what is democratic government essay

What Is Democracy? Definition and Examples

• B.S., Texas A&M University

A democracy is a form of government that empowers the people to exercise political control, limits the power of the head of state, provides for the separation of powers between governmental entities, and ensures the protection of natural rights and civil liberties . In practice, democracy takes many different forms. Along with the two most common types of democracies—direct and representative—variants such as participatory, liberal, parliamentary, pluralist, constitutional, and socialist democracies can be found in use today.

Key Takeaways: Democracy

• Democracy, literally meaning “rule by the people,” empowers individuals to exercise political control over the form and functions of their government.
• While democracies come in several forms, they all feature competitive elections, freedom of expression , and protection of individual civil liberties and human rights.
• In most democracies, the needs and wishes of the people are represented by elected lawmakers who are charged with writing and voting on laws and setting policy.
• When creating laws and policies, the elected representatives in a democracy strive to balance conflicting demands and obligations to maximize freedom and protect individual rights.

Despite the prominence in the headlines of non-democratic, authoritarian states like China, Russia, North Korea, and Iran, democracy remains the world’s most commonly practiced form of government. In 2018, for example, a total of 96 out of 167 countries (57%) with populations of at least 500,000 were democracies of some type. Statics show that the percentage of democracies among the world’s governments has been increasing since the mid-1970s, currently standing just short of its post- World War II high of 58% in 2016.

Democracy Definition

Meaning “rule by the people,” democracy is a system of government that not only allows but requires the participation of the people in the political process to function properly. U.S. President Abraham Lincoln , in his famed 1863 Gettysburg Address may have best-defined democracy as a “…government of the people, by the people, for the people…”

Semantically, the term democracy comes from the Greek words for “people” (dēmos) and “rule” (karatos). However, achieving and preserving a government by the people—a “popular” government—is far more complicated than the concept’s semantic simplicity might imply. In creating the legal framework under which the democracy will function, typically a constitution, several crucial political and practical questions must be answered.

Is “rule by the people” even appropriate for the given state? Do the inherent freedoms of a democracy justify dealing with its complex bureaucracy and electoral processes, or would the streamlined predictability of a monarchy , for example, be preferable?

Assuming a preference for democracy, which residents of the country, state, or town should enjoy the political status of full citizenship? Simply stated, who are the “people” in the “government by the people” equation? In the United States, for example, the constitutionally established doctrine of birthright citizenship provides that any person born on U.S. soil automatically becomes a U.S. citizen. Other democracies are more restrictive in bestowing full citizenship.

Which people within the democracy should be empowered to participate in it? Assuming that only adults are allowed to fully participate in the political process, should all adults be included? For example, until the enactment of the 19th Amendment in 1920, women in the United States were not allowed to vote in national elections. A democracy that excludes too many of the governed from taking part in what is supposed to be their government runs the risk of becoming an aristocracy—government by a small, privileged ruling class—or an oligarchy —government by an elite, typically wealthy, few.

If, as one of the foundational principles of democracy holds, the majority rules, what will a “proper” majority be? A majority of all citizens or a majority of citizens who vote only? When issues, as they inevitably will, divide the people, should the wishes of the majority always prevail, or should, as in the case of the American Civil Rights Movement , minorities be empowered to overcome majority rule? Most importantly, what legal or legislative mechanisms should be created to prevent the democracy from becoming a victim of what one of America’s Founding Fathers , James Madison , called “the tyranny of the majority?”

Finally, how likely is it that a majority of the people will continue to believe that democracy is the best form of government for them? For a democracy to survive it must retain the substantial support of both the people and the leaders they choose. History has shown that democracy is a particularly fragile institution. In fact, of the 120 new democracies that have emerged around the world since 1960, nearly half have resulted in failed states or have been replaced by other, typically more authoritarian forms of government. It is therefore essential that democracies be designed to respond quickly and appropriately to the internal and external factors that will inevitably threaten them.

Democratic Principles

While their opinions vary, a consensus of political scientists agree that most democracies are based on six foundational elements:

• Popular sovereignty: The principle that the government is created and maintained by the consent of the people through their elected representatives.
• An Electoral System: Since according to the principle of popular sovereignty, the people are the source of all political power, a clearly defined system of conducting free and fair elections is essential.
• Public Participation: Democracies rarely survive without the active participation of the people. Health democracies enable and encourage the people to take part in their political and civic processes. 
• Separation of Powers: Based on a suspicion of power concentrated in a single individual—like a king—or group, the constitutions of most democracies provide that political powers be separated and shared among the various governmental entities.
• Human Rights: Along with their constitutionally enumerated rights freedoms, democracies protect the human rights of all citizens. In this context, human rights are those rights considered inherent to all human beings, regardless of nationality, sex, national or ethnic origin, color, religion, language, or any other considerations.
• A Rule of Law: Also called due process of law , the rule of law is the principle that all citizens are accountable to laws that are publicly created and equitably enforced in a manner consistent with human rights by an independent judicial system.

Types of Democracy

Throughout history, more types of democracy have been identified than there are countries in the world. According to social and political philosopher Jean-Paul Gagnon, more than 2,234 adjectives have been used to describe democracy. While many scholars refer to direct and representative as the most common of these, several other types of democracies can be found around the world today. While direct democracy is unique, most other recognized types of democracy are variants of representative democracy. These various types of democracy are generally descriptive of the particular values emphasized by the representative democracies that employ them.

Originated in Ancient Greece during the 5th century BCE, direct democracy , sometimes called “pure democracy,” is considered the oldest non-authoritarian form of government. In a direct democracy, all laws and public policy decisions are made directly by a majority vote of the people, rather than by the votes of their elected representatives.

Functionally possible only in small states, Switzerland is the only example of a direct democracy applied on a national level today. While Switzerland is no longer a true direct democracy, any law passed by the popularly elected national parliament can be vetoed by a direct vote of the public. Citizens can also change the constitution through direct votes on amendments. In the United States, examples of direct democracy can be found in state-level recall elections and lawmaking ballot initiatives .

Representative

Also called indirect democracy, representative democracy is a system of government in which all eligible citizens elect officials to pass laws and formulate public policy on their behalf. These elected officials are expected to represent the needs and viewpoints of the people in deciding the best course of action for the nation, state, or other jurisdiction as a whole.

As the most commonly found type of democracy in use today, almost 60% of all countries employ some form of representative democracy including the United States, the United Kingdom, and France.

Participatory

In a participatory democracy, the people vote directly on policy while their elected representatives are responsible for implementing those policies. Participatory democracies rely on the citizens in setting the direction of the state and the operation of its political systems. While the two forms of government share similar ideals, participatory democracies tend to encourage a higher, more direct form of citizen participation than traditional representative democracies.

While there are no countries specifically classified as participatory democracies, most representative democracies employ citizen participation as a tool for social and political reform. In the United States, for example, so-called “grassroots” citizen participation causes such as the Civil Rights Movement of the 1960s have led elected officials to enact laws implementing sweeping social, legal, and political policy changes.

Liberal democracy is loosely defined as a form of representative democracy that emphasizes the principles of classical liberalism —an ideology advocating the protection of individual civil liberties and economic freedom by limiting the power of the government. Liberal democracies employ a constitution, either statutorily codified, as in the United States or uncodified, as in the United Kingdom, to define the powers of the government, provide for a separation of those powers, and enshrine the social contract .

Liberal democracies may take the form of a constitutional republic , like the United States, or a constitutional monarchy , such as the United Kingdom, Canada, and Australia.

Parliamentary

In a parliamentary democracy, the people directly elect representatives to a legislative parliament . Similar to the U.S. Congress , the parliament directly represents the people in making necessary laws and policy decisions for the country.

In parliamentary democracies such as the United Kingdom, Canada, and Japan, the head of government is a prime minister, who is first elected to parliament by the people, then elected prime minister by a vote of the parliament. However, the prime minister remains a member of the parliament and thus plays an active role in the legislative process of creating and passing laws. Parliamentary democracies are typically a feature of a constitutional monarch, a system of government in which the head of state is a queen or king whose power is limited by a constitution.

In a pluralist democracy, no single group dominates politics. Instead, organized groups within the people compete to influence public policy. In political science, the term pluralism expresses the ideology that influence should be spread among different interest groups, rather than held by a single elite group as in an aristocracy. Compared to participatory democracies, in which individuals take part in influencing political decisions, in a pluralist democracy, individuals work through groups formed around common causes hoping to win the support of elected leaders.

In this context, the pluralist democracy assumes that the government and the society as a whole benefit from a diversity of viewpoints. Examples of pluralist democracy can be seen in the impact special interest groups, such as the National Organization for Women , have had on American politics.

Constitutional

While the exact definition continues to be debated by political scientists, constitutional democracy is generally defined as a system of government based on popular sovereignty and a rule of law in which the structures, powers, and limits of government are established by a constitution. Constitutions are intended to restrict the power of the government, typically by separating those powers between the various branches of government, as in the United States’ constitution’s system of federalism . In a constitutional democracy, the constitution is considered to be the “ supreme law of the land .”

Democratic socialism is broadly defined as a system of government based on a socialist economy , in which most property and means of production are collectively, rather than individually, controlled by a constitutionally established political hierarchy—the government. Social democracy embraces government regulation of business and industry as a means of furthering economic growth while preventing income inequality .

While there are no purely socialist governments in the world today, elements of democratic socialism can be seen in Sweden’s provision of free universal health care, education, and sweeping social welfare programs. 

Is America a Democracy

While the word “democracy” does not appear in the United States Constitution, the document provides the basic elements of representative democracy: an electoral system based on majority rule, separation of powers, and a dependence on a rule of law. Also, America’s Founding Fathers used the word often when debating the form and function of the Constitution.  

However, a long-running debate over whether the United States is a democracy or a republic continues today. According to a growing number of political scientists and constitutional scholars, it is both—a “democratic republic.”

Similar to democracy, a republic is a form of government in which the country is governed by the elected representatives of the people. However, since the people do not govern the state themselves, but do so through their representatives, a republic is distinguished from direct democracy.

Professor Eugene Volokh of the UCLA School of Law argues that the governments of democratic republics embrace the principles shared by both republics and democracies. To illustrate his point, Volokh notes that in the United States, many decisions on local and state levels are made by the people through the process of direct democracy, while as in a republic, most decisions at the national level are made by democratically elected representatives.

Brief History

Archeological evidence suggests that disorganized practices at least resembling democracy existed in some parts of the world during prehistoric times, However, the concept of democracy as a form of populist civic engagement emerged during the 5th century BCE in the form of the political system used in some of the city-states of Ancient Greece , most notably Athens . At that time, and for the next several centuries, tribes or city-states remained small enough that if democracy was practiced at all, it took the form of direct democracy. As city-states grew into larger, more heavily populated sovereign nation-states or countries, direct democracy became unwieldy and slowly gave way to representative democracy. This massive change necessitated an entirely new set of political institutions such as legislatures, parliaments, and political parties all designed according to the size and cultural character of the city or country to be governed.

Until the 17th century, most legislatures consisted only of the entire body of citizens, as in Greece, or representatives selected from among a tiny oligarchy or an elite hereditary aristocracy. This began to change during the English Civil Wars from 1642 to 1651 when members of the radical Puritan reformation movement demanded expanded representation in Parliament and the universal right to vote for all male citizens. By the middle 1700s, as the power of the British Parliament grew, the first political parties—the Whigs and Tories—emerged. It soon became obvious that laws could not be passed or taxes levied without the support of the Whig or Tory party representatives in Parliament.

While the developments in the British Parliament showed the feasibility of a representative form of government, the first truly representative democracies emerged during the 1780s in the British colonies of North America and took its modern form with the formal adoption of the Constitution of the United States of America on March 4, 1789.

Sources and Further Reference

• Desilver, Drew. “Despite global concerns about democracy, more than half of countries are democratic.” Pew Research Center , May 14, 2019, https://www.pewresearch.org/fact-tank/2019/05/14/more-than-half-of-countries-are-democratic/.
• Kapstein, Ethan B., and Converse, Nathan. “The Fate of Young Democracies.” Cambridge University Press, 2008, ISBN 9780511817809.
• Diamond, Larry. “Democracy in Decline?” Johns Hopkins University Press, October 1, 2015, ISBN-10 1421418185.
• Gagnon, Jean-Paul. “2,234 Descriptions of Democracy: An Update to Democracy's Ontological Pluralism.” Democratic Theory, vol. 5, no. 1, 2018.
• Volokh, Eugene. “Is the United States of America a republic or a democracy?” The Washington Post , May 13, 2015, https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/volokh-conspiracy/wp/2015/05/13/is-the-united-states-of-america-a-republic-or-a-democracy/. 
• Republic vs. Democracy: What Is the Difference?
• Direct Democracy: Definition, Examples, Pros and Cons
• Representative Democracy: Definition, Pros, and Cons
• Reasons to Keep the Electoral College
• What Is a Constitutional Monarchy? Definition and Examples
• Major Parliamentary Governments and How They Work
• Key Election Terms for Students
• What Is a Unitary State?
• The Definition and Purpose of Political Institutions
• What Is Political Participation? Definition and Examples
• Democracy Promotion as Foreign Policy
• Is Libya a Democracy Now?
• Understanding Types of Government
• What Is Theocracy? Definition and Examples
• Is Iraq a Democracy?
• What Is Majoritarianism? Definition and Examples

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Normative democratic theory deals with the moral foundations of democracy and democratic institutions, as well as the moral duties of democratic representatives and citizens. It is distinct from descriptive and explanatory democratic theory, which aim to describe and explain how democracy and democratic institutions function. Normative democracy theory aims to provide an account of when and why democracy is morally desirable as well as moral principles for guiding the design of democratic institutions and the actions of citizens and representatives. Of course, normative democratic theory is inherently interdisciplinary and must draw on the results of political science, sociology, psychology, and economics in order to give concrete moral guidance.

This brief outline of normative democratic theory focuses attention on seven related issues. First, it proposes a definition of democracy. Second, it outlines different approaches to the question of why democracy is morally valuable at all. Third, it discusses the issue of whether and when democratic institutions have authority and different conceptions of the limits of democratic authority. Fourth, it explores the question of what it is reasonable to demand of citizens in large democratic societies. This issue is central to the evaluation of normative democratic theories. A large body of opinion has it that most classical normative democratic theory is incompatible with what we can reasonably expect from citizens. Fifth, it surveys different accounts of the proper characterization of equality in the processes of representation and the moral norms of representation. Sixth, it discusses the relationship between central findings in social choice theory and democracy. Seventh, it discusses the question of who should be included in the group that makes democratic decisions.

1. Democracy Defined

2.1.1.1 the production of relatively good laws and policies: responsiveness theories, 2.1.1.2 the production of relatively good laws and policies: epistemic theories, 2.1.1.3 character-based arguments, 2.1.2 instrumental arguments against democracy, 2.1.3 grounds for instrumentalism, 2.2.1 liberty, 2.2.2 democracy as public justification, 2.2.3 equality, 3.1 instrumentalist conceptions of democratic authority, 3.2.1 democracy as collective self-rule, 3.2.2 freedom and democratic authority, 3.2.3 equality and authority, 3.3.1 internal limits to democratic authority, 3.3.2 the problem of persistent minorities, 3.3.3 external limits to democratic authority, 4.1 the problem of democratic participation, 4.2.1 elite theory of democracy, 4.2.2 interest group pluralism, 4.2.3 neo-liberalism.

• 4.2.4. The self-interest assumption

4.2.5 The Division of Democratic Labor

4.3.1 the duty to vote, 4.3.2 principled disobedience of the law, 4.3.3 accommodate disagreement through compromise and consensus, 5.1 what sort of representative system is best, 5.2 the ethics of representation, 6. social choice and democracy, 7. the boundary problem: constituting the demos, other internet resources, related entries.

The term “democracy”, as we will use it in this entry, refers very generally to a method of collective decision making characterized by a kind of equality among the participants at an essential stage of the decision-making process. Four aspects of this definition should be noted. First, democracy concerns collective decision making, by which we mean decisions that are made for groups and are meant to be binding on all the members of the group. Second, we intend for this definition to cover many different kinds of groups and decision-making procedures that may be called democratic. So there can be democracy in families, voluntary organizations, economic firms, as well as states and transnational and global organizations. The definition is also consistent with different electoral systems, for example first-past-the-post voting and proportional representation. Third, the definition is not intended to carry any normative weight. It is compatible with this definition of democracy that it is not desirable to have democracy in some particular context. So the definition of democracy does not settle any normative questions. Fourth, the equality required by the definition of democracy may be more or less deep. It may be the mere formal equality of one-person one-vote in an election for representatives to a parliament where there is competition among candidates for the position. Or it may be more robust, including substantive equality in the processes of deliberation and coalition building leading up to the vote. “Democracy” may refer to any of these political arrangements. It may involve direct referenda of the members of a society in deciding on the laws and policies of the society or it may involve the participation of those members in selecting representatives to make the decisions.

The function of normative democratic theory is not to settle questions of definition but to determine which, if any, of the forms democracy may take are morally desirable and when and how. To evaluate different moral justifications of democracy, we must decide on the merits of the different principles and conceptions of human beings and society from which they proceed.

2. The Justification of Democracy

In this section, we examine different views concerning the justification of democracy. Proposed justifications of democracy identify values or reasons that support democracy over alternative forms of decision-making, such as oligarchy or dictatorship. It is important to distinguish views concerning the justification of democracy from views concerning the authority of democracy, which we examine in section 3 . Attempts to establish democratic authority identify values or reasons in virtue of which subjects have a duty to obey democratic decisions. Justification and authority can come apart (Simmons 2001: ch. 7)—it is possible to hold that the balance of values or reasons supports democracy over alternative forms of decision-making while denying that subjects have a duty to obey democratic decisions.

We can evaluate the justification of democracy along at least two different dimensions: instrumentally, by reference to the outcomes of using it compared with other methods of political decision; or intrinsically, by reference to values that are inherent in the method.

2.1 Instrumentalism

2.1.1 instrumental arguments in favor of democracy.

Two kinds of in instrumental benefits are commonly attributed to democracy: (1) the production of relatively good laws and policies and (2) improvements in the characters of the participants.

It is often argued that democratic decision-making best protects subjects’ rights or interests because it is more responsive to their judgments or preferences than competing forms of government. John Stuart Mill, for example, argues that since democracy gives each subject a share of political power, democracy forces decision-makers to take into account the rights and interests of a wider range of subjects than are taken into account under aristocracy or monarchy (Mill 1861: ch. 3). There is some evidence that as groups are included in the democratic process, their interests are better advanced by the political system. For example, when African Americans regained the right to vote in the United States in 1965, they were able to secure many more benefits from the state than previously (Wright 2013). Economists argue that democracy promotes economic growth (Acemoglu et al. 2019). Several contemporary authors defend versions of this instrumental argument by pointing to the robust empirical correlation between well-functioning democratic institutions and the strong protection of core liberal rights, such as rights to a fair trial, bodily integrity, freedom of association, and freedom of expression (Gaus 1996: ch. 13; Christiano 2011; Gaus 2011: ch. 22).

A related instrumental argument for democracy is provided by Amartya Sen, who argues that

no substantial famine has ever occurred in any independent country with a democratic form of government and a relatively free press. (Sen 1999: 152)

The basis of this argument is that politicians in a multiparty democracy with free elections and a free press have incentives to respond to the expressions of needs of the poor.

Epistemic justifications of democracy argue that, under the right conditions, democracy is generally more reliable than alternative methods at producing political decisions that are correct according to procedure-independent standards. While there are many different explanations for the reliability of democratic decision-making, we outline three of the most prominent explanations here: (1) Condorcet’s Jury Theorem, (2) the effects of cognitive diversity, and (3) information gathering and sharing.

The most prominent explanation for democracy’s epistemic reliability rests on Condorcet’s Jury Theorem (CJT), a mathematical theorem developed by eighteenth-century mathematician the Marquis de Condorcet that builds on the so-called “law of large numbers”. CJT states that, when certain assumptions hold, the probability that a majority of voters support the correct decision increases and approaches one as the number of voters increases. The assumptions are (Condorcet 1785):

• each voter is more likely than not to identify the correct decision (the competence assumption );
• voters vote for what they believe is the correct decision (the sincerity assumption );
• votes are statistically independent of one another (the independence assumption ).

While Condorcet’s original proof was restricted to decisions with only two choices, more recent work argues that CJT can be extended to decisions with three or more choices (List & Goodin 2001). The use of CJT to explain democracy’s reliability is often thought to originate with Jean-Jacques Rousseau’s claim that

[i]f, when a sufficiently informed populace deliberates, the citizens were to have no communication among themselves, the general will would always result from the large number of small differences, and the deliberation would always be good. (Rousseau 1762: Book III, ch. IV)

Contemporary theorists continue to rely on CJT, or variants of it, to justify democracy (Barry 1965; Cohen 1986; Grofman and Feld 1988; Goodin & Spiekermann 2019).

The appeal of CJT for epistemic democrats derives from the fact that, if its underlying assumptions are satisfied, decisions produced by even moderately-sized electorates are almost certain to be correct. For example, if the assumptions of CJT hold for an electorate of 10,000 voters, and if each voter is 51 percent likely to identify the correct decision of two options, then the probability that a majority will select the correct decision is 99.97 percent. The formal mathematics of CJT are not subject to dispute. However, critics of CJT-based arguments for democracy argue that the assumptions underlying CJT are rarely, if ever, satisfied in actual democracies (see Black 1963: 159–65; Ladha 1992; Estlund 1997b; 2008: ch. XII; Anderson 2006). First, many have remarked that voters’ opinions are not independent of each other. Indeed, the democratic process seems to emphasize persuasion and coalition building. Second, the theorem does not seem to apply to cases in which the information that voters have access to, and on the basis of which they make their judgments, is segmented in various ways. Segmentation occurs when some sectors of the society do not have the relevant information while others do have it. Modern societies and politics seem to instantiate this kind of segmentation in terms of class, race, ethnic groupings, religion, occupational position, geographical place and so on. Finally, all voters approach issues they have to make decisions on with strong ideological biases that undermine the claim that each voter is bringing a kind of independent observation on the nature of the common good to the vote.

Advocates of CJT-based justifications of democracy generally respond to these sorts of criticisms by attempting to develop variations of CJT with weaker assumptions. These assumptions are more easily satisfied in democracies and so the revised theorems may show that even moderately-sized electorates are almost certain to produce correct decisions (Grofman & Feld 1988; Austen-Smith 1992; Austen-Smith & Banks 1996).

A second common epistemic justification for democracy—which is often traced to Aristotle ( Politics , Book II, Ch. 11; see Waldron 1995)—argues that democratic procedures are best able to exploit the underlying cognitive diversity of large groups of citizens to solve collective problems. Since democracy brings a lot of people into the process of decision making, it can take advantage of many sources of information and perspectives in assessing proposed laws and policies. More recently, Hélène Landemore (2013) has drawn on the “diversity-trumps-ability” theorem of Scott Page and Lu Hong (Hong & Page 2004; Page 2007)—which states that a random collection of agents drawn from a large set of limited-ability agents typically outperforms a collection of the very best agents from that same set—to argue that democracy can be expected to produce better decisions than rule by experts. Both Page and Hong’s original theorem and Landemore’s use of it to justify democracy are subject to dispute (see Quirk 2014; Brennan 2014; Thompson 2014; Bajaj 2014).

A third common epistemic justification for democracy relies on the idea that democratic decision-making tends to be more informed than other forms of decision-making about the interests of citizens and the causal mechanisms necessary to advance those interests. John Dewey argues that democracy involves “a consultation and a discussion which uncovers social needs and troubles”. Even if experts know how best to solve collective problems, they need input from the masses to correct their biases tell them where the problems lie (Dewey 1927 [2012: 154–155]; see also Anderson 2006; Knight & Johnson 2011).

Many have endorsed democracy on the grounds that democracy has beneficial effects on the characters of subjects. Many agree with Mill and Rousseau that democracy tends to make people stand up for themselves more than other forms of rule do because it makes collective decisions depend on their input more than monarchy or aristocracy do. Hence, in democratic societies individuals are encouraged to be more autonomous. Relatedly, by giving citizens a share of control over political-decision-making, democracy cultivates citizens with active and productive characters rather than passive characters. In addition, it has been argued that democracy tends to get people to think carefully and rationally more than other forms of rule because it makes a difference to political outcomes whether they do or not. Finally, some argue that democracy tends to enhance the moral qualities of citizens. When they participate in making decisions, they have to listen to others, they are called upon to justify themselves to others and they are forced to think in part in terms of the interests of others. Some have argued that when people find themselves in this kind of circumstance, they can be expected genuinely to think in terms of the common good and justice. Hence, some have argued that democratic processes tend to enhance the autonomy, rationality, activity, and morality of participants. Since these beneficial effects are thought to be worthwhile in themselves, they count in favor of democracy and against other forms of rule (Mill 1861 [1991: 74]; Elster 1986 [2003: 152]; Hannon 2020).

Some argue in addition that the above effects on character tend to enhance the quality of legislation as well. A society of autonomous, rational, active, and moral decision-makers is more likely to produce good legislation than a society ruled by a self-centered person or a small group of persons who rule over slavish and unreflective subjects. Of course, the soundness of any of the above arguments depends on the truth of the causal theories of the consequences of different institutions.

Not all instrumental arguments favor democracy. Plato argues that democracy is inferior to various forms of monarchy, aristocracy and even oligarchy on the grounds that democracy tends to undermine the expertise necessary to the proper governance of societies (Plato 1974, Book VI). Most people do not have the kinds of intellectual talents that enable them to think well about the difficult issues that politics involves. But in order to win office or get a piece of legislation passed, politicians must appeal to these people’s sense of what is right or not right. Hence, the state will be guided by very poorly worked out ideas that experts in manipulation and mass appeal use to help themselves win office. Plato argues instead that the state should be ruled by philosopher-kings who have the wisdom and moral character required for good rule. He thus defends a version of what David Estlund calls “epistocracy”, a form of oligarchy that involves rule by experts (Estlund 2003).

Mill defends a form of epistocracy that is sometimes referred to as the “plural voting” scheme (1861: ch. 4). While all rational adults get at least one vote under this scheme, some citizens get a greater number of votes based on satisfying some measure of political expertise. While Mill identifies the relevant measure of expertise in terms of formal education, the plural voting scheme is consistent with other measures. This scheme might be thought to combine the instrumental value of political expertise with the intrinsic value of broad inclusion.

One objection to any form of epistocracy—the demographic objection —holds that any criterion of expertise is likely to select demographically homogeneous individuals who are be biased in ways that undermine their ability to produce political outcomes that promote the general welfare (Estlund 2003).

Hobbes argues that democracy is inferior to monarchy because democracy fosters destabilizing dissension among subjects (Hobbes 1651: chap. XIX). On his view, individual citizens and even politicians are apt not to have a sense of responsibility for the quality of legislation because no one makes a significant difference to the outcomes of decision making. As a consequence, citizens’ concerns are not focused on politics and politicians succeed only by making loud and manipulative appeals to citizens in order to gain more power, but all lack incentives to consider views that are genuinely for the common good. Hence the sense of lack of responsibility for outcomes undermines politicians’ concern for the common good and inclines them to make sectarian and divisive appeals to citizens.

Many contemporary theorists expand on these Platonic and Hobbesian criticisms. A good deal of empirical data shows that citizens of large-scale democracies are ill-informed and apathetic about politics. This makes room for special interests to control the behavior of politicians and use the state for their own limited purposes all the while spreading the costs to everyone. Moreover, there is empirical evidence that democratic citizens often engage in motivated reasoning that unconsciously aims to affirm their existing political identities rather than arrive at correct judgments (Lord, Ross, & Lepper 1979; Bartels 2002; Kahan 2013; Achen & Bartels 2016). Some theorists argue that these considerations justify abandoning democracy altogether, while modest versions of these arguments have been used to justify modification of democratic institutions (Caplan 2007; Somin 2013; Brennan 2016). Relatedly, some theorists argue that rather than having beneficial effects on the characters of subjects as Mill and others argue, democracy actually has deleterious effects on the subjects’ characters and relationships (Brennan 2016: ch. 3).

Pure instrumentalists argue that these instrumental arguments for and against the democratic process are the only bases on which to evaluate the justification of democracy or compare it with other forms of political decision-making. There are a number of different kinds of argument for pure instrumentalism. One kind of argument proceeds from a more general moral theory. For example, classical utilitarianism has no room in its monistic axiology for the intrinsic values of fairness and liberty or the intrinsic importance of an egalitarian distribution of political power. Its sole concern with maximizing utility—understood as pleasure or desire satisfaction—guarantees that it can provide only instrumental arguments for and against democracy.

But one need not be a thoroughgoing utilitarian to argue for instrumentalism in democratic theory. There are arguments in favor of instrumentalism that pertain directly to the question of democracy and collective decision making generally. One argument states that political power involves the exercise of power of some over others. And it argues that the exercise of power of one person over another can only be justified by reference to the protection of the interests or rights of the person over whom power is exercised. Thus no distribution of political power could ever be justified except by reference to the quality of outcomes of the decision making process (Arneson 1993 [2002: 96–97]; 2003; 2004; 2009). Another sort of argument for instrumentalism proceeds negatively, attempting to show that the non-instrumental values most commonly used in attempted justifications for democracy do not actually justify democracy, and that an instrumental justification for democracy is therefore the only available sort of justification (Wall 2007).

Other arguments question the coherence of the idea of intrinsically fair collective decision making processes. For instance, social choice theory questions the idea that there can be a fair decision making function that transforms a set of individual preferences into a rational collective preference. The core objection is that no general rule satisfying reasonable constraints can be devised that can transform any set of individual preferences into a rational social preference. And this is taken to show that democratic procedures cannot be intrinsically fair (Riker 1982: 116). Ronald Dworkin argues that the idea of equality, which is for him at the root of social justice, cannot be given a coherent and plausible interpretation when it comes to the distribution of political power among members of the society. The relation of politicians to citizens inevitably gives rise to inequality; the process of democratic deliberation inevitably gives those with superior argument making abilities and greater willingness to participate more influence and therefore more power, than others, so equality of political power cannot be intrinsically fair or just (Dworkin 2000). In later work, Dworkin has pulled back from this originally thoroughgoing instrumentalism (Dworkin 1996).

2.2 Non-instrumentalism

Few theorists deny that political institutions must be at least in part evaluated in terms of the outcomes of having those institutions. Some argue in addition, that some forms of decision making are morally desirable independent of the consequences of having them. A variety of different approaches have been used to show that democracy has this kind of intrinsic value.

One prominent justification for democracy appeals to the value of liberty. According to one version of the view, democracy is grounded in the idea that each ought to be master of his or her life. Each person’s life is deeply affected by the larger social, legal and cultural environment in which he or she lives. Only when each person has an equal voice and vote in the process of collective decision-making will each have equal control over this larger environment. Thinkers such as Carol Gould conclude that only when some kind of democracy is implemented, will individuals have a chance at self-government (Gould 1988: 45–85). Since individuals have a right of self-government, they have a right to democratic participation. The idea is that the right of self-government gives one a right, within limits, to do wrong. Just as an individual has a right to make some bad decisions for himself or herself, so a group of individuals have a right to make bad or unjust decisions for themselves regarding those activities they share.

One major difficulty with this line of argument is that it appears to require that the basic rule of decision-making be consensus or unanimity. If each person must freely choose the outcomes that bind him or her then those who oppose the decision are not self-governing. They live in an environment imposed on them by others. So only when all agree to a decision are they freely adopting the decision (Wolff 1970: ch. 2). The trouble is that there is rarely agreement on major issues in politics. Indeed, it appears that one of the main reasons for having political decision making procedures is that they can settle matters despite disagreement.

One liberty-based argument that might seem to escape this worry appeals to an irreducibly collective right to self-determination. It is often argued that political communities have a right as a community to organize themselves politically in accordance with their values, principles, or commitments. Some argue that the right to collective self-determination requires democratic institutions that give citizens collective control over their political and legal structure (Cassese 1995). However, many argue democratic institutions are sufficient but not necessary to realize the right to collective self-determination because political communities might exercise this right to implement non-democratic institutions (Altman & Wellman 2009; Stilz 2016).

Another non-instrumental justification of democracy appeals to the ideal of public justification. The idea behind this approach is that laws and policies are legitimate to the extent that they are publicly justified to the citizens of the community. Public justification is justification to each citizen as a result of free and reasoned debate among equals.

Jürgen Habermas’s discourse theory of deliberative democracy has been highly influential in the development of this approach. Habermas analyses the form and function of modern legal systems through the lens of his theory of communicative action. This analysis yields the Democratic Principle:

[O]nly those statutes may claim legitimacy that can meet with the assent of all citizens in a discursive process of legislation that in turn has been legally constituted. (Habermas 1992 [1996: 110])

Habermas advances a conception of democratic legitimacy according to which law is legitimate only if it results from a free and inclusive democratic process of “opinion and will-formation”. What might such a process look like in a complex and differentiated society? Habermas answers by advancing a “two-track” model that understands democratic legitimation in terms of the relationship between institutionalized deliberative bodies (e.g legislatures, agencies, courts) and informal communication in the public sphere, which is “wild”, and not centrally coordinated.

One possible objection to this view is that free and inclusive democratic procedures are insufficient to satisfy the demand for deliberative consensus embodied in the Democratic Principle. This demand is unlikely to be satisfied in diverse societies, since deep disagreements about which laws ought to be enacted is likely to remain after the relevant process of opinion and will-formation. The Democratic Principle might thus be thought to embody an overly idealistic conception of democratic legitimacy (Estlund 2008: ch.10). Another possible worry is that the Discourse Principle is not a genuine moral principle, but a principle that embodies the felicity conditions of practical discourse. As such, the Discourse Principle cannot ground a conception of democratic legitimacy that yields robust moral prescriptions (Forst 2016).

Drawing on Habermas and John Rawls, among others, Joshua Cohen (1996 [2003]) develops a conception of democracy in which citizens justify laws and policies on the basis of mutually acceptable reasons. Democracy, properly understood, is the context in which individuals freely engage in a process of reasoned discussion and deliberation on an equal footing. The ideas of freedom and equality provide guidelines for structuring democratic institutions.

The aim of Cohen’s conception of democracy as public justification is reasoned consensus among citizens. But a serious problem arises when we ask about what happens when disagreement remains. Two possible replies have been suggested. It has been urged that forms of consensus weaker than full consensus are sufficient for public justification and that the weaker varieties are achievable in many societies. For instance, there may be consensus on the list of reasons that are acceptable publicly but disagreement on the weight of the different reasons. Or there may be agreement on general reasons abstractly understood but disagreement about particular interpretations of those reasons. What would have to be shown here is that such weak consensus is achievable in many societies and that the disagreements that remain are not incompatible with the ideal of public justification.

The basic principle seems to be the principle of reasonableness according to which reasonable persons will only offer principles for the regulation of their society that other reasonable persons can reasonably accept. One only offers principles that others, who restrain themselves in the same way, can accept. Such a principle implies a kind of principle of restraint which requires that reasonable persons avoid proposing laws and policies on the basis of controversial moral or philosophical principles. When individuals offer proposals for the regulation of their society, they ought not to appeal to the whole truth as they see it but only to that part of the whole truth that others can reasonably accept. To put the matter in the way Rawls puts it: political society must be regulated by principles on which there is an overlapping consensus (Rawls 2005: Lecture IV). This is meant to obviate the need for a complete consensus on the principles that regulate society.

However, it is hard to see how this approach avoids the need for a complete consensus, which is highly unlikely to occur in any even moderately diverse society. The reason for this is that it is not clear why it is any less of an imposition on me when I propose legislation or policies for the society that I must restrain myself to considerations that other reasonable people accept than it is an imposition on others when I attempt to pass legislation on the basis of reasons they reasonably reject. For if I do restrain myself in this way, then the society I live in will not live up to the standards that I believe are essential to evaluating the society. I must then live in and support a society that does not accord with my conception of how it ought to be organized. It is not clear why this is any less of a loss of control over society than for those who must live in a society that is partly regulated by principles they do not accept. If one is a problem, then so is the other, and complete consensus is the only solution (Christiano 2009).

Many democratic theorists have argued that democracy is a way of treating persons as equals when there is good reason to impose some kind of organization on their shared lives but they disagree about how best to do it. Peter Singer argues that when people insist on different ways of arranging matters properly, each person in a sense claims a right to be dictator over their shared lives (Singer 1973: 30–41). But these claims to dictatorship cannot all hold up. Democracy embodies a kind of peaceful and fair compromise among these conflicting claims to rule. Each compromises equally on what he claims as long as the others do, resulting in each having an equal say over decision making. In effect, democratic decision making respects each person’s point of view on matters of common concern by giving each an equal say about what to do in cases of disagreement (Singer 1973; Waldron 1999: chap. 5).

What if people disagree on the democratic method or on the particular form democracy is to take? Are we to decide these latter questions by means of a higher order procedure? And if there is disagreement on the higher order procedure, must we also democratically decide that question? The view seems to lead to an infinite regress.

An alternative way of justifying democracy on the basis of equality is to ground democracy in public equality. Public equality is a principle of equality which ensures that people can see that they are being treated as equals. This view arises from three ideas. First, there is the basic egalitarian idea that people’s interests ought to be equally advanced, or at least that they ought to have equal opportunities to advance them. Second, human beings generally have highly fallible and biased understandings of their own and other people’s interests. Third, persons have fundamental interests in being able to see that they are being treated as equals. Public equality is an egalitarian principle that can be seen to be realized among persons despite the dramatically incomplete forms of knowledge people have. It is not all of justice, but it is essential that the principle be realized in a pluralistic society.

Democracy is a uniquely publicly egalitarian way to make collective decisions when there is substantial disagreement and conflict of interest among persons about how to shape the society they share. Each can see that the only plausible way of overcoming persistent disagreement over how to shape the society they all live in, while still publicly treating all persons as equals in the face of bias and fallibility, is to give each person an equal say in the process of shaping that society. Thus, democracy is necessary to the realization of public equality in a political society. Within the framework determined by this publicly realized equality, persons are permitted to attempt to bring about their more particular ideas about justice and the common good that they think are right.

The idea of public equality also grounds limits to democratic decision making. The thought is that a society cannot democratically decide to abolish the democratic rights of some of its members. Public equality also requires that basic liberal and civil rights be respected as well, by the democratic process and so serves as a limit to democratic decision making (Christiano 2008; Valentini 2013).

A number of worries attend this kind of view. First, it is generally thought that majority rule is required for treating persons as equals in collective decision making. This is because only majority rule is neutral towards alternatives in decision making. Unanimity tends to favor the status quo as do various forms of supermajority rule. But if this is so, the above view raises the twin dangers of majority tyranny and of persistent minorities, i.e., groups of persons who find themselves always losing in majority decisions. Surely these latter phenomena must be incompatible with public equality. Second, the kind of view defended above is susceptible to the worry that political equality is not a coherent ideal in any modern state with a complex division of labor and the need for representation. This last worry will be discussed in more detail in the next sections on democratic citizenship and legislative representation. The first worry will be discussed more in the discussion on the limits to democratic authority.

A related approach grounds democracy in the ideal of relational equality . A concern with relational equality is a concern for

human relationships that are, in certain crucial respects at least, unstructured by differences of rank, power, or status. (Scheffler 2010: 225)

Niko Kolodny argues that democratic institutions are an essential component of relational equality (Kolodny 2014a,b). One line of Kolodny’s argument holds that political decisions involve the use of coercive force. Inequalities in the power to use force undermine equal social status at least in part because the power to use force is “the power that usually determines the distribution of other powers” (Kolodny 2014b: 307). Individuals who have superior power to use force on others have a superior social status. An egalitarian distribution of political power is thus essential for realizing social equality. And only democratic institutions provide an egalitarian distribution of political power. We will discuss the relationship between relational equality and democracy further when we discuss the authority of democracy in Part 3 below.

3. The Authority of Democracy

Since democracy is a collective decision process, the question naturally arises about whether there is any duty of citizens to obey democratic decisions when they disagree with it.

There are three main concepts of the legitimate authority of the state. First, a state has legitimate authority to the extent that it is morally justified in coercively imposing its rule on the members. Legitimate authority on this account has no direct implications concerning the obligations or duties that citizens may hold toward that state. It simply says that if the state is morally justified in doing what it does, then it has legitimate authority. Second, a state has legitimate authority to the extent that its directives generate duties in citizens to obey. The duties of the citizens need not be owed to the state but they are real duties to obey. The third is that the state has a right to rule that is correlated with the citizens’ duty to it to obey it. This is the strongest notion of authority and it seems to be the core idea behind the legitimacy of the state. The idea is that when citizens disagree about law and policy it is important to be able to answer the question, who has the right to choose?

Instrumental arguments for democracy give some reason for why one ought to respect the democracy when one disagrees with its decisions. There may be many instrumental considerations that play a role in deciding on the question of whether one ought to obey. And these instrumental considerations are pretty much the same whether one is considering obedience to democracy or some other form of rule.

There is one instrumentalist approach which is quite unique to democracy and that seems to ground a strong conception of democratic authority. That is the epistemic approach inspired by the Condorcet Jury Theorem, which we discussed in section 2.1.1.2 above. There, we discussed a number of difficulties with the application of the Condorcet Jury Theorem to the case of voting in elections and referenda in large-scale democracies, including lack of independence, informational segmentation, and the existence of ideological biases.

One further worry about the Jury Theorem’s epistemic conceptions of authority is that it would prove too much since it undermines the common practice of the loyal opposition in democracies. If the background conditions of the Jury Theorem are met, a large-scale democracy majority is practically certain to produce the right decisions. On what basis can citizens in a political minority rationally hold on to their competing views? The members of the minority have a powerful reason for shifting their allegiance to the majority position, since each has very good reason to think that the majority is right. The epistemic conception of authority based on the Jury Theorem thus threatens to be objectionably authoritarian, since it looks like it demands not only obedience of action but obedience of thought as well. Even in scientific communities the fact that a majority of scientists favor a particular view does not make the minority scientists think that they are wrong, though it does perhaps give them pause (Goodin 2003: ch. 7).

Some theories of democratic authority combine instrumental and non-instrumental considerations. David Estlund argues that democratic procedures have legitimate authority because they are better than random and epistemically the best of the political systems that are acceptable to all reasonable citizens (Estlund 2008). They must be better than random because, otherwise, why wouldn’t we use a fair random procedure like a lottery or coin flip? Democratic authority must have an epistemic element. And the justification of democratic procedure must be acceptable to all reasonable citizens in order to respect their freedom and equality. Estlund’s conception of democratic authority—which he calls “epistemic proceduralism”— thus combines the ideal of public justification with a concern for the tendency of democracies to produce good decisions.

3.2 Intrinsic Conceptions of Democratic Authority

Some theorists argue that there is a special relation between democracy and legitimate authority grounded in the value of collective self-rule. John Locke argues that when a person consents to the creation of a political society, they necessarily consent to the use of majority rule in deciding how the political society is to be organized (Locke 1690: sec. 96). Locke thinks that majority rule is the natural decision rule when there is disagreement. He argues that a society is a kind of collective body that must move in the direction of the greater force. One way to understand this argument is as follows. If we think of each member of society as an equal and if we think that there is likely to be disagreement beyond the question of whether to join society or not, then we must accept majority rule as the appropriate decision rule. This interpretation of the greater force argument assumes that the expression “greater force” is to be understood in terms of the equal worth of each person’s interests and rights, so the society must go in the direction in which the greater number of persons wants it to go.

Locke thinks that a people, which is formed by individuals who consent to be members, could choose a monarchy by means of majority rule and so this argument by itself does not give us an argument for democracy. But Locke refers back to this argument when he defends the requirement of representative institutions for deciding when property may be regulated and taxes levied. He argues that a person must consent to the regulation or taxation of his property by the state. But he says that this requirement of consent is satisfied when a majority of the representatives of property holders consent to the regulation and taxation of property (Locke, 1690: sec. 140). This does seem to be moving towards a genuinely democratic conception of legitimate authority.

Rousseau argues that when individuals consent to form a political community, they agree to put themselves under the direction of the “general will” (Rousseau 1762). The general will is not a mere aggregation of individuals’ private wills. It is, rather, the will of the political community as a whole. And since the general will can only emerge as the product of a properly organized democratic procedure, individuals consent to put themselves under the direction of a properly organized democratic procedure. On one interpretation of Rousseau, democratic procedures are properly organized only when they (1) define rights that apply equally to all, (2) via a procedure that considers everyone’s interests equally, and (3) everyone who is coerced to obey the laws has a voice in that procedure.

There are at least two ways of understanding the idea of the general will. On what might be called the constitutive interpretation, the general will is constituted by the results of a properly organized democratic procedure. That is, the results of a properly organized democratic procedure are the general will in virtue of the fact that they emerge from a properly organized democratic procedure, and not because they reflect some procedure-independent truth about the common good. On what might be called the epistemic interpretation, the results of a properly organized democratic procedure are the way of tracking the procedure-independent truth about the common good. As we discussed in section 3.1 , Rousseau is often interpreted as appealing to Condorcet’s Jury Theorem to support the epistemic credentials of a properly organized democratic procedure.

Anna Stilz develops an account of democratic authority that appeals to the value of “freedom as independence” (Stilz 2009). Freedom as independence is freedom from being subject to the will of another. In order not to be subject to the will of others, individuals need property rights and a protected sphere of autonomy to pursue one’s plans. Drawing on Kant, Stilz argues that attempts by particular individuals, no matter how conscientious, to define and secure rights to property and autonomy in a state of nature will be inconsistent with freedom as independence. Such attempts unilaterally impose new obligations on others through acts of private will in the face of competing claims. But even if individuals in a state of nature do agree to a resolution of their competing claims, they are dependent on the will of others to honor this agreement. Stilz thus argues that justice must be administered by an authoritative legal system which can coercively impose one set of objective rules—rules we must respect even when we disagree—to adjudicate our conflicting claims. But if such a system is to be consistent with the freedom of subjects, it cannot be imposed by the private wills of rulers. The solution, Stilz argues, lies in Rousseau’s idea of the general will. When subjects obey the general will, they are not obeying the private will of any individual; they are obeying a will that arises from all and applies to all.

One worry with this account is that those who oppose democratically-enacted laws or policies can complain that those laws or policies are imposed against their will. Perhaps they are not subject to the will of a particular individual, but they are subject to the will of a majority. This might be thought to constitute a significant threat to individuals’ freedom as independence. Another worry, which Stilz’s view arguably inherits from Rousseau, is that the conditions for the general will to emerge are so demanding that the view implies that no state that exists or has existed has legitimate political authority. Stilz’s view might thus be thought to entail what A.J. Simmons calls “a posteriori anarchism” (Simmons 2001).

Another approach to democratic authority asserts that failing to obey the decisions of a democratic assembly amounts to treating one’s fellow citizens as inferiors (Christiano 2008: ch. 6). In the face of disagreement about substantive law and policy, democracy realizes a kind of public equality by giving each individual an equal say in determining which laws or policies will be enacted. Citizens who skirt laws made by suitably egalitarian procedures act contrary to the equal right of all citizens to have a say in making laws. Those who refuse to pay taxes or respect property laws on the grounds that they are unjust are affirming a superior right to that of others in determining how the shared aspects of social life ought to be arranged. Thus, they violate the duty to treat others publicly as equals. And there is reason to think this duty must normally have some pre-eminence. Public equality is the most important form of equality and democracy is required by public equality. The other forms of equality in play in substantive disputes about law and policy are ones about which people can have reasonable disagreements (within limits specified by the principle of public equality). Citizens thus have obligations to abide by the democratic process even if their favored conceptions of justice or equality are passed by in the decision making process.

Daniel Viehoff develops an egalitarian conception of democratic authority based on the ideal of relational equality (Viehoff 2014; see section 2.2.3 above for more on relational equality). Viehoff argues that relational equality is threatened by “subjection” in a relationship, which occurs when individuals have significantly different power over how they interact with and relate to one another. According to Viehoff, obeying the outcomes of egalitarian democratic procedures is necessary and sufficient for citizens to achieve coordination on common rules without subjection. It is sufficient because democratic procedures distribute decision-making power equally, which ensures that coordination is not determined by unequal power advantages. It is necessary because parties must set aside the considerations of greater and lesser power to realize non-subjection in their relationship.

Fabienne Peter develops a fairness-based conception of democratic authority that incorporates epistemic considerations (Peter 2008; 2009). Drawing on insights from proceduralist epistemology, Peter’s “pure epistemic proceduralism” holds that suitably egalitarian democratic decisions are binding at least in part because they result from a fair procedure of knowledge-production. This account differs from Estlund’s epistemic proceduralism (see section 5.1 above) because it does not condition the authority of democratic procedures on their ability to produce decisions that track the procedure-independent truth. Rather, the authority of democratic procedures is grounded in their fairness. And it differs from pure procedural accounts because the relevant notion of fairness is fairness in knowledge-production.

3.3 Limits to the Authority of Democracy

What are the limits to democratic authority? A limit to democratic authority is a principle violation of which defeats democratic authority. When the principle is violated by the democratic assembly, the assembly loses its authority in that instance or the moral weight of the authority is overridden. A number of different views have been offered on this issue. We can distinguish between internal and external limits to democratic authority. An internal limit arises from the constitutive requirements of the democratic process or from the principles that ground democracy. An external limit arises from principles that are independent of the values or requirements that ground democracy.

External limits to democratic authority are rebutting limits, which are principles that weigh against—and may sometimes outweigh the principles that ground democracy. So in a particular case, an individual may see that there are reasons to obey the assembly and some reasons against obeying the assembly and in the case at hand the reasons against obedience outweigh the reasons in favor of obedience. Internal limits to democratic authority are undercutting limits. These limits function not by weighing against the considerations in favor of authority, they undercut the considerations in favor of authority altogether; they simply short circuit the authority. When an undercutting limit is in play, it is not as if the principles which ground the limit outweigh the reasons for obeying the democratic assembly, it is rather that the reasons for obeying the democratic assembly are undermined altogether; they cease to exist or at least they are severely weakened.

Some have argued that the democratic process ought to be limited to decisions that are not incompatible with the proper functioning of the democratic process. So they argue that the democratic process may not legitimately take away the political rights of its citizens in good standing. It may not take away rights that are necessary to the democratic process such as freedom of association or freedom of speech. But these limits do not extend beyond the requirements for proper democratic functioning. They do not protect non political artistic speech or freedom of association in the case of non political activities (Ely 1980: chap. 4).

Another kind of internal limit is a limit that arises from the principles that underpin democracy. And the presence of this limit would seem to be necessary to making sense of the first limit because in order for the first limit to be morally important we need to know why a democracy ought to protect the democratic process.

Locke gives an account of the internal limits of democracy in his idea that there are certain things to which a citizen may not consent (Locke 1690: ch. XI). She may not consent to arbitrary rule or the violation of fundamental rights including democratic and liberal rights. Since consent is the basis of democratic authority for Locke, this account provides an explanation of the idea behind the first internal limit, that democracy may not be suspended by democratic means but it goes beyond that limit to suggest that rights that are not essentially connected with the exercise of the franchise may also not be violated because one may not consent to their violation.

More recently, Ronald Dworkin has defended an account of the limits of democratic authority (Dworkin 1996). He argues that democracy is justified by appeal to a principle of self-government. He argues that self-government cannot be realized unless all citizens are treated as full members of the political community, because, otherwise, they are not able to identify as members of the community. Among the conditions of full membership, he argues, are rights to be treated as equals and rights to have one’s moral independence respected. These principles support robust requirements of non-discrimination and of basic liberal rights.

The conception of democratic authority that grounds it in public equality also provides an account of the limits of that authority (Christiano 2008: ch. 6). Since democracy is founded in public equality, it may not violate public equality in any of its decisions. The basic idea is that overt violation of public equality by a democratic assembly undermines the claim that the democratic assembly embodies public equality. Democracy’s embodiment of public equality is conditional on its protecting public equality. To the extent that liberal rights are grounded in public equality and the provision of an economic minimum is also so grounded, this suggests that democratic rights and liberal rights and rights to an economic minimum create a limit to democratic authority. This account also provides a deep grounding for the kinds of limits to democratic authority defended in the first internal limit and it goes beyond these to the extent that protection of rights that are not connected with the exercise of the franchise is also necessary to public equality.

This account of the authority of democracy also provides some help with a vexing problem of democratic theory. This problem is the difficulty of persistent minorities. There is a persistent minority in a democratic society when that minority always loses in the voting. This is always a possibility in democracies because of the use of majority rule. If the society is divided into two or more highly unified voting blocks in which the members of each group votes in the same ways as all the other members of that group, then the group in the minority will find itself always on the losing end of the votes. This problem has plagued some societies, particularly those with indigenous peoples who live within developed societies. Though this problem is often connected with majority tyranny it is distinct from the problem of majority tyranny because it may be the case that the majority attempts to treat the minority well, in accordance with its conception of good treatment. It is just that the minority never agrees with the majority on what constitutes proper treatment. Being a persistent minority can be highly oppressive even if the majority does not try to act oppressively. This can be understood with the help of the very ideas that underpin democracy. Persons have interests in being able to correct for the cognitive biases of others and to be able to make the world in such a way that it makes sense to them. These interests are set back for a persistent minority since they never get their way.

The conception of democracy as grounded in public equality can shed light on this problem. It can say that the existence of a persistent minority violates public equality (Christiano 2008: chap. 7). In effect, a society in which there is a persistent minority is one in which that minority is being treated publicly as an inferior because it is clear that its fundamental interests are being set back. Hence to the extent that violations of public equality undercut the authority of a democratic assembly, the existence of a persistent minority undermines the authority of the democracy at least with respect to the minority. This suggests that certain institutions ought to be constructed so that the minority is not persistent.

One natural kind of limit to democratic authority is the external kind of limit. Here the idea is that there are certain considerations that favor democratic decision making and there are certain values that are independent of democracy that may be at issue in democratic decisions. For example, many theories recognize core liberal rights—such as rights to property, bodily integrity, and freedom of thought and expression—as external limits to democratic authority. Locke is often interpreted as arguing that individuals have natural rights to property in themselves and the external world that democratic laws must respect in order to have legitimate authority (Locke 1690).

Some views may assert that there are only external limits to democratic authority. But it is possible to think that there are both internal and external limits. Such an issue may arise in decisions to go to war, for example. In such decisions, one may have a duty to obey the decision of the democratic assembly on the grounds that this is how one treats one’s fellow citizens as equals but one may also have a duty to oppose the war on the grounds that the war is an unjust aggression against other people. To the extent that this consideration is sufficiently serious it may outweigh the considerations of equality that underpin democratic authority. Thus one may have an overall duty not to obey in this context. Issues of foreign policy in general seem to give rise to possible external limits to democracy.

4. The Demands of Democratic Participation

In this section, we examine the demands of participation in large-scale democracies. We begin by examining a core challenge to the idea that democratic citizens are capable of governing a large and complex society. We then explore different proposed solutions to the core challenge. Finally, we examine the moral duties of democratic citizens in large-scale democracies in light of the core challenge.

A vexing problem of democratic theory has been to determine whether ordinary citizens are up to the task of governing a large and complex society. There are three distinct problems here:

• Plato argued that some people are more intelligent and informed about political matters than others and have a superior moral character, and that those persons ought to rule ( The Republic , Book VI)
• Others have argued that a society must have a division of labor. If everyone were engaged in the complex and difficult task of politics, little time or energy would be left for the other essential tasks of a society. Conversely, if we expect most people to engage in other difficult and complex tasks, how can we expect them to have the time and resources sufficient to devote themselves intelligently to politics?
• Since individuals have so little impact on the outcomes of political decision making in large societies, they have little sense of responsibility for the outcomes. Some have argued that it is not rational to vote since the chances that an individual’s vote will a decide the outcome of an election (i.e., will determine whether a candidate gets elected or not) are nearly indistinguishable from zero. For example, one widely accepted estimate puts the odds of an individual casting the deciding vote in a United States presidential election at 1 in 100 million. Many estimates put the odds much lower. Worse still, Anthony Downs has argued that almost all of those who do vote have little reason to become informed about how best to vote (Downs 1957: ch.13). On the assumption that citizens reason and behave roughly according to the Downsian model, either the society must in fact be run by a relatively small group of people with minimal input from the rest or it will be very poorly run. As we can see these criticisms are echoes of the sorts of criticisms Plato and Hobbes made.

These observations pose challenges for any robustly egalitarian or deliberative conception of democracy. Without the ability to participate intelligently in politics one cannot use one’s votes to advance one’s aims nor can one be said to participate in a process of reasoned deliberation among equals. So, either equality of political power implies a kind of self-defeating equal participation of citizens in politics or a reasonable division of labor seems to undermine equality of power. And either substantial participation of citizens in public deliberation entails the relative neglect of other tasks or the proper functioning of the other sectors of the society requires that most people do not participate intelligently in public deliberation.

4.2 Proposed Solutions to the Problem of Democratic Participation

Some modern theorists of democracy, called elite theorists, have argued against any robustly egalitarian or deliberative forms of democracy in light of the problem of democratic participation. They argue that high levels of citizen participation tend to produce bad legislation designed by demagogues to appeal to poorly informed and overly emotional citizens. They look upon the alleged uninformedness of citizens evidenced in many empirical studies in the 1950s and 1960s as perfectly reasonable and predictable. Indeed they regard the alleged apathy of citizens in modern states as highly desirable social phenomena.

Political leaders are to avoid divisive and emotionally charged issues and make policy and law with little regard for the fickle and diffuse demands made by ordinary citizens. Citizens participate by voting but since they know very little they are not effectively the ruling part of the society. The process of election is usually just a fairly peaceful way of maintaining or changing those who rule (Schumpeter 1942 [1950: 269]).

On Schumpeter’s view, however, citizens do have a role to play in avoiding serious disasters. When politicians act in ways that nearly anyone can see is problematic, the citizens can throw the bums out.

So the elite theory of democracy does seem compatible with some of the instrumentalist arguments given above but it is strongly opposed to the intrinsic arguments from liberty, public justification and equality. To be sure, there can be an elite deliberative democracy wherein elites deliberate, perhaps even out of sight of the population at large, on how to run the society.

A view akin to the elite theory but less pessimistic about citizens’ political agency and competence argues that a well-functioning representative democracy can function as a kind of “defensible epistocracy” (Landa & Pevnick 2020). This view holds that, under the right conditions, elected officials can be expected to exercise political power more responsibly than citizens in a direct democracy because each official is far more likely to cast the deciding vote in legislative assemblies (the “pivotality effect”) and officials have more incentive to exercise power with due regard for the general welfare (the “accountability effect”). Moreover, under the right conditions, representative democracy allows individuals to assess the competence of candidates for office and to select candidates who are best able to help the community pursue its commitments.

One approach that is in part motivated by the problem of democratic citizenship but which attempts to preserve some elements of equality against the elitist criticism is the interest group pluralist account of politics. Robert Dahl’s early statement of the view is very powerful.

In a rough sense, the essence of all competitive politics is bribery of the electorate by politicians… The farmer… supports a candidate committed to high price supports, the businessman…supports an advocate of low corporation taxes… the consumer…votes for candidates opposed to a sales tax. (Dahl 1959: 69)

In this conception of the democratic process, each citizen is a member of an interest group with narrowly defined interests that are closely connected to their everyday lives. On these subjects citizens are supposed to be quite well informed and interested in having an influence. Or at least, elites from each of the interest groups that are relatively close in perspective to the ordinary members are the principal agents in the process. On this account, democracy is not rule by the majority but rather rule by coalitions of minorities. Policy and law in a democratic society are decided by means of bargaining among the different groups.

This approach is conceivably compatible with the more egalitarian approach to democracy. This is because it attempts to reconcile equality with collective decision making by limiting the tasks of citizens to ones which they are able to perform reasonably well. It is not particularly compatible with the deliberative public justification approach because it takes the democratic process to be concerned essentially with bargaining among the different interest groups where the preferences are not subject to further debate in the society as a whole.

A third approach inspired by the problem of participation may be called the neo-liberal approach to politics favored by public choice theorists such as James Buchanan & Gordon Tullock (1962). Against elite theories, they contend that elites and their allies will tend to expand the powers of government and bureaucracy for their own interests and that this expansion will occur at the expense of a largely inattentive public. For this reason, they argue for severe restrictions on the powers of elites. They argue against the interest group pluralist theorists that the problem of participation occurs within interest groups more or less as much as among the citizenry at large. Only powerful economic interests are likely to succeed in organizing to influence the government and they will do so largely for their own benefit. Since economic elites will advance their own interests in politics while spreading the costs to others, policies will tend to be more costly (because imposed on everyone in society) than they are beneficial (because they benefit only the elites in the interest group.)

Neo-liberals infer that one ought to transfer many of the current functions of the state to the market and limit the state to the enforcement of basic property rights and liberties. These can be more easily understood and brought under the control of ordinary citizens.

But the neo-liberal account of democracy must answer to two large worries. First, citizens in modern societies have more ambitious conceptions of social justice and the common good than are realizable by the minimal state. The neo-liberal account thus implies a very serious curtailment of democracy of its own. More evidence is needed to support the contention that these aspirations cannot be achieved by the modern state. Second, the neo-liberal approach ignores the problem of large private concentrations of wealth and power that are capable of pushing small states around for their own benefit and imposing their wills on populations without their consent.

Somin (2013) also argues that government be significantly reduced in size so that citizens have a lesser knowledge burden to carry. But he calls for government decentralization so that citizens can vote with their feet in favor of or against competing units of government, in effect creating a kind of market in governments among which citizens can choose.

4.2.4 The self-interest assumption

A considerable amount of the literature in political science and the economic theory of the state are grounded in the assumption that individuals act primarily and perhaps even exclusively in their self-interest narrowly construed. The problem of participation and the accounts of the democratic process described above are in large part dependent on this assumption. When the preferences of voters are not assumed to be self-interested the calculations of the value of participation change. For example, if a person is a motivated utilitarian, the small chance of making a difference is coupled with a huge accumulated return to many people if there is a significant difference between alternatives. It may be worth it in this case to become reasonably well informed (Parfit 1984: 74). Even more weakly altruistic moral preferences could make a big difference to the rationality of becoming informed, for example if one had a preference to comply with perceived civic duty to vote responsibly (see section 4.3.1 for discussion of the duty to vote). Any moral preference can be formulated in consistent utility functions.

Moreover, defenders of deliberative democracy often claim that concerns for the common good and justice are not merely given prior to politics but that they can evolve and improve through the process of discussion and debate in politics (Elster 1986 [2003]; Gutmann & Thompson 2004; Cohen 1989 [2009]). They assert that much debate and discussion in politics would not be intelligible were it not for the fact that citizens are willing to engage in open minded discussion with those who have distinct morally informed points of view. Empirical evidence suggests that individuals are motivated by moral considerations in politics in addition to their interests (Mansbridge 1990).

Public deliberation in any large-scale democracy will occur within a complex and differentiated “deliberative system”, a

wide variety of institutions, associations, and sites of contestation accomplish political work. (Mansbridge et. al. 2012)

Moreover, the deliberative system of a complex democracy will be characterized by a division of democratic labor , with different parts of the system making different contributions to the overall system. The question arises: what is the appropriate role for a citizen in this division of labor? Philosophically, we should ask two questions. What ought citizens have knowledge about in order to fulfill their role? What standards ought citizens’ beliefs live up to in order to be adequately supported? One promising view is that citizens must think about what ends the society ought to aim at and leave the question of how to achieve those aims to experts (Christiano 1996: ch 5). The rationale for this division of labor is that expertise is not as fundamental to the choice of aims as it is to the development of legislation and policy. Citizens are capable in their everyday lives of understanding and cultivating deep understandings of values and of their interests. And if citizens genuinely do choose the aims and others faithfully pursue the means to achieving those aims, then citizens are in the driver’s seat in society and they can play this role as equals.

To be sure, citizens need to know who to vote for and whether those they vote for are genuinely advancing their aims. This would appear to require some basic knowledge of about how best to achieve their political aims. How is this possible without extensive knowledge? In addition, there is empirical evidence that those who are better informed have more influence on representatives (Erikson 2015). So, if this task requires some kind of knowledge to do well, how can this be compatible with equality?

One promising response is that ordinary citizens do not need individually to have a lot of knowledge of social science and particular facts in order to make political decisions based on such knowledge. Recent research in cognitive science indicates the individuals use “cognitive shortcuts” to save on time in acquiring information about the world they live in (Lupia & McCubbins 1998). This use of shortcuts is common and essential throughout economic and political life. In political life, we see part of the rationale for the many intermediate institutions between government and citizens (Downs 1957: 221–229). Citizens save time by making use of institutions such as the press, unions and other interest group associations, political parties, and opinion leaders to get information about politics. They also rely on interactions in the workplace as well as conversations with friends and families. Political parties can connect ordinary citizens in various ways to expertise because each one contains a division of labor within them that mirrors that in the state. Experts in parties have incentives to make their expertise intelligible to other members (Christiano 2012). In addition, under favorable conditions, political parties stimulate the development of citizens’ normative perspectives and facilitate a healthy public competition of political justifications based on those perspectives (White & Ypi 2016).

People are dependent on social networks in other ways in a democracy. People receive “free” information (which they do not deliberately seek out) about politics and law in school, through their jobs, in discussion with friends, colleagues and family and incidentally through the media. And this can form a better or worse basis on which to pursue other information. Institutions can make a difference to the stream of free information individuals receive. Education can be distributed in a more or less egalitarian way. The circumstances of work can provide more or less free information about politics and law. People who have jobs with a significant amount of power such as lawyers, business persons, government officials will be beneficiaries of very high quality free information. They need to know about law and politics to do their jobs properly. Those who hold low skilled and non-unionized jobs will receive much less free information about politics at work. To the extent that we can alter the economic division of labor by for example giving more place to unions or having greater worker participation, we might be able to reduce inequalities of information among citizens.

4.3 The Moral Duties of Democratic Citizens

What are the moral duties of democratic citizens in complex democracies? In this section, we discuss three important democratic duties: (1) the duty to vote, (2) the duty to promote justice through principled disobedience of the law, and (3) duties to accommodate disagreement through compromise and consensus.

It is often thought that democratic citizens have a moral duty to vote in elections. But this is not obvious. Individual votes are a causally insignificant contribution to the democratic process. In large-scale democracies, the chance that any particular citizen’s vote will decide the outcome of an election is minuscule. What moral reason do democratic citizens have to participate in politics even though they’re almost certain not to make the difference to who gets elected? Why shouldn’t they seek to promote the good or justice in other ways?

Parfit develops an act-utilitarian answer to this question (Parfit 1984: 73–75). Act-utilitarians hold that morally right actions maximize the total expected sum of the utilities of all persons in the society. Parfit argues that voting might nonetheless maximize expected utility if one candidate is significantly superior to the other(s). If we add the benefits to each member of the society of having the superior candidate win, we get a very large difference in value. So when we multiply that value by the probability of casting the deciding vote, which is often thought to be about 1/100,000,000 in a United States presidential election, we might still get a reasonably high expected value. When we subtract the cost to the voter and others of voting, which is often quite low, from this number, we may still have a good reason to vote.

One worry with Parfit’s view is that it faces a version of what Jason Brennan calls “the particularity problem” (Brennan 2011). This is the problem of explaining why citizens ought to promote value through political participation as opposed to through non-political acts. Voting is just one way of promoting overall utility; we need to know the expected utility of the different acts they might perform instead. Even if the argument above is correct, it might be the case that many individuals maximize expected utility by not voting and doing something even more beneficial with their time.

Alex Guerrero argues that citizens have moral reasons to vote because candidates who win by a larger proportion of votes can claim a greater “normative mandate” to govern (Guerrero 2010). Still each individual vote makes only a tiny contribution to the proportion of votes a candidate receives. So, we might doubt the strength of the reason to vote that Guerrero identifies.

Some theorists argue that individuals have a moral duty to vote in order to absolve themselves of complicity in state injustices (Beerbohm 2012; Zakaras 2018). All states commit injustices—they make and enforce unjust laws, wage unjust wars, and much else. And citizens of large-scale democracies have a kind of standing responsibility, by paying taxes and obeying laws, for their state’s injustices of which they must actively absolve themselves The complicity account argues that citizens avoid shared responsibility for their state’s injustices if they oppose those injustices through voting and of public advocacy (Beerbohm 2012).

One worry is that it is unclear why voting and publicly advocating against injustice should be thought to absolve responsibility that is established by paying taxes and obeying laws. Another worry is that one’s concern to oppose injustice should derive from a more direct concern for the wrongs suffered by victims of injustice rather than a concern with keeping one’s hands clean.

One sort of account that avoids this worry grounds the moral duty to vote in the importance of doing one’s fair share of the demands of political justice consistent with public equality. The demands of creating and sustaining just institutions distribute fairly among all citizens (Maskivker 2019). If one fails to do one’s fair share of these demands, then one fails to show due regard for the eventual victims of injustice. Furthermore, voting provides citizens with a mechanism for doing their fair shares of the demands of making their institutions just in a way that is consistent with respecting the public equality of fellow citizens. By showing up and casting a vote, citizens can contribute to the collective achievement of justice while maintaining equal decision-making power with fellow citizens.

Civil disobedience has long been recognized as a central mechanism through which democratic citizens may legitimately promote political justice in their society. According to the standard view, civil disobedience is a public, non-violent and conscientious breach of law that aims to change laws or government policies. People who engage in civil disobedience are willing to accept the legal consequences of their actions in order to show fidelity to the law (Bedau 1961; Rawls 1971: ch. 55). The standard definition of civil disobedience has been subjected to challenge. For example, some argue that the private acts in which the disobedient seeks to evade legal consequences can count as instances of civil disobedience (Raz 1979; Brownlee 2004, 2007, 2012).

Perhaps the most common way of justifying civil disobedience argues that the same considerations that ground the pro tanto duty to obey the law sometimes make it appropriate to engage in civil disobedience of the law (see, e.g., Rawls 1971: ch. 57; Sabl 2001; Markovits 2005; Smith 2011). For example, Rawls argues that while citizens of a “nearly just” society have a pro tanto duty to obey its laws in virtue of it being nearly just, civil disobedience can be justified as a way of making the relevant society more just (Rawls 1971: ch. 57). Similarly, Daniel Markovits argues that members of a society with suitably egalitarian and inclusive democratic procedures have a general duty to obey its laws because they are produced by procedures that are suitably egalitarian and inclusive, but that civil disobedience can be justified as a way of making the relevant procedures more egalitarian or inclusive (Markovits 2005).

It is easy to see why this constitutes an attractive way of justifying civil disobedience, since it justifies it by appeal to the same values that ground the pro tanto duty to obey the law. On the other hand, as Simmons notes, if there is no general duty to obey the law, there would seem to be no presumption in favor of obedience and thus no special need for a justification of civil disobedience; obedience and disobedience would stand equally in need of justification (Simmons 2007: ch 4).

Advocates of the standard approach generally assume that only civil disobedience can be justified in this way. However, some argue civil disobedience does not enjoy a special normative presumption over uncivil disobedience. The core idea that insofar as the values that ground a pro tanto duty to obey the law—for example, justice or democratic equality—are sometimes best served by civil disobedience of the law, they are sometimes best served by covert, evasive, anonymous, or even violent disobedience of the law (Delmas 2018; Lai 2019; Pasternak 2018).

Disagreement about what laws, policies, or principles ought to be implemented is a persistent feature of democratic societies. It is often argued that citizens and officials have duties to moderate their political activity in order to accommodate the competing views of fellow citizens or officials. Two duties of accommodation are widely discussed in the literature: duties of compromise and duties of public justification.

A compromise can be understood as an agreement between parties to advance laws or policies that all regard as suboptimal because they disagree about which laws or policies are optimal (May 2005). While it is widely accepted that there are sometimes compelling instrumental reasons to compromise, whether there are intrinsic moral reasons to compromise is more controversial. Some defend intrinsic reasons to compromise based on democratic values like inclusion, mutual respect, and reciprocity (Gutmann and Thompson 2014; Wendt 2016; Weinstock 2013). However, Simon May argues that such arguments fail and that all reasons to compromise are pragmatic (May 2005).

Advocates of the public justification approach to democracy (see section 2.2.2 ) often argue that democratic citizens and officials have individual moral duties of public justification. John Rawls argues for a “duty of civility” that requires citizens and officials to be prepared to give mutually acceptable justifications for important laws when voting and engaged in public advocacy. Given the inevitability of disagreement about comprehensive moral and philosophical truth in free democracies, the duty of civility requires citizens to appeal to a reasonable “political” conception of justice that can be the object of an “overlapping consensus” between different comprehensive doctrines. While different theorists motivate duties of public justification in different ways, many appeal to the need for exercises of coercive political authority to respect citizens’ freedom and equality.

5. Democratic Representation

Representation is an essential part of the division of labor of large-scale democracies. In this section, we examine two moral questions concerning representation. First, what sort of representative system is best? Second, by what moral principles are representatives bound?

A number of debates have centered on the question of what kinds of representative systems are best for a democratic society. What choice we make here will depend heavily on our underlying moral justification of democracy, our conception of citizenship as well as on our empirical understanding of political institutions and how they function. The most basic types of formal political representation available are single member district representation, proportional representation and group representation. In addition, many societies have opted for multicameral legislative institutions. In some cases, combinations of the above forms have been tried.

Single member district representation returns single representatives of geographically defined areas containing roughly equal populations to the legislature and is prominent in the United States, the United Kingdom, and India, among other places. The most common form of proportional representation is party list proportional representation. In a simple form of such a scheme, a number of parties compete for election to a legislature that is not divided into geographical districts. Parties acquire seats in the legislature as a proportion of the total number of votes they receive in the voting population as a whole. Group representation occurs when the society is divided into non-geographically defined groups such as ethnic or linguistic groups or even functional groups such as workers, farmers and capitalists and returns representatives to a legislature from each of them.

Many have argued in favor of single member district legislation on the grounds that it has appeared to them to lead to more stable government than other forms of representation. The thought is that proportional representation tends to fragment the citizenry into opposing homogeneous camps that rigidly adhere to their party lines and that are continually vying for control over the government. Since there are many parties and they are unwilling to compromise with each other, governments formed from coalitions of parties tend to fall apart rather quickly. The post war experience of governments in Italy appears to confirm this hypothesis. Single member district representation, in contrast, is said to enhance the stability of governments by virtue of its favoring a two party system of government. Each election cycle then determines which party is to stay in power for some length of time.

Charles Beitz argues that single member district representation encourages moderation in party programs offered for citizens to consider (Beitz 1989: ch. 7). This results from the tendency of this kind of representation towards two party systems. In a two party system with majority rule, it is argued, each party must appeal to the median voter in the political spectrum. Hence, they must moderate their programs to appeal to the median voter. Furthermore, they encourage compromise among groups since they must try to appeal to a lot of other groups in order to become part of one of the two leading parties. These tendencies encourage moderation and compromise in citizens to the extent that political parties, and interest groups, hold these qualities up as necessary to functioning well in a democracy.

In criticism, advocates of proportional and group representation have argued that single member district representation tends to muffle the voices and ignore the interests of minority groups in the society (Mill 1861; Christiano 1996). Minority interests and views tend to be articulated in background negotiations and in ways that muffle their distinctiveness. Furthermore, representatives of minority interests and views often have a difficult time getting elected at all in single member district systems so it has been charged that minority views and interests are often systematically underrepresented. Sometimes these problems are dealt with by redrawing the boundaries of districts in a way that ensures greater minority representation. The efforts are invariably quite controversial since there is considerable disagreement about the criteria for apportionment.

In proportional representation, by contrast, representatives of different groups are seated in the legislature in proportion to citizens’ choices. Minorities need not make their demands conform to the basic dichotomy of views and interests that characterize single member district systems so their views are more articulated and distinctive as well as better represented.

Advocates of group representation, like Iris Marion Young, have argued that some historically disenfranchised groups may still not do very well under proportional representation (Young 1990: ch. 6). They may not be able to organize and articulate their views as easily as other groups. Also, minority groups can still be systematically defeated in the legislature and their interests may be consistently set back even if they do have some representation. For these groups, some have argued that the only way to protect their interests is legally to ensure that they have adequate and even disproportionate representation.

One worry about group representation is that it tends to freeze some aspects of the agenda that might be better left to the choice of citizens. For instance, consider a population that is divided into linguistic groups for a long time. And suppose that only some citizens continue to think of linguistic conflict as important. In the circumstances a group representation scheme may tend to be biased in an arbitrary way that favors the views or interests of those who do think of linguistic conflict as important.

What moral norms apply to representatives carrying out their official duties? We can get a better handle on possible answers by introducing Hannah Pitkin’s famous distinction between trustees and delegates (Pitkin 1967). Representatives who act as trustees rely on their own independent judgments in carrying out their duties. Norms of trusteeship are supported in recognition that, given a natural division of democratic labor, officials are in a much better position to make well-reasoned and well-informed political decisions than ordinary citizens.

Representatives who act as delegates defer to the judgments of their citizens. These norms might be thought to reflect the value of democratic accountability. Because the people authorize representatives to govern, it is natural to think that representatives are accountable to the people to enact their judgments. If representatives are not accountable in this way, citizens lose democratic control over their representatives’ actions.

Which norms should win out when they conflict? Pitkin argues that the answer varies by context. This seems plausible. For example, if we take the view that citizens primarily have the role of determining the aims of the society, we might think that representatives ought to be delegates with regard to the aims, but trustees with regard to the ways of realizing the aims (Christiano 1996). See Suzanne Dovi’s discussion of representation for a deeper and more nuanced discussion of these issues.

Kenneth Arrow’s impossibility theorem is thought by some to provide a major set of difficulties for democratic theory (Arrow 1951). William Riker, Russell Hardin, and others have thought that the impossibility theorem shows that there are deep problems with democratic ideals (Riker 1982; Hardin 1999). Neither of these thinkers are opposed to democracy itself, they both think that there are good instrumental reasons for having democracy.

The basic results of social choice theory are laid out in detail elsewhere in the encyclopedia (List 2013). Here we will simply articulate the basic result and an illustration. The question of Arrowian social choice theory is: how do we determine a social preference for a society overall on the basis of the set of the individual preferences of the members? Arrow shows that a social choice function that satisfies a number of plausible constraints cannot be defined when there are three or more alternatives to be chosen by the group. He lays out a number of conditions to be imposed on a social choice function. Unlimited domain : The social choice function must be able to give us a social preference no matter what the preferences of the individuals over alternatives are. Non dictatorship : the social choice function must not select the preference of one particular member regardless of others’ preferences. Transitivity and completeness : The individual preferences orderings must be transitive and complete orderings and the social preference derived from them must be transitive and complete. Independence of irrelevant alternatives : the social preference between two alternatives must be the result only of the individual orderings between those two alternatives. Pareto condition : if all the members prefer an alternative x over y , then x must be ranked above y in the social preference. The theorem says that no social choice function over more than two alternatives can satisfy all of these conditions.

A useful illustration of this idea involves an extension of majority rule to cases of more than two alternatives. The Condorcet rule says that an alternative x wins when, for every other alternative, a majority prefers x over that alternative. For example, suppose we have three persons A , B and C and three alternatives x , y and z . A prefers x over y , y over z ; B prefers y over z and z over x ; C prefers x over z and z over y . In this case, x is the Condorcet winner since it beats y , and it beats z . The problem with this plausible sounding rule is the case of a majority cycle. Suppose you have three persons A , B and C , and three alternatives, x , y and z . In the case in which A prefers x over y and y over z , while B prefers y over z and z over x , and C prefers z over x and x over y , the Condorcet rule will yield a social preference of x over y , y over z and z over x . One can see here that the Condorcet rule satisfies all the conditions except transitivity of social preference. One way to avoid intransitivity is to restrict the domain of preferences from which the social preference arises. Another is to introduce cardinal information that compares the how much people prefer alternatives (violating independence). Another might be to make one person a dictator. So, this case nicely illustrates that one cannot satisfy all of the constraints simultaneously.

Riker argues that the theorem shows that the idea that the popular will can be the governing element in a society is false. If an existence condition for a popular will is a restricted set of preferences the question naturally arises as to whether such a condition is always or normally met in a moderately complex society. We might wonder whether a highly pluralistic society with a very complex division of labor is likely to satisfy the restricted preference set condition necessary to avoid cycles or other pathologies of social choice. Some have argued that we have empirical evidence to the effect that modern societies do normally satisfy such conditions (Mackie 2003). Others have argued that this seems unlikely (Riker 1982; Ingham 2019). This is not merely a defense of unlimited domain. It is a defense of the thesis that normally the collections of preferences in modern societies are not likely to have the properties that enable them to avoid cycles.

The fairness critique from social choice theory is based on the idea that when a voting process meets requirements of fairness, the fairness of the process and the preferences may not generate determinate outcomes. If cycles are pervasive, the outcomes of democratic processes may be determined by clever strategies and not by the fairness of the procedures (Riker 1982). Three remarks are in order here. First, it is compatible with the process being completely fair that the outcomes of the process are indeterminate. After all, coin flips are fair. Second, there is some question as to how prominent the cycles are. Third, one might think that if the conditions which enable opposing sides to strategize effectively are themselves roughly equal, then the concerns for fairness are fully met. If resources for persuasion and organization are distributed in an egalitarian way, perhaps the fairness account is vindicated after all. This point can be made more compelling when we consider Sean Ingham’s account of political equality. He includes intensity of preference in his account of fairness. This is a departure from the Arrowian approach, but it is in many ways a realistic one. The idea is that majorities have equal control over policy areas when they are able to get what they want with the same amount of intensity of preferences. And equality holds generally when all groups of the same size have the same control (Ingham 2019). There remains an extreme case in which all majorities have equal intensity of preference and are caught in a majority cycle. But the chances of this happening are very slim, even if the chances of majority cycles more generally are not as small. Even if there are a lot of majority cycles, if the issues are resolved in such a way that those majorities that have most at stake in the conflict are the ones that get their way, then we can have fairness in a quite robust sense even while having pervasive majority cycles.

If democratic societies allow members to participate as equals in collective decision making, a natural question arises: who has the right to participate in making collective decisions? We can ask this question within a particular jurisdiction (ought all adults have the right to participation? Ought children have the right to participation? Ought all residents have such rights?). But we can also ask what the extent of the jurisdiction ought to be. How many of the people in the world ought to be included in the collective decision-making? An easy, though slightly misleading, way of asking this question is, what ought the physical boundaries of a particular institution of collective decision-making be? We see partially democratic societies within the confines of the modern nation-state. But we might ask, why should we restrict the set of persons who participate in making decisions of the modern state just to those who happen to be the physical inhabitants of those states? Surely there are many other persons affected by decisions made by democratic states aside from those persons. For example, activities in one society A can pollute another society B . Why shouldn’t the members of B have a say in the decisions regarding the polluting activities in A ? And there can be many other effects that activities in A can have on B .

Some have suggested that the boundaries of a state ought to be determined through a principle of national self-determination. We identify a nation as an ongoing group of persons who share certain cultural, historical and political norms and who identify with each other and with a piece of land. Then we determine the boundaries of the territory by appeal to the size of the group of people and the land they cherish (Miller 1995; Song 2012). This is an appealing idea in many ways: shared nationality breeds a willingness to share the sacrifices that arise from collective decision making; it generates a sense of at-homeness for people. But it is hard to use as a general principle for dividing land among persons when one of the central facts for many societies is that a diversity of nations, ethnic groups and cultures co-mingle on the very same land.

Is there a democratic solution to the boundary problem? A number of ideas have been suggested. The first idea is that the people ought to decide what the boundaries are. But this suggestion, while it may be a pragmatic resolution to the problem, seems to beg the question about who the members are and who are not (Whelan 1983).

A second theoretical solution that has some democratic credentials is to invoke the principle that all who are subjected to decision making, in the sense of who are coerced or have duties imposed upon them, ought to have a say in the decision making (Abizadeh 2008). This principle is plausible enough, but it doesn’t get at enough cases. The pollution case above is not a case of subjection.

A third proposed theoretical solution is the all-affected principle. One formulation is “all affected persons ought to have a say in the decisions that affect them”. This does suggest that when the activities in one state affect those of another state, the people of the other state ought to have a say in those activities. Some have thought that this principle tends to lead to a kind of politically cosmopolitan principle in support of world government (Goodin 2007).

But the all-affected principle is conceptually quite uncertain and morally deeply problematic, and it provides very little, if anything, in the way of a solution to the boundary problem.

First, “having a say” is not clear. Does it require having a vote in collective decision-making? Or is it also satisfied by a person’s being able to modify another’s action by negotiating with them, as we see when there is bargaining over an externality? This latter version would undermine the idea that the all-affected principle has direct implications for the boundary problem. When the United States permits activities that produce acid rain in Canada, Canada can negotiate with the United States to lessen the production of acid rain and/or to compensate Canada for the harm. As long as there is a fair and effective system of negotiation, this would seem to satisfy the all-affected principle without giving Canadians a vote in American politics or Americans a vote in Canadian politics.

Second, it is not clear what “being affected” means. One, does a person being affected just mean that there is a change in the person’s situation or must the effect involve the setting back of one’s preferences, or interests, or legitimate interests, or exercise of one’s capacities or one’s good? Two, are one’s interests affected by a decision only when they are advanced or set back relative to some baseline (either the present state of affairs or some morally defined baseline like what you have promised me), or am I affected by decisions that could be to my advantage or disadvantage but end up making no difference? For example, if I am drowning in a pool and you are deciding whether to save me or go buy yourself a candy bar, am I affected by your buying the candy bar? If I am not affected when no change occurs, then who is affected by a decision often depends on who participates in the decision and we have no solution to the problem of inclusion. If I am affected, then the principle has some quite extraordinary implications. Now it turns out that impoverished persons in South Asia are affected by my buying a candy bar, since I could have sent the money to them (Goodin 2007).

The all-affected principle is a merely suggestive and rhetorically effective phrase. It is a conversation starter and a list of topics to be discussed, not a genuine principle. For example, if I must include everyone possibly affected by my decision for every decision I make, I will not be able to make many decisions and my decision making will no longer enable me to give a shape to my own life and my relations with others. My life becomes fragmented and lacks integrity (Williams 1973). An analog of this problem would arise for political societies, presumably. Each society would have to include a variety of different persons in each decision. It is hard to see how any society could take on any particular character if this is the case.

A more plausible principle that encompasses some of the suggestions of the all-affected principle is that a framework of institutions should be set up so that people have power to advance and protect their legitimate interests in life.

But if we understand the principle in this way, it is not clear that it helps us much with the boundary problem. First of all, there are different ways in which people can be said to possess power over their lives. One kind of power is the power to participate as an equal in a collective decision-making process. Another kind is to be able to advance one’s interests in a decentralized process like a market or a system of agreement making like international law. Recalling our pollution problem above, we could give the state of which they are members power to negotiate with the polluting state terms that are mutually agreeable. Only the power to participate as an equal in collective decision-making involves the boundaries of collective decision-making.

Another solution to the boundary problem is a conservative one. The basic idea is to keep the boundaries of states roughly as they are except if there is a pressing need to change them. Trying to alter the boundaries of political societies is a recipe for serious conflict because there is no institution that has the legitimacy or power actually to resolve problems at an international level and there is likely to be a lot of disagreement on how to do it. States as we know them, are by far the most powerful political entities in the international system. They have developed more effective practices of accountability of power than any other entity in the system. They have created unified societies with highly interdependent populations. Finally, states and the individuals in them can be made accountable to some degree to other individuals and states through the process of negotiation and international law making. The origin of these boundaries may be arbitrary, but it is not, for all that, irrelevant. To be sure, there are clear cases where borders can be changed. One source of pressing need is serious injustice within a country. Another might be the existence of permanent minorities that are sectionally defined. Here, we ask only how to revise boundaries and the basis of such revision is that it is a remedy for serious injustice (Buchanan 1991).

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4.1: What is Democracy?

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• Dino Bozonelos, Julia Wendt, Charlotte Lee, Jessica Scarffe, Masahiro Omae, Josh Franco, Byran Martin, & Stefan Veldhuis
• Victor Valley College, Berkeley City College, Allan Hancock College, San Diego City College, Cuyamaca College, Houston Community College, and Long Beach City College via ASCCC Open Educational Resources Initiative (OERI)

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Learning Objectives

By the end of this section, you will be able to:

• Define democracy.
• Recognize the origins and characteristics of democracies.
• Distinguish between (the) types of democracy.

Introduction

“Many forms of Government have been tried, and will be tried in this world of sin and woe. No one pretends that democracy is perfect or all-wise. Indeed it has been said that democracy is the worst form of Government except for all those other forms that have been tried from time to time.…” — Winston Churchill, November 11th, 1947

More than half of the governments currently in existence operate under some variation of democracy. The global trends towards democratization worldwide during the twentieth century prompted some to conclude that democracy is simply the best, or most ideal, form of government. Indeed, near the end of the twentieth century, political scientist Francis Fukuyama wrote a book entitled, The End of History and the Last Man , where he argued humanity had reached the end of history because many countries had adopted forms of liberal democracy. His book was a best-seller which energized many about the prospects of a world which embraces democracy and will not again suffer the likes of major World Wars and conflicts. Twenty years after this publication, however, and in light of events like the September 11th attacks on the United States, the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan, the rise of China, the backsliding of Russia, the COVID-19 pandemic and the eventual fall of Afghanistan back to authoritarian rule, Fukuyama mostly retracted his conclusion that the world had accepted democracy as the standard. Instead, he now asserts that issues related to political identity now threaten the security of geo-political stability. The many challenges facing democracy, democratization, and democratic backsliding (discussed in Chapter 5), prompts us to take a hard look at democracy, its types, its institutions and models, and various manifestations throughout the world. Is democracy the best form of government? What are its advantages and disadvantages?

Francis Fukuyama is an American Political Scientist, economist, and author of books and journal articles. From left to right, his 1992 book, The End of History and the Last Man, prompted discussion over whether the world had reached the end of history because so many countries had been adopting liberal democracy as their form of government. One of his more recent books, Identity: The Demand for Dignity and the Politics of Resentment, came out in 2018, and his conclusions began veering away from the belief that the world had accepted liberal democracy. Instead, political identity and the weight of historical disputes potentially impede global geopolitical potential for long-term peace.

Origins, Definitions and Characteristics of Democracy

Although there is evidence of what anthropologists have designated primitive democracy , wherein small communities have face-to-face discussions in order to make decisions, as far back as 2,500 years ago, the first formal application of democratic institutions and processes is generally attributed to ancient Greece. Athens, Greece is generally credited with being the birthplace of democracy. In its simplest terms, democracy is a government system in which the supreme power of government is vested in the people. Democracy comes from the Greek word, dēmokratiā, where “demos” means “people”, and “kratos” meaning “power” or “rule.” Prior to the formation of legal reforms, Athens had operated as an aristocracy.

An aristocracy is a form of government where power is held by nobility or those concerned to be of the highest classes within a society. Aristocracy proved troublesome for Athens, and the people eventually rallied under an Athenian leader named Solon (circa 640 - 560 B.C.E.). In trying to meet the demands of the people, Solon attempted to satisfy all classes of the Athenian population, rich and poor alike, to devise a form of government which satisfied all. To this end, in 594 B.C.E., Solon created legal reforms and a constitution, which provided the foundations for citizen participation in government affairs, and abolished slavery of Athenian citizens. Under this construct, adult males who had completed their military training were given the right to vote, and as much as 20% of the population was considered to be active in making laws. Eventually, democracy in Athens failed, due to both internal and external factors. Internally, there was heavy criticism that the aristocracy was still in force, and able to pervert and manipulate legal outcomes to their own benefit. Further, the works of Socrates, Plato and Aristotle, all of whom were critical of the merits and feasibility of democracy, led to the erosion of trust in democracy in Athens. Generally, Socrates, Plato and Aristotle, though they had their own unique critiques of democracy, tended to value political stability over the potential of “rule of the mob.” Externally, and tied to the prospect of political stability, Athens faced frequent challenges to its democracy from the outside. The Peloponnesian War, the changes in leadership from King Phillip II of Macedon and Alexander the Great, and finally, the rise of the Roman Empire, all are also attributed to the eventual decline of democracy in ancient Greece. After the fall of democracy in Greece, the prospect of democracy did not re-emerge as a feasible, or even desired, option until the early modern era in the 1600s.

Ancient concepts and manifestations of democracy differ greatly from modern conceptualization and application of democracy. One of the key differences is in the way power from the people is channeled; the difference becomes apparent in comparing a direct democracy versus an indirect democracy. A direct democracy enables citizens to vote directly, or participate directly, in the formation of laws, public policy and government decisions. In this system, citizens personally get involved in all aspects of politics, and are able to change constitutional laws, recommend referendums and make suggestions for laws, and mandate the activities and actions of government officials. To some extent, Athens exercised a direct democracy in that adult male citizens, who had completed their military training, could participate directly in the making of laws. It was not a 'perfect' democracy in that not all citizens, male and female, rich and poor, could participate, but it did have a mechanism for a certain class of citizen participating, i.e. males. In contrast, indirect democracy channels the power of the people through representation, where citizens elect representatives to make laws and government decisions on their behalf. In this scenario, citizens of the country are granted suffrage , which is the right to vote in political elections and propose referendums. In a healthy democracy, elections are both free and fair . Free elections are those where all citizens are able to vote for the candidate of their choice. The election is free if all citizens who meet the requirements to vote (e.g. are of lawful age and meet the citizenship requirements, if they exist), are not prevented from participating in the election process. Fair elections are those in which all votes carry equal weight, are counted accurately, and the election results are able to be accepted by parties. Ideally, the following standards are met to ensure elections are free and fair:

Before the Election

• Eligible citizens are able to register to vote;
• Voters are given access to reliable information about the ballot and the elections;
• Citizens are able to run for office.

During the Election

• All voters have access to a polling station or some method of casting their vote;
• Voters are able to vote free from intimidation;
• The voting process is free of fraud and tampering.

After the Election

• Ballots are accurately counted and the results are announced;
• The results of the election are accepted / respected / honored.

The integrity of the election is of paramount importance in democracies, for if the process is not found to be free or fair, it violates the core principles of what constitutes a democracy: by the people, for the people.

Indirect democracy is what most democratic countries today practice, partly because of logistics (In the U.S., how would every single adult citizen directly participate in the making of laws? Would requiring a vote for every decision be time efficient?), and to another extent, a question over whether voting is always the best option for determining just, equitable or ideal outcomes. In a representative democracy, citizens, to some extent, outsource the power of lawmaking to those who, ideally, either have expertise in making laws or who may be granted a greater depth of information in order to make decisions.In this sense, not every citizen necessarily wants to be involved in every government decision, but would prefer selecting a representative to getting political work done. Further, although most democratic countries do practice indirect democracy, there are often some mechanisms that align with some characteristics of a direct democracy. For instance, the U.S. has a representative democracy, but voters in some states have the ability to put forth initiatives and referendums, also referred to as Ballot Propositions. Overall, democracy’s definition, if practiced as indirect democracy, can be understood as: a government system in which the supreme power of the government is vested in the people, and exercised by the people through a system of representation which includes the continued practice of holding free and fair elections.

Importantly, democracy has a number of characteristics which can be central to understanding the variation in democracies that exist worldwide today. These differences also highlight the difference between concepts of ancient democracy versus contemporary democracy. Ancient democracy had no concept or foundations for widespread suffrage or the protection of civil liberties. Some of these modern accepted democratic themes include (but are not limited to): free, fair and regular elections (ideally, with the inclusion of more than one viable political party), respect for civil liberties (freedom of religion, speech, the press, peaceful assembly; freedom to criticize the government) as well as the protection of civil rights (freedom from discrimination based on various characteristics deemed important in society). Democracies which not only facilitate free and fair elections, but also ensure the protection of civil liberties are called liberal democracies . Although these are the general themes, there is still ample debate among scholars about the importance and weight of these characteristics. Larry Diamond, an American political sociologist and a scholar of democratic studies, put forth the following four characteristics which make a democracy, a democracy. A democracy must include:

• A system for choosing and replacing the government through free and fair elections;
• Active participation of the people, as citizens, in politics and civic life;
• The protection of human rights of all citizens;
• A rule of law in which the laws and procedures apply equally to all citizens. (Diamond 2004)

Karl Popper, an Austrian-British academic and philosopher (whom you may recognize from Chapter 2 for his work on the nature of inquiry and the recognition of falsification theory), had a more blunt definition for democracy, “I personally call the type of government which can be removed without violence ‘democracy,’ and the other, ‘tyranny.’ (Popper 2002). Instead of citing specific characteristics of democracy, which Popper was hesitant to do given the wide variation in democracies that exist, he simply contrasted it with outright tyranny. In general, Popper emphasized the importance not in how the people could exercise authority, but that they have access, availability and opportunity, through some means, to control their leaders without violence, retribution or revolution.

Other scholars have noted more rigid qualifications for democracy. In looking at the world of Robert Dahl, Ian Shapiro and Jose Antonio Cheibub, all political scientists, they assert that every vote in a representative democracy must carry equal weight, and that the rights of citizens must be equally protected by a well-defined and clear “law of the land;” in most cases, the “law of the land,” rests with a written constitution. The rights and liberties of citizens must be protected by the law of the land. (Dahl, Shapiro, Cheibub, 2003)

Overall, there are hundreds of critiques and frameworks for defining democracies and noting its characteristics, and scholars are generally not in full agreement on what constitutes a perfect democracy. Nevertheless, reaching some consensus on the characteristics is important if scholars want to advance the understanding of regime types like democracy. The difference in perception of democracy can be seen in how some organizations choose to measure democracy across countries. At present, there are at least eight organizations which attempt to quantify the existence and health of democracies worldwide. These eight include: Freedom House, Economist Intelligence Unit, V-Dem, the Human Freedom Index, Polity IV, World Governance Indicators, Democracy Barometer, and Vanhanen’s Polyarchy Index. In Table 4.1.1, a few of these are highlighted based on what they identify as main characteristics of democracy. This table shows the differences in components considered when trying to measure democracy. From left to right, Freedom House, Economist Intelligence Unit, and Varieties of Democracy; all are organizations which attempt to determine whether countries are democratic and assess the strength of their democratic institutions.

Table 4.1.1 : Measuring Democracy

The different organizations, choosing different areas of emphasis and weight for characteristics of democracy, yield different outcomes in terms of identifying whether a country is a democracy, as well as judging the healthiness of a democracy. For instance, as of 2018, the Varieties of Democracies Project finds there are currently 99 democracies, and 80 autocracies. Autocracies are forms of government where countries are ruled either by a single person or group, who/which holds total power and control. For this same time-period, the Polity IV Index disagrees, finding 57 full democracies, 28 mixed-regime types, and 13 autocratic regimes. Importantly, the Polity IV Index does not take suffrage into consideration as a meaningful indicator of democracy. Freedom House also arrives at different outcomes for this same time-period, asserting that 86 countries are democracies, with 109 non-democracies. Finally, the Economist Intelligence Unit found 20 countries to be fully democratic, and 55 countries have “flawed democracies.” Given that scholars and these organizations have acknowledged that different types of democracies exist, it is now useful to discuss these types, as well as the implications for these types on the institution of democracy.

The number of democracies has significantly grown worldwide since 1900. Political scientists have sometimes called jumps in the number of democracies ‘waves.’ In this way, there have been three major waves of democratization: World War I (First wave, 1828-1926), with subsequent “waves” of democratization coming following World War II (Second wave) and the democratic transitions in Portugal, Spain and Latin American in the 1970s (Third wave).

Types of Democracy

The different organizations, choosing different areas of emphasis and weight for characteristics of democracy, yield different outcomes in terms of identifying whether a country is a democracy, as well as judging the healthiness of a democracy. For instance, as of 2018, the Varieties of Democracies Project finds there are currently 99 democracies, and 80 autocracies. Recall, autocracies are forms of government where countries are ruled either by a single person or group, who/which holds total power and control. For this same time-period, the Polity IV Index disagrees, finding 57 full democracies, 28 mixed-regime types, and 13 autocratic regimes. Importantly, the Polity IV Index does not take suffrage into consideration as a meaningful indicator of democracy. Freedom House also arrives at different outcomes for this same time-period, asserting that 86 countries are democracies, with 109 non-democracies. Finally, the Economist Intelligence Unit found 20 countries to be fully democratic, and 55 countries have “flawed democracies.” Given that scholars and these organizations have acknowledged that different types of democracies exist, it is now useful to discuss these types, as well as the implications for these types on the institution of democracy.

Democracy Essay for Students and Children

500+ words essay on democracy.

Democracy is known as the finest form of government. Why so? Because in a democracy, the people of the country choose their government. They enjoy certain rights which are very essential for any human being to live freely and happily. There are various democratic countries in the world , but India is the largest one. Democracy has withstood the test of time, and while other forms have the government has failed, democracy stood strong. It has time and again proved its importance and impact.

Significance of a Democracy

Democracy is very important for human development . When people have free will to live freely, they will be happier. Moreover, we have seen how other forms of government have turned out to be. Citizens are not that happy and prosperous in a monarchy or anarchy.

Furthermore, democracy lets people have equal rights. This ensures that equality prevails all over the country. Subsequently, it also gives them duties. These duties make them better citizens and are also important for their overall development.

Most importantly, in a democracy, the people form the government. So, this selection of the government by the citizens gives everyone a chance to work for their country. It allows the law to prevail efficiently as the rules are made by people whom they have selected.

In addition, democracy allows people of various religions and cultures to exist peacefully. It makes them live in harmony with one another. People of democracy are more tolerant and accepting of each other’s differences. This is very important for any country to be happy and prosper.

Get the huge list of more than 500 Essay Topics and Ideas

India: A Democratic Country

India is known to be the largest democracy all over the world. After the rule of the British ended in 1947 , India adopted democracy. In India, all the citizens who are above the age of 18 get the right to vote. It does not discriminate on the basis of caste, creed, gender, color, or more.

Although India is the largest democracy it still has a long way to go. The country faces a lot of problems which do not let it efficiently function as a democracy. The caste system is still prevalent which hampers with the socialist principle of democracy. Moreover, communalism is also on the rise. This interferes with the secular aspect of the country. All these differences need to be set aside to ensure the happiness and prosperity of the citizens.

In short, democracy in India is still better than that in most of the countries. Nonetheless, there is a lot of room for improvement which we must focus on. The government must implement stringent laws to ensure no discrimination takes place. In addition, awareness programs must be held to make citizens aware of their rights and duties.

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US government and civics

Course: us government and civics   >   unit 1.

• The social contract
• Democratic ideals of US government
• The ideas at the heart of US government
• Democratic ideals in the Declaration of Independence

Democratic ideals in the Declaration of Independence and the Constitution

The declaration of independence.

• Democratic ideals in the Preamble to the US Constitution
• The Preamble to the Constitution
• Ideals of democracy: lesson overview
• Ideals of democracy

• The Declaration of Independence and the Constitution are documents that provide the ideological foundations for the democratic government of the United States.
• The Declaration of Independence provides a foundation for the concept of popular sovereignty , the idea that the government exists to serve the people, who elect representatives to express their will.
• The US Constitution outlines the blueprint for the US governmental system, which strives to balance individual liberty with public order.

National treasures

• That all humans are born with “natural rights,” including the right to protect their lives, liberty, and property
• That government is a “social contract” between people and their rulers, which can be dissolved if rulers fail to promote the people’s welfare

“We hold these truths to be self-evident, that all men are created equal, that they are endowed by their Creator with certain unalienable Rights, that among these are Life, Liberty, and the pursuit of Happiness.

— That to secure these rights, Governments are instituted among Men, deriving their just powers from the consent of the governed,

— That whenever any Form of Government becomes destructive of these ends, it is the Right of the People to alter or to abolish it, and to institute new Government, laying its foundation on such principles and organizing its powers in such form, as to them shall seem most likely to effect their Safety and Happiness.”

The Constitution

“We the People of the United States, in Order to form a more perfect Union, establish Justice, insure domestic Tranquility, provide for the common defence, promote the general Welfare, and secure the Blessings of Liberty to ourselves and our Posterity, do ordain and establish this Constitution for the United States of America.”

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Democracy as the Best Form of Government Essay

A democracy is a form of governance characterized by power sharing. The implication of this is that all the citizens have an equal voice in the way a nation is governed. This often encompasses either direct or indirect involvement in lawmaking. “Democracy” can be a very delicate subject for any writer.

Throughout history, various scholars, including ancient philosophers, have had a divergent view on whether democracy is the best form of governance (Kelsen 3). Some of these arguments are discussed in this essay. Democracy appears to go hand in hand with national unity.

This is particularly true because this form of governance is all about people, and these people are working together towards attainment of national goals. The cohesiveness also results from the freedom prevailing in a democratic environment. Unity and liberty in a nation lay a fertile ground for economic and social growth (Weatherford 121).

In a democratic form of government, the entire citizenry is cushioned against exploitation and all form of abuse. As opposed to other governance approaches (for instance monarchy and dictatorship), democracy engages the people in decision-making processes. This ensures efficient delivery of basic services such as education, health care, and security.

Moreover, these services will be of high quality. Having people govern themselves significantly minimizes the risk of running a nation into chaos. In operational democracies, policies must undergo thorough scrutiny by many organs of government and stakeholders before they are made laws. The modalities of implementing the laws are also carefully determined.

In such a corporate system, it would be rare for all the involved people to be wrong. Therefore democracy protects a nation against the consequences of human errors. As a consequence of reduced possibility for human errors, people will experience a nation devoid of civil wars and strife. This atmosphere, in turn, perpetuates the general growth of a nation.

Democracy acts as a framework within which the law about the basic human rights operates (Barak 27). In a democratic environment, the law gives equal entitlement to the bill of rights with total disregard of race, ethnicity or economic class.

On the other hand, democracy may not be worth the high status it has been accorded for centuries by many schools of thought. Democracy gives an opportunity for all citizens to vote (Williamson 36). This can be technically hazardous to a nation. An average voter is not adequately equipped with the necessary information on the economic and political aspects of a nation.

The direct implication is that a fairly large percentage of voters will base their choice on limited and incorrect information. This situation can greatly impair development. Democratic approaches tend to slow down the process of policy-making and implementation (Dahl 49). This is due to the bureaucracies associated with democracy.

For example, it may take twelve months for parliament to debate over a bill, pass it into law and fully enforce it. In a dictatorial system, however, the same process would take utmost one day. For many years, democracy has been synonymous with political instability (Snell 18). The high turnover rate of governments comes with drastic changes in national and international policies.

New governments tend to attract much criticism from the media and non-governmental bodies. This criticism and alteration of international relations policies keep off foreign investors, something that can have immense economic implications to a nation.

The seemingly most feared danger of democracy relates to the basic rights of the minority. A case in point is the Netherlands. The Dutch parliament enacted a law against female genital mutilation. The Somali living in the Netherlands could not have a say in this because they are a small group.

In conclusion, the name a government gives itself is immaterial. Whether a government calls itself democratic, anarchy, monarchy, or dictatorial, the most important question should be “Are the people getting back what they deserve?”

Works Cited

Barak, Aharon. The Judge in a Democracy . New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 2006. Print.

Dahl, Robert. Democracy and its Critics. New Haven: Yale University Press, 1989. Print.

Kelsen, Hans. “Foundations of Democracy.” Ethics 66.1 (1955):1–101.

Snell, Daniel. Flight and Freedom in the Ancient Near East . Leiden: Brill Publishers, 2001. Print.

Weatherford, McIver. Indian givers: how the Indians of the America transformed the world . New York: Fawcett Columbine, 1988. Print.

Williamson, Thames. Problems in American Democracy . Montana: Kessinger Publishing, 2004. Print.

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Essay on Democracy in 100, 300 and 500 Words

• Updated on  
• Jan 15, 2024

The oldest account of democracy can be traced back to 508–507 BCC Athens . Today there are over 50 different types of democracy across the world. But, what is the ideal form of democracy? Why is democracy considered the epitome of freedom and rights around the globe? Let’s explore what self-governance is and how you can write a creative and informative essay on democracy and its significance. 

Today, India is the largest democracy with a population of 1.41 billion and counting. Everyone in India above the age of 18 is given the right to vote and elect their representative. Isn’t it beautiful, when people are given the option to vote for their leader, one that understands their problems and promises to end their miseries? This is just one feature of democracy , for we have a lot of samples for you in the essay on democracy. Stay tuned!

Can you answer these questions in under 5 minutes? Take the Ultimate GK Quiz to find out!

This Blog Includes:

What is democracy , sample essay on democracy (100 words), sample essay on democracy (250 to 300 words), sample essay on democracy for upsc (500 words).

Democracy is a form of government in which the final authority to deliberate and decide the legislation for the country lies with the people, either directly or through representatives. Within a democracy, the method of decision-making, and the demarcation of citizens vary among countries. However, some fundamental principles of democracy include the rule of law, inclusivity, political deliberations, voting via elections , etc. 

Did you know: On 15th August 1947, India became the world’s largest democracy after adopting the Indian Constitution and granting fundamental rights to its citizens?

Must Explore: Human Rights Courses for Students 

Must Explore: NCERT Notes on Separation of Powers in a Democracy

Democracy where people make decisions for the country is the only known form of governance in the world that promises to inculcate principles of equality, liberty and justice. The deliberations and negotiations to form policies and make decisions for the country are the basis on which the government works, with supreme power to people to choose their representatives, delegate the country’s matters and express their dissent. The democratic system is usually of two types, the presidential system, and the parliamentary system. In India, the three pillars of democracy, namely legislature, executive and judiciary, working independently and still interconnected, along with a free press and media provide a structure for a truly functional democracy. Despite the longest-written constitution incorporating values of sovereignty, socialism, secularism etc. India, like other countries, still faces challenges like corruption, bigotry, and oppression of certain communities and thus, struggles to stay true to its democratic ideals.

Did you know: Some of the richest countries in the world are democracies?

Must Read : Consumer Rights in India

Must Read: Democracy and Diversity Class 10

As Abraham Lincoln once said, “democracy is the government of the people, by the people and for the people.” There is undeniably no doubt that the core of democracies lies in making people the ultimate decision-makers. With time, the simple definition of democracy has evolved to include other principles like equality, political accountability, rights of the citizens and to an extent, values of liberty and justice. Across the globe, representative democracies are widely prevalent, however, there is a major variation in how democracies are practised. The major two types of representative democracy are presidential and parliamentary forms of democracy. Moreover, not all those who present themselves as a democratic republic follow its values.

Many countries have legally deprived some communities of living with dignity and protecting their liberty, or are practising authoritarian rule through majoritarianism or populist leaders. Despite this, one of the things that are central and basic to all is the practice of elections and voting. However, even in such a case, the principles of universal adult franchise and the practice of free and fair elections are theoretically essential but very limited in practice, for a democracy. Unlike several other nations, India is still, at least constitutionally and principally, a practitioner of an ideal democracy.

With our three organs of the government, namely legislative, executive and judiciary, the constitutional rights to citizens, a multiparty system, laws to curb discrimination and spread the virtues of equality, protection to minorities, and a space for people to discuss, debate and dissent, India has shown a commitment towards democratic values. In recent times, with challenges to freedom of speech, rights of minority groups and a conundrum between the protection of diversity and unification of the country, the debate about the preservation of democracy has become vital to public discussion.

Did you know: In countries like Brazil, Scotland, Switzerland, Argentina, and Austria the minimum voting age is 16 years?

Also Read: Difference Between Democracy and Dictatorship

Democracy originated from the Greek word dēmokratiā , with dēmos ‘people’ and Kratos ‘rule.’ For the first time, the term appeared in the 5th century BC to denote the political systems then existing in Greek city-states, notably Classical Athens, to mean “rule of the people.” It now refers to a form of governance where the people have the right to participate in the decision-making of the country. Majorly, it is either a direct democracy where citizens deliberate and make legislation while in a representative democracy, they choose government officials on their behalf, like in a parliamentary or presidential democracy.

The presidential system (like in the USA) has the President as the head of the country and the government, while the parliamentary system (like in the UK and India) has both a Prime Minister who derives its legitimacy from a parliament and even a nominal head like a monarch or a President.

The notions and principle frameworks of democracy have evolved with time. At the core, lies the idea of political discussions and negotiations. In contrast to its alternatives like monarchy, anarchy, oligarchy etc., it is the one with the most liberty to incorporate diversity. The ideas of equality, political representation to all, active public participation, the inclusion of dissent, and most importantly, the authority to the law by all make it an attractive option for citizens to prefer, and countries to follow.

The largest democracy in the world, India with the lengthiest constitution has tried and to an extent, successfully achieved incorporating the framework to be a functional democracy. It is a parliamentary democratic republic where the President is head of the state and the Prime minister is head of the government. It works on the functioning of three bodies, namely legislative, executive, and judiciary. By including the principles of a sovereign, socialist, secular and democratic republic, and undertaking the guidelines to establish equality, liberty and justice, in the preamble itself, India shows true dedication to achieving the ideal.

It has formed a structure that allows people to enjoy their rights, fight against discrimination or any other form of suppression, and protect their rights as well. The ban on all and any form of discrimination, an independent judiciary, governmental accountability to its citizens, freedom of media and press, and secular values are some common values shared by all types of democracies.

Across the world, countries have tried rooting their constitution with the principles of democracy. However, the reality is different. Even though elections are conducted everywhere, mostly, they lack freedom of choice and fairness. Even in the world’s greatest democracies, there are challenges like political instability, suppression of dissent, corruption , and power dynamics polluting the political sphere and making it unjust for the citizens. Despite the consensus on democracy as the best form of government, the journey to achieve true democracy is both painstaking and tiresome. 

Did you know: Countries like Singapore, Peru, and Brazil have compulsory voting?

Must Read: Democracy and Diversity Class 10 Notes

Democracy is a process through which the government of a country is elected by and for the people.

Yes, India is a democratic country and also holds the title of the world’s largest democracy.

Direct and Representative Democracy are the two major types of Democracy.

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What ails American democracy, and what to do about it

Harvard Kennedy School scholars examine threats and responses.

Harvard Kennedy School faculty share insights into the evident fragility of American democratic norms and institutions following the attack on the United States Capitol by followers of President Trump. These essays examine the nature and scale of the threat and weigh potential avenues for protecting and nurturing democracy. They were written before the U.S. House of Representatives impeached President Trump on Wednesday for the second time.

• Nicholas Burns
• Cornell William Brooks
• Joan Donovan
• Thomas Patterson
• Tarek Masoud
• Archon Fung
• Pippa Norris

Allies fret and foes gloat at the homegrown threats to American democracy

Nicholas Burns, Roy and Barbara Goodman Family Professor of the Practice of Diplomacy and International Relations

Fragility, white nationalism, and redemptive healing

The second thing that I think is incredibly important is this notion that white nationalism is a threat to the black and brown ‘they’, as opposed to an existential threat to the multi-racial multi-ethnic ‘we the people.’ It's clear here that what happened last week is a threat to democracy itself. Not they, not them, but us.

Last point here that I'm still processing as a human being, not as a member of the Kennedy school faculty, but as a human being, as a moral being, is this notion that healing can be harmful or that healing can be redemptive. In other words, this impatient call for the country to heal, to come together, to paper over the differences, to paper over the divisions, to paper over the violence that we were subject to both morally and physically, is offensive. And this is in fact a common response to this challenge. 

[But] healing can be redemptive, which is to say that we can patiently process as we're doing today what we've come through, the ways in which our sensibilities have been violated; the degree to which many of us feel physically vulnerable. For those of us on this call who have been subject to death threats, who have been subject to racist thoughts and hate, this was a moment of vulnerability.

(Excerpt from Kennedy School community online discussion ) 

Cornell William Brooks, Hauser Professor of the Practice of Nonprofit Organizations; Professor of the Practice of Public Leadership and Social Justice

Curbing the deadly damage caused by misinformation

Joan Donovan, adjunct lecturer in public policy, research director, Shorenstein Center on Media, Politics and Public Policy 

The GOP’s record of undermining democracy predates Trump election claims

When it became clear that mail-in balloting might benefit Biden and other Democratic candidates, Republicans claimed without a shred of evidence that it was riddled with fraud and then obstructed it. Texas’s Republican governor limited each of the state’s counties to a single drop-off location, seeking to suppress the vote in heavily populated Democratic counties. Montana and North Carolina were among the Republican states that sought to limit mail-in voting . The Trump administration cut Postal Service funding in hope that mail-in ballots would arrive too late to be counted. 

The list of Republican shenanigans is lengthy. There was no constitutional barrier to prevent Wisconsin’s outgoing Republican governor Scott Walker, in consort with the state’s Republican-controlled legislature, to strip the governor’s office of power before the incoming Democratic governor could take office in 2019. But it violated the longstanding norm of American politics that the outgoing party accept the transfer of power that comes with losing an election . North Carolina’s Republicans pulled the same stunt when the state’s voters elected a Democratic governor in 2016. 

The 1965 Voting Rights Act was designed to end the voter suppression that had long darkened America’s elections. It worked until Republicans began devising schemes to keep minorities from voting. In the early 2000s, they enacted laws requiring residents to have a government-issued photo ID, such as a driver’s license or passport, in order to register to vote. Minority group members, young adults, and people of low income—all of whom tend to vote Democratic—are less likely than white Americans as a whole to have a passport or driver’s license.

Nearly thirty states have since enacted voter ID laws and all but one did so when controlled by Republican lawmakers who claimed without evidence that the requirement is needed to prevent voter fraud. The true purpose is unmistakable. As a longtime Republican political consultant said: “Of course it’s political. Why else would you do it?” Republican lawmakers in Florida and Pennsylvania slipped up and publicly said that the aim was to suppress the Democratic vote.

Perhaps the mob that ransacked the Capital last week will lead the GOP to change colors. It will, of course, force the GOP to distance itself from Donald Trump. But don’t expect more. Republicans oppose strengthening the Voting Rights Act and have signaled their intention to limit mail-in voting . And, if their recent past is a guide, they won’t stop there.

Thomas E. Patterson, Bradlee Professor of Government & the Press and author of Is the Republican Party Destroying Itself?

Did the Capitol Hill riots demonstrate US democracy’s weakness or its strength?

Tarek Masoud, Professor of Public Policy and Sultan Qaboos bin Said of Oman Professor of International Relations

How can we build a democracy that we all believe in?

Though this idea of putting citizens in charge of democracy would be new to the United States, the experience of Citizen Assemblies from countries such Canada, Ireland, and Iceland shows that they can generate very sensible recommendations that many other citizens like and accept as legitimate. Most of our political leaders will reject the idea that citizens should have a powerful role in improving our democracy, not least because they won their positions according to the current rules of democracy. But if the Stop the Steal riots last week mobilize us to be more ambitious and innovative about our republic, to be curiously searching for better ways from all around the world rather than congratulating ourselves about our exceptional system of government, we can build together a democracy that we all believe in.

(Excerpt from a longer essay )

Archon Fung, Winthrop Laflin McCormack Professor of Citizenship and Self-Government

The roots of democratic backsliding go beyond Trump 

But the rot goes deeper than one man. In the last eight elections, from 1992 to 2020, the Republican Party won a majority of the popular vote only once (in 2004), and as its national electoral prospects declined, it has drifted further toward illiberalism. Two recent independent cross-national studies, by the V-Party project and the Global Party Survey , show just how extreme the GOP has become in its position toward the principles of liberal democracy, where it is now estimated to be closer to authoritarian populist parties such as Spain’s Vox, the Netherlands’ Party for Freedom, and the Alterative for Germany than it is to mainstream conservative, Christian Democratic, and center-right parties. By contrast, the studies found that the Democratic Party’s position is similar to that of many moderate parties within the mainstream center-left. 

Finally, the problem also lies in the Republican base. The foundations of American civic culture—attitudes of trust in government, confidence in the political system, and support for democracy—have weakened over the decades. The World Values Survey asks whether people approve of various types of political systems, and in 1995, 25 percent of Americans said it was a good idea to have “a strong leader who does not have to bother with parliament and elections.” That already alarming share rose steadily, and by 2017, 38 percent of Americans embraced this belief. Trump was thus throwing a lit match into a puddle of gasoline when he chose to claim that Biden had stolen the election.

(Excerpt from commentary in Foreign Affairs, “It Happened in America”)

Pippa Norris, the Paul F. McGuire Lecturer in Comparative Politics

Header image: Police clear the U.S. Capitol Building with tear gas as supporters of U.S. President Donald Trump gather outside, in Washington, U.S. January 6, 2021. REUTERS/Stephanie Keith

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Democracy Essay

Democracy is derived from the Greek word demos or people. It is defined as a government in which the supreme power is vested in the people. Democracy is exercised directly by the people; in large societies, it is by the people through their elected agents. In the phrase of President Abraham Lincoln, democracy is the “Government of the people, by the people, and for the people.” There are various democratic countries, but India has the largest democracy in the world. This Democracy Essay will help you know all about India’s democracy. Students can also get a list of CBSE Essays on different topics to boost their essay-writing skills.

500+ Words Democracy Essay

India is a very large country full of diversities – linguistically, culturally and religiously. At the time of independence, it was economically underdeveloped. There were enormous regional disparities, widespread poverty, illiteracy, unemployment, and a shortage of almost all public welfare means. Since independence, India has been functioning as a responsible democracy. The same has been appreciated by the international community. It has successfully adapted to challenging situations. There have been free and fair periodic elections for all political offices, from the panchayats to the President. There has been a smooth transfer of political power from one political party or set of political parties to others, both at national and state levels, on many occasions.

India: A Democratic Country

Democracy is of two, i.e. direct and representative. In a direct democracy, all citizens, without the intermediary of elected or appointed officials, can participate in making public decisions. Such a system is only practical with relatively small numbers of people in a community organisation or tribal council. Whereas in representative democracy, every citizen has the right to vote for their representative. People elect their representatives to all levels, from Panchayats, Municipal Boards, State Assemblies and Parliament. In India, we have a representative democracy.

Democracy is a form of government in which rulers elected by the people take all the major decisions. Elections offer a choice and fair opportunity to the people to change the current rulers. This choice and opportunity are available to all people on an equal basis. The exercise of this choice leads to a government limited by basic rules of the constitution and citizens’ rights.

Democracy is the Best Form of Government

A democratic government is a better government because it is a more accountable form of government. Democracy provides a method to deal with differences and conflicts. Thus, democracy improves the quality of decision-making. The advantage of a democracy is that mistakes cannot be hidden for long. There is a space for public discussion, and there is room for correction. Either the rulers have to change their decisions, or the rulers can be changed. Democracy offers better chances of a good decision. It respects people’s own wishes and allows different kinds of people to live together. Even when it fails to do some of these things, it allows a way of correcting its mistakes and offers more dignity to all citizens. That is why democracy is considered the best form of government.

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33 Modes Of Democratic Governance

Amit Ron is an Assistant Professor of Political Science in the New College of Interdisciplinary Arts and Sciences at Arizona State University.

• Published: 18 September 2012
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This article discusses the working definition of democratic governance. It defines democratic governance as attempts to institutionalize spaces for the expression of the voice of the people where these institutions of voice do not have the capacity to guarantee the implementation of their decisions. The article offers a classification of forms of democratic governance according to the answers that they provide to the question about the rationale for creating a space for voice. It also suggests that the institutional design of different forms of democratic governance is based simultaneously on a normative ideal of democratic legitimacy and a sociological account of the functioning of existing democratic institutions.

The language that we use to describe social processes is simultaneously descriptive and evaluative. When we describe a phenomenon using a specific term—bureaucracy, corruption, the public, and so forth—we also pass judgment about its desirability. In our present context, the term democracy is such a descriptive–evaluative term. In using it to describe a situation we are performing a speech-act commending it (Skinner 1973 : 298). In contrast with “democracy,” the term “governance” has not yet acquired the same descriptive–evaluative qualities. The contention that motivates this chapter is that we have to be very careful when we affix the notion of democracy to the notion of governance. I am particularly worried that too loose a description of certain practices as “democratic governance” can unintentionally become a speech act endorsing them. I therefore seek to be careful, even pedantic, in what I am choosing to label as democratic governance.

Thus, in seeking to discuss the different forms of democratic governance, this chapter has two goals. The first is to elaborate a working definition of democratic governance. As I explain in the next section, I understand governance to imply decision-making in an environment where there is no single institution with agency—that is, the power to carry out its decisions. Particularly, it is an environment in which government is unwilling or is unable to be the body with the overarching authority to design and watch over the implementation of policies. Accordingly, I define democratic governance as attempts to institutionalize spaces for the expression of the voice of the people where these institutions of voice do not have the capacity to guarantee the implementation of their decisions. In short, democratic governance happens where democratic voice is not tied to agency. My definition of democratic governance tries to capture the domain of governance that can properly be called democratic. My discussion of forms of democratic governance refers to the institutional forms of practices of governance that can be described as democratic.

Processes of democratic governance try to create a space for reaching resolutions that can claim to be a legitimate expression of the voice of the people. However, according to the very definition I just proposed, these processes are attempts to speak in the dark, so to speak. Unlike the traditional model of government, where an executive branch carries the decision of a legislative one, in an environment of governance there is no single agency that carries out the resolutions reached by the democratic process. But if no one is guaranteed to be listening, then what is the rationale for creating a space for voice? My second goal in this chapter is to offer a classification of forms of democratic governance according to the answers that they provide to this question. The answer that underlies and motivates each form of democratic governance is based on an assessment of the working of the institutions of voice of democratic government, and an explanation of what factors necessitate the creation of alternative institutions of voice. I will call this account the moral sociology (or moral political sociology) that undergirds the institutionalization of voice. The notion of moral sociology is an adaptation of John Rawls's “moral psychology” (1999: 429ff.), which he introduced to contend that any theory of human psychology embodies a normative conception of the good life. I use the term moral sociology in a similar way to explain how the institutional design of different forms of democratic governance is based simultaneously on a normative ideal of democratic legitimacy and a sociological account of the functioning of existing democratic institutions.

i. What is Democratic Governance?

The different forms of democratic governance that I study in this chapter are ideal types of institutions that seek to express the voice of the people. It is useful to begin the discussion with an exploration of the ideal form of democratic government. The form of democratic government is tied to an understanding of the public as sovereign in democracy. This understanding emerges from a merger of a classical account of democracy and a traditional top-down account of policy-making. In this view, the democratic institutions that stand for the voice of the people are in control over the executive power of state. These institutions serve both as the voice of the people and as their agent. This form of decision-making is commonly described as democratic government: “democratic” because decisions are made by representative institutions that stand for the voice of the people; “government” because the decisions of these institutions are carried out by the bureaucracy of the state. I want to distinguish between challenges to the “democratic” element of this ideal type—that representative institutions can claim to speak for the voice of the people—and challenges to the “government” element—that policies are implemented in a top-down manner.

The challenge to the claim of representative institutions of modern democracies to stand for the voice of the people is twofold. The first part is conceptual: the increased complexity of modern society puts pressure on the very idea of a unified “people” with a single “voice” that underlies traditional democratic theory. The model of a small closed community—where the decisions of the governing body affect the members of the community and no one but them—has little resemblance to the global and interconnected nature of today's societies (Held 1995 ).

The second part is political: despite a system of “one person, one vote,” many argue that modern democracies are tilted toward wealth and social power. I will not elaborate here on these familiar claims (for the case of the USA, see Winters and Page 2009 ).

The second challenge is to the understanding of policy-making and implementation that focuses on a government that governs. Studies in public policy suggest that policy-making should not be viewed as a top-down process. Instead, such studies use the term “governance” to describe situations in which policy decisions and, even more so, policy outcomes, are the product of complex interactions between different groups within and outside government (and that the distinction between what counts as inside and outside government is itself becoming more blurred). The scholarly work on governance originated from a set of processes that took place at an accelerated pace beginning in the early 1980s. These processes shifted organizational and decision-making power away from government into the hands of private and civil society organizations. These organizations mainly interact with government agencies and among themselves through the mechanism of the market and through policy networks (Bevir and Rhodes 2003 , 2006 ; Rhodes, Chapter 3 , this volume). In our context, it is important to keep in mind that for the most part the battle cry of these policy reforms was “efficiency” and not “democracy.”

The very rationale of decision-making in an environment of governance is different from that of government. The legitimacy of democratic decision-making does not emerge simply from counting votes but from the institutional spaces where the interest of the public can be articulated through exchange of reasons both about the topics of the day and about the fair procedures for resolving conflicts and reaching decisions (see Urbinati 2006 ). What we count as the voice of the people always depends on the institutions through which it is expressed. Democratic government is based on the discursive logic of deliberations and the procedural logic of elections. When decisions about policies and their implementation are made in collaboration with markets and policy networks, they follow different logics. Markets operate based on procedural rationality that is based on preferences rather than on reasons (Elster 1997 ). Networks “make decisions and regulate various issues in and through negotiations between interdependent and autonomous actors that might facilitate negative or positive coordination” (Sørensen and Torfing 2005 : 198). Thus, the main feature of the decision-making environment of governance, which I describe as the loss of agency, is that there is no single institutional player with the capacity to make decisions or implement them.

Generally speaking, the response of democratic theorists who want to hold on to the notion of democratic legitimacy is to develop a complex understanding of democratic legitimacy that corresponds to the complexity of modern societies. In this complex view, the burden of democratic legitimacy cannot fall on one institutional setting (such as a parliament) that generates one voice on behalf of the people. Rather, it requires a multilayered and diverse set of institutions that would allow democratic voices rather than one voice (Bohman 2007 ). Furthermore, democratic legitimacy requires engaged citizens who take an active part in the discussions about the rules that shape their own lives, and therefore it requires the blurring of the distinction between government and civil society. The model of complex democratic legitimacy serves as an ideal against which to understand the “deficits” of current democratic institutions.

Now, some scholars use the term democratic governance to describe the ideal of complex democratic government (Hirst 1994 ; Cohen and Rogers 1992 ; Elstub 2008 ; Sørensen and Torfing 2005 ; and, in a different context, de la Porte and Nanz 2004 ). I believe that the use of the term democratic governance in this context is misleading. Such an ideal of complex democracy would not be an instance of democratic governance but rather one of democratic government properly understood. Indeed, democratic legitimacy requires the blurring of the fault lines between government and civil society, and the disentanglement of powerful centralized authority: processes that are similar to what happens in systems of governance. However, their modus operandi is different. In a complex system of democratic government, the various institutions of voice interact with each other mainly based on agreed-upon procedures whose reasons are subject to scrutiny and deliberations and not, as in systems of governance, mainly based through bargaining and markets. Again, we need to attend to the speech act of affixing democratic to governance. Initiatives where policy-makers encourage themes like empowered participation, focused deliberation, and attentiveness to those affected by decisions (what Mark Warren 2009 : 3, describes as “governance driven democratization”) can be designed to perform different functions. They can intend to ensure that government follows the voice of the people, and be designed accordingly, and in that case they should be understood to be part of democratic government. However, they can perform other functions such as ensuring efficient delivery of services, appeasing powerful stakeholders and removing objections, or creating an aura of legitimacy. While these latter practices of governance are not necessarily antidemocratic and can fit within an overall democratic system, there is no reason for them to be dubbed democratic (Papadopoulos, Chapter 36 , this volume; Klijn and Skelcher 2007 ).

Thus, I want to reserve the term democratic governance to democratic practices that take place in a public administration environment that is based on the principles of governance. In such an environment, the discursive and procedural logic that governs democratic voice-making does not have priority over the procedural logic of the market and the bargaining logic of the governance network. The voice of the people does not have any preferred status in the system of decision-making. The people have to “play” with other participants in the “game” of governance.

Democratic societies allow organizations that seek to represent the interests of common people or of vulnerable groups to participate in the “game” of governance. They can engage in demonstrations, negotiate with the chamber of local businesses, or rely on the power of their constituencies as consumers (Bevir and Trantmann 2007 ; Christensen and Lægreid 2011 ). However, it is not self-evident that groups that claim to stand for the common interest or for vulnerable groups have a valid claim to represent these groups. Democratic forms of governance are attempts to create space where people can articulate, using democratic procedures, what they take to be their common interest, with the intention of carrying this voice forward by participating in the “governance game” of policy-making and implementation. These institutions of voice seek to participate in the process of governance not in virtue of any political power they possess but in virtue of the legitimacy of the voice that is coming out of the institution.

I want to stress the point that democracy, which I understand as the sovereignty of the voice of the people, requires institutions that allow for the expression of this voice. For this reason, I would caution against understanding all forms of social activism or of citizens’ participation as instances of democratic governance (Fischer, Chapter 32 , this volume; McLaverty 2011 ; Bang and Sørensen 1999 ). To be sure, as I have argued above, social activism and participation are important components of democracy. Given the complexity of modern societies, the burden of democratic legitimacy cannot rest on few representative institutions but must be distributed widely across society. However, social activism and participation are not in themselves democratic. The crucial question is whether the forms of participation or activism can claim to stand for the voice of the people.

2. Four forms of democratic governance and their underlying moral sociology

In the previous section, I defined democratic forms of governance as attempts to participate in policy-making by representing the voice of the people in an environment where there is no guarantee that the voice of the people will prevail. In this section, I want to look in more detail at the reasoning that underlies these attempts and the manner in which they claim to stand for the voice of the people. I do so by examining what I described as the moral sociologies that underlie four different forms of democratic governance.

By introducing the notion of moral sociology, I intend to bring together two important contributions to the theorization of democratic experimentations. First, Archon Fung ( 2003 ; also Smith 2009 ) identifies the relationship between the institutional design of spaces for democracy and their claim for legitimacy. He argues that decisions that might appear as technical or innocuous, such as how participants are selected, how long they meet, or who moderates the discussion, actually have a significant effect on the plausibility of claims for democratic legitimacy of the process.

Second, Robert Goodin and John Dryzek ( 2006 ) introduce the notion of a “macro-political uptake” of democratic spaces. They argue that alternative institutions of voice do not operate in a social and political vacuum. To understand the claim of these initiatives to legitimacy, one has to take into account how they are situated vis-à-vis the public sphere at large and other political institutions. Alternative institutions can perform an entire range of functions, such as to have a mandate or have the aspiration to make binding decisions, make recommendations, educate the participants or the public at large, and so on.

I argue that different forms of democratic governance take different aspects of the procedure through which voice is expressed as essential to their claim for legitimacy based on the moral sociology with which they operate. The design of the institution of voice has to be understood in the context of the intended macro-political uptake, which, in turn, depends on the way the institution of voice is understand itself in relation to the broader political and social environment in which it is situated. Thus, the classification of forms of democratic governance that I present below is based on their claim to express the voice of the people (Saward 2006 ). The classification consists of four ideal types of forms of democratic governance. I discuss their view about the legitimacy of the voice that is coming from existing democratic government, their claim for legitimacy, and their understanding of their relationship to government and other powerful players.

Voice as a Supplement : The first form of democratic governance understands the institutionalization of voice as a supplement to the system of government. The moral sociology that underlies this form of democratic governance is the closest to the ideal form of democratic government. In this view, the representative institutions of modern democracy are essentially functioning. Overall, the decisions of the formal representative institutions reflect the voice of the people and that government has the capacity—if it wishes—to see it that these decisions are implemented. Practices of governance supplement an essentially functioning system of government. They are responses to local deficits in democratic legitimacy based on the belief of the capacity of the existing system to rehabilitate itself.

In general, institutions of voice within this form of democratic governance direct their voice toward the agency of the state. Initiatives of this form are likely to be carried out with the support of some officials and even with financial and organizational support from government. The decisions reached by the forum or the summary report of the process are likely to be sent to the government or to other important stakeholders that have the capacity to influence government.

The moral sociology that underlies this form of governance takes the main burden of democratic legitimacy to fall on the representative institutions of democratic government. Since the institutions of governance only supplement existing institutions, the details of the internal working of the institutions are not essential for legitimacy. The main concern of the institutional design is to establish the contention that the recommendations, decisions, or insights that emerge from the alternative institution are not the same as those of any interest group, but that they intend to provide the outcome of a democratic process. It would therefore be essential to provide room for expressing diversity of opinions and procedures to deal, negotiate, or resolve disagreements. The process can claim legitimacy if the “losers” in the process—those whose positions did not carry the day—would still recognize the process as legitimate.

Voice as Corrective : This form of democratic governance seeks to correct for the biases of the voice of the institutions of democratic government, which is understood as failing to represent the diversity of perspectives in society by marginalizing and silencing certain voices. These alternative voices, according to the moral sociology that underlies the institutions of this form, are speaking loud and clear. The problem is that the institutions of democratic government and other powerful players choose not to listen to them. This hearing impairment is not innocuous. The systemic silencing of certain voices in society allows powerful groups to maintain their position of power while claiming democratic legitimacy.

The institutions of democratic governance can perform two functions. First, they can provide a stage for the silenced positions to be expressed (so to make their voice louder). Second, they can provide an alternative site for the formulation of a real dialogue that includes all voices in society. The product of this dialogue can provide policy proposals that will be able to claim wider democratic legitimacy.

To the extent that the sociology underlying this form of governance is accurate, institutions of voice of this form cannot hope to have the same cozy relationship with government and other institutional stakeholders as those who understand their voice as the corrective. Government and other stakeholders do not want to listen. Thus, the purpose of these institutions of voice is to discredit the government's claim for democratic legitimacy and to blow up the democracy-friendly image of other players. For this reason, their impact is highly dependent on their ability to become visible and to be perceived as a legitimate extension of democracy. Once they achieve the required visibility, institutions of this form can hope to be invited to the table to engage in processes of governance on behalf of the people they represent. Their power in the governance process emerges from the alleged legitimacy of the process (and not from any status as an interest group).

Institutions of this form understand themselves as working in a political environment in which there are significant democratic deficits. Therefore, more of the burden of democratic legitimacy falls on their inner working. One key issue for such institutions is the recruitment of participants. If participants are coming only from groups whose voices are marginalized, the voice that is coming out of the institution resembles the voice of an interest group and can lack democratic legitimacy. However, when divisions in society are deep, it may be difficult to get “ordinary” people to meet and discuss with members of marginalized groups. Furthermore, since the discussion is more likely to address the legitimacy of the allocation of power and resources in society (for them, that is the point of having the discussion) the dialogue is likely to become contentious and divisive. There is likely to be more attention given to the procedures for dealing with these divisions and especially to those who demarcate the discussion: which issues are on and which issues are off the table, what phrases can be used, and so on.

Voice as Transformative : Both the forms of democratic governance that see voice as corrective and those that see it as transformative take the voice that is claimed by democratic government as it is practiced in modern democracies to be essentially illegitimate. However, their explanation for the lack of legitimacy is different and it carries different implications for the design of democratic governance. For those who see voice as corrective, power operates by blocking certain views that exist in the public sphere from entering the decision-making arena. For those who see it as transformative, social powers enter into the public sphere itself and shape the very process of opinion formation, particularly through control over the media, advertisement, and the system of education (I follow here the discussion of power in Lukes 2005 ; see also Ron 2008 ). Modern democracies do not block free discussion and debate and many times they encourage it. However, these debates take place in an environment in which most participants in these debates are 1) not particularly interested in political issues; 2) have significant gaps in their knowledge about political issues; and 3) understand issues through the narrow frames in which they are discussed in the media.

There are a number of social theories that undergird this moral sociology. Not all of these social theories see the formation of voice as a useful route for rectifying the failure of democratic government (the question is discussed in Young 2001 ; for elaborations, see Talisse 2005 ; Fung 2005 ). Given the topic of this chapter, I refer here only to those who take democratic or deliberative activism to be a viable option for social change (for a theoretical exploration of democracy in radical social movements, see Polletta 2002 ; Juris 2008 ). These social theories believe that the creation of spaces for voice is a worthwhile endeavor, even in an unaccommodating political environment, for a mix of three reasons. First, they believe that free and open discussion has the capacity to unsettle deeply held beliefs. Thus, they can make people aware of the inadequacies of the frames with which they discuss social issues and encourage them to develop more adequate ones (see Bohman 2000 : 57ff.). Second, there is no legitimate way other than discussion to identify the goals toward which social change should strive. Social activism that is not informed by an active and open discussion with the community it seeks to represent can end up failing to pursue the real interest of the community. Third, carefully planned and executed expressions of voice can ultimately have some political traction even in a hostile political environment.

Typically, these institutions of voice do not try to affect everyday governance in the same way in which the previous two forms do. The transformation they seek to generate is broader and deeper than this or that policy. Therefore, they do not seek to cultivate relationships with official or semiofficial institutions. They see themselves as working with and speaking to the public. However, their position vis-à-vis the public is complex (and even paradoxical). They do not seek to provide a voice for the public as it stands now. Rather, they are seeking to represent the voice of the public as it could be had it had the chance to engage in free deliberation. The institution of voice can be understood as a laboratory for social activists to discuss with the public the viability and desirability of ideas and policies that are outside the boundaries of conventional discourse.

The design of transformative institutions has to face two zones of tension. The first is the choice of participants. These institutions expect participants to undergo some “transformation” as a result of the process. To the extent participants are aware of the nature of the institution of voice and of this expectation prior to participating in the institution, they are already somewhat committed to the goal. This does not mean that the process is not important and that no meaningful transformation can take place. Nevertheless, the democratic credentials of this process are questionable. Members of the congregation can undergo significant transformation when listening to an effective preacher, but preaching to the converted is not the same as preaching to nonbelievers. As a consequence, the more the participants are being transformed, the less they stand for other people in their community.

The second zone of tension is the learning process. The process that takes place in the institutions of democratic governance provides legitimate outcome in part because participants get the opportunity to be exposed to information, knowledge, opinions, and expertise that they do not have otherwise. However, transformative institutions understand themselves to operate in an epistemic and discursive environment that is already structured in a way which makes existing power relations appear legitimate and part of the commonsense order of the world (for a discussion of hermeneutic injustice see Fricker 2007 ; Morgan-Olsen 2010 ). The entire point of these institutions is to unsettle this perception. Therefore, they do not see themselves as obliged to follow any principles of neutrality and offer an equal chance for all relevant voices to be heard. However, to the extent that the conversation is constrained by the information and expertise that are provided or by implicit or explicit boundaries on the scope of the discussion, then it becomes harder to make the distinction between real democratic transformation and brainwashing.

Voice as Participation : So far, I presented the three moral sociologies in a way that ties together the systemic failure of democratic government and the existence of social power. In particular, for the moral sociologies of those who understand voice as corrective or transformative, there are causal relations (albeit complex ones) between the failure of democracy and the dominance of certain groups in society. However, it is possible to identify a different moral sociology in which the failure of democratic government is not the product of power but rather of historical contingencies, increasing complexity, the education system, and other factors. In this view, democratic government needs to undergo fundamental changes so that it can provide multiple spaces for wider participation and public deliberation; what prevents these changes from occurring are timid conceptions of citizenship and not asymmetries of social power. Democratic governance is needed to demonstrate the possibility and plausibility of wider and more informed public participation. According to this moral sociology, the problem with those who see democratic governance as corrective or transformative is that they have fallen prey to the “blame fallacy,” which asserts that whenever “something did not turn out as intended, someone must be to blame” (Dowding 1996 : 16). They unnecessarily understand themselves as operating in a hostile environment and cut themselves some unjustifiable slack when they set the procedures for the institutions of voice.

For this moral sociology, even though the failure of democratic government is systemic and not local, there is no reason why democratic governance should not seek to appeal to the agency of government. Institutions of democratic governance of this form see themselves as providing a model and a laboratory for what democratic government should emulate. Institutions of this form will be careful to maintain the integrity (if not the purity) of internal procedures such as random sampling, inclusion of all relevant positions, and neutral moderation. The belief is that good examples of the promise of wider public participation can be replicated, and, in the long run, become part of democratic government.

The main zone of tension for this moral sociology is the question of significant change in the views of the participants. It is not hard for those who understand voice as participation to explain how participants changed their position on questions on which they did not have any strong knowledge or opinion beforehand (such as in the cases of forums that address the legitimacy of technological innovations). However, if we move from topics that are at the periphery of the attention of the public toward its center, it becomes harder to explain why citizens would significantly change their minds. If the epistemic and discursive environment is not structurally biased, then there is no reason to expect citizens to arrive at views that are different from those arrived at by their representatives. But if there is no reason to hold such an expectation, it is not clear why there is a need to resort to governance in the first place.

3. Conclusion: governance and democracy

Numerous experiments of very different sorts are taking place these days that integrate citizens and civil society organizations into the process of policy-making and implementation. Some of these take place within government, some outside government, and many are hybrid. I have argued that, to the extent that participants in these initiatives can expect the recommendations or decisions that are made to carry the day in the following stages of implementation, these initiatives should be understood to be part of democratic government and that any conception of democratic government that fits the complexities of modern society must provide plenty of room for such initiatives. To be sure, many times, despite the expectations of participants, some of these initiatives end up not carrying the day. Their recommendations or decisions are ignored or are subverted by other powerful players. This is another indication that democratic government can be democratic only in name.

However, other experiments seek to get citizens involved and to form what they take to be a legitimate expression of the voice of the people, knowing that there is no expectation that their voice will be heard or that the reasons they provide will be engaged with. These experiments are forms of democratic governance. But are they truly democratic? Do they really express the voice of the people? Rather than sketching a normative ideal of democratic governance, I have tried in this chapter to address this question by comparing the different claims that institutions of democratic governance make for their democratic legitimacy, the presuppositions of each form, and the challenges that each form has in claiming democratic legitimacy.

I would like to thank David Levi-Faur and Frank Fischer for their helpful comments on an earlier version of this chapter, and Julia Ketchum for editorial assistance.

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‘America Is a Republic, Not a Democracy’ Is a Dangerous—And Wrong—Argument

Enabling sustained minority rule at the national level is not a feature of our constitutional design, but a perversion of it.

Dependent on a minority of the population to hold national power, Republicans such as Senator Mike Lee of Utah have taken to reminding the public that “we’re not a democracy.” It is quaint that so many Republicans, embracing a president who routinely tramples constitutional norms, have suddenly found their voice in pointing out that, formally, the country is a republic. There is some truth to this insistence. But it is mostly disingenuous. The Constitution was meant to foster a complex form of majority rule, not enable minority rule.

The founding generation was deeply skeptical of what it called “pure” democracy and defended the American experiment as “wholly republican.” To take this as a rejection of democracy misses how the idea of government by the people, including both a democracy and a republic, was understood when the Constitution was drafted and ratified. It misses, too, how we understand the idea of democracy today.

George Packer: Republicans are suddenly afraid of democracy

When founding thinkers such as James Madison spoke of democracy, they were usually referring to direct democracy, what Madison frequently labeled “pure” democracy. Madison made the distinction between a republic and a direct democracy exquisitely clear in “ Federalist No. 14 ”: “In a democracy, the people meet and exercise the government in person; in a republic, they assemble and administer it by their representatives and agents. A democracy, consequently, will be confined to a small spot. A republic may be extended over a large region.” Both a democracy and a republic were popular forms of government: Each drew its legitimacy from the people and depended on rule by the people. The crucial difference was that a republic relied on representation, while in a “pure” democracy, the people represented themselves.

At the time of the founding, a narrow vision of the people prevailed. Black people were largely excluded from the terms of citizenship, and slavery was a reality, even when frowned upon, that existed alongside an insistence on self-government. What this generation considered either a democracy or a republic is troublesome to us insofar as it largely granted only white men the full rights of citizens, albeit with some exceptions. America could not be considered a truly popular government until the passage of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 and the Voting Rights Act of 1965, which commanded equal citizenship for Black Americans. Yet this triumph was rooted in the founding generation’s insistence on what we would come to call democracy.

The history of democracy as grasped by the Founders, drawn largely from the ancient world, revealed that overbearing majorities could all too easily lend themselves to mob rule, dominating minorities and trampling individual rights. Democracy was also susceptible to demagogues—men of “factious tempers” and “sinister designs,” as Madison put it in “Federalist No. 10”—who relied on “vicious arts” to betray the interests of the people. Madison nevertheless sought to defend popular government—the rule of the many—rather than retreat to the rule of the few.

American constitutional design can best be understood as an effort to establish a sober form of democracy. It did so by embracing representation, the separation of powers, checks and balances, and the protection of individual rights—all concepts that were unknown in the ancient world where democracy had earned its poor reputation.

In “Federalist No. 10” and “Federalist No. 51,” the seminal papers, Madison argued that a large republic with a diversity of interests capped by the separation of powers and checks and balances would help provide the solution to the ills of popular government. In a large and diverse society, populist passions are likely to dissipate, as no single group can easily dominate. If such intemperate passions come from a minority of the population, the “ republican principle ,” by which Madison meant majority rule , will allow the defeat of “ sinister views by regular vote .” More problematic are passionate groups that come together as a majority. The large republic with a diversity of interests makes this unlikely, particularly when its separation of powers works to filter and tame such passions by incentivizing the development of complex democratic majorities : “In the extended republic of the United States, and among the great variety of interests, parties, and sects which it embraces, a coalition of a majority of the whole society could seldom take place on any other principles than those of justice and the general good.” Madison had previewed this argument at the Constitutional Convention in 1787 using the term democracy , arguing that a diversity of interests was “the only defense against the inconveniences of democracy consistent with the democratic form of government.”

Jeffrey Rosen: America is living James Madison’s nightmare

Yet while dependent on the people, the Constitution did not embrace simple majoritarian democracy. The states, with unequal populations, got equal representation in the Senate. The Electoral College also gave the states weight as states in selecting the president. But the centrality of states, a concession to political reality, was balanced by the House of Representatives, where the principle of representation by population prevailed, and which would make up the overwhelming number of electoral votes when selecting a president.

But none of this justified minority rule, which was at odds with the “republican principle.” Madison’s design remained one of popular government precisely because it would require the building of political majorities over time. As Madison argued in “ Federalist No. 63, ” “The cool and deliberate sense of the community ought, in all governments, and actually will, in all free governments, ultimately prevail over the views of its rulers.”

Alexander Hamilton, one of Madison’s co-authors of The Federalist Papers , echoed this argument. Hamilton made the case for popular government and even called it democracy: “A representative democracy, where the right of election is well secured and regulated & the exercise of the legislative, executive and judiciary authorities, is vested in select persons, chosen really and not nominally by the people, will in my opinion be most likely to be happy, regular and durable.”

The American experiment, as advanced by Hamilton and Madison, sought to redeem the cause of popular government against its checkered history. Given the success of the experiment by the standards of the late 18th and early 19th centuries, we would come to use the term democracy as a stand-in for representative democracy, as distinct from direct democracy.

Consider that President Abraham Lincoln, facing a civil war, which he termed the great test of popular government, used constitutional republic and democracy synonymously, eloquently casting the American experiment as government of the people, by the people, and for the people. And whatever the complexities of American constitutional design, Lincoln insisted , “the rule of a minority, as a permanent arrangement, is wholly inadmissible.” Indeed, Lincoln offered a definition of popular government that can guide our understanding of a democracy—or a republic—today: “A majority, held in restraint by constitutional checks, and limitations, and always changing easily, with deliberate changes of popular opinions and sentiments, is the only true sovereign of a free people.”

The greatest shortcoming of the American experiment was its limited vision of the people, which excluded Black people, women, and others from meaningful citizenship, diminishing popular government’s cause. According to Lincoln, extending meaningful citizenship so that “all should have an equal chance” was the basis on which the country could be “saved.” The expansion of we the people was behind the Fourteenth and Fifteenth Amendments ratified in the wake of the Civil War. The Fourteenth recognized that all persons born in the U.S. were citizens of the country and entitled to the privileges and immunities of citizenship. The Fifteenth secured the vote for Black men. Subsequent amendments, the Nineteenth, Twenty-Fourth, and Twenty-Sixth, granted women the right to vote, prohibited poll taxes in national elections, and lowered the voting age to 18. Progress has been slow— and s ometimes halted, as is evident from current efforts to limit voting rights —and the country has struggled to become the democratic republic first set in motion two centuries ago. At the same time, it has also sought to find the right republican constraints on the evolving body of citizens, so that majority rule—but not factious tempers—can prevail.

Adam Serwer: The Supreme Court is helping Republicans rig elections

Perhaps the most significant stumbling block has been the states themselves. In the 1790 census, taken shortly after the Constitution was ratified, America’s largest state, Virginia, was roughly 13 times larger than its smallest state, Delaware. Today, California is roughly 78 times larger than Wyoming. This sort of disparity has deeply shaped the Senate, which gives a minority of the population a disproportionate influence on national policy choices. Similarly, in the Electoral College, small states get a disproportionate say on who becomes president. Each of California’s electoral votes is estimated to represent 700,000-plus people, while one of Wyoming’s speaks for just under 200,000 people.

Subsequent to 1988, the Republican presidential candidate has prevailed in the Electoral College in three out of seven elections, but won the popular vote only once (2004). If President Trump is reelected, it will almost certainly be because he once again prevailed in the Electoral College while losing the popular vote. If this were to occur, he would be the only two-term president to never win a plurality of the popular vote. In 2020, Trump is the first candidate in American history to campaign for the presidency without making any effort to win the popular vote, appealing only to the people who will deliver him an Electoral College win. If the polls are any indication, more Americans may vote for Vice President Biden than have ever voted for a presidential candidate, and he could still lose the presidency. In the past, losing the popular vote while winning the Electoral College was rare. Given current trends, minority rule could become routine. Many Republicans are actively embracing this position with the insistence that we are, after all, a republic, not a democracy.

They have also dispensed with the notion of building democratic majorities to govern, making no effort on health care, immigration, or a crucial second round of economic relief in the face of COVID-19. Instead, revealing contempt for the democratic norms they insisted on when President Barack Obama sought to fill a vacant Supreme Court seat, Republicans in the Senate have brazenly wielded their power to entrench a Republican majority on the Supreme Court by rushing to confirm Justice Amy Coney Barrett. The Senate Judiciary Committee vote to approve Barrett also illuminates the disparity in popular representation: The 12 Republican senators who voted to approve of Barrett’s nomination represented 9 million fewer people than the 10 Democratic senators who chose not to vote. Similarly, the 52 Republican senators who voted to confirm Barrett represented 17 million fewer people than the 48 senators who voted against her. And the Court Barrett is joining, made up of six Republican appointees (half of whom were appointed by a president who lost the popular vote) to three Democratic appointees, has been quite skeptical of voting rights—a severe blow to the “democracy” part of a democratic republic.  In 2013’s Shelby County v. Holder , the Court struck down a section of the Voting Rights Act of 1965 that allowed the federal government to preempt changes in voting regulations from states with a history of racial discrimination.

As Adam Serwer recently wrote in these pages , “ Shelby County ushered in a new era of experimentation among Republican politicians in restricting the electorate, often along racial lines.” Republicans are eager to shrink the electorate. Ostensibly seeking to prevent voting fraud, which studies have continually shown is a nonexistent problem, Republicans support efforts to make voting more difficult—especially for minorities, who do not tend to vote Republican. The Republican governor of Texas, in the midst of a pandemic when more people are voting by mail, limited the number of drop-off locations for absentee ballots to one per county. Loving, with a population of 169, has one drop-off location; Harris, with a population of 4.7 million (majority nonwhite), also has one drop-off location. States controlled by Republicans, such as Georgia, Louisiana, and Texas, have also closed polling places, making voters in predominantly minority communities stand in line for hours to cast their ballot.

Who counts as a full and equal citizen—as part of we the people —has shrunk in the Republican vision. Arguing against statehood for the District of Columbia, which has 200,000 more people than the state of Wyoming, Senator Tom Cotton from Arkansas said Wyoming is entitled to representation because it is “a well-rounded working-class state.” It is also overwhelmingly white. In contrast, D.C. is 50 percent nonwhite.

High-minded claims that we are not a democracy surreptitiously fuse republic with minority rule rather than popular government. Enabling sustained minority rule at the national level is not a feature of our constitutional design, but a perversion of it. Routine minority rule is neither desirable nor sustainable, and makes it difficult to characterize the country as either a democracy or a republic. We should see this as a constitutional failure demanding constitutional reform.

This story is part of the project “ The Battle for the Constitution ,” in partnership with the National Constitution Center .

1.1 What is Government?

Learning objectives.

By the end of this section, you will be able to:

• Explain what government is and what it does
• Identify the type of government in the United States and compare it to other forms of government

Government affects all aspects of people’s lives. What we eat, where we go to school, what kind of education we receive, how our tax money is spent, and what we do in our free time are all affected by government. Americans are often unaware of the pervasiveness of government in their everyday lives, and many are unsure precisely what it does. Here we will look at what government is, what it does, and how the government of the United States differs from other kinds of governments.

DEFINING GOVERNMENT

The term government describes the means by which a society organizes itself and how it allocates authority in order to accomplish collective goals and provide benefits that the society as a whole needs. Among the goals that governments around the world seek to accomplish are economic prosperity, secure national borders, and the safety and well-being of citizens. Governments also provide benefits for their citizens. The type of benefits provided differ according to the country and their specific type of governmental system, but governments commonly provide such things as education, health care, and an infrastructure for transportation. The term politics refers to the process of gaining and exercising control within a government for the purpose of setting and achieving particular goals, especially those related to the division of resources within a nation.

Sometimes governmental systems are confused with economic systems . This is because certain types of political thought or governmental organization are closely related to or develop with certain types of economic systems. For example, the economic system of capitalism in Western Europe and North America developed at roughly the same time as ideas about democratic republics, self-government, and natural rights. At this time, the idea of liberty became an important concept. According to John Locke , an English political philosopher of the seventeenth century, all people have natural rights to life, liberty, and property. From this came the idea that people should be free to consent to being governed. In the eighteenth century, in Great Britain’s North American colonies, and later in France, this developed into the idea that people should govern themselves through elected representatives and not a king; only those representatives chosen by the people had the right to make laws to govern them.

Similarly, Adam Smith , a Scottish philosopher who was born nineteen years after Locke’s death, believed that all people should be free to acquire property in any way that they wished. Instead of being controlled by government, business, and industry, Smith argued, people should be allowed to operate as they wish and keep the proceeds of their work. Competition would ensure that prices remained low and faulty goods disappeared from the market. In this way, businesses would reap profits, consumers would have their needs satisfied, and society as a whole would prosper. Smith discussed these ideas, which formed the basis for industrial capitalism, in his book The Wealth of Nations , which was published in 1776, the same year that the Declaration of Independence was written.

Representative government and capitalism developed together in the United States, and many Americans tend to equate democracy , a political system in which people govern themselves, with capitalism. In theory, a democratic government promotes individualism and the freedom to act as one chooses instead of being controlled, for good or bad, by government. Capitalism, in turn, relies on individualism. At the same time, successful capitalists prefer political systems over which they can exert at least some influence in order to maintain their liberty.

Democracy and capitalism do not have to go hand in hand, however. Indeed, one might argue that a capitalist economic system might be bad for democracy in some respects. Although Smith theorized that capitalism would lead to prosperity for all, this has not necessarily been the case. Great gaps in wealth between the owners of major businesses, industries, and financial institutions and those who work for others in exchange for wages exist in many capitalist nations. In turn, great wealth may give a very small minority great influence over the government—a greater influence than that held by the majority of the population, which will be discussed later.

Socialism is an alternative economic system. In socialist societies, the means of generating wealth, such as factories, large farms, and banks, are owned by the government and not by private individuals. The government accumulates wealth and then redistributes it to citizens, primarily in the form of social programs that provide such things as free or inexpensive health care, education, and childcare. In socialist countries, the government also usually owns and controls utilities such as electricity, transportation systems like airlines and railroads, and telecommunications systems. In many socialist countries the government is an oligarchy : only members of a certain political party or ruling elite can participate in government. For example, in China, the government is run by members of the Chinese Communist Party.

In the United States, the democratic government works closely together with its capitalist economic system. The interconnectedness of the two affects the way in which goods and services are distributed. The market provides many goods and services needed by Americans. For example, food, clothing, and housing are provided in ample supply by private businesses that earn a profit in return. These goods and services are known as private goods . 1 People can purchase what they need in the quantity in which they need it. This, of course, is the ideal. In reality, those who live in poverty cannot always afford to buy ample food and clothing to meet their needs, or the food and clothing that they can afford to buy in abundance is of inferior quality. Also, it is often difficult to find adequate housing; housing in the most desirable neighborhoods—those that have low crime rates and good schools—is often too expensive for poor or working-class (and sometimes middle-class) people to buy or rent.

Thus, the market cannot provide everything (in enough quantity or at low enough costs) in order to meet everyone’s needs. Therefore, some goods are provided by the government. Such goods or services that are available to all without charge are called public goods . Two such public goods are national security and education. It is difficult to see how a private business could protect the United States from attack. How could it build its own armies and create plans for defense and attack? Who would pay the men and women who served? Where would the intelligence come from? Due to its ability to tax, draw upon the resources of an entire nation, and compel citizen compliance, only government is capable of protecting the nation.

Similarly, public schools provide education for all children in the United States. Children of all religions, races and ethnicities, socioeconomic classes, and levels of academic ability can attend public schools free of charge from kindergarten through the twelfth grade. It would be impossible for private schools to provide an education for all of the nation’s children. Private schools do provide some education in the United States; however, they charge tuition, and only those parents who can afford to pay their fees (or whose children gain a scholarship) can attend these institutions. Some schools charge very high tuition, the equivalent to the tuition at a private college. If private schools were the only educational institutions, most poor and working-class children and many middle-class children would be uneducated. Private schooling is a type of good called a toll good . Toll goods are available to many people, and many people can make use of them, but only if they can pay the price. They occupy a middle ground between public and private goods. All parents may send their children to public schools in the United States. They can choose to send their children to a private school, but the private school will charge them. On the other hand, public schools, which are operated by the government, provide free education so all children can attend school. Therefore, everyone in the nation benefits from the educated voters and workers produced by the public school system. Another distinction between public and private goods is that public goods are available to all, typically without additional charge.

What other public goods does government provide in the United States? At the federal, state, and local level, government provides stability and security, not only in the form of a military but also in the form of police and fire departments. Government provides other valuable goods and services such as public education, public transportation, mail service, and food, housing, and health care for the poor ( Figure 1.2 ). If a house catches on fire, the fire department does not demand payment before they put the fire out. If someone breaks into a house and tries to harm the occupants, the police will try to protect them and arrest the intruder, but the police department will not request payment for services rendered. The provision of these goods and services is funded by citizens paying into the general tax base.

Government also performs the important job of protecting common goods : goods that all people may use free of charge but that are of limited supply, such as fish in the sea or clean drinking water. Because everyone can use these goods, they must be protected so a few people do not take everything that is available and leave others with nothing. Some examples of common goods, private goods, public goods, and toll goods are listed below ( Figure 1.3 ).

Link to Learning

This federal website shares information about the many services the government provides.

Finding a Middle Ground

Fishing regulations.

One of the many important things government does is regulate public access to common goods like natural resources. Unlike public goods, which all people may use without charge, common goods are in limited supply. If more public schools are needed, the government can build more. If more firefighters or mail carriers are needed, the government can hire them. Public lands and wildlife, however, are not goods the government can simply multiply if supply falls due to demand. Indeed, if some people take too freely from the supply of common goods, there will not be enough left for others to use.

Fish are one of the many common goods in which the government currently regulates access. It does so to ensure that certain species are not fished into extinction, thus depriving future generations of an important food source and a means to make a living. This idea is known as sustainability. Environmentalists want to set strict fishing limits on a variety of species. Commercial fishers resist these limits, claiming they are unnecessary and, if enforced, would drive them out of business ( Figure 1.4 ). Currently, fishing limits are set by a combination of scientists, politicians, local resource managers, and groups representing the interests of fishers. 3

Should the government regulate fishing? Is it right to interfere with people’s ability to earn money today in order to protect the access of future generations to the nation’s common goods?

Besides providing stability and goods and services for all, government also creates a structure by which goods and services can be made available to the people. In the United States, people elect representatives to city councils, state legislatures, and Congress. These bodies make laws to govern their respective jurisdictions. They also pass measures to raise money, through the imposition of taxes on such things as income, property, and sales. Local, state, and national governments also draft budgets to determine how the revenue taken in will be spent for services. On the local level, funds are allotted for education, police and fire departments, and maintenance of public parks. State governments allocate money for state colleges and universities, maintenance of state roads and bridges, and wildlife management, among other priorities. On the national level, money goes to such things as defense, Social Security, pensions for veterans, maintenance of federal courts and prisons, and management of national parks. At each level, representatives elected by the people try to secure funding for things that will benefit those who live in the areas they represent. Once money has been allocated, government agencies at each level then receive funds for the purposes mentioned above and use them to provide services to the public.

Local, state, and national governments also make laws to maintain order and to ensure the efficient functioning of society, including the fair operation of the business marketplace. In the United States, for example, Congress passes laws regulating banking, and government agencies regulate such things as the amount of toxic gases that can be emitted by factories, the purity of food offered for sale, and the safety of toys and automobiles. In this way, government checks the actions of business, something that it would not do if capitalism in the United States functioned strictly in the manner that Adam Smith believed it should…almost entirely unregulated.

Besides providing goods to citizens and maintaining public safety, most governments also provide a means for citizens to participate in government and to make their opinions known to those in power. Western democracies like the United States, Britain, France, and others protect citizens’ freedom of speech and the press. These nations, and others in the world, also allow citizens to vote.

As noted earlier, politics is the process by which choices are made regarding how resources will be allocated and which economic and social policies government will pursue. Put more simply, politics is the process of who gets what and how. Politics involves choosing which values government will support and which it will not. If government chooses to support an ideal such as individualism , it may choose to loosen regulations on business and industry or to cut taxes so that people have more money to invest in business. If it chooses to support an ideal such as egalitarianism , which calls for equal treatment for all and the destruction of socioeconomic inequalities, it may raise taxes in order to be able to spend more on public education, public transportation, housing for the poor, and care for the elderly. If, for example, the government is more concerned with national security than with individual liberty , it may authorize the tapping of people’s phones and restrict what newspapers may publish. If liberty is more important, then government will place greater restrictions on the extent that law enforcement agencies can intrude upon citizens’ private communications. The political process and the input of citizens help determine the answer.

Civic engagement, or the participation that connects citizens to government, is a vital ingredient of politics. In the United States, citizens play an important role in influencing what policies are pursued, what values the government chooses to support, what initiatives are granted funding, and who gets to make the final decisions. Political engagement can take many forms: reading about politics, listening to news reports, discussing politics, attending (or watching televised) political debates, donating money to political campaigns, handing out flyers promoting a candidate, voting, joining protest marches, and writing letters to their elected representatives.

DIFFERENT TYPES OF GOVERNMENT

The government of the United States can best be described as a republic, or representative democracy. A democracy is a government in which political power —influence over institutions, leaders, and policies—rests in the hands of the people. In a representative democracy , however, the citizens do not govern directly. Instead, they elect representatives to make decisions and pass laws on behalf of all the people. Thus, U.S. citizens vote for members of Congress, the president and vice president, members of state legislatures, governors, mayors, and members of town councils and school boards to act on their behalf. Most representative governments favor majority rule : the opinions of the majority of the people have more influence with government than those of the minority. If the number of elected representatives who favor a proposed law is greater than those who oppose it, the law will be enacted.

However, in representative governments like the United States, minority rights are protected: people cannot be deprived of certain rights even if an overwhelming number of people think that they should be. For example, let’s say American society decided that atheists, people who do not believe that God exists, were evil and should be imprisoned or expelled from the country. Even though atheists only account for about 7 percent of the population, they would be protected due to minority rights. 4 Even though the number of Americans who believe in God far outweighs the number who do not, the minority is still protected. Because decisions are made through majority rule, making your opinions known and voting for those men and women who make decisions that affect all of us are critical and influential forms of civic engagement in a representative democracy such as the United States.

In a direct democracy , unlike representative democracy, people participate directly in making government decisions. For example, in ancient Athens, the most famous example of a direct democracy, all male citizens were allowed to attend meetings of the Assembly. Here they debated and voted for or against all proposed laws. Although neither the federal government nor any of the state governments function as a direct democracy—the Constitution requires the national and state governments to be representative forms of government—some elements of direct democracy do exist in the United States. While residents of the different states vote for people to represent them and to make laws in their behalf in the state legislatures and in Congress, people may still directly vote on certain issues. For example, a referendum or proposed law might be placed on the ballot for citizens to vote on directly during state or local elections instead of leaving the matter in the hands of the state legislature. At New England town meetings, all residents are allowed to debate decisions affecting the town ( Figure 1.5 ). Such occasions provide additional opportunities for civic engagement.

Most countries now have some form of representative government. 5 At the other end of the political spectrum are elite-driven forms of government. In a monarchy , one ruler, usually a hereditary ruler, holds political power. Although the power of some monarchs is limited by law, and such kings and queens often rule along with an elected legislature that makes laws for the country, this is not always the case. Many southwest Asian kingdoms, such as Saudi Arabia, Qatar, and the United Arab Emirates, have absolute monarchs whose power is unrestricted. As discussed earlier, another nondemocratic form of government is oligarchy, in which a handful of elite members of society, often those who belong to a particular political party, hold all political power. For example, in Cuba, as in China, only members of the Communist Party are allowed to vote or hold public office, and the party’s most important members make all government decisions. Some nondemocratic societies are totalitarian in nature. Under totalitarianism , the government is more important than the citizens, and it controls all aspects of citizens’ lives. Citizens’ rights are limited, and the government does not allow political criticism or opposition. These forms of government are fairly rare. North Korea is an example of a totalitarian government.

The CIA website provides information about the types of government across the world.

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• Authors: Glen Krutz, Sylvie Waskiewicz, PhD
• Publisher/website: OpenStax
• Book title: American Government 3e
• Publication date: Jul 28, 2021
• Location: Houston, Texas
• Book URL: https://openstax.org/books/american-government-3e/pages/1-introduction
• Section URL: https://openstax.org/books/american-government-3e/pages/1-1-what-is-government

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Measuring African perspectives on democracy and governance

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Joseph asunka and ja joseph asunka ceo - afrobarometer @joeasunka landry signé landry signé senior fellow - global economy and development , africa growth initiative @landrysigne.

May 15, 2024

• The rise of coups on the continent can’t be explained by a singular factor.  
• Collaboration amongst the African Union and other regional economic bodies could lead to stronger policy outcomes.
• The quality of governance and democracy are more important determinants of constituency satisfaction than economic outcomes.
• 27 min read

Africa experienced a wave of democratic unrest from 2020-23, with seven countries—Mali, Chad, Guinea, Sudan, Burkina Faso, Niger, and Gabon—falling to military coups during this time. Why? Host Landry Signé and his guest Joseph Asunka. CEO of Afrobarometer , a pan-African survey research network, discuss Africans’ views on democracy and governance, as well as policy recommendations for reversing the recent trends.

Asunka is author of “ Governance trends in Africa: Resilient demand, flagging supply ,” in Foresight Africa 2024.

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SIGNÉ: Hello, I am Landry Signé, senior fellow in the Global Economy and Development Program and the Africa Growth Initiative at the Brookings Institution. Welcome to Foresight Africa podcast, where I engage with contributors to our annual Foresight Africa report, as well as with policymakers, industry leaders, and other key figures. You can learn more about this show and our work at Brookings dot edu slash Foresight Africa podcast.

Today on the podcast, I am pleased to welcome Doctor Joseph Asunka. Joseph Asunka is the CEO at Afrobarometer, a nonpartisan survey research network that conducts surveys on democracy, governance, the economy, and society. Prior to joining Afrobarometer, Joseph was a program officer in the Global Development and Population Program at the Hewlett Foundation. He was also a lecturer at UCLA, where he received his Ph.D. in political science.

Welcome to the podcast, Joseph.

ASUNKA: Thank you so much, Landry. It’s good to be with you.

SIGNÉ: Fabulous. What drew you to political science to begin with?

ASUNKA: That’s, it’s a long, winding story of a combination of planned decisions and accidental academic prospecting. So, I started off my studies at the high school level in the hard sciences. I was into physics, chemistry, and mathematics. And then for my undergraduate degree, I studied statistics and computer science. But right after my undergraduate degree, I started being very interested in applied statistics, courses in applied statistics, biostatistics, economics and the like. But a course that immediately came to mind was economics. So, I decided to pursue a degree, a master’s degree in economics.

After that, I joined the Ghana Center for Democratic Development. This is, a research entity, I think tank based in Accra, Ghana. So, I worked with them for two years and I realized, you know, economics is a useful topic. But if you don’t understand how politics works, it can be a futile exercise to have economic fixes to issues when politics comes into play. So, that’s why I got interested in politics and decided to go back to my Ph.D. in political science at UCLA.

SIGNÉ: Can you explain what Afrobarometer does for those who might be unfamiliar with the organization?

ASUNKA: Thanks for asking. So, Afrobarometer is a Pan-African survey research network. What we do is conduct public attitudes survey across the African continent. And we ask questions on several topics, including governance, the economy, society, and living conditions. The Afrobarometer started actually in 1999. So, this year we are 25 years on.

The main purpose of Afrobarometer is to give African citizens a voice in public policy and decision-making. That when governments are making decisions, or policymakers are making decisions about development issues, they take into account what citizens are experiencing, what their priorities are, and what they are feeling or experiencing in the context of governance. And so, the main purpose is to give citizens a voice in that, in those debates.

We started in 12 countries in 1999. These were the 12 countries that were open enough for us to ask the types of questions we asked in terms of openness, in terms of political openness. But we have since grown out to 40 countries on the continent at the moment, and our data now represents about 75% of the opinions of Africa, the population of Africa.

SIGNÉ: Very insightful, Joseph. Where do you see Afrobarometer’s place in policy?

ASUNKA: So, Afrobarometer started off more as an academic project. It was started by three academics, Professors Michael Bratton, Professor Gyimah-Boadi, and Professor Robert Mattes. And these are professors based on the continent, one in Accra, one in Cape Town, South Africa, and one in Zimbabwe. So, it started more as an academic exercise.

But it has since evolved very strongly into policy space. And that is because Afrobarometer’s main purpose is to give African citizens a voice in policymaking. And there is no way to really do that without actually being engaged in public policy advocacy.

So, we do contribute to public policy in two ways. First is from the data. So, we make sure that we get high-quality data and put it in the public domain for free. So, our data is a public good that we give to the public for free so that policymakers, policy actors, development actors, investors, and all who engage on the African continent when they do so, there is data available to inform them about what African citizens are thinking. That is a first in our space of our policy influence—putting data available, making it available out there for different actors to use.

The second area that we contribute to policy is within the institution itself. So, we analyze the data, and we write policy briefs and come up with policy recommendations that we distribute widely around in different actors. So, we share it widely with the media, we share it with government, with policy actors at the country level where we do the surveys, but also at the regional level, as well as the continental level.

And so, that, these are the two ways we contribute to public policy: making sure that they will have good quality data, and that we can analyze and make policy recommendations for actors to take up.

SIGNÉ: Fantastic. Would you mind sharing a few impact stories, when you provided policy recommendations which have been successfully adopted or implemented?

ASUNKA: Right. So, some of the major ones have been especially anti-corruption efforts. I remember when, after one of our surveys were released, it was about the issues about corruption in Sierra Leone, as well as in Ghana and other parts of the continent. But the then-president of Sierra Leone, Bai Koroma, was, you know, a staunch user of Afrobarometer data. And so, he used the Afrobarometer data as a a reason, as a logic behind his development of what they call the “no pay, no bribe campaign.” And that was driven mainly by the fact that Afrobarometer data showed that there was high levels of perceived corruption in the country, and that drove him to come up with that policy.

Same thing happened in Malawi. When we released the results and there was an indication of the police being perceived as the most corrupt entity. What the police actually did was they called us to come and share more data with them. But one day, what they did, cleverly, was to look at the trends over time. So, over time in Malawi, how has the perception of corruption been in Malawi? And when you look at the data, it actually trended downwards, meaning that Malawian police were doing increasingly better, even though they were still the most … the institution perceived to be the most corrupt. So, they saw value in the data.

And so, usually we have different government entities inviting us to share more data with them so to inform their decisions internally.

SIGNÉ: If this could be helpful, Joseph, I have also used Afrobarometer data when testifying before the United States Congress. So, your impact goes beyond the frontier of the continent.

Joseph, Afrobarometer surveys Africans’ view on democracy and governance, among other topics. And your Foresight essay focuses on governance and the rise in coups across the continent. In your view, what has led to the rise?

ASUNKA: Right. It is really hard to point to one cause. And in fact, the drivers of these coups are also different in different countries. So, if you take the case of Guinea, when President Alpha Condé attempted to, you know, manipulate the constitution so that he could run for a third term, this he did almost entirely against what citizens, the Guineans, wanted. Just right before he started to change the constitution, our data did show that almost 8 in 10 Guineans said they want the president to abide by two terms.

And I should say here that the presidential term limit is the most popular democratic norm on the African continent. In all the countries that we have surveyed to date, we always have a majority of citizens in every single country saying that they wanted their president to abide by two-term limits. And so, when Bai Koroma made the attempt to change the Constitution, this was against the wishes of its own people.

And that would have motivated general public discontent by the fact that he was doing this. And we were not surprised to see people on the streets celebrating because it is a fundamental principle, a fundamental norm that Africans strongly supports. So, in the case of Guinea it was more going against the popular sentiment of wanting presidential term limits.

In other cases, it was probably a combination of economic issues as well as perceptions of corruption, growing corruption, especially in the presidency, and the anxieties about crime and insecurity. And, you know, when you look across the continent, especially in the 2010s, you know, the period of the Africa rising narrative, our data did show that poverty was actually declining between 2009 and 2012, 2015. There was a decline in the rates of poverty in our data. But since then, poverty has continued to grow. And then the latest round of the survey that we conducted in 2021 through 2023, we recorded the highest level of incidence of poverty. So, poverty may have been one of the underlying causes in terms of people’s dissatisfaction with the way our governments were actually working.

And unfortunately, the military juntas actually took advantage of this. They would cite the issues of poverty. They’d cite the issues of, you know, insecurity, especially violent extremism, as a reason why they are intervening in politics. And these were the sentiments that citizens had been expressing: poverty increasing, the perceived corruption in their governments, as well as this anxiety about violent extremist groups, which made the military seem like the only institution that could salvage them. And that may have been the reason we saw the rise in these coups.

SIGNÉ: So, I like how you connect the various causes that you provide as to coups and the Afrobarometer survey results. Are there additional examples of survey results that you want to share, which could further explain the rise of coups?

ASUNKA: Right. So, I think those are the keys. And by if when we look at our data, so I’ll say two things, you know. One, in terms of the issues that we have found to drive people to be very dissatisfied with the way democracy works. And it comes as a result of one, as I said, you know, when there’s perceived the rising levels of corruption in governments, elected governments in particular, especially, how they call it, perhaps perception of corruption in the presidency itself. That’s one critical factor.

The second factor being the level of trust in the military. At the moment, the military in Africa is the most trusted democratic institution. Consistently it has been. So, if you take parliament, the presidency, the judiciary, and with the military, the military is on top of all of them, like, the most trusted institution on the continent. And so, here’s the case, you have an institution that is very well trusted by citizens. And I think that trust is driven by the fact that citizens see the military as a disciplined institution. And they are somehow looking for an entity with a level of discipline that can be brought into the governance system, which is probably one of the drivers.

And of course, if you now take that combined with the fact that there’s the rise in perceptions of corruption in the elected government, and there is this sentiment of insecurity, or people are afraid of violent extremism, then the military it sounds very attractive. But let me put a caveat here that even though there’s that attraction for military intervention, Africans still do not want military rule. They may see the intervention as a useful mechanism for getting rid of their corrupt leaders, but they don’t want the military to stay in power longer than they are welcome.

SIGNÉ: Very insightful. Your essay describes the role of the African Union and other regional economic communities in preventing unconstitutional changes of government on the continent. However, you note that many of these organization governance tools aren’t successfully used, or they are not simply successful because member states don’t comply. How do we reform the African Union and other regional economic communities so their tools are more effective at both deterring noncompliance or enforcing these mechanisms if noncompliance occurs?

ASUNKA: Right. So, the African Union certainly, and the regional economic communities, many have gone through several reforms and there’s a plethora of well written political, economic, and social governance protocols, which if implemented well, will transform the African continent. And these documents, you can read all the protocols about whether it is via the African Peer Review Mechanism, the African Governance Architecture, and the instruments that set all of these institutions up are really well crafted and their mandates are very clear.

I think it’s one, of course, the commitment of elected leaders on the continent to seeing through the implementation of these programs. But it does seem like we’ve gotten to a point where reform is probably no longer the logic, or the driver, but that we have the tools available to actually effectively implement or at least drive this continent forward.

That said, I think there’s one particular reform that hopefully our policy actors will listen. That is the way the African Union operates. This issue of the principle of subsidiarity, where it feels like the African Union sees itself as a hierarchical organization where the African Union and the regional economic bodies operate as a hierarchy, that the African Union is on top of the regional economic bodies. And in that case the principle of subsidiarity, requiring that the Union cede decision-making powers to the regional economic bodies on issues, especially when it comes to conflict or unconstitutional change of government.

I think that principle makes the African Union weak. Weak in the sense that instead of working collaboratively with the regional economic bodies, the Union rather sees the primacy of the regional economic bodies in decision making in the region.

I think, as many other advocates have called for, a better arrangement will be for the African Union do away with the principle of subsidiarity and operate as a collaboration, that the African Union works in collaboration with the regional economic bodies whenever they are trying to address issues. I think that collaboration would help to build more momentum and actually provide some kind of solidarity behind the issues that we are trying to address, instead of standing on the side and expecting the regional economic bodies to be the ones taking the lead. If that rule alone can be reformed, we may see some changes.

SIGNÉ: How should they collaborate?

ASUNKA: Let’s just give an example. If there is a military intervention in the country X. Right. Rather than say the regional economic body—so, for example, rather than say ECOWAS should be making the decisions about Niger, it should be the continental body together with ECOWAS working together to get things done. So, the African Union shouldn’t sit, and the rest of the region shouldn’t sit aloof and wait for ECOWAS to deal with the situation. Because sometimes, even within their region, the countries are not as cohesive as you would imagine. They’ve got, sometimes some of the countries may not even be in agreement as to how to resolve the issue. But having the regional body as the other continental bodies are playing a role alongside ECOWAS can bring a lot more, you know, impact.

Sometimes it may even be useful for ECOWAS to intervene in the East Africa community than some of the countries in the East Africa community intervening in a situation in East Africa, because they have the distance, and they can actually sometimes intervene more impartially. So, I think that kind of collaboration with the continental bodies will make more sense than this principle of subsidiarity.

SIGNÉ: Wonderful illustrations. Joseph, why do you think support for democracy is waning in some countries with histories of democratic governments, such as South Africa or Botswana?

ASUNKA: Yeah, it’s interesting that you ask this question, and this is a critical question for us as well. So, much of the decline in support for democracy on the continent is driven by the poor delivery of democratic or political governance. Our analysis does show that three critical factors. First of all, the perceived rising levels of corruption in the presidency as well as in local government. So, when there’s perceptions of increasing corruption in the presidency and local government. When there is weak rule of law, perceived weak rule of law, that especially parliament and the president do not respect the decisions of the courts. And when elections are not seen to not be free and fair are of the highest quality. These three key factors are the ones that drive support for democracy down on the continent.

What I must say here is that Africans’ support for democracy is actually not affected by economic factors. Sometimes I say this, and people wonder why. So, the commitment to democracy is driven by how people see the delivery of their democratic goods, and the democratic goods being clean elections, effective rule of law, and clean government. That is, no corruption. When there is corruption, the rule of law is seen to not be effective and elections are not free and fair. That’s when you see people begin to, now they … the support for democracy begins to drop.

If you analyze the data using an economic factor—poverty, lack of economic performance on the parts of government—these economic indicators do not affect people’s commitment to democracy and democratic norms and institutions. The things that affect democracy’s support on the continent, as I said, is the political governance outcomes, not the economic outcomes.

SIGNÉ: This is very interesting, Joseph. So, you are saying that the quality of governance and the quality of democracy will be more important in determining whether citizens will be supporting democracy or not. But now, what about economic performance? What makes citizens satisfied about economic performance or not? And what will be their reaction to democratic governance?

ASUNKA: Right. So, the economic factors impact people’s satisfaction with the way democracy works. So, first of all, do you support democracy is asked as one question. The second part is, are you satisfied with the way democracy works? And so, people’s support for democracy, as I said, is not related to economic factors. But their satisfaction with the way democracy works is driven largely by economic factors as well as the political factor. So, the economic factors will dampen people’s satisfaction with democracy. But their support for democracy is only dampened by the quality of democratic governance.

SIGNÉ: And what are the consequences of a low satisfaction for democracy?

ASUNKA: Right. So, the consequences for low satisfaction with democracy. When people are not satisfied with the way democracy works, that’s where the risks of, you know, unconstitutional change of government, especially military coups, can happen. Because people, in terms of their economic livelihoods. Now even the Africans who want a democracy, when their economic needs are not met, then they feel disappointed in the performance of their governments. The leaders’ failure then dampens economic opportunities. In that sense, it creates an environment where there’s anxiety, agitation, and sometimes a public discontent with elected leaders. And that public discontent can then lead into the military, for example, taking advantage of that opportunity to step in.

It can also create an opening for violent extremist groups to mobilize citizens in support of their causes, where they can get into a community, violent extremist groups can live in a community, provide some of the economic benefits that governments are not providing. Maybe they’re providing them with water, they’re providing them with their basic their basic needs, and then they begin to infiltrate in a way that, you know, it can continue to perpetuate violent extremism in these countries, so.

Their dissatisfaction with democracy driven by the economic factors can make governments a lot more vulnerable both to the military, but also violent extremist groups and other groups that want to cause harm.

SIGNÉ: Joseph, how do you reconcile some of the contradictory findings in this year’s survey? For example, youth are more willing to tolerate military interventions and are less trustful of military institutions than the older cohorts.

ASUNKA: Right, So, I wouldn’t characterize it as a contradiction, per se. Yes, it is true, young people are relatively more willing to tolerate military intervention, and the word here that I underline here is intervention and not military rule. So, they are more likely to tolerate military intervention. But there is a condition there: only if their elected leaders abuse power. And so, the extent to which they dislike having their elected leaders abuse power is the driving force behind this interest in wanting the military to intervene. And so, they are willing to get rid of a government that is abusing power. And that is because of their own commitment to democracy and democratic governance.

And as I said, they are not supporting military rule. So, they don’t trust the military to stay in power and rule for forever. Their expectation is an intervention, and there will be a timeline to transition back to civilian rule.

So, the results may not be as contradictory because these young folks are eager to see a change. At some time, they see the military as one vehicle for that change to come, for them to reset and then hopefully get back to civilian rule.

SIGNÉ: We have talked a lot about the rise of coups and reversal of democratic governments. What can be done to reverse the trends we are seeing and promote democratic governance on the continent, Joseph?

ASUNKA: Maybe I would describe the recent coups more as opportunistic episodes and not a trend. And I say not a trend because I do not expect that we will see another coup in the region anytime soon. And I’m keeping my fingers crossed for that. But at least this is driven by the data that I have, and I at least I can foresee what I I hope would be the case.

The good news is that Africans want democracy, and they have consistently expressed this desire to live under governments that are democratic and accountable. The military is certainly not that option. So, it is therefore important for democracy stakeholders, both domestic and international, to invest time and resources to engage the military rulers now in negotiating a firm timeline to return to civilian rule.

Of course, the African Union and the regional economic bodies all play a big role here. But I hope that, as I mentioned earlier on, that we will do away with this self-defeating principle of subsidiarity, and rather work collaboratively. I think if the African Union, the regional economic bodies, worked collaboratively to engage with the military rulers at the moment to plan a clear transition back to civilian rule, that would be much more effective, as opposed to saying ECOWAS should take care of Niger and somebody else takes care of …, it just doesn’t. I don’t think it works well for us.

So, we need African leadership in these negotiations. It shouldn’t be any foreign intervention, or actor. The African leadership, African Union, the regional economic bodies and our elected leaders in the other countries should be the ones driving this effort forward.

SIGNÉ: I like your enthusiasm and your specific recommendations, Joseph. What governments are doing a particularly good job at listening to and paying attention to their constituencies?

ASUNKA: Right. So, I’d say if you look at the data that we currently have, especially of the survey done in 2021 to 2023, the most enthusiastic citizens have been Zambians and Tanzanians. The governments of Zambia and government of Tanzania are the ones that enjoy the highest performance ratings in terms of democratic governance and economic performance from their citizens. And so, in my view, I mean, these are the countries, at least per the data, these are the countries where we have seen some positive signals.

And I would probably attribute Zambia’s case to their most recent elections, where young people and civil society groups played a very powerful role in bringing to power the opposition that is in power. And that does seem like it has created a sense of enthusiasm and euphoria around the fact that citizens can change their government if they make a determination.

Of course, we just started the next round of the surveys now, and I’m sure we are going to get a similar picture from Senegal after we have are done with those surveys. Because that euphoria of citizens feeling that they can change their leaders through elections is critical to these kinds of … the way citizens appraise their governments on these issues.

SIGNÉ: Fantastic. You mentioned Senegal. Would you mind elaborating more on that case?

ASUNKA: So, Senegal’s case is a combination of the role of the judiciary, and I and I and I can’t emphasize enough how important the judiciary is when it comes to democratic governance, and the need for democracy stakeholders and citizens, as well as civil society groups, to work in ensuring that the judiciary can enjoy a high level of independence in their actions and decisions.

So, the judiciary in Senegal, similarly as it happens in Malawi as well as in Kenya, where the judiciary steps in in an election dispute and makes sure that the president at that time in Senegal, Macky Sall, did not have the opportunity to postpone the elections. This was because of the role of the judiciary, right, in making sure that the decision of the president does not contravene the constitution, which paved the way for Senegalese to be able to express themselves in terms of who they want to be their leader and leading to the opposition coming into power.

Which, as I said, clean elections are one of the critical things that most African citizens want. And when elections are seen to be free, fair, and that citizens can make a change through elections, they can do that. So, I would advocate here for building an electoral system that gives people the confidence that they can change their leaders. And I hope that will also invest in protecting the independence of the judiciary to sustain our democracies.

SIGNÉ: Joseph, how can other governments learn from these countries which have been successful?

ASUNKA: Right. So, maybe I would rather think of it in terms of how citizens and civil society advocates can learn from these countries, because for government sometimes politics and the incentives around elected leaders can undermine, or it at least can undermine their interest in learning about successful countries. But I think the critical thing here will be how can citizens and other democracy actors here on the continent learn from these successful cases.

And I think the learning can come from just what I mentioned, one, making sure that we can find ways to protect the judiciary as an institution of democracy. Secondly, ensuring that our elections are clean. And one thing that I’ve always pushed here for has been, increasingly there’s an integration of technology in elections, to make sure that elections are clean so that technology can play a role, that if we are bringing technology into elections, we want to make sure that that technology is trusted.

And here, again, I believe that the African Union and the regional economic bodies can play a role in the sense that, you know, when you are thinking about how to regulate the use of technology and the kinds of technology you use, if we have a centralized pool of resources that you can imagine having an African-generated technology, election management technology, that sits on the continent. So, that election results do not have to go and sit in a server that is in the United States, or a server that sits in in Europe. But that there is a system on the continent where both the election management software and the hardware can be located on the continent and used for managing elections, so it can provide more credibility and trust among citizens.

SIGNÉ: Is there anything Afrobarometer survey failed to capture this year, and that you are hoping to get more insight into in upcoming surveys rounds?

ASUNKA: Right. So, as for the upcoming survey round, we have actually a very new topic that we have never covered. And this is on sexual reproductive health and rights. So, we want to get our citizens’ attitudes towards safe abortion and access to contraceptives and the like. And I think this module we developed for this time around, which is the first time we are going to cover that topic, was also partly motivated by what happened in the U.S. in terms of Roe v. Wade, because we want to see if it has any ripple effects, but also to just get a general sentiment and cross-country variation in terms of attitudes for sexual and reproductive health and rights. So, that’s a very new topic we are covering in round ten.

But in addition to that, we are going to cover other topics that we had taken a break from. Usually, Afrobarometer sometimes we cover certain topics, but because opinions and attitudes don’t change that frequently, like opinions on certain topics don’t change year to year. So, what we would normally do is give it a break and then we come back to it. So, the topics that we are going to revisit this time around, the surveys which we just launched in January, will be migration, and the attitudes towards refugees and migrants across the continent. And that is in the context of the African Continental Free Trade Area, to see what people’s attitudes are in terms of the cross-border trading, but also migration and labor movement on the continent.

The second piece is access to justice, which has been a topic we covered in about two rounds ago. We are revisiting it now to get people’s sentiment on their access to, to justice.

And the final one that we’ll be covering this time will be Africa’s voice in the global context. So, the African Union, now part of the G20 and other, you know, global bodies, their citizens’ views about the role and voice of Africa on this global in this global context. These are some of the topics I will be covering in round ten. And hopefully by the middle of this year, you will start to see new results come out from the different countries.

SIGNÉ: These are all fascinating topics. And I’m enthusiastically looking forward to reading your next findings.

Joseph, thank you so much for joining us today.

ASUNKA: It has been a pleasure to be with you. Thank you so much. And then I really enjoy Africa Foresight , I read all the articles in it. It’s entertaining and also informative in many, many ways. So, thank you for doing this.

SIGNÉ: I am Landry Signé, and this has been Foresight Africa . To learn more about this show and our report, visit Brookings dot edu slash Foresight Africa podcast. 

The Foresight Africa podcast is brought to you by the Brookings Podcast Network. Send your feedback and questions to podcasts at Brookings dot edu.

My special thanks to the production team, including Kuwilileni Hauwanga, supervising producer; Fred Dews, producer; Nicole Ntungire and Alexandria Cordero, associate producers; and Colin Cruickshank, audio engineer. 

This show’s art was designed by Shavanthi Mendis. Additional support for this podcast comes from my colleagues in Brookings Global and the Office of Communications at Brookings.

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Georgia political party advisory questions (may 2024).

The Republican Party and Democratic Party placed nonbinding advisory questions on the May 21, 2024, statewide primary ballots. Republican ballots featured eight questions , and Democratic ballots featured eight questions . [1] [2]

The Democratic and Republican primaries were open , meaning all voters were able to vote in the election.

Click here to learn more about Georgia's elections in 2024.

• 1.1 What is an advisory question?
• 2.1 Question 1
• 2.2 Question 2
• 2.3 Question 3
• 2.4 Question 4
• 2.5 Question 5
• 2.6 Question 6
• 2.7 Question 7
• 2.8 Question 8
• 3.1 Question 1
• 3.2 Question 2
• 3.3 Question 3
• 3.4 Question 4
• 3.5 Question 5
• 3.6 Question 6
• 3.7 Question 7
• 3.8 Question 8
• 3.9 See also
• 3.10 Footnotes

What is an advisory question?

An advisory question is a type of ballot measure in which citizens vote on a non-binding question. The largest difference between an advisory vote and any other type of ballot measure is that the outcome of the ballot question will not result in a new, changed, or rejected law or constitutional amendment. Rather, the advisory question symbolically makes heard the general opinion of the voting population in regard to the issue at hand. Political parties place nonbinding questions on ballots to gauge voters' priorities.

Republican Party questions

The Georgia Republican Party placed eight nonbinding propositions on the May 21 statewide primary ballot. [3]

Question 1 was as follows: [2]

Question 2 was as follows: [2]

Question 3 was as follows: [2]

Question 4 was as follows: [2]

Question 5 was as follows: [2]

Question 6 was as follows: [2]

Question 7 was as follows: [2]

Question 8 was as follows: [2]

Democratic Party questions

The Georgia Democratic Party placed eight nonbinding propositions on the May 21 statewide primary ballot. [1]

Question 1 was as follows: [1]

Question 2 was as follows: [1]

Question 3 was as follows: [1]

Question 4 was as follows: [1]

Question 5 was as follows: [1]

Question 6 was as follows: [1]

Question 7 was as follows: [1]

Question 8 was as follows: [1]

• 2024 ballot measures
• Georgia ballot measures
• Democratic Party
• Republican Party
• ↑ 1.0 1.1 1.2 1.3 1.4 1.5 1.6 1.7 1.8 1.9 DeKalb County, Georgia , "Official Democratic sample ballots," accessed May 10, 2024
• ↑ 2.0 2.1 2.2 2.3 2.4 2.5 2.6 2.7 2.8 11 Alive , "How to decode the partisan advisory questions on Georgia primary ballots," accessed May 10, 2024
• ↑ Cite error: Invalid <ref> tag; no text was provided for refs named text
• ↑ 4.00 4.01 4.02 4.03 4.04 4.05 4.06 4.07 4.08 4.09 4.10 4.11 4.12 4.13 4.14 4.15 Note: This text is quoted verbatim from the original source. Any inconsistencies are attributable to the original source.
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