research on thinking

Thinking About Kahneman’s Contribution to Critical Thinking

A nobel laureate on contributions on the importance of 'thinking slow.'.

Updated April 10, 2024 | Reviewed by Lybi Ma

• Kahneman won a Nobel Memorial Prize in Economics for his work.
• He found that people are often irrational about economics.

During my Ph.D. studies, I recall focusing on reconceptualising what we know of as critical thinking to include reflective judgment (not jumping to conclusions and taking your time in your decision-making to consider the nature limits, and certainty of knowing) on par with the commonly accepted skills and dispositions components. The importance of reflective judgment wasn’t a particularly novel idea – a good deal of research on reflective judgment and similar processes akin to critical thinking had already been conducted (see King and Kitchener, 1994; Kuhn, 1999; 2000; Stanovich, 1999). However, reflective judgment – as opposed to intuitive judgment – didn’t seem to have ‘the presence’ in the discussion of critical thinking that it does today.

The same month I submitted my Ph.D. back in 2011, a book was released that massively helped to accomplish what I had been working to help facilitate – changing the terrain of thought surrounding critical thinking: Thinking, Fast, and Slow . Its author, Daniel Kahneman, passed away a couple of weeks ago at age 90. Psychology students will likely recognise the name associated with Amos Tversky and their classic work together in the 1970s on the availability, representativeness, and anchoring and adjustment heuristics (for example, Tversky and Kahneman, 1974). Indeed, such heuristics, alongside the affect heuristic (Kahneman and Frederick, 2002; Slovic and colleagues, 2002) play a large role in how we think about thinking and barriers to critical thought. In 2002, Kahneman won a Nobel Memorial Prize in Economics for his work on prospect theory concerning loss aversion and people’s often irrational approach to economics. Indeed, Kahneman’s resume is full of awards and achievements.

However, the accomplishment I will remember him best for is the publication of Thinking, Fast, and Slow and its contribution to the field of critical thinking. Funny enough, I don’t recall the term, critical thinking being used very often in the book, if at all – and I read it two or three times. No, critical thinking was not the focus of his book; rather system 1 (fast) and 2 (slow) thinking (see also Stanovich, 1999) – intuitive and reflective judgment. Not only did this book put into the spotlight many of the mechanics of reflective judgment for fellow academics and researchers of cognitive psychology, it also did so l for non-academic audiences – becoming a New York Times bestseller. Moreover, it won the Los Angeles Times Book Award for Current Interest, and the National Academy of Sciences Communication Award for Best Book (both in 2011). Good thinking was cool again in popular culture.

In the critical thinking literature, reflective judgment – regardless of what you want to call it (for example, system 2 thinking, epistemological understanding, ‘taking your time’) – is becoming more accepted as a core component of critical thinking. The field of critical thinking research and psychology more broadly, owes Kahneman a debt of gratitude for his contributions in helping shine a light on the importance of ‘thinking slow’. Thank you .

Kahneman, D. (2011). Thinking, fast and slow . 2UK: Penguin.

Kahneman, D., & Frederick, S. (2002). Representativeness revisited: Attribute substitution in intuitive judgment. Heuristics and biases: The Psychology of Intuitive Judgment , 49 (49-81), 74.

King, P. M., & Kitchener, K. S. (1994). Developing Reflective Judgment: Understanding and Promoting Intellectual Growth and Critical Thinking in Adolescents and Adults. CA: Jossey-Bass.

King, P. M., & Kitchener, K. S. (2004). Reflective judgment: Theory and research on the development of epistemic assumptions through adulthood. Educational Psychologist, 39 (1), 5–15.

Kuhn, D. (1999). A developmental model of critical thinking. Educational Researcher , 28 (2), 16-46.

Kuhn, D. (2000). Metacognitive development. Current Directions in Psychological Science , 9 (5), 178-181.

Slovic, P., Finucane, M., Peters, E., & MacGregor, D. G. (2002). Rational actors or rational fools: Implications of the affect heuristic for behavioral economics. The Journal of Socio-economics , 31 (4), 329-342.

Stanovich, K.E. (1999) Who is rational? Studies of individual differences in reasoning. Mahwah, Erlbaum.

Tversky, A., & Kahneman, D. (1974). Judgment under Uncertainty: Heuristics and Biases: Biases in judgments reveal some heuristics of thinking under uncertainty. Science , 185 (4157), 1124-1131.

Christopher Dwyer, Ph.D., is a lecturer at the Technological University of the Shannon in Athlone, Ireland.

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What Is Cognitive Psychology?

The Science of How We Think

Kendra Cherry, MS, is a psychosocial rehabilitation specialist, psychology educator, and author of the "Everything Psychology Book."

Steven Gans, MD is board-certified in psychiatry and is an active supervisor, teacher, and mentor at Massachusetts General Hospital.

Topics in Cognitive Psychology

• Current Research
• Cognitive Approach in Practice

Careers in Cognitive Psychology

How cognitive psychology differs from other branches of psychology, frequently asked questions.

Cognitive psychology involves the study of internal mental processes—all of the workings inside your brain, including perception, thinking, memory, attention, language, problem-solving, and learning.

Cognitive psychology--the study of how people think and process information--helps researchers understand the human brain. It also allows psychologists to help people deal with psychological difficulties.

This article discusses what cognitive psychology is, the history of this field, and current directions for research. It also covers some of the practical applications for cognitive psychology research and related career options you might consider.

Findings from cognitive psychology help us understand how people think, including how they acquire and store memories. By knowing more about how these processes work, psychologists can develop new ways of helping people with cognitive problems.

Cognitive psychologists explore a wide variety of topics related to thinking processes. Some of these include: 

• Attention --our ability to process information in the environment while tuning out irrelevant details
• Choice-based behavior --actions driven by a choice among other possibilities
• Decision-making
• Information processing
• Language acquisition --how we learn to read, write, and express ourselves
• Problem-solving
• Speech perception -how we process what others are saying
• Visual perception --how we see the physical world around us

History of Cognitive Psychology

Although it is a relatively young branch of psychology , it has quickly grown to become one of the most popular subfields. Cognitive psychology grew into prominence between the 1950s and 1970s.

Prior to this time, behaviorism was the dominant perspective in psychology. This theory holds that we learn all our behaviors from interacting with our environment. It focuses strictly on observable behavior, not thought and emotion. Then, researchers became more interested in the internal processes that affect behavior instead of just the behavior itself. 

This shift is often referred to as the cognitive revolution in psychology. During this time, a great deal of research on topics including memory, attention, and language acquisition began to emerge. 

In 1967, the psychologist Ulric Neisser introduced the term cognitive psychology, which he defined as the study of the processes behind the perception, transformation, storage, and recovery of information.

Cognitive psychology became more prominent after the 1950s as a result of the cognitive revolution.

Current Research in Cognitive Psychology

The field of cognitive psychology is both broad and diverse. It touches on many aspects of daily life. There are numerous practical applications for this research, such as providing help coping with memory disorders, making better decisions , recovering from brain injury, treating learning disorders, and structuring educational curricula to enhance learning.

Current research on cognitive psychology helps play a role in how professionals approach the treatment of mental illness, traumatic brain injury, and degenerative brain diseases.

Thanks to the work of cognitive psychologists, we can better pinpoint ways to measure human intellectual abilities, develop new strategies to combat memory problems, and decode the workings of the human brain—all of which ultimately have a powerful impact on how we treat cognitive disorders.

The field of cognitive psychology is a rapidly growing area that continues to add to our understanding of the many influences that mental processes have on our health and daily lives.

From understanding how cognitive processes change as a child develops to looking at how the brain transforms sensory inputs into perceptions, cognitive psychology has helped us gain a deeper and richer understanding of the many mental events that contribute to our daily existence and overall well-being.

The Cognitive Approach in Practice

In addition to adding to our understanding of how the human mind works, the field of cognitive psychology has also had an impact on approaches to mental health. Before the 1970s, many mental health treatments were focused more on psychoanalytic , behavioral , and humanistic approaches.

The so-called "cognitive revolution" put a greater emphasis on understanding the way people process information and how thinking patterns might contribute to psychological distress. Thanks to research in this area, new approaches to treatment were developed to help treat depression, anxiety, phobias, and other psychological disorders .

Cognitive behavioral therapy and rational emotive behavior therapy are two methods in which clients and therapists focus on the underlying cognitions, or thoughts, that contribute to psychological distress.

What Is Cognitive Behavioral Therapy?

Cognitive behavioral therapy (CBT) is an approach that helps clients identify irrational beliefs and other cognitive distortions that are in conflict with reality and then aid them in replacing such thoughts with more realistic, healthy beliefs.

If you are experiencing symptoms of a psychological disorder that would benefit from the use of cognitive approaches, you might see a psychologist who has specific training in these cognitive treatment methods.

These professionals frequently go by titles other than cognitive psychologists, such as psychiatrists, clinical psychologists , or counseling psychologists , but many of the strategies they use are rooted in the cognitive tradition.

Many cognitive psychologists specialize in research with universities or government agencies. Others take a clinical focus and work directly with people who are experiencing challenges related to mental processes. They work in hospitals, mental health clinics, and private practices.

Research psychologists in this area often concentrate on a particular topic, such as memory. Others work directly on health concerns related to cognition, such as degenerative brain disorders and brain injuries.

Treatments rooted in cognitive research focus on helping people replace negative thought patterns with more positive, realistic ones. With the help of cognitive psychologists, people are often able to find ways to cope and even overcome such difficulties.

Reasons to Consult a Cognitive Psychologist

• Alzheimer's disease, dementia, or memory loss
• Brain trauma treatment
• Cognitive therapy for a mental health condition
• Interventions for learning disabilities
• Perceptual or sensory issues
• Therapy for a speech or language disorder

Whereas behavioral and some other realms of psychology focus on actions--which are external and observable--cognitive psychology is instead concerned with the thought processes behind the behavior. Cognitive psychologists see the mind as if it were a computer, taking in and processing information, and seek to understand the various factors involved.

A Word From Verywell

Cognitive psychology plays an important role in understanding the processes of memory, attention, and learning. It can also provide insights into cognitive conditions that may affect how people function.

Being diagnosed with a brain or cognitive health problem can be daunting, but it is important to remember that you are not alone. Together with a healthcare provider, you can come up with an effective treatment plan to help address brain health and cognitive problems.

Your treatment may involve consulting with a cognitive psychologist who has a background in the specific area of concern that you are facing, or you may be referred to another mental health professional that has training and experience with your particular condition.

Ulric Neisser is considered the founder of cognitive psychology. He was the first to introduce the term and to define the field of cognitive psychology. His primary interests were in the areas of perception and memory, but he suggested that all aspects of human thought and behavior were relevant to the study of cognition.

A cognitive map refers to a mental representation of an environment. Such maps can be formed through observation as well as through trial and error. These cognitive maps allow people to orient themselves in their environment.

While they share some similarities, there are some important differences between cognitive neuroscience and cognitive psychology. While cognitive psychology focuses on thinking processes, cognitive neuroscience is focused on finding connections between thinking and specific brain activity. Cognitive neuroscience also looks at the underlying biology that influences how information is processed.

Cognitive psychology is a form of experimental psychology. Cognitive psychologists use experimental methods to study the internal mental processes that play a role in behavior.

Sternberg RJ, Sternberg K. Cognitive Psychology . Wadsworth/Cengage Learning. 

Krapfl JE. Behaviorism and society . Behav Anal. 2016;39(1):123-9. doi:10.1007/s40614-016-0063-8

Cutting JE. Ulric Neisser (1928-2012) . Am Psychol . 2012;67(6):492. doi:10.1037/a0029351

Ruggiero GM, Spada MM, Caselli G, Sassaroli S. A historical and theoretical review of cognitive behavioral therapies: from structural self-knowledge to functional processes .  J Ration Emot Cogn Behav Ther . 2018;36(4):378-403. doi:10.1007/s10942-018-0292-8

Parvin P. Ulric Neisser, cognitive psychology pioneer, dies . Emory News Center.

APA Dictionary of Psychology. Cognitive map . American Psychological Association.

Forstmann BU, Wagenmakers EJ, Eichele T, Brown S, Serences JT. Reciprocal relations between cognitive neuroscience and formal cognitive models: opposites attract? . Trends Cogn Sci . 2011;15(6):272-279. doi:10.1016/j.tics.2011.04.002

By Kendra Cherry, MSEd Kendra Cherry, MS, is a psychosocial rehabilitation specialist, psychology educator, and author of the "Everything Psychology Book."

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35 Scientific Thinking and Reasoning

Kevin N. Dunbar, Department of Human Development and Quantitative Methodology, University of Maryland, College Park, MD

David Klahr, Department of Psychology, Carnegie Mellon University, Pittsburgh, PA

• Published: 21 November 2012
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Scientific thinking refers to both thinking about the content of science and the set of reasoning processes that permeate the field of science: induction, deduction, experimental design, causal reasoning, concept formation, hypothesis testing, and so on. Here we cover both the history of research on scientific thinking and the different approaches that have been used, highlighting common themes that have emerged over the past 50 years of research. Future research will focus on the collaborative aspects of scientific thinking, on effective methods for teaching science, and on the neural underpinnings of the scientific mind.

There is no unitary activity called “scientific discovery”; there are activities of designing experiments, gathering data, inventing and developing observational instruments, formulating and modifying theories, deducing consequences from theories, making predictions from theories, testing theories, inducing regularities and invariants from data, discovering theoretical constructs, and others. — Simon, Langley, & Bradshaw, 1981 , p. 2

What Is Scientific Thinking and Reasoning?

There are two kinds of thinking we call “scientific.” The first, and most obvious, is thinking about the content of science. People are engaged in scientific thinking when they are reasoning about such entities and processes as force, mass, energy, equilibrium, magnetism, atoms, photosynthesis, radiation, geology, or astrophysics (and, of course, cognitive psychology!). The second kind of scientific thinking includes the set of reasoning processes that permeate the field of science: induction, deduction, experimental design, causal reasoning, concept formation, hypothesis testing, and so on. However, these reasoning processes are not unique to scientific thinking: They are the very same processes involved in everyday thinking. As Einstein put it:

The scientific way of forming concepts differs from that which we use in our daily life, not basically, but merely in the more precise definition of concepts and conclusions; more painstaking and systematic choice of experimental material, and greater logical economy. (The Common Language of Science, 1941, reprinted in Einstein, 1950 , p. 98)

Nearly 40 years after Einstein's remarkably insightful statement, Francis Crick offered a similar perspective: that great discoveries in science result not from extraordinary mental processes, but rather from rather common ones. The greatness of the discovery lies in the thing discovered.

I think what needs to be emphasized about the discovery of the double helix is that the path to it was, scientifically speaking, fairly commonplace. What was important was not the way it was discovered , but the object discovered—the structure of DNA itself. (Crick, 1988 , p. 67; emphasis added)

Under this view, scientific thinking involves the same general-purpose cognitive processes—such as induction, deduction, analogy, problem solving, and causal reasoning—that humans apply in nonscientific domains. These processes are covered in several different chapters of this handbook: Rips, Smith, & Medin, Chapter 11 on induction; Evans, Chapter 8 on deduction; Holyoak, Chapter 13 on analogy; Bassok & Novick, Chapter 21 on problem solving; and Cheng & Buehner, Chapter 12 on causality. One might question the claim that the highly specialized procedures associated with doing science in the “real world” can be understood by investigating the thinking processes used in laboratory studies of the sort described in this volume. However, when the focus is on major scientific breakthroughs, rather than on the more routine, incremental progress in a field, the psychology of problem solving provides a rich source of ideas about how such discoveries might occur. As Simon and his colleagues put it:

It is understandable, if ironic, that ‘normal’ science fits … the description of expert problem solving, while ‘revolutionary’ science fits the description of problem solving by novices. It is understandable because scientific activity, particularly at the revolutionary end of the continuum, is concerned with the discovery of new truths, not with the application of truths that are already well-known … it is basically a journey into unmapped terrain. Consequently, it is mainly characterized, as is novice problem solving, by trial-and-error search. The search may be highly selective—but it reaches its goal only after many halts, turnings, and back-trackings. (Simon, Langley, & Bradshaw, 1981 , p. 5)

The research literature on scientific thinking can be roughly categorized according to the two types of scientific thinking listed in the opening paragraph of this chapter: (1) One category focuses on thinking that directly involves scientific content . Such research ranges from studies of young children reasoning about the sun-moon-earth system (Vosniadou & Brewer, 1992 ) to college students reasoning about chemical equilibrium (Davenport, Yaron, Klahr, & Koedinger, 2008 ), to research that investigates collaborative problem solving by world-class researchers in real-world molecular biology labs (Dunbar, 1995 ). (2) The other category focuses on “general” cognitive processes, but it tends to do so by analyzing people's problem-solving behavior when they are presented with relatively complex situations that involve the integration and coordination of several different types of processes, and that are designed to capture some essential features of “real-world” science in the psychology laboratory (Bruner, Goodnow, & Austin, 1956 ; Klahr & Dunbar, 1988 ; Mynatt, Doherty, & Tweney, 1977 ).

There are a number of overlapping research traditions that have been used to investigate scientific thinking. We will cover both the history of research on scientific thinking and the different approaches that have been used, highlighting common themes that have emerged over the past 50 years of research.

A Brief History of Research on Scientific Thinking

Science is often considered one of the hallmarks of the human species, along with art and literature. Illuminating the thought processes used in science thus reveal key aspects of the human mind. The thought processes underlying scientific thinking have fascinated both scientists and nonscientists because the products of science have transformed our world and because the process of discovery is shrouded in mystery. Scientists talk of the chance discovery, the flash of insight, the years of perspiration, and the voyage of discovery. These images of science have helped make the mental processes underlying the discovery process intriguing to cognitive scientists as they attempt to uncover what really goes on inside the scientific mind and how scientists really think. Furthermore, the possibilities that scientists can be taught to think better by avoiding mistakes that have been clearly identified in research on scientific thinking, and that their scientific process could be partially automated, makes scientific thinking a topic of enduring interest.

The cognitive processes underlying scientific discovery and day-to-day scientific thinking have been a topic of intense scrutiny and speculation for almost 400 years (e.g., Bacon, 1620 ; Galilei 1638 ; Klahr 2000 ; Tweney, Doherty, & Mynatt, 1981 ). Understanding the nature of scientific thinking has been a central issue not only for our understanding of science but also for our understating of what it is to be human. Bacon's Novumm Organum in 1620 sketched out some of the key features of the ways that experiments are designed and data interpreted. Over the ensuing 400 years philosophers and scientists vigorously debated about the appropriate methods that scientists should use (see Giere, 1993 ). These debates over the appropriate methods for science typically resulted in the espousal of a particular type of reasoning method, such as induction or deduction. It was not until the Gestalt psychologists began working on the nature of human problem solving, during the 1940s, that experimental psychologists began to investigate the cognitive processes underlying scientific thinking and reasoning.

The Gestalt psychologist Max Wertheimer pioneered the investigation of scientific thinking (of the first type described earlier: thinking about scientific content ) in his landmark book Productive Thinking (Wertheimer, 1945 ). Wertheimer spent a considerable amount of time corresponding with Albert Einstein, attempting to discover how Einstein generated the concept of relativity. Wertheimer argued that Einstein had to overcome the structure of Newtonian physics at each step in his theorizing, and the ways that Einstein actually achieved this restructuring were articulated in terms of Gestalt theories. (For a recent and different account of how Einstein made his discovery, see Galison, 2003 .) We will see later how this process of overcoming alternative theories is an obstacle that both scientists and nonscientists need to deal with when evaluating and theorizing about the world.

One of the first investigations of scientific thinking of the second type (i.e., collections of general-purpose processes operating on complex, abstract, components of scientific thought) was carried out by Jerome Bruner and his colleagues at Harvard (Bruner et al., 1956 ). They argued that a key activity engaged in by scientists is to determine whether a particular instance is a member of a category. For example, a scientist might want to discover which substances undergo fission when bombarded by neutrons and which substances do not. Here, scientists have to discover the attributes that make a substance undergo fission. Bruner et al. saw scientific thinking as the testing of hypotheses and the collecting of data with the end goal of determining whether something is a member of a category. They invented a paradigm where people were required to formulate hypotheses and collect data that test their hypotheses. In one type of experiment, the participants were shown a card such as one with two borders and three green triangles. The participants were asked to determine the concept that this card represented by choosing other cards and getting feedback from the experimenter as to whether the chosen card was an example of the concept. In this case the participant may have thought that the concept was green and chosen a card with two green squares and one border. If the underlying concept was green, then the experimenter would say that the card was an example of the concept. In terms of scientific thinking, choosing a new card is akin to conducting an experiment, and the feedback from the experimenter is similar to knowing whether a hypothesis is confirmed or disconfirmed. Using this approach, Bruner et al. identified a number of strategies that people use to formulate and test hypotheses. They found that a key factor determining which hypothesis-testing strategy that people use is the amount of memory capacity that the strategy takes up (see also Morrison & Knowlton, Chapter 6 ; Medin et al., Chapter 11 ). Another key factor that they discovered was that it was much more difficult for people to discover negative concepts (e.g., not blue) than positive concepts (e.g., blue). Although Bruner et al.'s research is most commonly viewed as work on concepts, they saw their work as uncovering a key component of scientific thinking.

A second early line of research on scientific thinking was developed by Peter Wason and his colleagues (Wason, 1968 ). Like Bruner et al., Wason saw a key component of scientific thinking as being the testing of hypotheses. Whereas Bruner et al. focused on the different types of strategies that people use to formulate hypotheses, Wason focused on whether people adopt a strategy of trying to confirm or disconfirm their hypotheses. Using Popper's ( 1959 ) theory that scientists should try and falsify rather than confirm their hypotheses, Wason devised a deceptively simple task in which participants were given three numbers, such as 2-4-6, and were asked to discover the rule underlying the three numbers. Participants were asked to generate other triads of numbers and the experimenter would tell the participant whether the triad was consistent or inconsistent with the rule. They were told that when they were sure they knew what the rule was they should state it. Most participants began the experiment by thinking that the rule was even numbers increasing by 2. They then attempted to confirm their hypothesis by generating a triad like 8-10-12, then 14-16-18. These triads are consistent with the rule and the participants were told yes, that the triads were indeed consistent with the rule. However, when they proposed the rule—even numbers increasing by 2—they were told that the rule was incorrect. The correct rule was numbers of increasing magnitude! From this research, Wason concluded that people try to confirm their hypotheses, whereas normatively speaking, they should try to disconfirm their hypotheses. One implication of this research is that confirmation bias is not just restricted to scientists but is a general human tendency.

It was not until the 1970s that a general account of scientific reasoning was proposed. Herbert Simon, often in collaboration with Allan Newell, proposed that scientific thinking is a form of problem solving. He proposed that problem solving is a search in a problem space. Newell and Simon's theory of problem solving is discussed in many places in this handbook, usually in the context of specific problems (see especially Bassok & Novick, Chapter 21 ). Herbert Simon, however, devoted considerable time to understanding many different scientific discoveries and scientific reasoning processes. The common thread in his research was that scientific thinking and discovery is not a mysterious magical process but a process of problem solving in which clear heuristics are used. Simon's goal was to articulate the heuristics that scientists use in their research at a fine-grained level. By constructing computer programs that simulated the process of several major scientific discoveries, Simon and colleagues were able to articulate the specific computations that scientists could have used in making those discoveries (Langley, Simon, Bradshaw, & Zytkow, 1987 ; see section on “Computational Approaches to Scientific Thinking”). Particularly influential was Simon and Lea's ( 1974 ) work demonstrating that concept formation and induction consist of a search in two problem spaces: a space of instances and a space of rules. This idea has influenced problem-solving accounts of scientific thinking that will be discussed in the next section.

Overall, the work of Bruner, Wason, and Simon laid the foundations for contemporary research on scientific thinking. Early research on scientific thinking is summarized in Tweney, Doherty and Mynatt's 1981 book On Scientific Thinking , where they sketched out many of the themes that have dominated research on scientific thinking over the past few decades. Other more recent books such as Cognitive Models of Science (Giere, 1993 ), Exploring Science (Klahr, 2000 ), Cognitive Basis of Science (Carruthers, Stich, & Siegal, 2002 ), and New Directions in Scientific and Technical Thinking (Gorman, Kincannon, Gooding, & Tweney, 2004 ) provide detailed analyses of different aspects of scientific discovery. Another important collection is Vosnadiau's handbook on conceptual change research (Vosniadou, 2008 ). In this chapter, we discuss the main approaches that have been used to investigate scientific thinking.

How does one go about investigating the many different aspects of scientific thinking? One common approach to the study of the scientific mind has been to investigate several key aspects of scientific thinking using abstract tasks designed to mimic some essential characteristics of “real-world” science. There have been numerous methodologies that have been used to analyze the genesis of scientific concepts, theories, hypotheses, and experiments. Researchers have used experiments, verbal protocols, computer programs, and analyzed particular scientific discoveries. A more recent development has been to increase the ecological validity of such research by investigating scientists as they reason “live” (in vivo studies of scientific thinking) in their own laboratories (Dunbar, 1995 , 2002 ). From a “Thinking and Reasoning” standpoint the major aspects of scientific thinking that have been most actively investigated are problem solving, analogical reasoning, hypothesis testing, conceptual change, collaborative reasoning, inductive reasoning, and deductive reasoning.

Scientific Thinking as Problem Solving

One of the primary goals of accounts of scientific thinking has been to provide an overarching framework to understand the scientific mind. One framework that has had a great influence in cognitive science is that scientific thinking and scientific discovery can be conceived as a form of problem solving. As noted in the opening section of this chapter, Simon ( 1977 ; Simon, Langley, & Bradshaw, 1981 ) argued that both scientific thinking in general and problem solving in particular could be thought of as a search in a problem space. A problem space consists of all the possible states of a problem and all the operations that a problem solver can use to get from one state to the next. According to this view, by characterizing the types of representations and procedures that people use to get from one state to another it is possible to understand scientific thinking. Thus, scientific thinking can be characterized as a search in various problem spaces (Simon, 1977 ). Simon investigated a number of scientific discoveries by bringing participants into the laboratory, providing the participants with the data that a scientist had access to, and getting the participants to reason about the data and rediscover a scientific concept. He then analyzed the verbal protocols that participants generated and mapped out the types of problem spaces that the participants search in (e.g., Qin & Simon, 1990 ). Kulkarni and Simon ( 1988 ) used a more historical approach to uncover the problem-solving heuristics that Krebs used in his discovery of the urea cycle. Kulkarni and Simon analyzed Krebs's diaries and proposed a set of problem-solving heuristics that he used in his research. They then built a computer program incorporating the heuristics and biological knowledge that Krebs had before he made his discoveries. Of particular importance are the search heuristics that the program uses, which include experimental proposal heuristics and data interpretation heuristics. A key heuristic was an unusualness heuristic that focused on unusual findings, which guided search through a space of theories and a space of experiments.

Klahr and Dunbar ( 1988 ) extended the search in a problem space approach and proposed that scientific thinking can be thought of as a search through two related spaces: an hypothesis space and an experiment space. Each problem space that a scientist uses will have its own types of representations and operators used to change the representations. Search in the hypothesis space constrains search in the experiment space. Klahr and Dunbar found that some participants move from the hypothesis space to the experiment space, whereas others move from the experiment space to the hypothesis space. These different types of searches lead to the proposal of different types of hypotheses and experiments. More recent work has extended the dual-space approach to include alternative problem-solving spaces, including those for data, instrumentation, and domain-specific knowledge (Klahr & Simon, 1999 ; Schunn & Klahr, 1995 , 1996 ).

Scientific Thinking as Hypothesis Testing

Many researchers have regarded testing specific hypotheses predicted by theories as one of the key attributes of scientific thinking. Hypothesis testing is the process of evaluating a proposition by collecting evidence regarding its truth. Experimental cognitive research on scientific thinking that specifically examines this issue has tended to fall into two broad classes of investigations. The first class is concerned with the types of reasoning that lead scientists astray, thus blocking scientific ingenuity. A large amount of research has been conducted on the potentially faulty reasoning strategies that both participants in experiments and scientists use, such as considering only one favored hypothesis at a time and how this prevents the scientists from making discoveries. The second class is concerned with uncovering the mental processes underlying the generation of new scientific hypotheses and concepts. This research has tended to focus on the use of analogy and imagery in science, as well as the use of specific types of problem-solving heuristics.

Turning first to investigations of what diminishes scientific creativity, philosophers, historians, and experimental psychologists have devoted a considerable amount of research to “confirmation bias.” This occurs when scientists only consider one hypothesis (typically the favored hypothesis) and ignore other alternative hypotheses or potentially relevant hypotheses. This important phenomenon can distort the design of experiments, formulation of theories, and interpretation of data. Beginning with the work of Wason ( 1968 ) and as discussed earlier, researchers have repeatedly shown that when participants are asked to design an experiment to test a hypothesis they will predominantly design experiments that they think will yield results consistent with the hypothesis. Using the 2-4-6 task mentioned earlier, Klayman and Ha ( 1987 ) showed that in situations where one's hypothesis is likely to be confirmed, seeking confirmation is a normatively incorrect strategy, whereas when the probability of confirming one's hypothesis is low, then attempting to confirm one's hypothesis can be an appropriate strategy. Historical analyses by Tweney ( 1989 ), concerning the way that Faraday made his discoveries, and experiments investigating people testing hypotheses, have revealed that people use a confirm early, disconfirm late strategy: When people initially generate or are given hypotheses, they try and gather evidence that is consistent with the hypothesis. Once enough evidence has been gathered, then people attempt to find the boundaries of their hypothesis and often try to disconfirm their hypotheses.

In an interesting variant on the confirmation bias paradigm, Gorman ( 1989 ) showed that when participants are told that there is the possibility of error in the data that they receive, participants assume that any data that are inconsistent with their favored hypothesis are due to error. Thus, the possibility of error “insulates” hypotheses against disconfirmation. This intriguing hypothesis has not been confirmed by other researchers (Penner & Klahr, 1996 ), but it is an intriguing hypothesis that warrants further investigation.

Confirmation bias is very difficult to overcome. Even when participants are asked to consider alternate hypotheses, they will often fail to conduct experiments that could potentially disconfirm their hypothesis. Tweney and his colleagues provide an excellent overview of this phenomenon in their classic monograph On Scientific Thinking (1981). The precise reasons for this type of block are still widely debated. Researchers such as Michael Doherty have argued that working memory limitations make it difficult for people to consider more than one hypothesis. Consistent with this view, Dunbar and Sussman ( 1995 ) have shown that when participants are asked to hold irrelevant items in working memory while testing hypotheses, the participants will be unable to switch hypotheses in the face of inconsistent evidence. While working memory limitations are involved in the phenomenon of confirmation bias, even groups of scientists can also display confirmation bias. For example, the controversy over cold fusion is an example of confirmation bias. Here, large groups of scientists had other hypotheses available to explain their data yet maintained their hypotheses in the face of other more standard alternative hypotheses. Mitroff ( 1974 ) provides some interesting examples of NASA scientists demonstrating confirmation bias, which highlight the roles of commitment and motivation in this process. See also MacPherson and Stanovich ( 2007 ) for specific strategies that can be used to overcome confirmation bias.

Causal Thinking in Science

Much of scientific thinking and scientific theory building pertains to the development of causal models between variables of interest. For example, do vaccines cause illnesses? Do carbon dioxide emissions cause global warming? Does water on a planet indicate that there is life on the planet? Scientists and nonscientists alike are constantly bombarded with statements regarding the causal relationship between such variables. How does one evaluate the status of such claims? What kinds of data are informative? How do scientists and nonscientists deal with data that are inconsistent with their theory?

A central issue in the causal reasoning literature, one that is directly relevant to scientific thinking, is the extent to which scientists and nonscientists alike are governed by the search for causal mechanisms (i.e., how a variable works) versus the search for statistical data (i.e., how often variables co-occur). This dichotomy can be boiled down to the search for qualitative versus quantitative information about the paradigm the scientist is investigating. Researchers from a number of cognitive psychology laboratories have found that people prefer to gather more information about an underlying mechanism than covariation between a cause and an effect (e.g., Ahn, Kalish, Medin, & Gelman, 1995 ). That is, the predominant strategy that students in simulations of scientific thinking use is to gather as much information as possible about how the objects under investigation work, rather than collecting large amounts of quantitative data to determine whether the observations hold across multiple samples. These findings suggest that a central component of scientific thinking may be to formulate explicit mechanistic causal models of scientific events.

One type of situation in which causal reasoning has been observed extensively is when scientists obtain unexpected findings. Both historical and naturalistic research has revealed that reasoning causally about unexpected findings plays a central role in science. Indeed, scientists themselves frequently state that a finding was due to chance or was unexpected. Given that claims of unexpected findings are such a frequent component of scientists' autobiographies and interviews in the media, Dunbar ( 1995 , 1997 , 1999 ; Dunbar & Fugelsang, 2005 ; Fugelsang, Stein, Green, & Dunbar, 2004 ) decided to investigate the ways that scientists deal with unexpected findings. In 1991–1992 Dunbar spent 1 year in three molecular biology laboratories and one immunology laboratory at a prestigious U.S. university. He used the weekly laboratory meeting as a source of data on scientific discovery and scientific reasoning. (He termed this type of study “in vivo” cognition.) When he looked at the types of findings that the scientists made, he found that over 50% of the findings were unexpected and that these scientists had evolved a number of effective strategies for dealing with such findings. One clear strategy was to reason causally about the findings: Scientists attempted to build causal models of their unexpected findings. This causal model building results in the extensive use of collaborative reasoning, analogical reasoning, and problem-solving heuristics (Dunbar, 1997 , 2001 ).

Many of the key unexpected findings that scientists reasoned about in the in vivo studies of scientific thinking were inconsistent with the scientists' preexisting causal models. A laboratory equivalent of the biology labs involved creating a situation in which students obtained unexpected findings that were inconsistent with their preexisting theories. Dunbar and Fugelsang ( 2005 ) examined this issue by creating a scientific causal thinking simulation where experimental outcomes were either expected or unexpected. Dunbar ( 1995 ) has called the study of people reasoning in a cognitive laboratory “in vitro” cognition. These investigators found that students spent considerably more time reasoning about unexpected findings than expected findings. In addition, when assessing the overall degree to which their hypothesis was supported or refuted, participants spent the majority of their time considering unexpected findings. An analysis of participants' verbal protocols indicates that much of this extra time was spent formulating causal models for the unexpected findings. Similarly, scientists spend more time considering unexpected than expected findings, and this time is devoted to building causal models (Dunbar & Fugelsang, 2004 ).

Scientists know that unexpected findings occur often, and they have developed many strategies to take advantage of their unexpected findings. One of the most important places that they anticipate the unexpected is in designing experiments (Baker & Dunbar, 2000 ). They build different causal models of their experiments incorporating many conditions and controls. These multiple conditions and controls allow unknown mechanisms to manifest themselves. Thus, rather than being the victims of the unexpected, they create opportunities for unexpected events to occur, and once these events do occur, they have causal models that allow them to determine exactly where in the causal chain their unexpected finding arose. The results of these in vivo and in vitro studies all point to a more complex and nuanced account of how scientists and nonscientists alike test and evaluate hypotheses about theories.

The Roles of Inductive, Abductive, and Deductive Thinking in Science

One of the most basic characteristics of science is that scientists assume that the universe that we live in follows predictable rules. Scientists reason using a variety of different strategies to make new scientific discoveries. Three frequently used types of reasoning strategies that scientists use are inductive, abductive, and deductive reasoning. In the case of inductive reasoning, a scientist may observe a series of events and try to discover a rule that governs the event. Once a rule is discovered, scientists can extrapolate from the rule to formulate theories of observed and yet-to-be-observed phenomena. One example is the discovery using inductive reasoning that a certain type of bacterium is a cause of many ulcers (Thagard, 1999 ). In a fascinating series of articles, Thagard documented the reasoning processes that Marshall and Warren went through in proposing this novel hypothesis. One key reasoning process was the use of induction by generalization. Marshall and Warren noted that almost all patients with gastric entritis had a spiral bacterium in their stomachs, and he formed the generalization that this bacterium is the cause of stomach ulcers. There are numerous other examples of induction by generalization in science, such as Tycho De Brea's induction about the motion of planets from his observations, Dalton's use of induction in chemistry, and the discovery of prions as the source of mad cow disease. Many theories of induction have used scientific discovery and reasoning as examples of this important reasoning process.

Another common type of inductive reasoning is to map a feature of one member of a category to another member of a category. This is called categorical induction. This type of induction is a way of projecting a known property of one item onto another item that is from the same category. Thus, knowing that the Rous Sarcoma virus is a retrovirus that uses RNA rather than DNA, a biologist might assume that another virus that is thought to be a retrovirus also uses RNA rather than DNA. While research on this type of induction typically has not been discussed in accounts of scientific thinking, this type of induction is common in science. For an influential contribution to this literature, see Smith, Shafir, and Osherson ( 1993 ), and for reviews of this literature see Heit ( 2000 ) and Medin et al. (Chapter 11 ).

While less commonly mentioned than inductive reasoning, abductive reasoning is an important form of reasoning that scientists use when they are seeking to propose explanations for events such as unexpected findings (see Lombrozo, Chapter 14 ; Magnani, et al., 2010 ). In Figure 35.1 , taken from King ( 2011 ), the differences between inductive, abductive, and deductive thinking are highlighted. In the case of abduction, the reasoner attempts to generate explanations of the form “if situation X had occurred, could it have produced the current evidence I am attempting to interpret?” (For an interesting of analysis of abductive reasoning see the brief paper by Klahr & Masnick, 2001 ). Of course, as in classical induction, such reasoning may produce a plausible account that is still not the correct one. However, abduction does involve the generation of new knowledge, and is thus also related to research on creativity.

The different processes underlying inductive, abductive, and deductive reasoning in science. (Figure reproduced from King 2011 ).)

Turning now to deductive thinking, many thinking processes that scientists adhere to follow traditional rules of deductive logic. These processes correspond to those conditions in which a hypothesis may lead to, or is deducible to, a conclusion. Though they are not always phrased in syllogistic form, deductive arguments can be phrased as “syllogisms,” or as brief, mathematical statements in which the premises lead to the conclusion. Deductive reasoning is an extremely important aspect of scientific thinking because it underlies a large component of how scientists conduct their research. By looking at many scientific discoveries, we can often see that deductive reasoning is at work. Deductive reasoning statements all contain information or rules that state an assumption about how the world works, as well as a conclusion that would necessarily follow from the rule. Numerous discoveries in physics such as the discovery of dark matter by Vera Rubin are based on deductions. In the dark matter case, Rubin measured galactic rotation curves and based on the differences between the predicted and observed angular motions of galaxies she deduced that the structure of the universe was uneven. This led her to propose that dark matter existed. In contemporary physics the CERN Large Hadron Collider is being used to search for the Higgs Boson. The Higgs Boson is a deductive prediction from contemporary physics. If the Higgs Boson is not found, it may lead to a radical revision of the nature of physics and a new understanding of mass (Hecht, 2011 ).

The Roles of Analogy in Scientific Thinking

One of the most widely mentioned reasoning processes used in science is analogy. Scientists use analogies to form a bridge between what they already know and what they are trying to explain, understand, or discover. In fact, many scientists have claimed that the making of certain analogies was instrumental in their making a scientific discovery, and almost all scientific autobiographies and biographies feature one particular analogy that is discussed in depth. Coupled with the fact that there has been an enormous research program on analogical thinking and reasoning (see Holyoak, Chapter 13 ), we now have a number of models and theories of analogical reasoning that suggest how analogy can play a role in scientific discovery (see Gentner, Holyoak, & Kokinov, 2001 ). By analyzing several major discoveries in the history of science, Thagard and Croft ( 1999 ), Nersessian ( 1999 , 2008 ), and Gentner and Jeziorski ( 1993 ) have all shown that analogical reasoning is a key aspect of scientific discovery.

Traditional accounts of analogy distinguish between two components of analogical reasoning: the target and the source (Holyoak, Chapter 13 ; Gentner 2010 ). The target is the concept or problem that a scientist is attempting to explain or solve. The source is another piece of knowledge that the scientist uses to understand the target or to explain the target to others. What the scientist does when he or she makes an analogy is to map features of the source onto features of the target. By mapping the features of the source onto the target, new features of the target may be discovered, or the features of the target may be rearranged so that a new concept is invented and a scientific discovery is made. For example, a common analogy that is used with computers is to describe a harmful piece of software as a computer virus. Once a piece of software is called a virus, people can map features of biological viruses, such as that it is small, spreads easily, self-replicates using a host, and causes damage. People not only map individual features of the source onto the target but also the systems of relations. For example, if a computer virus is similar to a biological virus, then an immune system can be created on computers that can protect computers from future variants of a virus. One of the reasons that scientific analogy is so powerful is that it can generate new knowledge, such as the creation of a computational immune system having many of the features of a real biological immune system. This analogy also leads to predictions that there will be newer computer viruses that are the computational equivalent of retroviruses, lacking DNA, or standard instructions, that will elude the computational immune system.

The process of making an analogy involves a number of key steps: retrieval of a source from memory, aligning the features of the source with those of the target, mapping features of the source onto those of the target, and possibly making new inferences about the target. Scientific discoveries are made when the source highlights a hitherto unknown feature of the target or restructures the target into a new set of relations. Interestingly, research on analogy has shown that participants do not easily use remote analogies (see Gentner et al., 1997 ; Holyoak & Thagard 1995 ). Participants in experiments tend to focus on the sharing of a superficial feature between the source and the target, rather than the relations among features. In his in vivo studies of science, Dunbar ( 1995 , 2001 , 2002 ) investigated the ways that scientists use analogies while they are conducting their research and found that scientists use both relational and superficial features when they make analogies. Whether they use superficial or relational features depends on their goals. If their goal is to fix a problem in an experiment, their analogies are based upon superficial features. However, if their goal is to formulate hypotheses, they focus on analogies based upon sets of relations. One important difference between scientists and participants in experiments is that the scientists have deep relational knowledge of the processes that they are investigating and can hence use this relational knowledge to make analogies (see Holyoak, Chapter 13 for a thorough review of analogical reasoning).

Are scientific analogies always useful? Sometimes analogies can lead scientists and students astray. For example, Evelyn Fox-Keller ( 1985 ) shows how an analogy between the pulsing of a lighthouse and the activity of the slime mold dictyostelium led researchers astray for a number of years. Likewise, the analogy between the solar system (the source) and the structure of the atom (the target) has been shown to be potentially misleading to students taking more advanced courses in physics or chemistry. The solar system analogy has a number of misalignments to the structure of the atom, such as electrons being repelled from each other rather than attracted; moreover, electrons do not have individual orbits like planets but have orbit clouds of electron density. Furthermore, students have serious misconceptions about the nature of the solar system, which can compound their misunderstanding of the nature of the atom (Fischler & Lichtfeld, 1992 ). While analogy is a powerful tool in science, like all forms of induction, incorrect conclusions can be reached.

Conceptual Change in Science

Scientific knowledge continually accumulates as scientists gather evidence about the natural world. Over extended time, this knowledge accumulation leads to major revisions, extensions, and new organizational forms for expressing what is known about nature. Indeed, these changes are so substantial that philosophers of science speak of “revolutions” in a variety of scientific domains (Kuhn, 1962 ). The psychological literature that explores the idea of revolutionary conceptual change can be roughly divided into (a) investigations of how scientists actually make discoveries and integrate those discoveries into existing scientific contexts, and (b) investigations of nonscientists ranging from infants, to children, to students in science classes. In this section we summarize the adult studies of conceptual change, and in the next section we look at its developmental aspects.

Scientific concepts, like all concepts, can be characterized as containing a variety of “knowledge elements”: representations of words, thoughts, actions, objects, and processes. At certain points in the history of science, the accumulated evidence has demanded major shifts in the way these collections of knowledge elements are organized. This “radical conceptual change” process (see Keil, 1999 ; Nersessian 1998 , 2002 ; Thagard, 1992 ; Vosniadou 1998, for reviews) requires the formation of a new conceptual system that organizes knowledge in new ways, adds new knowledge, and results in a very different conceptual structure. For more recent research on conceptual change, The International Handbook of Research on Conceptual Change (Vosniadou, 2008 ) provides a detailed compendium of theories and controversies within the field.

While conceptual change in science is usually characterized by large-scale changes in concepts that occur over extensive periods of time, it has been possible to observe conceptual change using in vivo methodologies. Dunbar ( 1995 ) reported a major conceptual shift that occurred in immunologists, where they obtained a series of unexpected findings that forced the scientists to propose a new concept in immunology that in turn forced the change in other concepts. The drive behind this conceptual change was the discovery of a series of different unexpected findings or anomalies that required the scientists to both revise and reorganize their conceptual knowledge. Interestingly, this conceptual change was achieved by a group of scientists reasoning collaboratively, rather than by a scientist working alone. Different scientists tend to work on different aspects of concepts, and also different concepts, that when put together lead to a rapid change in entire conceptual structures.

Overall, accounts of conceptual change in individuals indicate that it is indeed similar to that of conceptual change in entire scientific fields. Individuals need to be confronted with anomalies that their preexisting theories cannot explain before entire conceptual structures are overthrown. However, replacement conceptual structures have to be generated before the old conceptual structure can be discarded. Sometimes, people do not overthrow their original conceptual theories and through their lives maintain their original views of many fundamental scientific concepts. Whether people actively possess naive theories, or whether they appear to have a naive theory because of the demand characteristics of the testing context, is a lively source of debate within the science education community (see Gupta, Hammer, & Redish, 2010 ).

Scientific Thinking in Children

Well before their first birthday, children appear to know several fundamental facts about the physical world. For example, studies with infants show that they behave as if they understand that solid objects endure over time (e.g., they don't just disappear and reappear, they cannot move through each other, and they move as a result of collisions with other solid objects or the force of gravity (Baillargeon, 2004 ; Carey 1985 ; Cohen & Cashon, 2006 ; Duschl, Schweingruber, & Shouse, 2007 ; Gelman & Baillargeon, 1983 ; Gelman & Kalish, 2006 ; Mandler, 2004 ; Metz 1995 ; Munakata, Casey, & Diamond, 2004 ). And even 6-month-olds are able to predict the future location of a moving object that they are attempting to grasp (Von Hofsten, 1980 ; Von Hofsten, Feng, & Spelke, 2000 ). In addition, they appear to be able to make nontrivial inferences about causes and their effects (Gopnik et al., 2004 ).

The similarities between children's thinking and scientists' thinking have an inherent allure and an internal contradiction. The allure resides in the enthusiastic wonder and openness with which both children and scientists approach the world around them. The paradox comes from the fact that different investigators of children's thinking have reached diametrically opposing conclusions about just how “scientific” children's thinking really is. Some claim support for the “child as a scientist” position (Brewer & Samarapungavan, 1991 ; Gelman & Wellman, 1991 ; Gopnik, Meltzoff, & Kuhl, 1999 ; Karmiloff-Smith 1988 ; Sodian, Zaitchik, & Carey, 1991 ; Samarapungavan 1992 ), while others offer serious challenges to the view (Fay & Klahr, 1996 ; Kern, Mirels, & Hinshaw, 1983 ; Kuhn, Amsel, & O'Laughlin, 1988 ; Schauble & Glaser, 1990 ; Siegler & Liebert, 1975 .) Such fundamentally incommensurate conclusions suggest that this very field—children's scientific thinking—is ripe for a conceptual revolution!

A recent comprehensive review (Duschl, Schweingruber, & Shouse, 2007 ) of what children bring to their science classes offers the following concise summary of the extensive developmental and educational research literature on children's scientific thinking:

Children entering school already have substantial knowledge of the natural world, much of which is implicit.

What children are capable of at a particular age is the result of a complex interplay among maturation, experience, and instruction. What is developmentally appropriate is not a simple function of age or grade, but rather is largely contingent on children's prior opportunities to learn.

Students' knowledge and experience play a critical role in their science learning, influencing four aspects of science understanding, including (a) knowing, using, and interpreting scientific explanations of the natural world; (b) generating and evaluating scientific evidence and explanations, (c) understanding how scientific knowledge is developed in the scientific community, and (d) participating in scientific practices and discourse.

Students learn science by actively engaging in the practices of science.

In the previous section of this article we discussed conceptual change with respect to scientific fields and undergraduate science students. However, the idea that children undergo radical conceptual change in which old “theories” need to be overthrown and reorganized has been a central topic in understanding changes in scientific thinking in both children and across the life span. This radical conceptual change is thought to be necessary for acquiring many new concepts in physics and is regarded as the major source of difficulty for students. The factors that are at the root of this conceptual shift view have been difficult to determine, although there have been a number of studies in cognitive development (Carey, 1985 ; Chi 1992 ; Chi & Roscoe, 2002 ), in the history of science (Thagard, 1992 ), and in physics education (Clement, 1982 ; Mestre 1991 ) that give detailed accounts of the changes in knowledge representation that occur while people switch from one way of representing scientific knowledge to another.

One area where students show great difficulty in understanding scientific concepts is physics. Analyses of students' changing conceptions, using interviews, verbal protocols, and behavioral outcome measures, indicate that large-scale changes in students' concepts occur in physics education (see McDermott & Redish, 1999 , for a review of this literature). Following Kuhn ( 1962 ), many researchers, but not all, have noted that students' changing conceptions resemble the sequences of conceptual changes in physics that have occurred in the history of science. These notions of radical paradigm shifts and ensuing incompatibility with past knowledge-states have called attention to interesting parallels between the development of particular scientific concepts in children and in the history of physics. Investigations of nonphysicists' understanding of motion indicate that students have extensive misunderstandings of motion. Some researchers have interpreted these findings as an indication that many people hold erroneous beliefs about motion similar to a medieval “impetus” theory (McCloskey, Caramazza, & Green, 1980 ). Furthermore, students appear to maintain “impetus” notions even after one or two courses in physics. In fact, some authors have noted that students who have taken one or two courses in physics can perform worse on physics problems than naive students (Mestre, 1991 ). Thus, it is only after extensive learning that we see a conceptual shift from impetus theories of motion to Newtonian scientific theories.

How one's conceptual representation shifts from “naive” to Newtonian is a matter of contention, as some have argued that the shift involves a radical conceptual change, whereas others have argued that the conceptual change is not really complete. For example, Kozhevnikov and Hegarty ( 2001 ) argue that much of the naive impetus notions of motion are maintained at the expense of Newtonian principles even with extensive training in physics. However, they argue that such impetus principles are maintained at an implicit level. Thus, although students can give the correct Newtonian answer to problems, their reaction times to respond indicate that they are also using impetus theories when they respond. An alternative view of conceptual change focuses on whether there are real conceptual changes at all. Gupta, Hammer and Redish ( 2010 ) and Disessa ( 2004 ) have conducted detailed investigations of changes in physics students' accounts of phenomena covered in elementary physics courses. They have found that rather than students possessing a naive theory that is replaced by the standard theory, many introductory physics students have no stable physical theory but rather construct their explanations from elementary pieces of knowledge of the physical world.

Computational Approaches to Scientific Thinking

Computational approaches have provided a more complete account of the scientific mind. Computational models provide specific detailed accounts of the cognitive processes underlying scientific thinking. Early computational work consisted of taking a scientific discovery and building computational models of the reasoning processes involved in the discovery. Langley, Simon, Bradshaw, and Zytkow ( 1987 ) built a series of programs that simulated discoveries such as those of Copernicus, Bacon, and Stahl. These programs had various inductive reasoning algorithms built into them, and when given the data that the scientists used, they were able to propose the same rules. Computational models make it possible to propose detailed models of the cognitive subcomponents of scientific thinking that specify exactly how scientific theories are generated, tested, and amended (see Darden, 1997 , and Shrager & Langley, 1990 , for accounts of this branch of research). More recently, the incorporation of scientific knowledge into computer programs has resulted in a shift in emphasis from using programs to simulate discoveries to building programs that are used to help scientists make discoveries. A number of these computer programs have made novel discoveries. For example, Valdes-Perez ( 1994 ) has built systems for discoveries in chemistry, and Fajtlowicz has done this in mathematics (Erdos, Fajtlowicz, & Staton, 1991 ).

These advances in the fields of computer discovery have led to new fields, conferences, journals, and even departments that specialize in the development of programs devised to search large databases in the hope of making new scientific discoveries (Langley, 2000 , 2002 ). This process is commonly known as “data mining.” This approach has only proved viable relatively recently, due to advances in computer technology. Biswal et al. ( 2010 ), Mitchell ( 2009 ), and Yang ( 2009 ) provide recent reviews of data mining in different scientific fields. Data mining is at the core of drug discovery, our understanding of the human genome, and our understanding of the universe for a number of reasons. First, vast databases concerning drug actions, biological processes, the genome, the proteome, and the universe itself now exist. Second, the development of high throughput data-mining algorithms makes it possible to search for new drug targets, novel biological mechanisms, and new astronomical phenomena in relatively short periods of time. Research programs that took decades, such as the development of penicillin, can now be done in days (Yang, 2009 ).

Another recent shift in the use of computers in scientific discovery has been to have both computers and people make discoveries together, rather than expecting that computers make an entire scientific discovery. Now instead of using computers to mimic the entire scientific discovery process as used by humans, computers can use powerful algorithms that search for patterns on large databases and provide the patterns to humans who can then use the output of these computers to make discoveries, ranging from the human genome to the structure of the universe. However, there are some robots such as ADAM, developed by King ( 2011 ), that can actually perform the entire scientific process, from the generation of hypotheses, to the conduct of experiments and the interpretation of results, with little human intervention. The ongoing development of scientific robots by some scientists (King et al., 2009 ) thus continues the tradition started by Herbert Simon in the 1960s. However, many of the controversies as to whether the robot is a “real scientist” or not continue to the present (Evans & Rzhetsky, 2010 , Gianfelici, 2010 ; Haufe, Elliott, Burian, & O' Malley, 2010 ; O'Malley 2011 ).

Scientific Thinking and Science Education

Accounts of the nature of science and research on scientific thinking have had profound effects on science education along many levels, particularly in recent years. Science education from the 1900s until the 1970s was primarily concerned with teaching students both the content of science (such as Newton's laws of motion) or the methods that scientists need to use in their research (such as using experimental and control groups). Beginning in the 1980s, a number of reports (e.g., American Association for the Advancement of Science, 1993; National Commission on Excellence in Education, 1983; Rutherford & Ahlgren, 1991 ) stressed the need for teaching scientific thinking skills rather than just methods and content. The addition of scientific thinking skills to the science curriculum from kindergarten through adulthood was a major shift in focus. Many of the particular scientific thinking skills that have been emphasized are skills covered in previous sections of this chapter, such as teaching deductive and inductive thinking strategies. However, rather than focusing on one particular skill, such as induction, researchers in education have focused on how the different components of scientific thinking are put together in science. Furthermore, science educators have focused upon situations where science is conducted collaboratively, rather than being the product of one person thinking alone. These changes in science education parallel changes in methodologies used to investigate science, such as analyzing the ways that scientists think and reason in their laboratories.

By looking at science as a complex multilayered and group activity, many researchers in science education have adopted a constructivist approach. This approach sees learning as an active rather than a passive process, and it suggests that students learn through constructing their scientific knowledge. We will first describe a few examples of the constructivist approach to science education. Following that, we will address several lines of work that challenge some of the assumptions of the constructivist approach to science education.

Often the goal of constructivist science education is to produce conceptual change through guided instruction where the teacher or professor acts as a guide to discovery, rather than the keeper of all the facts. One recent and influential approach to science education is the inquiry-based learning approach. Inquiry-based learning focuses on posing a problem or a puzzling event to students and asking them to propose a hypothesis that could explain the event. Next, the student is asked to collect data that test the hypothesis, make conclusions, and then reflect upon both the original problem and the thought processes that they used to solve the problem. Often students use computers that aid in their construction of new knowledge. The computers allow students to learn many of the different components of scientific thinking. For example, Reiser and his colleagues have developed a learning environment for biology, where students are encouraged to develop hypotheses in groups, codify the hypotheses, and search databases to test these hypotheses (Reiser et al., 2001 ).

One of the myths of science is the lone scientist suddenly shouting “Eureka, I have made a discovery!” Instead, in vivo studies of scientists (e.g., Dunbar, 1995 , 2002 ), historical analyses of scientific discoveries (Nersessian, 1999 ), and studies of children learning science at museums have all pointed to collaborative scientific discovery mechanisms as being one of the driving forces of science (Atkins et al., 2009 ; Azmitia & Crowley, 2001 ). What happens during collaborative scientific thinking is that there is usually a triggering event, such as an unexpected result or situation that a student does not understand. This results in other members of the group adding new information to the person's representation of knowledge, often adding new inductions and deductions that both challenge and transform the reasoner's old representations of knowledge (Chi & Roscoe, 2002 ; Dunbar 1998 ). Social mechanisms play a key component in fostering changes in concepts that have been ignored in traditional cognitive research but are crucial for both science and science education. In science education there has been a shift to collaborative learning, particularly at the elementary level; however, in university education, the emphasis is still on the individual scientist. As many domains of science now involve collaborations across scientific disciplines, we expect the explicit teaching of heuristics for collaborative science to increase.

What is the best way to teach and learn science? Surprisingly, the answer to this question has been difficult to uncover. For example, toward the end of the last century, influenced by several thinkers who advocated a constructivist approach to learning, ranging from Piaget (Beilin, 1994 ) to Papert ( 1980 ), many schools answered this question by adopting a philosophy dubbed “discovery learning.” Although a clear operational definition of this approach has yet to be articulated, the general idea is that children are expected to learn science by reconstructing the processes of scientific discovery—in a range of areas from computer programming to chemistry to mathematics. The premise is that letting students discover principles on their own, set their own goals, and collaboratively explore the natural world produces deeper knowledge that transfers widely.

The research literature on science education is far from consistent in its use of terminology. However, our reading suggests that “discovery learning” differs from “inquiry-based learning” in that few, if any, guidelines are given to students in discovery learning contexts, whereas in inquiry learning, students are given hypotheses and specific goals to achieve (see the second paragraph of this section for a definition of inquiry-based learning). Even though thousands of schools have adopted discovery learning as an alternative to more didactic approaches to teaching and learning, the evidence showing that it is more effective than traditional, direct, teacher-controlled instructional approaches is mixed, at best (Lorch et al., 2010 ; Minner, Levy, & Century, 2010 ). In several cases where the distinctions between direct instruction and more open-ended constructivist instruction have been clearly articulated, implemented, and assessed, direct instruction has proven to be superior to the alternatives (Chen & Klahr, 1999 ; Toth, Klahr, & Chen, 2000 ). For example, in a study of third- and fourth-grade children learning about experimental design, Klahr and Nigam ( 2004 ) found that many more children learned from direct instruction than from discovery learning. Furthermore, they found that among the few children who did manage to learn from a discovery method, there was no better performance on a far transfer test of scientific reasoning than that observed for the many children who learned from direct instruction.

The idea of children learning most of their science through a process of self-directed discovery has some romantic appeal, and it may accurately describe the personal experience of a handful of world-class scientists. However, the claim has generated some contentious disagreements (Kirschner, Sweller, & Clark, 2006 ; Klahr, 2010 ; Taber 2009 ; Tobias & Duffy, 2009 ), and the jury remains out on the extent to which most children can learn science that way.

Conclusions and Future Directions

The field of scientific thinking is now a thriving area of research with strong underpinnings in cognitive psychology and cognitive science. In recent years, a new professional society has been formed that aims to facilitate this integrative and interdisciplinary approach to the psychology of science, with its own journal and regular professional meetings. 1 Clearly the relations between these different aspects of scientific thinking need to be combined in order to produce a truly comprehensive picture of the scientific mind.

While much is known about certain aspects of scientific thinking, much more remains to be discovered. In particular, there has been little contact between cognitive, neuroscience, social, personality, and motivational accounts of scientific thinking. Research in thinking and reasoning has been expanded to use the methods and theories of cognitive neuroscience (see Morrison & Knowlton, Chapter 6 ). A similar approach can be taken in exploring scientific thinking (see Dunbar et al., 2007 ). There are two main reasons for taking a neuroscience approach to scientific thinking. First, functional neuroimaging allows the researcher to look at the entire human brain, making it possible to see the many different sites that are involved in scientific thinking and gain a more complete understanding of the entire range of mechanisms involved in this type of thought. Second, these brain-imaging approaches allow researchers to address fundamental questions in research on scientific thinking, such as the extent to which ordinary thinking in nonscientific contexts and scientific thinking recruit similar versus disparate neural structures of the brain.

Dunbar ( 2009 ) has used some novel methods to explore Simon's assertion, cited at the beginning of this chapter, that scientific thinking uses the same cognitive mechanisms that all human beings possess (rather than being an entirely different type of thinking) but combines them in ways that are specific to a particular aspect of science or a specific discipline of science. For example, Fugelsang and Dunbar ( 2009 ) compared causal reasoning when two colliding circular objects were labeled balls or labeled subatomic particles. They obtained different brain activation patterns depending on whether the stimuli were labeled balls or subatomic particles. In another series of experiments, Dunbar and colleagues used functional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI) to study patterns of activation in the brains of students who have and who have not undergone conceptual change in physics. For example, Fugelsang and Dunbar ( 2005 ) and Dunbar et al. ( 2007 ) have found differences in the activation of specific brain sites (such as the anterior cingulate) for students when they encounter evidence that is inconsistent with their current conceptual understandings. These initial cognitive neuroscience investigations have the potential to reveal the ways that knowledge is organized in the scientific brain and provide detailed accounts of the nature of the representation of scientific knowledge. Petitto and Dunbar ( 2004 ) proposed the term “educational neuroscience” for the integration of research on education, including science education, with research on neuroscience. However, see Fitzpatrick (in press) for a very different perspective on whether neuroscience approaches are relevant to education. Clearly, research on the scientific brain is just beginning. We as scientists are beginning to get a reasonable grasp of the inner workings of the subcomponents of the scientific mind (i.e., problem solving, analogy, induction). However, great advances remain to be made concerning how these processes interact so that scientific discoveries can be made. Future research will focus on both the collaborative aspects of scientific thinking and the neural underpinnings of the scientific mind.

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• Published: 08 June 2021

Metacognition: ideas and insights from neuro- and educational sciences

• Damien S. Fleur   ORCID: orcid.org/0000-0003-4836-5255 1 , 2 ,
• Bert Bredeweg   ORCID: orcid.org/0000-0002-5281-2786 1 , 3 &
• Wouter van den Bos 2 , 4  

npj Science of Learning volume  6 , Article number:  13 ( 2021 ) Cite this article

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Metacognition comprises both the ability to be aware of one’s cognitive processes (metacognitive knowledge) and to regulate them (metacognitive control). Research in educational sciences has amassed a large body of evidence on the importance of metacognition in learning and academic achievement. More recently, metacognition has been studied from experimental and cognitive neuroscience perspectives. This research has started to identify brain regions that encode metacognitive processes. However, the educational and neuroscience disciplines have largely developed separately with little exchange and communication. In this article, we review the literature on metacognition in educational and cognitive neuroscience and identify entry points for synthesis. We argue that to improve our understanding of metacognition, future research needs to (i) investigate the degree to which different protocols relate to the similar or different metacognitive constructs and processes, (ii) implement experiments to identify neural substrates necessary for metacognition based on protocols used in educational sciences, (iii) study the effects of training metacognitive knowledge in the brain, and (iv) perform developmental research in the metacognitive brain and compare it with the existing developmental literature from educational sciences regarding the domain-generality of metacognition.

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Introduction

Metacognition is defined as “thinking about thinking” or the ability to monitor and control one’s cognitive processes 1 and plays an important role in learning and education 2 , 3 , 4 . For instance, high performers tend to present better metacognitive abilities (especially control) than low performers in diverse educational activities 5 , 6 , 7 , 8 , 9 . Recently, there has been a lot of progress in studying the neural mechanisms of metacognition 10 , 11 , yet it is unclear at this point how these results may inform educational sciences or interventions. Given the potential benefits of metacognition, it is important to get a better understanding of how metacognition works and of how training can be useful.

The interest in bridging cognitive neuroscience and educational practices has increased in the past two decades, spanning a large number of studies grouped under the umbrella term of educational neuroscience 12 , 13 , 14 . With it, researchers have brought forward issues that are viewed as critical for the discipline to improve education. Recurring issues that may impede the relevance of neural insights for educational practices concern external validity 15 , 16 , theoretical discrepancies 17 and differences in terms of the domains of (meta)cognition operationalised (specific or general) 15 . This is important because, in recent years, brain research is starting to orient itself towards training metacognitive abilities that would translate into real-life benefits. However, direct links between metacognition in the brain and metacognition in domains such as education have still to be made. As for educational sciences, a large body of literature on metacognitive training is available, yet we still need clear insights about what works and why. While studies suggest that training metacognitive abilities results in higher academic achievement 18 , other interventions show mixed results 19 , 20 . Moreover, little is known about the long-term effects of, or transfer effects, of these interventions. A better understanding of the cognitive processes involved in metacognition and how they are expressed in the brain may provide insights in these regards.

Within cognitive neuroscience, there has been a long tradition of studying executive functions (EF), which are closely related to metacognitive processes 21 . Similar to metacognition, EF shows a positive relationship with learning at school. For instance, performance in laboratory tasks involving error monitoring, inhibition and working memory (i.e. processes that monitor and regulate cognition) are associated with academic achievement in pre-school children 22 . More recently, researchers have studied metacognition in terms of introspective judgements about performance in a task 10 . Although the neural correlates of such behaviour are being revealed 10 , 11 , little is known about how behaviour during such tasks relates to academic achievement.

Educational and cognitive neuroscientists study metacognition in different contexts using different methods. Indeed, while the latter investigate metacognition via behavioural task, the former mainly rely on introspective questionnaires. The extent to which these different operationalisations of metacognition match and reflect the same processes is unclear. As a result, the external validity of methodologies used in cognitive neuroscience is also unclear 16 . We argue that neurocognitive research on metacognition has a lot of potential to provide insights in mechanisms relevant in educational contexts, and that theoretical and methodological exchange between the two disciplines can benefit neuroscientific research in terms of ecological validity.

For these reasons, we investigate the literature through the lenses of external validity, theoretical discrepancies, domain generality and metacognitive training. Research on metacognition in cognitive neuroscience and educational sciences are reviewed separately. First, we investigate how metacognition is operationalised with respect to the common framework introduced by Nelson and Narens 23 (see Fig. 1 ). We then discuss the existing body of evidence regarding metacognitive training. Finally, we compare findings in both fields, highlight gaps and shortcomings, and propose avenues for research relying on crossovers of the two disciplines.

Meta-knowledge is characterised as the upward flow from object-level to meta-level. Meta-control is characterised as the downward flow from meta-level to object-level. Metacognition is therefore conceptualised as the bottom-up monitoring and top-down control of object-level processes. Adapted from Nelson and Narens’ cognitive psychology model of metacognition 23 .

In cognitive neuroscience, metacognition is divided into two main components 5 , 24 , which originate from the seminal works of Flavell on metamemory 25 , 26 . First, metacognitive knowledge (henceforth, meta-knowledge) is defined as the knowledge individuals have of their own cognitive processes and their ability to monitor and reflect on them. Second, metacognitive control (henceforth, meta-control) consists of someone’s self-regulatory mechanisms, such as planning and adapting behaviour based on outcomes 5 , 27 . Following Nelson and Narens’ definition 23 , meta-knowledge is characterised as the flow and processing of information from the object level to the meta-level, and meta-control as the flow from the meta-level to the object level 28 , 29 , 30 (Fig. 1 ). The object-level encompasses cognitive functions such as recognition and discrimination of objects, decision-making, semantic encoding, and spatial representation. On the meta-level, information originating from the object level is processed and top-down regulation on object-level functions is imposed 28 , 29 , 30 .

Educational researchers have mainly investigated metacognition through the lens of Self-Regulated Learning theory (SRL) 3 , 4 , which shares common conceptual roots with the theoretical framework used in cognitive neuroscience but varies from it in several ways 31 . First, SRL is constrained to learning activities, usually within educational settings. Second, metacognition is merely one of three components, with “motivation to learn” and “behavioural processes”, that enable individuals to learn in a self-directed manner 3 . In SRL, metacognition is defined as setting goals, planning, organising, self-monitoring and self-evaluating “at various points during the acquisition” 3 . The distinction between meta-knowledge and meta-control is not formally laid down although reference is often made to a “self-oriented feedback loop” describing the relationship between reflecting and regulating processes that resembles Nelson and Narens’ model (Fig. 1 ) 3 , 23 . In order to facilitate the comparison of operational definitions, we will refer to meta-knowledge in educational sciences when protocols operationalise self-awareness and knowledge of strategies, and to meta-control when they operationalise the selection and use of learning strategies and planning. For an in-depth discussion on metacognition and SRL, we refer to Dinsmore et al. 31 .

Metacognition in cognitive neuroscience

Operational definitions.

In cognitive neuroscience, research in metacognition is split into two tracks 32 . One track mainly studies meta-knowledge by investigating the neural basis of introspective judgements about one’s own cognition (i.e., metacognitive judgements), and meta-control with experiments involving cognitive offloading. In these experiments, subjects can perform actions such as set reminders, making notes and delegating tasks 33 , 34 , or report their desire for them 35 . Some research has investigated how metacognitive judgements can influence subsequent cognitive behaviour (i.e., a downward stream from the meta-level to the object level), but only one study so far has explored how this relationship is mapped in the brain 35 . In the other track, researchers investigate EF, also referred to as cognitive control 30 , 36 , which is closely related to metacognition. Note however that EF are often not framed in metacognitive terms in the literature 37 (but see ref. 30 ). For the sake of concision, we limit our review to operational definitions that have been used in neuroscientific studies.

Metacognitive judgements

Cognitive neuroscientists have been using paradigms in which subjects make judgements on how confident they are with regards to their learning of some given material 10 . These judgements are commonly referred to as metacognitive judgements , which can be viewed as a form of meta-knowledge (for reviews see Schwartz 38 and Nelson 39 ). Historically, researchers mostly resorted to paradigms known as Feelings of Knowing (FOK) 40 and Judgements of Learning (JOL) 41 . FOK reflect the belief of a subject to knowing the answer to a question or a problem and being able to recognise it from a list of alternatives, despite being unable to explicitly recall it 40 . Here, metacognitive judgement is thus made after retrieval attempt. In contrast, JOL are prospective judgements during learning of one’s ability to successfully recall an item on subsequent testing 41 .

More recently, cognitive neuroscientists have used paradigms in which subjects make retrospective metacognitive judgements on their performance in a two-alternative Forced Choice task (2-AFC) 42 . In 2-AFCs, subjects are asked to choose which of two presented options has the highest criterion value. Different domains can be involved, such as perception (e.g., visual or auditory) and memory. For example, subjects may be instructed to visually discriminate which one of two boxes contains more dots 43 , identify higher contrast Gabor patches 44 , or recognise novel words from words that were previously learned 45 (Fig. 2 ). The subjects engage in metacognitive judgements by rating how confident they are relative to their decision in the task. Based on their responses, one can evaluate a subject’s metacognitive sensitivity (the ability to discriminate one’s own correct and incorrect judgements), metacognitive bias (the overall level of confidence during a task), and metacognitive efficiency (the level of metacognitive sensitivity when controlling for task performance 46 ; Fig. 3 ). Note that sensitivity and bias are independent aspects of metacognition, meaning that two subjects may display the same levels of metacognitive sensitivity, but one may be biased towards high confidence while the other is biased towards low confidence. Because metacognitive sensitivity is affected by the difficulty of the task (one subject tends to display greater metacognitive sensitivity in easy tasks than difficult ones and different subjects may find a task more or less easy), metacognitive efficiency is an important measure as it allows researchers to compare metacognitive abilities between subjects and between domains. The most commonly used methods to assess metacognitive sensitivity during retrospective judgements are the receiver operating curve (ROC) and meta- d ′. 46 Both derive from signal detection theory (SDT) 47 which allows Type 1 sensitivity, or d’ ′ (how a subject can discriminate between stimulus alternatives, i.e. object-level processes) to be differentiated from metacognitive sensitivity (a judgement on the correctness of this decision) 48 . Importantly, only comparing meta- d ′ to d ′ seems to give reliable assessments metacognitive efficiency 49 . A ratio of 1 between meta- d’ ′ and d’ ′, indicates that a subject was perfectly able to discriminate between their correct and incorrect judgements. A ratio of 0.8 suggests that 80% of the task-related sensory evidence was available for the metacognitive judgements. Table 1 provides an overview of the different types of tasks and protocols with regards to the type of metacognitive process they operationalise. These operationalisations of meta-knowledge are used in combination with brain imaging methods (functional and structural magnetic resonance imaging; fMRI; MRI) to identify brain regions associated with metacognitive activity and metacognitive abilities 10 , 50 . Alternatively, transcranial magnetic stimulation (TMS) can be used to temporarily deactivate chosen brain regions and test whether this affects metacognitive abilities in given tasks 51 , 52 .

a Visual perception task: subjects choose the box containing the most (randomly generated) dots. Subjects then rate their confidence in their decision. b Memory task: subjects learn a list of words. In the next screen, they have to identify which of two words shown was present on the list. The subjects then rate their confidence in their decision.

The red and blue curves represent the distribution of confidence ratings for incorrect and correct trials, respectively. A larger distance between the two curves denotes higher sensitivity. Displacement to the left and right denote biases towards low confidence (low metacognitive bias) and high confidence (high metacognitive bias), respectively (retrieved from Fig. 1 in Fleming and Lau 46 ). We repeat the disclaimer of the original authors that this figure is not a statistically accurate description of correct and incorrect responses, which are typically not normally distributed 46 , 47 .

A recent meta-analysis analysed 47 neuroimaging studies on metacognition and identified a domain-general network associated with high vs. low confidence ratings in both decision-making tasks (perception 2-AFC) and memory tasks (JOL, FOK) 11 . This network includes the medial and lateral prefrontal cortex (mPFC and lPFC, respectively), precuneus and insula. In contrast, the right anterior dorsolateral PFC (dlPFC) was specifically involved in decision-making tasks, and the bilateral parahippocampal cortex was specific to memory tasks. In addition, prospective judgements were associated with the posterior mPFC, left dlPFC and right insula, whereas retrospective judgements were associated with bilateral parahippocampal cortex and left inferior frontal gyrus. Finally, emerging evidence suggests a role of the right rostrolateral PFC (rlPFC) 53 , 54 , anterior PFC (aPFC) 44 , 45 , 55 , 56 , dorsal anterior cingulate cortex (dACC) 54 , 55 and precuneus 45 , 55 in metacognitive sensitivity (meta- d ′, ROC). In addition, several studies suggest that the aPFC relates to metacognition specifically in perception-related 2-AFC tasks, whereas the precuneus is engaged specifically in memory-related 2-AFC tasks 45 , 55 , 56 . This may suggest that metacognitive processes engage some regions in a domain-specific manner, while other regions are domain-general. For educational scientists, this could mean that some domains of metacognition may be more relevant for learning and, granted sufficient plasticity of the associated brain regions, that targeting them during interventions may show more substantial benefits. Note that rating one’s confidence and metacognitive sensitivity likely involve additional, peripheral cognitive processes instead of purely metacognitive ones. These regions are therefore associated with metacognition but not uniquely per se. Notably, a recent meta-analysis 50 suggests that domain-specific and domain-general signals may rather share common circuitry, but that their neural signature varies depending on the type of task or activity, showing that domain-generality in metacognition is complex and still needs to be better understood.

In terms of the role of metacognitive judgements on future behaviour, one study found that brain patterns associated with the desire for cognitive offloading (i.e., meta-control) partially overlap with those associated with meta-knowledge (metacognitive judgements of confidence), suggesting that meta-control is driven by either non-metacognitive, in addition to metacognitive, processes or by a combination of different domain-specific meta-knowledge processes 35 .

Executive function

In EF, processes such as error detection/monitoring and effort monitoring can be related to meta-knowledge while error correction, inhibitory control, and resource allocation can be related to meta-control 36 . To activate these processes, participants are asked to perform tasks in laboratory settings such as Flanker tasks, Stroop tasks, Demand Selection tasks and Motion Discrimination tasks (Fig. 4 ). Neural correlates of EF are investigated by having subjects perform such tasks while their brain activity is recorded with fMRI or electroencephalography (EEG). Additionally, patients with brain lesions can be tested against healthy participants to evaluate the functional role of the impaired regions 57 .

a Flanker task: subjects indicate the direction to which the arrow in the middle points. b Stroop task: subjects are presented with the name of colour printed in a colour that either matches or mismatches the name. Subjects are asked to give the name of the written colour or the printed colour. c Motion Discrimination task: subjects have to determine in which direction the dots are going with variating levels of noise. d Example of a Demand Selection task: in both options subjects have to switch between two tasks. Task one, subjects determine whether the number shown is higher or lower than 5. Task two, subjects determine whether the number is odd or even. The two options (low and high demand) differ in their degree of task switching, meaning the effort required. Subjects are allowed to switch between the two options. Note, the type of task is solely indicated by the colour of the number and that the subjects are not explicitly told about the difference in effort between the two options (retrieved from Fig. 1c in Froböse et al. 58 ).

In a review article on the neural basis of EF (in which they are defined as meta-control), Shimamura argues that a network of regions composed of the aPFC, ACC, ventrolateral PFC (vlPFC) and dlPFC is involved in the regulations of cognition 30 . These regions are not only interconnected but are also intricately connected to cortical and subcortical regions outside of the PFC. The vlPFC was shown to play an important role in “selecting and maintaining information in working memory”, whereas the dlPFC is involved in “manipulating and updating information in working memory” 30 . The ACC has been proposed to monitor cognitive conflict (e.g. in a Stroop task or a Flanker task), and the dlPFC to regulate it 58 , 59 . In particular, activity in the ACC in conflict monitoring (meta-knowledge) seems to contribute to control of cognition (meta-control) in the dlPFC 60 , 61 and to “bias behavioural decision-making toward cognitively efficient tasks and strategies” (p. 356) 62 . In a recent fMRI study, subjects performed a motion discrimination task (Fig. 4c ) 63 . After deciding on the direction of the motion, they were presented additional motion (i.e. post-decisional evidence) and then were asked to rate their confidence in their initial choice. The post-decisional evidence was encoded in the activity of the posterior medial frontal cortex (pMFC; meta-knowledge), while lateral aPFC (meta-control) modulated the impact of this evidence on subsequent confidence rating 63 . Finally, results from a meta-analysis study on cognitive control identified functional connectivity between the pMFC, associated with monitoring and informing other regions about the need for regulation, and the lPFC that would effectively regulate cognition 64 .

Online vs. offline metacognition

While the processes engaged during tasks such as those used in EF research can be considered as metacognitive in the sense that they are higher-order functions that monitor and control lower cognitive processes, scientists have argued that they are not functionally equivalent to metacognitive judgements 10 , 11 , 65 , 66 . Indeed, engaging in metacognitive judgements requires subjects to reflect on past or future activities. As such, metacognitive judgements can be considered as offline metacognitive processes. In contrast, high-order processes involved in decision-making tasks such as used in EF research are arguably largely made on the fly, or online , at a rapid pace and subjects do not need to reflect on their actions to perform them. Hence, we propose to explicitly distinguish online and offline processes. Other researchers have shared a similar view and some have proposed models for metacognition that make similar distinctions 65 , 66 , 67 , 68 . The functional difference between online and offline metacognition is supported by some evidence. For instance, event-related brain potential (ERP) studies suggest that error negativities are associated with error detection in general, whereas an increased error positivity specifically encodes error that subjects could report upon 69 , 70 . Furthermore, brain-imaging studies suggest that the MFC and ACC are involved in online meta-knowledge, while the aPFC and lPFC seem to be activated when subjects engage in more offline meta-knowledge and meta-control, respectively 63 , 71 , 72 . An overview of the different tasks can be found in Table 1 and a list of different studies on metacognition can be found in Supplementary Table 1 (organised in terms of the type of processes investigated, the protocols and brain measures used, along with the brain regions identified). Figure 5 illustrates the different brain regions associated with meta-knowledge and meta-control, distinguishing between what we consider to be online and offline processes. This distinction is often not made explicitly but it will be specifically helpful when building bridges between cognitive neuroscience and educational sciences.

The regions are divided into online meta-knowledge and meta-control, and offline meta-knowledge and meta-control following the distinctions introduced earlier. Some regions have been reported to be related to both offline and online processes and are therefore given a striped pattern.

Training metacognition

There are extensive accounts in the literature of efforts to improve EF components such as inhibitory control, attention shifting and working memory 22 . While working memory does not directly reflect metacognitive abilities, its training is often hypothesised to improve general cognitive abilities and academic achievement. However, most meta-analyses found that training methods lead only to weak, non-lasting effects on cognitive control 73 , 74 , 75 . One meta-analysis did find evidence of near-transfer following EF training in children (in particular working memory, inhibitory control and cognitive flexibility), but found no evidence of far-transfer 20 . According to this study, training on one component leads to improved abilities in that same component but not in other EF components. Regarding adults, however, one meta-analysis suggests that EF training in general and working memory training specifically may both lead to significant near- and far-transfer effects 76 . On a neural level, a meta-analysis showed that cognitive training resulted in decreased brain activity in brain regions associated with EF 77 . According to the authors, this indicates that “training interventions reduce demands on externally focused attention” (p. 193) 77 .

With regards to meta-knowledge, several studies have reported increased task-related metacognitive abilities after training. For example, researchers found that subjects who received feedback on their metacognitive judgements regarding a perceptual decision-making task displayed better metacognitive accuracy, not only in the trained task but also in an untrained memory task 78 . Related, Baird and colleagues 79 found that a two-week mindfulness meditation training lead to enhanced meta-knowledge in the memory domain, but not the perceptual domain. The authors link these results to evidence of increased grey matter density in the aPFC in meditation practitioners.

Research on metacognition in cognitive science has mainly been studied through the lens of metacognitive judgements and EF (specifically performance monitoring and cognitive control). Meta-knowledge is commonly activated in subjects by asking them to rate their confidence in having successfully performed a task. A distinction is made between metacognitive sensitivity, metacognitive bias and metacognitive efficacy. Monitoring and regulating processes in EF are mainly operationalised with behavioural tasks such as Flanker tasks, Stroop tasks, Motion Discrimination tasks and Demand Selection tasks. In addition, metacognitive judgements can be viewed as offline processes in that they require the subject to reflect on her cognition and develop meta-representations. In contrast, EF can be considered as mostly online metacognitive processes because monitoring and regulation mostly happen rapidly without the need for reflective thinking.

Although there is some evidence for domain specificity, other studies have suggested that there is a single network of regions involved in all meta-cognitive tasks, but differentially activated in different task contexts. Comparing research on meta-knowledge and meta-control also suggest that some regions play a crucial role in both knowledge and regulation (Fig. 5 ). We have also identified a specific set of regions that are involved in either offline or online meta-knowledge. The evidence in favour of metacognitive training, while mixed, is interesting. In particular, research on offline meta-knowledge training involving self-reflection and metacognitive accuracy has shown some promising results. The regions that show structural changes after training, were those that we earlier identified as being part of the metacognition network. EF training does seem to show far-transfer effects at least in adults, but the relevance for everyday life activity is still unclear.

One major limitation of current research in metacognition is ecological validity. It is unclear to what extent the operationalisations reviewed above reflect real-life metacognition. For instance, are people who can accurately judge their performance on a behavioural task also able to accurately assess how they performed during an exam? Are people with high levels of error regulation and inhibitory control able to learn more efficiently? Note that criticism on the ecological validity of neurocognitive operationalisations extends beyond metacognition research 16 . A solution for improving validity may be to compare operationalisations of metacognition in cognitive neuroscience with the ones in educational sciences, which have shown clear links with learning in formal education. This also applies to metacognitive training.

Metacognition in educational sciences

The most popular protocols used to measure metacognition in educational sciences are self-report questionnaires or interviews, learning journals and thinking-aloud protocols 31 , 80 . During interviews, subjects are asked to answer questions regarding hypothetical situations 81 . In learning journals, students write about their learning experience and their thoughts on learning 82 , 83 . In thinking-aloud protocols, subjects are asked to verbalise their thoughts while performing a problem-solving task 80 . Each of these instruments can be used to study meta-knowledge and meta-control. For instance, one of the most widely used questionnaires, the Metacognitive Awareness Inventory (MAI) 42 , operationalises “Flavellian” metacognition and has dedicated scales for meta-knowledge and meta-control (also popular are the MSLQ 84 and LASSI 85 which operate under SRL). The meta-knowledge scale of the MAI operationalises knowledge of strategies (e.g., “ I am aware of what strategies I use when I study ”) and self-awareness (e.g., “ I am a good judge of how well I understand something ”); the meta-control scale operationalises planning (e.g., “ I set a goal before I begin a task ”) and use of learning strategies (e.g., “ I summarize what I’ve learned after I finish ”). Learning journals, self-report questionnaires and interviews involve offline metacognition. Thinking aloud, though not engaging the same degree self-reflection, also involves offline metacognition in the sense that online processes are verbalised, which necessitate offline processing (see Table 1 for an overview and Supplementary Table 2 for more details).

More recently, methodologies borrowed from cognitive neuroscience have been introduced to study EF in educational settings 22 , 86 . In particular, researchers used classic cognitive control tasks such as the Stroop task (for a meta-analysis 86 ). Most of the studied components are related to meta-control and not meta-knowledge. For instance, the BRIEF 87 is a questionnaire completed by parents and teachers which assesses different subdomains of EF: (1) inhibition, shifting, and emotional control which can be viewed as online metacognitive control, and (2) planning, organisation of materials, and monitoring, which can be viewed as offline meta-control 87 .

Assessment of metacognition is usually compared against metrics of academic performance such as grades or scores on designated tasks. A recent meta-analysis reported a weak correlation of self-report questionnaires and interviews with academic performance whereas think-aloud protocols correlated highly 88 . Offline meta-knowledge processes operationalised by learning journals were found to be positively associated with academic achievement when related to reflection on learning activities but negatively associated when related to reflection on learning materials, indicating that the type of reflection is important 89 . EF have been associated with abilities in mathematics (mainly) and reading comprehension 86 . However, the literature points towards contrary directions as to what specific EF component is involved in academic achievement. This may be due to the different groups that were studied, to different operationalisations or to different theoretical underpinnings for EF 86 . For instance, online and offline metacognitive processes, which are not systematically distinguished in the literature, may play different roles in academic achievement. Moreover, the bulk of research focussed on young children with few studies on adolescents 86 and EF may play a role at varying extents at different stages of life.

A critical question in educational sciences is that of the nature of the relationship between metacognition and academic achievement to understand whether learning at school can be enhanced by training metacognitive abilities. Does higher metacognition lead to higher academic achievement? Do these features evolve in parallel? Developmental research provides valuable insights into the formation of metacognitive abilities that can inform training designs in terms of what aspect of metacognition should be supported and the age at which interventions may yield the best results. First, meta-knowledge seems to emerge around the age of 5, meta-control around 8, and both develop over the years 90 , with evidence for the development of meta-knowledge into adolescence 91 . Furthermore, current theories propose that meta-knowledge abilities are initially highly domain-dependent and gradually become more domain-independent as knowledge and experience are acquired and linked between domains 32 . Meta-control is believed to evolve in a similar fashion 90 , 92 .

Common methods used to train offline metacognition are direct instruction of metacognition, metacognitive prompts and learning journals. In addition, research has been done on the use of (self-directed) feedback as a means to induce self-reflection in students, mainly in computer-supported settings 93 . Interestingly, learning journals appear to be used for both assessing and fostering metacognition. Metacognitive instruction consists of teaching learners’ strategies to “activate” their metacognition. Metacognitive prompts most often consist of text pieces that are sent at specific times and that trigger reflection (offline meta-knowledge) on learning behaviour in the form of a question, hint or reminder.

Meta-analyses have investigated the effects of direct metacognitive instruction on students’ use of learning strategies and academic outcomes 18 , 94 , 95 . Their findings show that metacognitive instruction can have a positive effect on learning abilities and achievement within a population ranging from primary schoolers to university students. In particular, interventions lead to the highest effect sizes when they both (i) instructed a combination of metacognitive strategies with an emphasis on planning strategies (offline meta-control) and (ii) “provided students with knowledge about strategies” (offline meta-knowledge) and “illustrated the benefits of applying the trained strategies, or even stimulated metacognitive reasoning” (p.114) 18 . The longer the duration of the intervention, the more effective they were. The strongest effects on academic performance were observed in the context of mathematics, followed by reading and writing.

While metacognitive prompts and learning journals make up the larger part of the literature on metacognitive training 96 , meta-analyses that specifically investigate their effectiveness have yet to be performed. Nonetheless, evidence suggests that such interventions can be successful. Researchers found that metacognitive prompts fostered the use of metacognitive strategies (offline meta-control) and that the combination of cognitive and metacognitive prompts improved learning outcomes 97 . Another experiment showed that students who received metacognitive prompts performed more metacognitive activities inside the learning environment and displayed better transfer performance immediately after the intervention 98 . A similar study using self-directed prompts showed enhanced transfer performance that was still observable 3 weeks after the intervention 99 .

Several studies suggest that learning journals can positively enhance metacognition. Subjects who kept a learning journal displayed stronger high meta-control and meta-knowledge on learning tasks and tended to reach higher academic outcomes 100 , 101 , 102 . However, how the learning journal is used seems to be critical; good instructions are crucial 97 , 103 , and subjects who simply summarise their learning activity benefit less from the intervention than subjects who reflect about their knowledge, learning and learning goals 104 . An overview of studies using learning journals and metacognitive prompts to train metacognition can be found in Supplementary Table 3 .

In recent years, educational neuroscience researchers have tried to determine whether training and improvements in EF can lead to learning facilitation and higher academic achievement. Training may consist of having students continually perform behavioural tasks either in the lab, at home, or at school. Current evidence in favour of training EF is mixed, with only anecdotal evidence for positive effects 105 . A meta-analysis did not show evidence for a causal relationship between EF and academic achievement 19 , but suggested that the relationship is bidirectional, meaning that the two are “mutually supportive” 106 .

A recent review article has identified several gaps and shortcoming in the literature on metacognitive training 96 . Overall, research in metacognitive training has been mainly invested in developing learners’ meta-control rather than meta-knowledge. Furthermore, most of the interventions were done in the context of science learning. Critically, there appears to be a lack of studies that employed randomised control designs, such that the effects of metacognitive training intervention are often difficult to evaluate. In addition, research overwhelmingly investigated metacognitive prompts and learning journals in adults 96 , while interventions on EF mainly focused on young children 22 . Lastly, meta-analyses evaluating the effectiveness of metacognitive training have so far focused on metacognitive instruction on children. There is thus a clear disbalance between the meta-analyses performed and the scope of the literature available.

An important caveat of educational sciences research is that metacognition is not typically framed in terms of online and offline metacognition. Therefore, it can be unclear whether protocols operationalise online or offline processes and whether interventions tend to benefit more online or offline metacognition. There is also confusion in terms of what processes qualify as EF and definitions of it vary substantially 86 . For instance, Clements and colleagues mention work on SRL to illustrate research in EF in relation to academic achievement but the two spawn from different lines of research, one rooted in metacognition and socio-cognitive theory 31 and the other in the cognitive (neuro)science of decision-making. In addition, the MSLQ, as discussed above, assesses offline metacognition along with other components relevant to SRL, whereas EF can be mainly understood as online metacognition (see Table 1 ), which on the neural level may rely on different circuitry.

Investigating offline metacognition tends to be carried out in school settings whereas evaluating EF (e.g., Stroop task, and BRIEF) is performed in the lab. Common to all protocols for offline metacognition is that they consist of a form of self-report from the learner, either during the learning activity (thinking-aloud protocols) or after the learning activity (questionnaires, interviews and learning journals). Questionnaires are popular protocols due to how easy they are to administer but have been criticised to provide biased evaluations of metacognitive abilities. In contrast, learning journals evaluate the degree to which learners engage in reflective thinking and may therefore be less prone to bias. Lastly, it is unclear to what extent thinking-aloud protocols are sensitive to online metacognitive processes, such as on-the-fly error correction and effort regulation. The strength of the relationship between metacognitive abilities and academic achievement varies depending on how metacognition is operationalised. Self-report questionnaires and interviews are weakly related to achievement whereas thinking-aloud protocols and EF are strongly related to it.

Based on the well-documented relationship between metacognition and academic achievement, educational scientists hypothesised that fostering metacognition may improve learning and academic achievement, and thus performed metacognitive training interventions. The most prevalent training protocols are direct metacognitive instruction, learning journals, and metacognitive prompts, which aim to induce and foster offline metacognitive processes such as self-reflection, planning and selecting learning strategies. In addition, researchers have investigated whether training EF, either through tasks or embedded in the curriculum, results in higher academic proficiency and achievement. While a large body of evidence suggests that metacognitive instruction, learning journals and metacognitive prompts can successfully improve academic achievement, interventions designed around EF training show mixed results. Future research investigating EF training in different age categories may clarify this situation. These various degrees of success of interventions may indicate that offline metacognition is more easily trainable than online metacognition and plays a more important role in educational settings. Investigating the effects of different methods, offline and online, on the neural level, may provide researchers with insights into the trainability of different metacognitive processes.

In this article, we reviewed the literature on metacognition in educational sciences and cognitive neuroscience with the aim to investigate gaps in current research and propose ways to address them through the exchange of insights between the two disciplines and interdisciplinary approaches. The main aspects analysed were operational definitions of metacognition and metacognitive training, through the lens of metacognitive knowledge and metacognitive control. Our review also highlighted an additional construct in the form of the distinction between online metacognition (on the fly and largely automatic) and offline metacognition (slower, reflective and requiring meta-representations). In cognitive neuroscience, research has focused on metacognitive judgements (mainly offline) and EF (mainly online). Metacognition is operationalised with tasks carried out in the lab and are mapped onto brain functions. In contrast, research in educational sciences typically measures metacognition in the context of learning activities, mostly in schools and universities. More recently, EF has been studied in educational settings to investigate its role in academic achievement and whether training it may benefit learning. Evidence on the latter is however mixed. Regarding metacognitive training in general, evidence from both disciplines suggests that interventions fostering learners’ self-reflection and knowledge of their learning behaviour (i.e., offline meta-knowledge) may best benefit them and increase academic achievement.

We focused on four aspects of research that could benefit from an interdisciplinary approach between the two areas: (i) validity and reliability of research protocols, (ii) under-researched dimensions of metacognition, (iii) metacognitive training, and (iv) domain-specificity vs. domain generality of metacognitive abilities. To tackle these issue, we propose four avenues for integrated research: (i) investigate the degree to which different protocols relate to similar or different metacognitive constructs, (ii) implement designs and perform experiments to identify neural substrates necessary for offline meta-control by for example borrowing protocols used in educational sciences, (iii) study the effects of (offline) meta-knowledge training on the brain, and (iv) perform developmental research in the metacognitive brain and compare it with the existing developmental literature in educational sciences regarding the domain-generality of metacognitive processes and metacognitive abilities.

First, neurocognitive research on metacognitive judgements has developed robust operationalisations of offline meta-knowledge. However, these operationalisations often consist of specific tasks (e.g., 2-AFC) carried out in the lab. These tasks are often very narrow and do not resemble the challenges and complexities of behaviours associated with learning in schools and universities. Thus, one may question to what extent they reflect real-life metacognition, and to what extent protocols developed in educational sciences and cognitive neuroscience actually operationalise the same components of metacognition. We propose that comparing different protocols from both disciplines that are, a priori, operationalising the same types of metacognitive processes can help evaluate the ecological validity of protocols used in cognitive neuroscience, and allow for more holistic assessments of metacognition, provided that it is clear which protocol assesses which construct. Degrees of correlation between different protocols, within and between disciplines, may allow researchers to assess to what extent they reflect the same metacognitive constructs and also identify what protocols are most appropriate to study a specific construct. For example, a relation between meta- d ′ metacognitive sensitivity in a 2-AFC task and the meta-knowledge subscale of the MAI, would provide external validity to the former. Moreover, educational scientists would be provided with bias-free tools to assess metacognition. These tools may enable researchers to further investigate to what extent metacognitive bias, sensitivity and efficiency each play a role in education settings. In contrast, a low correlation may highlight a difference in domain between the two measures of metacognition. For instance, metacognitive judgements in brain research are made in isolated behaviour, and meta-d’ can thus be viewed to reflect “local” metacognitive sensitivity. It is also unclear to what extent processes involved in these decision-making tasks cover those taking place in a learning environment. When answering self-reported questionnaires, however, subjects make metacognitive judgements on a large set of (learning) activities, and the measures may thus resemble more “global” or domain-general metacognitive sensitivity. In addition, learners in educational settings tend to receive feedback — immediate or delayed — on their learning activities and performance, which is generally not the case for cognitive neuroscience protocols. Therefore, investigating metacognitive judgements in the presence of performance or social feedback may allow researchers to better understand the metacognitive processes at play in educational settings. Devising a global measure of metacognition in the lab by aggregating subjects’ metacognitive abilities in different domains or investigating to what extent local metacognition may affect global metacognition could improve ecological validity significantly. By investigating the neural correlates of educational measures of metacognition, researchers may be able to better understand to what extent the constructs studied in the two disciplines are related. It is indeed possible that, though weakly correlated, the meta-knowledge scale of the MAI and meta-d’ share a common neural basis.

Second, our review highlights gaps in the literature of both disciplines regarding the research of certain types of metacognitive processes. There is a lack of research in offline meta-control (or strategic regulation of cognition) in neuroscience, whereas this construct is widely studied in educational sciences. More specifically, while there exists research on EF related to planning (e.g. 107 ), common experimental designs make it hard to disentangle online from offline metacognitive processes. A few studies have implemented subject reports (e.g., awareness of error or desire for reminders) to pin-point the neural substrates specifically involved in offline meta-control and the current evidence points at a role of the lPFC. More research implementing similar designs may clarify this construct. Alternatively, researchers may exploit educational sciences protocols, such as self-report questionnaires, learning journals, metacognitive prompts and feedback to investigate offline meta-control processes in the brain and their relation to academic proficiency and achievement.

Third, there is only one study known to us on the training of meta-knowledge in the lab 78 . In contrast, meta-knowledge training in educational sciences have been widely studied, in particular with metacognitive prompts and learning journals, although a systematic review would be needed to identify the benefits for learning. Relative to cognitive neuroscience, studies suggest that offline meta-knowledge trained in and outside the lab (i.e., metacognitive judgements and meditation, respectively) transfer to meta-knowledge in other lab tasks. The case of meditation is particularly interesting since meditation has been demonstrated to beneficiate varied aspects of everyday life 108 . Given its importance for efficient regulation of cognition, training (offline) meta-knowledge may present the largest benefits to academic achievement. Hence, it is important to investigate development in the brain relative to meta-knowledge training. Evidence on metacognitive training in educational sciences tends to suggest that offline metacognition is more “plastic” and may therefore benefit learning more than online metacognition. Furthermore, it is important to have a good understanding of the developmental trajectory of metacognitive abilities — not only on a behavioural level but also on a neural level — to identify critical periods for successful training. Doing so would also allow researchers to investigate the potential differences in terms of plasticity that we mention above. Currently, the developmental trajectory of metacognition is under-studied in cognitive neuroscience with only one study that found an overlap between the neural correlates of metacognition in adults and children 109 . On a side note, future research could explore the potential role of genetic factors in metacognitive abilities to better understand to what extent and under what constraints they can be trained.

Fourth, domain-specific and domain-general aspects of metacognitive processes should be further investigated. Educational scientists have studied the development of metacognition in learners and have concluded that metacognitive abilities are domain-specific at the beginning (meaning that their quality depends on the type of learning activity, like mathematics vs. writing) and progressively evolve towards domain-general abilities as knowledge and expertise increase. Similarly, neurocognitive evidence points towards a common network for (offline) metacognitive knowledge which engages the different regions at varying degrees depending on the domain of the activity (i.e., perception, memory, etc.). Investigating this network from a developmental perspective and comparing findings with the existing behavioural literature may improve our understanding of the metacognitive brain and link the two bodies of evidence. It may also enable researchers to identify stages of life more suitable for certain types of metacognitive intervention.

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Acknowledgements

We would like to thank the University of Amsterdam for supporting this research through the Interdisciplinary Doctorate Agreement grant. W.v.d.B. is further supported by the Jacobs Foundation, European Research Council (grant no. ERC-2018-StG-803338), the European Union Horizon 2020 research and innovation programme (grant no. DiGYMATEX-870578), and the Netherlands Organization for Scientific Research (grant no. NWO-VIDI 016.Vidi.185.068).

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Fleur, D.S., Bredeweg, B. & van den Bos, W. Metacognition: ideas and insights from neuro- and educational sciences. npj Sci. Learn. 6 , 13 (2021). https://doi.org/10.1038/s41539-021-00089-5

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Critical Thinking

Critical thinking is a widely accepted educational goal. Its definition is contested, but the competing definitions can be understood as differing conceptions of the same basic concept: careful thinking directed to a goal. Conceptions differ with respect to the scope of such thinking, the type of goal, the criteria and norms for thinking carefully, and the thinking components on which they focus. Its adoption as an educational goal has been recommended on the basis of respect for students’ autonomy and preparing students for success in life and for democratic citizenship. “Critical thinkers” have the dispositions and abilities that lead them to think critically when appropriate. The abilities can be identified directly; the dispositions indirectly, by considering what factors contribute to or impede exercise of the abilities. Standardized tests have been developed to assess the degree to which a person possesses such dispositions and abilities. Educational intervention has been shown experimentally to improve them, particularly when it includes dialogue, anchored instruction, and mentoring. Controversies have arisen over the generalizability of critical thinking across domains, over alleged bias in critical thinking theories and instruction, and over the relationship of critical thinking to other types of thinking.

2.1 Dewey’s Three Main Examples

2.2 dewey’s other examples, 2.3 further examples, 2.4 non-examples, 3. the definition of critical thinking, 4. its value, 5. the process of thinking critically, 6. components of the process, 7. contributory dispositions and abilities, 8.1 initiating dispositions, 8.2 internal dispositions, 9. critical thinking abilities, 10. required knowledge, 11. educational methods, 12.1 the generalizability of critical thinking, 12.2 bias in critical thinking theory and pedagogy, 12.3 relationship of critical thinking to other types of thinking, other internet resources, related entries.

Use of the term ‘critical thinking’ to describe an educational goal goes back to the American philosopher John Dewey (1910), who more commonly called it ‘reflective thinking’. He defined it as

active, persistent and careful consideration of any belief or supposed form of knowledge in the light of the grounds that support it, and the further conclusions to which it tends. (Dewey 1910: 6; 1933: 9)

and identified a habit of such consideration with a scientific attitude of mind. His lengthy quotations of Francis Bacon, John Locke, and John Stuart Mill indicate that he was not the first person to propose development of a scientific attitude of mind as an educational goal.

In the 1930s, many of the schools that participated in the Eight-Year Study of the Progressive Education Association (Aikin 1942) adopted critical thinking as an educational goal, for whose achievement the study’s Evaluation Staff developed tests (Smith, Tyler, & Evaluation Staff 1942). Glaser (1941) showed experimentally that it was possible to improve the critical thinking of high school students. Bloom’s influential taxonomy of cognitive educational objectives (Bloom et al. 1956) incorporated critical thinking abilities. Ennis (1962) proposed 12 aspects of critical thinking as a basis for research on the teaching and evaluation of critical thinking ability.

Since 1980, an annual international conference in California on critical thinking and educational reform has attracted tens of thousands of educators from all levels of education and from many parts of the world. Also since 1980, the state university system in California has required all undergraduate students to take a critical thinking course. Since 1983, the Association for Informal Logic and Critical Thinking has sponsored sessions in conjunction with the divisional meetings of the American Philosophical Association (APA). In 1987, the APA’s Committee on Pre-College Philosophy commissioned a consensus statement on critical thinking for purposes of educational assessment and instruction (Facione 1990a). Researchers have developed standardized tests of critical thinking abilities and dispositions; for details, see the Supplement on Assessment . Educational jurisdictions around the world now include critical thinking in guidelines for curriculum and assessment.

For details on this history, see the Supplement on History .

2. Examples and Non-Examples

Before considering the definition of critical thinking, it will be helpful to have in mind some examples of critical thinking, as well as some examples of kinds of thinking that would apparently not count as critical thinking.

Dewey (1910: 68–71; 1933: 91–94) takes as paradigms of reflective thinking three class papers of students in which they describe their thinking. The examples range from the everyday to the scientific.

Transit : “The other day, when I was down town on 16th Street, a clock caught my eye. I saw that the hands pointed to 12:20. This suggested that I had an engagement at 124th Street, at one o’clock. I reasoned that as it had taken me an hour to come down on a surface car, I should probably be twenty minutes late if I returned the same way. I might save twenty minutes by a subway express. But was there a station near? If not, I might lose more than twenty minutes in looking for one. Then I thought of the elevated, and I saw there was such a line within two blocks. But where was the station? If it were several blocks above or below the street I was on, I should lose time instead of gaining it. My mind went back to the subway express as quicker than the elevated; furthermore, I remembered that it went nearer than the elevated to the part of 124th Street I wished to reach, so that time would be saved at the end of the journey. I concluded in favor of the subway, and reached my destination by one o’clock.” (Dewey 1910: 68–69; 1933: 91–92)

Ferryboat : “Projecting nearly horizontally from the upper deck of the ferryboat on which I daily cross the river is a long white pole, having a gilded ball at its tip. It suggested a flagpole when I first saw it; its color, shape, and gilded ball agreed with this idea, and these reasons seemed to justify me in this belief. But soon difficulties presented themselves. The pole was nearly horizontal, an unusual position for a flagpole; in the next place, there was no pulley, ring, or cord by which to attach a flag; finally, there were elsewhere on the boat two vertical staffs from which flags were occasionally flown. It seemed probable that the pole was not there for flag-flying.

“I then tried to imagine all possible purposes of the pole, and to consider for which of these it was best suited: (a) Possibly it was an ornament. But as all the ferryboats and even the tugboats carried poles, this hypothesis was rejected. (b) Possibly it was the terminal of a wireless telegraph. But the same considerations made this improbable. Besides, the more natural place for such a terminal would be the highest part of the boat, on top of the pilot house. (c) Its purpose might be to point out the direction in which the boat is moving.

“In support of this conclusion, I discovered that the pole was lower than the pilot house, so that the steersman could easily see it. Moreover, the tip was enough higher than the base, so that, from the pilot’s position, it must appear to project far out in front of the boat. Moreover, the pilot being near the front of the boat, he would need some such guide as to its direction. Tugboats would also need poles for such a purpose. This hypothesis was so much more probable than the others that I accepted it. I formed the conclusion that the pole was set up for the purpose of showing the pilot the direction in which the boat pointed, to enable him to steer correctly.” (Dewey 1910: 69–70; 1933: 92–93)

Bubbles : “In washing tumblers in hot soapsuds and placing them mouth downward on a plate, bubbles appeared on the outside of the mouth of the tumblers and then went inside. Why? The presence of bubbles suggests air, which I note must come from inside the tumbler. I see that the soapy water on the plate prevents escape of the air save as it may be caught in bubbles. But why should air leave the tumbler? There was no substance entering to force it out. It must have expanded. It expands by increase of heat, or by decrease of pressure, or both. Could the air have become heated after the tumbler was taken from the hot suds? Clearly not the air that was already entangled in the water. If heated air was the cause, cold air must have entered in transferring the tumblers from the suds to the plate. I test to see if this supposition is true by taking several more tumblers out. Some I shake so as to make sure of entrapping cold air in them. Some I take out holding mouth downward in order to prevent cold air from entering. Bubbles appear on the outside of every one of the former and on none of the latter. I must be right in my inference. Air from the outside must have been expanded by the heat of the tumbler, which explains the appearance of the bubbles on the outside. But why do they then go inside? Cold contracts. The tumbler cooled and also the air inside it. Tension was removed, and hence bubbles appeared inside. To be sure of this, I test by placing a cup of ice on the tumbler while the bubbles are still forming outside. They soon reverse” (Dewey 1910: 70–71; 1933: 93–94).

Dewey (1910, 1933) sprinkles his book with other examples of critical thinking. We will refer to the following.

Weather : A man on a walk notices that it has suddenly become cool, thinks that it is probably going to rain, looks up and sees a dark cloud obscuring the sun, and quickens his steps (1910: 6–10; 1933: 9–13).

Disorder : A man finds his rooms on his return to them in disorder with his belongings thrown about, thinks at first of burglary as an explanation, then thinks of mischievous children as being an alternative explanation, then looks to see whether valuables are missing, and discovers that they are (1910: 82–83; 1933: 166–168).

Typhoid : A physician diagnosing a patient whose conspicuous symptoms suggest typhoid avoids drawing a conclusion until more data are gathered by questioning the patient and by making tests (1910: 85–86; 1933: 170).

Blur : A moving blur catches our eye in the distance, we ask ourselves whether it is a cloud of whirling dust or a tree moving its branches or a man signaling to us, we think of other traits that should be found on each of those possibilities, and we look and see if those traits are found (1910: 102, 108; 1933: 121, 133).

Suction pump : In thinking about the suction pump, the scientist first notes that it will draw water only to a maximum height of 33 feet at sea level and to a lesser maximum height at higher elevations, selects for attention the differing atmospheric pressure at these elevations, sets up experiments in which the air is removed from a vessel containing water (when suction no longer works) and in which the weight of air at various levels is calculated, compares the results of reasoning about the height to which a given weight of air will allow a suction pump to raise water with the observed maximum height at different elevations, and finally assimilates the suction pump to such apparently different phenomena as the siphon and the rising of a balloon (1910: 150–153; 1933: 195–198).

Diamond : A passenger in a car driving in a diamond lane reserved for vehicles with at least one passenger notices that the diamond marks on the pavement are far apart in some places and close together in others. Why? The driver suggests that the reason may be that the diamond marks are not needed where there is a solid double line separating the diamond lane from the adjoining lane, but are needed when there is a dotted single line permitting crossing into the diamond lane. Further observation confirms that the diamonds are close together when a dotted line separates the diamond lane from its neighbour, but otherwise far apart.

Rash : A woman suddenly develops a very itchy red rash on her throat and upper chest. She recently noticed a mark on the back of her right hand, but was not sure whether the mark was a rash or a scrape. She lies down in bed and thinks about what might be causing the rash and what to do about it. About two weeks before, she began taking blood pressure medication that contained a sulfa drug, and the pharmacist had warned her, in view of a previous allergic reaction to a medication containing a sulfa drug, to be on the alert for an allergic reaction; however, she had been taking the medication for two weeks with no such effect. The day before, she began using a new cream on her neck and upper chest; against the new cream as the cause was mark on the back of her hand, which had not been exposed to the cream. She began taking probiotics about a month before. She also recently started new eye drops, but she supposed that manufacturers of eye drops would be careful not to include allergy-causing components in the medication. The rash might be a heat rash, since she recently was sweating profusely from her upper body. Since she is about to go away on a short vacation, where she would not have access to her usual physician, she decides to keep taking the probiotics and using the new eye drops but to discontinue the blood pressure medication and to switch back to the old cream for her neck and upper chest. She forms a plan to consult her regular physician on her return about the blood pressure medication.

Candidate : Although Dewey included no examples of thinking directed at appraising the arguments of others, such thinking has come to be considered a kind of critical thinking. We find an example of such thinking in the performance task on the Collegiate Learning Assessment (CLA+), which its sponsoring organization describes as

a performance-based assessment that provides a measure of an institution’s contribution to the development of critical-thinking and written communication skills of its students. (Council for Aid to Education 2017)

A sample task posted on its website requires the test-taker to write a report for public distribution evaluating a fictional candidate’s policy proposals and their supporting arguments, using supplied background documents, with a recommendation on whether to endorse the candidate.

Immediate acceptance of an idea that suggests itself as a solution to a problem (e.g., a possible explanation of an event or phenomenon, an action that seems likely to produce a desired result) is “uncritical thinking, the minimum of reflection” (Dewey 1910: 13). On-going suspension of judgment in the light of doubt about a possible solution is not critical thinking (Dewey 1910: 108). Critique driven by a dogmatically held political or religious ideology is not critical thinking; thus Paulo Freire (1968 [1970]) is using the term (e.g., at 1970: 71, 81, 100, 146) in a more politically freighted sense that includes not only reflection but also revolutionary action against oppression. Derivation of a conclusion from given data using an algorithm is not critical thinking.

What is critical thinking? There are many definitions. Ennis (2016) lists 14 philosophically oriented scholarly definitions and three dictionary definitions. Following Rawls (1971), who distinguished his conception of justice from a utilitarian conception but regarded them as rival conceptions of the same concept, Ennis maintains that the 17 definitions are different conceptions of the same concept. Rawls articulated the shared concept of justice as

a characteristic set of principles for assigning basic rights and duties and for determining… the proper distribution of the benefits and burdens of social cooperation. (Rawls 1971: 5)

Bailin et al. (1999b) claim that, if one considers what sorts of thinking an educator would take not to be critical thinking and what sorts to be critical thinking, one can conclude that educators typically understand critical thinking to have at least three features.

• It is done for the purpose of making up one’s mind about what to believe or do.
• The person engaging in the thinking is trying to fulfill standards of adequacy and accuracy appropriate to the thinking.
• The thinking fulfills the relevant standards to some threshold level.

One could sum up the core concept that involves these three features by saying that critical thinking is careful goal-directed thinking. This core concept seems to apply to all the examples of critical thinking described in the previous section. As for the non-examples, their exclusion depends on construing careful thinking as excluding jumping immediately to conclusions, suspending judgment no matter how strong the evidence, reasoning from an unquestioned ideological or religious perspective, and routinely using an algorithm to answer a question.

If the core of critical thinking is careful goal-directed thinking, conceptions of it can vary according to its presumed scope, its presumed goal, one’s criteria and threshold for being careful, and the thinking component on which one focuses. As to its scope, some conceptions (e.g., Dewey 1910, 1933) restrict it to constructive thinking on the basis of one’s own observations and experiments, others (e.g., Ennis 1962; Fisher & Scriven 1997; Johnson 1992) to appraisal of the products of such thinking. Ennis (1991) and Bailin et al. (1999b) take it to cover both construction and appraisal. As to its goal, some conceptions restrict it to forming a judgment (Dewey 1910, 1933; Lipman 1987; Facione 1990a). Others allow for actions as well as beliefs as the end point of a process of critical thinking (Ennis 1991; Bailin et al. 1999b). As to the criteria and threshold for being careful, definitions vary in the term used to indicate that critical thinking satisfies certain norms: “intellectually disciplined” (Scriven & Paul 1987), “reasonable” (Ennis 1991), “skillful” (Lipman 1987), “skilled” (Fisher & Scriven 1997), “careful” (Bailin & Battersby 2009). Some definitions specify these norms, referring variously to “consideration of any belief or supposed form of knowledge in the light of the grounds that support it and the further conclusions to which it tends” (Dewey 1910, 1933); “the methods of logical inquiry and reasoning” (Glaser 1941); “conceptualizing, applying, analyzing, synthesizing, and/or evaluating information gathered from, or generated by, observation, experience, reflection, reasoning, or communication” (Scriven & Paul 1987); the requirement that “it is sensitive to context, relies on criteria, and is self-correcting” (Lipman 1987); “evidential, conceptual, methodological, criteriological, or contextual considerations” (Facione 1990a); and “plus-minus considerations of the product in terms of appropriate standards (or criteria)” (Johnson 1992). Stanovich and Stanovich (2010) propose to ground the concept of critical thinking in the concept of rationality, which they understand as combining epistemic rationality (fitting one’s beliefs to the world) and instrumental rationality (optimizing goal fulfillment); a critical thinker, in their view, is someone with “a propensity to override suboptimal responses from the autonomous mind” (2010: 227). These variant specifications of norms for critical thinking are not necessarily incompatible with one another, and in any case presuppose the core notion of thinking carefully. As to the thinking component singled out, some definitions focus on suspension of judgment during the thinking (Dewey 1910; McPeck 1981), others on inquiry while judgment is suspended (Bailin & Battersby 2009, 2021), others on the resulting judgment (Facione 1990a), and still others on responsiveness to reasons (Siegel 1988). Kuhn (2019) takes critical thinking to be more a dialogic practice of advancing and responding to arguments than an individual ability.

In educational contexts, a definition of critical thinking is a “programmatic definition” (Scheffler 1960: 19). It expresses a practical program for achieving an educational goal. For this purpose, a one-sentence formulaic definition is much less useful than articulation of a critical thinking process, with criteria and standards for the kinds of thinking that the process may involve. The real educational goal is recognition, adoption and implementation by students of those criteria and standards. That adoption and implementation in turn consists in acquiring the knowledge, abilities and dispositions of a critical thinker.

Conceptions of critical thinking generally do not include moral integrity as part of the concept. Dewey, for example, took critical thinking to be the ultimate intellectual goal of education, but distinguished it from the development of social cooperation among school children, which he took to be the central moral goal. Ennis (1996, 2011) added to his previous list of critical thinking dispositions a group of dispositions to care about the dignity and worth of every person, which he described as a “correlative” (1996) disposition without which critical thinking would be less valuable and perhaps harmful. An educational program that aimed at developing critical thinking but not the correlative disposition to care about the dignity and worth of every person, he asserted, “would be deficient and perhaps dangerous” (Ennis 1996: 172).

Dewey thought that education for reflective thinking would be of value to both the individual and society; recognition in educational practice of the kinship to the scientific attitude of children’s native curiosity, fertile imagination and love of experimental inquiry “would make for individual happiness and the reduction of social waste” (Dewey 1910: iii). Schools participating in the Eight-Year Study took development of the habit of reflective thinking and skill in solving problems as a means to leading young people to understand, appreciate and live the democratic way of life characteristic of the United States (Aikin 1942: 17–18, 81). Harvey Siegel (1988: 55–61) has offered four considerations in support of adopting critical thinking as an educational ideal. (1) Respect for persons requires that schools and teachers honour students’ demands for reasons and explanations, deal with students honestly, and recognize the need to confront students’ independent judgment; these requirements concern the manner in which teachers treat students. (2) Education has the task of preparing children to be successful adults, a task that requires development of their self-sufficiency. (3) Education should initiate children into the rational traditions in such fields as history, science and mathematics. (4) Education should prepare children to become democratic citizens, which requires reasoned procedures and critical talents and attitudes. To supplement these considerations, Siegel (1988: 62–90) responds to two objections: the ideology objection that adoption of any educational ideal requires a prior ideological commitment and the indoctrination objection that cultivation of critical thinking cannot escape being a form of indoctrination.

Despite the diversity of our 11 examples, one can recognize a common pattern. Dewey analyzed it as consisting of five phases:

• suggestions , in which the mind leaps forward to a possible solution;
• an intellectualization of the difficulty or perplexity into a problem to be solved, a question for which the answer must be sought;
• the use of one suggestion after another as a leading idea, or hypothesis , to initiate and guide observation and other operations in collection of factual material;
• the mental elaboration of the idea or supposition as an idea or supposition ( reasoning , in the sense on which reasoning is a part, not the whole, of inference); and
• testing the hypothesis by overt or imaginative action. (Dewey 1933: 106–107; italics in original)

The process of reflective thinking consisting of these phases would be preceded by a perplexed, troubled or confused situation and followed by a cleared-up, unified, resolved situation (Dewey 1933: 106). The term ‘phases’ replaced the term ‘steps’ (Dewey 1910: 72), thus removing the earlier suggestion of an invariant sequence. Variants of the above analysis appeared in (Dewey 1916: 177) and (Dewey 1938: 101–119).

The variant formulations indicate the difficulty of giving a single logical analysis of such a varied process. The process of critical thinking may have a spiral pattern, with the problem being redefined in the light of obstacles to solving it as originally formulated. For example, the person in Transit might have concluded that getting to the appointment at the scheduled time was impossible and have reformulated the problem as that of rescheduling the appointment for a mutually convenient time. Further, defining a problem does not always follow after or lead immediately to an idea of a suggested solution. Nor should it do so, as Dewey himself recognized in describing the physician in Typhoid as avoiding any strong preference for this or that conclusion before getting further information (Dewey 1910: 85; 1933: 170). People with a hypothesis in mind, even one to which they have a very weak commitment, have a so-called “confirmation bias” (Nickerson 1998): they are likely to pay attention to evidence that confirms the hypothesis and to ignore evidence that counts against it or for some competing hypothesis. Detectives, intelligence agencies, and investigators of airplane accidents are well advised to gather relevant evidence systematically and to postpone even tentative adoption of an explanatory hypothesis until the collected evidence rules out with the appropriate degree of certainty all but one explanation. Dewey’s analysis of the critical thinking process can be faulted as well for requiring acceptance or rejection of a possible solution to a defined problem, with no allowance for deciding in the light of the available evidence to suspend judgment. Further, given the great variety of kinds of problems for which reflection is appropriate, there is likely to be variation in its component events. Perhaps the best way to conceptualize the critical thinking process is as a checklist whose component events can occur in a variety of orders, selectively, and more than once. These component events might include (1) noticing a difficulty, (2) defining the problem, (3) dividing the problem into manageable sub-problems, (4) formulating a variety of possible solutions to the problem or sub-problem, (5) determining what evidence is relevant to deciding among possible solutions to the problem or sub-problem, (6) devising a plan of systematic observation or experiment that will uncover the relevant evidence, (7) carrying out the plan of systematic observation or experimentation, (8) noting the results of the systematic observation or experiment, (9) gathering relevant testimony and information from others, (10) judging the credibility of testimony and information gathered from others, (11) drawing conclusions from gathered evidence and accepted testimony, and (12) accepting a solution that the evidence adequately supports (cf. Hitchcock 2017: 485).

Checklist conceptions of the process of critical thinking are open to the objection that they are too mechanical and procedural to fit the multi-dimensional and emotionally charged issues for which critical thinking is urgently needed (Paul 1984). For such issues, a more dialectical process is advocated, in which competing relevant world views are identified, their implications explored, and some sort of creative synthesis attempted.

If one considers the critical thinking process illustrated by the 11 examples, one can identify distinct kinds of mental acts and mental states that form part of it. To distinguish, label and briefly characterize these components is a useful preliminary to identifying abilities, skills, dispositions, attitudes, habits and the like that contribute causally to thinking critically. Identifying such abilities and habits is in turn a useful preliminary to setting educational goals. Setting the goals is in its turn a useful preliminary to designing strategies for helping learners to achieve the goals and to designing ways of measuring the extent to which learners have done so. Such measures provide both feedback to learners on their achievement and a basis for experimental research on the effectiveness of various strategies for educating people to think critically. Let us begin, then, by distinguishing the kinds of mental acts and mental events that can occur in a critical thinking process.

• Observing : One notices something in one’s immediate environment (sudden cooling of temperature in Weather , bubbles forming outside a glass and then going inside in Bubbles , a moving blur in the distance in Blur , a rash in Rash ). Or one notes the results of an experiment or systematic observation (valuables missing in Disorder , no suction without air pressure in Suction pump )
• Feeling : One feels puzzled or uncertain about something (how to get to an appointment on time in Transit , why the diamonds vary in spacing in Diamond ). One wants to resolve this perplexity. One feels satisfaction once one has worked out an answer (to take the subway express in Transit , diamonds closer when needed as a warning in Diamond ).
• Wondering : One formulates a question to be addressed (why bubbles form outside a tumbler taken from hot water in Bubbles , how suction pumps work in Suction pump , what caused the rash in Rash ).
• Imagining : One thinks of possible answers (bus or subway or elevated in Transit , flagpole or ornament or wireless communication aid or direction indicator in Ferryboat , allergic reaction or heat rash in Rash ).
• Inferring : One works out what would be the case if a possible answer were assumed (valuables missing if there has been a burglary in Disorder , earlier start to the rash if it is an allergic reaction to a sulfa drug in Rash ). Or one draws a conclusion once sufficient relevant evidence is gathered (take the subway in Transit , burglary in Disorder , discontinue blood pressure medication and new cream in Rash ).
• Knowledge : One uses stored knowledge of the subject-matter to generate possible answers or to infer what would be expected on the assumption of a particular answer (knowledge of a city’s public transit system in Transit , of the requirements for a flagpole in Ferryboat , of Boyle’s law in Bubbles , of allergic reactions in Rash ).
• Experimenting : One designs and carries out an experiment or a systematic observation to find out whether the results deduced from a possible answer will occur (looking at the location of the flagpole in relation to the pilot’s position in Ferryboat , putting an ice cube on top of a tumbler taken from hot water in Bubbles , measuring the height to which a suction pump will draw water at different elevations in Suction pump , noticing the spacing of diamonds when movement to or from a diamond lane is allowed in Diamond ).
• Consulting : One finds a source of information, gets the information from the source, and makes a judgment on whether to accept it. None of our 11 examples include searching for sources of information. In this respect they are unrepresentative, since most people nowadays have almost instant access to information relevant to answering any question, including many of those illustrated by the examples. However, Candidate includes the activities of extracting information from sources and evaluating its credibility.
• Identifying and analyzing arguments : One notices an argument and works out its structure and content as a preliminary to evaluating its strength. This activity is central to Candidate . It is an important part of a critical thinking process in which one surveys arguments for various positions on an issue.
• Judging : One makes a judgment on the basis of accumulated evidence and reasoning, such as the judgment in Ferryboat that the purpose of the pole is to provide direction to the pilot.
• Deciding : One makes a decision on what to do or on what policy to adopt, as in the decision in Transit to take the subway.

By definition, a person who does something voluntarily is both willing and able to do that thing at that time. Both the willingness and the ability contribute causally to the person’s action, in the sense that the voluntary action would not occur if either (or both) of these were lacking. For example, suppose that one is standing with one’s arms at one’s sides and one voluntarily lifts one’s right arm to an extended horizontal position. One would not do so if one were unable to lift one’s arm, if for example one’s right side was paralyzed as the result of a stroke. Nor would one do so if one were unwilling to lift one’s arm, if for example one were participating in a street demonstration at which a white supremacist was urging the crowd to lift their right arm in a Nazi salute and one were unwilling to express support in this way for the racist Nazi ideology. The same analysis applies to a voluntary mental process of thinking critically. It requires both willingness and ability to think critically, including willingness and ability to perform each of the mental acts that compose the process and to coordinate those acts in a sequence that is directed at resolving the initiating perplexity.

Consider willingness first. We can identify causal contributors to willingness to think critically by considering factors that would cause a person who was able to think critically about an issue nevertheless not to do so (Hamby 2014). For each factor, the opposite condition thus contributes causally to willingness to think critically on a particular occasion. For example, people who habitually jump to conclusions without considering alternatives will not think critically about issues that arise, even if they have the required abilities. The contrary condition of willingness to suspend judgment is thus a causal contributor to thinking critically.

Now consider ability. In contrast to the ability to move one’s arm, which can be completely absent because a stroke has left the arm paralyzed, the ability to think critically is a developed ability, whose absence is not a complete absence of ability to think but absence of ability to think well. We can identify the ability to think well directly, in terms of the norms and standards for good thinking. In general, to be able do well the thinking activities that can be components of a critical thinking process, one needs to know the concepts and principles that characterize their good performance, to recognize in particular cases that the concepts and principles apply, and to apply them. The knowledge, recognition and application may be procedural rather than declarative. It may be domain-specific rather than widely applicable, and in either case may need subject-matter knowledge, sometimes of a deep kind.

Reflections of the sort illustrated by the previous two paragraphs have led scholars to identify the knowledge, abilities and dispositions of a “critical thinker”, i.e., someone who thinks critically whenever it is appropriate to do so. We turn now to these three types of causal contributors to thinking critically. We start with dispositions, since arguably these are the most powerful contributors to being a critical thinker, can be fostered at an early stage of a child’s development, and are susceptible to general improvement (Glaser 1941: 175)

8. Critical Thinking Dispositions

Educational researchers use the term ‘dispositions’ broadly for the habits of mind and attitudes that contribute causally to being a critical thinker. Some writers (e.g., Paul & Elder 2006; Hamby 2014; Bailin & Battersby 2016a) propose to use the term ‘virtues’ for this dimension of a critical thinker. The virtues in question, although they are virtues of character, concern the person’s ways of thinking rather than the person’s ways of behaving towards others. They are not moral virtues but intellectual virtues, of the sort articulated by Zagzebski (1996) and discussed by Turri, Alfano, and Greco (2017).

On a realistic conception, thinking dispositions or intellectual virtues are real properties of thinkers. They are general tendencies, propensities, or inclinations to think in particular ways in particular circumstances, and can be genuinely explanatory (Siegel 1999). Sceptics argue that there is no evidence for a specific mental basis for the habits of mind that contribute to thinking critically, and that it is pedagogically misleading to posit such a basis (Bailin et al. 1999a). Whatever their status, critical thinking dispositions need motivation for their initial formation in a child—motivation that may be external or internal. As children develop, the force of habit will gradually become important in sustaining the disposition (Nieto & Valenzuela 2012). Mere force of habit, however, is unlikely to sustain critical thinking dispositions. Critical thinkers must value and enjoy using their knowledge and abilities to think things through for themselves. They must be committed to, and lovers of, inquiry.

A person may have a critical thinking disposition with respect to only some kinds of issues. For example, one could be open-minded about scientific issues but not about religious issues. Similarly, one could be confident in one’s ability to reason about the theological implications of the existence of evil in the world but not in one’s ability to reason about the best design for a guided ballistic missile.

Facione (1990a: 25) divides “affective dispositions” of critical thinking into approaches to life and living in general and approaches to specific issues, questions or problems. Adapting this distinction, one can usefully divide critical thinking dispositions into initiating dispositions (those that contribute causally to starting to think critically about an issue) and internal dispositions (those that contribute causally to doing a good job of thinking critically once one has started). The two categories are not mutually exclusive. For example, open-mindedness, in the sense of willingness to consider alternative points of view to one’s own, is both an initiating and an internal disposition.

Using the strategy of considering factors that would block people with the ability to think critically from doing so, we can identify as initiating dispositions for thinking critically attentiveness, a habit of inquiry, self-confidence, courage, open-mindedness, willingness to suspend judgment, trust in reason, wanting evidence for one’s beliefs, and seeking the truth. We consider briefly what each of these dispositions amounts to, in each case citing sources that acknowledge them.

• Attentiveness : One will not think critically if one fails to recognize an issue that needs to be thought through. For example, the pedestrian in Weather would not have looked up if he had not noticed that the air was suddenly cooler. To be a critical thinker, then, one needs to be habitually attentive to one’s surroundings, noticing not only what one senses but also sources of perplexity in messages received and in one’s own beliefs and attitudes (Facione 1990a: 25; Facione, Facione, & Giancarlo 2001).
• Habit of inquiry : Inquiry is effortful, and one needs an internal push to engage in it. For example, the student in Bubbles could easily have stopped at idle wondering about the cause of the bubbles rather than reasoning to a hypothesis, then designing and executing an experiment to test it. Thus willingness to think critically needs mental energy and initiative. What can supply that energy? Love of inquiry, or perhaps just a habit of inquiry. Hamby (2015) has argued that willingness to inquire is the central critical thinking virtue, one that encompasses all the others. It is recognized as a critical thinking disposition by Dewey (1910: 29; 1933: 35), Glaser (1941: 5), Ennis (1987: 12; 1991: 8), Facione (1990a: 25), Bailin et al. (1999b: 294), Halpern (1998: 452), and Facione, Facione, & Giancarlo (2001).
• Self-confidence : Lack of confidence in one’s abilities can block critical thinking. For example, if the woman in Rash lacked confidence in her ability to figure things out for herself, she might just have assumed that the rash on her chest was the allergic reaction to her medication against which the pharmacist had warned her. Thus willingness to think critically requires confidence in one’s ability to inquire (Facione 1990a: 25; Facione, Facione, & Giancarlo 2001).
• Courage : Fear of thinking for oneself can stop one from doing it. Thus willingness to think critically requires intellectual courage (Paul & Elder 2006: 16).
• Open-mindedness : A dogmatic attitude will impede thinking critically. For example, a person who adheres rigidly to a “pro-choice” position on the issue of the legal status of induced abortion is likely to be unwilling to consider seriously the issue of when in its development an unborn child acquires a moral right to life. Thus willingness to think critically requires open-mindedness, in the sense of a willingness to examine questions to which one already accepts an answer but which further evidence or reasoning might cause one to answer differently (Dewey 1933; Facione 1990a; Ennis 1991; Bailin et al. 1999b; Halpern 1998, Facione, Facione, & Giancarlo 2001). Paul (1981) emphasizes open-mindedness about alternative world-views, and recommends a dialectical approach to integrating such views as central to what he calls “strong sense” critical thinking. In three studies, Haran, Ritov, & Mellers (2013) found that actively open-minded thinking, including “the tendency to weigh new evidence against a favored belief, to spend sufficient time on a problem before giving up, and to consider carefully the opinions of others in forming one’s own”, led study participants to acquire information and thus to make accurate estimations.
• Willingness to suspend judgment : Premature closure on an initial solution will block critical thinking. Thus willingness to think critically requires a willingness to suspend judgment while alternatives are explored (Facione 1990a; Ennis 1991; Halpern 1998).
• Trust in reason : Since distrust in the processes of reasoned inquiry will dissuade one from engaging in it, trust in them is an initiating critical thinking disposition (Facione 1990a, 25; Bailin et al. 1999b: 294; Facione, Facione, & Giancarlo 2001; Paul & Elder 2006). In reaction to an allegedly exclusive emphasis on reason in critical thinking theory and pedagogy, Thayer-Bacon (2000) argues that intuition, imagination, and emotion have important roles to play in an adequate conception of critical thinking that she calls “constructive thinking”. From her point of view, critical thinking requires trust not only in reason but also in intuition, imagination, and emotion.
• Seeking the truth : If one does not care about the truth but is content to stick with one’s initial bias on an issue, then one will not think critically about it. Seeking the truth is thus an initiating critical thinking disposition (Bailin et al. 1999b: 294; Facione, Facione, & Giancarlo 2001). A disposition to seek the truth is implicit in more specific critical thinking dispositions, such as trying to be well-informed, considering seriously points of view other than one’s own, looking for alternatives, suspending judgment when the evidence is insufficient, and adopting a position when the evidence supporting it is sufficient.

Some of the initiating dispositions, such as open-mindedness and willingness to suspend judgment, are also internal critical thinking dispositions, in the sense of mental habits or attitudes that contribute causally to doing a good job of critical thinking once one starts the process. But there are many other internal critical thinking dispositions. Some of them are parasitic on one’s conception of good thinking. For example, it is constitutive of good thinking about an issue to formulate the issue clearly and to maintain focus on it. For this purpose, one needs not only the corresponding ability but also the corresponding disposition. Ennis (1991: 8) describes it as the disposition “to determine and maintain focus on the conclusion or question”, Facione (1990a: 25) as “clarity in stating the question or concern”. Other internal dispositions are motivators to continue or adjust the critical thinking process, such as willingness to persist in a complex task and willingness to abandon nonproductive strategies in an attempt to self-correct (Halpern 1998: 452). For a list of identified internal critical thinking dispositions, see the Supplement on Internal Critical Thinking Dispositions .

Some theorists postulate skills, i.e., acquired abilities, as operative in critical thinking. It is not obvious, however, that a good mental act is the exercise of a generic acquired skill. Inferring an expected time of arrival, as in Transit , has some generic components but also uses non-generic subject-matter knowledge. Bailin et al. (1999a) argue against viewing critical thinking skills as generic and discrete, on the ground that skilled performance at a critical thinking task cannot be separated from knowledge of concepts and from domain-specific principles of good thinking. Talk of skills, they concede, is unproblematic if it means merely that a person with critical thinking skills is capable of intelligent performance.

Despite such scepticism, theorists of critical thinking have listed as general contributors to critical thinking what they variously call abilities (Glaser 1941; Ennis 1962, 1991), skills (Facione 1990a; Halpern 1998) or competencies (Fisher & Scriven 1997). Amalgamating these lists would produce a confusing and chaotic cornucopia of more than 50 possible educational objectives, with only partial overlap among them. It makes sense instead to try to understand the reasons for the multiplicity and diversity, and to make a selection according to one’s own reasons for singling out abilities to be developed in a critical thinking curriculum. Two reasons for diversity among lists of critical thinking abilities are the underlying conception of critical thinking and the envisaged educational level. Appraisal-only conceptions, for example, involve a different suite of abilities than constructive-only conceptions. Some lists, such as those in (Glaser 1941), are put forward as educational objectives for secondary school students, whereas others are proposed as objectives for college students (e.g., Facione 1990a).

The abilities described in the remaining paragraphs of this section emerge from reflection on the general abilities needed to do well the thinking activities identified in section 6 as components of the critical thinking process described in section 5 . The derivation of each collection of abilities is accompanied by citation of sources that list such abilities and of standardized tests that claim to test them.

Observational abilities : Careful and accurate observation sometimes requires specialist expertise and practice, as in the case of observing birds and observing accident scenes. However, there are general abilities of noticing what one’s senses are picking up from one’s environment and of being able to articulate clearly and accurately to oneself and others what one has observed. It helps in exercising them to be able to recognize and take into account factors that make one’s observation less trustworthy, such as prior framing of the situation, inadequate time, deficient senses, poor observation conditions, and the like. It helps as well to be skilled at taking steps to make one’s observation more trustworthy, such as moving closer to get a better look, measuring something three times and taking the average, and checking what one thinks one is observing with someone else who is in a good position to observe it. It also helps to be skilled at recognizing respects in which one’s report of one’s observation involves inference rather than direct observation, so that one can then consider whether the inference is justified. These abilities come into play as well when one thinks about whether and with what degree of confidence to accept an observation report, for example in the study of history or in a criminal investigation or in assessing news reports. Observational abilities show up in some lists of critical thinking abilities (Ennis 1962: 90; Facione 1990a: 16; Ennis 1991: 9). There are items testing a person’s ability to judge the credibility of observation reports in the Cornell Critical Thinking Tests, Levels X and Z (Ennis & Millman 1971; Ennis, Millman, & Tomko 1985, 2005). Norris and King (1983, 1985, 1990a, 1990b) is a test of ability to appraise observation reports.

Emotional abilities : The emotions that drive a critical thinking process are perplexity or puzzlement, a wish to resolve it, and satisfaction at achieving the desired resolution. Children experience these emotions at an early age, without being trained to do so. Education that takes critical thinking as a goal needs only to channel these emotions and to make sure not to stifle them. Collaborative critical thinking benefits from ability to recognize one’s own and others’ emotional commitments and reactions.

Questioning abilities : A critical thinking process needs transformation of an inchoate sense of perplexity into a clear question. Formulating a question well requires not building in questionable assumptions, not prejudging the issue, and using language that in context is unambiguous and precise enough (Ennis 1962: 97; 1991: 9).

Imaginative abilities : Thinking directed at finding the correct causal explanation of a general phenomenon or particular event requires an ability to imagine possible explanations. Thinking about what policy or plan of action to adopt requires generation of options and consideration of possible consequences of each option. Domain knowledge is required for such creative activity, but a general ability to imagine alternatives is helpful and can be nurtured so as to become easier, quicker, more extensive, and deeper (Dewey 1910: 34–39; 1933: 40–47). Facione (1990a) and Halpern (1998) include the ability to imagine alternatives as a critical thinking ability.

Inferential abilities : The ability to draw conclusions from given information, and to recognize with what degree of certainty one’s own or others’ conclusions follow, is universally recognized as a general critical thinking ability. All 11 examples in section 2 of this article include inferences, some from hypotheses or options (as in Transit , Ferryboat and Disorder ), others from something observed (as in Weather and Rash ). None of these inferences is formally valid. Rather, they are licensed by general, sometimes qualified substantive rules of inference (Toulmin 1958) that rest on domain knowledge—that a bus trip takes about the same time in each direction, that the terminal of a wireless telegraph would be located on the highest possible place, that sudden cooling is often followed by rain, that an allergic reaction to a sulfa drug generally shows up soon after one starts taking it. It is a matter of controversy to what extent the specialized ability to deduce conclusions from premisses using formal rules of inference is needed for critical thinking. Dewey (1933) locates logical forms in setting out the products of reflection rather than in the process of reflection. Ennis (1981a), on the other hand, maintains that a liberally-educated person should have the following abilities: to translate natural-language statements into statements using the standard logical operators, to use appropriately the language of necessary and sufficient conditions, to deal with argument forms and arguments containing symbols, to determine whether in virtue of an argument’s form its conclusion follows necessarily from its premisses, to reason with logically complex propositions, and to apply the rules and procedures of deductive logic. Inferential abilities are recognized as critical thinking abilities by Glaser (1941: 6), Facione (1990a: 9), Ennis (1991: 9), Fisher & Scriven (1997: 99, 111), and Halpern (1998: 452). Items testing inferential abilities constitute two of the five subtests of the Watson Glaser Critical Thinking Appraisal (Watson & Glaser 1980a, 1980b, 1994), two of the four sections in the Cornell Critical Thinking Test Level X (Ennis & Millman 1971; Ennis, Millman, & Tomko 1985, 2005), three of the seven sections in the Cornell Critical Thinking Test Level Z (Ennis & Millman 1971; Ennis, Millman, & Tomko 1985, 2005), 11 of the 34 items on Forms A and B of the California Critical Thinking Skills Test (Facione 1990b, 1992), and a high but variable proportion of the 25 selected-response questions in the Collegiate Learning Assessment (Council for Aid to Education 2017).

Experimenting abilities : Knowing how to design and execute an experiment is important not just in scientific research but also in everyday life, as in Rash . Dewey devoted a whole chapter of his How We Think (1910: 145–156; 1933: 190–202) to the superiority of experimentation over observation in advancing knowledge. Experimenting abilities come into play at one remove in appraising reports of scientific studies. Skill in designing and executing experiments includes the acknowledged abilities to appraise evidence (Glaser 1941: 6), to carry out experiments and to apply appropriate statistical inference techniques (Facione 1990a: 9), to judge inductions to an explanatory hypothesis (Ennis 1991: 9), and to recognize the need for an adequately large sample size (Halpern 1998). The Cornell Critical Thinking Test Level Z (Ennis & Millman 1971; Ennis, Millman, & Tomko 1985, 2005) includes four items (out of 52) on experimental design. The Collegiate Learning Assessment (Council for Aid to Education 2017) makes room for appraisal of study design in both its performance task and its selected-response questions.

Consulting abilities : Skill at consulting sources of information comes into play when one seeks information to help resolve a problem, as in Candidate . Ability to find and appraise information includes ability to gather and marshal pertinent information (Glaser 1941: 6), to judge whether a statement made by an alleged authority is acceptable (Ennis 1962: 84), to plan a search for desired information (Facione 1990a: 9), and to judge the credibility of a source (Ennis 1991: 9). Ability to judge the credibility of statements is tested by 24 items (out of 76) in the Cornell Critical Thinking Test Level X (Ennis & Millman 1971; Ennis, Millman, & Tomko 1985, 2005) and by four items (out of 52) in the Cornell Critical Thinking Test Level Z (Ennis & Millman 1971; Ennis, Millman, & Tomko 1985, 2005). The College Learning Assessment’s performance task requires evaluation of whether information in documents is credible or unreliable (Council for Aid to Education 2017).

Argument analysis abilities : The ability to identify and analyze arguments contributes to the process of surveying arguments on an issue in order to form one’s own reasoned judgment, as in Candidate . The ability to detect and analyze arguments is recognized as a critical thinking skill by Facione (1990a: 7–8), Ennis (1991: 9) and Halpern (1998). Five items (out of 34) on the California Critical Thinking Skills Test (Facione 1990b, 1992) test skill at argument analysis. The College Learning Assessment (Council for Aid to Education 2017) incorporates argument analysis in its selected-response tests of critical reading and evaluation and of critiquing an argument.

Judging skills and deciding skills : Skill at judging and deciding is skill at recognizing what judgment or decision the available evidence and argument supports, and with what degree of confidence. It is thus a component of the inferential skills already discussed.

Lists and tests of critical thinking abilities often include two more abilities: identifying assumptions and constructing and evaluating definitions.

In addition to dispositions and abilities, critical thinking needs knowledge: of critical thinking concepts, of critical thinking principles, and of the subject-matter of the thinking.

We can derive a short list of concepts whose understanding contributes to critical thinking from the critical thinking abilities described in the preceding section. Observational abilities require an understanding of the difference between observation and inference. Questioning abilities require an understanding of the concepts of ambiguity and vagueness. Inferential abilities require an understanding of the difference between conclusive and defeasible inference (traditionally, between deduction and induction), as well as of the difference between necessary and sufficient conditions. Experimenting abilities require an understanding of the concepts of hypothesis, null hypothesis, assumption and prediction, as well as of the concept of statistical significance and of its difference from importance. They also require an understanding of the difference between an experiment and an observational study, and in particular of the difference between a randomized controlled trial, a prospective correlational study and a retrospective (case-control) study. Argument analysis abilities require an understanding of the concepts of argument, premiss, assumption, conclusion and counter-consideration. Additional critical thinking concepts are proposed by Bailin et al. (1999b: 293), Fisher & Scriven (1997: 105–106), Black (2012), and Blair (2021).

According to Glaser (1941: 25), ability to think critically requires knowledge of the methods of logical inquiry and reasoning. If we review the list of abilities in the preceding section, however, we can see that some of them can be acquired and exercised merely through practice, possibly guided in an educational setting, followed by feedback. Searching intelligently for a causal explanation of some phenomenon or event requires that one consider a full range of possible causal contributors, but it seems more important that one implements this principle in one’s practice than that one is able to articulate it. What is important is “operational knowledge” of the standards and principles of good thinking (Bailin et al. 1999b: 291–293). But the development of such critical thinking abilities as designing an experiment or constructing an operational definition can benefit from learning their underlying theory. Further, explicit knowledge of quirks of human thinking seems useful as a cautionary guide. Human memory is not just fallible about details, as people learn from their own experiences of misremembering, but is so malleable that a detailed, clear and vivid recollection of an event can be a total fabrication (Loftus 2017). People seek or interpret evidence in ways that are partial to their existing beliefs and expectations, often unconscious of their “confirmation bias” (Nickerson 1998). Not only are people subject to this and other cognitive biases (Kahneman 2011), of which they are typically unaware, but it may be counter-productive for one to make oneself aware of them and try consciously to counteract them or to counteract social biases such as racial or sexual stereotypes (Kenyon & Beaulac 2014). It is helpful to be aware of these facts and of the superior effectiveness of blocking the operation of biases—for example, by making an immediate record of one’s observations, refraining from forming a preliminary explanatory hypothesis, blind refereeing, double-blind randomized trials, and blind grading of students’ work. It is also helpful to be aware of the prevalence of “noise” (unwanted unsystematic variability of judgments), of how to detect noise (through a noise audit), and of how to reduce noise: make accuracy the goal, think statistically, break a process of arriving at a judgment into independent tasks, resist premature intuitions, in a group get independent judgments first, favour comparative judgments and scales (Kahneman, Sibony, & Sunstein 2021). It is helpful as well to be aware of the concept of “bounded rationality” in decision-making and of the related distinction between “satisficing” and optimizing (Simon 1956; Gigerenzer 2001).

Critical thinking about an issue requires substantive knowledge of the domain to which the issue belongs. Critical thinking abilities are not a magic elixir that can be applied to any issue whatever by somebody who has no knowledge of the facts relevant to exploring that issue. For example, the student in Bubbles needed to know that gases do not penetrate solid objects like a glass, that air expands when heated, that the volume of an enclosed gas varies directly with its temperature and inversely with its pressure, and that hot objects will spontaneously cool down to the ambient temperature of their surroundings unless kept hot by insulation or a source of heat. Critical thinkers thus need a rich fund of subject-matter knowledge relevant to the variety of situations they encounter. This fact is recognized in the inclusion among critical thinking dispositions of a concern to become and remain generally well informed.

Experimental educational interventions, with control groups, have shown that education can improve critical thinking skills and dispositions, as measured by standardized tests. For information about these tests, see the Supplement on Assessment .

What educational methods are most effective at developing the dispositions, abilities and knowledge of a critical thinker? In a comprehensive meta-analysis of experimental and quasi-experimental studies of strategies for teaching students to think critically, Abrami et al. (2015) found that dialogue, anchored instruction, and mentoring each increased the effectiveness of the educational intervention, and that they were most effective when combined. They also found that in these studies a combination of separate instruction in critical thinking with subject-matter instruction in which students are encouraged to think critically was more effective than either by itself. However, the difference was not statistically significant; that is, it might have arisen by chance.

Most of these studies lack the longitudinal follow-up required to determine whether the observed differential improvements in critical thinking abilities or dispositions continue over time, for example until high school or college graduation. For details on studies of methods of developing critical thinking skills and dispositions, see the Supplement on Educational Methods .

12. Controversies

Scholars have denied the generalizability of critical thinking abilities across subject domains, have alleged bias in critical thinking theory and pedagogy, and have investigated the relationship of critical thinking to other kinds of thinking.

McPeck (1981) attacked the thinking skills movement of the 1970s, including the critical thinking movement. He argued that there are no general thinking skills, since thinking is always thinking about some subject-matter. It is futile, he claimed, for schools and colleges to teach thinking as if it were a separate subject. Rather, teachers should lead their pupils to become autonomous thinkers by teaching school subjects in a way that brings out their cognitive structure and that encourages and rewards discussion and argument. As some of his critics (e.g., Paul 1985; Siegel 1985) pointed out, McPeck’s central argument needs elaboration, since it has obvious counter-examples in writing and speaking, for which (up to a certain level of complexity) there are teachable general abilities even though they are always about some subject-matter. To make his argument convincing, McPeck needs to explain how thinking differs from writing and speaking in a way that does not permit useful abstraction of its components from the subject-matters with which it deals. He has not done so. Nevertheless, his position that the dispositions and abilities of a critical thinker are best developed in the context of subject-matter instruction is shared by many theorists of critical thinking, including Dewey (1910, 1933), Glaser (1941), Passmore (1980), Weinstein (1990), Bailin et al. (1999b), and Willingham (2019).

McPeck’s challenge prompted reflection on the extent to which critical thinking is subject-specific. McPeck argued for a strong subject-specificity thesis, according to which it is a conceptual truth that all critical thinking abilities are specific to a subject. (He did not however extend his subject-specificity thesis to critical thinking dispositions. In particular, he took the disposition to suspend judgment in situations of cognitive dissonance to be a general disposition.) Conceptual subject-specificity is subject to obvious counter-examples, such as the general ability to recognize confusion of necessary and sufficient conditions. A more modest thesis, also endorsed by McPeck, is epistemological subject-specificity, according to which the norms of good thinking vary from one field to another. Epistemological subject-specificity clearly holds to a certain extent; for example, the principles in accordance with which one solves a differential equation are quite different from the principles in accordance with which one determines whether a painting is a genuine Picasso. But the thesis suffers, as Ennis (1989) points out, from vagueness of the concept of a field or subject and from the obvious existence of inter-field principles, however broadly the concept of a field is construed. For example, the principles of hypothetico-deductive reasoning hold for all the varied fields in which such reasoning occurs. A third kind of subject-specificity is empirical subject-specificity, according to which as a matter of empirically observable fact a person with the abilities and dispositions of a critical thinker in one area of investigation will not necessarily have them in another area of investigation.

The thesis of empirical subject-specificity raises the general problem of transfer. If critical thinking abilities and dispositions have to be developed independently in each school subject, how are they of any use in dealing with the problems of everyday life and the political and social issues of contemporary society, most of which do not fit into the framework of a traditional school subject? Proponents of empirical subject-specificity tend to argue that transfer is more likely to occur if there is critical thinking instruction in a variety of domains, with explicit attention to dispositions and abilities that cut across domains. But evidence for this claim is scanty. There is a need for well-designed empirical studies that investigate the conditions that make transfer more likely.

It is common ground in debates about the generality or subject-specificity of critical thinking dispositions and abilities that critical thinking about any topic requires background knowledge about the topic. For example, the most sophisticated understanding of the principles of hypothetico-deductive reasoning is of no help unless accompanied by some knowledge of what might be plausible explanations of some phenomenon under investigation.

Critics have objected to bias in the theory, pedagogy and practice of critical thinking. Commentators (e.g., Alston 1995; Ennis 1998) have noted that anyone who takes a position has a bias in the neutral sense of being inclined in one direction rather than others. The critics, however, are objecting to bias in the pejorative sense of an unjustified favoring of certain ways of knowing over others, frequently alleging that the unjustly favoured ways are those of a dominant sex or culture (Bailin 1995). These ways favour:

• reinforcement of egocentric and sociocentric biases over dialectical engagement with opposing world-views (Paul 1981, 1984; Warren 1998)
• distancing from the object of inquiry over closeness to it (Martin 1992; Thayer-Bacon 1992)
• indifference to the situation of others over care for them (Martin 1992)
• orientation to thought over orientation to action (Martin 1992)
• being reasonable over caring to understand people’s ideas (Thayer-Bacon 1993)
• being neutral and objective over being embodied and situated (Thayer-Bacon 1995a)
• doubting over believing (Thayer-Bacon 1995b)
• reason over emotion, imagination and intuition (Thayer-Bacon 2000)
• solitary thinking over collaborative thinking (Thayer-Bacon 2000)
• written and spoken assignments over other forms of expression (Alston 2001)
• attention to written and spoken communications over attention to human problems (Alston 2001)
• winning debates in the public sphere over making and understanding meaning (Alston 2001)

A common thread in this smorgasbord of accusations is dissatisfaction with focusing on the logical analysis and evaluation of reasoning and arguments. While these authors acknowledge that such analysis and evaluation is part of critical thinking and should be part of its conceptualization and pedagogy, they insist that it is only a part. Paul (1981), for example, bemoans the tendency of atomistic teaching of methods of analyzing and evaluating arguments to turn students into more able sophists, adept at finding fault with positions and arguments with which they disagree but even more entrenched in the egocentric and sociocentric biases with which they began. Martin (1992) and Thayer-Bacon (1992) cite with approval the self-reported intimacy with their subject-matter of leading researchers in biology and medicine, an intimacy that conflicts with the distancing allegedly recommended in standard conceptions and pedagogy of critical thinking. Thayer-Bacon (2000) contrasts the embodied and socially embedded learning of her elementary school students in a Montessori school, who used their imagination, intuition and emotions as well as their reason, with conceptions of critical thinking as

thinking that is used to critique arguments, offer justifications, and make judgments about what are the good reasons, or the right answers. (Thayer-Bacon 2000: 127–128)

Alston (2001) reports that her students in a women’s studies class were able to see the flaws in the Cinderella myth that pervades much romantic fiction but in their own romantic relationships still acted as if all failures were the woman’s fault and still accepted the notions of love at first sight and living happily ever after. Students, she writes, should

be able to connect their intellectual critique to a more affective, somatic, and ethical account of making risky choices that have sexist, racist, classist, familial, sexual, or other consequences for themselves and those both near and far… critical thinking that reads arguments, texts, or practices merely on the surface without connections to feeling/desiring/doing or action lacks an ethical depth that should infuse the difference between mere cognitive activity and something we want to call critical thinking. (Alston 2001: 34)

Some critics portray such biases as unfair to women. Thayer-Bacon (1992), for example, has charged modern critical thinking theory with being sexist, on the ground that it separates the self from the object and causes one to lose touch with one’s inner voice, and thus stigmatizes women, who (she asserts) link self to object and listen to their inner voice. Her charge does not imply that women as a group are on average less able than men to analyze and evaluate arguments. Facione (1990c) found no difference by sex in performance on his California Critical Thinking Skills Test. Kuhn (1991: 280–281) found no difference by sex in either the disposition or the competence to engage in argumentative thinking.

The critics propose a variety of remedies for the biases that they allege. In general, they do not propose to eliminate or downplay critical thinking as an educational goal. Rather, they propose to conceptualize critical thinking differently and to change its pedagogy accordingly. Their pedagogical proposals arise logically from their objections. They can be summarized as follows:

• Focus on argument networks with dialectical exchanges reflecting contesting points of view rather than on atomic arguments, so as to develop “strong sense” critical thinking that transcends egocentric and sociocentric biases (Paul 1981, 1984).
• Foster closeness to the subject-matter and feeling connected to others in order to inform a humane democracy (Martin 1992).
• Develop “constructive thinking” as a social activity in a community of physically embodied and socially embedded inquirers with personal voices who value not only reason but also imagination, intuition and emotion (Thayer-Bacon 2000).
• In developing critical thinking in school subjects, treat as important neither skills nor dispositions but opening worlds of meaning (Alston 2001).
• Attend to the development of critical thinking dispositions as well as skills, and adopt the “critical pedagogy” practised and advocated by Freire (1968 [1970]) and hooks (1994) (Dalgleish, Girard, & Davies 2017).

A common thread in these proposals is treatment of critical thinking as a social, interactive, personally engaged activity like that of a quilting bee or a barn-raising (Thayer-Bacon 2000) rather than as an individual, solitary, distanced activity symbolized by Rodin’s The Thinker . One can get a vivid description of education with the former type of goal from the writings of bell hooks (1994, 2010). Critical thinking for her is open-minded dialectical exchange across opposing standpoints and from multiple perspectives, a conception similar to Paul’s “strong sense” critical thinking (Paul 1981). She abandons the structure of domination in the traditional classroom. In an introductory course on black women writers, for example, she assigns students to write an autobiographical paragraph about an early racial memory, then to read it aloud as the others listen, thus affirming the uniqueness and value of each voice and creating a communal awareness of the diversity of the group’s experiences (hooks 1994: 84). Her “engaged pedagogy” is thus similar to the “freedom under guidance” implemented in John Dewey’s Laboratory School of Chicago in the late 1890s and early 1900s. It incorporates the dialogue, anchored instruction, and mentoring that Abrami (2015) found to be most effective in improving critical thinking skills and dispositions.

What is the relationship of critical thinking to problem solving, decision-making, higher-order thinking, creative thinking, and other recognized types of thinking? One’s answer to this question obviously depends on how one defines the terms used in the question. If critical thinking is conceived broadly to cover any careful thinking about any topic for any purpose, then problem solving and decision making will be kinds of critical thinking, if they are done carefully. Historically, ‘critical thinking’ and ‘problem solving’ were two names for the same thing. If critical thinking is conceived more narrowly as consisting solely of appraisal of intellectual products, then it will be disjoint with problem solving and decision making, which are constructive.

Bloom’s taxonomy of educational objectives used the phrase “intellectual abilities and skills” for what had been labeled “critical thinking” by some, “reflective thinking” by Dewey and others, and “problem solving” by still others (Bloom et al. 1956: 38). Thus, the so-called “higher-order thinking skills” at the taxonomy’s top levels of analysis, synthesis and evaluation are just critical thinking skills, although they do not come with general criteria for their assessment (Ennis 1981b). The revised version of Bloom’s taxonomy (Anderson et al. 2001) likewise treats critical thinking as cutting across those types of cognitive process that involve more than remembering (Anderson et al. 2001: 269–270). For details, see the Supplement on History .

As to creative thinking, it overlaps with critical thinking (Bailin 1987, 1988). Thinking about the explanation of some phenomenon or event, as in Ferryboat , requires creative imagination in constructing plausible explanatory hypotheses. Likewise, thinking about a policy question, as in Candidate , requires creativity in coming up with options. Conversely, creativity in any field needs to be balanced by critical appraisal of the draft painting or novel or mathematical theory.

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6 Thinking and Intelligence

What is the best way to solve a problem? How does a person who has never seen or touched snow in real life develop an understanding of the concept of snow? How do young children acquire the ability to learn language with no formal instruction? Psychologists who study thinking explore questions like these and are called cognitive psychologists.

Cognitive psychologists also study intelligence. What is intelligence, and how does it vary from person to person? Are “street smarts” a kind of intelligence, and if so, how do they relate to other types of intelligence? What does an IQ test really measure? These questions and more will be explored in this chapter as you study thinking and intelligence.

In other chapters, we discussed the cognitive processes of perception, learning, and memory. In this chapter, we will focus on high-level cognitive processes. As a part of this discussion, we will consider thinking and briefly explore the development and use of language. We will also discuss problem solving and creativity before ending with a discussion of how intelligence is measured and how our biology and environments interact to affect intelligence. After finishing this chapter, you will have a greater appreciation of the higher-level cognitive processes that contribute to our distinctiveness as a species.

Learning Objectives

By the end of this section, you will be able to:

• Describe cognition
• Distinguish concepts and prototypes
• Explain the difference between natural and artificial concepts
• Describe how schemata are organized and constructed

Imagine all of your thoughts as if they were physical entities, swirling rapidly inside your mind. How is it possible that the brain is able to move from one thought to the next in an organized, orderly fashion? The brain is endlessly perceiving, processing, planning, organizing, and remembering—it is always active. Yet, you don’t notice most of your brain’s activity as you move throughout your daily routine. This is only one facet of the complex processes involved in cognition. Simply put,  cognition  is thinking, and it encompasses the processes associated with perception, knowledge, problem solving, judgment, language, and memory. Scientists who study cognition are searching for ways to understand how we integrate, organize, and utilize our conscious cognitive experiences without being aware of all of the unconscious work that our brains are doing (for example, Kahneman, 2011).

Upon waking each morning, you begin thinking—contemplating the tasks that you must complete that day. In what order should you run your errands? Should you go to the bank, the cleaners, or the grocery store first? Can you get these things done before you head to class or will they need to wait until school is done? These thoughts are one example of cognition at work. Exceptionally complex, cognition is an essential feature of human consciousness, yet not all aspects of cognition are consciously experienced.

Cognitive psychology  is the field of psychology dedicated to examining how people think. It attempts to explain how and why we think the way we do by studying the interactions among human thinking, emotion, creativity, language, and problem solving, in addition to other cognitive processes. Cognitive psychologists strive to determine and measure different types of intelligence, why some people are better at problem solving than others, and how emotional intelligence affects success in the workplace, among countless other topics. They also sometimes focus on how we organize thoughts and information gathered from our environments into meaningful categories of thought, which will be discussed later.

Concepts and Prototypes

The human nervous system is capable of handling endless streams of information. The senses serve as the interface between the mind and the external environment, receiving stimuli and translating it into nerve impulses that are transmitted to the brain. The brain then processes this information and uses the relevant pieces to create thoughts, which can then be expressed through language or stored in memory for future use. To make this process more complex, the brain does not gather information from external environments only. When thoughts are formed, the mind synthesizes information from emotions and memories ( Figure 7.2 ). Emotion and memory are powerful influences on both our thoughts and behaviors.

In order to organize this staggering amount of information, the mind has developed a “file cabinet” of sorts in the mind. The different files stored in the file cabinet are called concepts.  Concepts  are categories or groupings of linguistic information, images, ideas, or memories, such as life experiences. Concepts are, in many ways, big ideas that are generated by observing details, and categorizing and combining these details into cognitive structures. You use concepts to see the relationships among the different elements of your experiences and to keep the information in your mind organized and accessible.

Concepts are informed by our semantic memory (you will learn more about semantic memory in a later chapter) and are present in every aspect of our lives; however, one of the easiest places to notice concepts is inside a classroom, where they are discussed explicitly. When you study United States history, for example, you learn about more than just individual events that have happened in America’s past. You absorb a large quantity of information by listening to and participating in discussions, examining maps, and reading first-hand accounts of people’s lives. Your brain analyzes these details and develops an overall understanding of American history. In the process, your brain gathers details that inform and refine your understanding of related concepts like democracy, power, and freedom.

Concepts can be complex and abstract, like justice, or more concrete, like types of birds. In psychology, for example, Piaget’s stages of development are abstract concepts. Some concepts, like tolerance, are agreed upon by many people because they have been used in various ways over many years. Other concepts, like the characteristics of your ideal friend or your family’s birthday traditions, are personal and individualized. In this way, concepts touch every aspect of our lives, from our many daily routines to the guiding principles behind the way governments function.

Another technique used by your brain to organize information is the identification of prototypes for the concepts you have developed. A  prototype  is the best example or representation of a concept. For example, what comes to your mind when you think of a dog? Most likely your early experiences with dogs will shape what you imagine. If your first pet was a Golden Retriever, there is a good chance that this would be your prototype for the category of dogs.

Natural and Artificial Concepts

In psychology, concepts can be divided into two categories, natural and artificial.  Natural concepts  are created “naturally” through your experiences and can be developed from either direct or indirect experiences. For example, if you live in Essex Junction, Vermont, you have probably had a lot of direct experience with snow. You’ve watched it fall from the sky, you’ve seen lightly falling snow that barely covers the windshield of your car, and you’ve shoveled out 18 inches of fluffy white snow as you’ve thought, “This is perfect for skiing.” You’ve thrown snowballs at your best friend and gone sledding down the steepest hill in town. In short, you know snow. You know what it looks like, smells like, tastes like, and feels like. If, however, you’ve lived your whole life on the island of Saint Vincent in the Caribbean, you may never have actually seen snow, much less tasted, smelled, or touched it. You know snow from the indirect experience of seeing pictures of falling snow—or from watching films that feature snow as part of the setting. Either way, snow is a natural concept because you can construct an understanding of it through direct observations, experiences with snow, or indirect knowledge (such as from films or books) ( Figure 7.3 ).

An  artificial concept , on the other hand, is a concept that is defined by a specific set of characteristics. Various properties of geometric shapes, like squares and triangles, serve as useful examples of artificial concepts. A triangle always has three angles and three sides. A square always has four equal sides and four right angles. Mathematical formulas, like the equation for area (length × width), are artificial concepts defined by specific sets of characteristics that are always the same. Artificial concepts can enhance the understanding of a topic by building on one another. For example, before learning the concept of “area of a square” (and the formula to find it), you must understand what a square is. Once the concept of “area of a square” is understood, an understanding of area for other geometric shapes can be built upon the original understanding of area. The use of artificial concepts to define an idea is crucial to communicating with others and engaging in complex thought. According to Goldstone and Kersten (2003), concepts act as building blocks and can be connected in countless combinations to create complex thoughts.

A  schema  is a mental construct consisting of a cluster or collection of related concepts (Bartlett, 1932). There are many different types of schemata, and they all have one thing in common: schemata are a method of organizing information that allows the brain to work more efficiently. When a schema is activated, the brain makes immediate assumptions about the person or object being observed.

There are several types of schemata. A  role schema  makes assumptions about how individuals in certain roles will behave (Callero, 1994). For example, imagine you meet someone who introduces himself as a firefighter. When this happens, your brain automatically activates the “firefighter schema” and begins making assumptions that this person is brave, selfless, and community-oriented. Despite not knowing this person, already you have unknowingly made judgments about him. Schemata also help you fill in gaps in the information you receive from the world around you. While schemata allow for more efficient information processing, there can be problems with schemata, regardless of whether they are accurate: Perhaps this particular firefighter is not brave, he just works as a firefighter to pay the bills while studying to become a children’s librarian.

An  event schema , also known as a  cognitive script , is a set of behaviors that can feel like a routine. Think about what you do when you walk into an elevator ( Figure 7.4 ). First, the doors open and you wait to let exiting passengers leave the elevator car. Then, you step into the elevator and turn around to face the doors, looking for the correct button to push. You never face the back of the elevator, do you? And when you’re riding in a crowded elevator and you can’t face the front, it feels uncomfortable, doesn’t it? Interestingly, event schemata can vary widely among different cultures and countries. For example, while it is quite common for people to greet one another with a handshake in the United States, in Tibet, you greet someone by sticking your tongue out at them, and in Belize, you bump fists (Cairns Regional Council, n.d.)

Because event schemata are automatic, they can be difficult to change. Imagine that you are driving home from work or school. This event schema involves getting in the car, shutting the door, and buckling your seatbelt before putting the key in the ignition. You might perform this script two or three times each day. As you drive home, you hear your phone’s ring tone. Typically, the event schema that occurs when you hear your phone ringing involves locating the phone and answering it or responding to your latest text message. So without thinking, you reach for your phone, which could be in your pocket, in your bag, or on the passenger seat of the car. This powerful event schema is informed by your pattern of behavior and the pleasurable stimulation that a phone call or text message gives your brain. Because it is a schema, it is extremely challenging for us to stop reaching for the phone, even though we know that we endanger our own lives and the lives of others while we do it (Neyfakh, 2013) ( Figure 7.5 ).

Remember the elevator? It feels almost impossible to walk in and  not  face the door. Our powerful event schema dictates our behavior in the elevator, and it is no different with our phones. Current research suggests that it is the habit, or event schema, of checking our phones in many different situations that make refraining from checking them while driving especially difficult (Bayer & Campbell, 2012). Because texting and driving has become a dangerous epidemic in recent years, psychologists are looking at ways to help people interrupt the “phone schema” while driving. Event schemata like these are the reason why many habits are difficult to break once they have been acquired. As we continue to examine thinking, keep in mind how powerful the forces of concepts and schemata are to our understanding of the world.

• Define language and demonstrate familiarity with the components of language
• Understand the development of language
• Explain the relationship between language and thinking

Language  is a communication system that involves using words and systematic rules to organize those words to transmit information from one individual to another. While language is a form of communication, not all communication is language. Many species communicate with one another through their postures, movements, odors, or vocalizations. This communication is crucial for species that need to interact and develop social relationships with their conspecifics. However, many people have asserted that it is language that makes humans unique among all of the animal species (Corballis & Suddendorf, 2007; Tomasello & Rakoczy, 2003). This section will focus on what distinguishes language as a special form of communication, how the use of language develops, and how language affects the way we think.

Components of Language

Language, be it spoken, signed, or written, has specific components: a lexicon and grammar.  Lexicon  refers to the words of a given language. Thus, lexicon is a language’s vocabulary.  Grammar  refers to the set of rules that are used to convey meaning through the use of the lexicon (Fernández & Cairns, 2011). For instance, English grammar dictates that most verbs receive an “-ed” at the end to indicate past tense.

Words are formed by combining the various phonemes that make up the language. A  phoneme  (e.g., the sounds “ah” vs. “eh”) is a basic sound unit of a given language, and different languages have different sets of phonemes. Phonemes are combined to form  morphemes , which are the smallest units of language that convey some type of meaning (e.g., “I” is both a phoneme and a morpheme). We use semantics and syntax to construct language. Semantics and syntax are part of a language’s grammar.  Semantics  refers to the process by which we derive meaning from morphemes and words.  Syntax  refers to the way words are organized into sentences (Chomsky, 1965; Fernández & Cairns, 2011).

We apply the rules of grammar to organize the lexicon in novel and creative ways, which allow us to communicate information about both concrete and abstract concepts. We can talk about our immediate and observable surroundings as well as the surface of unseen planets. We can share our innermost thoughts, our plans for the future, and debate the value of a college education. We can provide detailed instructions for cooking a meal, fixing a car, or building a fire. Through our use of words and language, we are able to form, organize, and express ideas, schema, and artificial concepts.

Language Development

Given the remarkable complexity of a language, one might expect that mastering a language would be an especially arduous task; indeed, for those of us trying to learn a second language as adults, this might seem to be true. However, young children master language very quickly with relative ease. B. F.  Skinner  (1957) proposed that language is learned through reinforcement. Noam  Chomsky  (1965) criticized this behaviorist approach, asserting instead that the mechanisms underlying language acquisition are biologically determined. The use of language develops in the absence of formal instruction and appears to follow a very similar pattern in children from vastly different cultures and backgrounds. It would seem, therefore, that we are born with a biological predisposition to acquire a language (Chomsky, 1965; Fernández & Cairns, 2011). Moreover, it appears that there is a critical period for language acquisition, such that this proficiency at acquiring language is maximal early in life; generally, as people age, the ease with which they acquire and master new languages diminishes (Johnson & Newport, 1989; Lenneberg, 1967; Singleton, 1995).

Children begin to learn about language from a very early age ( Table 7.1 ). In fact, it appears that this is occurring even before we are born. Newborns show a preference for their mother’s voice and appear to be able to discriminate between the language spoken by their mother and other languages. Babies are also attuned to the languages being used around them and show preferences for videos of faces that are moving in synchrony with the audio of spoken language versus videos that do not synchronize with the audio (Blossom & Morgan, 2006; Pickens, 1994; Spelke & Cortelyou, 1981).

DIG DEEPER: The Case of Genie

In the fall of 1970, a social worker in the Los Angeles area found a 13-year-old girl who was being raised in extremely neglectful and abusive conditions. The girl, who came to be known as Genie, had lived most of her life tied to a potty chair or confined to a crib in a small room that was kept closed with the curtains drawn. For a little over a decade, Genie had virtually no social interaction and no access to the outside world. As a result of these conditions, Genie was unable to stand up, chew solid food, or speak (Fromkin, Krashen, Curtiss, Rigler, & Rigler, 1974; Rymer, 1993). The police took Genie into protective custody.

Genie’s abilities improved dramatically following her removal from her abusive environment, and early on, it appeared she was acquiring language—much later than would be predicted by critical period hypotheses that had been posited at the time (Fromkin et al., 1974). Genie managed to amass an impressive vocabulary in a relatively short amount of time. However, she never developed a mastery of the grammatical aspects of language (Curtiss, 1981). Perhaps being deprived of the opportunity to learn language during a critical period impeded Genie’s ability to fully acquire and use language.

You may recall that each language has its own set of phonemes that are used to generate morphemes, words, and so on. Babies can discriminate among the sounds that make up a language (for example, they can tell the difference between the “s” in vision and the “ss” in fission); early on, they can differentiate between the sounds of all human languages, even those that do not occur in the languages that are used in their environments. However, by the time that they are about 1 year old, they can only discriminate among those phonemes that are used in the language or languages in their environments (Jensen, 2011; Werker & Lalonde, 1988; Werker & Tees, 1984).

After the first few months of life, babies enter what is known as the babbling stage, during which time they tend to produce single syllables that are repeated over and over. As time passes, more variations appear in the syllables that they produce. During this time, it is unlikely that the babies are trying to communicate; they are just as likely to babble when they are alone as when they are with their caregivers (Fernández & Cairns, 2011). Interestingly, babies who are raised in environments in which sign language is used will also begin to show babbling in the gestures of their hands during this stage (Petitto, Holowka, Sergio, Levy, & Ostry, 2004).

Generally, a child’s first word is uttered sometime between the ages of 1 year to 18 months, and for the next few months, the child will remain in the “one word” stage of language development. During this time, children know a number of words, but they only produce one-word utterances. The child’s early vocabulary is limited to familiar objects or events, often nouns. Although children in this stage only make one-word utterances, these words often carry larger meaning (Fernández & Cairns, 2011). So, for example, a child saying “cookie” could be identifying a cookie or asking for a cookie.

As a child’s lexicon grows, she begins to utter simple sentences and to acquire new vocabulary at a very rapid pace. In addition, children begin to demonstrate a clear understanding of the specific rules that apply to their language(s). Even the mistakes that children sometimes make provide evidence of just how much they understand about those rules. This is sometimes seen in the form of  overgeneralization . In this context, overgeneralization refers to an extension of a language rule to an exception to the rule. For example, in English, it is usually the case that an “s” is added to the end of a word to indicate plurality. For example, we speak of one dog versus two dogs. Young children will overgeneralize this rule to cases that are exceptions to the “add an s to the end of the word” rule and say things like “those two gooses” or “three mouses.” Clearly, the rules of the language are understood, even if the exceptions to the rules are still being learned (Moskowitz, 1978).

Language and Thought

When we speak one language, we agree that words are representations of ideas, people, places, and events. The given language that children learn is connected to their culture and surroundings. But can words themselves shape the way we think about things? Psychologists have long investigated the question of whether language shapes thoughts and actions, or whether our thoughts and beliefs shape our language. Two researchers, Edward Sapir and Benjamin Lee Whorf began this investigation in the 1940s. They wanted to understand how the language habits of a community encourage members of that community to interpret language in a particular manner (Sapir, 1941/1964). Sapir and Whorf proposed that language determines thought. For example, in some languages, there are many different words for love. However, in English, we use the word love for all types of love. Does this affect how we think about love depending on the language that we speak (Whorf, 1956)? Researchers have since identified this view as too absolute, pointing out a lack of empiricism behind what Sapir and Whorf proposed (Abler, 2013; Boroditsky, 2011; van Troyer, 1994). Today, psychologists continue to study and debate the relationship between language and thought.

• Describe problem solving strategies
• Define algorithm and heuristic
• Explain some common roadblocks to effective problem solving and decision making

People face problems every day—usually, multiple problems throughout the day. Sometimes these problems are straightforward: To double a recipe for pizza dough, for example, all that is required is that each ingredient in the recipe is doubled. Sometimes, however, the problems we encounter are more complex. For example, say you have a work deadline, and you must mail a printed copy of a report to your supervisor by the end of the business day. The report is time-sensitive and must be sent overnight. You finished the report last night, but your printer will not work today. What should you do? First, you need to identify the problem and then apply a strategy for solving the problem.

Problem-Solving Strategies

When you are presented with a problem—whether it is a complex mathematical problem or a broken printer, how do you solve it? Before finding a solution to the problem, the problem must first be clearly identified. After that, one of many problem solving strategies can be applied, hopefully resulting in a solution.

A  problem-solving strategy  is a plan of action used to find a solution. Different strategies have different action plans associated with them ( Table 7.2 ). For example, a well-known strategy is  trial and error . The old adage, “If at first, you don’t succeed, try, try again” describes trial and error. In terms of your broken printer, you could try checking the ink levels, and if that doesn’t work, you could check to make sure the paper tray isn’t jammed. Or maybe the printer isn’t actually connected to your laptop. When using trial and error, you would continue to try different solutions until you solved your problem. Although trial and error is not typically one of the most time-efficient strategies, it is a commonly used one.

Another type of strategy is an algorithm. An  algorithm  is a problem-solving formula that provides you with step-by-step instructions used to achieve a desired outcome (Kahneman, 2011). You can think of an algorithm as a recipe with highly detailed instructions that produce the same result every time they are performed. Algorithms are used frequently in our everyday lives, especially in computer science. When you run a search on the Internet, search engines like Google use algorithms to decide which entries will appear first in your list of results. Facebook also uses algorithms to decide which posts to display on your newsfeed. Can you identify other situations in which algorithms are used?

A heuristic is another type of problem solving strategy. While an algorithm must be followed exactly to produce a correct result, a  heuristic is a general problem-solving framework (Tversky & Kahneman, 1974). You can think of these as mental shortcuts that are used to solve problems. A “rule of thumb” is an example of a heuristic. Such a rule saves the person time and energy when making a decision, but despite its time-saving characteristics, it is not always the best method for making a rational decision. Different types of heuristics are used in different types of situations, but the impulse to use a heuristic occurs when one of the five conditions is met (Pratkanis, 1989):

• When one is faced with too much information
• When the time to make a decision is limited
• When the decision to be made is unimportant
• When there is access to very little information to use in making the decision
• When an appropriate heuristic happens to come to mind in the same moment

Working backward is a useful heuristic in which you begin solving the problem by focusing on the end result. Consider this example: You live in Washington, D.C., and have been invited to a wedding at 4 PM on Saturday in Philadelphia. Knowing that Interstate 95 tends to back up any day of the week, you need to plan your route and time your departure accordingly. If you want to be at the wedding service by 3:30 PM, and it takes 2.5 hours to get to Philadelphia without traffic, what time should you leave your house? You use the working backward heuristic to plan the events of your day on a regular basis, probably without even thinking about it.

Another useful heuristic is the practice of accomplishing a large goal or task by breaking it into a series of smaller steps. Students often use this common method to complete a large research project or a long essay for school. For example, students typically brainstorm, develop a thesis or main topic, research the chosen topic, organize their information into an outline, write a rough draft, revise and edit the rough draft, develop a final draft, organize the references list, and proofread their work before turning in the project. The large task becomes less overwhelming when it is broken down into a series of small steps.

EVERYDAY CONNECTION: Solving Puzzles

Problem-solving abilities can improve with practice. Many people challenge themselves every day with puzzles and other mental exercises to sharpen their problem-solving skills. Sudoku puzzles appear daily in most newspapers. Typically, a sudoku puzzle is a 9×9 grid. The simple sudoku below ( Figure 7.7 ) is a 4×4 grid. To solve the puzzle, fill in the empty boxes with a single digit: 1, 2, 3, or 4. Here are the rules: The numbers must total 10 in each bolded box, each row, and each column; however, each digit can only appear once in a bolded box, row, and column. Time yourself as you solve this puzzle and compare your time with a classmate.

Here is another popular type of puzzle ( Figure 7.8 ) that challenges your spatial reasoning skills. Connect all nine dots with four connecting straight lines without lifting your pencil from the paper:

Take a look at the “Puzzling Scales” logic puzzle below ( Figure 7.9 ). Sam Loyd, a well-known puzzle master, created and refined countless puzzles throughout his lifetime (Cyclopedia of Puzzles, n.d.).

Not all problems are successfully solved, however. What challenges stop us from successfully solving a problem? Albert Einstein once said, “Insanity is doing the same thing over and over again and expecting a different result.” Imagine a person in a room that has four doorways. One doorway that has always been open in the past is now locked. The person, accustomed to exiting the room by that particular doorway, keeps trying to get out through the same doorway even though the other three doorways are open. The person is stuck—but she just needs to go to another doorway, instead of trying to get out through the locked doorway. A  mental set  is where you persist in approaching a problem in a way that has worked in the past but is clearly not working now.

Functional fixedness  is a type of mental set where you cannot perceive an object being used for something other than what it was designed for. Duncker (1945) conducted foundational research on functional fixedness. He created an experiment in which participants were given a candle, a book of matches, and a box of thumbtacks. They were instructed to use those items to attach the candle to the wall so that it did not drip wax onto the table below. Participants had to use functional fixedness to solve the problem ( Figure 7.10 ). During the  Apollo 13  mission to the moon, NASA engineers at Mission Control had to overcome functional fixedness to save the lives of the astronauts aboard the spacecraft. An explosion in a module of the spacecraft damaged multiple systems. The astronauts were in danger of being poisoned by rising levels of carbon dioxide because of problems with the carbon dioxide filters. The engineers found a way for the astronauts to use spare plastic bags, tape, and air hoses to create a makeshift air filter, which saved the lives of the astronauts.

Researchers have investigated whether functional fixedness is affected by culture. In one experiment, individuals from the Shuar group in Ecuador were asked to use an object for a purpose other than that for which the object was originally intended. For example, the participants were told a story about a bear and a rabbit that were separated by a river and asked to select among various objects, including a spoon, a cup, erasers, and so on, to help the animals. The spoon was the only object long enough to span the imaginary river, but if the spoon was presented in a way that reflected its normal usage, it took participants longer to choose the spoon to solve the problem. (German & Barrett, 2005). The researchers wanted to know if exposure to highly specialized tools, as occurs with individuals in industrialized nations, affects their ability to transcend functional fixedness. It was determined that functional fixedness is experienced in both industrialized and nonindustrialized cultures (German & Barrett, 2005).

In order to make good decisions, we use our knowledge and our reasoning. Often, this knowledge and reasoning is sound and solid. Sometimes, however, we are swayed by biases or by others manipulating a situation. For example, let’s say you and three friends wanted to rent a house and had a combined target budget of $1,600. The realtor shows you only very run-down houses for $1,600 and then shows you a very nice house for $2,000. Might you ask each person to pay more in rent to get the $2,000 home? Why would the realtor show you the run-down houses and the nice house? The realtor may be challenging your anchoring bias. An  anchoring bias  occurs when you focus on one piece of information when making a decision or solving a problem. In this case, you’re so focused on the amount of money you are willing to spend that you may not recognize what kinds of houses are available at that price point.

The  confirmation bias  is the tendency to focus on information that confirms your existing beliefs. For example, if you think that your professor is not very nice, you notice all of the instances of rude behavior exhibited by the professor while ignoring the countless pleasant interactions he is involved in on a daily basis.  Hindsight bias  leads you to believe that the event you just experienced was predictable, even though it really wasn’t. In other words, you knew all along that things would turn out the way they did.  Representative bias describes a faulty way of thinking, in which you unintentionally stereotype someone or something; for example, you may assume that your professors spend their free time reading books and engaging in intellectual conversation because the idea of them spending their time playing volleyball or visiting an amusement park does not fit in with your stereotypes of professors.

Finally, the  availability heuristic  is a heuristic in which you make a decision based on an example, information, or recent experience that is that readily available to you, even though it may not be the best example to inform your decision .  Biases tend to “preserve that which is already established—to maintain our preexisting knowledge, beliefs, attitudes, and hypotheses” (Aronson, 1995; Kahneman, 2011). These biases are summarized in  Table 7.3 .

Were you able to determine how many marbles are needed to balance the scales in  Figure 7.9 ? You need nine. Were you able to solve the problems in  Figure 7.7  and  Figure 7.8 ? Here are the answers ( Figure 7.11 ).

• Define intelligence
• Explain the triarchic theory of intelligence
• Identify the difference between intelligence theories
• Explain emotional intelligence
• Define creativity

Classifying Intelligence

What exactly is intelligence? The way that researchers have defined the concept of intelligence has been modified many times since the birth of psychology. British psychologist Charles Spearman believed intelligence consisted of one general factor, called  g , which could be measured and compared among individuals. Spearman focused on the commonalities among various intellectual abilities and de-emphasized what made each unique. Long before modern psychology developed, however, ancient philosophers, such as Aristotle, held a similar view (Cianciolo & Sternberg, 2004).

Other psychologists believe that instead of a single factor, intelligence is a collection of distinct abilities. In the 1940s, Raymond Cattell proposed a theory of intelligence that divided general intelligence into two components: crystallized intelligence and fluid intelligence (Cattell, 1963). Crystallized intelligence  is characterized as acquired knowledge and the ability to retrieve it. When you learn, remember, and recall information, you are using crystallized intelligence. You use crystallized intelligence all the time in your coursework by demonstrating that you have mastered the information covered in the course.  Fluid intelligence  encompasses the ability to see complex relationships and solve problems. Navigating your way home after being detoured onto an unfamiliar route because of road construction would draw upon your fluid intelligence. Fluid intelligence helps you tackle complex, abstract challenges in your daily life, whereas crystallized intelligence helps you overcome concrete, straightforward problems (Cattell, 1963).

Other theorists and psychologists believe that intelligence should be defined in more practical terms. For example, what types of behaviors help you get ahead in life? Which skills promote success? Think about this for a moment. Being able to recite all 45 presidents of the United States in order is an excellent party trick, but will knowing this make you a better person?

Robert Sternberg developed another theory of intelligence, which he titled the  triarchic theory of intelligence  because it sees intelligence as comprised of three parts (Sternberg, 1988): practical, creative, and analytical intelligence ( Figure 7.12 ).

Practical intelligence , as proposed by Sternberg, is sometimes compared to “street smarts.” Being practical means you find solutions that work in your everyday life by applying knowledge based on your experiences. This type of intelligence appears to be separate from the traditional understanding of IQ; individuals who score high in practical intelligence may or may not have comparable scores in creative and analytical intelligence (Sternberg, 1988).

Analytical intelligence is closely aligned with academic problem solving and computations. Sternberg says that analytical intelligence is demonstrated by an ability to analyze, evaluate, judge, compare, and contrast. When reading a classic novel for a literature class, for example, it is usually necessary to compare the motives of the main characters of the book or analyze the historical context of the story. In a science course such as anatomy, you must study the processes by which the body uses various minerals in different human systems. In developing an understanding of this topic, you are using analytical intelligence. When solving a challenging math problem, you would apply analytical intelligence to analyze different aspects of the problem and then solve it section by section.

Creative intelligence  is marked by inventing or imagining a solution to a problem or situation. Creativity in this realm can include finding a novel solution to an unexpected problem or producing a beautiful work of art or a well-developed short story. Imagine for a moment that you are camping in the woods with some friends and realize that you’ve forgotten your camp coffee pot. The person in your group who figures out a way to successfully brew coffee for everyone would be credited as having higher creative intelligence.

Multiple Intelligences Theory  was developed by Howard Gardner, a Harvard psychologist and former student of Erik Erikson. Gardner’s theory, which has been refined for more than 30 years, is a more recent development among theories of intelligence. In Gardner’s theory, each person possesses at least eight intelligences. Among these eight intelligences, a person typically excels in some and falters in others (Gardner, 1983).  Table 7.4  describes each type of intelligence.

Gardner’s theory is relatively new and needs additional research to better establish empirical support. At the same time, his ideas challenge the traditional idea of intelligence to include a wider variety of abilities, although it has been suggested that Gardner simply relabeled what other theorists called “cognitive styles” as “intelligences” (Morgan, 1996). Furthermore, developing traditional measures of Gardner’s intelligences is extremely difficult (Furnham, 2009; Gardner & Moran, 2006; Klein, 1997).

Gardner’s inter- and intrapersonal intelligences are often combined into a single type: emotional intelligence.  Emotional intelligence  encompasses the ability to understand the emotions of yourself and others, show empathy, understand social relationships and cues, and regulate your own emotions and respond in culturally appropriate ways (Parker, Saklofske, & Stough, 2009). People with high emotional intelligence typically have well-developed social skills. Some researchers, including Daniel Goleman, the author of  Emotional Intelligence: Why It Can Matter More than IQ , argue that emotional intelligence is a better predictor of success than traditional intelligence (Goleman, 1995). However, emotional intelligence has been widely debated, with researchers pointing out inconsistencies in how it is defined and described, as well as questioning results of studies on a subject that is difficult to measure and study empirically (Locke, 2005; Mayer, Salovey, & Caruso, 2004)

The most comprehensive theory of intelligence to date is the Cattell-Horn-Carroll (CHC) theory of cognitive abilities (Schneider & McGrew, 2018). In this theory, abilities are related and arranged in a hierarchy with general abilities at the top, broad abilities in the middle, and narrow (specific) abilities at the bottom. The narrow abilities are the only ones that can be directly measured; however, they are integrated within the other abilities. At the general level is general intelligence. Next, the broad level consists of general abilities such as fluid reasoning, short-term memory, and processing speed. Finally, as the hierarchy continues, the narrow level includes specific forms of cognitive abilities. For example, short-term memory would further break down into memory span and working memory capacity.

Intelligence can also have different meanings and values in different cultures. If you live on a small island, where most people get their food by fishing from boats, it would be important to know how to fish and how to repair a boat. If you were an exceptional angler, your peers would probably consider you intelligent. If you were also skilled at repairing boats, your intelligence might be known across the whole island. Think about your own family’s culture. What values are important for Latinx families? Italian families? In Irish families, hospitality and telling an entertaining story are marks of the culture. If you are a skilled storyteller, other members of Irish culture are likely to consider you intelligent.

Some cultures place a high value on working together as a collective. In these cultures, the importance of the group supersedes the importance of individual achievement. When you visit such a culture, how well you relate to the values of that culture exemplifies your  cultural intelligence , sometimes referred to as cultural competence.

Creativity  is the ability to generate, create, or discover new ideas, solutions, and possibilities. Very creative people often have intense knowledge about something, work on it for years, look at novel solutions, seek out the advice and help of other experts, and take risks. Although creativity is often associated with the arts, it is actually a vital form of intelligence that drives people in many disciplines to discover something new. Creativity can be found in every area of life, from the way you decorate your residence to a new way of understanding how a cell works.

Creativity is often assessed as a function of one’s ability to engage in  divergent thinking . Divergent thinking can be described as thinking “outside the box;” it allows an individual to arrive at unique, multiple solutions to a given problem. In contrast,  convergent thinking describes the ability to provide a correct or well-established answer or solution to a problem (Cropley, 2006; Gilford, 1967)

• Explain how intelligence tests are developed
• Describe the history of the use of IQ tests
• Describe the purposes and benefits of intelligence testing

While you’re likely familiar with the term “IQ” and associate it with the idea of intelligence, what does IQ really mean? IQ stands for  intelligence quotient  and describes a score earned on a test designed to measure intelligence. You’ve already learned that there are many ways psychologists describe intelligence (or more aptly, intelligences). Similarly, IQ tests—the tools designed to measure intelligence—have been the subject of debate throughout their development and use.

When might an IQ test be used? What do we learn from the results, and how might people use this information? While there are certainly many benefits to intelligence testing, it is important to also note the limitations and controversies surrounding these tests. For example, IQ tests have sometimes been used as arguments in support of insidious purposes, such as the eugenics movement (Severson, 2011). The infamous Supreme Court Case,  Buck v. Bell , legalized the forced sterilization of some people deemed “feeble-minded” through this type of testing, resulting in about 65,000 sterilizations ( Buck v. Bell , 274 U.S. 200; Ko, 2016). Today, only professionals trained in psychology can administer IQ tests, and the purchase of most tests requires an advanced degree in psychology. Other professionals in the field, such as social workers and psychiatrists, cannot administer IQ tests. In this section, we will explore what intelligence tests measure, how they are scored, and how they were developed.

Measuring Intelligence

It seems that the human understanding of intelligence is somewhat limited when we focus on traditional or academic-type intelligence. How then, can intelligence be measured? And when we measure intelligence, how do we ensure that we capture what we’re really trying to measure (in other words, that IQ tests function as valid measures of intelligence)? In the following paragraphs, we will explore the how intelligence tests were developed and the history of their use.

The IQ test has been synonymous with intelligence for over a century. In the late 1800s, Sir Francis Galton developed the first broad test of intelligence (Flanagan & Kaufman, 2004). Although he was not a psychologist, his contributions to the concepts of intelligence testing are still felt today (Gordon, 1995). Reliable intelligence testing (you may recall from earlier chapters that reliability refers to a test’s ability to produce consistent results) began in earnest during the early 1900s with a researcher named Alfred Binet ( Figure 7.13 ). Binet was asked by the French government to develop an intelligence test to use on children to determine which ones might have difficulty in school; it included many verbally based tasks. American researchers soon realized the value of such testing. Louis Terman, a Stanford professor, modified Binet’s work by standardizing the administration of the test and tested thousands of different-aged children to establish an average score for each age. As a result, the test was normed and standardized, which means that the test was administered consistently to a large enough representative sample of the population that the range of scores resulted in a bell curve (bell curves will be discussed later).  Standardization  means that the manner of administration, scoring, and interpretation of results is consistent.  Norming  involves giving a test to a large population so data can be collected comparing groups, such as age groups. The resulting data provide norms, or referential scores, by which to interpret future scores. Norms are not expectations of what a given group  should  know but a demonstration of what that group  does  know. Norming and standardizing the test ensures that new scores are reliable. This new version of the test was called the Stanford-Binet Intelligence Scale (Terman, 1916). Remarkably, an updated version of this test is still widely used today.

In 1939, David Wechsler, a psychologist who spent part of his career working with World War I veterans, developed a new IQ test in the United States. Wechsler combined several subtests from other intelligence tests used between 1880 and World War I. These subtests tapped into a variety of verbal and nonverbal skills because Wechsler believed that intelligence encompassed “the global capacity of a person to act purposefully, to think rationally, and to deal effectively with his environment” (Wechsler, 1958, p. 7). He named the test the Wechsler-Bellevue Intelligence Scale (Wechsler, 1981). This combination of subtests became one of the most extensively used intelligence tests in the history of psychology. Although its name was later changed to the Wechsler Adult Intelligence Scale (WAIS) and has been revised several times, the aims of the test remain virtually unchanged since its inception (Boake, 2002). Today, there are three intelligence tests credited to Wechsler, the Wechsler Adult Intelligence Scale-fourth edition (WAIS-IV), the Wechsler Intelligence Scale for Children (WISC-V), and the Wechsler Preschool and Primary Scale of Intelligence—IV (WPPSI-IV) (Wechsler, 2012). These tests are used widely in schools and communities throughout the United States, and they are periodically normed and standardized as a means of recalibration. As a part of the recalibration process, the WISC-V was given to thousands of children across the country, and children taking the test today are compared with their same-age peers ( Figure 7.13 ).

The WISC-V is composed of 14 subtests, which comprise five indices, which then render an IQ score. The five indices are Verbal Comprehension, Visual Spatial, Fluid Reasoning, Working Memory, and Processing Speed. When the test is complete, individuals receive a score for each of the five indices and a Full Scale IQ score. The method of scoring reflects the understanding that intelligence is comprised of multiple abilities in several cognitive realms and focuses on the mental processes that the child used to arrive at his or her answers to each test item.

Interestingly, the periodic recalibrations have led to an interesting observation known as the Flynn effect. Named after James Flynn, who was among the first to describe this trend, the  Flynn effect  refers to the observation that each generation has a significantly higher IQ than the last. Flynn himself argues, however, that increased IQ scores do not necessarily mean that younger generations are more intelligent per se (Flynn, Shaughnessy, & Fulgham, 2012).

Ultimately, we are still left with the question of how valid intelligence tests are. Certainly, the most modern versions of these tests tap into more than verbal competencies, yet the specific skills that should be assessed in IQ testing, the degree to which any test can truly measure an individual’s intelligence, and the use of the results of IQ tests are still issues of debate (Gresham & Witt, 1997; Flynn, Shaughnessy, & Fulgham, 2012; Richardson, 2002; Schlinger, 2003).

The Bell Curve

The results of intelligence tests follow the bell curve, a graph in the general shape of a bell. When the bell curve is used in psychological testing, the graph demonstrates a normal distribution of a trait, in this case, intelligence, in the human population. Many human traits naturally follow the bell curve. For example, if you lined up all your female schoolmates according to height, it is likely that a large cluster of them would be the average height for an American woman: 5’4”–5’6”. This cluster would fall in the center of the bell curve, representing the average height for American women ( Figure 7.14 ). There would be fewer women who stand closer to 4’11”. The same would be true for women of above-average height: those who stand closer to 5’11”. The trick to finding a bell curve in nature is to use a large sample size. Without a large sample size, it is less likely that the bell curve will represent the wider population. A  representative sample  is a subset of the population that accurately represents the general population. If, for example, you measured the height of the women in your classroom only, you might not actually have a representative sample. Perhaps the women’s basketball team wanted to take this course together, and they are all in your class. Because basketball players tend to be taller than average, the women in your class may not be a good representative sample of the population of American women. But if your sample included all the women at your school, it is likely that their heights would form a natural bell curve.

The same principles apply to intelligence test scores. Individuals earn a score called an intelligence quotient (IQ). Over the years, different types of IQ tests have evolved, but the way scores are interpreted remains the same. The average IQ score on an IQ test is 100. Standard deviations  describe how data are dispersed in a population and give context to large data sets. The bell curve uses the standard deviation to show how all scores are dispersed from the average score ( Figure 7.15 ). In modern IQ testing, one standard deviation is 15 points. So a score of 85 would be described as “one standard deviation below the mean.” How would you describe a score of 115 and a score of 70? Any IQ score that falls within one standard deviation above and below the mean (between 85 and 115) is considered average, and 68% of the population has IQ scores in this range. An IQ score of 130 or above is considered a superior level.

Only 2.2% of the population has an IQ score below 70 (American Psychological Association [APA], 2013). A score of 70 or below indicates significant cognitive delays. When these are combined with major deficits in adaptive functioning, a person is diagnosed with having an intellectual disability (American Association on Intellectual and Developmental Disabilities, 2013). Formerly known as mental retardation, the accepted term now is intellectual disability, and it has four subtypes: mild, moderate, severe, and profound ( Table 7.5 ).  The Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Psychological Disorders  lists criteria for each subgroup (APA, 2013).

On the other end of the intelligence spectrum are those individuals whose IQs fall into the highest ranges. Consistent with the bell curve, about 2% of the population falls into this category. People are considered gifted if they have an IQ score of 130 or higher, or superior intelligence in a particular area. Long ago, popular belief suggested that people of high intelligence were maladjusted. This idea was disproven through a groundbreaking study of gifted children. In 1921, Lewis Terman began a longitudinal study of over 1500 children with IQs over 135 (Terman, 1925). His findings showed that these children became well-educated, successful adults who were, in fact, well-adjusted (Terman & Oden, 1947). Additionally, Terman’s study showed that the subjects were above average in physical build and attractiveness, dispelling an earlier popular notion that highly intelligent people were “weaklings.” Some people with very high IQs elect to join Mensa, an organization dedicated to identifying, researching, and fostering intelligence. Members must have an IQ score in the top 2% of the population, and they may be required to pass other exams in their application to join the group.

DIG DEEPER: What’s in a Name? 

In the past, individuals with IQ scores below 70 and significant adaptive and social functioning delays were diagnosed with mental retardation. When this diagnosis was first named, the title held no social stigma. In time, however, the degrading word “retard” sprang from this diagnostic term. “Retard” was frequently used as a taunt, especially among young people, until the words “mentally retarded” and “retard” became an insult. As such, the DSM-5 now labels this diagnosis as “intellectual disability.” Many states once had a Department of Mental Retardation to serve those diagnosed with such cognitive delays, but most have changed their name to the Department of Developmental Disabilities or something similar in language.

Erin Johnson’s younger brother Matthew has Down syndrome. She wrote this piece about what her brother taught her about the meaning of intelligence:

His whole life, learning has been hard. Entirely possible – just different. He has always excelled with technology – typing his thoughts was more effective than writing them or speaking them. Nothing says “leave me alone” quite like a text that reads, “Do Not Call Me Right Now.” He is fully capable of reading books up to about a third-grade level, but he didn’t love it and used to always ask others to read to him. That all changed when his nephew came along, because he willingly reads to him, and it is the most heart-swelling, smile-inducing experience I have ever had the pleasure of witnessing.

When it comes down to it, Matt can learn. He does learn. It just takes longer, and he has to work harder for it, which if we’re being honest, is not a lot of fun. He is extremely gifted in learning things he takes an interest in, and those things often seem a bit “strange” to others. But no matter. It just proves my point – he  can  learn. That does not mean he will learn at the same pace, or even to the same level. It also, unfortunately, does not mean he will be allotted the same opportunities to learn as many others.

Here’s the scoop. We are all wired with innate abilities to retain and apply our learning and natural curiosities and passions that fuel our desire to learn. But our abilities and curiosities may not be the same.

The world doesn’t work this way though, especially not for my brother and his counterparts. Have him read aloud a book about skunks, and you may not get a whole lot from him. But have him tell you about skunks straight out of his memory, and hold onto your hats. He can hack the school’s iPad system, but he can’t tell you how he did it. He can write out every direction for a drive to our grandparents’ home in Florida, but he can’t drive.

Society is quick to deem him disabled and use demeaning language like the r-word to describe him, but in reality, we haven’t necessarily given him opportunities to showcase the learning he can do. In my case, I can escape the need to memorize how to change the oil in my car without anyone assuming I can’t do it, or calling me names when they find out I can’t. But Matthew can’t get through a day at his job without someone assuming he needs help. He is bright. Brighter than most anyone would assume. Maybe we need to redefine what is smart.

My brother doesn’t fit in the narrow schema of intelligence that is accepted in our society. But intelligence is far more than being able to solve 525 x 62 or properly introduce yourself to another. Why can’t we assume the intelligence of someone who can recite all of a character’s lines in a movie or remember my birthday a year after I told him/her a single time? Why is it we allow a person’s diagnosis or appearance to make us not just wonder if, but entirely doubt that they are capable? Maybe we need to cut away the sides of the box we have created for people so everyone can fit.

My brother can learn. It may not be what you know. It may be knowledge you would deem unimportant. It may not follow a traditional learning trajectory. But the fact remains – he can learn. Everyone can learn. And even though it is harder for him and harder for others still, he is not a “retard.” Nobody is.

When you use the r-word, you are insinuating that an individual, whether someone with a disability or not, is unintelligent, foolish, and purposeless. This in turn tells a person with a disability that they too are unintelligent, foolish, and purposeless. Because the word was historically used to describe individuals with disabilities and twisted from its original meaning to fit a cruel new context, it is forevermore associated with people like my brother. No matter how a person looks or learns or behaves, the r-word is never a fitting term. It’s time we waved it goodbye.

Why Measure Intelligence?

The value of IQ testing is most evident in educational or clinical settings. Children who seem to be experiencing learning difficulties or severe behavioral problems can be tested to ascertain whether the child’s difficulties can be partly attributed to an IQ score that is significantly different from the mean for her age group. Without IQ testing—or another measure of intelligence—children and adults needing extra support might not be identified effectively. In addition, IQ testing is used in courts to determine whether a defendant has special or extenuating circumstances that preclude him from participating in some way in a trial. People also use IQ testing results to seek disability benefits from the Social Security Administration.

• Describe how genetics and environment affect intelligence
• Explain the relationship between IQ scores and socioeconomic status
• Describe the difference between a learning disability and a developmental disorder

High Intelligence: Nature or Nurture?

Where does high intelligence come from? Some researchers believe that intelligence is a trait inherited from a person’s parents. Scientists who research this topic typically use twin studies to determine the  heritability  of intelligence. The Minnesota Study of Twins Reared Apart is one of the most well-known twin studies. In this investigation, researchers found that identical twins raised together and identical twins raised apart exhibit a higher correlation between their IQ scores than siblings or fraternal twins raised together (Bouchard, Lykken, McGue, Segal, & Tellegen, 1990). The findings from this study reveal a genetic component to intelligence ( Figure 7.15 ). At the same time, other psychologists believe that intelligence is shaped by a child’s developmental environment. If parents were to provide their children with intellectual stimuli from before they are born, it is likely that they would absorb the benefits of that stimulation, and it would be reflected in intelligence levels.

The reality is that aspects of each idea are probably correct. In fact, one study suggests that although genetics seem to be in control of the level of intelligence, the environmental influences provide both stability and change to trigger manifestation of cognitive abilities (Bartels, Rietveld, Van Baal, & Boomsma, 2002). Certainly, there are behaviors that support the development of intelligence, but the genetic component of high intelligence should not be ignored. As with all heritable traits, however, it is not always possible to isolate how and when high intelligence is passed on to the next generation.

Range of Reaction  is the theory that each person responds to the environment in a unique way based on his or her genetic makeup. According to this idea, your genetic potential is a fixed quantity, but whether you reach your full intellectual potential is dependent upon the environmental stimulation you experience, especially in childhood. Think about this scenario: A couple adopts a child who has average genetic intellectual potential. They raise her in an extremely stimulating environment. What will happen to the couple’s new daughter? It is likely that the stimulating environment will improve her intellectual outcomes over the course of her life. But what happens if this experiment is reversed? If a child with an extremely strong genetic background is placed in an environment that does not stimulate him: What happens? Interestingly, according to a longitudinal study of highly gifted individuals, it was found that “the two extremes of optimal and pathological experience are both represented disproportionately in the backgrounds of creative individuals”; however, those who experienced supportive family environments were more likely to report being happy (Csikszentmihalyi & Csikszentmihalyi, 1993, p. 187).

Another challenge to determining the origins of high intelligence is the confounding nature of our human social structures. It is troubling to note that some ethnic groups perform better on IQ tests than others—and it is likely that the results do not have much to do with the quality of each ethnic group’s intellect. The same is true for socioeconomic status. Children who live in poverty experience more pervasive, daily stress than children who do not worry about the basic needs of safety, shelter, and food. These worries can negatively affect how the brain functions and develops, causing a dip in IQ scores. Mark Kishiyama and his colleagues determined that children living in poverty demonstrated reduced prefrontal brain functioning comparable to children with damage to the lateral prefrontal cortex (Kishyama, Boyce, Jimenez, Perry, & Knight, 2009).

The debate around the foundations and influences on intelligence exploded in 1969 when an educational psychologist named Arthur Jensen published the article “How Much Can We Boost I.Q. and Achievement” in the Harvard Educational Review . Jensen had administered IQ tests to diverse groups of students, and his results led him to the conclusion that IQ is determined by genetics. He also posited that intelligence was made up of two types of abilities: Level I and Level II. In his theory, Level I is responsible for rote memorization, whereas Level II is responsible for conceptual and analytical abilities. According to his findings, Level I remained consistent among the human race. Level II, however, exhibited differences among ethnic groups (Modgil & Routledge, 1987). Jensen’s most controversial conclusion was that Level II intelligence is prevalent among Asians, then Caucasians, then African Americans. Robert Williams was among those who called out racial bias in Jensen’s results (Williams, 1970).

Obviously, Jensen’s interpretation of his own data caused an intense response in a nation that continued to grapple with the effects of racism (Fox, 2012). However, Jensen’s ideas were not solitary or unique; rather, they represented one of many examples of psychologists asserting racial differences in IQ and cognitive ability. In fact, Rushton and Jensen (2005) reviewed three decades worth of research on the relationship between race and cognitive ability. Jensen’s belief in the inherited nature of intelligence and the validity of the IQ test to be the truest measure of intelligence are at the core of his conclusions. If, however, you believe that intelligence is more than Levels I and II, or that IQ tests do not control for socioeconomic and cultural differences among people, then perhaps you can dismiss Jensen’s conclusions as a single window that looks out on the complicated and varied landscape of human intelligence.

In a related story, parents of African American students filed a case against the State of California in 1979, because they believed that the testing method used to identify students with learning disabilities was culturally unfair as the tests were normed and standardized using white children ( Larry P. v. Riles ). The testing method used by the state disproportionately identified African American children as mentally retarded. This resulted in many students being incorrectly classified as “mentally retarded.”

What are Learning Disabilities?

Learning disabilities are cognitive disorders that affect different areas of cognition, particularly language or reading. It should be pointed out that learning disabilities are not the same thing as intellectual disabilities. Learning disabilities are considered specific neurological impairments rather than global intellectual or developmental disabilities. A person with a language disability has difficulty understanding or using spoken language, whereas someone with a reading disability, such as dyslexia, has difficulty processing what he or she is reading.

Often, learning disabilities are not recognized until a child reaches school age. One confounding aspect of learning disabilities is that they most often affect children with average to above-average intelligence. In other words, the disability is specific to a particular area and not a measure of overall intellectual ability. At the same time, learning disabilities tend to exhibit comorbidity with other disorders, like attention-deficit hyperactivity disorder (ADHD). Anywhere between 30–70% of individuals with diagnosed cases of ADHD also have some sort of learning disability (Riccio, Gonzales, & Hynd, 1994). Let’s take a look at three examples of common learning disabilities: dysgraphia, dyslexia, and dyscalculia.

Children with  dysgraphia  have a learning disability that results in a struggle to write legibly. The physical task of writing with a pen and paper is extremely challenging for the person. These children often have extreme difficulty putting their thoughts down on paper (Smits-Engelsman & Van Galen, 1997). This difficulty is inconsistent with a person’s IQ. That is, based on the child’s IQ and/or abilities in other areas, a child with dysgraphia should be able to write, but can’t. Children with dysgraphia may also have problems with spatial abilities.

Students with dysgraphia need academic accommodations to help them succeed in school. These accommodations can provide students with alternative assessment opportunities to demonstrate what they know (Barton, 2003). For example, a student with dysgraphia might be permitted to take an oral exam rather than a traditional paper-and-pencil test. Treatment is usually provided by an occupational therapist, although there is some question as to how effective such treatment is (Zwicker, 2005).

Dyslexia is the most common learning disability in children. An individual with  dyslexia  exhibits an inability to correctly process letters. The neurological mechanism for sound processing does not work properly in someone with dyslexia. As a result, dyslexic children may not understand sound-letter correspondence. A child with dyslexia may mix up letters within words and sentences—letter reversals, such as those shown in  Figure 7.17 , are a hallmark of this learning disability—or skip whole words while reading. A dyslexic child may have difficulty spelling words correctly while writing. Because of the disordered way that the brain processes letters and sounds, learning to read is a frustrating experience. Some dyslexic individuals cope by memorizing the shapes of most words, but they never actually learn to read (Berninger, 2008).

Dyscalculia

Dyscalculia  is difficulty in learning or comprehending arithmetic. This learning disability is often first evident when children exhibit difficulty discerning how many objects are in a small group without counting them. Other symptoms may include struggling to memorize math facts, organize numbers, or fully differentiate between numerals, math symbols, and written numbers (such as “3” and “three”).

Additional Supplemental Resources

• Use Google’s QuickDraw web app on your phone to quickly draw 5 things for Google’s artificially intelligent neural net. When you are done, the app will show you what it thought each of the drawings was. How does this relate to the psychological idea of concepts, prototypes, and schemas? Check out here.  Works best in Chrome if used in a web browser
• This article lists information about a variety of different topics relating to speech development, including how speech develops and what research is currently being done regarding speech development.
• The Human intelligence site includes biographical profiles of people who have influenced the development of intelligence theory and testing, in-depth articles exploring current controversies related to human intelligence, and resources for teachers.

• In 2000, psychologists Sheena Iyengar and Mark Lepper from Columbia and Stanford University published a study about the paradox of choice.  This is the original journal article.
• Mensa , the high IQ society, provides a forum for intellectual exchange among its members. There are members in more than 100 countries around the world.  Anyone with an IQ in the top 2% of the population can join.
• This test developed in the 1950s is used to refer to some kinds of behavioral tests for the presence of mind, or thought, or intelligence in putatively minded entities such as machines.
• Your central “Hub” of information and products created for the network of Parent Centers serving families of children with disabilities.
• How have average IQ levels changed over time? Hear James Flynn discuss the “Flynn Effect” in this Ted Talk. Closed captioning available.
• We all want customized experiences and products — but when faced with 700 options, consumers freeze up. With fascinating new research, Sheena Iyengar demonstrates how businesses (and others) can improve the experience of choosing. This is the same researcher that is featured in your midterm exam.
• What does an IQ Score distribution look like?  Where do most people fall on an IQ Score distribution?  Find out more in this video. Closed captioning available.
• How do we solve problems?  How can data help us to do this?  Follow Amy Webb’s story of how she used algorithms to help her find her way to true love. Closed captioning available.
• In this Ted-Ed video, explore some of the ways in which animals communicate, and determine whether or not this communication qualifies as language.  A variety of discussion and assessment questions are included with the video (free registration is required to access the questions). Closed captioning available.
• Watch this Ted-Ed video to learn more about the benefits of speaking multiple languages, including how bilingualism helps the brain to process information, strengthens the brain, and keeps the speaker more engaged in their world.  A variety of discussion and assessment questions are included with the video (free registration is required to access the questions). Closed captioning available.
• This video is on how your mind can amaze and betray you includes information on topics such as concepts, prototypes, problem-solving and mistakes in thinking. Closed captioning available.
• This video on language includes information on topics such as the development of language, language theories, and brain areas involved in language, as well as language disorders. Closed captioning available.
• This video on the controversy of intelligence includes information on topics such as theories of intelligence, emotional intelligence, and measuring intelligence. Closed captioning available.
• This video on the brains vs. bias includes information on topics such as intelligence testing, testing bias, and stereotype threat. Closed captioning available.

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Introduction to Psychology Copyright © 2020 by Julie Lazzara is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution 4.0 International License , except where otherwise noted.

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• Defining Critical Thinking
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Each year it sponsors an annual International Conference on Critical Thinking and Educational Reform. It has worked with the College Board, the National Education Association, the U.S. Department of Education, as well as numerous colleges, universities, and school districts to facilitate the implementation of critical thinking instruction focused on intellectual standards.

The following three studies demonstrate:

• the fact that, as a rule, critical thinking is not presently being effectively taught at the high school, college and university level, and yet
• it is possible to do so.

To assess students' understanding of critical thinking, we recommend use of the International Critical Thinking Test as well as the Critical Thinking Interview Profile for College Students . To assess faculty understanding of critical thinking and its importance to instruction, we recommend the Critical Thinking Interview Profile For Teachers and Faculty . By registering as a member of the community, you will have access to streaming video, which includes a sample student interview with Dr. Richard Paul and Rush Cosgrove.

RESEARCH TITLES

View Abstract  -  View Full Dissertation (Adobe Acrobat PDF)

  A Critical Analysis of Richard Paul's Substantive Trans-disciplinary Conception of Critical Thinking

by Enoch Hale, Ph.D.

Union Institute & University - Cincinnati, Ohio - October 2008

View Abstract      Dissertation Table of Contents

Effect of a Model for Critical Thinking on Student Achievement in Primary Source Document Analysis and Interpretation, Argumentative Reasoning, Critical Thinking Dispositions and History Content in a Community College History Course Abstract of the Study, conducted by Jenny Reed, in partial fulfillment for her dissertation (October 26, 1998) View Abstract   -   View Full Dissertation (Adobe Acrobat PDF)

The Effect of Richard Paul's Universal Elements and Standards of Reasoning on Twelfth Grade Composition A Research Proposal Presented to the Faculty Of the School of Education Alliant International University In Partial Fulfillment of the Requirements for the Degree of Master of Arts in Education: Teaching Study conducted by J. Stephen Scanlan, San Diego (2006) View Abstract   -    View Full Dissertation (Adobe Acrobat PDF)

Study of 38 Public Universities and 28 Private Universities To Determine Faculty Emphasis on Critical Thinking In Instruction

Principal Researchers: Dr. Richard Paul, Dr. Linda Elder, and Dr. Ted Bartell

View Abstract    -    View the full study

Substantive Critical Thinking as Developed by the Foundation for Critical Thinking Proves Effective in Raising SAT and ACT Test Scores at West Side High School:  Staff Development Program Utilizes Critical Thinking Instruction to Improve Student Performance on ACT and SAT Tests, and in Critical Reading, Writing and Math Dr.   John Crook, West Side High School Principal View the Report

Teaching Critical Thinking Skills to Fourth Grade Students Identified as Gifted and Talented by Debra Connerly Graceland University - Cedar Rapids, Iowa - December 2006 View the Report

The Loss of the Space Shuttle Columbia: Portaging Leadership Lessons with a Critical Thinking Model

by Rob Niewoehner, Ph.D. U.S. Navy Graceland University - Cedar Rapids, Iowa - December 2006 View the Report

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Critical Thinking and Academic Research

Academic research focuses on the creation of new ideas, perspectives, and arguments. The researcher seeks relevant information in articles, books, and other sources, then develops an informed point of view within this ongoing "conversation" among researchers.

The research process is not simply collecting data, evidence, or "facts," then piecing together this preexisting information into a paper. Instead, the research process is about inquiry—asking questions and developing answers through serious critical thinking and thoughtful reflection.

As a result, the research process is recursive, meaning that the researcher regularly revisits ideas, seeks new information when necessary, and reconsiders and refines the research question, topic, or approach. In other words, research almost always involves constant reflection and revision.

This guide is designed to help you think through various aspects of the research process. The steps are not sequential, nor are they prescriptive about what steps you should take at particular points in the research process. Instead, the guide should help you consider the larger, interrelated elements of thinking involved in research.

Research Anxiety?

Research is not often easy or straightforward, so it's completely normal to feel anxious, frustrated, or confused. In fact, if you feel anxious, it can be a good sign that you're engaging in the type of critical thinking necessary to research and write a high-quality paper.

Think of the research process not as one giant, impossibly complicated task, but as a series of smaller, interconnected steps. These steps can be messy, and there is not one correct sequence of steps that will work for every researcher. However, thinking about research in small steps can help you be more productive and alleviate anxiety.

Paul-Elder Framework

This guide is based on the "Elements of Reasoning" from the Paul-Elder framework for critical thinking. For more information about the Paul-Elder framework, click the link below.

Some of the content in this guide has been adapted from The Aspiring Thinker's Guide to Critical Thinking (2009) by Linda Elder and Richard Paul.

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New state of mind: rethinking how researchers understand brain activity.

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Understanding the link between brain activity and behavior is among the core interests of neuroscience. Having a better grasp of this relationship will both help scientists understand how the brain works on a basic level and uncover what specifically goes awry in cases of neurological and psychological disease.

One way that researchers study this connection is through what are known as “brain states,” patterns of neural activity or connectivity that emerge during specific cognitive tasks and are common enough in all individuals that they become predictable. Another, newer, approach is the study of brain waves, rhythmic, repetitive patterns of brain cell activity caused by synchronization across cells.

In a new paper, two Yale researchers propose that these two ways of thinking about brain activity may not represent separate events but two aspects of the same occurrence. Essentially, they suggest that though brain states are traditionally thought of as a snapshot of brain activity while waves are more like a movie, they’re capturing parts of the same story.

Reconsidering these two approaches in this context, the researchers say, could help both fields benefit from the methods and knowledge of the other and advance our understanding of the brain.

Inspired by ecological, conservation, and Indigenous philosophies, Maya Foster, a third-year Ph.D. student in the Department of Biomedical Engineering, began pursuing this idea once she joined the lab of Dustin Scheinost , an associate professor in the Department of Radiology and Biomedical Imaging at Yale School of Medicine.

They are co-authors of the new paper , published April 5 in the journal Trends in Cognitive Sciences.

“ We’re arguing that rather than a brain state being one single thing, it’s a collection of things, a collection of discrete patterns that emerge in time in a predictable way,” she said.

In an interview with Yale News, Foster and Scheinost describe their proposal, and discuss how they might help researchers better understand the mysteries of the brain. This interview has been edited and condensed.

When did you start to consider these might be two aspects of the same occurrence?

Maya Foster: This has been on my mind even before I came to this lab. I was reading a book — “Erosion: Essays of Undoing” by Terry Tempest Williams — and she talks about how human-made machinery like helicopters cause vibrations that interrupt the natural pulse of things and cause things like rock formations to fall apart. Relatedly, there are a lot of Indigenous populations that believe everything has a pulse. And that got me thinking of the brain and whether we have some type of resonance or vibration that can be disrupted.

Then I joined this lab and Dustin let me experiment with a lot of different things. During one of those experiments, I input some data into a particular analysis and the outputs looked wave-like, and patterns emerged and then repeated. That took me down a whole rabbit hole of research literature and there was a lot of evidence for this idea of wave-like patterns in brain states.

What are the benefits of considering brain states as wave-like?

Foster: I think it creates a synergy where both sides — the brain state folks and the brain wave folks — benefit by learning from each other. And maybe the gaps in knowledge we have now when it comes to how brain activity relates to behavior might be filled by both groups working together.

Dustin Scheinost: Brain waves are newer in this field and they’re complex. And any time you can take something new and relate it to something old — brain states in this case — it gives you a natural jumping off point. You can bring along everything you’ve learned so far. It’s kind of like not throwing the baby out with the bath water. We don’t need to drop brain states. They’ve informed us, but we can go in a different direction with them too.

How are you proposing researchers consider brain states and brain waves now?

Foster: Borrowing from physics, when you analyze light, it can be a discrete point — a photon — or it can be wave-like. And that’s one way we’re thinking about this. Similarly, depending on how you analyze brain states you can get static patterns, much like a photon, or you if you look at activity more dynamically, certain patterns start to occur more than once over time, kind of like a wave.

So we’re arguing that rather than a brain state being one single thing, it’s a collection of things, a collection of discrete patterns that emerge in time in a predictable way.

For example, if we measured four distinct patterns in brain activity as someone completed a cognitive task, a brain state could be that pattern one emerges, then pattern three, then two, then four, and that series might repeat over time. And when that repetition stops, that would be the end of that particular brain state.

You also draw comparisons to the musical technique known as “fugue.” How does that fit with how you’re visualizing these phenomena?

Foster: I’m a music person, so that’s where this came from. In a fugue, you have a basic melody and then that melody emerges later in the music in different forms and formats. For instance, the melody will play, then some other music comes in, then the melody returns with the same rhythm and time sequence but maybe it’s in a different key.

Fugues are cyclical and wave-like, they have distinct groups of notes, and there’s a systematic repetition and sometimes layering of the main melody. We’re arguing that brain states are also wave-like, have distinct patterns of brain activity, and display systematic repetition and layering of sequential patterns.

How are you hoping other researchers respond to your argument?

Foster: I would love feedback, honestly. There is evidence for what we’re proposing but when it comes to implementing these ideas going forward, it would be helpful to have a conversation about how that might work. There are a lot of different strategies and I’m interested in a broader conversation about how we as researchers might go about studying this.

What’s it like as someone who has been in this field for a while to have a student come in with a new idea like this?

Scheinost: You can get set in your ways as a researcher and you need new ideas, new creativity. Sometimes they may sound outlandish when you first hear them. But then you ruminate, and they start to take form. And it’s fun. That’s really where the fun of this job is, to hear new ideas and see how people discuss and debate them.

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Critical thinking refers to deliberately scrutinizing and evaluating theories, concepts, or ideas using reasoned reflection and analysis. The act of thinking critically implies moving beyond simply understanding information, but questioning its source, its production, and its presentation in order to expose potential bias or researcher subjectivity. Applying critical thinking to investigating a research problem involves the act of challenging assumptions and questioning the choices and potential motives underpinning how the author designed the study and arrived at particular conclusions or recommended courses of action.

Mintz, Steven. "How the Word "Critical" Came to Signify the Leading Edge of Cultural Analysis." Higher Ed Gamma Blog , Inside Higher Ed, February 13, 2024; Van Merriënboer, Jeroen JG and Paul A. Kirschner. Ten Steps to Complex Learning: A Systematic Approach to Four-component Instructional Design . New York: Routledge, 2017.

Thinking Critically

Applying Critical Thinking to Research and Writing

Professors like to use the term critical thinking; in fact, the idea of being critical permeates much of academe writ large. In the classroom, the idea of thinking critically is often mentioned by professors when students ask how they should approach a research and writing assignment [other approaches your professor might mention include interdisciplinarity, comparative, gendered, global, etc.]. However, critical thinking is more than just an approach to research and writing. It is an acquired skill used in becoming a complex learner capable of discerning important relationships among the elements of, as well as integrating multiple ways of understanding applied to, the research problem. Critical thinking is a lens through which you holistically interrogate a topic.

Given this, thinking critically encompasses a variety of inter-related connotations applied to college-level research and writing * :

• Integrated and Multi-Dimensional . Critical thinking is not focused on any one element of the research design, but rather, is applied holistically throughout the process of identifying the research problem, reviewing of literature, applying methods of analysis, describing the results, discussing their implications, and, if appropriate, offering recommendations for further research. The act of thinking critically is non-linear [i.e., applies to going back and changing prior thoughts when new evidence emerges]; it permeates the entire research endeavor from contemplating what to write to proofreading the final product.
• Normative . This refers to the idea that critical thinking can be used to challenge prior assumptions in ways that advocate for social justice, equity, and inclusion in ways that are transformative and have lasting impact. In this respect, critical thinking can be a method for breaking out of dominant culture norms so as to produce research outcomes that illuminate previously hidden aspects of exploitation and injustice.
• Power Dynamics . Research in the social sciences often includes examining aspects of power and influence that shape social relations, organizations, institutions, and the production of knowledge. This involves how power operates, how it can be acquired, and how power and influence can be maintained. Critical thinking can reveal how societal structures perpetuate power in ways that marginalizes and oppresses group and within historical , political, economic, and cultural contexts.
• Reflection . A key aspect of critical thinking is practicing reflexivity; the act of turning ideas and concepts back onto yourself in order to reveal and clarify your own beliefs, assumptions, and perspectives. Being critically reflexive is important because it can reveal hidden biases you may have that could unintentionally influence how you interpret and validate information. The more reflexive you are, the better able and more comfortable you are about opening yourself up to new modes of understanding.
• Rigorous Questioning . Thinking critically is guided by asking questions that lead to addressing complex concepts, principles, theories, or problems more effectively and to help distinguish what is known from from what is not known [or that may be hidden]. In this way, critical thinking involves deliberately framing inquiries not just as research questions, but as a way to focus on systematic, disciplined,  in-depth questioning concerning the research problem and your positionality as a researcher.
• Social Change . An overarching goal of critical thinking applied to research and writing is to seek to identify and challenge sources of inequality, exploitation, oppression, and marinalization that contributes to maintaining the status quo. This way of thinking can help humanize the research problem, extending the scope of interpretive analysis beyond the boundaries of traditional approaches to understanding the topic.

In writing a research paper, the act of critical thinking applies most directly to the literature review and discussion sections of your paper . In reviewing the literature, it is important to reflect upon specific aspects of a study, such as, determining if the research design effectively establishes cause and effect relationships or provides insight into explaining why certain phenomena do or do not occur, assessing whether the method of gathering data or information supports the objectives of the study, and evaluating if the assumptions used t o arrive at a specific conclusion are evidence-based and relevant to addressing the research problem. An assessment of whether a source is helpful to investigating the research problem also involves critically analyzing how the research challenges conventional approaches to investigations that perpetuate inequalities or hides the voices of others.

Critical thinking also applies to the discussion section of your paper because this is where you interpret the findings of your study and explain its significance. This involves more than summarizing findings and describing outcomes. It includes reflecting on their importance and providing reasoned explanations why the research study is important in filling a gap in the literature or expanding knowledge and understanding about the topic in ways that inform practice. Critical reflection helps you think introspectively about your own beliefs concerning the significance of the findings but in ways that avoid biased judgment and decision making.

* Mintz, Steven. "How the Word "Critical" Came to Signify the Leading Edge of Cultural Analysis." Higher Ed Gamma Blog , Inside Higher Ed, February 13, 2024; Suter, W. Newton. Introduction to Educational Research: A Critical Thinking Approach. 2nd edition. Thousand Oaks, CA: SAGE Publications, 2012

Behar-Horenstein, Linda S., and Lian Niu. “Teaching Critical Thinking Skills in Higher Education: A Review of the Literature.” Journal of College Teaching and Learning 8 (February 2011): 25-41; Bayou, Yemeserach and Tamene Kitila. "Exploring Instructors’ Beliefs about and Practices in Promoting Students’ Critical Thinking Skills in Writing Classes." GIST–Education and Learning Research Journal 26 (2023): 123-154; Butcher, Charity. "Using In-class Writing to Promote Critical Thinking and Application of Course Concepts." Journal of Political Science Education 18 (2022): 3-21; Loseke, Donileen R. Methodological Thinking: Basic Principles of Social Research Design. Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage, 2012; Hart, Claire et al. “Exploring Higher Education Students’ Critical Thinking Skills through Content Analysis.” Thinking Skills and Creativity 41 (September 2021): 100877; Sabrina, R., Emilda Sulasmi, and Mandra Saragih. "Student Critical Thinking Skills and Student Writing Ability: The Role of Teachers' Intellectual Skills and Student Learning." Cypriot Journal of Educational Sciences 17 (2022): 2493-2510.Van Merriënboer, Jeroen JG and Paul A. Kirschner. Ten Steps to Complex Learning: A Systematic Approach to Four-component Instructional Design. New York: Routledge, 2017; Yeh, Hui-Chin, Shih-hsien Yang, Jo Shan Fu, and Yen-Chen Shih. "Developing College Students’ Critical Thinking through Reflective Writing." Higher Education Research & Development 42 (2023): 244-259.

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Exploring generative ai at harvard.

Jessica McCann

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Leaders weigh in on where we are and what’s next

The explosion of generative AI technology over the past year and a half is raising big questions about how these tools will impact higher education. Across Harvard, members of the community have been exploring how GenAI will change the ways we teach, learn, research, and work.

As part of this effort, the Office of the Provost has convened three working groups . They will discuss questions, share innovations, and evolve guidance and community resources. They are:

• The Teaching and Learning Group , chaired by Bharat Anand , vice provost for advances in learning and the Henry R. Byers Professor of Business Administration at Harvard Business School. This group seeks to share resources, identify emerging best practices, guide policies, and support the development of tools to address common challenges among faculty and students.
• The Research and Scholarship Group , chaired by John Shaw , vice provost for research, Harry C. Dudley Professor of Structural and Economic Geology in the Earth and Planetary Sciences Department, and professor of environmental science and engineering in the Paulson School of Engineering and Applied Science. It focuses on how to enable, and support the integrity of, scholarly activities with generative AI tools.
• T he Administration and Operations Group , chaired by Klara Jelinkova , vice president and University chief information officer. It is charged with addressing information security, data privacy, procurement, and administration and organizational efficiencies.

Klara Jelinkova, Bharat Anand, and John Shaw.

Photos by Kris Snibbe/Harvard Staff Photographer; Evgenia Eliseeva; and courtesy of John Shaw

The Gazette spoke with Anand, Shaw, and Jelinkova to understand more about the work of these groups and what’s next in generative AI at Harvard.

When generative AI tools first emerged, we saw universities respond in a variety of ways — from encouraging experimentation to prohibiting their use. What was Harvard’s overall approach?

Shaw: From the outset, Harvard has embraced the prospective benefits that GenAI offers to teaching, research, and administration across the University, while being mindful of the potential pitfalls. As a University, our mission is to help enable discovery and innovation, so we had a mandate to actively engage. We set some initial, broad policies that helped guide us, and have worked directly with groups across the institution to provide tools and resources to inspire exploration.

Jelinkova: The rapid emergence of these tools meant the University needed to react quickly, to provide both tools for innovation and experimentation and guidelines to ensure their responsible use. We rapidly built an AI Sandbox to enable faculty, students, and staff to experiment with multiple large language models in a secure environment. We also worked with external vendors to acquire enterprise licenses for a variety of tools to meet many different use cases. Through working groups, we were able to learn, aggregate and collate use cases for AI in teaching, learning, administration, and research. This coordinated, collective, and strategic approach has put Harvard ahead of many peers in higher education.

Anand: Teaching and learning are fundamentally decentralized activities. So our approach was to ask: First, how can we ensure that local experimentation by faculty and staff is enabled as much as possible; and second, how can we ensure that it’s consistent with University policies on IP, copyright, and security? We also wanted to ensure that novel emerging practices were shared across Schools, rather than remaining siloed.

What do these tools mean for faculty, in terms of the challenges they pose or the opportunities they offer? Is there anything you’re particularly excited about?

Anand: Let’s start with some salient challenges. How do we first sift through the hype that’s accompanied GenAI? How can we make it easy for faculty to use GenAI tools in their classrooms without overburdening them with yet another technology? How can one address real concerns about GenAI’s impact?

While we’re still early in this journey, many compelling opportunities — and more importantly, some systematic ways of thinking about them — are emerging. Various Harvard faculty have leaned into experimenting with LLMs in their classrooms. Our team has now interviewed over 30 colleagues across Harvard and curated short videos that capture their learnings. I encourage everyone to view these materials on the new GenAI site; they are remarkable in their depth and breadth of insight.

Here’s a sample: While LLMs are commonly used for Q&A, our faculty have creatively used them for a broader variety of tasks, such as simulating tutors that guide learning by asking questions, simulating instructional designers to provide active learning tips, and simulating student voices to predict how a class discussion might flow, thus aiding in lesson preparation. Others demonstrate how more sophisticated prompts or “prompt engineering” are often necessary to yield more sophisticated LLM responses, and how LLMs can extend well beyond text-based responses to visuals, simulations, coding, and games. And several faculty show how LLMs can help overcome subtle yet important learning frictions like skill gaps in coding, language literacy, or math.

Do these tools offer students an opportunity to support or expand upon their learning?

Anand: Yes. GenAI represents a unique area of innovation where students and faculty are working together. Many colleagues are incorporating student feedback into the GenAI portions of their curriculum or making their own GenAI tools available to students. Since GenAI is new, the pedagogical path is not yet well defined; students have an opportunity to make their voices heard, as co-creators, on what they think the future of their learning should look like.

Beyond this, we’re starting to see other learning benefits. Importantly, GenAI can reach beyond a lecture hall. Thoughtful prompt engineering can turn even publicly available GenAI tools into tutorbots that generate interactive practice problems, act as expert conversational aids for material review, or increase TA teams’ capacity. That means both that the classroom is expanding and that more of it is in students’ hands. There’s also evidence that these bots field more questions than teaching teams can normally address and can be more comfortable and accessible for some students.

Of course, we need to identify and counter harmful patterns. There is a risk, in this early and enthusiastic period, of sparking over-reliance on GenAI. Students must critically evaluate how and where they use it, given its possibility of inaccurate or inappropriate responses, and should heed the areas where their style of cognition outperforms AI. One other thing to watch out for is user divide: Some students will graduate with vastly better prompt engineering skills than others, an inequality that will only magnify in the workforce.

What are the main questions your group has been tackling?

Anand: Our group divided its work into three subgroups focused on policy, tools, and resources. We’ve helped guide initial policies to ensure safe and responsible use; begun curating resources for faculty in a One Harvard repository ; and are exploring which tools the University should invest in or develop to ensure that educators and researchers can continue to advance their work.

In the fall, we focused on supporting and guiding HUIT’s development of the AI Sandbox. The Harvard Initiative for Learning and Teaching’s annual conference , which focused exclusively on GenAI, had its highest participation in 10 years. Recently, we’ve been working with the research group to inform the development of tools that promise broad, generalizable use for faculty (e.g., tutorbots).

What has your group focused on in discussions so far about generative AI tools’ use in research?

Shaw: Our group has some incredible strength in researchers who are at the cutting edge of GenAI development and applications, but also includes voices that help us understand the real barriers to faculty and students starting to use these tools in their own research and scholarship. Working with the other teams, we have focused on supporting development and use of the GenAI sandbox, examining IP and security issues, and learning from different groups across campus how they are using these tools to innovate.

Are there key areas of focus for your group in the coming months?

Shaw: We are focused on establishing programs — such as the new GenAI Milton Fund track — to help support innovation in the application of these tools across the wide range of scholarship on our campus. We are also working with the College to develop new programs to help support students who wish to engage with faculty on GenAI-enabled projects. We aim to find ways to convene students and scholars to share their experiences and build a stronger community of practitioners across campus.

What types of administration and operations questions are your group is exploring, and what type of opportunities do you see in this space?

Jelinkova: By using the group to share learnings from across Schools and units, we can better provide technologies to meet the community’s needs while ensuring the most responsible and sustainable use of the University’s financial resources. The connections within this group also inform the guidelines that we provide; by learning how generative AI is being used in different contexts, we can develop best practices and stay alert to emerging risks. There are new tools becoming available almost every day, and many exciting experiments and pilots happening across Harvard, so it’s important to regularly review and update the guidance we provide to our community.

Can you talk a bit about what has come out of these discussions, or other exciting things to come?

Jelinkova: Because this technology is rapidly evolving, we are continually tracking the release of new tools and working with our vendors as well as open-source efforts to ensure we are best supporting the University’s needs. We’re developing more guidance and hosting information sessions on helping people to understand the AI landscape and how to choose the right tool for their task. Beyond tools, we’re also working to build connections across Harvard to support collaboration, including a recently launched AI community of practice . We are capturing valuable findings from emerging technology pilot programs in HUIT , the EVP area , and across Schools. And we are now thinking about how those findings can inform guiding principles and best practices to better support staff.

While the GenAI groups are investigating these questions, Harvard faculty and scholars are also on the forefront of research in this space. Can you talk a bit about some of the interesting research happening across the University in AI more broadly ?

Shaw: Harvard has made deep investments in the development and application of AI across our campus, in our Schools, initiatives, and institutes — such as the Kempner Institute and Harvard Data Science Initiative. In addition, there is a critical role for us to play in examining and guiding the ethics of AI applications — and our strengths in the Safra and Berkman Klein centers, as examples, can be leading voices in this area.

What would be your advice for members of our community who are interested in learning more about generative AI tools?

Anand: I’d encourage our community to view the resources available on the new Generative AI @ Harvard website , to better understand how GenAI tools might benefit you.

There’s also no substitute for experimentation with these tools to learn what works, what does not, and how to tailor them for maximal benefit for your particular needs. And of course, please know and respect University policies around copyright and security.

We’re in the early stages of this journey at Harvard, but it’s exciting.

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Thinking too much: rumination and psychopathology

Thomas ehring.

1 Department of Psychology, Ludwig‐Maximilians‐Universität, Munich Germany

Patients suffering from mental health problems often complain about thinking too much. Their mind is frequently focused on negative thoughts about their symptoms, problems, or negative experiences.

Traditionally, researchers and clinicians have either regarded this type of rumination as an epiphenomenon or consequence of suffering from mental health problems, or – as in the case of cognitive therapy – have mostly been interested in the content of these thoughts. However, there is increasing evidence suggesting that rumination, defined as a process of repetitive negative thinking, is a causal mechanism involved in the development and maintenance of psychopathology 1 .

The vast majority of research on rumination has been conducted in the context of depression. In her seminal response styles theory, S. Nolen‐Hoeksema introduced rumination as a way of responding to depressed mood that is characterized by repetitively and passively focusing on the symptoms of depression, and their possible causes and consequences 2 . The tendency to engage in a ruminative response style appears to be a reasonably stable trait, and can be assessed with the Response Styles Questionnaire (RSQ) 2 .

There is now extensive longitudinal research showing that rumination assessed in this way: a) predicts the onset of new episodes of depression; b) predicts the maintenance of already existing depressive symptoms; c) is a mediator between other known risk factors (e.g., negative cognitive styles, childhood adversity, psychosocial stress) and depression, and d) is related to reduced response to treatment 1 , 2 , 3 , 4 .

Converging evidence comes from experimental research showing that induced rumination leads to negative thinking, poor problem solving, inhibition of instrumental behavior, biased information processing, and impaired interpersonal functioning 1 , 2 , 4 .

Importantly, however, rumination is not only related to depression, but is involved in the development and/or maintenance of a broad range of disorders, including post‐traumatic stress disorder (PTSD), anxiety disorders, insomnia, eating disorders, somatic symptom disorder, and substance use disorders 2 , 3 .

It has been argued that repetitive negative thinking (RNT) is a transdiagnostic process, and that rumination can be subsumed under this overarching concept 3 , 5 . For example, our group has defined RNT as a style of thinking about one’s problems (current, past or future) or negative experiences (past or anticipated) that is: a) repetitive, b) intrusive, c) difficult to disengage from, d) perceived as unproductive, and e) capturing mental capacity 6 .

Importantly, RNT is characterized by its process features, not its content. Specifically, the transdiagnostic perspective states that RNT shares the same process across different disorders, but is applied to disorder‐specific and/or idiosyncratic topics. Thus, phenomena that have traditionally been studied from a disorder‐specific perspective (e.g., depressive rumination, excessive worry in generalized anxiety disorder, trauma‐related rumination in PTSD, or post‐event processing in social anxiety) are now regarded as different expressions of the same underlying construct.

Supporting evidence for this conceptualization comes from research showing that the common aspects of RNT (i.e., the transdiagnostic process) are more predictive of depression and anxiety disorders than unique features of disorder‐specific worry or rumination 7 . Different questionnaire measures to assess the transdiagnostic properties of RNT have been developed, including the Perseverative Thinking Questionnaire (PTQ) 6 .

Thus, current evidence is in line with the idea that RNT in general (as well as rumination as a specific subfacet) can be regarded as an important process, involved in the development and maintenance of psychopathology across different diagnostic categories.

Why do some individuals then frequently engage in RNT despite the proven negative consequences? A number of different theoretical perspectives have been put forward to explain this puzzling phenomenon 1 , 5 . An important basic tenet of many models is the assumption that RNT is essentially a normal process that usually serves the adaptive function to alert us to a current goal discrepancy and motivate us to engage in action to reduce this discrepancy. However, excessive RNT observed in the context of psychopathology has apparently lost this function.

According to Wells 8 , excessive RNT is maintained by a combination of positive metacognitive beliefs (e.g., “RNT helps me to better cope with problems”), negative metacognitive beliefs (e.g., “RNT is dangerous”) as well as dysfunctional control strategies (e.g., thought suppression) triggered by negative metacognitions. In addition, there is evidence that RNT in the context of psychopathology often serves the function to avoid both unpleasant experi­ences (e.g., negative emotions, arousal, aversive imagery or memories) as well as action, leading to negative reinforcement. Moreover, RNT can become a mental habit that can be triggered independent of goal pursuit simply by contextual cues.

From an information processing perspective, RNT can be regarded as the consequence of cognitive biases leading to the frequent involuntary activation of representations with negative content. In addition, deficits in cognitive control then lead to a lack of top‐down control of these representations, resulting in attention remaining allocated to negative content in the form of RNT.

In his influential theoretical model, Watkins highlights that adaptive and maladaptive forms of RNT can additionally be distinguished by their processing mode 1 , 4 . There is now extensive evidence showing that dysfunctional RNT is characterized by an abstract processing mode (focus on general and decontextualized mental representations), whereas a more concrete processing mode (focus on the direct, specific and contextualized experience of concrete events and actions) is related to functional outcomes.

The important transdiagnostic role of RNT makes this process a promising target for prevention and treatment. Based on the theoretical models described, researchers have developed a number of interventions focused on modifying RNT, including mindfulness‐based treatments, metacognitive interventions, cognitive control training, and rumination‐focused cognitive‐behavioral therapy 4 . In addition, there is promising evidence showing that targeting RNT in a high‐risk group of adolescents has strong preventive effects by significantly reducing the incidence of depression 9 .

In sum, whereas RNT had originally mainly been studied from a disorder‐specific perspective, with a strong focus on the content of thinking (e.g., rumination in depression, worry in generalized anxiety disorder), there is now an emerging consensus that it is best studied from a transdiagnostic perspective focused on the characteristic process.

An important future direction for research into RNT includes clarifying links to current meta‐models of transdiagnostic processes and mechanisms, such as the Research Domain Criteria framework. In addition, although there is promising evidence for the efficacy of interventions directly targeting RNT, more systematic research is needed to compare these novel interventions to traditional evidence‐based treatments, and investigate the proposed mechanisms of change.

Thinking Outside the Box: Science Day 2024 unveils innovative research from GSDM community

During GSDM’s annual Science Day on March 7, almost 50 students, residents, and fellows presented their latest research, highlighting and celebrating their forward-thinking experimentations and accomplishments.   

Science Day allows all participants the opportunity to present their findings to the Boston University Medical Campus (BUMC) community, either delivering poster presentations in person or oral presentations shared via Zoom.  

“I am confident that these studies will drive new discoveries in dental medicine with innovative clinical applications,” said Dr. Maria Kukuruzinska, associate dean for research and predoctoral research program director  

The diverse research portfolio presented during this year’s Science Day emphasized the importance of basic, translational, clinical, behavioral, and public health studies and their intersection with the groundbreaking approaches of digital and artificial intelligence, Kukuruzinska said.  

“We have a lot of research happening at GSDM, but it is not always as visible as our clinical and educational work,” said Kendrick Smaellie, GSDM Center for Clinical Research & Predoctoral Research program manager. “It is always very inspiring to have events like Science Day that showcase the variety and importance of the research our students and residents are doing.”   

The event’s keynote presentation was delivered by Dr. Niki Moutsopoulos, senior investigator and chief of the oral immunity and infection section at the National Institute of Dental and Craniofacial Research at the National Institutes of Health. Moutsopoulos spoke about the current research on the molecular and cellular basis of oral immunity and on the implementation of a bedside-to-bench approach.   

“The oral cavity is a site for first exposure, so many things will come through the mouth for the first time: food starts here, microbiota start here, [and] the air we breathe will come first from the nose and through the mouth,” Moutsopoulos said. “Many of these are the first exposures from an alien environment and how can the local immune response maintain a balance between the exposure and the response is not very well understood.”  

Gracie Abdalla DMD 26 said Science Day acts as a great platform to share time-intensive research with peers. 

“It took me a long time to do everything, so it’s pretty exciting that I get to show people [during Science Day],” Abdalla said of her project, “Use and Longevity of Direct Restorative Materials in an Urban Dental School Setting (2010-2019).”   

Qi Ming Lao DMD 25 said Science Day is a much-welcomed occasion to learn from peer research. Lao remarked that their current experimentation stemmed from previous research with a GSDM pediatric resident on zirconia crowns. Therefore, a new research idea may be one conversation away.   

“I think it’s important to come to Science Day because you get to look into new development stuff and I think that’s valuable in itself, something you wouldn’t otherwise get exposure with,” Lao said.  

After presenting “Chronic Inflammation Elicited Different Responses on Mandible and Femur,” Mohammad Boushehri PERIO DscD/CAGS 2026 said it was exciting to interact with Science Day attendees.   

“[Presenting an in-person presentation] is something I always wanted to do,” Boushehri  said. “So, I’m really happy and it’s an interesting event. I did a virtual presentation last year, but the [in-person- interaction and the concept are totally different.”   

“I think [Science Day] is encouraging for students to think beyond their regular clinical work [and] think outside of the box,” said Roxana Hashemian SPH 19 CAGS 12, GSDM clinical assistant professor of general dentistry and one of the 21 judges for this year’s event. “You need people to do [research] and I see lots of great ideas today.”    

By Rachel Grace Philipson 

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