research paper on iraq culture

Middle East Research and Information Project: Critical Coverage of the Middle East Since 1971

Interview—The Past, Present and Future of Iraq’s Cultural Heritage

M arch 2023 marked the 20-year anniversary of the US invasion and occupation of Iraq. The war, violence and reconstruction efforts that followed have had an impact on Iraq’s tangible and intangible cultural heritage. Following the collapse of the government, looting occurred at an unprecedented scale. The most well-publicized instance was the looting of the national museum of Iraq (founded one hundred years ago, in March of 1923, as a single room in a government building housing artifacts curated by the British Orientalist Gertrude Bell). Over a period of 36 hours in April of 2003, 15,000 artifacts were stolen from the museum. Meanwhile, displacement and violence following the expansion of ISIS in 2014 led not only to the destruction of heritage sites but to the targeting of minority cultures. Hannah Parsons-Morgan, a PhD candidate in archaeology at the University of Exeter interviewed archaeologists Mark Altaweel at University College London and Jaafar Jotheri at the University of Al-Qadisiyah. Parsons-Morgan spoke with Altaweel on March 16, 2023. Jotheri subsequently contributed to their conversation over email. Their conversation—which explores the crises and opportunities of Iraq’s cultural heritage since 2003—has been edited for length and clarity. This interview is also available in Arabic as part of a collaboration between MER and the independent Iraqi media initiative Jummar .

In the complex of the Great Mosque of al-Nuri and al-Habda Minaret, destroyed by ISIS in 2017. An earlier prayer hall and ablution rooms, dating to the 12th century, were discovered during the preparations for reconstruction. Mosul, Iraq, 2022. Ismael Adnan Yaqoob/Anadolu Agency via Getty Images

Hannah Parsons-Morgan: To begin, can you describe the immediate impact on Iraq’s cultural heritage of the US invasion of Iraq in 2003?

Mark Altaweel: The immediate impact, of course, was the looting to the national museum in Baghdad. That happened before Baghdad had fallen to American soldiers and continued for some days after. I think that was the initial immediate shock or trauma to Iraq’s cultural heritage. But, with the US invasion there was also a significant increase in looting of archaeological sites in southern Iraq, places like Umma—a site dating back to the Sumerians—as the government authority had more or less collapsed.

Jaafar Jotheri: Yes, it’s worth mentioning that the period between 2003 and 2008 was the worst in Iraq’s history for illegal digging. Many archaeological sites were virtually destroyed by the scale of looting. Smuggling routes became more developed through places such as Baghdad and Iraqi Kurdistan with items ending up in Turkey, Iran and the Gulf states. The vast majority of items looted from these sites have never been found, even while a few publicized items from the Iraq National Museum and illegally excavated sites (such as the famous Warka Mask or smuggled tablets purchased by Hobby Lobby) were eventually returned to Iraq.

Hannah: Why specifically was southern Iraq so vulnerable to looting?

Mark: This goes back to pre-2003. Obviously looting didn’t begin in 2003. In southern Iraq, especially, looting had been increasing substantially in the 1990’s as a response to poverty caused by the economic sanctions that hit this area particularly hard. So, by 2003, there were already fairly well-organized looters in that part of the country. The government had tried to limit looting in the late 1990’s through targeted excavations, which had some success. But it still was a recurring problem. With the invasion, as the economy and society effectively collapsed, this facilitated moving artifacts. These artifacts had a big market in places like the United States, as evidenced by the Hobby Lobby scandal . There was an appetite for a lot of objects from Iraq’s pre-Islamic and pre-Christian periods.

There was also some damage to other areas but relatively minor: some looting in Mosul Museum, a bit of targeted looting in places like Nimrud, but that damage was much more minor, far less extensive than in Baghdad and southern Iraq. In those areas, what we saw in the early 2000’s was a general insecurity, even before the arrival of ISIS, which caused a halt in archaeological work. Archaeologists working in Mosul felt routinely threatened and work was only done on a limited scale. Excavations and heritage conservation efforts in the provinces of Salahaddin, Nineveh, Kirkuk and Diyala were almost nonexistent or very small scale. Again, some looting occurred, but it was far less extensive.

Hannah: What efforts were made to prevent looting and have they been successful?

Jaafar: To prevent looting, in 2008 the government established a new department in the Interior Ministry called “the Archaeology Protection Forces” in each province, which began recruiting Iraqi archaeologists to serve as “commanders.” At the same time, this was a period when the internet was becoming more accessible, and local community members grew more engaged in Iraq’s cultural history through social media, which aided in efforts for its protection. Religious authorities in Najaf and Karbala also became engaged with safeguarding and raising awareness about the importance of Iraq’s wider heritage. Leaders like Ayatollah Ali al-Sistani have issued fatwas forbidding the smuggling of artifacts. Local and international conferences and workshops have even been organized in Najaf and Karbala around the themes of heritage. For example, the first International Conference for the Enhancement of the Archaeological Heritage in Iraq (ICEAHI) was held in Kufa in 2018. All of this has had the effect of slowing looting in southern Iraq, although it still persists at a reduced level.

Hannah: What about the looting that happened with the emergence of ISIS in Iraq, particularly following 2014?

Mark: What happened in 2014 was very different. By then looting in the south had diminished substantially. With the conquest of Mosul, ISIS basically took the practice of organized looting they had been doing in Syria and more or less applied it to Iraq. We saw organized looting in a few key places, like Nineveh, but also organized destruction for propaganda purposes. This included the destruction of the Prophet Jonah Mosque, believed to be the burial site of Jonah, which had been revered not only by Muslims but also Christians and Jews. Other sites destroyed include the Mausoleum of Imam Awn al-Din, a 13th century Shia shrine that had survived the Mongol sack of Mosul and Saint Elijah’s Monastery, a 6th century Christian monastery that was one of Iraq’s oldest Christian structures. Yezidi sites were destroyed, and Iraq’s ancient heritage was also targeted, again, for propaganda videos that could circulate on social media and grab headlines. But there was also targeted looting to sell objects to Western markets (buyers in Europe and the United States), which was a means to finance their operations.

Hannah: Can you describe what’s been done subsequently to preserve the cultural heritage in these particular regions?

Mark: There’s actually a lot of work now in the area once ruled by ISIS, which is being done by various aid agencies from UNESCO to smaller agencies. A team from the University of Pennsylvania, sponsored by the US government, is working inside of Nimrud. In Mosul, there has been rebuilding of some of the old churches and mosques funded again largely from international donors. I think there’s been neglect in Yezidi heritage and reconstruction in northern Iraq, particularly after ISIS. Even compared to other minorities in Iraq, Yezidi heritage preservation has very little attention from the outside compared to Christian groups who might have more connections, not only to a diaspora, but also to external funding sources. But I think in some ways the current threat is potentially more to the intangible heritage (languages, cultural memory, communal identity) because a lot of the minorities that were targeted and displaced do not necessarily feel safe enough to return in mass.

Mark: I think there is. I noticed on my last trip to Mosul in 2022 there’s a real hunger by people to understand and preserve their heritage in part provoked by the traumas of ISIS. There is something to be said for trying to bring in the sort of recent trauma to Iraq’s intangible heritage to the tangible. One example that speaks to this: The University of Heidelberg was asked by the Iraqi antiquities authority to excavate ruins dating back to the Assyrian empire, which were found under the Prophet Jonah Mosque—the biblical site that was blasted by ISIS, who then dug tunnels underneath. When the mosque is rebuilt, they are hoping to also preserve the ancient items that they had found because of the destruction. Basically, they’re trying to merge this reconstruction with the opportunity to learn something about the deeper past as a way to potentially bring the population together.

Jaafar: It’s also worth mentioning when speaking about intangible heritage that some types of intangible heritage have thrived after 2003 while other types have declined. The reason behind that is that when Iraq was under economic sanctions (1990–2003), people depended on the local resources and crafts. In 2003, when the Iraqi markets opened up and started filling with Chinese, Turkish, Iranian and Syrian products, local Iraqi products lost out to competition with the foreign products. As a result, the skills to produce traditional crafts have declined rapidly since 2003. Some examples are the traditional boatbuilding, textile of men’s Abaya and women’s accessories, goldsmith, horse saddles, coffee preparation, the production of reed oboes and agricultural and farming tools. However, oral traditions, performing arts, social practices, rituals and festive events have thrived as restrictions that existed preceding 2003 lifted.

Hannah: One of this MER issue’s editors raised the following point, which I want to put to you, Mark: There’s a trope that certain groups like Assyrians and Yezidis have been more supported by the west, one that has led to their targeting. At the same time, external reconstruction funds do not always meet local needs as conveyed by local community organizations and their counterparts in the diaspora. For example, many Yezidis and Assyrians might note the emphasis on rebuilding churches has overshadowed other needs of local populations. Do you see this playing out?

Mark: Yes, possibly. There is a lot of general poverty and lack of opportunity, which is made worse by corruption. Perhaps providing for more general opportunities for work could help all of the population. There should be assistance to everyone so envy and strife does not become a potential problem.

Hannah: Speaking of reconstruction, Mark, you’ve spoken before about a “renaissance” in cultural heritage in Iraq’s Kurdish regions. Can you speak more about this and why specifically in this region?

Mark: I think a combination of factors contributed to this. The Kurdish region of Iraq was an area that hadn’t been explored very much, especially by international archaeologists as it was kind of a no-go zone during the Saddam years. Particularly around 2009–2010, foreign archaeologists started to come to the Kurdish region. Then the war in Syria began in 2011, and this indirectly benefited the Kurdish region in terms of archaeology because a lot of archaeologists who couldn’t work in Syria instead went to the Kurdish region. Now the entire country has become safer, but the Kurdish region was relatively safe at the time, and corruption was also relatively limited unlike in other parts of Iraq; the biggest project was the Erbil Citadel. Since 2014, however, the region has suffered from a major financial crisis and increasing corruption, which has limited local Kurdish research and work.

Hannah: In 2022, the Chatham House Report on Cultural Predation suggested that the muhasasa system has been a key factor in cultural heritage issues. They write that due to this ethno-sectarian system, “income and other resources derived from cultural heritage increasingly accrue not to the Iraqi state but to subnational institutions that actively promote ethno-nationalism, sectarianism and religious objectives.”  How do you see this playing out in archaeology?

Mark: The main problems I see in terms of predation is that you have corruption, which is pervasive at multiple scales following 2003. For example, things might not get done at the ministry levels without some bribe effectively, or development is happening without permissions. Iraq’s antiquities laws that are already in place are actually pretty good. But unfortunately, they’re often not followed. All of this means that people are doing things in regards to heritage that may not be addressing the needs of certain communities, for one. Insofar as the political system contributes to corruption, I think that is one of the biggest threats. For instance, I was hearing a recent story from Samarra. A lot of houses were being built on the site, which is completely illegal, but there was not much anyone could do because a local government official was corrupt. It creates a situation where the authorities who are interested in protecting the heritage are not able to do their job.

Meanwhile, it’s worth mentioning, you have regions that are woefully neglected particularly south of Mosul and north of Baghdad for reasons related to mistrust and belief that everyone there had belonged to ISIS. That area in general is the most neglected part of Iraq. Over the past 20 years, it has also been among the most violent areas. There’s not much activity, very little archaeology, very little heritage building and there’s very little news about it. Even in the central government there’s almost no mention or funding to the area. I only know of one project effectively working in that area.

Jaafar: I think the system mismanaged all the sectors in Iraq after 2003, not only the archaeology sector. For example, look at the mismanagement in water resources, agriculture, manufacturers, housing and education. As for the ancient archaeological sites, they cannot be considered based on ethno-nationalism. In other words, the archaeological sites have been treated as national assets (belonging to the central government in Baghdad) rather than regional or local assets.

Hannah: We’ve obviously talked a lot about “manmade” issues, what about the impact of environmental or climatic factors on Iraq’s cultural heritage?

Mark: Climate change is also something that’s increasingly a threat. Iraq is one of the most vulnerable countries to climate change in the world. Rivers are drying up. Places that were green not long ago, when I was there recently, are now desert. These are massive threats both in terms of buildings being affected but also to people being displaced and the landscape changing, which presents new threats to the tangible and intangible heritage.

Hannah: Do you think that efforts to mitigate climate change can work hand-in-hand with efforts to preserve cultural heritage?

Mark: I think learning from the past can be quite effective as a lot of Iraq’s built heritage, historically, was constructed around climate. For instance, ancient irrigation practices in Iraq included the Qanat systems—these underground irrigation systems, which helped to preserve water by preventing evaporation. Much of Iraq’s irrigation today is just in ditches above the surface. Why not try to use underground systems? Another example is in the construction of homes. Mudbrick homes may seem like a bad idea, but actually this material prevents a house from getting too hot in the summertime. We can learn from the traditional heritage in architecture in Iraq, using technology that works together with the environment.

Hannah: This discussion of centering local knowledge practices recalls some of the work Jaafar is doing. Jaafar, I was reading a blog post you did for UCL with recommendations of how to “decolonize” archaeology within Iraq. Can you talk more here about what you mean by decolonizing archaeology?

Jaafar: By decolonizing archaeology I mean that international teams should encourage local Iraqi scholars and ordinary people to celebrate and promote Iraqi heritage. Rather than selecting areas to work in based on international interests, research based on Iraqi needs should be considered and prioritized. Involving local Iraqi experts in research, training more Iraqi archaeologists/heritage specialists (including in conservation) are also critical. Iraqis have stated that conferences and exhibitions about Iraq should be held more in the country and results should be published in Arabic and other local languages and Iraqi journals. Foreign teams should also help develop local museums and promote their work with local populations as part of their wider project efforts.

Hannah: On that note, I wonder if we could bring everything to a close by looking at the future as all archaeologists should. What is training like for the heritage disciplines in Iraq today and what opportunities exist for the future generation?

Jaafar: Over the past two decades, there has been a lot of investment at the university level. Iraqi historians and archaeologists in Baghdad, Mosul, Al-Qadisiyah and Babylon universities campaigned to establish more archaeology departments and even expand their departments to become faculties. In 2008, for example, Mosul University expanded the Department of Archaeology to become a Faculty of Archaeology. Samarra and Kufa established new faculties in 2010 and 2011, respectively, while Al-Qadisiyah, ThiQar and Al-Muthanna have done similar things after 2014. Two new scientific journals specializing in Iraqi heritage were founded: one by Mosul University and the other by Al-Qadisiyah University. Similar expansion of archaeological programs has been seen in the Kurdish region, though it has faced difficulties with funding since 2014.

Mark: I think investing in youth especially in a country like Iraq, which has such a young population, is critical. There’s so much eagerness to know about the heritage in Iraq, in part, thanks to social media. But while there might be investment in universities, students don’t find jobs easily after they graduate when they study heritage or archaeology. Increasing training opportunities is important but also increasing employment opportunities. For this, creativity is needed. For example, in the tourism sector, which in Iraq is so connected to cultural heritage, I have seen people with startups developing tourism in the marshes of Iraq or other heritage sites in central or southern Iraq. Some foreigners might think of Iraq as a no-go zone, but actually many visitors come to Iraq from Iran and Pakistan as part of Shi’i festivals like Ashura to visit religious heritage sites. There’s also emerging Western tourism, particularly after Pope Francis visited Ur in 2021. As a result of the pope’s visit, the Iraqi government launched a large project to rehabilitate Ur and provide local tourist infrastructure, and in 2021 the government also started granting visas upon arrival to most European countries, Canada and the United States. It’s obviously still limited in numbers, but there are tour groups now going to Iraq quite regularly.

Read the previous article. Read the next article. This article appears in MER issue 306 “The State of Iraq–20 Years After the Invasion.”

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Saving Iraq’s Cultural Heritage

Joshua Levkowitz

Ongoing conflict is robbing Iraq of both its future and its past by stripping the country of its tangible cultural heritage. [1] The Islamic State, as part of its strategy, is deliberately seeking to erase all aspects of Iraqi identity which compete with its own dogma. Iraq’s cultural heritage faces additional threats in the form of illicit looting, vandalism, government neglect, and political infighting. The Iraqi government lacks a nationwide strategy to preserve, protect, and rebuild the sites contributing to the country’s cultural legacy of being the cradle of civilization.

War and Neglect

Iraq’s cultural history spans some 10,000 years and is home to more than 10,000 heritage sites including the former Assyrian capital Samarra, the Erbil citadel, and the fortified city of Hatra. Iraq’s National Museum was, prior to the U.S. invasion, home to the largest collection of Mesopotamian artifacts. The country’s oil revenues funded some of the best heritage preservation efforts and archaeological research in the entire Middle East. But the state’s capacity diminished after the lengthy Iran-Iraq war, the Gulf War, and punitive sanctions. The American invasion in 2003 resulted in wholesale destruction, including the ancient city of Babylon , and left the country’s cultural property vulnerable to excessive looting .

This has played right into the hands of the Islamic State, whose iconoclasm is a tactic of war. Since its emergence in 2014, the Islamic State has destroyed a myriad of important physical artifacts, including the tomb of the biblical prophet Jonah in Mosul and ancient sites in the former Assyrian capital at Nimrud. There are several motivations for this. The organization sees its actions as keeping with the Salafist-Jihadist interpretation, calling for the removal of polytheistic influences in society. More practically, the destruction of mosques and shrines—mainly Shiite and Sufi—libraries, and universities cleanse Islamic State-controlled territories in Iraq of any competing religious and cultural influences. These spectacular attacks capture the world’s attention, prop up its pretense of invincibility, and facilitate financing, through underground antiquity markets, for its activities. According to Bilal Wahab, a lecturer at the American University of Iraq- Sulaimani (A.U.I.S.), the Islamic State’s revenue from looting and trafficking artifacts is second only to oil smuggling.

The negligence of the central Iraqi government is only exacerbating the situation. On February 29, 2016, the U.S. Embassy in Baghdad warned that the Mosul Dam "faces a serious and unprecedented risk of catastrophic failure with little warning," a failure that would result in an in-land tidal wave jeopardizing the lives of hundreds of thousands of people. The breach would also destroy the town of Samarra, a UNESCO World Heritage Site and former capital of the Abbasid Caliphate. The U.S. Army Corps of Engineers called the Mosul Dam “the most dangerous dam in the world” in 2006. The Assyrian sites of Nimrud, Ninevah, and Khorsabad are only a few of the known sites that lie in the tidal wave’s path. The Islamic State’s presence in the area has caused security concerns, to be sure, and has contributed to delayed maintenance plans, but ultimately it is the central government’s responsibility to ensure the dam does not collapse.

Other aspects of Iraq’s cultural heritage are threatened because of strained internal politics in the Iraqi government. Prophet Nahum famously predicted the fall of the Assyrian empire in the mid-7 th century BC. His tomb lies in the town of al-Qosh, on the border between the central government’s area of control and that of the Kurdistan Regional Government (K.R.G.). The tomb may potentially collapse due to neglect and, according to Sherzad Omar Mamsani, the Jewish representative of the K.R.G.’s Ministry of Religious Affairs, the Islamic State in nearby Mosul could move in to destroy the tomb, just as it destroyed Jonah’s and Ezekiel’s tombs in 2014. Responsibility and sovereignty in the area remain murky. A local Assyrian-Christian family has protected the dilapidated site on their own initiative since Kurdish Jews moved to Israel in the 1950s. The K.R.G.’s Ministry of Religious Affairs has appealed to UNESCO to intervene, which responded that it can only intervene after receiving an official request from Iraq’s central government. However, Baghdad has yet to follow up on the Kurdish appeal, leaving the tomb in a precarious state.

Cultural Protection: Step by Step

Unfortunately, the loss of cultural heritage is not new for Iraqis. After the first Gulf War, the Ba’athist regime drained the marshes of southern Iraq, forcing denizens of the marshlands, whose history stretches back to 3000 B.C., to abandon their traditional lifestyle. The regime sought to divert the flow of the Tigris and Euphrates rivers away from the marshes in order to remove President Saddam Hussein’s enemies, both the local Marsh Arabs and those who sought cover in the marshes. By 2000, 90 percent of the marshlands had disappeared . After the 2003 overthrow of Saddam, however, local initiatives helped destroy many of the dams put in place by the Ba’athists, allowing the Tigris and Euphrates to flood the area once again and enabling the return of the delta’s flora, fauna, and original habitants. Nature Iraq, a local NGO, helped spearhead several projects to recreate freshwater marshes, among other initiatives. On July 18, 2016, UNESCO classified the marshlands a world heritage site. Prime Minister Haider al-Abadi highlighted the success in light of the “destruction and demolition of Iraqi heritage and antiquities by barbaric terrorist gangs.” Although the marshes continue to face ecological issues from dams further upstream in Syria and Turkey, the local initiative to restore the marshes, backed by international consensus, is providing a bright light for Iraqis trying to preserve their culture from the direct and indirect causes of protracted conflict.

The Iraqi Institute for the Conservation of Antiquities and Heritage (IICAH) is another exemplary initiative. IICAH trains Iraqi museum and heritage professionals to build the next generation of Iraqi conservationists. IICAH’s educational facility, based out of Erbil, brings together Iraqis from diverse backgrounds who want to master modern preservation techniques to prevent future loss of the country’s cultural patrimony. IICAH receives joint funding from the central government and the K.R.G., demonstrating the collective interest in preserving Iraq’s cultural heritage, despite oft-tense relations. The flagship conservation training course has now had more than 200 graduates. IICAH has also convened its first-ever training related to disaster risk management for collection sites, following the Islamic State takeover of Mosul.

Raising Awareness

Preserving Iraq’s cultural heritage is both essential and urgent. Different platforms and initiatives have sought to raise awareness and call for Iraqis to join together in celebrating their cultural diversity (see video clips produced by the Iraqi State Board of Antiquities and Heritage in partnership with UNESCO). Conferences have been successful at bringing together a wide range of actors to explore ways to move forward. A.U.I.S. hosted its first annual Iraq Cultural Heritage Symposium last April , focusing on the destruction of important heritage sites by the Islamic State. After the success of this first symposium, a second has been planned for mid-September. The Middle East Institute has embarked on a region-wide effort to preserve the region’s antiquities amid threats from conflict and terrorists. MEI is hosting its second annual #CultureUnderThreat conference, bringing together ministers from 17 Arab countries to analyze the region’s approach to curbing the illegal smuggling of cultural artifacts from conflict zones.

Local initiatives have also been launched to raise awareness and stop the damage. For example, Let Us Save What Remains , organizes educational trips for youth groups to visit ancient rock reliefs in the Zawa Mountains and, in partnership with the Dohuk Governorate Directorate of Antiquities, to view active excavation sites. Plans are also underway to begin visiting schools and youth centers to develop an education system that teaches young Iraqis about the importance of cultural heritage sites. Rima Raban, one of the organizers, said she is confident that greater knowledge of the issue will help “maintain the country’s identity from being faded away by destruction, whether by the national conflict, deliberate damage, or negligence.”

On a national scale, the reopening of the Iraqi National Museum last year provided strong support to Iraq’s threatened cultural heritage, countering the Islamic State’s divide-and-conquer narrative. However, the rampant looting of the museum after the 2003 American invasion reminds Iraqis that threats to their cultural patrimony will likely outlive radical groups like the Islamic State. The Iraqi government needs to look ahead to develop a long-term national strategy to protect its cultural property.

[1] Cultural heritage is the legacy of both tangible and intangible artifacts inherited from past generations. However, the scope of this article focuses only on tangible artifacts. 

The Middle East Institute (MEI) is an independent, non-partisan, non-for-profit, educational organization. It does not engage in advocacy and its scholars’ opinions are their own. MEI welcomes financial donations, but retains sole editorial control over its work and its publications reflect only the authors’ views. For a listing of MEI donors, please click here .

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Zanj: The Journal of Critical Global South Studies

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• 1 Editor's Introduction: Kurdish Culture as Resistance, and the Rise of Global South Epistemologies
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Constituting Histories Through Culture In Iraqi Kurdistan

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Abstract

Today, Kurds in Northern Iraq are employing a narrative of the Kurdish nation that bears strong ethnic roots and includes the memory of the victimization of the Kurdish nation. This essay examines the repurposing of the National Museum at Amna Suraka in Iraqi Kurdistan, from its former role as a Ba'ath site for detention, torture and execution, into a site for the preservation of Kurdish history and culture. In doing so, this essay locates the National Museum at Amna Suraka, and its role as a museum for Kurdish history and culture and as a national memorial,within the historical context of the Iraqi state. Such an examination, demonstrates the intersectional nature of the struggle for national identity within Iraqi Kurdish society, non-Kurds outside of Iraqi Kurdistan and for transnational Kurdish publics.

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Cultural Diversity in Iraq: Embracing the Tapestry of Ethnic Traditions

Iraq, frequently in the global spotlight for political and social reasons, but do you know that Iraq is a country that boasts a rich and intricate tapestry of cultural diversity? Situated at the crossroads of history, it has been home to numerous civilisations, each leaving an indelible mark on its cultural landscape. According to the latest data from the  Central Statistical Organisation of Iraq, the nation is home to over 18 distinct ethnic groups.

Beyond the headlines and the turmoil that too often define Iraq's image, there lies a world brimming with hidden treasures. It is a world where unique traditions flourish.

Let us explore the hidden treasures within Iraq's culture and the vibrant world of Iraq's cultural diversity, delving into the various ethnic traditions that make it unique.

Mesopotamian Roots and Modern Diversity

Iraq's roots and history stretch back to ancient Mesopotamia, often referred to as the “Cradle of Civilisation.” The Sumerians, Akkadians, Babylonians, and Assyrians all left their indelible mark on this land. Despite its ancient roots, Iraq is also home to a diverse array of contemporary ethnic groups, including Arabs, Kurds, Turkmen, Assyrians, Yazidis, and more. This current diversity stands as evidence of the country's history of welcoming and accommodating different cultures, backgrounds, and ethnicities.

Each of these ancient civilizations contributed to the rich tapestry and cultural diversity of present-day Iraq. In addition to the architectural marvels left behind by these ancient civilizations, such as the ziggurats and the Code of Hammurabi, which continue to fascinate the world. Each city in Iraq has its own culture and stories, starting from Baghdad and the bustling heart of historic Al-Mutanabbi Street , a vibrant and diverse community of booksellers that has thrived for generations. Known as the  Al-Rasheed Street Book Market , this cultural place is a testament to the enduring love for literature that transcends ethnic and religious boundaries.

In the southern city of Basra, Iraq, there exists a remarkable institution known as the “House of Iraqi Culture.” Founded in 2010 by a group of passionate individuals from various ethnic backgrounds, this cultural center is dedicated to preserving and promoting the rich heritage of Iraq's diverse communities.

Shanidar Park

In the north, specifically in the heart of the ancient city of Erbil, the capital of the Kurdistan Region of Iraq, stands  Shanidar Park , a testament to the resilience and harmony among various ethnic groups in the region. This park, named after the nearby Shanidar Cave, which is famous for Neanderthal remains, serves as a symbol of unity and cooperation among Kurds, Arabs, Turkmen, Assyrians, and other ethnic communities.

These places and those people stand as living testaments to the rich tapestry of cultures that Iraq holds within its borders.

The Legacy of Arab Influence

The Arab conquest of Iraq in the 7th century brought the Arabic language, Islamic culture, and traditions to the region. As a result, Arabs make up the majority of Iraq's population, constituting approximately 75-80% of the country's demographic, according to the  CIA World Factbook , and have played a significant role in shaping the country's culture.

Iraqi Arab culture is a vibrant blend of traditional and modern elements. The influence of Arab culture remains evident in the everyday lives of Iraqis, from the Arabic language spoken by the majority to the Islamic faith practiced by many. On the other hand, Arab traditions, including cuisine, music, and literature, are widely celebrated.

Exploring the Rich Flavours of Traditional Iraqi Cuisine

Iraqi cuisine is a testament to the country's diverse cultural influences and showcases a blend of flavours from various civilisations that have thrived in the region. Popular  dishes are biryani, dolma, tashreeb, falafel, masgouf, and various rice-based dishes. Bread, particularly samoon and khubz , is a staple element of the Iraqi diet. The diverse array of spices, herbs, and cooking techniques used in Iraqi cuisine make it a true gastronomic adventure.

As the matter is not limited to food only, there is something that Iraqis are fond of, and it is not possible to complete the meal without it: the “Love for Tea”, the  Iraqi Chai . Iraqis share a deep love for tea, a common thread that binds them across ethnic backgrounds. Whether it is the strong, dark chai served in tiny glasses or the herbal teas infused with mint and cardamom, tea is a symbol of hospitality and social interaction in Iraq.

It is important to note that regional variations exist within Iraqi cuisine, influenced by the geography and ethnic diversity of the country. For example, Kurdish, Arab, and Turkman cuisines all contribute to the overall culinary tapestry of Iraq. Despite the challenges the country has faced in recent years, traditional Iraqi cuisine remains an essential part of its cultural heritage and identity.

Harmony in Diversity: Iraq's Resilience and Coexistence

Despite the richness of cultural diversity and the wide range of ethnic groups, including Arabs, Kurds, Turkmen, Assyrians, Chaldeans, Yezidis, Shabaks, Mandeans, and Armans, the country has faced significant challenges in recent decades, including conflict and instability. These challenges have sometimes strained the relationships between different ethnic and religious groups.

However, it is essential to recognise that Iraq's cultural diversity is also a source of resilience. Communities have often come together to protect and preserve their traditions in the face of adversity. For example, during the ISIS occupation of Mosul and the Nineveh Plains, diverse communities, including Christians and Muslims, worked together to protect historic sites and manuscripts.

In this context, the visit of  Pope Francis to Iraq in 2021 took on immense significance. It served as a symbol of hope and a call for peaceful coexistence among Iraq's diverse communities. During his visit, Pope Francis met with religious leaders from various denominations, emphasising the importance of interfaith dialogue and collaboration.

We cannot close our eyes to the fact that we exist in a world where cultural homogenisation sometimes seems inevitable. Iraq serves as a beacon of hope. Its diverse ethnic groups and their traditions demonstrate that coexistence is possible, and indeed, it can be a source of strength and resilience.

In the end, it is important to understand that Iraq's cultural diversity is a testament to the country's rich history and the resilience of more than  43 million Iraqis. The blend of ancient Mesopotamian, Arab, Kurdish, Turkmen, Chaldean, and Assyrian traditions creates a unique tapestry that defines the country's identity. Despite the challenges, Iraqis continue to celebrate their diverse heritage, fostering unity and understanding among different ethnic groups. Embracing this cultural diversity is not only a source of pride for Iraqis but also a symbol of hope for a brighter, more harmonious future.

This article was written by Fatima Oleiwi and is licensed under CC BY-NC 4.0 .

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Title: No Good Way to Occupy a Country: Conceptions of Culture in the Iraq War

Q&A with Professor Rochelle Davis

CCAS Professor Rochelle Davis’ latest book project examines the role that the U.S. military’s conception of culture played in the American wars in Iraq and Afghanistan. Her work—which makes use of interviews with U.S. servicemembers and Iraqis, as well as military documents, cultural training materials, journalist reports, and soldier memoirs—analyzes the narratives that are told about Iraqis, Afghans, Arabs, and Muslims and explicates the paradoxical military objectives of cultural sensitivity and occupation. Professor Davis, who has published two prior books on Palestine, is currently finalizing the manuscript for No Good Way to Occupy a Country. She shares a bit about her project below.

How did you get started on this research?

When I came to teach at Georgetown in 2005, the U.S. occupation was in its third year and CCAS had invited the late Anthony Shadid to speak on his book Night Draws Near: Iraq’s People in the Shadow of America’s War. I recall an American military officer in the audience remarking that “we are trying to do better, we are trying to provide cultural training now.” As an anthropologist whose academic discipline is about culture and society, I was intrigued and wondered about the content of military cultural training. I began going to lectures by civilians who worked for the military about their vision of “cultural training” and collecting material and eventually trained six student research assistants to conduct interviews with veterans and current services members. The research—which includes interviews with 70 U.S. military personnel and 50 Iraqis, plus thousands of pages of written material and videos—grew into a book project, which is now almost completed.  

What are some of the takeaways from the book?

First, that so much of the cultural training is mired in Orientalist and/or racist tropes copied and pasted from material that is ten, twenty or seventy years old. For example, the idea that Arabs take offense easily has been baked into military guides across the decades. The 1943 U.S. military’s Short Guide to Iraq issues a warning to take care in not offending locals, as that could undermine the entire mission: “American success or failure in Iraq,” it reads, “may well depend on whether the Iraqis […] like American soldiers or not.”  This idea of the offendable Arab gets repeated in a Department of Defense Pocket Guide to the Middle East from 1962 “To avoid offending Arabs, you must observe their customs when you are with them. If you do, you will gain their warm friendship. Since their religious and social customs are closely intermingled, one misstep on your part might violate both.” Fast forward forty years to the American invasions of Iraq and Afghanistan—and soldiers were still receiving similar information. One reported being told in his cultural training: “Instead of shaking hands, use the hand gesture of putting your palm over your heart. Not showing the bottoms of your feet. The type of conduct that would be offensive to an Iraqi you picked up quickly.”

This trope of Arabs taking offense suggests that somehow Arabs are rigid and bound by their own behaviors, and thus are not familiar with other ways of life. The focus on avoiding offence also struck me as misplaced. Perhaps because I saw the invasion of the country (any country) as wrong, the concern that a soldier might do something “offensive” seemed to focus on something trivial, given there was so much American violence toward Iraqis and the discounting of Iraqis’ expertise and knowledge. Suggesting that “causing offense” was what was critical to the occupation missed the point about why some Iraqis were not supportive of the U.S. presence in Iraq. One soldier described how, in his experience with cultural training, the power dynamic was framed almost as if the soldiers were tourists in a host country, and causing offense could result in getting laughed or shouted at or kicked out of a café. “You know,” he recalled learning “here are three or four things that you can do to not offend people. In sort of the same way that you would tell a tourist, which was not really … I don’t think at the depth of what we needed.”

Another example is the simplified depictions of the kufiya. For example, a red and white kufiya, according to the Iraq Culture Smart Card, meant the person was from a country with a monarchy, while black and white indicated he was from a country with presidential rule. A plain white kufiya signified that the wearer had not been on pilgrimage to Mecca. But what did all this have to do with Iraq? Over and over again the cultural training material relied on wrong information and Orientalist stereotypes and failed to demonstrate an understanding of the big picture. Was it racism on the part of the developers? Lack of time? Lack of knowledge? Much of the material lists no author, so it is difficult to probe further.

A second takeaway from the book was how the cultural training was counter to the U.S. government’s stated reasons for the invasion and occupation of Iraq. The examples are many, but a blatant one is that President Bush cited, as one of three reasons for the invasion, the goal of bringing democracy to Iraqis, which many of the soldiers interviewed also gave as the reason they thought they were there. At the same time, the Soldier’s Handbook to Iraq , published by the Army 1 st Infantry Division in 2003, declared that Iraqis are essentially unable to practice democracy because of their culture and faith: 

“[Their] desire for modernity is contradicted by a desire for tradition (especially Islamic tradition, since Islam is the one area free of Western identification and influence). Desiring democracy and modernization immediately is a good example of what a Westerner might view as an Arab’s ‘wish vs. reality.’”  

In other words, American soldiers being sent to invade and occupy Iraq to free its citizens were being told that Iraqis were not ready for democracy. This is despite the fact that Iraqis were on the street demonstrating for elections to be held after Paul Bremmer cancelled them in June 2003. 

In presenting my research, I’ve had a number of military contractors and personnel ask me how I would recommend it be done differently. My response is always: “I’d start by not invading other countries”—hence the title of my book. I know that military personnel don’t have a choice. They have to obey their orders. Could the cultural training have been better? Certainly. Would it have changed the outcome? Unlikely. The most damaging impacts of the occupation resulted not from the types of surface-level, cultural interactions covered in the training materials. They resulted instead from policies that created sectarian political representation, postponed elections, and disbanded the Iraqi military and police—to name but a few. 

Associate Professor Dr. Rochelle Davis is the Director of Graduate Studies and holds the Sultanate of Oman Chair at CCAS. 

This article was originally published in the Spring/Summer 2023 CCAS Newsmagazine.

• Countries and Their Cultures
• Culture of Iraq

Culture Name

Orientation.

Identification. Modern Iraq covers almost the same area as ancient Mesopotamia, which centered on the land between the Tigres and the Euphrates Rivers. Mesopotamia, also referred to as the Fertile Crescent, was an important center of early civilization and saw the rise and fall of many cultures and settlements. In the medieval era, Iraq was the name of an Arab province that made up the southern half of the modern-day country. In today's Republic of Iraq, where Islam is the state religion and claims the beliefs of 95 percent of the population, the majority of Iraqis identify with Arab culture. The second-largest cultural group is the Kurds, who are in the highlands and mountain valleys of the north in a politically autonomous settlement. The Kurds occupy the provinces of As Sulaymaniyah, Dahuk and Irbil, the area of which is commonly referred to as Kurdistan.

Location and Geography. Iraq, in the Middle East, is 168,754 square miles (437,073 square kilometers), which is comparable to twice the size of Idaho. Iraq is bordered by Iran, Jordan, Kuwait, Saudi Arabia, Syria, Turkey, and the Persian Gulf. Baghdad was the name of a village that the Arabs chose to develop as their capital and is in the central plains. The northern border areas near Iran and Turkey are mountainous and experience cold, harsh winters, while the west is mostly desert. The differences in climate have influenced the economies of the various areas and ethnic groups, especially since a large part of the economy used to be agriculturally based.

Demography. The estimated Iraqi population for 2000 is 22,675,617 people. Arabs comprise about three-fourths of the population, and Kurds compose about one-fifth. The remaining people are divided into several ethnic groups, including Assyrian, Turkoman, Chaldean, Armenian, Yazidi, and Jewish.

Linguistic Affiliation. Almost all Iraqis speak and understand their official language, Arabic. Arabic, a Semitic language, was introduced by the Arab conquerors and has three different forms: classical, modern standard, and spoken. Classical Arabic, best known by scholars, is the written language of the Qur'an. Modern standard Arabic, which has virtually the same structure in all Arabic-speaking countries, is taught in schools for reading and writing. The spoken language is Iraqi Arabic, and is extremely similar to that which is spoken in Syria, Lebanon, and parts of Jordan. Those who go to school learn Modern Standard Arabic, and many that do not attend school are likely to at least understand it. The major differences between modern standard and Iraqi Arabic are changes in verb form, and an overall simplicity in grammar of the spoken Arabic.

Kurdish is the official language in Kurdistan, and serves to distinguish Kurds from other Iraqis. It is not of Semitic origin nor an Arab or Persian dialect, but a distinct language from the Indo-European family. Other minority languages include Aramaic, Turkic, Armenian, and Persian.

The Iraqi flag is also an important national symbol, and is composed of three colored, horizontal sections, starting with red on the top, white, and black. On the white band there are three green five-pointed stars. During the Persian Gulf War in 1991, the phrase Allahu Akbar (God is great) was added to the flag. The flag resembles other Arab countries' flags and demonstrates Iraqi faith in Allah and Arab unity.

History and Ethnic Relations

When the Sumerian civilization collapsed in about 1700 B.C.E. , King Hammurabi took over the area and renamed it Babylonia. Hammurabi, a great leader known for creating the first recorded legal code in history, united the Assyrians and Babylonians in harmony. Following several changes in power, Nebuchadnezzar II came to rule from 604 to 562 B.C.E. , and restored Babylonia to its former glory. Babylon, which is about thirty miles (forty-eight kilometers) south of modern-day Baghdad, became the most famous city in the world, and boasted, among other things, the Hanging Gardens of Babylon.

In 323 B.C.E. Babylonia became part of the Persian Empire, until Arab Muslims overtook it in 634 C.E. At the time of the invasion, the people of Mesopotamia were mostly Christian, and paid non-Muslim taxes to the invaders. As the Persians were eventually defeated, the people of Mesopotamia began to convert to Islam and intermarry with Arabs. In 762 C.E. the capital city of Baghdad was founded, and it became an important commercial, cultural, and educational center. It linked Asia to Mediterranean countries via trade; welcomed visitors, scholars, and commercial traders from all over the world; and produced incredible philosophical and scientific works by both Arab and Persian thinkers.

The 1200s witnessed yet another invasion, and control went to the Mongols, who ruled until the 1400s. The Ottoman Turks took control in the sixteenth century, in a reign that lasted until the end of World War I. When the Ottoman Empire was defeated in that war, the League of Nations assigned Britain to set up the administration in Mesopotamia. The British defined the territory of Iraq, and in doing so paid little attention to natural boundaries and ethnic divisions. They set up the institutional framework for government and politics, which included installation of a monarchy and influence in writing the constitution. On 14 July 1958 the monarchy was overthrown, and Iraq was declared a republic. The following ten years were followed by much political instability. Then, on 17 July 1968, another coup d'état occurred, which brought to power the Baath Party, today's government leader.

National Identity. Arab rule during the medieval period had the greatest cultural impact on modern Iraq. The dominating culture within Iraq is Arab, and most Arabs are Muslim. Iraqi Muslims are split into two groups, the Sunnis and the Shias (Shiites). The Sunnis, a majority in Islam, are a minority in Iraq, and the Shias, a minority in the Arab world, are the majority in Iraq. Between the Shia and Sunni Muslims, loyalty to Iraq has come to be a common factor. Though they have differing views, both Sunnis and Shias hold high leadership positions in the government (including the Sunni Saddam Hussein), as do some Christians.

The Arab culture, as influenced by the conquerors in the seventh century, withstood many changes of power throughout the centuries, and managed to remain influential. In the nineteenth century, while the Ottoman Empire was focusing on the "Turkification" of its people, rebels in Mesopotamia were building their Arab nationalist movement. They were granted an opportunity to act during World War I, when the British agreed to recognize Arab independence in Mesopotamia if they helped fight against the Turks. Though Iraq was subject to British mandate rule following the defeat of the Ottoman Empire, Arab nationalism stood strong. For the next few decades, even after independence from Britain, the government's attitude wavered between being pro-British and Arab nationalist. Today Iraq stands firm in its belief in pro-Arab nationalism.

Ethnic Relations. The largest minority in Iraq, the Kurds, continually battle with the majority Arabs, and the sparring between these two cultural groups has contributed to a survivalist mentality for the Kurds. The Turkomans, who populate the northern mountainous areas, also have had strained relations with the Kurds due to their historical role as buffers between Arab and Kurdish areas. Other cultural groups who are sometimes subject to the will of the Arab majority are the Yazidis, who are of Kurdish descent, but differ from the Kurds because of their unique religion. There are the Assyrians, who are direct descendents of the ancient Mesopotamian people and speak Aramaic. They are mainly Christian, and though they compose a significant minority in Iraq, the government does not officially recognize them as an ethnic group. Regarding relations with other countries, Iraq's Shias have been the traditional enemies of Persians for centuries; this contributed to Iraq fighting Iran in a costly war from 1980 to 1988 over a land dispute. The Iraqi Kurdish population is surrounded by fellow Kurds in the countries of Iran, Turkey, Syria, and Azerbaijan.

Urbanism, Architecture, and the Use of Space

Iraq's economy was once based on agriculture, which stipulated a large rural population. However, due to oil production, an economic boom hit Iraq in the 1970s, and with the change of economic basis, much of population migrated toward urban centers. Modern apartment and office buildings sprang up in Baghdad, and programs and services such as education and health care developed with the shift from rural areas to urban population centers. In addition to modernization, the influx of monetary resources allowed Iraq to do things for its cultural identity and preservation, especially in architecture. High priority was placed on restoring and building according to historic style, and the structures targeted included archaeological sites, mosques, and government buildings. Some of the traditional aspects of the architecture include rooms surrounding an open center or courtyard, and use of multiple colors, tiles, and arches.

Food and Economy

Food in Daily Life. Prior to the United Nations economic sanctions, the traditional diet included rice with soup or sauce, accompanied by lamb and vegetables. Today, because food is tightly rationed, most people eat rice or another grain sometimes with sauce. Both vegetables and meat are hard to come by. In rural areas it is customary for families to eat together out of a common bowl, while in urban areas individuals eat with plates and utensils.

Food Customs at Ceremonial Occasions. It is traditional to sacrifice a lamb or a goat to celebrate holidays. However, today few Iraqis have the means to do this, and celebrations are now minimal.

Prior to the sanctions, Iraq imported about 70 percent of its food. However, food shortages have forced people to grow their own, but given the severity of the economic situation of the country, it is difficult for Iraqis to find the means to do this. Items that are imported through the oil-for-food program are distributed to people in a food basket on the first of each month. The rations are estimated to last twenty to twenty-three days and include flour, tea, sugar, rice, beans, milk, cooking oil, soap, and salt.

Land Tenure and Property. Private property was an important notion first introduced by the Sumerians during their control of Mesopotamia, and emerged again in the late nineteenth century. The reintroduction of private property had a major impact on Iraq's social system, as it went from a feudal society where sheikhs provided both spiritual and tribal leadership for the inhabitants, to one separated between landowners and sharecroppers. At present many people have sold or are selling their land to the government to purchase essentials such as food and medicine. Though private property does exist, fewer and fewer people can now claim it.

Commercial Activities. Oil, mining, manufacturing, construction, and agriculture are the major types of goods and services produced for sale.

Major Industries. Crude oil, refined petroleum products, and natural gas are products produced by the most important industry in Iraq. Other products and services include light manufacturing, food processing, textiles, and mining of nonmetallic minerals.

Trade. Iraq may only legally trade with other countries through the oil-for-food program, wherein they are allowed to sell oil to buy basic food supplies. However, diplomatic reports have indicated that Iraq has been illegally exporting some of its medical supplies and food, purchased through the oil-for-food program, to Lebanon, Syria, and Jordan. Prior to the sanctions, Iraq's main exports were crude oil, refined petroleum products, natural gas, chemical fertilizers, and dates. Its major trade partners were Russia, France, Brazil, Spain, and Japan.

Division of Labor. It is common for jobs to be assigned through knowing people in the government. Those who enter the military may have more opportunity locating work, as they are trained for jobs that are specifically needed in the country.

Social Stratification

Classes and Castes. Arabs, Kurds, and other ethnic groups each have their own social stratospheres, and no one ethnicity dominates another in a caste system. In terms of social class there is great disparity between rich and poor. Those who compose the high class in society of Iraq are essentially chosen by the government, since there is no opportunity to start a business or make a name for oneself without the endorsement of the government. The once-dominant middle class of the 1970s has deteriorated in the face of the economic crisis. These people, who are very well educated, now perform unskilled labor, if they have jobs at all, and have joined the ranking of the majority lower or poor class.

Political Life

Government. Iraq is a republic divided into eighteen provinces, which are subdivided into districts. There is a National Assembly elected every four years, and they meet twice annually and work with the Revolutionary Command Council (RCC) to make legislative decisions. The RCC holds ultimate authority over legislative decisions, and the chairman of the RCC is also president of the country. The president exercises all executive decision-making powers, and he as well as the vice presidents are elected by a two-thirds majority vote of the RCC. There is universal suffrage at age eighteen, and the popular vote elects 220 of the 250 seats in the National Assembly. The president chooses the remaining 30 seats, which belong to the three provinces of Kurdistan; he also appoints judges.

Leadership and Political Officials. On 16 July 1979 Saddam Hussein became president of Iraq, and has been reelected since. He is also the prime minister, as well as chairman of the RCC. The Baath Party, which stands for Arab Socialist Resurrection, is the controlling party of the government and the most powerful political party. Its authority is the Regional Command, and the secretary general of the Regional Command is Saddam Hussein.

Political activities are carried out through the Progressive National Front (PNF), which is an official organization of political parties. PNF participants include the Iraqi Communist Party, Kurdish political parties, and other independent groups. Politics that try to be exercised outside the framework of the PNF are banned.

Though granted the right to vote for some positions, many Iraqis feel that elections are fixed. They also fear that they might vote for the "wrong" candidate and that they may be punished for doing so. It is a crime for any Iraqi to speak out against the government, and those who disagree with it place themselves and their families at great risk of being persecuted, as many citizens will turn in fellow Iraqis they feel are not loyal to the government or Saddam Hussein.

Social Problems and Control. The head of the formal judicial system is the Court of Cassation, which is the highest court in the country. There are other levels of courts, and all judges are government-appointed. Personal disputes are handled by religious community courts, which are based on Islamic law. Normally punishment is swift for crimes, with no long court trials and with severe sentences.

The crime rate has been traditionally low, but following the United Nations embargo, there has been an increase in crime, especially theft. In addition to crimes by the general public, many crimes by corrupt police and military forces have been reported, the most common being bribery and blackmail. Conditions in prisons are said to be extremely harsh. Prisoners are housed with more than twenty people in a cell meant for two, with no sanitation system, and no food is given unless brought by relatives. Other punishment practices include torture, often in front of family members, and execution.

Social Welfare and Change Programs

Before the Persian Gulf War, welfare benefits such as Social Security, pensions for retirees and disabled people, and money for maternity and sick leaves were available. Currently the only known welfare programs are food distribution and medical aid food. Some nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) have been involved, but unless the Iraqi government can direct NGO operations, they are not permitted to function.

Nongovernmental Organizations and Other Associations

The most important NGOs are those that are responsible for food rationing and distribution, medical aid, and rebuilding of water and sewage treatment facilities. Many of the NGOs, such as the World Food Program, are associated with the United Nations. Currently Iraqi leaders have been turning down humanitarian efforts and have refused offers of relief from private medical groups. They recently expelled representatives of the Middle East Council of Churches, and denied entry of a Russian envoy from the United Nations who was to investigate the cases of missing persons since 1990. The only NGOs Iraq allows are foreign antisanctions protesters, who bring in small amounts of aid but who are welcome principally because of the propaganda they provide.

Gender Roles and Statuses

Division of Labor by Gender. During the Iran-Iraq War, with so many men fighting in the military, women were required to study in fields and to work in positions normally filled by men. Many women joined the labor force as teachers, physicians, dentists, factory workers, and civil servants, with the majority performing unskilled labor. Women professionals, such as doctors, are normally pediatricians or obstetricians, so that they work with only women or children. Those drafted into the workforce during the Iran-Iraq War were also made to comply with about a one-third deduction from their salary to go toward the war effort.

The Relative Status of Women and Men. The General Federation for Iraqi Women (GFIW) is a government organization for women with eighteen branches, one in each province. Its stated goal is to officially organize women, promote literacy and higher education, and encourage women in the labor force. The federation supported big legislative steps, such as a 1977 law that said a woman may be appointed an officer in the military if she has a university degree in medicine, dentistry, or pharmacy. However, it has had little impact on issues that affect women as individuals, such as polygamy, divorce, and inheritance.

Many believe that the GFIW is not really functioning in the interests of women, but rather in the interests of the Baathist regime. Instead of trying to improve the situation of women in Iraq, the government seems to use the federation as a means to exercise control over them. In an address to the federation, Saddam said that an educated and liberated mother is one who will give back to the country conscious and committed fighters for Iraq. An underlying goal of the GFIW, whether it is stated or not, is to encourage women to "liberate" themselves through commitment to the Iraqi revolution.

In politics Iraq was the first Arab country ever to elect a woman to a parliamentary position. Though an incredible advancement for women in the Arab world, many believe that rather than exercising real authority, she was put in power to falsely demonstrate the controlling regime as a progressive one. Today there are women in politics, though the legitimacy of their authority is often questioned. In Islam, the state religion, women do not hold any leadership roles. Many cannot go to the mosque to pray, and if they do, they are segregated from the men. It is largely due to Islamic influence that women do not enjoy the same social rights and privileges as men, and if gender reform is to take place, it will have to be within the context of Islamic law.

Marriage, Family, and Kinship

Marriage. In the past, arranged marriages were common. However, this practice is becoming more rare, and a law was passed that gave authority to a state-appointed judge to overrule the wishes of the father in the event of an early marriage. The Muslim majority traditionally views marriage as a contract between two families, as the family's needs are considered most important. In urban settings, women and men have more options in choosing their spouses, though the proposed spouse still must have parental approval. Partners often come from the same kin group, and though marriage between different ethnic groups is accepted, it is not too common. The ruling Baath regime considers marriage to be a national duty that should be guided and encouraged. Starting in 1982, women were forbidden to marry non-Iraqi men. If they were already married, they were prohibited from transferring money or property to their spouses.

Following the Iran-Iraq War, the loss of men's lives was so severe that the government embarked on a campaign to increase the population. Government grants were given to men to marry war widows, and polygamy, once rare, became more common. Divorce is accepted, but usually is left solely as a decision of the husband. If the husband wishes to be divorced, it is normally without question or problem, while it is close to impossible for a woman to initiate a divorce proceeding. In the event of divorce, custody is supposed to be granted based on what is best for the child's welfare.

Domestic Unit. Couples can live in either of two ways: with the husband's extended family, or as a nuclear family. At present, with economic hard-ships, families tend to live with extended households. The extended family unit consists of the older couple, sons, their wives and families, and unmarried daughters. Other dependent relatives also may make up part of this group, and the oldest male heads the group. He manages property and makes the final decisions regarding such things as the type of education the children receive, their occupations, and whom they will marry. In this living arrangement household and child-rearing tasks are shared among all female members of the larger families. If the couple can afford to live in a nuclear household, women, even though they work outside the home, retain all domestic and child-care responsibilities. The challenge of the woman's role in this situation is that there is no change in cooking methods or materials, and they are isolated from the help and emotional support of other female family members. Families often grow large, because the Iraqi government has stated that every family should have five children, as four children or fewer is considered a threat to national security. Considering the extreme hardships families now face in light of economic hardship and harsh living conditions, the goal of many is now to simply feed their families and preserve a semblance of some sort of home life.

Inheritance. Based on the Islamic rule, a man inherits twice as much as a woman. The justification for this is that women are to be protected by their male relatives, so men need to be granted more means to provide. Normally, property and belongings are passed down through the family, split two-to-one between sons and daughters.

Kin Groups. Large kin groups are the fundamental social units, and are of higher importance than ethnic, social class, and sectarian lines. Familial loyalty is considered an essential quality, and the family is mutually protective of each other. The kin group usually is organized through descent and marriage and involves three generations, many of whom live together. They often cooperate in areas such as agriculture and land ownership. If some family members live in nuclear families, they keep up practices such as depending on one another and asking the elders for advice. Individual status within the group is determined by the family's position and the individual's position within that group.

Socialization

Infant Care. Children are the mother's responsibility, and in extended domestic units other female members also take care of the children. Children normally imitate older siblings, and obedience and loyalty to elders are of vital importance. Boys and girls have different upbringings, as a boy's birth into the family is usually celebrated, while a girl's typically is not. The boy is thought to be more valuable to a family, given his potential to work, while the girl is considered more of a dependent. At puberty girls are separated from boys and have much less freedom than boys.

In urban settings, more authority is found in schools rather than with the family. Schools teach about religion and values that stem from it. One present problem, however, is that differing values are taught in schools than are taught in families. State schools tend to emphasize national sovereignty, Arab unity, economic security, and socialism, while families usually focus on such values as love, people, generosity, and religion. Many families also fear that their children acquire violent views and habits such as spying while in school.

Higher Education. Prior to the Persian Gulf War higher education was greatly prized, and the state used to pay for all of it, even literacy classes for adults. In the 1980s the literacy rate was about 80 percent, and there were several plans to build new universities and expand existing ones. During the Iran-Iraq War the government refused to recruit or draft university students, claiming that they would ensure the future of Iraq. However, the situation has gravely changed since the Persian Gulf War. No current literacy statistic is available, but in 1995 the rate was estimated to be 42 percent, a sharp drop from the previous decade. Also, there is no indication that the universities were ever expanded. Fewer women than men receive the highest levels of education.

In general, both adults and children keep to themselves and are not loud and boisterous, especially in public. Men commonly hold hands or kiss when greeting each other, but this is not the case for men and women. Respect is given to the elderly and women, especially those with children, as men give up their seats to them on buses and trains.

Religious Practitioners. There are five pillars of Islam: praise of Allah as the only God, with Muhammad as his prophet; prayer five times per day; almsgiving; fasting; and pilgrimage to Mecca. Muezzins invoke a call to prayer, reminding everyone it is either time to pray or to call them to the mosque, and imams lead the prayers. Imams are not required to go through formal training, but usually are men of importance in their communities and are appointed by the government. During Ramadan, men gather in homes or the marketplace to participate in readings of the Qur'an led by mumins (men trained at a religious school in An Najaf) or by mullahs (men apprenticed with older specialists). Christians are organized under a bishop who resides in Baghdad, and gather for Mass on Sundays.

Rituals and Holy Places. Muslims gather at the mosque every Friday for afternoon prayer. Ramadan falls in the ninth month of the Muslim calendar, which is on a lunar cycle and thus falls during different times of the year. The month entails a period of fasting from all food, drink, and activities such as smoking and sexual intercourse during daylight hours. At night the fast is broken, and on the first day of the tenth month there is a celebration, Id al Fitr, to acknowledge the end of the fast. During Id al Adha, on the tenth day of the twelfth month, there is a sacrificial festival. Both this and the one following Ramadan last for three or four days, and people dress up, visit each other, exchange gifts, and also visit cemeteries.

Death and the Afterlife. Funerals are very simple and somber events. People are buried on the day following their death, and are wrapped in a white cloth and placed in a plain box, if available. Whether the person is rich or poor, funerals are generally the same for everyone.

Medicine and Health Care

Health care is socialized, with a few private hospitals. The current situation of hospitals is dire, as they are tremendously understaffed, under-equipped, and overbooked. There has been a dramatic rise in disease since 1990, due to chemicals used in the fighting of the Persian Gulf War, and from malnutrition and bacterial disease exacerbated by conditions resulting from the economic embargo. In the 1980s Iraq was extremely advanced in health care, but lack of resources and education has compromised medical advancement, and in fact has caused it to regress. Doctors who could once cure many diseases through medicine or surgery are no longer able to do so due for lack of resources. Because Iraq was so advanced in medical expertise in the past, there was little reliance on traditional medicine. The current situation is disheartening for older physicians, because they are not able to do medical procedures that they have the capability to perform, and young physicians are no longer educated in the available techniques that older physicians know. The health care situation is rapidly deteriorating, and once-controlled diseases such as malnutrition, diarrhea, typhoid fever, measles, chicken pox, and cholera are reappearing in great numbers; in addition, there is a large increase in diseases such as leukemia and other cancers.

Secular Celebrations

The Anniversary of the Revolution is 17 July and the most important secular holiday. It was on this day in 1968 that the Baath Party took control of the Republic of Iraq. Other holidays celebrate Islamic feasts and include the day following the month-long fast of Ramadan (Id al Fitr), the sacrificial festival of Id al Adha, the birth of Muhammad, and a pilgrim's return from Mecca.

The Arts and Humanities

Support for the Arts. The government supports artists, provided they are chosen by the state and do works requested by the state. For example, all writers, when commissioned by the state, must include praise to Saddam Hussein in their work. In general, artistic forms of thought and expression have been banned. Private ownership of typewriters and photocopiers is prohibited, so that no independent writings may be published or distributed. In addition, publishing houses, distribution networks, newspapers, art galleries, theaters, and film companies are subject to state censorship and must register all writing equipment with authorities. The end result is that artists are unable to express themselves freely.

Graphic Arts. Islamic art is very important, as are ceramics, carpets, and Islamic-style fashion design. In 1970 the Iraqi Fashion House opened, and design concentrated on the preservation of traditional attire and historical style. At present historical art, which is colorful and fine, has been reduced to art produced for function, such as sculptures of political figures and propaganda for the government.

Performance Arts. Music festivals have been important, such as the Babylon International Music and Arts Festival (last held in 1987 and 1995). International orchestras and performance troupes were invited to perform in the restored sites of Babylon, and people from all over the world attended. At present due to the harsh and severe living conditions, there are no resources to allocate to performance arts.

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—E LIZABETH C. P IETANZA

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Researchers explain social media's role in rapidly shifting social norms on gender and sexuality

A new paper summarizing decades of research demonstrates how social media has supported an explosion of diversity in gender and sexuality in America during the 21st century, and also how these technologies have equally enabled a cultural backlash.

The paper's authors, UC Santa Cruz Psychology Department faculty members Phil Hammack and Adriana Manago, identified five main narratives about gender and sexuality that they believe emerged through social media as people have strived to be "authentic" on these platforms. The findings, along with resulting recommendations for psychology researchers and practitioners, were published in American Psychologist .

Since its inception, social media has essentially reversed the flow of information in American society, challenging traditional sources of authority and empowering individuals to create and share information for themselves, the paper says. The formats and customs of social media especially encourage self-expression and "authenticity," or sharing your inner experience. Online connectivity also removes geographic barriers to finding other like-minded individuals.

Together, these conditions set the stage perfectly for new cultural norms to emerge, the paper's authors argue. Manago, an associate professor of psychology who studies how communication technology shapes human development, explained that the team's theory runs directly counter to "social contagion theory."

"We've seen so much change so quickly in things like pronouns and sexual orientation that people have been hungry for an explanation, and as a result, social contagion theory is this very harmful idea that has become popular, despite not being backed by good evidence," she said.

"Social contagion theory argues that adolescents are going online and seeing that expressing yourself as having an LGBTQ+ identity is cool and popular, so they are conforming to a popular notion outside of themselves," Manago continued. "Our paper argues the opposite. The diversity that we're seeing now was always there, but the dominant cultural paradigms previously masked it. Now, new communications tools are bringing it to light by promoting and enabling authenticity."

New cultural narratives of gender and sexuality

Among the new cultural narratives that researchers say have emerged from online authenticity is the concept of gender as self-constructed, meaning that there can be a difference between sex assigned at birth and a person's gender identity or expression. For example, research shows that Tumblr blogs have helped transgender people navigate the gender affirmation process, and TikTok has become a central resource for youth who are questioning their own gender or sexuality to explore identities and connect with others.

Hammack, a psychology professor and expert on generational differences in gender and sexuality, emphasizes that people are using social media as a tool to better understand complexities around gender identity that they already feel within themselves.

"We have to remember that with social media, an algorithm responds to the person," he said. "So if you're starting to question your gender, you're going to look for related content, and then the algorithm affirms that, but you are still the active agent who is on social media liking things. That agency sometimes gets downplayed when we talk about the influence of social media."

Another narrative that has gained traction on social media is the idea that sexuality is plural, playful, flexible, and fluid. One aspect of this is the possibility for attraction to multiple genders. For example, research that used the Craigslist personals section to recruit participants has bolstered new understandings of bisexuality among men and has also shown that some people who identify as straight still seek same-sex contact. Meanwhile, Tumblr helped to popularize the pansexual identity. And new social networking websites for people with fetishes have increased acceptance of a wider variety of sexual practices.

Some modern online narratives also present sexuality and monogamy as cultural compulsions, rather than biological ones. For example, asexuality has become an accepted identity for those who feel little or no sexual attraction, with help from a website that challenged traditional pathologizing views. And new dating apps have been developed specifically to support forms of consensual nonmonogamy that are gaining public visibility.

Intersectionality has become a key part of many online narratives too, such as the #SayHerName campaign on Twitter, which sought to draw attention to state-sanctioned violence against Black cisgender and transgender women alike. New terminologies and forms of identity have also developed on Tumblr that increasingly recognize how gender and sexuality intersect with each other, and these concepts have spilled over onto platforms like Twitter, now called X, and TikTok.

But not all online narratives that seek to convey authenticity in gender and sexuality promote diversity. A transphobic, homophobic, and misogynistic backlash has also spread through social media technology, sometimes resulting in real-world violence. One example is how Reddit and TikTok have spread "incel" or "involuntary celibate" ideology that views both women's equality and sexual and gender diversity as threats to masculinity.

"These reactionary forces that are being destabilized from their dominant position in society are also using authenticity narratives about being a 'real man' to spread their views, and they're claiming that all of these other narratives are false," Manago explained. "So authenticity is a central concept in all of the narratives on gender and sexuality that we see emerge through these platforms, regardless of whether they're progressive or regressive."

Recommendations for psychologists

Based on their findings, the paper's authors offer several recommendations. Psychology researchers and practitioners should start by grounding their work in people's lived experiences, the paper says. That could include counselors making sure they stay up to date on new popular terminology around gender and sexuality and researchers asking more open-ended questions and offering write-in options for collecting information about gender and sexuality.

The team also recommends approaching emerging forms of identity with affirmation, rather than suspicion and focusing on the phenomena of sexual and gender diversity more so than individual identity labels, which inevitably always leave someone out. The paper advises that social change on these issues is fluid and nonlinear, and the current context is not necessarily one of "achievement" for rights and recognition, as evidenced by regressive authenticity narratives that have spread alongside progressive ones.

Hammack and Manago ultimately encourage psychologists to continue challenging normative thinking, both around sexuality and gender and around social media's role in identity formation. They say social media is neither a source of youth corruption nor a cure-all for advancing acceptance and equity. Instead, meaningful cultural change that starts on social media should result in new resources and support in our geographic communities.

"If community spaces and educational spaces don't keep pace with these changes, that can become dangerous, because young people will continue to turn to social media, and they may lose confidence in other sources of authority, like teachers and parents, who they see as being socially behind the times," Hammack said.

"As adults, the responsible thing is for us to acknowledge that we live in a time of great change in gender and sexuality and to find ways to integrate new perspectives into education, our communities, and our families, so that young people don't experience isolation and don't lose confidence in us."

More information: Phillip L. Hammack et al, The psychology of sexual and gender diversity in the 21st century: Social technologies and stories of authenticity., American Psychologist (2024). DOI: 10.1037/amp0001366

Provided by University of California - Santa Cruz