been sent.
In fact, there is a way to get an original essay! Turn to our writers and order a plagiarism-free paper.
samplius.com uses cookies to offer you the best service possible.By continuing we’ll assume you board with our cookie policy .--> -->