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existence of God

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existence of God , in religion , the proposition that there is a supreme supernatural or preternatural being that is the creator or sustainer or ruler of the universe and all things in it, including human beings. In many religions God is also conceived as perfect and unfathomable by humans, as all-powerful and all-knowing (omnipotent and omniscient), and as the source and ultimate ground of morality .

Belief in the existence of God (or gods) is definitional of theism and characteristic of many (though not all) religious traditions. For much of its history , Christianity in particular has been concerned with the question of whether God’s existence can be established rationally (i.e., by reason alone or by reason informed by sense experience) or through religious experience or revelation or instead must be accepted as a matter of faith . The remainder of this article will consider some historically influential arguments that have been advanced to demonstrate the existence of God.

Arguments for the existence of God are usually classified as either a priori or a posteriori —that is, based on the idea of God itself or based on experience. An example of the latter is the cosmological argument , which appeals to the notion of causation to conclude either that there is a first cause or that there is a necessary being from whom all contingent beings derive their existence. Other versions of this approach include the appeal to contingency—to the fact that whatever exists might not have existed and therefore calls for explanation—and the appeal to the principle of sufficient reason , which claims that for anything that exists there must be a sufficient reason why it exists. The arguments by St. Thomas Aquinas known as the Five Ways—the argument from motion, from efficient causation, from contingency , from degrees of perfection, and from final causes or ends in nature—are generally regarded as cosmological. Something must be the first or prime mover, the first efficient cause, the necessary ground of contingent beings, the supreme perfection that imperfect beings approach, and the intelligent guide of natural things toward their ends. This, Aquinas said, is God. The most common criticism of the cosmological argument has been that the phenomenon that God’s existence supposedly accounts for does not in fact need to be explained.

The argument from design also starts from human experience: in this case the perception of order and purpose in the natural world. The argument claims that the universe is strongly analogous , in its order and regularity, to an artifact such as a watch; because the existence of the watch justifies the presumption of a watchmaker, the existence of the universe justifies the presumption of a divine creator of the universe, or God. Despite the powerful criticisms of the Scottish philosopher David Hume (1711–76)—e.g., that the evidence is compatible with a large number of hypotheses , such as polytheism or a god of limited power, that are as plausible as or more plausible than monotheism —the argument from design continued to be very popular in the 19th century. According to a more recent version of the argument, known as intelligent design , biological organisms display a kind of complexity (“irreducible complexity”) that could not have come about through the gradual adaptation of their parts through natural selection ; therefore, the argument concludes, such organisms must have been created in their present form by an intelligent designer. Other modern variants of the argument attempt to ground theistic belief in patterns of reasoning that are characteristic of the natural sciences, appealing to simplicity and economy of explanation of the order and regularity of the universe.

Perhaps the most sophisticated and challenging argument for the existence of God is the ontological argument , propounded by St. Anselm of Canterbury . According to Anselm, the concept of God as the most perfect being—a being greater than which none can be conceived—entails that God exists, because a being who was otherwise all perfect and who failed to exist would be less great than a being who was all perfect and who did exist. This argument has exercised an abiding fascination for philosophers; some contend that it attempts to “define” God into existence, while others continue to defend it and to develop new versions.

It may be possible (or impossible) to prove the existence of God, but it may be unnecessary to do so in order for belief in God to be reasonable. Perhaps the requirement of a proof is too stringent, and perhaps there are other ways of establishing God’s existence. Chief among these is the appeal to religious experience—a personal, direct acquaintance with God or an experience of God mediated through a religious tradition. Some forms of mysticism appeal to religious tradition to establish the significance and appropriateness of religious experiences. Interpretations of such experiences, however, typically cannot be independently verified.

The Abrahamic religions ( Judaism , Christianity , and Islam ) also appeal to revelation, or to claims that God has spoken through appointed messengers to disclose matters which would otherwise be inaccessible. In Christianity these matters have included the doctrine of creation, the Trinity , and the Incarnation of Jesus Christ . Various attempts have been made to establish the reasonableness of the appeal to revelation through the witness of the church and through signs and miracles , all of which are thought to herald the authentic voice of God. (This is the context in which Hume’s classic critique of the credibility of reported miracles—that no amount or kind of evidence can establish that a miracle has occurred—must be understood.) Yet appeals to revelation by the various religions conflict with each other, and the appeal to revelation itself is open to the charge of circularity.

The Concept and Worship of the Supreme Being

• First Online: 21 May 2022

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• Dorothy Nguemo Afaor 3  

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The idea of a spiritual being that created and sustains the universe is manifest in most human societies around the world. However, the conception (in terms of name, nature, power and attributes) of such a being is not in any way unanimous. This is also the case among the African people. Their devotion to this being can be traced through their thought as well as their worship rituals. This chapter employs a comparative analysis method to study these issues. The author finds that: (1) despite a general notion of a Supreme Being, the conception differs from one religious group to the other; (2) some African communities practice a kind of monotheism while others are polytheistic; and (3) worship rituals vary from one community to another. The researcher concludes that the concept and worship of a Supreme Being are essential to understanding the practice of African Traditional Religion.

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The Great Ancestor: An African Conception of God

Kitause, R.H. “Moral Decadence: A Challenge to Sustainable Development in Contemporary Nigeria” in Journal of Sustainable Development (Vol. 2, No. 1, 2012), 202.

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Dzurgba, A. On the Tiv of Central Nigeria: A Cultural Perspective (Ibadan: John Archers Publishers, 2007), 175–176.

Atel, E.T. Dynamics of Tiv Religion and Culture: A Philosophical-Theological Perspective (Lagos: Free Enterprise Publications, 2004), 28.

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Ibigbolade S. Aderibigbe

Department of History, University of Texas at Austin, Austin, TX, USA

Toyin Falola

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Afaor, D.N. (2022). The Concept and Worship of the Supreme Being. In: Aderibigbe, I.S., Falola, T. (eds) The Palgrave Handbook of African Traditional Religion. Palgrave Macmillan, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-89500-6_5

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Descartes’ Ontological Argument

Descartes’ ontological (or a priori ) argument is both one of the most fascinating and poorly understood aspects of his philosophy. Fascination with the argument stems from the effort to prove God’s existence from simple but powerful premises. Existence is derived immediately from the clear and distinct idea of a supremely perfect being. Ironically, the simplicity of the argument has also produced several misreadings, exacerbated in part by Descartes’ tendency to formulate it in different ways.

The main statement of the argument appears in the Fifth Meditation. This comes on the heels of an earlier causal argument for God’s existence in the Third Meditation, raising questions about the order and relation between these two distinct proofs. Descartes repeats the ontological argument in a few other central texts including the Principles of Philosophy . He also defends it in the First, Second, and Fifth Replies against scathing objections by some of the leading intellectuals of his day.

Descartes was not the first philosopher to formulate an ontological argument. An earlier version of the argument had been vigorously defended by St. Anselm in the eleventh century, and then criticized by a monk named Gaunilo (Anselm’s contemporary) and later by St. Thomas Aquinas. Aquinas’ critique was regarded as so devastating that the ontological argument died out for several centuries. It thus came as a surprise to Descartes’ contemporaries that he should attempt to resurrect it. Although he claims not to be familiar with Anselm’s version of the proof, Descartes appears to craft his own argument so as to block traditional objections.

Despite similarities, Descartes’ version of the argument differs from Anselm’s in important ways. The latter’s version is thought to proceed from the meaning of the word “God,” by definition, God is a being a greater than which cannot be conceived. Descartes’ argument, in contrast, is grounded in two central tenets of his philosophy — the theory of innate ideas and the doctrine of clear and distinct perception. He purports to rely not on an arbitrary definition of God but rather on an innate idea whose content is “given.” Descartes’ version is also extremely simple. God’s existence is inferred directly from the fact that necessary existence is contained in the clear and distinct idea of a supremely perfect being. Indeed, on some occasions he suggests that the so-called ontological “argument” is not a formal proof at all but a self-evident axiom grasped intuitively by a mind free of philosophical prejudice.

Descartes often compares the ontological argument to a geometric demonstration, arguing that necessary existence cannot be excluded from idea of God anymore than the fact that its angles equal two right angles, for example, can be excluded from the idea of a triangle. The analogy underscores once again the argument’s supreme simplicity. God’s existence is purported to be as obvious and self-evident as the most basic mathematical truth. It also attempts to show how the “logic” of the demonstration is rooted in our ordinary reasoning practices.

In the same context, Descartes also characterizes the ontological argument as a proof from the “essence” or “nature” of God, arguing that necessary existence cannot be separated from the essence of a supremely perfect being without contradiction. In casting the argument in these terms, he is implicitly relying on a traditional medieval distinction between a thing’s essence and its existence. According to this tradition, one can determine what something is (i.e. its essence), independently of knowing whether it exists. This distinction appears useful to Descartes’ aims, some have thought, because it allows him to specify God’s essence without begging the question of his existence.

1. The Simplicity of the “Argument”

2. the distinction between essence and existence, 3. objections and replies, primary texts, secondary texts, other internet resources, related entries.

One of the hallmarks of Descartes’ version of the ontological argument is its simplicity. Indeed, it reads more like the report of an intuition than a formal proof. Descartes underscores the simplicity of his demonstration by comparing it to the way we ordinarily establish very basic truths in arithmetic and geometry, such as that the number two is even or that the sum of the angles of a triangle is equal to the sum of two right angles. We intuit such truths directly by inspecting our clear and distinct ideas of the number two and of a triangle. So, likewise, we are able to attain knowledge of God’s existence simply by apprehending that necessary existence is included in the clear and distinct idea of a supremely perfect being. As Descartes writes in the Fifth Meditation:

[1] But if the mere fact that I can produce from my thought the idea of something entails that everything which I clearly and distinctly perceive to belong to that thing really does belong to it, is not this a possible basis for another argument to prove the existence of God? Certainly, the idea of God, or a supremely perfect being, is one that I find within me just as surely as the idea of any shape or number. And my understanding that it belongs to his nature that he always exists is no less clear and distinct than is the case when I prove of any shape or number that some property belongs to its nature (AT 7:65; CSM 2:45).

One is easily misled by the analogy between the ontological argument and a geometric demonstration, and by the language of “proof” in this passage and others like it. Descartes does not conceive of the ontological argument on the model of an Euclidean or axiomatic proof, in which theorems are derived from epistemically prior axioms and definitions. On the contrary, he is drawing our attention to another method of establishing truths that informs our ordinary practices and is non-discursive. This method employs intuition or, what is the same for Descartes, clear and distinct perception. It consists in unveiling the contents of our clear and distinct ideas. The basis for this method is the rule for truth, which was previously established in the Fourth Meditation. According to the version of this rule invoked in the Fifth Meditation, whatever I clearly and distinctly perceive to be contained in the idea of something is true of that thing. So if I clearly and distinctly perceive that necessary existence pertains to the idea of a supremely perfect being, then such a being truly exists.

Although Descartes maintains that God’s existence is ultimately known through intuition, he is not averse to presenting formal versions of the ontological argument. He never forgets that he is writing for a seventeenth-century audience, steeped in scholastic logic, that would have expected to be engaged at the level of the Aristotelian syllogism. Descartes satisfies such expectations, presenting not one but at least two separate versions of the ontological argument. These proofs, however, are stunningly brief and betray his true intentions. One version of the argument simply codifies the psychological process by which one intuits God’s existence, in the manner described above:

Version A : Whatever I clearly and distinctly perceive to be contained in the idea of something is true of that thing. I clearly and distinctly perceive that necessary existence is contained in the idea of God. Therefore, God exists.

The rule for truth appears here in the guise of the first premise, but it is more naturally read as a statement of Descartes’ own alternative method of “demonstration” via clear and distinct perception or intuition. In effect, the first “premise” is designed to instruct the meditator on how to apply this method, the same role that the analogy with a geometric demonstration serves in passage [1].

When presenting this version of the argument in the First Replies, Descartes sets aside this first premise and focuses our attention on the second. In so doing, he is indicating the relative unimportance of the proof itself. Having learned how to apply Descartes’ alternative method of reasoning, one need only perceive that necessary existence pertains to the idea of a supremely perfect being. Once one attains this perception, formal arguments are no longer required; God’s existence will be self-evident (Second Replies, Fifth Postulate; AT 7:163–4; CSM 2:115).

Descartes sometimes uses traditional arguments as heuristic devices, not merely to appease a scholastically trained audience but to help induce clear and distinct perceptions. This is evident for example in the version of the ontological argument standardly associated with his name:

Version B : I have an idea of supremely perfect being, i.e. a being having all perfections. Necessary existence is a perfection. Therefore, a supremely perfect being exists.

While this set of sentences has the surface structure of a formal argument, its persuasive force lies at a different level. A meditator who is having trouble perceiving that necessary existence is contained in the idea of a supreme perfect being can attain this perception indirectly by first recognizing that this idea includes every perfection. Indeed, the idea of a supremely perfect being just is the idea of a being having all perfections. To attempt to exclude any or all perfections from the idea of a supremely being, Descartes observes, involves one in a contradiction and is akin to conceiving a mountain without a valley (or, better, an up-slope without a down-slope). Having formed this perception, one need only intuit that necessary existence is itself a perfection. It will then be clear that necessary existence is one of the attributes included in the idea of a supremely perfect being.

While such considerations might suffice to induce the requisite clear and distinct perception in the meditator, Descartes is aiming a deeper point, namely that there is a conceptual link between necessary existence and each of the other divine perfections. It is important to recall that in the Third Meditation, in the midst of the causal argument for the existence of God, the meditator already discovered many of these perfections — omnipotence, omniscience, immutability, eternality, simplicity, etc. Because our mind is finite, we normally think of the divine perfections separately and “hence may not immediately notice the necessity of their being joined together” (First Replies, AT 7:119; CSM 2:85). But if we attend carefully to “whether existence belongs to a supremely perfect being, and what sort of existence it is” we shall discover that we cannot conceive any one of the other attributes while excluding necessary existence from it (ibid.).

To illustrate this point Descartes appeals to divine omnipotence. He thinks that we cannot conceive an omnipotent being except as existing. Descartes’ illustration presupposes the traditional, medieval understanding of “necessary existence.” When speaking of this divine attribute, he sometimes uses the term “existence” simpliciter as shorthand. But in his more careful pronouncements he always insists on the phrase “necessary and eternal existence,” which resonates with tradition. Medieval, scholastic philosophers often spoke of God as the sole “necessary being,” by which they meant a being who depends only on himself for his existence. This is the notion of “aseity” or self-existence ( a se esse ). Since such a being does not depend on anything else for its existence, he has neither a beginning nor an end, but is eternal. Returning to the discussion in the First Replies, one can see how omnipotence is linked conceptually to necessary existence in this traditional sense. An omnipotent or all-powerful being does not depend ontologically on anything (for if it did then it would not be omnipotent). It exists by its own power:

[2] when we attend to immense power of this being, we shall be unable to think of its existence as possible without also recognizing that it can exist by its own power; and we shall infer from this that this being does really exist and has existed from eternity, since it is quite evident by the natural light that what can exist by its own power always exists. So we shall come to understand that necessary existence is contained in the idea of a supremely perfect being …. ( ibid .)

Some readers have thought that Descartes offers yet a third version of the ontological argument in this passage (Wilson, 1978, 174–76), but whether or not that was his intention is unimportant, since his primary aim, as indicated in the last line, is to enable his meditator to intuit that necessary existence is included in the idea of God. Since there is a conceptual link between the divine attributes, a clear and distinct perception of one provides a cognitive route to any of the others.

Although Descartes sometimes uses formal versions of the ontological argument to achieve his aims, he consistently affirms that God’s existence is ultimately known through clear and distinct perception. The formal versions of the argument are merely heuristic devices, to be jettisoned once one has attained the requisite intuition of a supremely perfect being. Descartes stresses this point explicitly in the Fifth Meditation, immediately after presenting the two versions of the argument considered above:

[3] whatever method of proof I use, I am always brought back to the fact that it is only what I clearly and distinctly perceive that completely convinces me. Some of the things I clearly and distinctly perceive are obvious to everyone, while others are discovered only by those who look more closely and investigate more carefully; but once they have been discovered, the latter are judged to be just as certain as the former. In the case of a right-angled triangle, for example, the fact that the square on the hypotenuse is equal to the square on the other two sides is not so readily apparent as the fact that the hypotenuse subtends the largest angle; but once one has seen it, one believes it just as strongly. But as regards God, if I were not overwhelmed by philosophical prejudices, and if the images of things perceived by the senses did not besiege my thought on every side, I would certainly acknowledge him sooner and more easily than anything else. For what is more manifest than the fact that the supreme being exists, or that God, to whose essence alone existence belongs, exists? (AT 7:68–69; CSM 2:47)

Here Descartes develops his earlier analogy between the (so-called) ontological argument and a geometric demonstration. He suggests that there are some meditators for whom God’s existence is immediately manifest; for them God’s existence is akin to an axiom or definition in geometry, such as that the hypotenuse of a right triangle subtends its largest angle. But other meditators, whose minds are confused and mired in sensory images, must work much harder, and might even require a proof to attain the requisite clear and distinct perception. For them, God’s existence is akin to the Pythagorean Theorem. The important point is that both kinds of meditators ultimately attain knowledge of God’s existence by clearly and distinctly perceiving that necessary existence is contained in the idea of supremely perfect being. Once one has achieved this perception, God’s existence will be manifest or, as Descartes says elsewhere, “self-evident” ( per se notam ) (Second Replies, Fifth Postulate; AT 7: 164; CSM 2:115).

Descartes’ contemporaries would have been surprised by this last remark. While reviewing an earlier version of the ontological argument, Aquinas had rejected the claim that God’s existence is self-evident, at least with respect to us. He argued that what is self-evident cannot be denied without contradiction, but God’s existence can be denied. Indeed, the proverbial fool says in his heart “There is no God” (Psalm 53.1).

When confronted with this criticism by a contemporary objector, Descartes tries to find common ground: “St. Thomas asks whether existence is self-evident as far as we are concerned, that is, whether it is obvious to everyone; and he answers, correctly, that it is not” (First Replies, AT 7:115; CSM 2:82). Descartes interprets Aquinas to be claiming that God’s existence is not self-evident to everyone , which is something with which he can agree. Descartes does not hold that God’s existence is immediately self-evident, or self-evident to everyone, but that it can become self-evident to some careful and industrious meditators.

In the Fifth Meditation and elsewhere Descartes says that God’s existence follows from the fact that existence is contained in the “true and immutable essence, nature, or form” of a supremely perfect being, just as it follows from the essence of a triangle that its angles equal two right angles. This way of putting the a priori argument has puzzled commentators and has led to a lively debate about the ontological status of Cartesian essences and the objects which are purported to “have” them. Some commentators have thought that Descartes is committed to a species of Platonic realism. According to this view, some objects that fall short of actual existence nevertheless subsist as abstract, logical entities outside the mind and beyond the physical world (Kenny, 1968; Wilson, 1978). Another commentator places Cartesian essences in God (Schmaltz 1991), while two recent revisionist interpretations (Chappell, 1997; Nolan, 1997) read Descartes as a conceptualist who takes essences to be ideas in human minds.

Descartes’ reference to “essences” raises another important issue more directly related to the ontological argument. In claiming that necessary existence cannot be excluded from the essence of God, Descartes is drawing on the traditional medieval distinction between essence and existence. According to this distinction, one can say what something is (i.e. its essence), prior to knowing whether it exists. So, for example, one can define what a horse is — enumerating all of its essential properties — before knowing whether there are any horses in the world. The only exception to this distinction was thought to be God himself, whose essence just is to exist. It is easy to see how this traditional distinction could be exploited by a defender of the ontological argument. Existence is included in the essence of a supremely perfect being, but not in the essence of any finite thing. Thus it follows solely from the essence of the former that such a being actually exists. At times, Descartes appears to support this interpretation of the ontological argument. In the Fifth Replies, for example, he writes that “the existence of a triangle should not be compared with the existence of God, since the relation between existence and essence is manifestly quite different in the case of God from what it is in the case of the triangle. God is his own existence, but this is not true of the triangle” (AT 7:383; CSM 2:263). But Descartes’ complete view is subtler and more sophisticated than these remarks first suggest. Understanding this view requires a more careful investigation of the distinction between essence and existence as it appears in medieval sources. Although one often speaks of the “traditional” distinction, the exact nature of the relation between essence and existence in finite things was the subject of a fierce debate among medieval philosophers. Seeing where Descartes’ position fits within this debate will provide a deeper understanding of his version of the ontological argument.

The distinction between essence and existence can be traced back as far as Boethius in the fifth century. It was later developed by Islamic thinkers such as Avicenna. But the issue did not become a major philosophical problem until it was taken up by Aquinas in the thirteenth century. The issue arose not as part of an effort to establish God’s existence on a priori grounds (as mentioned above, Aquinas was one of the staunchest critics of the ontological argument), but out of concern to distinguish God from finite spiritual entities such as angels. Like many scholastic philosophers, Aquinas believed that God is perfectly simple and that created beings, in contrast, have a composite character that accounts for their finitude and imperfection. Earthly creatures are composites of matter and form (the doctrine of hylomorphism), but since purely spiritual beings are immaterial, Aquinas located their composite character in the distinction between essence and existence.

Some of the details of Aquinas’ account will emerge from our discussion below. The primary interest of his theory for our purposes, however, is that it led to a lively debate among his successors both as to how to interpret the master and about the true nature of the relation between essence and existence in created things. This debate produced three main positions:

• The Theory of Real Distinction
• The Intermediate Position
• The Theory of Rational Distinction

Proponents of the first view conceived the distinction between essence and existence as obtaining between two separate things. In the eyes of many Thomists, this view was considered to be quite radical, especially as an interpretation of Aquinas’ original position. The latter is sometimes expressed by saying that essence and existence are “principles of being” rather than beings themselves. One problem then with the theory of real distinction, at least as espoused by many of Aquinas’ followers, was that it reified essence and existence, treating them as real beings in addition to the created entity that they compose.

The theory of real distinction was also considered objectionable for philosophical reasons. Following Aquinas, many participants in the debate urged that essence and existence are related to each other as potency and act, so that existence can be said to “actualize” essence. On the theory of real distinction, this view leads to an infinite regress. If an essence becomes actual only in virtue of something else — viz. existence — being superadded to it, then what gives existence its reality, and so on ad infinitum ? (Wippel, 1982, 393f).

In response to these difficulties some scholastic philosophers developed a position at the polar extreme from the theory of real distinction. This was the view that there is merely a rational distinction or a “distinction of reason” between essence and existence in created beings. As the term suggests, this theory held that essence and existence of a creature are identical in reality and distinguished only within our thought by means of reason. Needless to say, proponents of this theory were forced to distinguish purely spiritual entities from God on grounds other than real composition.

Giving up the doctrine of real composition seemed too much for another group of thinkers who were also critical of the theory of real distinction. This led to the development of a number of intermediate positions, including Duns Scotus’ curious notion of a formal distinction and the view that essence and existence are modally distinct such that existence constitutes a mode of a thing’s essence.

Like Francisco Suárez, his most immediate scholastic predecessor, Descartes sides with the proponents of a rational distinction between essence and existence. His position is unique, however, insofar as it springs from a more general theory of “attributes”. Articulating this theory in an important passage in the Principles of Philosophy , Descartes claims that there is merely a distinction of reason between a substance and any one of its attributes or between any two attributes of a single substance (1:62, AT 8A:30; CSM 1:214). For Descartes’ purposes, the most significant instance of a rational distinction is that which obtains between a substance and its essence — or what he sometimes refers to as its “principal attribute” (1:53, AT 8A:25; CSM 1:210). Since thought and extension constitute the essence of mind and body, respectively, a mind is merely rationally distinct from its thinking and a body is merely rationally distinct from its extension (1:63, AT 8A:31; CSM 1:215). But Descartes insists that a rational distinction also obtains between any two attributes of a substance. Since existence qualifies as an attribute in this technical sense, the essence and existence of a substance are also distinct merely by reason (1:56, AT 8A:26; CSM 1:211). Descartes reaffirms this conclusion in a letter intended to elucidate his account of the relation between essence and existence:

[4]… existence, duration, size, number and all universals are not, it seems to me, modes in the strict sense …. They are referred to by a broader term and called attributes … because we do indeed understand the essence of a thing in one way when we consider it in abstraction from whether it exists or not, and in a different way when we consider it as existing; but the thing itself cannot be outside our thought without its existence …. Accordingly I say that shape and other similar modes are strictly speaking modally distinct from the substance whose modes they are; but there is a lesser distinction between the other attributes …. I call it a rational distinction …. (To an unknown correspondent, AT 4:349; CSMK 3:280)

Indications are given here as to how a rational distinction is produced in our thought. Descartes explains that we regard a single thing in different abstract ways. Case in point, we can regard a thing as existing, or we can abstract from its existence and attend to its other aspects. In so doing, we have distinguished the existence of a substance from its essence within our thought. Like scholastic proponents of the theory of rational distinction, however, Descartes is keen to emphasize that this distinction is purely conceptual. Indeed, he goes on to explain that the essence and existence of a substance are “in no way distinct” outside thought (AT 4:350; CSMK 3:280). In reality they are identical.

While borrowing much from scholasticism, Descartes’ account is distinguished by its scope of application. He extends the theory of rational distinction from created substances to God. In general, the essence and the existence of a substance are merely rationally distinct, and hence identical in reality.

This result appears to wreak havoc on Descartes’ ontological argument. One of the most important objections to the argument is that if it were valid, one could proliferate such arguments for all sorts of things, including beings whose existence is merely contingent. By supposing that there is merely a rational distinction between essence and existence abroad in all things, Descartes seems to confirm this objection. In general, a substance is to be identified with its existence, whether it is God or a finite created thing.

The problem with this objection, in this instance, is that it assumes that Descartes locates the difference between God and creatures in the relation each of these things bears to its existence. This is not the case. In a few important passages, Descartes affirms that existence is contained in the clear and distinct idea of every single thing, but he also insists that there are different grades of existence:

[5] Existence is contained in the idea or concept of every single thing, since we cannot conceive of anything except as existing. Possible or contingent existence is contained in the concept of a limited thing, whereas necessary and perfect existence is contained in the concept of a supremely perfect being (Axiom 10, Second Replies; AT 7:166; CSM 2:117).

In light of this passage and others like it, we can refine the theory of rational distinction. What one should say, strictly speaking, is that God is merely rationally distinct from his necessary existence, while every finite created thing is merely rationally distinct from its possible or contingent existence. The distinction between possible or contingent existence on the one hand, and necessary existence on the other, allows Descartes to account for the theological difference between God and his creatures.

Now, when Descartes says that a substance (be it finite or infinite) is merely rationally distinct from its existence, he always means an actually existing substance. So how are we to understand the claim that a finite substance is merely rationally distinct from its possible existence? What is meant by “possible (or contingent) existence”? It is tempting to suppose that this term means non-actual existence. But as we saw already with the case of necessary existence, Descartes does not intend these terms in their logical or modal senses. If “necessary existence” means ontologically independent existence, then “possible existence” means something like dependent existence. After all, Descartes contrasts possible existence not with actual existence but with necessary existence in the traditional sense. This account is also suggested by the term “contingent.” Created things are contingent in the sense that they depend for their existence on God, the sole independent being.

This result explains why Descartes believes that we cannot proliferate ontological arguments for created substances. It is not that the relation between essence and existence is any different in God than it is in finite things. In both cases there is merely a rational distinction. The difference is in the grade of existence that attaches to each. Whereas the concept of an independent being entails that such a being exists, the concept of a finite thing entails only that it has dependent existence.

Looking back at the problematic passage cited above from the Fifth Replies, it becomes clear that Descartes intended something along these lines even there. He says that “the existence of a triangle should not be compared with the existence of God”, reinforcing the point that it is the kind of existence involved that makes God unique. And just before this statement, he writes, “in the case of God necessary existence…applies to him alone and forms a part of his essence as it does of no other thing”. Later he adds: “I do not … deny that possible existence is a perfection in the idea of a triangle, just as necessary existence is perfection in the idea of God” (AT 7:383; CSM 2:263). Descartes’ final position then is that essence and existence are identical in all things. What distinguishes God from creatures is his grade of existence. We can produce an ontological argument for God, and not for finite substances, because the idea of a supremely perfect being uniquely contains necessary — or ontologically independent — existence.

Because of its simplicity, Descartes’ version of the ontological argument is commonly thought to be cruder and more obviously fallacious than the one put forward by Anselm in the eleventh century. But when the complete apparatus of the Cartesian system is brought forth, the argument proves itself to be quite resilient, at least on its own terms. Indeed, Descartes’ version is superior to his predecessor’s insofar as it is grounded in a theory of innate ideas and the doctrine of clear and distinct perception. These two doctrines inoculate Descartes from the charge made against Anselm, for example, that the ontological argument attempts to define God into existence by arbitrarily building existence into the concept of a supremely perfect being. In the Third Meditation, the meditator discovers that her idea of God is not a fiction that she has conveniently invented but something native to the mind. As we shall see below, these two doctrines provide the resources for answering other objections as well.

Given our earlier discussion concerning the non-logical status of the ontological argument, it may seem surprising that Descartes would take objections to it seriously. He should be able to dismiss most objections in one neat trick by insisting on the non-logical nature of the demonstration. This is especially true of the objection that the ontological argument begs the question. If God’s existence is ultimately self-evident and known by a simple intuition of the mind, then there are no questions to be begged. Unfortunately, not all of the objections to the ontological argument can be dismissed so handily, for the simple reason that they do not all depend on the assumption that we are dealing with a formal proof.

Although it is often overlooked, many of the best known criticisms of the ontological argument were put to Descartes by official objectors to the Meditations . He in turn responded to these objections — sometimes in lengthy replies — though many contemporary readers have found his responses opaque and unsatisfying. We can better understand his replies and, in some cases, improve upon them by appealing to discussions from previous sections.

One classical objection to the ontological argument, which was first leveled by Gaunilo against Anselm’s version of the proof, is that it makes an illicit logical leap from the mental world of concepts to the real world of things. The claim is that even if we were to concede that necessary existence is inseparable from the idea of God (in Kant’s terms, even if necessary existence were analytic of the concept “God”), nothing follows from this about what does or does not exist in the actual world. Johannes Caterus, the author of the First Set of Objections to the Meditations , puts the point as follows:

[6] Even if it is granted that a supremely perfect being carries the implication of existence in virtue of its very title, it still does not follow that the existence in question is anything actual in the real world; all that follows is that the concept of existence is inseparably linked to the concept of a supreme being. So you cannot infer that the existence of God is anything actual unless you suppose that the supreme being actually exists; for then it will actually contain all perfections, including the perfection of real existence (AT 7:99; CSM 2:72).

To meet this challenge, Descartes must explain how he “bridges” the inferential gap between thought and reality. The principle of clear and distinct perception is intended to do just that. According to this principle, for which he argues in the Fourth Meditation, whatever one clearly and distinctly perceives or understands is true — true not just of ideas but of things in the real world represented by those ideas. Thus, Descartes’ commitment to the principle of clear and distinct perception allows him to elude another objection that had haunted Anselm’s version of the argument.

The previous objection is related to another difficulty raised by Caterus. In order to illustrate that the inference from the mental to the extra-mental commits a logical error, critics have observed that if such inferences were legitimate then we could proliferate ontological arguments for supremely perfect islands, existing lions, and all sorts of things which either do not exist or whose existence is contingent and thus should not follow a priori from their concept. The trick is simply to build existence into the concept. So, while existence does not follow from the concept of lion as such, it does follow from the concept of an “existing lion.”

Descartes’ actual reply to this objection, which he took very seriously, is highly complex and couched in terms of a theory of “true and immutable natures.” We can simplify matters by focusing on its key elements. One of his first moves is to introduce a point that we discussed earlier ( see passage [5] in section 2), namely that existence is contained in the idea of every thing that we clearly and distinctly perceive: possible (or dependent) existence is contained in our clear and distinct idea of every finite thing and necessary (or independent) existence is uniquely contained in the idea of God (AT 7:117; CSM 2:83). So for Descartes one does not have to build existence into the idea of something if that idea is clear and distinct; existence is already included in every clear and distinct idea. But it does not follow that the thing represented by such an idea actually exists, except in the case of God. We cannot produce ontological arguments for finite things for the simple reason that the clear and distinct ideas of them contain merely dependent existence. Actual existence is demanded only by the idea of God, which uniquely contains independent existence.

A natural rejoinder to this reply would be to ask about the idea of a lion having not possible but wholly necessary existence. If Descartes’ method of reasoning were valid, it would seem to follow from this idea that such a creature exists. This formulation of the objection requires Descartes’ second and deeper point, which is only hinted at in his official reply. This is that the idea of a lion — let alone the idea of a lion having necessary existence — is hopelessly obscure and confused. As Descartes says, the nature of a lion is “not transparently clear to us” (Axiom 10, Second Replies; AT 7:117; CSM 2:84). Since this idea is not clear and distinct, the method of demonstration employed in the ontological argument does not apply to it. Recall that the geometrical method of demonstration is grounded in the principle of clear and distinct perception and consists in drawing out the contents of our clear and distinct ideas. If an idea is not clear and distinct then we cannot draw any conclusions from it about things outside thought.

The key difference then between the idea of God on the one hand and the idea of a necessarily existing lion is that the former can be clearly and distinctly perceived. For Descartes, it is just a brute fact that certain ideas can be clearly and distinctly perceived and others cannot. Some critics have charged him with dogmatism in this regard. Why should Descartes be allowed to legislate the scope of our clear and distinct perceptions? Perhaps we can clearly and distinctly perceive something that he could not.

Descartes cannot be saved entirely from this charge, but two important points can be made in his defense. First, he has principled reasons for thinking that everyone has the same set of innate or clear and distinct ideas. When the meditator first proved God’s existence in the Third Meditation, she also established that God is supremely good and hence no deceiver. One consequence of God’s perfect benevolence is that he implanted the same set of innate ideas in all finite minds. Thus, Descartes feels justified in concluding that the limits of his capacity for clear and distinct perception will be shared by everyone.

Second, when responding to objections to the ontological argument such as the ones considered above, Descartes typically does more than insist dogmatically on a unique set of clear and distinct ideas. He also tries to dispel the confusion which he thinks is at the root of the objection. Since the ontological argument ultimately reduces to an axiom, the source of an objection according to Descartes’ diagnosis is the failure of the objector to perceive this axiom clearly and distinctly. Thus, Descartes devotes the bulk of his efforts to trying to remove those philosophical prejudices which are hindering his objector from intuiting the axiom. These efforts are not always obvious, however. Descartes is good at maintaining the pretense of answering criticisms to a formal proof. But his replies to Caterus’ objections to the ontological argument are best read as an extended effort to dispel prejudice and confusion, so as to enable his reader to intuit God’s existence for himself.

Let us return for a moment to the objection that the ontological argument slides illicitly from the mental to the extramental realm. We have seen how Descartes responds to it, but it is related to another objection that has come to be associated with Leibniz. Leibniz claims that Descartes’ version of the ontological argument is incomplete. It shows merely that if God’s existence is possible or non-contradictory, then God exists. But it fails to demonstrate the antecedent of this conditional (Robert Adams 1998, 135). To reinforce this objection, it is sometimes observed that the divine perfections (omnipotence, omniscience, benevolence, eternality, etc.) might be inconsistent with one another. This objection is related to the previous one in that the point in both cases is that Descartes’ argument restricts us to claims about the concept of God and lacks existential import. In order to redress this issue himself, Leibniz formulates a different version of the ontological argument (see Adams 1998, 141f).

Descartes was dead long before Leibniz articulated this criticism but it was familiar to him from the Second Set of Objectors (Marin Mersenne et al .) (AT 7:127; CSM 2:91). He replies by appealing once again to the principle of clear and distinct perception, which states that if something is contained in the clear and distinct idea of something then it is not only possible but also true of that thing in reality. (Descartes might have said that if something is conceivable then it is possible, and a being having all perfections is conceivable, but he has an even stronger principle at his disposal in the rule for truth.) In effect, Descartes thinks he has already satisfied Mersenne and Leibniz’s extra condition. But Mersenne’s version of the objection goes further, urging that in order to know with certainty that God’s nature is possible, one must have an adequate idea that encompasses all of the divine attributes and the relations between them (ibid.) — something that Descartes denies that we have. Descartes responds to this criticism as follows:

[7] For as far as our concepts are concerned there is no impossibility in the nature of God; on the contrary, all the attributes which we include in the concept of the divine nature are so interconnected that it seems to us to be self-contradictory that any one of them should not belong to God (AT 7:151; CSM 2:107).

It is difficult to see how this statement on its own addresses Mersenne’s criticism, but here again we can gain a better grip on what Descartes has in mind by appealing to our earlier discussion in section 2. We noted there that on Descartes’ view there is merely a rational distinction between a substance and each of its attributes, and between any two attributes of a single substance. He also maintains that God has only attributes and no modes or accidental properties. This implies that there is merely a rational distinction between all of the divine perfections, something that he expressly affirms in his correspondence (see, e.g., AT 4:349; CSMK 3:280). In the Third Meditation he also notes that “the unity, simplicity, or the inseparability of all the divine attributes of God is one of the most important of the perfections which I understand him to have” (AT 7:50; CSM 2:34). So not only is there no inconsistency between the divine perfections, but we understand that one of the most important perfections is simplicity (contra Curley 2005), which is just to say that in God there is no distinction between his attributes: God’s omnipotence just is his omniscience, which just is his benevolence, etc. The very distinction between the divine attributes is confined to our thought or reason. This then is what he means by saying in passage [7] that the divine attributes are “interconnected,” which echoes a remark in the Third Meditation passage concerning “the interconnection and inseparability of the perfections” (ibid.). Descartes’ responses probably would not have satisfied Leibniz and Mersenne, but we can appreciate how they have a fundamental basis in his philosophical system.

Perhaps the most famous objection to the ontological argument is that existence is not a property or predicate. Popularized by Kant, this objection enjoys the status of a slogan known by every undergraduate philosophy major worth her salt. In claiming that existence is included in the idea of a supremely perfect being, along with all the other divine attributes, Descartes’ version of the argument appears to succumb to this objection.

It is not obvious of course that existence is not a predicate. To convince us of this point, Kant observes that there is no intrinsic difference between the concept of a hundred real thalers (coins common in Kant’s time) and the concept of a hundred possible thalers. Whenever we think of anything, we regard it as existing, even if the thing in question does not actually exist. Thus, existence does not add anything to the concept of a thing. What then is existence if not a predicate? Kant’s answer is that existence is “merely the positing of a thing” or “the copula of a judgment,” the point being that when we say “God exists” we are simply affirming that there is an object answering to the concept of God. We are not ascribing any new predicates to God, but merely judging that there is a subject, with all its predicates, in the world (CPR:B626–27).

Kant’s formulation of the objection was later refined by Bertrand Russell in his famous theory of descriptions. He argues that existential statements such as “God exists” are misleading as to their logical form. While serving grammatically as a predicate, the term “exists” in this sentence has a much different logical function, which is revealed only by analysis. Properly analyzed, “God exists” means “there is one (and only one) x such that ‘x is omnipotent, omniscient, etc.’ is true.” Russell thinks this translation shows that, appearances to the contrary, the statement “God exists” is not ascribing existence to a subject, but asserting that a certain description (in single quotes) applies to something in reality. Russell’s view is reflected in the standard modern logical treatment of existence as a quantifier rather than a predicate.

It is widely believed that Descartes did not have a response to this objection, indeed that he blithely assumed that existence is a property without ever considering the matter carefully. But this is not the case. The seventeenth-century empiricist Pierre Gassendi confronted Descartes with this criticism in the Fifth Set of Objections (and deserves credit for being the first to enunciate it): “existence is not a perfection either in God or in anything else; it is that without which no perfections can be present” (AT 7:323; CSM 2:224). As with most of his replies to Gassendi (whom he regarded as a loathsome materialist and quibbler), Descartes responded somewhat curtly. But it is clear from the discussion in section 2 that he had the resources for addressing this objection in a systematic manner.

Before examining how Descartes might defend himself, it is important to note that the question at issue is typically framed in non-Cartesian terms and thus often misses its target. Both Kant and Russell for example are interested in the logical issue of whether existence is a predicate . Descartes, in contrast, was not a logician and disparaged the standard subject-predicate logic inherited from Aristotle. Although, as discussed above, he sometimes presents formal versions of the ontological arguments as heuristic devices, Descartes thought that God’s existence is ultimately known through intuition. This intuitive process is psychological in character. It is not a matter of assigning predicates to subjects but of determining whether the idea of a supremely perfect being can be clearly and distinctly perceived while excluding necessary existence from it through a purely intellectual operation. To be sure, Descartes was interested in the ontological question of whether existence is a “property” of substances. For him, however, the analogues of properties are clear and distinct ideas and ways of regarding them, not predicates.

Having said that, Descartes’ best strategy for answering the ontological version of the objection is to concede it, or at least certain aspects of it. Descartes explicitly affirms Kant’s point that existence does not add anything to the idea of something (provided that the terms “idea” and “concept” are regarded as psychological items). Once again we should recall passage [4] from the Second Replies: “Existence is contained in the idea or concept of every single thing, since we cannot conceive of anything except as existing” (Axiom 10, AT 7:166; CSM 2:117). So, Descartes agrees with Kant that there is no conceptual difference between conceiving of a given substance as actually existing and conceiving it as merely possible. In the first instance one is attending to the existence that is contained in every clear and distinct idea, and in the other instance one is ignoring the thing’s existence without actively excluding it. He would, however, stress another conceptual difference that Kant and other critics do not address, namely that between the two grades of existence — contingent and necessary. The clear and distinct ideas of all finite things contain merely contingent or dependent existence, whereas the clear and distinct idea of God uniquely contains necessary or wholly independent existence (ibid.). As discussed previously, the ontological argument hinges on this distinction.

Another intuition underlying the claim that existence is not a property is that there is more intimate connection between an individual and its existence than the traditional one between a substance and a property, especially if the property in question is conceived as something accidental. If existence were accidental, then a thing could be without its existence, which seems absurd. It seems no less absurd to say that existence is a property among other properties (accidental or essential), for how can a thing even have properties if it does not exist? Descartes shares this intuition. He does not think that existence is a property in the traditional sense or is even distinct from the substance that is said to bear it. Recall the view discussed in section 2 that there is merely a rational distinction between a substance and its existence, or between the essence and existence of a substance. This means that the distinction between a substance and its existence is confined to thought or reason. Human beings, in their efforts to understand things using their finite intellects, draw distinctions in thought that do not obtain in reality. In reality, a substance (whether created or divine) just is its existence.

The purpose of this defense of Descartes is not to render a verdict as whether he has the correct account of existence, but to show that he has a rather sophisticated and systematic treatment of what has been one of the great bugbears in the history of philosophy. He does not make the ad hoc assumption that existence is an attribute in order to serve the needs of the ontological argument. Indeed, on Descartes’ view, existence is not a property in the traditional sense, nor can one conceive of something without regarding it as existing. Descartes’ critics might not be convinced by his account of existence, but then they have the burden of providing a better account. The focus of the debate will then be shifted to the question of who has the correct ontology, rather than whether the ontological argument is sound.

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How to cite this entry . Preview the PDF version of this entry at the Friends of the SEP Society . Look up topics and thinkers related to this entry at the Internet Philosophy Ontology Project (InPhO). Enhanced bibliography for this entry at PhilPapers , with links to its database.

• The Ontological Argument , entry in the Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy, by Kenneth Einar Himma (Seattle Pacific University)
• Medieval Sourcebook: Philosophers’ Criticisms of Anselm’s Ontological Argument for the Being of God , by Paul Halsell (Fordham University)
• Medieval Sourcebook: Thomas Aquinas: On Being and Essence , by Paul Halsell (Fordham University)
• “ On the Logic of the Ontological Argument ”, paper by Paul E. Oppenheimer and Edward N. Zalta.
• Philosophy of Religion.Info by Tim Holt.

Anselm of Canterbury [Anselm of Bec] | Aquinas, Thomas | Descartes, René | Descartes, René: epistemology | Descartes, René: life and works | Descartes, René: modal metaphysics | Elisabeth, Princess of Bohemia | existence | Kant, Immanuel | ontological arguments | Russell, Bertrand

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The Supreme Being: Phenomenological Structure and Historical Development by Raffaele Pettazzoni

The history of religions: essays in methodology by mircea eliade and joseph m. kitagawa (eds.).

When one speaks in a historical-religious way of the Supreme Being of the so-called primitive peoples, one usually means by this the Celestial Supreme Being.

The sky, in its unbounded immensity, in its perennial presence, in its wondrous luminosity, is particularly well suited to suggest to the mind of man the idea of sublimity, of incomparable majesty, of a sovereign and mysterious power. The sky elicits in ma n the feeling of a theophany. This is the feeling of a manifestation of the divine, which finds adequate expression in the notion of a Supreme Being.

On the other hand, the notion of a Supreme Being is not exhausted in the image of the Celestial Being. In the following pages I propose to show that there exist various distinct forms of the Supreme Being and that the Celestial Being is just one of them.

Forty years ago, when I began to study the notion of a Supreme Being, I insisted especially on its uranic aspects. (I refer especially to my book entitled L’Essere celeste nelle credenze dei popoli primitivi (Rome, 1922). The Supreme Being was for me essentially a mythical personification of the sky. The evolution of my thought in this matter has come about without any modification of the original theoretical basis of my position. For example, while I am now in partial agreement with Fr. Wilhelm Schmidt as to the non-reducibility of the Supreme Being to the Celestial Being, it must be noticed that the convergence of positions is extrinsic to them and limited to the specific point. (Father Wilhelm Schmidt, Handbuch der vergleichenden Religionswissenschaft [Münster i.W., 1930], pp. 202 ff.) Aside from the question of Urmonotheismus , which I have considered again recently, (Raffaele Pettazzoni, "Das Ende des Urmonotheismus?" Numen III (1956), 156.) with respect to the notion of the Supreme Being I am still of the opinion that it is not mainly the product of logico-causal thought, as Schmidt held, but rather that this notion is the product of mythical thought. I am still opposed to the theory that the notion of the Supreme Being arises out of man’s supposed intellectualistic need of becoming aware of the origin and wherefore of things. In what follows it will be clarified that the notion of a Supreme Being springs from man’s existential needs.

The above argument is also valid with respect to other investigators, who starting from different theoretical premises have also recognized the non-reducibility of the Supreme Being to the Celestial Being. Gerardus van der Leeuw held a similar position from the point of view of religious phenomenology. Van der Leeuw delineated the phenomenological structure of the Supreme Being and distinguished it from the structure of Yahweh. (Gerardus van der Leeuw, "Die Struktur der Vorstellung des sogenannten höchsten Wesens," Archiv für Religionswissenschaft , XXIX (1931), 79-107.) The specific structure of the Supreme Being is especially represented, for Van der Leeuw, by the various Supreme Beings that one can find among peoples of inferior civilization. This structure, however, is not limited to them but rather extends beyond the primitive world and also comprehends, for example, the Supreme Being as defined by Robespierre at the time of the French Revolution in opposition to the cult of Divine Reason. The structure of Yahweh is, for Van der Leeuw, totally different. The Supreme Being is a distant god, removed in space and time, a static immanence rather than an active presence. Yahweh, on the other hand, is not only a power but also a will, not only a person but also a personality, a live personality, a live god operating on and ever present to man, a hostile and jealous god, not without something of the demonic.

This characterization of Yahweh abstracts completely from his uranic aspect, and also from every other naturalistic aspect of the personality of the Supreme Being. The distance between the two structures leaves us perplexed, however, and we ask ourselves if the separation between the two structures is so neat. Creativity is postulated as a specific character of the Supreme Being. But Yahweh also is a creator; Yahweh’s very creation ex nihilo is found comparable to the creation of some Supreme Beings of primitive peoples who create by means of pure thought and will. (Cf. Raffaele Pettazzoni, "L’Idée de création et la notion d’un Être créateur chez les Californiens," Proceedings of the Thirty-second International Congress of Americanists , 1956 (Copenhagen, 1958). On the other hand, a salient trait of the personality of Yahweh is the severe surveillance he maintains on all human actions, on all human words, on all human thoughts, scrutinizing "hearts and kidneys" inexorably. Moreover, this all-seeing and omniscience as applied to human conduct issues into divine sanctions. But in its turn, this last character of Yahweh is likewise one of the more constant attributes of the Supreme Beings of primitive peoples. (Raffaele Pettazzoni, The All-knowing God (London, 1956), passim .) Robespierre’s address to the Commune of Paris at the convention of 1793 evidences that his Supreme Being also had this same character: "L’homme pervers se croit sans cesse environné d’un témoin puissant et terrible anquel il ne peut échapper, qui le voit et le veille, tandis que les hommes sont livrés au sommeil...." (F. A. Aulard, Le Culte de la raison et le culte de l’Être Supreme (Paris, 1892), pp. 285 f.) How can one isolate this "structure" and separate it from its biblical antecedents, when -- to cite only one of the many passages -- one can read in the book of Isaiah (29:15): "Woe to those who hide deep from the Lord their counsel, whose deeds are in the dark, and who say, ‘Who sees us? Who knows us?"’

It is in this character of irascibility and of vindictiveness, which not even the prophets can completely transfigure into their ideal of a God of justice, that Yahweh has been compared to the Vedic Varuna. (A. Titius, "Die Anfänge der Religion bei Ariern und Israeliten," Studien zur systematischen Theologie, XVI [Heidelberg, 1934], 34.) On the other hand, for Van der Leeuw, Varuna is the maximum approximation of Indian religious thought to the structure of the Supreme Being. (Van der Leeuw, op. Cit ., p. 97) It appears, then, that the alleged difference in structure between Yahweh and the Supreme Being is rather a fluid one and that in this matter it is very easy to be misled by purely hypothetical and genial but non-objective suggestions.

Because of his demonic character, Yahweh can also be compared to other gods and Supreme Beings of inferior civilizations. For example, the Aztec god Tezcatlipoca, a despotic numen, vengeful, implacable, violent in his chastisement, pleased by suffering, has seemed to the ethnologist H. Dietschy "ein alttestamentlicher Cott.’’ (H. Die, "Mensh und Gott bei mexikanischen Indianern," Anthropos , XXXV/XXXVI [1940/41] 336.) Chungichnish (or Chinigchinish), a god of the Luiseño (Southern California) already known to the Franciscan missionaries, has been considered by A. L. Kroeber as "a living god that watches and punishes, a kind of Jahve." (A. L. Kroeber, Handbook of the Indians of California (Bureau of American Ethnology, Smithsonian Institution, Bull. 78 [Washington, 1925]), p. 656. G. Boscana, "Chinigchinich," in A. Robinson, Life in California [New York, 1846]). The same character has been noted in the Supreme Being of the Cuna Indians of Darien (Panama). This god, named Diolele, is a severe punisher of sins; omniscient, there is no sin that escapes his sanction or sinner who can find compassion in him. Erland Nordenskiöld has written that this conception of a god so inexorably severe seems to be more akin to the austere spirit of the Calvinistic creed than that of the more tolerant Catholicism. (Erland Nordenskiöld Picture-Writings and Other Documents of the Cuna Indians ("Comparative Ethnological Studies," Vol. VII, No. 2 [Göteborg, 1930]), pp. 8, 13. 62) It is true that these comparisons of similarity are anthropologically rather than phenomenologically derived. But, this even points to the danger that phenomenological structures may become as superficially empty and purely formal as are anthropological comparisons. It is not without reason that Van der Leeuw, the great master of religious phenomenology, prescribed that religious phenomenology should constantly appeal to history. Phenomenology, he wrote, is interpretation; but phenomenological hermeneutics "becomes pure art and fantasy, as soon as it is separated from the control of philological-archeological hermeneutics.’’ (Gerardus van der Leeuw, Phänornenologie der Religion (Tübingen, 1933), p. 642: "Soll die Phänomenologie ihre Aufgabe vollbringen, so hat sie die immerwährende Korrektur der gewissenschaftesten philologischen, archäologischen Forschung sehr nötig. Sie muss stets bereit sein, sich der Konfrontation mit dem Tatsachenmaterial zu stellen.... [Die] rein philologische Hermeneutik hat weniger weite Ziele als die rein phänomenologische....Das phänlomenologische Verständnis wird aber zur reinen Kunst oder zur leeren Phantastik, sobald [es] sich der Kontrolle durch die philologisch-archäologisehe Deutung entzieht" (quoting Joachim Wach, Religionswissenschaft [Leipzig, 1924], p. 117). In the spirit of the constant process of auto-revision recommended by Van der Leeuw the phenomenology of the Supreme Being likewise needs to be revised and modified in accordance with the progress of the historical disciplines, in this case especially of ethnology conceived as non-philological history, as the history of non-literate peoples.

The structural dualism introduced by Van der Leeuw in the phenomenology of the Supreme Being is particularly evident in the contrast between the otiositas which is attributed to many Supreme Beings of the ethnological world, and the intense activity of Yahweh. He is always vigilant, always ready to intervene in human affairs. But this interventionism, this perennial surveillance, the speedy sanctions with the presupposition of omniscience is likewise a common character of many ethnological Supreme Beings. (Pettazzoni, The All-Knowing God, passim ) On the other hand, the laziness of several Supreme Beings is a secondary condition that follows an initial phase of extraordinary activity such as the creation of the world.

The phenomenology of the Supreme Being is not exhausted by the alternatives of a Supreme Being who is creator of the world (and eventually a candidate to successive inactivity) and a Supreme Being who is omnipresent and omniscient with the explicit vocation to interventionism. If Yahweh, creator of the world and punisher of human transgressions, unites both structures it is because we are really dealing not with different structures, but with two aspects of a unique two-sided structure, one cosmic and the other human: on the one side the creation of the world and its conservation in statu quo , as a condition that guarantees the existence and endurance of the universe; on the other side the establishment of the social order and its restoration when man has subverted it. (Cf. Raffaele Pettazzoni, "Myths of Beginnings and Creation Myths," Essays on the History of Religions (Leiden, 1954), pp. 24-36.) This subversion, with its transgressions of tribal law, with its violations of traditional norms, is a return to primitive barbarism, just as lightning, hurricanes, and other cataclysms sent as divine punishment are a suspension of cosmic order and a relapse into primordial chaos.

All of the above phenomenology is oriented toward the heavens. Yahweh, creator of the world, punisher with the flood, pacifier with the rainbow, is a Supreme Being equal to Zeus, who is a god of lightning but not the creator of the world. Many Supreme Beings are Celestial Beings, some even have names that signify the sky, as, for example, the Chinese Tien, the Mongolian Tangri, the Greek Zeus, the Roman Jupiter, and others. For these cases, my thesis that we are dealing with mythical personifications of the sky is valid, in my opinion. But, as I have already indicated, this thesis is not valid for all Supreme Beings. Not all Supreme Beings are Celestial Beings. The notion of the Supreme Being is not exhausted in the notion of a Celestial Being. For many peoples the Supreme Being is not the heavenly Father, but the Mother Earth. The Earth as universal mother and creatrix par excellence is not omniscient, that is to say that she does not have that omniscience which is rooted in all-seeing (the Greek oida , "I know," properly means "I have seen"). The visual omniscience which is naturally proper to the Celestial Being is proper to him because of the luminosity of the heavens. On the contrary, the earth is opaque, dark, and tenebrous. The creativity of the earth also is different from the creativity of the Celestial Being.

There is a phenomenology of the Supreme Being oriented toward the sky and there is a phenomenology of the Supreme Being oriented toward the earth. This polarity is phenomenologically legitimate because both sky and earth are theophanies, i.e., manifestations of the divine. Furthermore, this polarity is methodologically well founded because it realizes the historical premises of phenomenology (in this case the history of preliterate peoples) according to the principle that without history phenomenology tends to vanish in a more or less arbitrary subjectivism.

Behind the Heavenly Father there is a long tradition of pastoral patriarchal civilization. Behind the Mother Earth there is a long tradition of agricultural matriarchal civilization. The Heavenly Father is the Supreme Being typical of the nomads who live on the products of their herds; the herds live on the pastures, and these in their turn depend on rain from the sky. The Mother Earth is the Supreme Being typical of farmers who live on the products of the soil. In more remote times prior to agriculture and to the breeding of livestock, the Supreme Being was the Lord of animals. On this Lord depended the success of the hunt. There are always in play in the notion of the Supreme Being reasons that are vital to human existence. The notion of the Supreme Being does not proceed so much from intellectualistic requirements as from existential anxieties.

These considerations are central to religious phenomenology. Phenomenology can ignore the historical-cultural sequences of ethnology, and the general theories of the development of religious history. This development can be thought of in the evolutionary (i.e., E. B. Tylor) or involutionary (i.e., W. Schmidt) sense; in either case phenomenology can ignore these theories. Van der Leeuw has written that: "Von einer historischen ‘Entwicklung’ der Religion, weisst die Phänomenologie nichts." (Van der Leeuw, Phänomenologie der Religion , p. 652 [quoting Wach, op. cit ., p. 82]).

On the other hand, phenomenology cannot disregard the elementary forms of civilization because the historical-cultural reality, even in the mere economic aspect, fully invades the religious life. Mireca Eliade has written that "L’agriculture est avant tout un rituel.... Le laboureur pénètre et s’intègre dans une zone riche et sacré. Ses gestes, son travail sont responsables de graves conséquences.’’ (Mircea Eliade, Traité d’histoire des religions (Paris, 1949), p. 285.) The hunt is likewise a sacred operation in which "... l’homme doit se trouver dans un état de grace; [elle est] l’aboutissement de longs préparatifs, oit les préoccupations religieuses et magiques tiennent une place préponderante." (Eveline Lot-Falk, Les Rites de chasse chez les peuples sibériens (Paris 1953), p. 8; Fr. G. Speck, "Jagd ist eine heilige Beschäftigung," in Naskapi, The Savage Hunters of Labrador (Norman, Okla., 1935), edited by W. Müller, Die Religionen der waldindianer Nordamerikas (Berlin, 1956), p. 79.) The life of the shepherd is no less rich in religious experiences, being occasioned by the manifold risks and adventures of a wandering life. This historicism is of value for religious phenomenology. Existential anxiety is the common root in the structure of the Supreme Being, but this structure is historically expressed in different forms: the Lord of animals, the Mother Earth, the Heavenly Father. All these structures have profound relations with different cultural realities which have conditioned them and of which the various Supreme Beings are expressions.

The sky is extended equally over all the peoples of the world, but the sacral experience of sky is profoundly different where the sky is conceived as a cosmic complement of earth or eventually generated by the Earth (Ouranos in Hesiod), from where the heavens are felt as a diffuse, immanent presence that intrudes on man in every place and in every instant, without escape or refuge from the all-seeing eye. The earth is always and everywhere the theater of human life; but the sacral experience of earth is different where the earth tilled by man is the Mother, the nurturer, the giver of fruits and flowers for man’s sustenance and joy; from the experience of the earth where it is sterile, the boundless extension of steppe whose fascination has inspired in modern times the narratives of Chekhov ( The Steppe ), the music of Borodin, and indirectly the poetry of Leopardi ( Canto notturno di un pastore errante dell’Asia ).

Phenomenology and history complement each other. Phenomenology cannot do without ethnology, philology, and other historical disciplines. Phenomenology, on the other hand, gives the historical disciplines that sense of the religious which they are not able to capture. So conceived, religious phenomenology is the religious understanding ( Verständniss ) of history; it is history in its religious dimension. Religious phenomenology and history are not two sciences but are two complementary aspects of the integral science of religion, and the science of religion as such has a well-defined character given to it by its unique and proper subject matter. (Cf. Pettazzoni, Numen , I [1954], 5.)

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GOD-CONCEPT: ″SUPREME BEING″ IN AFRICAN TRIBAL RELIGIONS

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Is There a Supreme Being? or the Existence of God

Dr. S. Lewis Johnson teaches on question number one in theology.

Read the Sermon

[Prayer] Father, we thank Thee for the privilege of the study of the word of God. As we consider its teachings, its doctrines, may our thoughts be clear and plain. And may we each profit from the study of the Scriptures together. We thank Thee, again, for Jesus, who is the key to the Scriptures and the key to our relationship to Thee. And may all that is said tonight contribute to the glorification and exaltation of his name.

For it is in his name that we ask it. Amen.

[Message] I would like to give you just a brief review of what we went over last week and complete what we studied. But at the same time, I want to give those of you who are studying seriously a little assignment. I mentioned last time that I wanted to give you a reading assignment, and so here it is. I want you to read in two books both are entitled Systematic Theology. The first by Professor Louis Berkhof — it’s BERKHOF, L. Berkhof — and the other is Lewis Sperry Chafer. Now, I want you to read in Professor Berkhof’s Systematic Theology, pages nineteen through one hundred and seventy-eight, nineteen through one hundred and seventy-eight. And in Dr. Chafer’s book, volume one, pages one through one hundred and twenty-five, volume one, pages one through one hundred and twenty-five. Now, Professor Berkhof is a reformed theologian, Dutch reformed. It is Presbyterian. Dr. Chafer was the president of Dallas Theological Seminary, founder of it, first president. And these two reading assignments cover, in general, the material that we will be covering in our studies.

Now, let’s go over the outline that we went over last time, very quickly. Some of you may not have realized I did have an outline but I did. And this was it.

You’ll remember I began by saying that systematic theology for a long time was considered the queen of the sciences. But prejudice against doctrine and against dogma had changed that evaluation. Last time we discussed the idea of systematic theology. We sought to define it as the science of God. We sought to discuss the aim of systematic theology, which was, as I put it, to perceive, arrange, and systematize the facts of revelation and to set forth the general truths that are involved. We discussed the possibility of theology. And we said that it grew out of three things, the existence of God, the revelation of God, and the endowments of man. We then discussed, fourthly, the necessity of systematic theology, or capital D on the outline.

And I sought to give you some reasons why systematic theology is a necessary thing. It arises or it is found in the instinct of the human mind for systems. It is important to a definite and just view of the truth, a balanced view of the truth. It is important to the Christian life because Christian morality is the fruit that grows from the tree of Christian doctrine. We cannot expect to produce the Christian life if we do not understand Christian truth. It is doctrine first and then life, not life and doctrine. That is why the study of the Scriptures and the doctrines of the Scriptures is so important.

We said it was important to the power of the church. And one of the reasons the church is not powerful today is because it has neglected the parts of the Scriptures that have to do with its order, its worship, its ministry. And so, consequently, the truth is encased in a system which is contrary to the Scriptures. And it is difficult for the doctrines of Scriptures to find their way out to the average man because the organization of the church is a hindrance.

Then we discussed the limitations of systematic theology, the finiteness of the human mind. We cannot understand everything about God, of course. The blindness of sin and every one of us to some extent still manifests the evidence of sin because we still have an old nature. This is why Christians can still fall into sin. Though we have been cleansed and we stand before God perfect in the righteousness which he has provided, we still possess a sin nature, and because we do we may fail. We cannot, therefore, understand because of the blindness that has to do with the old nature everything that we probably ought to understand. God has given us the teaching of the Holy Spirit, but we have to contend with our blindness.

We also pointed out that the Scriptures does not tell us the answer to a lot of questions that we might have. For example, what did our Lord look like? We don’t know. What was the state of the resurrection body of Jesus Christ? How would you describe him? What was his material or matter? What are the capacities of a resurrection body? We can only infer the answer to some of those questions and others we have to throw up our hands and say we are just ignorant.

Also, systematic theology is limited by the imperfect state of sound. It might seem strange to say that, but systematic theology is the consideration of knowledge not only from the Bible but from the revelation of God and the harmonization of what we find in the word of God for that stands firm and what we know about God’s creation. And the imperfect state of sound is a hindrance to the complete understanding of all the theology that we should understand. The incompleteness of our knowledge of Scripture itself, for many of us do not know the word as we should. The inadequacy of human language because it almost seems at times as if the Apostle Paul gives out of human words to express the teachings that he would like to give us. And those who study the Greek language know that every now and then the apostle coins a new word to express what, apparently for him, was something inexpressible in the language that he knew at that time. We, by the way, do that for many things. Well, Paul did it in the New Testament to express his teaching.

And systematic theology is, of course, limited by the illuminating ministry of the Holy Spirit, for the Spirit has not revealed everything to us. And throughout the entire age, from the time of cross on to the time of the Second Advent, the Spirit is teaching. Now, he has not taught us everything at once. It is my firm belief that there is still something left for us to discover in God’s word. No new revelations but new illuminations upon the revelation that we possess.

Now, we were about here I think. The qualifications for systematic theology, and they are simple. I’ll just state them quickly. Number one, there is need for the new life. No one can understand theology who has not been born again. It is useless to study the doctrine concerning God if we do not have the Holy Spirit of God as our teacher. And it is not until we believe in our Lord Jesus Christ that we receive the Holy Spirit. Then we are qualified to understand, or we — I say qualified. Yes. That’s right. We are qualified and we have the capacity to understand the truth of God because we have the Holy Spirit. The natural man receiveth not the things of the spirit of God, they are foolishness unto him. Neither can he know them because they are spiritually discerned. We’re discerned by the spirit. It is the man who has been born again who possesses the Holy Spirit.

Then not only must he be born again, but he must have a healthy Christian life. The man who has just been born again may understand the milk of the word, but God desires that we grow so that we can come to the place where we take the meat of the word. Now, if instead of growing, we persist in our carnality and become fleshly, then we cannot understand the meat of the word. We can only understand the milk. If you remember that Paul wrote the Corinthians, and he told them that he could not speak unto them as unto spiritual. He had to speak unto them as unto carnal, as unto babes in Christ because they had just been born again. But then in his epistle he said, even now after this time you are still carnal because whereas there is among you strife, envy, division, are ye not carnal and walk as men and consequently they cannot understand the meat of the word because they didn’t have a healthy spiritual life.

That’s why many Christians who have sat in church for year after year after year never understand anything but just a basic little facts about the ministry of Jesus Christ and what it is to be a Christian, and that’s the limit of their understanding of all of God’s word because their Christian life is not healthy. They are carnal. Now, we could talk for a whole night on that subject, cannot do it.

The division of systematic theology. Just very quickly, I have listed four of them so that you might understand precisely where systematic theology stands logically in theology. Exegetical theology is the study of the background of the New Testament and the Old Testament. It is the study of Greek and Hebrew and questions such as this. That is exegetical theology. Historical theology is the study of the history of the doctrines of the church. In other words, if we were studying historical theology, we might start with the doctrine of Christ. And we would study what the church has believed about the doctrine of the Christ down through the centuries, historical theology. What men in the church have believed about the doctrines of the word of God, historical theology.

Our seminaries teach exegetical theology, they teach historical theology, then systematic theology — we’ve discussed that. And practical theology has to do with such subjects as — well, how you should conduct a wedding ceremony. How should you conduct a funeral service? What are the practical out-workings of the ministry of the truth that is found in systematic theology? Practical theology, of course, is not nearly so significant as the others.

Now, very quickly, Roman II, the Material of Systematic Theology. Now, since we are going to take this up, I’m just going to point this out. Systematic theology has, as its materials, two things, general revelation, the revelation of God in nature; special revelation, the revelation of God in his word. General revelation is revelation that is addressed to man as a man. And by means of general revelation, we understand that God is a supreme being. Special revelation is addressed to man as a sinner. And it is by means of the special revelation in his word that we learn how to be saved from our sins. Now, since we are going to talk a lot about that, and I have devoted one night entirely to revelation, I think we can drop that.

And, finally, Roman III, The Method of Systematic Theology. The method of systematic theology is induction. What we shall do is to collect, arrange, and exhibit in their relationship to each other, the facts that are found in the word of God. We will not seek to impose upon the facts our ideas but on the basis of what we see in the Scriptures and in general revelation. From these facts, we will construct our theology. So the method of systematic theology as in the study of any science is induction.

Now, then tonight, our topic now, “Is There a Supreme Being?, or the Existence of God.” When we begin the study of systematic theology, in spite of the God is dead theology of today, we begin with two presuppositions. The first, God exists. It is really remarkable that the Bible does not contain a proof of God’s existence. You might have expected that the first chapter of the Book of Genesis would be devoted to just such a proof. Some might say, well, the Bible would have helped us a great deal if it had. Or you might say, if you do not believe in the existence of God, it couldn’t give it and so it is omitted. And yet, in spite of the fact that the word of God does not give us any proof of God’s existence in its opening pages, the existence of God is a fact that is accepted by almost all men consciously or unconsciously. Browning wrote of the reality of the unseen as “the feeling that there is God, he reigns and rules out of this low world.”

The first presupposition, God exists. The second presupposition is that God has revealed himself. And, of course, a correlate of this fact is that this revelation is authoritative. If he has revealed himself, then of course his revelation is authoritative. Now, it also might surprise you to know that the Bible contains no definition of God. We do not find anywhere in the Bible a definition of God. I wonder why that is.

Now, when I was a youngster and was in Sunday school, I was asked to memorize a definition of God. In fact, I was given a catechism, and it was the fourth question which said, who is God? And I was to learn, as just a little kid, God is a spirit infinite, eternal, and unchangeable in his being, wisdom, power, holiness, justice, goodness, and truth. That’s what I learned. That was the answer to the question number four in the catechism.

Charles Hodge said that that was the best definition of God every penned by man. Well, you might expect that because Charles Hodge was a Presbyterian. And that was in the catechism that all Presbyterians learn, the Shorter Catechism.

Now, the reason that the Bible does not give us any definition of God is more significant than we might realize. You see the truth of the matter is we cannot give a definition of God. It is impossible for us to absolutely define God. Only God can define God. And consequently, there is nowhere in the Bible any definition of God. And, philosophically, I’m very glad there is no definition of God because it’s just one of those implicit proofs that what we have in the word of God is not a study that attempts to deceive people, but something that is true to the fact we could never define God absolutely.

We can however define him relationally, and the Bible does define him relationally. You remember when Moses asked God about his name, he repeats this answer. “I am that I am.” That’s who God is. “I am who I am.” And that’s all you can say. Once you start defining God, then you begin to limit him. And since ultimately we can never known him completely and fully in his fullness, in the fullness of his perfection, we can never really define God absolutely. But he himself defines himself relationally.

And in that great passage in Exodus chapter 3 — and you might turn there — we have a relational definition of God which is significant. In the 13th verse in the second book of the Bible we read, in verse 13, Exodus 3:13, “And Moses said unto God, behold when I come unto the children of Israel and shall say unto them the God of your fathers has sent me unto you, and they shall say to me what is his name?” Now, you’ll remember in Hebrew the name refers to the character of a person. The name was descriptive of a person’s being. “What is his name? What shall I say unto them?” And God said unto Moses, “I am that I am.” I am who I am. And he said “thus shalt thou say unto the children of Israel, I am hast sent me unto you.”

Now, notice the 15th verse, and God said moreover unto Moses thus shalt thou say unto the children of Israel the Lord God of your fathers, the God of Abraham, the God of Isaac, and the God of Jacob hath sent me unto you.” This is my name forever, and this is my memorial unto all generations. In other words, absolutely he is who he is, and that’s all we can say. Relationally, so far as Israel is concerned he is the God of Abraham, the God of Isaac, and the God of Jacob. He’s the God who has entered into a personal relationship with them. That is his relational name, the God of Abraham, the God of Isaac, the God of Jacob. So we cannot define God absolutely, though he may define himself relatively.

Now, let’s consider the truth of God as the first the intuitive proof of the existence of God. Haman once said, “If he who denies God’s existence is a fool then he who would demonstrate it is a greater one.” And we are in danger of becoming that when we try to demonstrate it. But there is an innate knowledge which men possess. There are intuitive senses which we all possess. There are truths that arise out of these intuitions of the human mind as well as the human senses. For example, there are intuitive truths of the senses. We feel pain, and we don’t have to stop and reason about it. The moment we feel it we know we feel it. We don’t have to rationalize it. It’s there immediately. We have a sense of touch with which we are born. We don’t rationalize it. We have it. It’s one of those intuitive senses. And the truths that arise out of the intuitive senses, the truths with which we are born by our constitution, they are intuitive truths of the intellect. For example, just to be as simple as we can almost all of us know immediately that the part of a thing is less than a whole. We know that the shortest distance between two points is a straight line. Now, I know that some women find it difficult to realize that that’s true, men. But that is one of the intuitive truths of the intellect which all men possess.

There are also intuitive truths of our moral nature. We, for example, as soon as we are conscious of anything, we are conscious of the fact that we are responsible for our conduct. We are conscious of the distinction between right and wrong. We are conscious of the fact that sin deserves punishment. We do not have to have these things reasoned into our understanding, but they are intuitive with us. Such truths we call universal, necessary truths. They are true of men generally everywhere. They are rooted in the fact that we are men. The moral law, the sense of touch, the sense of dependence, all of these things are part of human nature. We are born with these senses.

And so the knowledge of God, men are born with the sense of the knowledge of God because it is part of their constitution. It is the way they were created by God. Adam, I believe, believed in God the moment he was created for the same reason that he believed in the external world. He had an eye to see and he believed in the external world. He had a spiritual nature with which he was born, and out of that spiritual nature he comprehended the existence of God. That was the way he was created. And we, because we are men, intuitively have the sense of the existence of God. Now, of course there are men who seek to deny this. We do not question that. But this is one of the universal and necessary truths. And wherever you go you will find that men believe in God from the beginning.

Now, secondly, the scriptural truth of the existence of God. Now, of course, we all recognize the limited apologetic value of appealing to the Scriptures. But for the sake of most of you here who are Christians, we’ll just look at a couple of passages to remind ourselves of the fact that the Bible does claim to speak of God. Notice the first verse of the Bible, “In the beginning God created the heaven and the earth.” No warning, no previous definition but simply, “In the beginning God created.” Someone has said that this simple statement denies materialism or God created the heavens and the earth; denies atheism or in the beginning God; it denies polytheism, or it is God singular not Gods as chapter 2 verse 4 makes very plain; it denies pantheism, for God is not in his creation. He has created the heavens and the earth. It denies agnosticism or, of course from the Scriptures we know there is a God when we read in the beginning God. And it denies fatalism, for it is God who exercises creative power. And there is also a denial of evolution as it is popularly understood.

Hebrews chapter 11, verse 6 is another passage we might look at for a moment. Hebrews chapter 11, verse 6. Here the writer of the Epistle to the Hebrews states the existence of God is one of the basic tenants of the faith. Verse 6, Hebrews 11, “But without faith it is impossible to please him, for he that cometh to God must believe that he is” or as the Greek text says that he exists and that he is the rewarder of them that diligently seek him, the existence of God.

Will you also turn to Romans chapter 1, Romans chapter 1? And let’s read verses 19 through 21, Romans 1, 19 through 21. In this passage, which we shall look at later, you see that the Apostle Paul believed that it was possible for us to know that God existed from his creation. Romans 1:19, “Because that which may be known of God is manifested in them, for God hath shown it unto them. For the invisible things of him from the creation of the world are clearly seen, being understood by the things that are made even if eternal power and Godhood not head, so that they are without excuse.” In other words, by the creation we are able to understand the eternal power and deity of God so that men are without excuse. In general revelation, there is a revelation of the existence of God.

Now, let’s move on finally to the rational truth for the existence of God. Now, these rational truths are very ancient proofs. Some of them go back as far as Plato and Aristotle. It might surprise you to find in a discussion of Christian theology rational proof that go back to Plato and Aristotle. But you see these truths about the existence of God are truths that, as we have said, are true to the constitution of man and because men are men they have been able to understand why there must be a God to some extent. Now, these are not convincing proof. In the final analysis the only one who will ever convince you that God exists completely and finally is God himself. But for those who are persuaded or who are open, the rational proofs of the existence of God do have some testimonial value.

And the first is the — now, I don’t want to apologize for big words, but we do have one — the cosmological argument. Wouldn’t it be interesting tomorrow when you go to work and you young ladies who are secretaries, you go in and ask your boss, do you know what the cosmological argument for the existence of God is? Now, this is the first of the rational proofs for the existence of God. Now, I’ll just go through it briefly, if you have any questions, remember you can always come and ask me. This is the argument from effect to cause. Every effect, not everything, but every effect must have a cause. And because every effect has a cause, we must ultimately posit someone who is responsible for all of the effects. And the fact that there is a unity in God’s creation argues logically for a creator. In the cosmological argument, we can at least come to the conclusion that there is an ultimate cause for everything. We, of course, cannot tell that he is personal necessarily but that there is a cause.

Then the second argument is that — nowm this the much shorter word, this is the teleological argument –it’s T-E-L-E-O-L-O-G-I-C-A-L. Tele in Greek means the end, a goal. Elios means perfect or mature. Permissable argument from the design to a designer. In other words, as we look at God’s creation, the material world, the moral world, the intellectual world, but particularly the material world, there is an indication of design. And design suggests purpose, which in turn indicates intelligence or a designer. If we could say that this first argument indicates that there is a cause. This one is that there is an intelligent cause responsible for the universe.

Now, you can think of all kinds of illustrations. I don’t have time to give them to you, but the illustrations would come to all of us. If I were to hold a watch before you, you would immediately say, if you were interested, who made it or what’s the make? Watches do not come into existence apart from purpose, design. And the fact that we have this glorious creation about us immediately suggests to us that someone must be responsible for it.

C. now this is really a little word. The moral argument, the moral argument. Now, the moral argument for the existence of God is an argument that is related to the conscience of man. Conscience is a word that means with knowledge. In other words, conscience is that part of man which expresses a moral viewpoint with regard to the knowledge that we have. With our knowledge, we have moral sensibilities. We have a sense of ought. Well, how do we get that sense of ought? Well, it’s because there is written in the constitution of man the existence of God. We have our consciences as a gift from God.

Man did not say at a point in history, you know I think it would be very useful to me if I had a sense of ought because then, of course, he would have already had that sense of ought, wouldn’t he? It’s something with which we are born because it is part of our nature, our sense of ought. We do not impose upon ourselves any golden rules. If they were self-imposed, they would be of no significance whatsoever.

But let’s just suppose that there was no such thing as the moral argument. And let’s suppose that there were two men working for a firm and John is one of them and his friend is the other. And John knows that while he’s very good in mathematics, his friend is just a little bit better. But he doesn’t like his friend very much. And so the word gets out that in the organization, a job is open with a superior pay for the man who has the best knowledge of mathematics, and John is approached, but he knows that really this friend of his, whom he doesn’t like much, has a better sense than he does. And so let’s suppose with no sense of ought, let’s suppose that John would say, you know he ought to have the job and I ought to have the sense of ought whereby he might have this job. Well, you can see that such a thing is ridiculous because any kind of self-imposed ought is of no significance whatsoever to anyone else. And so, consequently, the fact that we have a sense of ought cannot be explained apart from the fact that it has been given us by someone else, by God. And we can say now, if this is true, that the cause of the universe is not only intelligent but also moral.

And, finally, the ontological argument, O-N-T-O-L-O-G-I-C-A-L. The ontological argument. This is an argument from abstract and necessary ideas. This argument, by the way, has been stated in several different forms, but sometimes it’s stated like this and usually like this. We have an idea of an absolutely perfect being. That is something that each of us possesses. Existence is an attribute of perfection. And so because we have an idea of an absolutely perfect being and existence is an attribute of perfection then he must exist. If he did not exist then, of course, we could conceive of someone who was greater. And so the very fact that we have the idea of an absolutely perfect being and since existence is an attribute of perfection there must be such.

Now, these arguments, the cosmological, the teleological, the moral, the ontological, do not, it is obvious, prove the existence of God. They do help. I think they indicate that what we see in the nature of man is understandable on the basis of the existence of a God. There are many illustrations, of course, of individuals who have sensed that there was a God apart from teaching. One of the most famous was Helen Keller. As you know, Helen Keller was born blind and deaf. And for a long period of time she was taught. She was taught to speak. And her teacher who was very, very, patient with her felt that after a long time that Miss Keller should have some instruction concerning God. And so she asked Phillips Brooks, the famous preacher, to come and speak to her about God. And so Phillips Brooks came, and he spoke to Helen Keller about God. So far as the teacher was concerned, Mr. Brooks was concerned, it was the first time that she had ever heard about God. And when Mr. Brooks finished she said “Oh, Mr. Brooks, I always knew there must be a God, but I didn’t know his name.” Well, she had that innate sense that comes from the fact that she was a human being.

Now, let me conclude. It is impossible to prove God. Only God can really prove that he exists. As in law, psychology, philosophy, so in theology, too much depends on personal judgment. Much of the Bible teaching lies beyond our observation. We weren’t there when the creation took place. At the moment, we are — we cannot understand the facts that the Bible speaks about concerning the future world because it has not come to pass, and we’re on this earth. Much of the Bible is suprarational, the miracle, the virgin birth, the trinity. Who could ever rationalize these things?

We must remember that in the light of them we cannot expect to prove God. But Christianity is not a leap in the dark. I think that some Christians are frequently on the defensive. They think because they cannot prove God that they are in a worse situation than the man who doesn’t believe in a God. But remember, he cannot prove there is not a God, and the fact that you cannot prove that there is a God does not mean that there is no God. Men could not prove for hundreds of years that the earth was round but it was. In fact, they were very vehement in believing just the opposite. But the facts were different. And so because you cannot prove that there is a God, do not be discouraged. He cannot prove that there is not a God.

I think in the light of the fact that we have the intuitive evidence, the rational evidences, and then, above all, the testimony of the Holy Spirit of God that out of these things and the facts concerning the ministry of the Lord Jesus we can reach the place where we have an overwhelming probability that there is a God who has revealed himself in Jesus Christ. And when we take the leap of faith, which opens our eyes, then the Holy Spirit confirms the truth to the believer. And so while we cannot prove God as we believe, we do come to know him and to know him surely indefinitely.

In the final analysis, the test of an adequate hypothesis is its ability to explain the facts as we experience them. And Christianity is able to explain the facts as we experience them. Atheism, Agnosticism, they cannot explain the facts as we experience them. Christianity has the best answers to the problems of life and the remedies of them. And when men are willing to accept the testimony of the word of God and believe, then they can come to a sense of certainty in the biblical truths.

Well, we shall stop at this point for next time our subject will be “Canst thou by searching find out God?, or the knowability of God.”

Now, let me say that tonight we have had to engage in some things which I know were probably a little heavy for some of you, but I believe it will get a little lighter as we move on. These opening topics are important for us, but they are heavy. So if you can keep up above water, why things will be better in the future.

Let’s close with a word of prayer.

[Prayer] Father, we thank Thee for the privilege of the study of the word of God. Guide our thoughts that we may be, as the Scriptures say, equipped for every good work.

For Jesus’ sake. Amen.

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Theology proper.

• The Justice of God
• The Holiness of God (The Attribute of Attributes)
• The Goodness of God and the Existence of Evil
• The Will of God
• The Power of God, part II
• The Power of God, part I (Can God Do Everything?)
• The Knowledge and Wisdom of God, part II
• The Knowledge and Wisdom of God, part I
• The Repentance and Unchangeability of God
• Attributes of God, part VI (The Eternity of God or How Old is God?)

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• The New Testament

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On the Goodness of the Supreme Being

Orpheus, for 1]so the Gentiles call'd thy name, Israel's sweet Psalmist, who alone couldst wake Th'inanimate to motion; who alone The joyful hillocks, the applauding rocks, 5 And floods with musical persuasion drew; Thou who to hail and snow gav'st voice and sound, And mad'st the mute melodious! — greater yet Was thy divinest skill, and rul'd o'er more Than art or nature; for thy tuneful touch Drove trembling Satan from the heart of Saul, And quell'd the evil Angel: — in this breast Some portion of thy genuine spirit breathe, And lift me from myself, each thought impure Banish; each low idea raise, refine, Enlarge, and sanctify; — so shall the muse Above the stars aspire, and aim to praise Her God on earth, as he is prais'd in heaven. Immense Creator! whose all-powerful hand Fram'd universal Being, and whose Eye Saw like thyself, that all things form'd were good; Where shall the tim'rous bard thy praise begin, Where end the purest sacrifice of song, And just thanksgiving? — The thought — kindling light, Thy prime production, darts upon my mind Its vivifying beams, my heart illumines, And fills my soul with gratitude and Thee. Hail to the chearful rays of ruddy morn, That paint the streaky East, and blithsome rouse The birds, the cattle, and mankind from rest! Hail to the freshness of the early breeze, And Iris dancing on the new--fall'n dew! Without the aid of yonder golden globe Lost were the garnet's lustre, lost the lilly, The tulip and auricula's spotted pride; Lost were the peacock's plumage, to the sight So pleasing in its pomp and glossy glow. O thrice-illustrious! were it not for thee Those pansies, that reclining from the bank, View thro' th'immaculate, pellucid stream Their portraiture in the inverted heaven, Might as well change their triple boast, the white, The purple, and the gold, that far outvie The Eastern monarch's garb, ev'n with the dock, Ev'n with the baneful hemlock's irksome green. Without thy aid, without thy gladsome beams The tribes of woodland warblers wou'd remain Mute on the bending branches, nor recite The praise of him, who, e'er he form'd their lord, Their voices tun'd to transport, wing'd their flight, And bade them call for nurture, and receive; And lo! they call; the blackbird and the thrush, The woodlark, and the redbreast jointly call; He hears and feeds their feather'd families, He feeds his sweet musicians, — nor neglects Th'invoking ravens in the greenwood wide; And tho' their throats coarse ruttling hurt the ear, They mean it all for music, thanks and praise They mean, and leave ingratitude to man;-- But not to all,--for hark! the organs blow Their swelling notes round the cathedral's dome, And grace th'harmonious choir, celestial feast To pious ears, and med'cine of the mind; The thrilling trebles of the manly base Join in accordance meet, and with one voice All to the sacred subject suit their song: While in each breast sweet melancholy reigns Angelically pensive, till the joy Improves and purifies; — the solemn scene The Sun thro' storied panes surveys with awe, And bashfully with-holds each bolder beam. Here, as her home, from morn to eve frequents The cherub Gratitude; — behold her eyes! With love and gladness weepingly they shed Extatic smiles; the incense, that her hands Uprear, is sweeter than the breath of May Caught from the nectarine's blossom, and her voice Is more than voice can tell; to him she sings, To him who feeds, who clothes and who adorns, Who made and who preserves, whatever dwells In air, in stedfast earth, or fickle sea. O He is good, he is immensely good! Who all things form'd, and form'd them all for man; Who mark'd the climates, varied every zone, Dispensing all his blessings for the best In order and in beauty: — raise, attend, Attest, and praise, ye quarters of the world! Bow down, ye elephants, submissive bow To him, who made the mite; tho' Asia's pride, Ye carry armies on your tow'r-crown'd backs, And grace the turban'd tyrants, bow to him Who is as great, as perfect and as good In his less-striking wonders, till at length The eye's at fault and seeks th'assisting glass. Approach and bring from Araby the blest The fragrant cassia, frankincense and myrrh, And meekly kneeling at the altar's foot Lay all the tributary incense down. Stoop, sable Africa, with rev'rence stoop, And from thy brow take off the painted plume; With golden ingots all thy camels load T'adorn his temples, hasten with thy spear Reverted, and thy trusty bow unstrung, While unpursu'd the lions roam and roar, And ruin'd tow'rs, rude rocks and caverns wide Remurmur to the glorious, surly sound. And thou, fair Indian, whose immense domain To counterpoise the Hemisphere extends, Haste from the West, and with thy fruits and flow'rs, Thy mines and med'cines, wealthy maid, attend. More than the plenteousness so fam'd to flow By fabling bards from Amalthea's horn Is thine; thine therefore be a portion due Of thanks and praise: come with thy brilliant crown And vest of fur; and from thy fragrant lap Pomegranates and the rich ananas pour. But chiefly thou, Europa, seat of grace And Christian excellence, his goodness own, Forth from ten thousand temples pour his praise; Clad in the armour of the living God Approach, unsheath the spirit's flaming sword; Faith's shield, Salvation's glory, — compass'd helm With fortitude assume, and o'er your heart Fair truth's invulnerable breast-plate spread; Then join the general chorus of all worlds, And let the song of charity begin In strains seraphic, and melodious pray'r. ``O all-sufficient, all beneficent, ``Thou God of Goodness and of glory, hear! ``Thou, who to lowliest minds dost condescend, ``Assuming passions to enforce thy laws, ``Adopting jealousy to prove thy love: ``Thou, who resign'd humility uphold, ``Ev'n as the florist props the drooping rose, ``But quell tyrannic pride with peerless pow'r, ``Ev'n as the tempest rives the stubborn oak. ``O all-sufficient, all-beneficent, ``Thou God of Goodness, and of glory, hear!  ``Bless all mankind, and bring them in the end ``To heav'n, to immortality, and Thee! ↑ Note: See this conjecture strongly supported by Delany, in his Life of David. [The note is probably by the Author]. This work was published before January 1, 1929, and is in the public domain worldwide because the author died at least 100 years ago. Public domain Public domain false false Navigation menu Cult of the Supreme Being Server costs fundraiser 2024. The Cult of the Supreme Being was a deistic cult established by Maximilien Robespierre (1758-1794) during the French Revolution (1789-1799). Its purpose was to replace Roman Catholicism as the state religion of France and to undermine the atheistic Cult of Reason which had recently gained popularity. It represented the peak of Robespierre's power and went unsupported after his downfall. In establishing the Cult of the Supreme Being, Robespierre intended to shepherd the French Republic toward a state of absolute virtue, or moral excellence. He meant to use the idea of an abstract godhead, or Supreme Being, to educate the French people on the relationship between virtue and republican government, thereby creating a perfectly just society. According to the decree of 18 Floréal (7 May), the cult acknowledged the existence of a Supreme Being as well as the immortality of the human soul. Worship of the Supreme Being was to be done through acts of civic duty. On 8 June 1794, a Festival of the Supreme Being was held on the Champ de Mars . Robespierre, who was then at the apex of his dictatorial powers, took on a central role in the festivities, giving him the appearance of pontiff to the new religion. It is thought that distaste for the cult, and for Robespierre's central position in it, helped lead to his downfall a little over a month later. According to historian Mona Ozouf, the Festival represented a certain revolutionary stiffness that foreshadowed the "sclerosis of the Revolution" (Ozouf, 24). The Church & the Revolution The French Revolution had been at odds with the Catholic Church since its beginning. A fundamental pillar of the oppressive Ancien Régime , the institution of the Church seemed to stand for corruption, superstition, and backwardness, all contrary to revolutionary values. In November 1789, Church lands were seized and nationalized to bolster France's withering economy , while the Civil Constitution of the Clergy forced all practicing clergymen to swear oaths to the new constitution and pledge that their loyalty to the French state would supersede their loyalty to the Pope in Rome . Yet in this early phase of the Revolution, it was the institution of the church that was under attack rather than Christianity itself. Many citizens would still consider themselves Catholic, and many even sought to reconcile the Gallican Church with the Revolution; most early revolutionary festivals included sermons from constitutional priests, who made sure to draw parallels between revolutionary values and the Gospels and to refer to Jesus Christ as the ideal sans-culotte . Infants would be baptized with a tri-color cockade pinned to their diapers, being simultaneously given over to both Christ and the fatherland. But before long, the differences between the Church and the Revolution became too vast to ignore. The Pope condemned the Revolution and excommunicated certain clergymen who had supported the new constitution. King Louis XVI of France (r. 1774-1792), after his failed flight to Varennes , made clear his disgust at the Revolution's treatment of the Church, further helping to associate it with corrupt aristocracy. In late 1791, the French Legislative Assembly declared that all clergymen who had not yet sworn oaths to the constitution were guilty of conspiracy and sentenced to deportation. The Assembly also legalized divorce and declared that all records of births, deaths, and marriages would henceforth be handled by secular officials only, removing an important function from the Church. Rise of Atheism: The Cult of Reason Of course, the most fervent attempts at de-Christianization would not come until around the time of the Reign of Terror in September 1793. An anti-clerical, atheistic movement known as the Cult of Reason had arisen around Paris , propped up by an extremist, 'ultra-revolutionary' faction known as the Hébertists. The Cult of Reason rejected the existence of God in any form, instead dedicating itself to the celebration of Enlightenment values such as liberty and rationalism. While it still had ceremonies that resembled religious traditions, this was mainly done in mockery of organized religion, causing some historians to regard the cult as a "crude caricature of Catholic ceremonies" (Furet 564). The Hébertists, who had come to power in the Paris Commune, sought to make de-Christianization an official policy of the Revolution and to make the Cult of Reason its official religion. They were instrumental in replacing many Christian symbols and statues with revolutionary iconographies, while the National Convention adopted the French Republican calendar , which erased all references to Christianity from the French year. Hébertist-aligned representatives brought this attitude into the provinces, having church properties vandalized and stripped of their valuables to fund the war effort. One representative, Joseph Fouché, robbed a cemetery of religious symbols and posted a sign on its gate that read, " Death is but an eternal sleep," which became a tenet of the Cult of Reason (Schama, 777). The Cult of Reason was especially hostile to clerics themselves, who were humiliatingly forced to abjure their vows by getting married or to declare themselves to be charlatans, under threat of the guillotine. Outright violence against Catholics became increasingly common; Jean-Baptiste Carrier made a name for himself by submerging thousands of clergymen and religious Vendean rebels in the Loire River in the drownings at Nantes . On 7 November 1793, the Archbishop of Paris was forced to resign his duties and was made to replace his mitre with a red cap of liberty. To celebrate the archbishop's humiliation, the Hébertists organized a Festival of Reason to be held at the Notre-Dame Cathedral, which had been rededicated as the Temple of Reason. The Festival of Reason, held on 10 November, was long the subject of scandalous rumor. It was true that Sophie Momoro, wife of one of the leading Hébertists, played a central role as the scantily clad goddess of Reason, and that the Christian altar was dismantled in favor of an altar to ' Philosophy '. Yet rumors persisted of acts of licentiousness, such as depraved orgies, that took place. True or not, these rumors finally forced the hand of Robespierre and the moralizing Jacobins. Robespierre & Religion By the end of 1793, Robespierre was reaching the summit of his dictatorial powers. Although all members of the Committee of Public Safety were theoretically equal, Robespierre controlled it in all but name, which made him the veritable master of France. Famously self-righteous and borderline puritanical, Robespierre had never been closer to achieving his vision of a perfectly virtuous Republic, consisting of citizens who thought of the greater good above all else. Standing in his way were the Hébertists and their seemingly hedonistic Cult of Reason. On a pragmatic level, Robespierre knew that their outspoken aversion to Christianity would further alienate the Republic from potential supporters and allies. On a personal level, he was offended by the cult's atheism and its rumored depravity, traits that were antithetical to his idealistic, moral society. Either way, he knew it had to go. Not long after the Festival of Reason, Robespierre gave a speech in the Jacobin Club, denouncing atheism as 'aristocratic'. In March 1794, he arranged for the arrests and executions of nineteen leading Hébertists; their deaths also ensured the diminishment of the Cult of Reason. Immediately, Robespierre sought to undo the damage they had done, with his ally Georges Couthon announcing on 7 April that new proposals would shortly be brought forward for "channeling the spiritual leanings of the nation in more patriotic directions" (Doyle, 277). But the question remained as to what exactly this new spirituality would look like. Despite his hatred of atheism, Robespierre was no fan of Roman Catholicism either, an institution that he largely viewed as corrupt. Instead, it was necessary to introduce a new god, one that personified the revolutionary values of truth, liberty, and virtue. Only through a shared faith in a higher power, Robespierre believed, could French society achieve its destiny and reach the pinnacle of virtue; clearly, he agreed with Voltaire that, "if God did not exist, it would be necessary to invent him" (Scurr, 294). So, Robespierre set out to do exactly that. He established the Cult of the Supreme Being, which was centered around deism, the belief that a creator exists but refrains from interfering in the universe. Robespierre professed to believe in a Supreme Being as well as in the immortality of the human soul, preaching such doctrines before both the National Convention and the Jacobin Club. On 18 Floréal Year II (7 May 1794), he persuaded the Convention to officially establish the Worship of the Supreme Being; the opening lines of their decree proclaimed that: 1. The French people recognize the existence of the Supreme Being and the immortality of the soul. 2. They recognize that the worship worthy of the Supreme Being is the practice of the duties of man. 3. They place in the first rank of these duties [the obligation] to detest bad faith and tyranny, to punish tyrants and traitors, to rescue the unfortunate, to respect the weak, to defend the oppressed, [and] to do to others all the good that one can and not to be unjust toward anyone. ( Decree Establishing the Worship of the Supreme Being , from Alphahistory.com) Republican celebrations were to be held every tenth day, or décadi in the new calendar, with the first large festival to be held on 20 Prairial (8 June), which also happened to be Whit Sunday in the old Christian calendar; whether this was merely a coincidence or a subtle challenge to the old religion is not known. In any case, the instructions the Convention sent out to the localities on how to prepare for the coming Festival were vague. Some areas adapted the props used in the recently proscribed festivals of Reason, simply painting over the atheistic slogans with the new deistic ones. Other religiously conservative areas used it as an opportunity to publicly perform Christian Mass for the first time since the start of the Terror, without fear of repercussion. But the focal point of celebration would take place just outside Paris itself, on the Champ de Mars. Festival of the Supreme Being As the day of the festival approached, the renowned painter and fanatical Jacobin Jacques-Louis David was entrusted to organize the event. He constructed an artificial mountain on the Champ de Mars as the festival's centerpiece; it was a metaphor celebrating the triumph of the Mountain, the Jacobin's political party, over its enemies. David ensured that each celebration was meticulously choreographed, taking great pains to organize everything as efficiently as possible. The guillotine, which had been particularly busy as of late, was relocated from the Place de la Revolution to the site of the demolished Bastille, where the sound of the falling blade would be well out of earshot of the celebrating Parisians. 8 June 1794 proved to be a beautifully sunny day, as if the Supreme Being itself was smiling on the French people. Across Paris, citizens had decorated their homes with wreaths of oak and laurel, with tricolor ribbons and flowers. In the morning, they dutifully made their way to the gardens of the Tuileries Palace where the first of the day's celebrations and speeches were to be held. Watching the congregating masses from a room in the palace was Robespierre himself, dressed ostentatiously in a sky-blue coat, gold trousers, and a tricolor sash. Sign up for our free weekly email newsletter! Since Robespierre had rather conveniently been elected president of the National Convention four days before, the responsibility fell to him to officiate the ceremonies and perform the duties of a high priest. He was much too excited to eat his breakfast, and according to his companion Joachim Vilate, he could hardly be drawn from the window, where he stood watching the assembly of laughing children, women wearing roses in their hair, and men with oak leaves in their hats. Marveling at this crowd that had gathered to celebrate a religion he had created, Robespierre mused to Vilate: Behold the most interesting part of humanity! Here is the universe assembled before us! Nature, how sublime, how delightful thy power! How the tyrants must turn pale at the thought of this festival. (Scurr, 316) At midday, Robespierre went out into the garden and joined his fellow deputies of the Convention. After quieting the crowd, Robespierre delivered his first speech of the day, which he began by announcing: "the day forever fortunate has arrived that the French people have consecrated to the Supreme Being" ( ibid ). Upon finishing his speech, he turned toward an ugly, misshapen cardboard statue that was supposed to represent Atheism, and lit it on fire. As it burned, it revealed another statue, this one beautiful and majestic, that represented Wisdom. Afterwards, Robespierre gave another speech during which he could hear the Convention deputies whispering and snickering behind his back. He would not forget the insult. In the early afternoon, Robespierre led the crowd of singing citizens through the streets of Paris and to the Champ de Mars, where David's immense monument to Jacobinism loomed before them. Over half a million people were said to have gathered around it, shouting “ Vive la Republique !” and “ Vive Robespierre! ” as the deputies took their seats at the summit of the mountain, next to a grand liberty tree. From on high, they led the assembled throngs in singing La Marseillaise and swearing the now customary revolutionary oaths. The rest of the day was filled with athletic competitions, in the spirit of ancient Greece . By most accounts, the Festival of the Supreme Being was the happiest day of Robespierre's life. Reaction to the Festival The Festival of the Supreme Being was well received by ordinary Parisians, who had become used to the flashy theatrics of revolutionary celebrations and enjoyed the excuse to let loose and forget the grim realities of France in 1794. Jacobin newspapers praised the festival as the finest day in the life of virtuous man, while in Orléans, another festival was held in which similarly jubilated crowds cried out, “ Vive Robespierre! ” Of course, not everyone was happy with the festival, and many revolutionary leaders felt threatened by Robespierre's central role. By consolidating his power the previous winter and spring, Robespierre had already opened himself up to rumors that he aspired to total dictatorship; his role as chief pontiff of this strange new religion only seemed to confirm this speculation. One deputy of the National Convention, Jacques-Alexis Thuriot, thought as much. During Robespierre's grandiose speech in the Tuileries gardens, Thuriot whispered to a companion, "Look at the bugger. It's not enough for him to be master, he has to be God" (Doyle, 278). Perhaps Thuriot and those who shared his thoughts were right to be worried; a mere two days after the Festival of the Supreme Being, Robespierre and his allies introduced a law to the Convention without prior consultation. This law, infamously known as the Law of 22 Prairial, was meant to solve the problem of Paris' overcrowded prisons by accelerating trials. Resulting from this was the month-long period of the Great Terror, during which over 1,400 people were rapidly guillotined in Paris. Robespierre began to hint that he had a list of treacherous conspirators in the National Convention but kept refusing to name names, watching as the deputies squirmed beneath his shadow of Terror. Afraid that they had made the list, many deputies refused to sleep in their own beds, lest they be arrested in the dead of night. Finally, on 27 July 1794, members of the Convention rose up and overthrew Robespierre, who was executed the next day. End of the Cult With the fall of Maximilien Robespierre , the Cult of the Supreme Being largely fell into obscurity. Robespierre's central role in both the cult's creation and in the festival on 8 June meant that the cult was associated with him and his Jacobin movement. With his death, no one bothered to pick up the mantle. During the Thermidorian Reaction , the period that followed the Reign of Terror, the French government distanced itself from many Jacobin policies and customs, including the Cult of the Supreme Being. It was not until 1802 when Napoleon Bonaparte delivered the final death blow, officially banning both the Cult of the Supreme Being and the Cult of Reason with his Law on Cults of 18 Germinal Year X . Robespierre had created the Cult of the Supreme Being to help bring about the virtuous society he had long envisioned. Yet the ideas surrounding the cult were much too vague to have any lasting effect, and Robespierre himself lacked the eloquence and charisma needed to attract followers to the religion. The Cult also failed because many associated it with Robespierre's personal ambitions and saw it as his attempt to claim divine, or at least dictatorial, status. The short life of the cult makes it impossible to know what Robespierre's long-term plans were for it, and leaves scholars to speculate whether it was meant to be just a political tool or a true deist religion. Subscribe to topic Related Content Books Cite This Work License Bibliography Carlyle, Thomas & Sorensen, David R. & Kinser, Brent E. & Engel, Mark. The French Revolution . Oxford University Press, 2019. Davidson, Ian. The French Revolution. Pegasus Books, 2018. Decree establishing the Cult of the Supreme Being (1794) , accessed 18 Nov 2022. Doyle, William. The Oxford History of the French Revolution. Oxford University Press, 2018. Francois Furet & Mona Ozouf & Arthur Goldhammer. A Critical Dictionary of the French Revolution. Belknap Press: An Imprint of Harvard University Press, 1989. Ozouf, Mona & Sheridan, Alan. Festivals and the French Revolution. Harvard University Press, 1988. Palmer, R. R. & Woloch, Isser. Twelve Who Ruled. Princeton University Press, 2017. Schama, Simon. Citizens. Vintage, 1990. Scurr, Ruth. Fatal Purity. Holt Paperbacks, 2007. About the Author Translations We want people all over the world to learn about history. Help us and translate this definition into another language! Questions & Answers Who did the cult of the supreme being worship, what happened at the festival of the supreme being, what is the supreme being, what was the cult of reason, related content. Power Struggles in the Reign of Terror Maximilien Robespierre Reign of Terror Fall of Maximilien Robespierre Robespierre & the Death Penalty Thermidorian Reaction Free for the world, supported by you. World History Encyclopedia is a non-profit organization. For only $5 per month you can become a member and support our mission to engage people with cultural heritage and to improve history education worldwide. Recommended Books Cite This Work Mark, H. W. (2022, November 25). Cult of the Supreme Being . World History Encyclopedia . Retrieved from https://www.worldhistory.org/Cult_of_the_Supreme_Being/ Chicago Style Mark, Harrison W.. " Cult of the Supreme Being ." World History Encyclopedia . Last modified November 25, 2022. https://www.worldhistory.org/Cult_of_the_Supreme_Being/. Mark, Harrison W.. " Cult of the Supreme Being ." World History Encyclopedia . World History Encyclopedia, 25 Nov 2022. Web. 30 Aug 2024. License & Copyright Submitted by Harrison W. Mark , published on 25 November 2022. The copyright holder has published this content under the following license: Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial-ShareAlike . This license lets others remix, tweak, and build upon this content non-commercially, as long as they credit the author and license their new creations under the identical terms. When republishing on the web a hyperlink back to the original content source URL must be included. Please note that content linked from this page may have different licensing terms. Prof. Qualls' Course Blogs Blogging and teaching, teaching and blogging…but always learning. Cult of the Supreme Being Robespierre’s Cult of the Supreme Being was a form of Deism intended to replace Christianity as the national religion of France. It emphasized the existence of a single god, the immortality of the human soul, and placed considerable weight on natural observation and reason. Though somewhat consistent with Christian principles, these beliefs were aimed to promote public well being, rather than the well being of the church. The Cult of the Supreme Being was designed to adapt the belief in god to the Enlightenment. Robespierre wanted to find a middle ground between devout Christianity and Atheism. He denounced complete de-Christianization, which sought to completely rid France of the religion, but also condemned the church and king for disfiguring “Divinity by superstition,” and associating “it with their crimes.” Robespierre argued that the Christian Church had become corrupt, and that Christianity had become a way for the Clergy steal money from the Third Estate, and an excuse for the Nobility retain power. He Stated that God “did not create kings to devour the human race. He did not create priests to harness us, like vile animals, to the chariots of kings and to give to the world examples of baseness, pride, perfidy, avarice, debauchery, and falsehood,” rather “he created the universe to proclaim His power. He created men to help each other, to love each other mutually, and to attain to happiness by the way of virtue.” Robespierre saw the Cult of the Supreme Being as the way to reach this mutual happiness. 2 thoughts on “ Cult of the Supreme Being ” In looking at Robespierre and his essay on the “Cult of a Supreme Being,” one begins to see brilliant he was, for he could truly capture an audience with his words. Some examples of these words are,”The monster which the genius of kings had vomited over France has gone back into nothingness,” (Robespierre) and “Armed in turn with the daggers of fanaticism and the poisons of atheism, kings have always conspired to assassinate humanity,” (Robespierre). His writing is very matter-of-fact, for Robespierre knows that in order to make his audience feel the hatred for the King, he must be clear and concise in his writing, saying things like “kings have always conspired to assassinate humanity.” Ultimately, Robespierre does a tremendous job in his writing, for he wrote with passion and inspired his audience to take a hard look at the King’s injustices. I would agree with @myersjac that, not only did Robespierre write “Cult of a Supreme Being” to inspire/describe ultimate happiness, but to uproot absolute power. The piece’s main significance to the reader was to question whether the monarch truly had divine rights to rule. I wonder who the intended audience of “Cult of a Supreme Being” was, and if it had wide enough readership to be a major force in the revolution. Comments are closed. French Revolution Decree establishing the cult of the supreme being (1794). “1. The French people recognise the existence of the Supreme Being and the immortality of the soul. 2. They recognise that the worship worthy of the Supreme Being is the practice of the duties of man. 3. They place in the first rank of these duties [the obligation] to detest bad faith and tyranny, to punish tyrants and traitors, to rescue the unfortunate, to respect the weak, to defend the oppressed, [and] to do to others all the good that one can and not to be unjust toward anyone. 4. Festivals shall be established to remind man of the thought of the Divinity and of the dignity of his being. 5. They shall take their names from the glorious events of our revolution, from the virtues most dear and most useful to man and from the great benefactions of nature. 6. The French Republic shall celebrate every year the festivals of July 14th 1789, August 10th 1792, January 21st 1793, and May 31st 1793. 7. It shall celebrate on the days of decadi festivals to the Supreme Being and to nature, to the human race, to the French people, to the benefactors of humanity, to the martyrs of liberty, to liberty and equality, to the Republic, to the liberty of the world, to the love of country, to the hatred of tyrants and traitors, to truth, to justice, to modesty, to glory and immortality, to friendship, to frugality, to courage, to good faith, to heroism, to disinterestedness, to stoicism, to love, to conjugal love, to paternal love, to maternal tenderness, to filial piety, to childhood, to youth, to manhood, to old age, to misfortune, to agriculture, to industry, to our forefathers, to posterity, to happiness. 8. The Committees of Public Safety and Public Instruction are charged to present a plan of organisation for these festivals. 9. The National Convention summons all talents worthy to serve the cause of humanity to the honour of contributing to their establishment by hymns and patriotic songs and by all means which can further their beauty and utility. 10. The Committee of Public Safety shall confer distinction upon those works which seem most suited to fulfil these purposes and shall reward their authors. 11. Liberty of worship is maintained, in conformity with the decree of 18 Frimaire. 12. Every gathering that is aristocratic and contrary to public order shall be suppressed. 13. In case of disturbances of which any worship whatsoever may be the occasion or motive, those who may excite them by fanatical preaching or by counterrevolutionary insinuations [or by] gratuitous violence shall likewise be punished with the severity of the law… 15. A festival in honour of the Supreme Being shall be celebrated upon 20 Prairial next. [Jacques-Louis] David is charged to present a plan thereof to the National Convention.” This site uses cookies to improve user experience. By continuing to browse, you accept the use of cookies and other technologies. The Cult of the Supreme Being: A New Religion in Revolutionary France The French Revolution left fertile ground for a new approach to religion. 'The Festival of the Supreme Being', Pierre-Antoine Demachy. Photo Credit: Wikimedia Commons Maximilien Robespierre was a leading figure in the French Revolution . As a member of the Committee of Public Safety, he personally signed off on 542 arrests during the Reign of Terror, which saw more than 16,000 death sentences imposed throughout France. While Robespierre was an adherent to—and proponent of—most of the beliefs and policies which underscored the Revolution, however, there was one place where he and his fellows differed strongly, and that was belief in a higher power. Prior to the Revolution, France had been a Catholic country—both in practice and by law. Anti-clerical sentiment was one of the many factors which drove the Revolution, and the first “state religion” to replace Catholicism was the atheistic Cult of Reason, which replaced the worship of any deity with an anthropocentric veneration of human reason, liberty, and justice. Receive exclusive book deals and tales from the past when you join The Archive 's newsletter. In fact, by 1792, just three years after the Revolution had begun, the first nationwide “Festival of Reason” was held but the cult’s adherents, in which churches across France were transformed into “Temples of Reason”. In the Notre Dame cathedral in Paris, the altar was dismantled and transformed into a shrine to Liberty, while the stone above the cathedral doors was carved with the epithet, “To Philosophy”. Ostensibly as a way to avoid idolatry, the Festival of Reason eschewed statuary and other iconography, and instead featured stylized “Goddesses of Reason” portrayed by living women who sometimes dressed “provocatively”. In fact, the whole affair was described by many (often anti-revolutionary) sources at the time as “lurid”, “licentious”, and filled with “depravities”. Related: 13 Books That Explore the History of World Religions Whether true or manufactured, this reputation for wantonness helped to fuel anti-revolutionary sentiment and also empowered the downfall of the Cult of Reason, even among the adherents of the Revolution, especially Robespierre. While Robespierre agreed with many of the beliefs and ideals of his Revolutionary peers, he had a particular horror of atheism, and liked to quote Voltaire, saying that “If God did not exist, it would be necessary to invent him.”  To him, belief in a supreme being was a necessary element of society. So it was that, in late 1793, he denounced the Cult of Reason in an impassioned speech, proposing his own Cult of the Supreme Being in its place. Portrait of Maximilien Robespierre, Pierre Roch Vigneron.  Like the atheistic Cult of Reason, Robespierre’s new religion rejected the nation’s previous Catholic trappings and enshrined human reason as sacrosanct. However, to Robespierre, reason was merely a means to an end, not an end unto itself. And for him, that end was public virtue.  Unlike the Cult of Reason, this civic-minded form of deism placed as its primary pillars a belief in a supreme being (hence the name) and the immortality of the human soul, even while rejecting revelation as a means of knowing god, and looking instead to human reason to derive the necessary proofs of the existence of a supreme being. Related: The History of Freemasonry, a Fraternal Organization Fraught with Conspiracy Theories To Robespierre, these beliefs were “constant reminders of justice,” and were therefore necessary to sustain a just society. The result was a schism within the Revolution, as Robespierre and his followers used the “scandalous scenes” that had supposedly taken place under the Cult of Reason to denounce many of their fellow revolutionaries, eventually leading to the execution of numerous founding members of the Revolution, including Jacques Hebert and Antoine-Francois Momoro, two of the leading proponents of the Cult of Reason. By May of 1794, the Cult of the Supreme Being was the official state religion of France, as authorized by the National Convention. Perhaps as a direct response to the “scandalous” Festival of Reason, Robespierre declared a Festival of the Supreme Being to be held on June 8, 1794, just a month after the recognition of the cult as the nation’s official civic religion. Where the Festival of Reason was characterized by “wild masquerades” and much more spontaneous celebrations, the Festival of the Supreme Being was as meticulously planned as it’s possible for a nationwide festival to be in only one month, and was described by historian Mona Ozouf as possessing a “creaking stiffness” that may have been indicative of the growing “sclerosis of the Revolution.” Indeed, many historians point to the Festival of the Supreme Being as the beginning of the end for Robespierre. Other leading figures of the Revolution were starting to grow wary of Robespierre already, fearful that he would install some sort of dictatorship rather than the liberty and equality that they had fought for. His zealous promotion of the Cult of the Supreme Being rubbed these individuals the wrong way, especially those of anti-clerical sentiments, who had been for the dechristianization of France that happened early on. Related: France’s Prolific Executioner: The Life and Death of Charles-Henri Sanson Within a little more than a month, these growing concerns had metastasized into what later historians came to call the Thermidorian Reaction, named for the month in which it took place, Thermidor, the 11th month in the French Republican Calendar.  On what we know as July 27, 1794, not much more than two months after the Cult of the Supreme Being had been recognized as the official religion of France, Robespierre was forcibly removed from power. By the following day, he had been put to death, executed by guillotine in the Place de la Revolution – in the same spot and by the same means that King Louis XVI had met his end under Robespierre’s watch just a year before. Print from 1794, reading: "The French people recognize the Supreme Being and the immortality of the soul."  This also essentially marked the end of the Cult of the Supreme Being. Just as Robespierre had fallen out of favor, so too did the religion he had created, gone within three months of being instated. Within the decade, it was banned entirely when Napoleon restored France to Catholicism as part of his Law on Cults of 18 Germinal, Year X in April of 1802. Like so many things about the French Revolution, the Cult of the Supreme Being was ascendant for only a short time, yet it left a significant mark. Just as Robespierre had previously done with the dominant Cult of Reason, it was undermined by dissenting opinions from among Robespierre’s fellow revolutionaries. Like that short-lived cult, however, we still remember it today, in ways both large and small… Get historic book deals and news delivered to your inbox © 2024 OPEN ROAD MEDIA We are a participant in the Amazon Services LLC Associates Program, an affiliate advertising program designed to provide a means for us to earn fees by linking to Amazon.com and affiliated sites. Free Samples Premium Essays Editing Services Editing Proofreading Rewriting Extra Tools Essay Topic Generator Thesis Generator Citation Generator GPA Calculator Study Guides Donate Paper Essay Writing Help About Us About Us Testimonials FAQ Studentshare The Existence of the Supreme Being The Existence of the Supreme Being - Essay Example Subject: Philosophy Type: Essay Level: Undergraduate Pages: 3 (750 words) Downloads: 2 Author: marvinnakia Extract of sample "The Existence of the Supreme Being" With regards to the argument of design, aspects of the argument were inspired by Aristotle and Plato (O'Neill 110). It was adapted by Christian philosophers Augustine and Thomas Aquinas. The design argument argues that there is an observable design or order in the universe even though the design is not always flawless or perfect. The existence of such design confirms the existence of a Designer such as a supreme being. Finally, the moral argument clarified by a philosopher, Immanuel Kant, centered on the summum bonum or in other words the "Highest Good". The Highest Good refers to where happiness and moral virtue coincide at their fullest. Human beings, it is experimental, always struggle for this superior plane of existence, and yet they are never able to attain it (Protestantism 1). According to Immanuel, the longing human beings have for moral fairness, as well as happiness, and justice confirms that someone put this desire in their souls. Immanuel’s argument is a similar argument made by the Apostle Paul (O'Neill 110).Many famous scientists such as Stephen Hawking have tried to clarify the basis of the universe as a phenomenon from gravity. However, they fail to address the main issue at hand which is the origin of physical law. They need to ask themselves where gravity came from and how something can emerge from nothing since physical law is nothing (Strobel 1). In addition, scientists’ idea of joining universes to flee the conclusion of modification is philosophically unstable., metaphysically motivated, as well as less parsimonious, than the theistic understanding. This also leaves one liable thesis of the Supreme Being as the maker of the universe. This is evident in places such as the bible and other theories that explain the existence of the Supreme Being. The Biblical teachings on the basis of the universe can be found in Genesis 1:1 (Strobel 1). It clearly states that God, the Supreme Being, shaped the heavens and the earth. Hence, this surpasses all other theories. The Supreme Being is all powerful since it is recorded that the Being created the whole universe in just a word of mouth (Lutzer 75). The universe is thought to be 100 galaxies long. This requires mysterious powers to form. However, the Supreme Being is deemed to have created the universe in only six days (Lutzer 75). Since the being is thought to have created everything including evil, people wonder why the Being cannot just destroy evil. Surely, evil creates Cited: 1 times Copy Citation Citation is copied Copy Citation Citation is copied Copy Citation Citation is copied CHECK THESE SAMPLES OF The Existence of the Supreme Being Proofs for the existence of god, the color purple, theory of good by wilhelm leibniz, anselm's cosmological argument, arguments for the existence of god from a philosophical context, arguments for the existence of god, evaluation of the evil-god hypothesis, fundamental policy practices. TERMS & CONDITIONS PRIVACY POLICY COOKIES POLICY Essays From a Black Patriot Core Beliefs: Supreme Being Level 0: Supreme Being Earlier, I mentioned the behaviors for my life are based on a set of “Core Beliefs” . My highest level core belief is the concept of a “Supreme Being” ! Thinking about the idea of a Supreme Being led me to realize and adopt qualities that would be useful in helping me to be a winner in life! I have a sense of self, order and purpose about my life . Having a sense of order is the quality that prevents a life of chaos! Having a sense of self and purpose is what prevented exploitation from others that did not have my best interests at heart. These are qualities I was then able to pass on to my children. As an aside, these are beliefs I should have gotten from my culture! To prevent misunderstandings and save myself time with explanations, I am providing a common definition upfront on the idea of a Supreme Being. I have highlighted the areas that I relate to, the most. 1. Psychological Factors: Many psychologists suggest that belief in gods or a higher power is an extension of our social nature. As social animals, humans have a tendency to see the world in human terms and recognize the existence of others. 2. Existential Questions: The concept of a supreme being often arises from a sense of wonder and curiosity about the universe. People seek answers to profound questions about existence, purpose, and the nature of reality. 3. Cultural and Social Influences: Belief in a supreme being is deeply embedded in many hgjgjg cultures and societies. Religious traditions and teachings are passed down through generations, shaping individuals’ beliefs and practices. 4. Sense of Order and Purpose: The idea of a creator or supreme being provides a sense of order and purpose in the world . It offers an explanation for the complexity and beauty of the universe, as well as a framework for understanding moral and ethical principles. 5. Personal Experiences: Many people report personal experiences or feelings of connection with a higher power. These experiences can be deeply meaningful and reinforce their belief in a supreme being. Belief in a supreme being is a deeply personal and diverse aspect of human experience, influenced by a combination of psychological, cultural, and existential factors. Core Beliefs Supreme Being as an Abstraction Leave a Comment Cancel reply Save my name, email, and website in this browser for the next time I comment. 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Lord Sumption , a former UK Supreme Court judge, said the conservative majority on the US court had consistently backed Republican positions on abortion, gun control, election expenses, discriminatory voting rules, gerrymandering and the powers of agencies such as the Environmental Protection Agency. “As a result, the court’s legitimacy has been gravely undermined and its public approval rating has collapsed from 80 per cent in the 1990s to less than 50 per cent now,” he wrote in an essay for Prospect magazine published on Wednesday. He added: “This is a more serious problem in the United States than it would be in any other country. Congress is polarised, dysfunctional and gridlocked. Filibusters make it difficult to get controversial legislation through. “When the Supreme Court changes the law on constitutional grounds there is no democratic way to undo it. Their rulings determine what the Constitution means until the crack of doom”. Lord Sumption has also been a staunch critic of the European Convention on Human Rights and has urged the UK to leave the international agreement because he does not believe its “arrogant” court can change. He said the Strasbourg-based court had become a “law-making factory” that had over-reached its powers, intruding into every aspect of people’s lives without a democratic mandate. Lord Sumption was also a critic of the Covid lockdowns and accused the previous government of behaving like an authoritarian regime relying on police state tactics . It is the first time, however, that he has taken aim at the US Supreme Court. ‘Remarkable observations’ In the essay, Lord Sumption focused on the decision last month in which six of the court’s nine judges ruled that Donald Trump was immune from prosecution for criminal acts committed in the course of his official functions as president, even after he had left office. He wrote: “What this means is that because of the awesome powers and responsibilities of the president he must be allowed to do what he wants, without being unduly ‘distracted’ by the thought that it may be a criminal offence. “The majority did not say and cannot possibly have thought that it was part of the official functions of the president to try to overturn a regular election result and occupy the White House through what would have amounted to a coup.” The former judge added: “The majority’s most remarkable observations concern Trump’s notorious tweets and public speech on Jan 6 2021, in which he urged his supporters to head for the Capitol to pressure vice-president [Mike] Pence. “The president, they declared, ‘possesses extraordinary power to speak to his fellow citizens’. So if the court finds that Trump was tweeting and speaking as president and not, say, as a party leader or candidate, then what he said was by its very nature immune. “Never mind if the ‘fellow citizens’ whom he was addressing were an ugly mob whom he was inviting to invade the Capitol and threaten legislators with violence. The courts cannot be allowed to look into that either.” Lord Sumption added: “There are a number of problems about all this, apart from the absurdity of the result. One is that the distinction between the kind of power the president was exercising and the way that he was exercising it is incoherent. “However, the fundamental difficulty with the reasoning is that there is no analogy between the risk of civil litigation and the risk of criminal prosecution.” In a warning to Americans ahead of the presidential election in November , in which Trump is currently neck-and-neck with Kamala Harris, the Democrat candidate, Lord Sumption said: “The United States has never stood in greater need of impartial constitutional arbiters in its highest court, and has never been further from getting them.” On Tuesday, US federal prosecutors pared down the Jan 6 indictment against Trump in light of the Supreme Court’s immunity ruling, altering some charges and removing others. Broaden your horizons with award-winning British journalism. Try The Telegraph free for 3 months with unlimited access to our award-winning website, exclusive app, money-saving offers and more. We combed through thousands of Labor Day deals — these are the absolute best Share this — Watch Full Episodes Read With Jenna Inspirational Relationships TODAY Table Newsletters Start TODAY Shop TODAY Awards Citi Concert Series Listen All Day Follow today More Brands On The Show TODAY Plaza Supreme Court rejects bid to restrict access to abortion pill In a blow for anti-abortion advocates, the  Supreme Court  on Thursday rejected a challenge to the abortion pill mifepristone , meaning the commonly used drug can remain widely available. The court  found unanimously  that the group of anti-abortion doctors who questioned the Food and Drug Administration’s decisions making it easier to access the pill did not have legal standing to sue.  President Joe Biden said in a statement that while the ruling means the pill can remain easily accessible, “the fight for reproductive freedom continues” in the aftermath of the Supreme Court’s ruling two years ago that overturned abortion rights landmark Roe v. Wade. “It does not change the fact that the right for a woman to get the treatment she needs is imperiled if not impossible in many states,” he added. Justice Brett Kavanaugh, writing for the court, wrote that while plaintiffs have “sincere legal, moral, ideological, and policy objections to elective abortion and to FDA’s relaxed regulation of mifepristone,” that does not mean they have a federal case. The plaintiffs failed to show they had suffered any injury, meaning that “the federal courts are the wrong forum for addressing the plaintiffs’ concerns about FDA’s actions,” he added. “The plaintiffs may present their concerns and objections to the president and FDA in the regulatory process or to Congress and the president in the legislative process,” Kavanaugh wrote. “And they may also express their views about abortion and mifepristone to fellow citizens, including in the political and electoral processes.” The legal challenge was brought by doctors and other medical professionals represented by the conservative Christian legal group Alliance Defending Freedom. “We are disappointed that the Supreme Court did not reach the merits of the FDA’s lawless removal of commonsense safety standards for abortion drugs,” said Erin Hawley, one of the group’s lawyers. She told reporters she is hopeful the underlying lawsuit can continue because three states — Idaho, Missouri and Kansas — have brought their own claims and have different arguments for standing. By throwing out the case on such grounds, the court avoided reaching a decision on the legal merits of whether the FDA acted lawfully in lifting various restrictions, including one making the drug obtainable via mail, meaning the same issues could yet return to the court in another case. Another regulatory decision left in place means women can still obtain the pill within 10 weeks of gestation instead of seven.  Likewise a decision to allow health care providers other than physicians to dispense the pill will remain in effect. The court’s decision to roll back abortion rights two years ago led to a wave of new abortion restrictions in conservative states. Then, the court suggested it was removing itself from the political debate over abortion, but with litigation continuing to rage over abortion access, the justices are continuing to play a pivotal role.  Abortion rights supporters welcomed the ruling, with Nancy Northup, president of the Center for Reproductive Rights, saying she was relieved at the outcome but angered about the case lingering in the court system so long. “Thank goodness the Supreme Court rejected this unwarranted attempt to curtail access to medication abortion, but the fact remains that this meritless case should never have gotten this far,” she said in a statement. Danco Laboratories, manufacturer of Mifeprex, the brand version of mifepristone, praised the ruling too, saying it was good for the drug approval process writ large. In rejecting the challenge, the court “maintained the stability of the FDA drug approval process, which is based on the agency’s expertise and on which patients, health care providers and the U.S. pharmaceutical industry rely,” company spokeswoman Abigail Long said. Anti-abortion groups expressed disappointment, saying that the ruling highlighted the importance of this year’s election in which Democrat Biden, who has pledged to defend abortion rights, faces off against Republican Donald Trump, who has the strong backing of conservatives who oppose abortion. “Joe Biden and the Democrats are hell-bent on forcing abortion on demand any time for any reason, including DIY mail-order abortions, on every state in the country,” Marjorie Dannenfeiser, president of SBA Pro-Life America, said. If Trump were to win the election, his appointees to the FDA would be a position to impose new restrictions on mifepristone. Biden’s campaign manager, Julie Chavez-Rodriguez, alluded to the possibility in a call with reporters after the ruling. Calling the case “one tactic in a broader, relentless strategy” by anti-abortion activists, Chavez-Rodriguez said if Trump is elected, his advisers and allies would try to ban abortion nationwide “without the help of Congress or the court,” and also restrict access to contraception — a threat, she said, to blue as well as red states. The mifepristone dispute is not the only abortion case currently before the court. It is also due to decide whether  Idaho’s strict abortion ban  prevents doctors in emergency rooms from performing abortions when a pregnant woman is facing dangerous complications. Mifepristone is used as part of a two-drug FDA-approved regimen that is now the most common form of abortion in the United States. Abortion is effectively banned altogether in 14 states, according to the Guttmacher Institute, a research group that backs abortion rights. The FDA had the backing of the pharmaceutical industry, which has warned that any second-guessing of the approval process by untrained federal judges could  cause chaos and deter innovation. Last year, Texas-based U.S. District Judge Matthew Kacsmaryk issued a sweeping ruling that completely invalidated the FDA’s approval of the pill, leading to panic among abortion-rights activists that it would be banned nationwide. The Supreme Court last April put that ruling on hold, meaning the pill remained widely available while litigation continued. The New Orleans-based 5th U.S. Circuit Court of Appeals in August then narrowed Kacsmaryk’s decision but left in place his conclusion that the FDA’s move to lift restrictions starting in 2016 was unlawful. Both sides appealed to the Supreme Court. The court in December took up the Biden administration’s appeal in defense of the later FDA decisions, but it opted against hearing the challenge to the original approval of mifepristone in 2000.  The Supreme Court focused solely on the later FDA action, including the initial 2021 decision that made the drug available by mail, which was finalized last year. This article first appeared on NBCNews.com . Lawrence Hurley covers the Supreme Court for NBC News Digital. I’m a Paralympian. We’re not your ‘inspiration’ — we’re elite athletes IVF success rates by age: What to know These foods can reduce pain from period cramps Women's health. People tell me I don’t ‘look disabled,’ but I’m a Paralympian — and I’m going for gold Tom Brady's TB12 diet: The pros, the cons and a shopping list Diet & fitness. The 5 types of friendship we all need in our life Mind & body. What is cycle syncing? Everything to know, from foods to workouts to fertility 6 sneaky signs you have a protein deficiency, according to dietitians Where is deadly mosquito virus EEE spreading in US? 5 states reporting cases How to perform pigeon pose — the perfect stretch to do after sitting all day 238 IMAGES Concept of Supreme Being and Religious Actions Essay Example Superamacy Essay The U.S. Supreme Court Essay Assignment by Curt's Journey Benjamin Franklin Quote: “I believe there is one Supreme most perfect The Existence of the Supreme Being Essay Example Immanuel Kant Quote: “The ideal of the supreme being is nothing but a VIDEO Top 20 Reasons to Prioritize Your Well-being 人间至尊 The Supreme Being of the World Write Essay on Science a Blessing or a curse Reserved Seats Ruling: Did the Supreme Court Get it Right? राहुल गांधी -अपना ददे मेरा ददे ❤️🖐👍💯 राहुल गांधी #youtubeshorts #training #rahulgandhi #rahul Supreme court Big Decision in favour of PTI / Reserved seat and 8 Judges planning/Imran khan COMMENTS Supreme Being Supreme being is a seventeenth-century descriptor for God. Given that the social sciences are a modern phenomenon, this designation is appropriate. In an attempt to accommodate the growing awareness of the pluralism of beliefs in the world, supreme being became a generic term for the entity that underpins the various world faiths. Existence of God Existence of God, in religion, the proposition that there is a supreme being that is the creator or sustainer or ruler of the universe and all things in it, including human beings. In many religions God is also conceived as perfect, all-powerful and all-knowing, and the source and ultimate ground of morality. The Concept and Worship of the Supreme Being The idea of a spiritual being which created and sustains the universe is a manifest in most human societies around the world. Although it is conceived by all groups, the concept of the Supreme Being comes in different names depending on the ethnic group or language. Hence, the conception of the Supreme Being is not unanimous. PDF The Supreme Being in African Traditional Thought: a Logico-ontological An exposé of the logical nature of our idea of the Supreme Being (or God) should start with an examination of our conception of the Supreme or of Supremacy. According to the Oxford Advanced Learner's Dictionary of Current English the word "Supreme" means "highest in degree or rank or authority;" it also means "most important ... Descartes' Ontological Argument Descartes' ontological (or a priori) argument is both one of the most fascinating and poorly understood aspects of his philosophy. Fascination with the argument stems from the effort to prove God's existence from simple but powerful premises. Existence is derived immediately from the clear and distinct idea of a supremely perfect being. The Supreme Being: Phenomenological Structure and Historical The structural dualism introduced by Van der Leeuw in the phenomenology of the Supreme Being is particularly evident in the contrast between the otiositas which is attributed to many Supreme Beings of the ethnological world, and the intense activity of Yahweh. He is always vigilant, always ready to intervene in human affairs. GOD-CONCEPT: ″SUPREME BEING″ IN AFRICAN TRIBAL RELIGIONS John S. Mbiti, in his book African Religions and Philosophy says, ″All over Africa people have a notion of God as the Supreme Being the origin and sustenance of all things.″ Truly, African peoples strongly believe in the supreme Being (God). They consider Him ″older″ than the zamani period (long past). He is outside and beyond His creation. Is There a Supreme Being? or the Existence of God Read the Sermon. Transcript. [Prayer] Father, we thank Thee for the privilege of the study of the word of God. As we consider its teachings, its doctrines, may our thoughts be clear and plain. And may we each profit from the study of the Scriptures together. We thank Thee, again, for Jesus, who is the key to the Scriptures and the key to our ... Supreme Beings Nor does the supreme being figure in the Selk ʾ nam esoteric initiations (kl ó keten), on which the Yahgan probably modeled the kina. Although knowledge of a supreme being may be transmitted, refined, and reshaped in secret societies, it is unwarranted to draw the more general conclusion that supreme beings are the creation of such elites. PDF The Cult of the Supreme Being of the Supreme Being; let them be consecrated to Him, and let them open and close with a tribute to His power and goodness… . [Robespierre then proposed the following decree:] DECREE ESTABLISHING THE CULT OF THE SUPREME BEING Article I. The French people recognizes the existence of the Supreme Being, and the immortality of the soul. Article II. Robespierre's homage to the Supreme Being (1794) In June 1794, Maximilien Robespierre led a procession up an artificial mountain in the Tuileries, the culmination of the Festival of the Supreme Being.From the top of the mountain, Robespierre delivered a speech paying homage to France's new deist and nationalist god: "The day forever fortunate has arrived, which the French people have consecrated to the Supreme Being. The Cult of the Supreme Being A depiction of the Festival of the Supreme Being in 1794. The Cult of the Supreme Being, created in May 1794, was an ambitious attempt to construct a national religion based on patriotism, republican values and deism (the Enlightenment theory that God existed but did not interfere in the affairs of men). For its creator, Maximilien Robespierre, the Supreme Being movement was intended to ... On the Goodness of the Supreme Being POETICAL ESSAY. By CHRISTOPHER SMART, M. A. Of Pembroke Hall in the University of Cambridge.<> TO THE RIGHT HONOURABLE THE EARL OF DARLINGTON THIS ESSAY ON The GOODNESS of the SUPREME BEING. Is Inscribed, By His Lordship's Most obliged, And obedient Servant, C. SMART. Cult of the Supreme Being The Cult of the Supreme Being (French: Culte de l'Être suprême) [note 1] was a form of theocratic deism established by Maximilien Robespierre during the French Revolution as the intended state religion of France and a replacement for its rival, the Cult of Reason, and of Roman Catholicism.It went unsupported after the fall of Robespierre and, along with the Cult of Reason, was officially ... Cult of the Supreme Being The Cult of the Supreme Being was a deistic cult established by Maximilien Robespierre (1758-1794) during the French Revolution (1789-1799). Its purpose was to replace Roman Catholicism as the state religion of France and to undermine the atheistic Cult of Reason which had recently gained popularity. It represented the peak of Robespierre's power and went unsupported after his downfall. Cult of the Supreme Being The Cult of the Supreme Being was designed to adapt the belief in god to the Enlightenment. Robespierre wanted to find a middle ground between devout Christianity and Atheism. ... In looking at Robespierre and his essay on the "Cult of a Supreme Being," one begins to see brilliant he was, for he could truly capture an audience with his ... Decree establishing the Cult of the Supreme Being (1794) On 18 Floreal (May 7th 1794) the National Convention, at Robespierre's beckoning, passed the following decree, establishing the Cult of the Supreme Being: "1. The French people recognise the existence of the Supreme Being and the immortality of the soul. 2. They recognise that the worship worthy of the Supreme Being is the practice of the duties of man. Supreme Being Research Paper Supreme Being Research Paper. Final Paper. The idea of the existence of a supreme being has persisted through many centuries. Whether God is an idea of something or thing depends on the level of piousness of the individual. An individual who shows a dutiful spirit of reverence for God may acknowledge God as more than an idea of something. The Cult of the Supreme Being: A New Religion in Revolutionary France By May of 1794, the Cult of the Supreme Being was the official state religion of France, as authorized by the National Convention. Perhaps as a direct response to the "scandalous" Festival of Reason, Robespierre declared a Festival of the Supreme Being to be held on June 8, 1794, just a month after the recognition of the cult as the nation ... The Existence of the Supreme Being The Biblical teachings on the basis of the universe can be found in Genesis 1:1 (Strobel 1). It clearly states that God, the Supreme Being, shaped the heavens and the earth. Hence, this surpasses all other theories. The Supreme Being is all powerful since it is recorded that the Being created the whole universe in just a word of mouth (Lutzer ... Supreme Being Sent by you: How is the game of life a competition? Sent by CoPilot: The concept of "the game of life" can be seen as a competition in several ways: Resource Allocation: Just like in many games, individuals compete for limited resources such as jobs, money, and opportunities. Achievements and Goals: People often set personal and professional goals and strive to achieve them, sometimes in ... Supreme Being Earlier, I mentioned the behaviors for my life are based on a set of "Core Beliefs".My highest level core belief is the concept of a "Supreme Being"!Thinking about the idea of a Supreme Being led me to realize and adopt qualities that would be useful in helping me to be a winner in life! I have a sense of self, order and purpose about my life US Supreme Court 'gravely undermining its legitimacy', Lord ... A former leading UK judge has launched an unprecedented attack on the US Supreme Court, claiming its "legitimacy has been gravely undermined" by being so politically partisan. Lord Sumption, a ... Apple is Being Sued for Billions 'Catastrophic' SpaceX Starship explosion tore a hole in the atmosphere last year in 1st-of-its-kind event, Russian scientists reveal Supreme Court rejects bid to restrict access to abortion pill The Supreme Court on Thursday rejected a challenge to the abortion pill mifepristone, meaning the commonly used drug can remain widely available. ... Essay / Updated Aug. 30 ... Harris warns of Trump presidency with 'no guardrails' over Supreme Vice President Kamala Harris warned that Donald Trump would be a "dictator" on day one and face no checks or balances because of the Supreme Court's recent immunity ruling. assignment essay homework paper phd report resume review speech thesis