research topics in political science in pakistan

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Pakistan studies: politics.

• Urdu (and related languages)
• Pakistan Data

Legal Resources

• LLMC digital . This link opens in a new window Browse by Other Countries--Pakistan for Pakistan specific materials. Or keyword search more... less... LLMC digital .
• Pakistan Law Reporter Brief summaries and full text of key decisions from the Supreme Court, High Courts and tribunals within Pakistan
• Supreme Court of Pakistan Includes links to Judgements/Orders, news updates, etc.

Afghanistan/Pakistan Government Sites

• Afghanistan Web Archive Comprised primarily of websites produced by the Afghan government, specifically the executive branch. Also included are a selection of sites from statistical reporting agencies, banking institutions, universities, U.S. Embassy and critical NGOs supporting democratic and human rights initiatives. The date range of the collection overlaps with the country's presidential (2009) and parliamentary (2009) elections, which were the second national elections held in the country since the founding of the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan in 2003.
• Ministry of Planning, Development & Reform--Government of Pakistan Downloadable development plans and projects, publications, newsletters, reports
• Official Gateway to the Government of Pakistan Includes links to Ministries sites
• Pakistan Bureau of Statistics Links to statistical data related to various socio-economic sectors

Think Tanks and Policy Institutes (Pakistan and Afghanistan)

• Afghanistan Research and Evaluation Unit An independent research institute based in Kabul. AREU's mission is to inform and influence policy and practice through conducting high-quality, policy-relevant research and actively disseminating the results. Searchable catalog of archived publications.
• Amnesty International Pakistan AI Pakistan site
• Asian Centre for Human Rights--Pakistan Pakistan page, ACHR, New Delhi
• Asian Development Bank--Pakistan ADB country operation page. Browse and download publications and documents related to Pakistan. Other sublinks to strategy, economy, results, private sector, regional cooperation, news, speeches, articles, and videos.
• Asian Human Rights Commision--Pakistan Reports on Pakistan, from a Hong Kong based organization
• Aurat Publication & Information Service Foundation committed to create widespread awareness and commitment for a just, democratic and caring society in Pakistan, where women and men are recognised as equals, with the right to lead their lives with self-respect and dignity. Aurat Foundation has its Head Office in Islamabad. Includes links to publications and media.
• Background Notes--Pakistan U.S. Department of State. See Pakistan Page for more information on Pakistan. Archived versions of Background Notes are also available.
• Business & Human Rights Resource Center--Pakistan Tracks over 6000 companies, to advance human rights in business
• Center for Strategic & International Studies (CSIS)--Pakistan Strategic insights and bipartisan policy solutions
• Centre for Conflict and Peace Studies Afghanistan An independent research and advocacy centre headquartered in Kabul, dedicated to the creation of a sustainable environment that can support peace and stability in Afghanistan. Includes links to publications.
• Centre for Peace and Development Initiatives (CPDI) An independent, non-partisan and a not-for-profit civil society organization working on issues of peace and development in Pakistan. Areas of special sectoral focus include promotion of peace and tolerance, rule of law, transparency and access to information, budget watch and Legislative Watch and Development.
• Childtrafficking.com digital library--Pakistan & Afghanistan Swiss Foundation of Terre des hommes
• Council on Foreign Relations--Pakistan An independent, nonpartisan membership organization, think tank, and publisher.
• Country forecast--Pakistan Economist Intelligence Unit. Includes a main report every six months, and an update in each intervening quarter. Also available via ABI/Inform . For archived Pakistan country reports, search the Economist Intelligence Unit Country Reports Archive .
• Economic and Social Commission for Asia and the Pacific United Nations ESCAP. Search publications , official documents , and ESCAP statistical database .
• Fata Research Centre A non partisan and non-political research organization based in Islamabad that focuses on Federally Administrated Tribal Areas (FATA) in its entirety. Downloadable publications and reports.
• Gender Equity Program (GEP) Aurat Publication and Information Service Foundation (AF) is implementing a five year, USAID supported Gender Equity Program (GEP) in collaboration with The Asia Foundation. The program commenced on August 18, 2010 and will continued until August 15, 2015. Links to publications
• Global Conflict Tracker An interactive guide to ongoing conflicts around the world of concern to the United States. The interactive covers nearly thirty conflicts with background information and resources on each conflict.
• Human Rights Watch--Pakistan Reports from an independent, international organization based in New York.
• Institute for Defence Studies and Analyses A non-partisan, autonomous body based in India dedicated to objective research and policy relevant studies on all aspects of defence and security. Downloadable publications including ebooks and journals
• Institute of Peace and Conflict Studies (ICPS) Pakistan region links
• Institute of Policy Studies, Islamabad Dedicated to promoting policy oriented research. Links to publications, e-books and research updates
• Institute of Regional Studies (IRS) An independent, non-profit research centre (set up in 1982) devoted to the study of the region around Pakistan: South Asia, Southwest Asia (Iran, Afghanistan and the Gulf), China, Central Asia as well as the Indian Ocean region. Covers a wide spectrum of research in foreign and internal affairs, economy and industry, science and technology.
• Institute of Strategic Studies Islamabad (ISSI) An autonomous, non-profit research and analyses organization, established in 1973 providing in-depth understanding and objective analyses of regional and global strategic issues, affecting international peace and security.
• International Federation for Human Rights (FIDH)--Pakistan Downloadable reports.
• Islamabad Policy Research Institute IPRI is dedicated to undertaking analyses and evaluations of important national and international politico-strategic issues and developments affecting Pakistan, South Asia, and the world affairs. Links to books, journals, papers, and newsletter.
• Mahbub ul Haq Human Development Centre A policy research institute and think tank, committed to promoting human development paradigm as a powerful tool for informing people-centered development policy, with a special focus on South Asia as a region. Includes downloadable Human Development in South Asia reports, a policy brief series , downloadable writings and speeches of Mehbub ul Haq, and media.
• The National Bureau of Asian Research--Pakistan NBR conducts advanced independent research on strategic, political, economic, globalization, health, and energy issues affecting U.S. relations with Asia. Four signature publications are Strategic Asia, Asia Policy, NBR Analysis, and NBR Special Reports
• Nazaria-i-Pakistan Trust "Nazaria-i-Pakistan Trust is a national, intellectual institution which, since early 1999, is engaged in highlighting the Ideology of the Islamic Republic of Pakistan as enunciated in the words and deed of Allama Mohammad Iqbal and Quaid-i-Azam Mohammad Ali Jinnah." Links to publications (e-Books & magazines), videos, etc.
• NCCR Pakistan Research Group Partner of the Swiss National Centre of Competence in Research North-South. Research concentrates on the Khyber Pakhtunkhwa (KP; formerly known as North-West Frontier Province, NWFP) and focuses on four themes: Livelihoods, forests and power relations; From vulnerability to resilience: gender, migration and social capital; Development disparities on natural resource management; Development policies and livelihood realities.
• Overseas Development Institute--Pakistan ODI is an independent think tank on international development and humanitarian issues in Britain. Use country/region facet to locate Pakistan materials
• Pak Institute for Peace Studies An initiative of leading Pakistani scholars, researchers and journalists, PIPS conducts wide-ranging research and analysis of political, social and religious conflicts that have a direct bearing on both national and international security. The PIPS approach is grounded in field research. Includes free downloads links.
• Pakistan Institute of Development Economics Theoretical and empirical research in Development Economics in general and on Pakistan-related economic issues in particular. PIDE is located at the Quaid-i-Azam University Campus in Islamabad, Pakistan. Links to publications including Working Papers, e-Books and The Pakistan Development Review
• Pakistan Institute of Labour Education & Research--Karachi Includes links to pdf versions of selected publications
• Pakistan Institute of Legislative Development and Transparency PILDAT is an independent Think Tank focused on strengthening democracy and democratic institutions in Pakistan. Links to publications and video reports
• Pakistan Military Watch Archives Observer Research Foundation
• Revolutionary Association of the Women of Afghanistan (RAWA) The oldest political/social organization of Afghan women struggling for peace, freedom, democracy and women's rights in Afghanistan since 1977.
• Reliefweb--Pakistan Compilation of website scan results on humanitarian information
• Rural Poverty Portal International Fund for Agricultural Development (IFAD). "A website where rural poor people, policy-makers, donors, research institutes, non-governmental organizations and other development partners can share information about eradicating rural poverty." Browse by topic and country .
• SAARC: South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation Includes links to digital library.
• Social Policy and Development Centre (SPDC) SPDC (established in 1995) is working towards the achievement of basic goals that contribute to the social development of Pakistan. Its purpose is to help the government and other civil society institutions by providing policy guidelines to successfully address the issues of human security through research and policy papers.
• South Asia Intelligence Review Data, assessments and news briefs on terrorism, insurgencies and sub-conventional warfare, on counter-terrorism responses and policies, as well as on related economic, political, and social issues, in the South Asian region. Search tools include Pakistan country facets.
• South Asia Terrorism Portal "SATP is the largest website on terrorism and low intensity warfare in South Asia, and creates the database and analytic context for research and analysis of all extremist movements in the region. SATP establishes a comprehensive, searchable and continuously updated database on all available information relating to terrorism, low intensity warfare and ethnic/communal/sectarian strife in South Asia." Use the drop down menu under "Pakistan" for country specific resources
• Strategic Asia Database A service of NBR's Strategic Asia Program. The database contains data for 70 indicators across 10 themes for 37 countries from 1990 to 2012. The database supplements the annual Strategic Asia volume. Public access temporarily suspended as of 08/05/2015.
• Strategic Studies Institute Islamabad (SSII) Academic and research institution for conducting research and training on important issues related to Pakistan’s security. Includes links to opinions, area briefs, and the Journal of Strategic Affairs .
• Strengthening Participatory Organization (SPO) A Pakistani rights-based civil society organization. Publications include case studies, annual reports, discussion papers, etc.
• UNICEF--Afghanistan Country website for Afghanistan
• UNICIF--Pakistan Links to newsline, statistics, and the UNICIF country website for Pakistan
• United Nations Development Programme in Afghanistan UNDP is the UN's global development network. Use search box and links to locate documents
• United Nations Development Programme in Pakistan UNDP is the UN's global development network. Use search box and links to locate documents
• USAID's Development Experience Clearinghouse (DEC) Search a half century of U.S. international aid records. Holds USAID's institutional memory, spanning over 50 years; including documents, images, video and audio materials.
• World Bank--Pakistan Country report for Pakistan
• World Food Programme--Afghanistan
• World Food Programme--Pakistan WFP is the food aid arm of the United Nations system
• World Health Organization--Afghanistan
• World Health Organization--Pakistan
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MPhil Political Science

Course descriptions, electives courses, admission requirements, admission timeline, required documents, sample paper, merit lists, fee & funding.

The program builds on the training received at the Baccalaureate level and has a strong emphasis on research skills that will be beneficial for those pursuing careers in the government or private sectors, civil society, or teaching, among others.

Core Courses

PLSC 502: Theories of Comparative Politics

The course is designed to introduce students to many (but not all) of the major topics of study, theories and debates in comparative politics, one of the four major fields in political science. To a certain extent, it will entail a historiography of how the field has developed intellectually over the last few decades. However, primary emphasis is on the current state of debates. Most of the assigned readings have a strong theoretical focus and draw on case evidence to support theory-derived arguments. This is not a course for learning about the politics of particular countries: the empirics of a particular country case are less important for our purposes than developing the skills required to evaluate theoretical propositions using the comparative method, and acquiring a grasp of the state of a variety of literatures in the field of comparative politics.

PLSC 504: Political Thought

Review of fundamental concepts of ruling parties, justice and resistance and its methods; equality and liberty in the society; examination of traditions to explain their possible normative implication for the present.

PLSC 506: Theories of International Relations

Theories of international relations; the world order; conflicting situations; imperialism; the balance of power and integration as important modes adopted to avoid disorder; basic theoretical and analytical tools developed by political scientists to understand the complexities of international politics; features of the contemporary global system.

PLSC 507: Constitutional and Political Processes in Pakistan

Analysis of the political and constitutional developments in Pakistan since its creation; issues in constitution making; study of the constitutions of 1956, 1962 and 1973 and the amendments made; impact of constitution making on Pakistani politics.

PLSC 519: Local Government System in Pakistan

Understanding the political discourse in Pakistan is imperative if one aspires to further decode the political fabric governing both administrative and social contours of Pakistan. Pakistan, in its federalist construct, has an intricate political and administrative system divided under political leadership, legislative authorities, bureaucratic functionaries, provincial layout and local governance mechanism. This graduate level course will be an overview of the evolution of local governance system in Pakistan, its different manifestations and also a means to examine its pros and cons and forecast efficacy.

PLSC 523: Research Techniques in Political Science

This course is designed to help students formulate their research proposals, eventually leading to their thesis proposal and MS thesis. First we will discuss what political science is and how it has developed over time. We will discuss the philosophical as well as methodological differences underlying quantitative, qualitative, and interpretive research methods. We will engage in practical application of various methods. And most importantly, we will engage in a detailed discussion of how to design research projects. At the end of the course, students should have constructed a blue-print for their proposals.

PLSC 699: Research Thesis (12 credits)

Students will undertake research on a topic approved by the Departmental Committee and produce a thesis of at least 25000 words. The research proposal must have appropriate design and relate to the substantive and methodological understanding developed in the first year of the program through course work. Students will conduct research under the guidance of a faculty member of the Department of Political Science with expertise in the relevant field.

PLSC 508: Foreign Policy Analysis

This course is designed to give students an overview of different explanations for states’ foreign policy behavior. Theories of International Relations, whether realist or neo-liberal, often assume that states act rationally in their self-interest. However, we know from experience that actors in the international arena often behave in self-destructive ways, especially the decision to go to war. Readings, lectures, and discussions will focus on the pressures of the international system, on the nature of national political regimes, societal forces such as the media and lobbyists, as well as institutional structures and processes. We will also turn our attention to the role of perceptions and misperceptions of individual leaders, their ideologies and beliefs, as well as the problem of images and biases in decision-making particularly during crises.

PLSC 509: Political Sociology

Vision of a Society as outlined by Karl Marx, Max Weber, and Talcott Parsons; nature and distribution of power; political socialization; socio-political development and change encompassing nation-building/modernization, social and political movements—political parties/culture; social change focusing on social behavior and social order.

PLSC 513: Advanced Studies in International Relations

In depth study of a particular subject matter discussed in PLSC 505, with particular emphasis on the current salience of the topic to contemporary issues and events. Topic subject to faculty interest and departmental approval.

PLSC 514: International Organizations

Emergence of international organizations; their concepts and debates; specific focus on the emergence of United Nations and its roles; regional organizations; new economic grouping; challenges of international organizations

PLSC 515: Politico-Strategic Dynamics of the Middle East

Historic antecedents and contemporary issues that have shaped the Middle East; politico-strategic issues affecting the region; politics of the Arab-Israeli conflict; the rise of Arab nationalism; Iranian revolution and its impact on the region; American intervention in Iraq; the emergence of the ‘Arab Spring’

PLSC 517: Politico-Strategic Dynamics of South Asia

Drive behind Muslim struggle for establishment of an independent state; dynamics of South Asian politics; terrorism, conflicts about Kashmir, Siachin and water; mutual mistrust, the arms race, nuclear weapons; politico-strategic dynamics of South Asia which damage relations between India and Pakistan. Reference also to the politics of other SAARC members, including Bangladesh, Sri Lanka, Bhutan and the Maledives.

PLSC 518: Civil Society: local and global dynamics

This course will explore the origins of the concept of civil society, modern theoretical conceptualization of civil society, civil society and social capital, composition of civil society, civil society and the state, citizenship and civil society, movements and civil society. Emphasis will be placed on the development of civil society in Pakistan within local, regional and global dynamics.

PLSC 520: Advanced Studies in Political Philosophy

In depth study of one particular topic within political philosophy introduced in PLSC 504. Could include, but not limited to, ancient, medieval or modern Western political thought, Islamic political philosophy, critical theory and subaltern studies.

PLSC 521: Women and Politics in Pakistan

This course aims to develop a comprehensive understanding among students about the dynamics of women political participation in Pakistan-rural and urban, keeping in view the deeply entrenched patriarchy and religiosity in society. The course attempts to understand the cultural/religious perspective, constitutional guarantees as well as legislative enactments regarding women political participation. Further, another important component of this course will be a comparative analysis of Pakistani women with those in near similar environments like South Asia and Middle East. The students will also be exposed to various dimensions of feminist theory and its possible application in Pakistani context.

PLSC 522: Advanced Studies in Comparative Politics and Area Studies

A course that will focus on the politics of one particular region or neighborhood of the globe not covered in other course offerings. Dependent on faculty availability and research interests.

Admission Criteria

A 4-year Bachelor’s degree (completed with at least 2.0 CGPA) from any HEC-recognized university or a conventional MA/MSc (completed with at least 60% marks) in Political Science, International Relations, History, Sociology, or any related discipline.

Postgraduate Admissions Timeline (Fall 2023) – Round 2

Postgraduate admissions timeline (fall 2023) – round 1.

• In case of the O Level, a minimum of 8 subjects must have been passed. They should include English, Mathematics and 3 compulsory subjects (Pakistan Studies, Islamiyat and Urdu).
• In case of the A Level, a minimum of 3 subjects must have been passed.
• Attested copy of the O and A Level, High School or IB Equivalence Certificate (whichever applicable) issued by the IBCC.
• In case you have not received your degree yet, you are required to apply for it.
• Students can submit their Transcript at least till the 7th semester at the time of Admission Form submission. If offered admission, it will be a provisional offer; they must submit an attested copy of their complete official Transcript within 30 days of the beginning of the semester.
• Students having a foreign Bachelor’s Degree must get their Equivalence from the Higher Education Commission (HEC).
• Two Reference Letters.
• Statement of Purpose (300 – 500 words) describing the reason(s) why the student is applying to the program, long-term goals and the reason(s) for selecting Forman Christian College (A Chartered University).
• One recent passport-sized photograph.
• One copy each of the Student’s CNIC and of the Father/Guardian.
• Receipt of the Application Processing Fee (Rs. 3500).

Note: All documents submitted must be attested by a Gazetted Officer.

Payment Modes for Admission Processing Fee

• Please click here for instructions on how to pay your Application Processing Fee over the counter in HBL, UBL, Meezan & Allied Bank.
• Please click here for instructions on how to pay your Application Processing Fee through HBL, Meezan Bank & UBL Mobile App & Internet Banking.
• Please click here to pay the Application Processing Fee online.

In case you are not located in Lahore, you can send us the Admission Form along with all the required documents through Courier. You would need to make a Pay Order of Rs. 3500 from any Branch of HBL in the name of ‘Forman Christian College’. Then send us the Courier at ‘Admissions Office, Ahmad Saeed Administration Building, Forman Christian College, Ferozepur Road, Lahore 54600’.

Click  here   for the Merit List for Round 1 of Admissions.

Click  here   for the Merit List for Round 2 of Admissions.

Click here for the fee structure Click here for financial aid

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• Open access
• Published: 05 June 2018

The politics of the China―Pakistan economic corridor

• Maham Hameed 1  

Palgrave Communications volume  4 , Article number:  64 ( 2018 ) Cite this article

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• Politics and international relations

A Correction to this article was published on 07 August 2018

This article has been updated

China’s presence in the Global South has increased dramatically over the course of a decade. The discourse of mutual benefit and non-intervention has attracted much attention in the developing world, which is now facing the consequences of Western interventions. However, the extent to which Chinese engagement in the developing world stays true to these principles needs to be evaluated in terms of its effects on the political economic structures of the host nations. This study analyses how China and the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC) is interacting with the political and economic realities of Pakistan. Firstly, the study traces the history of regionalism in Pakistan and shows that over the years, the developmental mission of the central state has created deep-seated regionalism in Pakistan. The study shows that CPEC is deepening such cleavages. The regionalist forces have opposed the project in two broad ways: through demanding a greater share in the project or through completely rejecting the interventions. Secondly, the study analyses the lop-sided civil-military relations in Pakistan and concludes that Chinese engagement in Pakistan is leading to the military’s tighter control of civilian and economic matters relating to CPEC.

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China’s global rise has been presented in sharp contrast to the Western global order. The discourse of mutual benefit and non-interference has been maintained by not just China but also the countries that it engages with. A similar discourse has been deployed in Pakistan. However, discrepancies to these promises and hopes have not been hard to spot. In order to fully understand the implications of the Chinese presence in the third world, particularly in Pakistan, I look at the effects of Chinese engagement on the political economic structure of Pakistan. An analysis of Pakistan’s political economic structure, Pakistan’s history of infrastructure development, China’s foreign policy and national interests, and the basis of Pakistan–China friendship is utilized to understand how the China–Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC) is interacting and is expected to interact with the state structure of Pakistan.

CPEC and the strategic interests

Before we begin to understand the possible implications of Chinese engagement in Pakistan, personified by the CPEC, it is important to understand what the project means for both the states. An understanding of the strategic importance of the project and how the project interacts with the historical interests of both nations will better equip us to analyze the CPEC in terms of its political and social impacts.

Pakistan Muslim League (N) Footnote 1 assumed office in 2013 after its sweeping victory in the general elections 2013 of the National Assembly. The regime, led by two main protagonists—the Sharif brothers—was all about the economy: the Sharif’s had sold its vote bank the dream of a prosperous economy backed by a strong infrastructure network (Small, 2015 ). All the ambitious plans of motorways, industrial zones, and fixing energy crisis could not be financed locally and the Sharif government knew where to look for the investments. During this time, China, rethinking its economic policy that had sustained China's growth for over three decades, was ambitiously looking to build an integrated South Asian infrastructure to connect interior China to the ports of Indian Ocean. The infrastructural investments had become prerequisite for maintaining high growth rates in the newly growing provinces of Yunnan and Xinjiang. China looked for collaboration from India and Pakistan. Li Keqiang—the Chinese Prime Minister —first visited India with his ambitious proposals. However, India found its economic ally in Japan instead. Next was Pakistan’s turn.

However, convincing China to invest in Pakistan would not be an easy task for the Sharif government. Many of Chinese initiatives had languished in the past due to the incumbent regime’s lack of political will (Small, 2015 ). However, the Pakistani government’s commitment was to ease these qualms for China. Li arrived Pakistan on 22nd May, 2013 with an ambitious proposal of regional connectivity and resolution of Pakistan’s energy crisis. Pakistani civil and military leadership welcomed Li with grand gestures. From here on, the Xinjiang-Gwadar connection idea picked up pace. China was also willing to help Pakistan alleviate its energy crisis through building hydro-electric dams, coal-fired power stations, and nuclear power plants. Ideas were being quickly materialized: plans were made, meetings were held, and Memorandum of Understanding (MOUs) were signed.

However, not all was smooth sailing. China would soon have to reconsider its plans in Pakistan following terrorist attacks either targeting CPEC workers or the proposed regions for CPEC projects. Footnote 2 Chinese suspicions were received with promises of commitment by the Sharif government to make the execution of the corridor smooth and safe. China decided to tread carefully—starting with smaller projects.

Pakistan was to soon prove central to Beijing’s concerns, dispensing all qualms China had about investing in Pakistan. A bomb attack in Tiananmen Square, Beijing on 28th October 2013, for which the Turkistan Islamist Party Footnote 3 claimed responsibility, was a wake-up call for China. This attack was followed by knife and bomb attack in Kunming and Urumqi railway stations indicating the spread of terrorism from the country’s remote northwest to its urban centers (Small, 2015 ). If the 2009 riots between Han Chinese and the Muslim Uighurs in Xinjiang were not enough, this series of incidents shook up Beijing to pay closer attention to Pakistan and Afghanistan (Pant, 2012 ). Stability in these countries was to be of great concern to China lest the Islamist extremism spread in the Western region of China (Pant, 2012 ). Hence, Pakistan is crucial to China’s economic interests and its desire to expand its influence in the region. Although it did not change anything for the major economic projects in the pipeline (in fact, Li’s next visit and the near-final plans of the major projects were to show that they had become even more critical for Chinese interests), China began to put pressure on the security establishment in Pakistan for a crackdown on the Uighur militants Footnote 4 in North Waziristan (Small, 2015 ). The political infighting between the civilian government and military establishment led to embarrassing delays in reaching an agreement. However, despite their differences, one thing that the Pakistani leadership agreed on was the value of Pak–China friendship, which now promised an influx of $46 billion that would transform the Pakistani economy. As the pressure from the Chinese government intensified, Raheel Sharif finally obliged and launched an operation in North Waziristan. However, the decision to deploy tens of thousands of troops in the region was triggered by other factors pertaining to terrorism and security situation in the country too (Small, 2015 ).

Although security concerns are an important factor explaining China’s interest in Pakistan, China has other reasons to strengthen its ties with Pakistan too. In the last two decades, China has increased its global presence. To this end, China is taking a more proactive role in creating diplomatic ties with other nations. Pakistan is among the few countries that China can call a friend (Shambaugh, 2013 ). The friendship is a welcome change for the Pakistani political elites and various institutions of the state that are experiencing increasingly deteriorating relationship with the US (Small, 2015 ). Public support for Pak–China relations in Pakistan is also striking (Chandra, 2016 ). According to the Pew Research Centre survey of public opinion about China in Pakistan, 84 per cent of the respondents held a positive view about China, compared to 16 per cent for the US. If the survey is a realistic representation of reality, then Pakistan might be the most pro-China country in the world (Chandra, 2016 ).

The impetus that China–Pakistan friendship quickly gained post-2010 cannot be sufficiently explained by the Chinese interests in Pakistan alone. Pakistan had strong motivations behind strengthening its ties with China too. Pakistani military and civilian government had recently lost its long-standing friend—the US—and was experiencing the economic and military vacuum left behind by the US withdrawal.

Since its foundation, Pakistan has been highly dependent on foreign aid. One of its biggest donors throughout the history of the nation has been the United States. The flow of aid started as a part of the economic reconstruction effort. The aid played a crucial role in the high growth rates achieved in the 1960s—it gave impetus to industrialization and helped combat food insecurity (Zaidi, 2004, p. 104). The inflow of foreign aid during this period also lent support to public investment in infrastructure (mostly in power and irrigation sectors), and social services (Khan and Ahmed, 2007 , p. 220).

Later, the ideological alignment and military ties with the US during the Cold War accelerated the flow of aid and irreversibly tied the Pakistani military into the foreign aid and development nexus (Zaidi 2004, p. 104). The aid accelerated during the Soviet occupation of Afghanistan when the US lent its financial and military support to Pakistan to fight the Afghan War (Cooley, 2001 ). Since, the funds and training were not to be provided directly through the Central Intelligence Agency, but through Pakistan and its army, the security establishment accumulated immense power during this period (Cooley, 2001 ). Although aid during this period assisted Pakistan in upgrading its defense forces and military technology, it did so at the cost of rising terrorism, sectarianism, refugee crisis, rising debt-servicing expenses, and falling GDP (Hilali, 2002 ).

US-Pakistan relations remained strained throughout the 1990s; however, the friendship attained a new meaning following United States’ War on Terror. Pakistan received aid packages to fight terrorism within and outside its borders (Qazi, 2012 ). The political and social impact of war on terror within Pakistan has been disastrous. Footnote 5 Furthermore, Pakistan’s security establishment that has consistently provided refuge to the Taliban due its strategic interests, refused to comply with the US demands (Qazi, 2012 ). Civilian government too has been put off by the increasingly chaotic nature of the aid. Disappointed by Pakistan’s performance in fighting terrorism, the US keeps announcing delays or cancellation of the promised aid (Naviwala, 2017 ). In consequence, Pakistan has experienced a gradual withdrawal of the US resulting from the doubts that the US policy makers have cast upon the Pakistan’s role in fighting terrorism and effectiveness of aid as a counter-terrorism policy (Zaidi, 2011 ).

Following the US raid that killed Osama bin Laden in 2011, Pakistan faced intense international condemnation regarding its role in fighting extremism within its boundaries. During such times the country that openly voiced support for Pakistan was China (Pant, 2012 ). China expressed its interest in becoming an “all-weather strategic partner” of Pakistan (Pant, 2012 ). It was in this backdrop that the developmental vision of the Sharif government, the political and economic interests of the military establishment, and global, national and strategic interests of the Chinese government coincided.

All these interests converged and manifested in the form of CPEC.

CPEC as state-space

One of the most prominent features of CPEC is the highly visible presence of state. Both Chinese and Pakistani states have precious stakes in the project and are playing a crucial role in kick-starting the investment regime constituting both public and private sectors. Pakistani state, specifically the Sharif government, is at pains to claim ownership of the project despite the fact that allegedly most of the projects will be private ventures. The signing of MoUs, financial agreements, inauguration ceremonies, and press releases are heavily advertised through media. On project sites, along with a billboard of President Xi Jinping’s picture, Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif’s picture is carefully placed. Quick results of CPEC will bode well for PML-N in the next elections, but the relationship between the state and infrastructure is much deeper than interests of one regime. State and infrastructure are closely entwined together in the exercise of nation-making. In the following sections, I briefly review the literature on the relationship between infrastructure and state. To better understand the relationship between state and infrastructure in the case of Pakistan, I deconstruct the Pakistani state into the central state, regional elites and military and analyse the role of these power groups in the development of infrastructure in Pakistan.

Infrastructure as state-space

Infrastructures are matters that enable the movement of other matter (larkin, 2013 p. 328).

Very broadly, infrastructure is a physical and institutional structure that facilitates the flow of people, commodities, ideas and information (Guldi, 2012 ; Larkin, 2013 ). Although infrastructure in various forms have existed for millennia, the intersection of economic requirements, technical expertize and political incentives to create standardized structures for the purpose of consolidating state power and integrating nation is a modern phenomenon (Knox and Harvey, 2012 , p. 523). In other words, infrastructure is increasingly understood as a means to gain legitimacy; to create an ‘integrated’ national space and ideology (Anwar, 2015 ; Goswami, 2004 ; Akhter, 2015 ; Knox and Harvey, 2012 , 2015 ).

Marx in reflecting on the link between provision of infrastructure (what he termed as public works) and capital accumulation, argued that only in the most advanced stage of capitalism can capital itself provide the ‘‘the general condition of production’’ (1857–61). Until then, the capital appoints the task of providing infrastructure to the state. Alternately, the state still enjoys the authority and drive to make the society pay for the infrastructure in form of revenues (Marx, 1857 –).

Henri Lefebvre refined the Marxist understanding of the connection between capitalist state and infrastructure by theorizing relationship between state and space (Lefebvre, 2009 , p. 223; Akhter, 2015 , p. 852). Apart from providing infrastructure to facilitate capital, he argued that state has a deeper relationship with space. For him, “homogenized, hierarchized, and fragmented spaces” are produced through capital but also crucially through the spatial strategies (including institutional and material innovations and scientific knowledge) of the state (Lefebvre, 2009 ). The aim is to extend the political and social outreach and to fully penetrate the society.

This is an important point in relation to infrastructure and is worth delving into further. Manu Goswami in his study of production of colonial space in India argues infrastructure became a tool for the colonial government to lend legitimacy to the narrative that British rulers were there to help India progress and to integrate the state-space through new rules of subjectivity Footnote 6 (2004). Similarly, writing about a cross-border highway in Albania and Greece, Dimitris Dalakoglou, analyses how infrastructures reflects the fetishistic desires of the planning authorities to participate in the conceptual and visual pattern of modernity as imagined by advanced nations (Dalakoglou, 2010 ). Morten Alex Pedersen makes a similar point about Russian investment into infrastructure as a precondition to socialist modernity (Larkin, 2013 , p. 333). Infrastructure development was planned not only as serving economic purposes but it was imagined as “investing in a new being, a new humanity, a new cosmos” (Pedersen, 2011 , p. 45 cited in Larkin 2013 , p. 333). Knox and Harvey, 2012 , in their study of roads in northern Peru, make a similar argument but with a different approach—of how infrastructure is experienced by the local population. Roads, they argue, are closely tied to the local population’s desire for connection and modernity. The idea is that roads are physical support system of a regional economy that initiates a process of economic advancement through closer integration with the state and global trade system (Knox and Harvey, 2012 ).

Nation-building exercises and infrastructure development are two closely tied projects of the state as manifested in the history of infrastructure development of Pakistan. In the 1950s emerged a distinct discourse in the global economic development circles focusing on development as infrastructure (Anwar, 2015 , p. 8). This shift was crucial for the then Third World not only in concrete economic terms—in formulating financing arrangements and defining the trajectory of international aid—but also in how it affected state’s role as a central planning authority. Infrastructure was placed at the center for the economic reconstruction of post-colonial societies like Pakistan. Pakistan was to develop using foreign financing and expertize from the World Bank and Ford Foundation. Foreign advisors and economists developed ideas that aided the development of the new discourse locally. “Their writings particularly signaled the intensely metonymic relationship between infrastructure and the state” (Anwar, 2015 , p. 6). To overcome its backwardness, it not only had to have a disciplined, enterprising and productive population but it also needed national electricity grid, industries, automobiles, roads, and airports. Furthermore, infrastructure was also imagined as a binding force between the geographically odd East and West Pakistan (Anwar, 2015 , p. 35–37).

The close relationship between infrastructure and state continued to exist throughout Pakistan’s history. However, not always was this relationship as harmonious as the central state had wanted it to be. The central Pakistani state’s attempts at creating an integrated space through infrastructural projects were met with alternative conceptions of nationhood of various regional elites.

Majed Akhter, in his analysis of the politics of Indus river infrastructure development, also notes a similar pattern of incomplete hegemonic project of state. He argues that nation-building, economic reconstruction efforts and provision of large dams and other river infrastructures have been closely tied together in the case of Pakistan (Akhter, 2015 ). Indus Water Treaty, signed on 19 September 1960, divided the control over Indus River and its tributaries among India and Pakistan. The Indus Basin Development Agreement signed on the same day secured Pakistan $895 million as development grants from rich capitalist states for the construction of dams and other waterways. Apart from redirecting the use of water the projects also contributed to “the infrastructural production of state-space” (Akhter, 2015 , p. 861). Availability of large development funds and creation of an integrated water network expanded the strength and spatial reach of the state. However, the central state’s project of integrating national space was met with resistance from the regional intellectual elites (Akhter 2015 , p. 860–861). The provincial politicians, who enjoyed important power positions in the bureaucracy, by virtue of the colonial legacy of ‘‘over-developed’’ state, remained unconvinced that the central state’s nation-building process was an inclusive one. Such resistances intensified over time developing into regionalist ambitions. The case of secession of East Pakistan in 1971 revealed the strength of these forces (Akhter, 2015 ).

The military-bureaucratic state of Pakistan

To understand the roots of regionalism in Pakistan it is imperative to deconstruct the nature of Pakistani state. For this purpose, Hamza Alavi’s article, “The state in post-colonial societies: Pakistan and Bangladesh” is particularly insightful (1972). He argues that the structure of Pakistani state cannot be fully understood without understanding the institutional legacy it inherited from the colonial state. The colonial government or the metropolitan bourgeoisie needs an elaborate state apparatus in order to exercise dominion over all the indigenous social classes in the colony. Resultantly, power devolves to the military-bureaucratic state apparatus created through this structure of governance. He termed such a state as an ‘‘overdeveloped’’ state. Pakistan inherited this structure of colonial governance (1972). Predominance of the military-bureaucratic state structure continued throughout the history of Pakistan. Pakistan did not have any well-developed political party organizations, which hampered the process of developing a functional parliamentary democracy (Jalal, 1990 ). Hence, Pakistan has relied on its civil service and military to handle state functions. Concentration of power in the hands of such selected elite without a strong hegemonic project has created regional fissures (Jalal, 1990 ). The disproportionate representation of Punjabis in the military and civil bureaucracy further deepened these grievances. Desperate attempts by the state such as the One Unit Footnote 7 could not do much to assuage the symptomatic conditions of these deep fissures. In the following sections, I present the case studies of Sindh and Balochistan to illustrate the roots of these grievances in the context of infrastructural development.

Sindh and hydraulic regionalism

Although, most of the tension between the provinces emerged from the Punjabi disproportionate presence in the bureaucratic and military structure of state, friction between Punjab and Sindh is also rooted in the technological appropriation of Indus river waters (Akhter, 2013 ). The fact that Punjab is upstream and Sindh is downstream creates a political geographic dynamic. This dynamic led to the creation of friction between the two provinces once the colonial state began its project of planned river control system (Akhter, 2013 , p. 151). As more water began to be held by Punjab through various infrastructure technologies, Sindh’s water rights got stifled. These tensions continued into independence. The Punjabi military-bureaucratic elite helped Punjab appropriate a greater share of Indus waters than was its due (Akhter, 2013 ).

Finally, the hydraulic projects of the central state also gave impetus to regionalist politics. Tarbela dam, one of the most important dams in the country, became a very contentious site as the provinces vied for rights over the water stored in the dam. While the provinces fought for greater water rights, Punjab argued that it needed a greater share in order to compensate for the loss to India of the three Eastern Rivers. The Committee set-up to discuss the issues surrounding rights to storages at Tarbela constituted disproportionately of Punjabis; out of the 15 members, 11 were Punjabis. The final report of the committee favored the opinion that Punjab was entitled to greater allocation rights. Resultantly, the four members issued their notes of dissent, albeit with little consequence. Tarbela Dam was constructed and Punjab was given disproportionate share of stored water.

Although, all of the provinces got affected by the unfair character of the hydraulic technologies, Sindh and Punjab have been in direct confrontation by virtue of their upstream/downstream dynamic. Furthermore, Sindh is a largely agricultural province relying mostly on water from Indus. Unlike Punjab, Sindh doesn’t have much useable groundwater and it receives much less rain than Punjab. Hence, the grievances were deep-rooted and are yet to be resolved (Akhter, 2013 ).

Baluchistan: Nationalist politics of underdevelopment and development

Apart from Sindh, another province that has consistently opposed the central state’s hegemonic project is Baluchistan. The history of nationalist sentiments among Baluchi elites can be traced as far back as the late colonial period. Creation of Pakistan was a heavy blow to the regional elites (particularly Baluch and Pashtun) hoping to create autonomous states based on their ethnicities (Titus and Swidler, 2000 ). At the time of independence, the tribal leaders and municipal authorities in British Baluchistan were given the option to choose between declaring Baluchistan an independent state or to join Pakistan. Although, these elites opted to join Pakistan, there were committed groups of activists that opposed the manner in which this decision was imposed. Actions against the project ranged from peaceful political organizing to sabotage. The nascent state, dominated by the Punjabi military-bureaucratic elite, responded with arrests and its own sabotage campaigns (Titus and Swidler, 2000 ). A focal point of early Baluch nationalism was the Kalat region (Atarodi, 2011 ). Soon after the creation of Pakistan, independence of Kalat was declared. However, the central state refused to accept the declaration and through military action, Kalat was forced to assimilate into Pakistan on 27 March 1948. From that day on, Baluch nationalism intensified overtime. The friction between the central state and Baluch activists continued throughout the history of Pakistan, gaining momentous during periods of insurgencies and military action in 1948, 1958, 1962, 1973, and 2004 (which marks the latest wave of insurgency). After the first military crackdown in 1948, the province was put under Governor-General Control. Baluchistan did not get any electoral representation in the state until 1972, when National Awami Party (the progressive political party that eventually led the movement for independent East Pakistan) gained sweeping victory in Baluchistan. The newly elected representatives began to demand for state rights, pointing to the relative underdevelopment of the state. However, with the discovery of natural gas, the province had become very important to Pakistani state and hence Bhutto Footnote 8 refused to grant NAP its demands of greater autonomy. Bhutto dissolved the Baluchistan assembly and restored Governor’s rule. This led to the prolonged series of military confrontations (Atarodi, 2011 ). By the time the fighting subsided in 1977, grievances had deepened and intense separatist feelings had penetrated widely (Harrison, 1981 ).

Although one of the major historical reasons contributing to Baluch insurgency has been the relative underdevelopment of the province, the recent wave of insurgency is mobilized around the very opposite issue (Aslam, 2011 ; Grare, 2006 ). It has been fueled by the massive development projects that the central government is undertaking in the province (Grare, 2006 ). Government of Pakistan, from the very beginning, has exploited the province by extracting the provincial resources without giving the Baluch their due share. Not only have the royalties for these resources been low, but the province has also benefited the least from them. Hence, the Baluch nationalists and militants, extremely skeptical of these interventions of central state, have mainly targeted Pakistani and foreign involvement in ‘‘development’’ projects in Baluchistan. The military operation carried out in 2005 appeared to be a result of Baluchistan Liberation Army’s (BLA) rocket attack carried out a few hours before General Musharraf’s visit there (Atarodi, 2011 ).

The huge land mass of the province, its reasonable endowment of natural deposits like gas, minerals, and its highly strategic coast means that it is feasible target central state’s extractive ambitions (Akhtar, 2007 ). Given the long history of exploitation of the province, the nationalist elements have responded to state-led infrastructure projects with suspicions and outright rejection. Exploitation of gas reserves and acquisition of Gwadar port are the classic manifestation of state-led infrastructure projects being a site of resistance in Baluchistan (Akhtar, 2007 ).

Despite being a major producer of gas, Baluchistan not only receives much less share of gas than other provinces do, it also receives only 12.4% royalties of the gas produced in the province (Grare, 2006 ). This trend of exploitation has been fairly consistent over the years, building up grievances among the Baluch population. The result being that the Baluch nationalists are now violently opposing the exploitation of the gas reserves by central government (Grare, 2006 ). According to South Asia Terrorism Portal, there have been 165 incidents of attacks on gas pipelines from 2005 to 2011 (Mohanty, 2011 ).

Development of Gwadar Port is another locus of tension. In collaboration with China, the government of Pakistan started developing a deep sea port and ancillary infrastructure and industries at the coastal town of Gwadar on the Arabian Sea (Aslam, 2011 ). The Baluch nationalists assert that the agreement between the federal government and the Chinese company related to the development project is another proof of the exploitation of Baluch wealth. They claim that Pakistani state and the Chinese company are taking most of the profit from these projects, leaving little for the people of Baluchistan. To make matters worse, all construction contracts are given to non-Baluch firms (Aslam, 2011 ).

Furthermore, as Frédéric Grare points out, most of the people involved in the projects are from outside of Baluchistan (Grare, 2006 ). There is a growing fear among the Baluch youth nationalists that Gwadar is likely to continue to precipitate an influx of non-Balouch seeking employment (Akhtar, 2007 ). The fears are grounded in reality: out of 600 people employed in the first phase of construction of Gwadar port, only 100 were Baluch (Grare, 2006 ).

The case of Sindh and Baluchistan show that instead of integrating national space and creating a hegemonic state-space, politics of infrastructure have only created and deepened fissures in the national space. Regionalist ambitions have been exacerbated by the central state’s attempts to create an integrated space through technologies of integration. In the following sections, I talk about how CPEC is interacting and is expected to interact with these features of the Pakistani political economy.

CPEC and politics of regionalism

Political and militant presence of nationalist forces, Islamic extremists (now including Islamic State), makes Baluchistan a very contentious and dangerous space for CPEC. Although Baluchistan has proved to be most difficult for the Pakistani and Chinese actors involved in CPEC, the regional problem of CPEC extends the boundaries of Baluchistan. Planning of CPEC has been highly centralist and provincial governments have not responded well to these tendencies. Chinese engagement (through CPEC projects) has so far only deepened these regional cleavages. The regionalist forces have opposed the project in two broad ways: through demanding greater share in the project or through completely rejecting the interventions.

The center-province friction has manifested itself through the CPEC route controversy. Provincial governments have objected to the change in route of the roads and railways projects. The government of Pakistan announced that the original route, or Western alignment, will start after the completion of eastern alignment. According to the original plan, the corridor—constituting highways and railways—was to connect Gwadar to Kashgar, passing through various southern and eastern districts of Baluchistan, some parts of South Punjab, Islamabad (beyond which there is no difference between the Eastern and Western route) (Abid and Ashfaq, 2015 ). However, fears (backed by statistical data) among the regional elites have started emerging that central political elite is giving priority to the eastern route (Mengal, 2016 ). The Eastern Route completely cuts through Baluchistan, connects Gwadar to Karachi through bypassing major districts in Baluchistan, and mostly passes through the relatively well-developed provinces of Punjab and Sindh (Mengal, 2016 ). Different claims have been made by the government since this controversy emerged (Bengali, 2015 ). Although the maps have not been disclosed and statements have been kept vague and confusing, what does emerge from the press releases is that the route has been changed to pass mostly through Central Punjab instead (Bengali, 2015 ).

Even though a parliamentary committee has been established, not enough consultation has been made with the provinces in Pakistan (Qureshi, 2015 ). Provincial Assembly of Khyber Pakhtunkhwa (KPK) rejected prioritization of Eastern route and passed resolution opposing any route change, since the original route holds the promise of benefitting the underdeveloped areas of KPK (Mengal, 2016 ; Ahmad and Hong, 2017 ). Aftab Ahmed Sherpao, leader of the Qaumi Watan Party—the party that emerged as the fourth largest party in KPK in the 2013 General Elections—expressed his concerns about the national outreach of CPEC in a parliamentary committee meeting held in October 2016 (Raza, 2016 ). Claiming to represent all members of the opposition party, he claimed that government claims of injection of 10,000 megawatts of electricity into the national grid holds little promise for the provinces other than Punjab. Since all the other provinces have a weak power distribution system, the increase in the production of energy will not benefit these marginalized provinces (Raza, 2016).

Gilgit-Baltistan has also been demanding greater share in CPEC through protests and strikes (Ali, 2016 ). The central government responded by threats. Ministry of Planning, Development and Reforms announced that those protesting against CPEC will be charged under anti-terrorism laws (Business-Standard, 2016). The government has also responded to the objections raised by the provinces by repeatedly assuring that CPEC will benefit the provinces equally and through announcing projects in these provinces. Whether the central government will go through with these promises is uncertain and the lack of transparency is only going to stimulate these fears and opposition even further.

The trend in Baluchistan, due to history of exploitation in the province, has been the opposite. They have opposed CPEC on the grounds that it will further strengthen the circle of exploitation emerging from the center—this time in collaboration with a foreign state (Ahmad and Hong, 2017 ; Mengal, 2016 ). The Baluch separatists and militants have shown their opposition to CPEC by carrying out various acts of sabotage such as, target killing and abduction of Chinese workers and blasts targeting CPEC project sites or infrastructure.

Consequently, despite the promises of connectivity, integration, and development of entire nation, CPEC has mobilized a new wave of regional politics. The route controversy reveals the centralizing—not inclusive—mission of state. Provinces have not only been kept in dark regarding the planning process, but state has also responded inadequately to the fears of provinces and in some cases has even threatened repression. Assuaging nationalist sentiments in Baluchistan through CPEC has remained an elusive project of Pakistani state. Hence, not much can be expected from CPEC in terms of nation-building unless it is backed by a strong material and ideological project of uniting the provinces. Central state, which is bent to pursue its own interests, has not shown much commitment to this end.

However, the political boundaries of CPEC extend beyond the national territory—Chinese state and international organizations will play a crucial in the CPEC process. How can we logically expect the Chinese state to respond? The answer to this question needs to be grounded in China’s foreign policy and Chinese interests in Pakistan.

Chinese capital and ‘‘non-interference’’

Perhaps the most salient feature of Chinese capital that has been readily advertised as the revolutionary principle that marks the new global order is that of non-interference and peaceful coexistence. Furthermore, the core purpose of the National Security Commission of China is to engage in dialog and negotiations on an equal footing to overcome disputes and make peace possible. China envisions a “fair and reasonable new international order” to guarantee peace and security (Shambaugh, 2013 , p. 79). Overtime, due to certain geopolitical events and circumstances, China has become less passive and more proactive globally—it has stepped-up participation in regional organizations, established many bilateral relations, and has become more engaged in multilateral organizations (although still reluctant to exercise coercion to make a regime submit to international norms and rules on issues such as climate change, military transparency, human rights, and to a certain extent, counter terrorism).

China’s interest in security, political stability, and reluctance to engage in contentious politics abroad are partly attributable to China’s long history of internal and external insecurity and paranoia (Shambaugh, 2013 ). The persistent internal threats of secessionist movements have pushed China to enter into coalitions of anti-secessionist movements, the consequences of which transcend the national boundaries (Karatasli and Kumral, 2017 ). These anti-secessionist sentiments and external security threats combined with the economic interests of China, “seem to push China to preserve the global status quo in a very consistent manner” (Karatasli and Kumral, 2017 , p. 22). Among several others, Karatasli and Kumral cite the example of issues surrounding South Sudan and Chinese role amidst the direct actions of international powers and multilateral organizations. As secessionist movement in South Sudan gained power, China’s tensions grew. South Sudan was becoming an important site for serving Chinese economic interests. By 2001, South Sudan attracted international prominence—secession and human rights problems found strong Western coalition support. Till the very end, China tried to keep Sudan united playing the role of a mediator. When in 2011, South Sudan gained independence; China put efforts into building trade relationships with South Sudan as well (Karatasli and Kumral, 2017 , p. 22–23).

However, exemplified by the case of Namibia, there have been exceptions to China’s policy of non-intervention and lack of support for independence movements. Beijing extended its support to the Black Nationalist liberation movement against apartheid and white domination of South Africa (Larmer, 2017 ). China became one of its first allies when in early 1990 Namibia claimed independence. This move on Beijing’s part needs to be contextualized in China’s need to look for allies after its diplomatic isolation following the crackdown of Chinese government on the Tiananmen Square protestors in 1989 (Larmer, 2017 , p. 4).

The above discussion illustrates how China is bent upon preserving political stability and is completely intolerant to regionalist ambitions given the problem of regionalism within its borders. Hence, it is safe to expect here that China will also not react well to the regional elites making diverging claims to the central planning of CPEC. China will not tolerate giving concessions or autonomy to the regionalist elements lest it gives confidence to the regionalists in its own boundaries.

CPEC and security

Over the years, Pakistani military’s penetration into politics, society and economy has accrued the military establishment an important position in the state apparatus. Real and imagined security threats besetting Pakistani state, role of foreign powers and the ever-growing financial autonomy of the defense establishment have led to the creation of a crisis-ridden, ‘‘garrison’’ Footnote 9 state of Pakistan. To make matters worse, an increasingly powerful role has been assumed by Pakistani military during the lifespan of CPEC. The army has pushed for a formal role in the execution of the projects. Pressure from Pakistani army and Beijing’s disappointed over the performance of federal government in securing a stable environment for CPEC development has meant that army has made important headways in acquiring an important role in CPEC. The rhetoric of security has also been used to justify lack of transparency, censorship, and arbitrary actions of the state, making the process of planning and execution of CPEC highly undemocratic.

On the eve of independence, Pakistan inherited an elaborate military structure. The colonial rule in India was mediated through a garrison state. British powers were fully aware of the effective role that force and coercion played in ruling India (Ahmed, 2013 ). Writing about the militaristic nature of Punjab, Tan Tai Yong remarks that the colonial legacy of militarization of Punjab can be crucial in explaining the post-colonial state of Pakistan (Ahmed, 2013 , p. 13). He argues that the rise of military-bureaucratic oligarchy heavily dominated by Punjabis, which was powerful enough to dominate and control the state apparatus of Pakistan is to be partially explained by the developments in colonial Punjab in the early twentieth century (Ahmed, 2013 ).

The colonizers through their recruitment policy created the myth of ‘‘martial race’’ of Punjabis (Siddiqa, 2007 ). After the mutiny of Bengal Army in 1857, British rulers were faced with the need to restructure the armed forces. At this juncture, the colonizers found that Punjabis were more willing to enlist in the British army in return for employment opportunities and material rewards. As a result, the number of Punjabis in the British army grew disproportionately (Siddiqa, 2007 ).

The myth of Punjabis and Pathans (from North-West Frontier Province) as ‘‘martial race’’ continued even after independence. This acted as a cohesive force for retaining ethnic composition and maintaining the inherently elitist fabric of military (Siddiqa, 2007 ). Furthermore, the colonial bias against Bengalis, Sindhis, and Baluchis in recruitment processes continued. This discriminatory policy fed the tension between the center and the provinces. Consequences have been dire: Baluch leaders uphold grievances against the military who view it not as a national military but a Punjabi force that exploits (Siddiqa 2007 : p. 60).

The strong military apparatus bequeathed by the colonial government acquired more power as the nascent state struggled with nation-making. Owing to the deep sense of insecurity that ensued after independence, the army attained a central role as a protective authority (Ahmed, 2013 ). The ideology on which Pakistan’s nationalist struggle was based had a huge role to play in creating these threats. The independence struggle was pitched as a struggle for a separate homeland for Muslims. The much celebrated “Two Nation Theory”, Footnote 10 for once and for all, discarded all commonalities between Muslims and Hindus of India. The bloody riots following the partition of the subcontinent and an exaggerated belief that India was intent on leading Pakistan to ruin set the stage for national obsession with security (Ahmed, 2013 ). The imagined fear took shape following the multiple wars between India and Pakistan over the Kashmir issue (Siddiqa, 2007 : p. 63). The conflict holds immense priority among policy makers and the military establishment, who perceive Indian threat as the primary threat to Pakistan. Even internal threats such as Baluch insurgency and other ethnic and religious tensions are perceived as an extension of this external threat (Siddiqa, 2007 ).

The military establishment derived its ideological power from the Indian threat and economic strength from foreign powers. Due to certain strategic events, development aid was quickly turned into military aid (Ahmed, 2013 ). The bipolar rivalry between the United States and former Soviet Union gave the ruling elites a very effective strategic advantage to solicit alliance with the US (Ahmed, 2013 ). The civil and military rulers of Pakistan utilized this opportunity by marketing Pakistan as a frontline state against the rise of communism and communist powers. When the alliance with the US to contain the spread of communism became more or less dormant in the 1960s, Pakistan sought alliance with China. Later, Pakistan further diversified this web of dependence by seeking support of Saudi Arabia. The Pakistan–US alliance refurbished with the Soviet occupation of Afghanistan and Iranian Revolution. China has also similar concerns against the Soviet occupation. Saudi Arabia felt threatened by the rising power of Iranian strand of Islam. All these powers could realize their objectives through Pakistan. The Pakistani military exploited this unique strategic position of Pakistan to serve its interests (Ahmed, 2013 ).

Given the vested interests of foreign and local powers in militarizing the state, it is no surprise that over the 67 years of independence, the military establishment acquired enough power to rule the country four times. Even during times of civilian rule, army has maintained considerable power by negotiating authority (Siddiqa, 2007 ). Five armed conflicts with India, several operations in Baluchistan to suppress the organized demands for greater autonomy, and the most recent ‘‘war against terrorism’’ not only indicates the level of militarization of state but is also symptomatic of formidable power in the hands of Pakistan army (Siddiqa, 2007 ).

Pakistani military and CPEC

An increasingly powerful role has been assumed by the military during the lifespan of CPEC. Army has pushed for a formal role in the execution of the projects and proposed incorporation of CPEC in the National Action Plan Footnote 11 (Rana, 2016 ). The latter proposal was rejected by the civilian set-up and the civilian government has been overall reluctant in sharing control over CPEC (Ghumman, 2016 ). However, army’s power to meddle with civilian politics combined with Beijing’s disappointed over the performance of federal government in securing a stable environment for CPEC development (Ghumman, 2016 ) has meant that army has made important headways in acquiring an important role in CPEC.

The power that Pakistani army is gaining in CPEC operations is making the process of CPEC highly undemocratic. It is leading to further weakening of the civilian government. There are several developments that point towards this trend. Firstly, new armed forces have been formed in Baluchistan and Sindh by the army, dedicated solely to protect the CPEC projects (Wolf, 2016 ). This decision was made solely by the top officials of the army (Wolf, 2016 ). According to the four-layer security plan, an estimated 32,000 security personnel have been assigned to guard over 14,321 Chinese workers engaged in various projects throughout the country (Gishkori, 2015). According to the plan, Baluchistan will be guarded the heaviest, getting about 5,700 personnel of the Frontier Corps. Footnote 12 Similarly, the operation Zarb-e-Azb launched by the army to control militancy in North Waziristan in 2014 also gained legitimacy through CPEC. The Chinese foreign policy makers were satisfied by the Pakistani army’s attempt to eliminate the insurgency led by the East Turkestan Islamic Movement in the region. Likewise, the Chief of Army Staff kept reiterating the operation’s contribution to ensuring a secure environment for the completion and management of CPEC.

Secondly, the establishment of Apex committees at federal and provincial levels aimed at enhancing communication between civilian and military powers regarding security matters had the effect of further weakening the decision-making powers of the civilian government (Wolf, 2016 ). Handling powers to the apex committees has meant that important decisions regarding CPEC are now being made by the military-bureaucratic complex without any participation by the national or provincial assemblies (Wolf, 2016 ).

The military by invoking the rhetoric of security concerns has exonerated the state from making CPEC transparent and open to public debate. Lack of transparency, censorship, and arbitrary actions of the state are conveniently justified by labelling CPEC as a matter of state security (Ali, 2017 ; Bengali, 2015 ). If the situation persists, the planning and implementation of CPEC will become highly undemocratic, creating deeper fissures in the state space. However, this potential needs to be evaluated considering not just the politics of Pakistani state and society but also the nature of the investment regime of CPEC, the Chinese state, and international actors. Although, as mentioned earlier, the official rhetoric of China’s global investment policy is that of ‘non-interference’, the foreign policy seems to be evolving as China realizes the limitations of non-interference and the importance of protecting its economic interests (Mohan and Power, 2010). For example, the policy of blocking UN Security Council resolutions authorizing peacekeepers for Darfur has been lifted and China has put modest pressure on Khartoun to allow UN peacekeeping deployment (Hansen, 2008 ). Changes in the Chinese foreign policy are driven by the need to secure business interests and concerns about “a backlash and the potential damage to its strategic and economic relationships with the United States and Europe” (Ahlbrandt and Small, 2008 ). However, this emerging shift is to be understood cautiously as China has not experienced a fundamental change in values. Economic interests remain the top priority and, despite its increasing involvement with the US, China does not share their rhetoric of human rights and democracy (Ahlbrandt and Small, 2008 ).

Although China’s foreign policy has shown flexibility, it is important to note that Chinese presence in the Global South is driven by certain national and economic interests. China has shown willingness to forgo its non-interference stance if its economic and national interests necessitate it. In Pakistan, China showed this flexibility by pushing for the security establishment’s takeover of the security issue of CPEC. Involving the Pakistani military was also in China’s national interests. Fighting Uighur militants in North Waziristan was one of China’s crucial concerns that led to the Chinese state forming an alliance with Pakistani military. Historically as well, China has been more comfortable in negotiating with Pakistani military elite than its turbulent civilian counterpart (Small, 2015 ). Hence, Pakistani military elite’s power can only be expected to strengthen with this project unless there’s a serious international or local resistance to this trend.

The study aimed to understand how CPEC is interacting with the political economic structure of Pakistan. To this end, through a historical analysis, I deconstructed the Pakistani state and divided it into three major powers: the central state, the regional elites, and the military. Throughout the paper I used these categories to analyse the role of these powers in the planning and implementation process of CPEC and how these interactions are affecting the political landscape of Pakistan. Furthermore, I outlined the economic, national and strategic interests of China in Pakistan in order to analyse how China can be expected to intervene in this process.

After establishing a link between infrastructure and state, I argued that, since the very beginning, the project of infrastructure development in Pakistan has been deeply connected with the nation-building process. However, in its attempt to create a homogenous space, the Punjabi-dominated central state ended up creating fractured spaces that housed regionalist ambitions. CPEC, I argued, has initiated a new regime of regionalist politics by appropriating a disproportionate share of projects to Punjab and by keeping the planning of CPEC highly secretive and undemocratic.

Next, I analysed the role of military in Pakistani politics to understand its role in CPEC. Over the years, Pakistani military’s penetration into politics, society and economy has accrued the military establishment an important position in the state apparatus. CPEC has become another opportunity for the military to expand its influence in the decision-making process of the state. The Army has pushed for a formal role in the execution of CPEC projects. The process has been facilitated by Beijing’s security concerns and its own war against Uighur militants. The rhetoric of security has also been used to justify lack of transparency, censorship, and arbitrary actions of the state, making the process of planning and execution of CPEC highly undemocratic and unequal. Hence, I conclude that unless there is a serious international or local challenge to this trend, CPEC will only lead to an increase in the power of Pakistani military.

An analysis of the China’s foreign policy and national interests led to the conclusion that China has little interests or motivation to alter the power imbalances in Pakistan that are being exacerbated by CPEC. China is intent on preserving political stability in its bilateral relations. This inclination is reflected by a no strings-attached aid policy, reluctance to meddle in the internal issues, and respect for territorial sovereignty. The less apparent driver of China’s foreign policy is its national interests, which sometimes diverge from its principles of non-intervention. For example, China is bent upon preserving political stability and is completely intolerant to regionalist ambitions given the problem of regionalism within its borders. Given this concern, China is expected to not react well to the regional elites, making diverging claims to the central planning of CPEC.

Hence, I argue that, unless there is national or international backlash against the effects of CPEC on Pakistan’s political economic structure, CPEC can be expected to maintain the status quo of power structures of the Pakistani state—the fissures of which are going to only deepen further.

Data availability

The datasets generated during and/or analyzed during the current study are not publicly available to maintain the confidentiality of the interviewees but are available from the corresponding author on reasonable request.

Change history

07 august 2018.

The original article did not include an acknowledgements section. This has been corrected in both the HTML and PDF versions of this paper.

Pakistan Muslim League (N) is a center-right conservative party in Pakistan. PML-N is claimed to be solely representative of Punjabi interests.

Although there is no available data on the number of CPEC-related terrorist activities that have occurred in the past, there are some news reports that paint the bloody picture of CPEC. A report by a Pakistani, English language newspaper, ‘‘The Nation’’ claimed that different attacks have killed 44 Pakistani CPEC-related workers between 2014 and 2016. The targets were mainly men working on the construction of road in Balochistan (The Nation, 2016). In a report compiled by Asia Times in 2017, several incidents of different nature have been recorded occurring in Balochistan and Sindh that year. The report lists incidents targeting Frontier Corps personnel, police officers, CPEC laborers, and Chinese nationals working for different CPEC related projects (Shakil, 2017 ). Although the security situation surrounding CPEC is dire and demands attention, various acts of violence are also being used by various stakeholders to support the narrative that CPEC is under threat from external powers. Attacks and blasts in Balochistan have been openly labeled as ‘‘attempts to sabotage CPEC’’ by government officials (Shahid, 2016 ).

Turkistan Islamic Party is an extremist Islamist party founded by Uyghur nationalists in Western China. The separatist party aims to form an independent state for Uyghurs in Xinjiang called ‘‘East Turkestan’’ (Davis, 2010 ).

Uyghur Muslims are a religious and ethnic minority in Xinjiang province of China. Under the Qing state, Xinjiang region was never colonized and was strategically maintained as a frontier zone with its own governing structure (Davis, 2010 ). After the fall of Qing dynasty and the ensuing political turmoil, China was declared a multinational state in 1949. However, The Communist Party’s anti-rightist campaign aimed to root out “local nationalism.” The Cultural Revolution was an even stronger force against the ethnic minorities inhabiting in China. The Uyghur in Xinjiang were one of the victims of this state repression. Over the years, this ethnic minority developed into a separatist, militant entity (Davis, 2010 ). The Uyghur militants are believed to have transnational networks in Afghanistan, Pakistan, Tajikistan, Kyrgyzstan, and Kazakhstan (Davis, 2010 ; Small, 2015 ).

The civilians have become victims of War on Terror (Qazi, 2012 ). Apart from the budget restraint caused by massive military spending, civilians have also been direct targets of the war. CIA’s drone campaign inside Pakistan started in 2004. Although, the strikes target the al-Qaeda operatives, civilian deaths have been too colossal to go unnoticed. Both Pakistani and US public have criticized and opposed the drone strikes, seriously undermining the popularity of US-Pakistan relations. Although the military and civilian governments of Pakistan have openly condemned the strikes, they have supported the strikes behind the scenes. However, given the growing unpopularity, the government has recently tried to push for greater role in decision-making over the strikes (Qazi, 2012 ). Yet, despite growing criticism against drone warfare, it remains a vital component of US’ war against terrorism (Williams, 2017). By October 2015, number of drone strikes sanctioned by the Obama administration had risen up to 353 (compared to 48 drone strikes under President Bush) (Williams, 2017).

Goswami argued that part from being the symbolic representation of socioeconomic progress giving legitimacy to the colonial state; infrastructure also became the center of initiating new forms of subjectivity (Anwar, 2015 , p. 31). Infrastructure would irreversibly make the populace subjects of the state and parcel out sets of rights and duties to them. Infrastructure, in other words, would discipline and civilize the populace. Infrastructure also became a locus of patron-client relationship; of distributing out benefits to the loyal supporters, creating preferred subjects of the state (Anwar 2015 , p. 31).

One Unit was an administrative reform enacted in West Pakistan in 1954 that merged all the provinces into a single structure. Spearheaded by the bureaucratic-military elite, the reform was partly passed to suppress regionalist politics that were recently gaining momentum.

The fourth president of Pakistan from 1971 to 1973.

The term was originally coined by Tan Tai Yong in his book “The Garrison State: Military, Government and Society in Colonial Punjab, 1849–1947” to describe the colonial state structure in Punjab. However, it has been later used by authors like Ishtiaq Ahmed to describe the Pakistani state.

The Two-Nation Theory was an ideological tool used to mobilize Muslims for the Pakistan Movement positing that religion is primary identity of the South Asian Muslims and rather than language or ethnicity, their Islamic identity is the unifying denominator. Implicitly and extremely effectively, the ideology projected Hindus and Muslims of South Asia as being so different that they could not live together in one nation, even though the history of South Asia is precisely that of coexistence of Hindus and Muslims.

Pakistan’s counter-terrorism policy adopted in 2014

Frontier Corps is a security force part of the paramilitary forces of Pakistan stationed in Baluchistan and KPK. Although the force falls under the jurisdiction of the Interior Ministry, it is headed by a major-general rank Pakistan army officer.

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Acknowledgements

I would like to thank Dr. Burak Gürel for his supervision and support throughout this research. I would also like to acknowledge Dr. Erdem Yörük and Mustafa Yağcı for their comments on the thesis from which this paper was derived. Mr. Muhammad Aqeel Awan’s help in formulating this paper was also invaluable. I also feel deeply indebted to the Graduate School of Social Sciences and Humanities of Koç University for providing me with the opportunity and resources for conducting this research.

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Hameed, M. The politics of the China―Pakistan economic corridor. Palgrave Commun 4 , 64 (2018). https://doi.org/10.1057/s41599-018-0115-7

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• Chapter 2. Religion, Law, and Society
• Chapter 3. Attitudes Toward the United States
• Chapter 4. Attitudes Toward President Barack Obama
• Chapter 5. Relations with India
• Chapter 6. Ratings of Leaders and Institutions
• Chapter 7. Views of National Conditions
• Chapter 8. Pakistanis View Their Lives
• Survey Methods

Pakistanis see their country in crisis. They give their national government lower ratings than at any time in this decade, and almost no one is satisfied with national conditions. Crime and terrorism are seen as major problems by virtually everyone. And huge percentages of Pakistanis also see their country struggling mightily with corruption and a deteriorating economy.

A long-standing concern about Islamic extremism has grown even greater over the past year. No fewer than 69% of the Pakistanis questioned worry that extremists could take control of the country. At the same time, indifference and mixed opinions about both al Qaeda and the Taliban have given way to a strong condemnation of both groups. In 2008, just 33% held a negative view of the Taliban; today, 70% rate it unfavorably. Similarly, the percentage of Pakistanis with an unfavorable opinion of al Qaeda has jumped from 34% to 61% in the last year.

However, growing concern about Islamic extremism has not resulted in an improved view of the United States. Opinions of America and its people remain extremely negative. Barack Obama’s global popularity is not evident in Pakistan, and America’s image remains as tarnished in that country as it was in the Bush years. Only 22% of Pakistanis think the U.S. takes their interests into account when making foreign policy decisions, essentially unchanged from 21% since 2007. Fully 64% of the public regards the U.S. as an enemy, while only 9% describe it as a partner.

Further, many express serious concerns about the U.S.-led effort to combat terrorism, both globally and in Pakistan specifically. In particular, many who are aware of the drone strikes targeting extremist leaders believe these strikes are causing too many civilian deaths and are being carried out by the U.S. without the consent of the Pakistani government.

However, for all the anti-American sentiment, the new survey by the Pew Research Center’s Global Attitudes Project also finds an openness to improving relations with the U.S. and considerable support for the idea of working with it to combat terrorism. By a margin of 53% to 29% Pakistanis say it is important that relations between the two countries improve.

Moreover, many endorse U.S. assistance for the Pakistani government in its fight with extremist groups.Nearly three-fourths of those interviewed (72%) would support U.S. financial and humanitarian aid to areas where extremist groups operate. As many as 63% back the idea of the U.S. providing intelligence and logistical support to Pakistani troops who are combating these groups. And after being asked about these forms of cooperation between Pakistan and the U.S., nearly half (47%) then say they would favor U.S. missile strikes against extremist leaders.

It is not surprising that American cooperation with the Pakistani military is popular, given the confidence that Pakistanis have in it. As many as 86% say the military is having a good influence on the country, which is far greater than the number who feel that way about the police (39%), courts (58%), and even religious leaders (64%). Just 36% say the Directorate for Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI) is having a good impact, although many respondents (41%) do not offer an opinion.

These are the latest findings from the 2009 Pew Global Attitudes survey of Pakistan. Face-to-face interviews were conducted with 1,254 adults in Pakistan between May 22 and June 9, 2009. The sample, which is disproportionately urban, includes Punjab, Sindh, Baluchistan, and the North West Frontier Province (NWFP). However, portions of Baluchistan and the NWFP are not included because of instability. The Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA) were not surveyed. The area covered by the sample represents approximately 90% of the adult population. 1 (Pakistan was surveyed as part of the Spring 2009 Pew Global Attitudes Survey, which included 24 nations and the Palestinian territories. For more findings from this survey, see Confidence in Obama lifts U.S. Image around the World; Most Muslim Publics Not So Easily Moved , released July 23, 2009).

Concerns About India

Long-running concerns about India are also reflected in the poll. The dispute between Pakistan and India over Kashmir is cited as a major problem facing the country by no fewer than 88%. And growing worries about extremism notwithstanding, more Pakistanis judge India as a very serious threat to the nation (69%) than regard the Taliban (57%) or al Qaeda (41%) as very serious threats. Most Pakistanis see the U.S. as on the wrong side of this issue: by a margin of 54% to 4% the U.S. is seen as favoring India over Pakistan.

While fears about India persist, Pakistanis express overwhelmingly positive opinions about another Asian giant — 84% have a favorable view of China and 80% consider China a partner to their country.

Support for Severe Laws

One of the ironies in the survey is the extent to which Pakistanis embrace some of the severe laws associated with the Taliban and al Qaeda, even as they reject Islamic extremism and these extremist groups. The new poll finds broad support for harsh punishments: 78% favor death for those who leave Islam; 80% favor whippings and cutting off hands for crimes like theft and robbery; and 83% favor stoning adulterers.

Pakistani public opinion departs significantly from the Taliban on the issues of girls’ education and extremist violence. As many as 87% of Pakistanis believe it is equally important for boys and girls to be educated. The poll also finds that support for suicide bombing that targets civilians in defense of Islam remains very low. Only 5% of Pakistani Muslims believe these kinds of attacks can often or sometimes be justified; as recently as 2004 roughly four-in-ten (41%) held this view. Fully 87% now say such attacks can never be justified — the highest percentage among the Muslim publics included in the 2009 survey.

Breaking Down Views Toward the Taliban and Al Qaeda

Analysis of the survey data finds a number of important patterns regarding views of the Taliban and al Qaeda. First, both groups are unpopular across the board. Among all the major subgroups within Pakistani society analyzed in the study, negative views of the Taliban and al Qaeda outweigh positive views.

Second, support for both groups is low even among those who agree with some of the severe punishments endorsed by the Taliban and al Qaeda, such as stoning adulterers, cutting off the hands of thieves, and executing people who leave Islam. Still, those who disagree with these harsh measures are somewhat more likely to express an unfavorable view of both groups. For instance, among Pakistanis who support the death penalty for people who leave Islam, 69% have a negative view of the Taliban, while 77% of those who oppose the death penalty in such cases give the Taliban a negative rating.

Third, education plays a role in views about extremism. Pakistanis with higher levels of education are consistently more likely to reject the Taliban and al Qaeda.

Fourth, the Taliban and al Qaeda tend to be unpopular across regions, including the NWFP, where government forces are currently fighting extremist groups. However, Sindh stands out as the region with the most negative views. For example, 82% in Sindh have a negative opinion of the Taliban, compared with 75% in the NWFP and 67% in Punjab. More than half in Baluchistan do not offer opinions about the Taliban or al Qaeda.

Fifth, and perhaps unsurprisingly, views about the Taliban are linked to the extent to which people believe the country is threatened by extremist groups. Analysis of the data shows that people who think extremist groups may be able to seize control of the country are more likely to voice negative views about the Taliban, which has been engaged in armed-conflict with the Pakistani military.

Also of Note:

• The nation-state is of great significance to Pakistanis, and despite important ethnic and regional differences, national identity is strong throughout the country. Overall, 89% say they think of themselves first as Pakistani, rather than as a member of their ethnic group.
• Pakistani President Asif Ali Zardari’s ratings have plummeted: Last year, 64% had a favorable opinion of him; now just 32% hold this view.
• Zardari is much less popular than the other public figures tested: opposition leader Nawaz Sharif (79% favorable), Prime Minister Yousaf Raza Gilani (67%) and Chief Justice Iftikhar Muhammad Chaudhry (61%).
• About seven-in-ten (72%) want the U.S. and NATO to remove their military troops from Afghanistan as soon as possible. Only 16% approve of Obama’s decision to send more troops to Afghanistan.
• In 2008, 53% said the economy would improve in the next 12 months. This year, only 23% believe the economy will get better.
• The Pakistani media receives very high ratings — 77% say it is having a good influence on the country.
• While views about national conditions are overwhelmingly negative, most Pakistanis are upbeat about their personal lives — 74% say they are very or somewhat satisfied with their overall lives, and most are satisfied with their family lives and incomes. Nonetheless, compared with other nations, levels of personal satisfaction in Pakistan are relatively low.
• For more details, see Survey Methods. ↩

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Political Science Scope in Pakistan

Political Science scope in Pakistan is on the rise. It is one of the top degrees that students pursue after completion of 12 years of education in Pakistan. Students passing FA do not really know what are the best careers. After FA what can I do in Pakistan? Pursuing a degree in Political Science is one of the best fields in Arts after 12th class in Pakistan today.

Basically, political science is the study of politics in society. In fact, political science includes the study of political behavior, systems, and the structure of politics in societies, countries, and organizations. Political science is not limited to any country or organization. In fact it is the study of politics across different universe and societies. It is a very broad field of study.

What are the benefits of pursuing a degree in political sciences, and you can specialize in different fields of study. You can become a specialist in Constitution policymaking. You can also become a specialist in foreign policy. Furthermore, you have a variety of different subjects to choose from.

BS Political Science Scope in Pakistan

Majority of universities and colleges in Pakistan offer a 4-year degree program in Political Science. Previously, you could pursue a 2-year degree program. Now the universities and colleges are offering a 4-year degree program in Political Science. You can major in other subjects as well, along with Political Science.

BS Political Science scope in Pakistan is also on the high. After completing your bachelors in political science, you can pursue jobs in the private and public sector. You can also pursue advanced degree in this subject.

The objective of political science is to define the best policies and governance for a country. It entails understanding how to work with bordering nations. Majority of the leaders in many countries have studied political science. Political science teaches young leaders about the study of social and political systems. They get a comprehensive understanding of how systems and policies govern people. We also learn how  to make policies and how to implement them at the local, state, provincial, national, and even international levels.

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Scope of Political Science in Pakistan

Students that tend to enjoy history will also enjoy the subject of political science. In fact, history and political science are very similar. Many topics like Muslim Political Thought are common in both fields of study. Scope of History in Pakistan after graduation is also increasing. Historians and history experts are also in demand in Pakistan.

Political science is a very broad study of historical and modern political systems. The scope of political science in Pakistan is also important due to the political situation Pakistan is in.

While pursuing a degree in political science, you get to learn about foreign policy, public administration and international relations.

Political science is certainly a social science field of study. Predominantly, it is also the study of government systems. These government systems governed and defined world politics.

Like many other subjects like mathematics and physics, political science also plays a very important part in our daily lives. Political decisions are made at every level. Governments have different political agendas. Certain governments focus on environmental factors. Alternatively, other governments tend to focus on taxes. Other governments are more concerned about international remittances. Irrespective of the government policies, each policy has a trickling effect. Every individual is affected by the political system.

In Pakistan, political science is a very important field. In fact, it is taught in many of the colleges and universities all across Pakistan. Students enjoy enrolling in political science programs. Political science degree in Pakistan also discusses Islamic Revolution and prior governments responsible for governing Pakistan in different eras.

MA Political Science Scope in Pakistan

Master’s degree in political science has courses regarding the philosophical, historical and analytical systems of governments and local parties in Pakistan. M Phil degree in political science focuses on the Constitution level policies and political dominance in the provinces. MA Political Science scope in Pakistan is also on the rise. More students tend to enroll in master level programs after completing the bachelors program.

Students that successfully enroll and complete their master’s degree in political science are also known as political scientists. Political scientists have a huge role in the private and public sector.

One of the main advantages of political science is that you’re not limited to any country. Even apply for jobs at United Nations and other international agencies. You’re responsible to have built new policies that help societies and countries.

Many of the students that graduate with a degree in political science also start working as researchers. We work with grants to better understand the political systems at different levels of society. Medical scientists can also focus on political behavior, local decision-making and public policies. In fact, many of the projects focus on improving the social life in different regions. This encompasses the improvement of political stability. In fact, psychologist pay in Pakistan and the salary of a Political Science Researcher are high for such projects.

Political scientists are great researchers since they need to work extensively gathering data and analyzing inputs. They conduct research on upright variety of people policies and structures. Much of the research resources on the local level.

Top Political Science Jobs in Pakistan

The following are the main political science jobs in Pakistan:

Local Area Political Jobs. Students that pursue a degree in political science also are interested in joining local politics. They tend to start the readers as counselors and then move themselves up to ministers and lyrical political leaders. Many of the students that have a degree in clinical signs and to also work in the law and justice system of Pakistan.

Policy Making Jobs in Government . Like many other countries, action also needs its good share of political policymakers. This honesty makers working different government organizations to further help law and order situation entry policies that help build stability in the society.

Jobs in Embassies . Embassies also higher political science majors. Tend to work in the international department of embassies. This department responsible to lies over local governments to promote certain goals and agendas.

Civil Service Jobs in Pakistan . Another important field in which students pursue is a civil service.

Jobs for political science graduates in Pakistan

Below are the most common jobs for political science graduates in Pakistan:

Researcher . Majority of graduate students tend to become researchers. Several private, Non Profit Organizations and Non Government Organizations tend to hire researchers for different social projects. These organizations have funds to complete a particular task.

Journalist . In Pakistan, there are many number of television channels. There is a great need for quality political journalists.

Which University is best for Political Science in Pakistan?

Quaid-e-Azam University in Islamabad is the best university for political science in Pakistan. This university has the top

9 thoughts on “ Political Science Scope in Pakistan ”

please help me in aducation felid

Please set up appointment and we would love to help you out

I cant weathee i shiud chose political science or not it is lot confusing

Why confusion though? It is a great subject and career path.

I can try to get job in politics and any other fields am student of political science am fresher

I’m confused between IR and Public Administration like which program to choose for BS.

Both are very similar. Not much of a difference from a job perspective.

Hi, i graduated from Lahore College for Woman University last year in Political Science. I have completed 4years of my BS(Hons) and now i am looking for some main stream jobs. I have also completed my graphic designing course from the same institute and have 1.5 year experience in teaching. I want to join some professional field related to my subject that will allow me to grow further. Please help me out as where to apply or when to apply and how to apply. It would be a great favour if i get a good piece of advice. Thank you.

The article gives so many options. You need to focus on online portals.

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April 29, 2024

This article has been reviewed according to Science X's editorial process and policies . Editors have highlighted the following attributes while ensuring the content's credibility:

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It's all in the smile: New research finds politicians can influence voters with facial expressions

by Aston University

New research led by Aston University's Dr. Carl Senior has found that the type of smile used by a political leader can influence voters to support them and their political agenda. The research is published in the journal PLOS ONE .

There are many different types of smile, and the researchers, including Professor Patrick Stewart from the University of Arkansas, Professor Erik Bucy from Texas Tech University and Professor Nick Lee from Warwick Business School at the University of Warwick, UK, focused on two in particular—the "reward" smile and the "affiliative" smile. They used videos from political leaders from the 2019 UK general election , which was won by the Conservative party, then led by Boris Johnson. The Labour party, then led by Jeremy Corbyn, came second. Jo Swinson was the leader of the third-placed Liberal Democrat party.

The "reward" smile is the genuine ("felt") smile, associated with joy and enthusiasm. It is the smile most likely to be contagious with onlookers, and has been linked to higher levels of trust. The "affiliative" smile, meanwhile, communicates approachability, acknowledgement, and appeasement. It is associated with an affinity towards the onlooker and is thought to be important for developing cooperative relationships.

The researchers selected volunteers professing to be supporters of each of the three main parties and showed them the same video footage of the three leaders—Johnson, Corbyn and Swinson—before and after the 2019 election. The team assessed the emotional response to the different smiles for the candidates, whether positive (happiness and affinity) or negative (anger and distress).

When shown footage of election winner Johnson's affiliative smile after the election, people in all groups showed an increase in happiness and affinity compared to when they were shown the footage before the election. Supporters of the losing parties showed an overall decrease in the negative effect. It was only this affiliative smile that was found to act as a mechanism to align voter feelings and behavior to the dominant (winning) political message.

The reward smile did not have the same effect. Supporters of Labour showed an increased level of anger and distress when viewing Johnson's reward smile after the election compared to before it.

The effects for Corbyn and Swinson were less marked, showing that they failed to significantly change voters' responses to them. Their appeal was somewhat fixed and failed to match Johnson's charm. Johnson tapped into the voters' feeling of annoyance about the slow Brexit process with his "Get Brexit done" slogan, while Corbyn's position was ambiguous. Swinson's party was pro-Europe but lacked Johnson's performative abilities to link a strong message to his nonverbal communication.

Previous work by various researchers has shown that observers judge leadership traits and behavior, or a lack thereof, from non-verbal cues such as facial expressions. However, until now there has been little research outside the US on the effect of facial displays on voter behavior.

Dr. Senior said, "The human smile can convey both rewarding and affiliative social intent and thus has significant utility in politics, where the ability to bond with and reassure voters is vital to electoral success. We are in an unprecedented year as there are numerous elections scheduled to take place across several continents. The outcome of these campaigns will have a significant impact on millions of people across vast geopolitical regions. Given that almost all politicians involved in these election campaigns will make full use of broadcast media to reach voters, it is crucial to understand the effectiveness of their non-verbal displays in shifting voting preference."

Professor Lee added, "The individual appeal of party leaders has become increasingly influential. A smile can't win an election on its own. But Johnson's personal appeal transcended party policies, connecting with people who hadn't planned to vote for him. The upside for today's politicians is that charisma is not an innate quality. It can be taught. By paying attention to their facial behavior and ensuring they display the right smile in the right context, they can still leverage the power of emotional responses. It is something leaders of all organizations can learn."

The researchers say more work is required to understand how smiles work together with other verbal and nonverbal displays to generate affinity in voters and convey social dominance to other leaders.

Journal information: PLoS ONE

Provided by Aston University

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• School Guide
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Wars and Peace with Pakistan| Class 12 Political Science

Class 12 Political Science Chapter 4 Wars and Peace with Pakistan : The topic deals with the history of wars and peace between India and Pakistan. It begins by discussing the partition of British India in 1947 and the subsequent creation of the dominions of India and Pakistan. The chapter then goes on to discuss the various conflicts that have taken place between the two countries since independence, including the Indo-Pakistani War of 1947, the Indo-Pakistani War of 1965, the Indo-Pakistani War of 1971, and the Kargil War of 1999.

In this article, we will look into the topic ‘Wars and Peace with Pakistan’ in detail. It is an important topic in Political Science Class 12. Students can go through this article to get comprehensive notes on the topic Class 12 Political Science Chapter 4 Wars and Peace with Pakistan .

Conflict Between India and Pakistan: A Historical Overview

The Kashmir conflict between India and Pakistan began after the Partition over the dispute on Kashmir. A proxy war broke out between the two armies in 1947, but it did not escalate into a full war. The issue was later referred to the UN, and Pakistan became a significant factor in India’s relations with the US and China. Despite the conflict, both governments cooperated to restore women abducted during Partition to their original families.

The India-Pakistan Indus Waters Treaty was signed in 1960, which has been effective. In 1965, armed conflict escalated, with Pakistan launching attacks in Gujarat and Jammu and Kashmir. The conflict ended with UN intervention, and the Tashkent Agreement was signed in 1966 between Indian Prime Minister Lal Bahadur Shastri and Pakistan’s General Ayub Khan. The 1965 war added to India’s already difficult economic situation.

Wars and Peace with Pakistan

Since their independence from Great Britain in 1947, India and Pakistan have fought four wars and a number of smaller conflicts. The main cause of conflict has been the disputed territory of Kashmir, which both countries claim. The conflict has been further complicated by the presence of nuclear weapons on both sides.

The first war between India and Pakistan took place in 1947, shortly after independence. The war was inconclusive, and the Kashmir issue remained unresolved. The second war took place in 1965, and again ended in a stalemate. The third war, in 1971, resulted in the creation of Bangladesh, which was formerly East Pakistan. The fourth war, in 1999, was a limited conflict that took place in the Kargil region of Kashmir.

In recent years, there have been a number of ceasefire agreements between India and Pakistan, but the conflict remains unresolved. Both countries continue to build up their military forces, and there is a constant risk of renewed conflict.

The conflict between India and Pakistan is a complex one, with roots in history, religion, and culture. It is a conflict that has had a devastating impact on the people of both countries, and it is a conflict that is likely to continue for many years to come.

Bangladesh War, 1971

The Bangladesh Liberation War of 1971 was a bloody event that shaped the mindset of Bangladeshi people and forged their contemporary constitution. The war was fought for independence, but it was also triggered by religion. The Pakistani government wanted to turn Bangladeshis into exemplary Muslims by alienating them from their Hindu background.

The war began on December 7, 1970, when the Awami League won a substantial victory in Pakistan’s elections. The League was a political party led by Sheikh Mujibur Rahman, who had campaigned for autonomy for East Pakistan. The Pakistani army committed war crimes that reached the level of genocide. The fighting lasted for only two weeks before a Pakistani surrender.

The war resulted in the creation of the People’s Republic of Bangladesh. The war also had a significant impact on India, as it helped to define India’s role in foreign politics. The war also increased competition between India and Pakistan, forcing the United States to maintain its focus on regional developments.

The Bangladesh Liberation War is a significant event in South Asian history. It is a reminder of the importance of self-determination and the dangers of religious extremism. The war is also proof to the resilience of the Bangladeshi people.

In conclusion, the relationship between India and Pakistan has been complex and tumultuous since their independence in 1947. The two countries have fought four wars, and there have been numerous other conflicts and disputes. The most contentious issue between the two countries is the Kashmir region, which both claim as their own. Other factors that have contributed to the tension between the two countries include cross-border terrorism, trade and commerce, and the sharing of river waters.

People Also View:

• Comparative Study between India, China, and Pakistan
• Radcliffe Line (Boundary between India and Pakistan): History, Facts
• Appraisal of Development Strategies of India, China, and Pakistan

Wars and Peace with Pakistan- FAQs

What is the focus of chapter 4 of class 12 political science.

The chapter focuses on India’s relationship with Pakistan, including conflicts, peace efforts, and implications for regional stability.

How many wars have India and Pakistan fought since independence?

India and Pakistan have fought three major wars in 1947-48, 1965, and 1971, along with several smaller conflicts and skirmishes.

What are the major sources of conflict between India and Pakistan?

Sources include territorial disputes over Kashmir, cross-border terrorism, and competing regional influence.

How have India and Pakistan engaged in peace efforts?

Both countries have engaged in bilateral dialogues, peace initiatives, and confidence-building measures to resolve disputes and promote peace.

What role does external mediation play in India-Pakistan relations?

External actors, including the United States, China, and other international stakeholders, often facilitate peace talks and encourage de-escalation between India and Pakistan.

How do India and Pakistan manage their bilateral relations during periods of tension?

Both countries employ diplomatic channels, crisis management mechanisms, and military deterrence to manage tensions and prevent escalation.

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