federalist 70 argumentative essay

The Federalist Papers

By alexander hamilton , james madison , john jay, the federalist papers summary and analysis of essay 70.

Many people think that a vigorous and strong president is incompatible with a republican form of government. Hamilton, however, does not agree. An energetic and forceful president is essential to good government. National defense, sound administration of the law, and the protection of property rights all depend upon the vitality of the Presidency. In addition, an energetic president best protects liberty when faction, anarchy, and the excessive ambitions of others threaten it. Anyone familiar with Roman history knows that it was often the Roman dictator who prevented the fall of the council. Men agree that the president should be strong. What, then constitutes strength and energy? What characteristics do we look for? Can sufficient strength in the Presidency be combined with the principles of republican government?

An energetic executive branch must be characterized by unity, sufficient powers, and a certain degree of secrecy. For these reasons, one chief executive is better than two or more. Two people, granted equal power and authority, are bound to differ. Personal ambition can never be totally subdued, and a dual presidency would be marked by dissension, weakened authority, and the growth of conflicting factions. It is unnecessary and unwise to establish an executive branch that would make this form of divisiveness possible and likely. Conflict and argument are dangerous in the executive branch where decisions must be prompt; in the Congress, on the other hand, differences of opinion force discussion and deliberation. This is quite proper in the legislative branch and helps to prevent coercion by majority. The function of the legislature is to pass laws; once a law is passed, effective opposition comes to an end. But the executive branch is charged with the execution of the laws; a law once passed should be executed promptly. Furthermore, in case of war, when so much depends upon a strong presidency, divisiveness could destroy the national security.

The same arguments against having two presidents can be made in opposition to an executive council. In either a plural or council form of executive, faults and defects are more easily concealed, and no person can be held responsible. The American president, unlike the English king, must not be immune from censure, accountability, or punishment. The English king is not held responsible for his administration, and his person is sacred. Sometimes a king forms a council to act as a buffer between him and his subjects. But such a council in no way diminished the king's power; he is not even bound by the resolutions the council passes. The council functions as a public relations body while, at the same time, it protects the king in his absolute power.

In conclusion, Hamilton claims that there is the matter of expense. Those who recommend a council form of executive admit that the council should be large. That being so, the salaries of the council members would constitute too great an expense for the nation to tolerate. Second, before the Constitution was written, intelligent men agreed that New York's single executive was one of the most admirable features of state government.

This essay concerning the powers of the executive department is one of the most referenced federalist papers concerning the presidency. Hamilton writes, "energy in the executive" is one of the most important parts of the executive department of the country, as defined in the Constitution. This "energy" is one of the most written about components and excuses for expansion of presidential power, especially in the 20th century. If the Federalist Papers can be said to have "themes," one of those themes would be the importance of energy in making the Constitution come alive. In this essay, Hamilton demonstrates the necessity energy is to the president and his duties. The office and power of the president was consciously designed to provide the energy, secrecy, and dispatch traditionally associated with the monarchial form.

Another important aspect of this essay is the evidence of the proportion and participation principles and their relation to each other in the state. Since Hamilton considers the individual's protection the end of the government, an explanation of the protection principle can be derived from his specification of that end. In other Federalist Papers, Hamilton claims that with government being instituted for the distribution of justice, the end of government is "the public happiness" or the "public good." More specifically, the people's happiness means the protection of their "general liberty," their "rights." From his distinction between liberty and property and life and property follows Hamilton's classification of those rights into the categories commonly used in his time, namely, the rights of life, liberty, and property.

Of these rights, those of property are most important. Their greater weight, as compared with the rights of liberty, follows Hamilton's enumeration, in order of importance, of the advantages of an energetic executive. He mentions, first, the protection of the community against foreign attacks; second, the steady administration of the laws; third, the protection of property against irregular and high-handed combinations that sometimes interrupt the ordinary courts of justice; and fourth, the security of liberty. Hamilton thus puts the protection of property before the security of liberty and connects it more closely with that all-embracing end of government, justice. The prevalence of property before liberty is confirmed when Hamilton states that among vested rights, those concerning life and property are most important. When, finally, he refers hardly ever to the right of life and very often to that of property, the conclusion can be drawn that either he considers the right of life to be already accepted, or he attributes a greater weight to the right of property, which he once referred to as "the great and fundamental distinction of society."

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The federalist no. 70, [15 march 1788], the federalist no. 70 1.

[New York, March 15, 1788]

To the People of the State of New-York.

THERE is an idea, which is not without its advocates, that a vigorous executive is inconsistent with the genius of republican government. The enlightened well wishers to this species of government must at least hope that the supposition is destitute of foundation; since they can never admit its truth, without at the same time admitting the condemnation of their own principles. Energy in the executive is a leading character in the definition of good government. It is essential to the protection of the community against foreign attacks: It is not less essential to the steady administration of the laws, to the protection of property against those irregular and high handed combinations, which sometimes interrupt the ordinary course of justice to the security of liberty against the enterprises and assaults of ambition, of faction and of anarchy. Every man the least conversant in Roman story knows how often that republic was obliged to take refuge in the absolute power of a single man, under the formidable title of dictator, as well against the intrigues of ambitious individuals, who aspired to the tyranny, and the seditions of whole classes of the community, whose conduct threatened the existence of all government, as against the invasions of external enemies, who menaced the conquest and destruction of Rome.

There can be no need however to multiply arguments or examples on this head. A feeble executive implies a feeble execution of the government. A feeble execution is but another phrase for a bad execution: And a government ill executed, whatever it may be in theory, must be in practice a bad government.

Taking it for granted, therefore, that all men of sense will agree in the necessity of an energetic executive; it will only remain to inquire, what are the ingredients which constitute this energy—how far can they be combined with those other ingredients which constitute safety in the republican sense? And how far does this combination characterise the plan, which has been reported by the convention?

The ingredients, which constitute energy in the executive, are first unity, secondly duration, thirdly an adequate provision for its support, fourthly competent powers. 2

The circumstances 3 which constitute safety in the republican sense are, Ist. a due dependence on the people, secondly 4 a due responsibility.

Those politicians and statesmen, who have been the most celebrated for the soundness of their principles, and for the justness of their views, have declared in favor of a single executive and a numerous legislature. They have with great propriety considered energy as the most necessary qualification of the former, and have regarded this as most applicable to power in a single hand; while they have with equal propriety considered the latter as best adapted to deliberation and wisdom, and best calculated to conciliate the confidence of the people and to secure their privileges and interests.

That unity is conducive to energy will not be disputed. Decision, activity, secrecy, and 5 dispatch will generally characterise the proceedings 6 of one man, in a much more eminent degree, than the proceedings of any greater number; and in proportion as the number is increased, these qualities will be diminished.

This unity may be destroyed in two ways; either by vesting the power in two or more magistrates of equal dignity and authority; or by vesting it ostensibly in one man, subject in whole or in part to the controul and co-operation of others, in the capacity of counsellors to him. Of the first the two consuls of Rome may serve as an example; of the last we shall find examples in the constitutions of several of the states. New-York and New-Jersey, if I recollect right, are the only states, which have entrusted the executive authority wholly to single men. * Both these methods of destroying the unity of the executive have their partisans; but the votaries of an executive council are the most numerous. They are both liable, if not to equal, to similar objections; and may in most lights be examined in conjunction.

The experience of other nations will afford little instruction on this head. As far however as it teaches any thing, it teaches us not to be inamoured of plurality in the executive. We have seen that the Achæans on an experiment of two Præetors, were induced to abolish one. 7 The Roman history records many instances of mischiefs to the republic from the dissentions between the consuls, and between the military tribunes, who were at times substituted to the consuls. But it gives us no specimens of any peculiar advantages derived to the state, from the circumstance of the 8 plurality of those magistrates. That the dissentions between them were not more frequent, or more fatal, is matter of astonishment; until we advert to the singular position in which the republic was almost continually placed and to the prudent policy pointed out by the circumstances of the state, and pursued by the consuls, of making a division of the government between them. The Patricians engaged in a perpetual struggle with the Plebeians for the preservation of their antient authorities and dignities; the consuls, who were generally chosen out of the former body, were commonly united by the personal interest they had in the defence of the privileges of their order. In addition to this motive of union, after the arms of the republic had considerably expanded the bounds of its empire, it became an established custom with the consuls to divide the administration between themselves by lot; one of them remaining at Rome to govern the city and its environs; the other taking the command in the more distant provinces. This expedient must no doubt have had great influence in preventing those collisions and rivalships, which might otherwise have embroiled the peace of 9 the republic.

But quitting the dim light of historical research, and attaching ourselves purely to the dictates of reason and good sense, we shall discover much greater cause to reject than to approve the idea of plurality in the executive, under any modification whatever.

Wherever two or more persons are engaged in any common enterprize or pursuit, there is always danger of difference of opinion. If it be a public trust or office in which they are cloathed with equal dignity and authority, there is peculiar danger of personal emulation and even animosity. From either and especially from all these causes, the most bitter dissentions are apt to spring. Whenever these happen, they lessen the respectability, weaken the authority, and distract the plans and operations of those whom they divide. If they should unfortunately assail the supreme executive magistracy of a country, consisting of a plurality of persons, they might impede or frustrate the most important measures of the government, in the most critical emergencies of the state. And what is still worse, they might split the community into the most 10 violent and irreconcilable factions, adhering differently to the different individuals who composed the magistracy.

Men often oppose a thing merely because they have had no agency in planning it, or because it may have been planned by those whom they dislike. But if they have been consulted and have happened to disapprove, opposition then becomes in their estimation an indispensable duty of self love. They seem to think themselves bound in honor, and by all the motives of personal infallibility to defeat the success of what has been resolved upon, contrary to their sentiments. Men of upright, benevolent tempers have too many opportunities of remarking with horror, to what desperate lengths this disposition is sometimes carried, and how often the great interests of society are sacrificed to the vanity, to the conceit and to the obstinacy of individuals, who have credit enough to make their passions and their caprices interesting to mankind. Perhaps the question now before the public may in its consequences afford melancholy proofs of the effects of this despicable frailty, or rather detestable vice in the human character.

Upon the principles of a free government, inconveniencies from the source just mentioned must necessarily be submitted to in the formation of the legislature; but it is unnecessary and therefore unwise to introduce them into the constitution of the executive. It is here too that they may be most pernicious. In the legislature, promptitude of decision is oftener an evil than a benefit. The differences of opinion, and the jarrings of parties in that department of the government, though they may sometimes obstruct salutary plans, yet often promote deliberations and circumspection; and serve to check excesses in the majority. When a resolution too is once taken, the opposition must be at an end. That resolution is a law, and resistance to it punishable. But no favourable circumstances palliate or atone for the disadvantages of dissention in the executive department. Here they are pure and unmixed. There is no point at which they cease to operate. They serve to embarrass and weaken the execution of the plan or measure, to which they relate, from the first step to the final conclusion of it. They constantly counteract those qualities in the executive, which are the most necessary ingredients in its composition, vigour and expedition, and this without any counterballancing good. In the conduct of war, in which the energy of the executive is the bulwark of the national security, every thing would be to be apprehended from its plurality.

It must be confessed that these observations apply with principal weight to the first 11 case supposed, that is to a plurality of magistrates of equal dignity and authority; a scheme the advocates for which are not likely to form a numerous sect: But they apply, though not with equal, yet with considerable weight, to the project of a council, whose concurrence is made constitutionally necessary to the operations of the ostensible executive. An artful cabal in that council would be able to distract and to enervate the whole system of administration. If no such cabal should exist, the mere diversity of views and opinions would alone be sufficient to tincture the exercise of the executive authority with a spirit of habitual feebleness and delatoriness.

But one of the weightiest objections to a plurality in the executive, and which lies as much against the last as the first plan, is that it tends to conceal faults, and destroy responsibility. Responsibility is of two kinds, to censure and to punishment. The first is the most important of the two; especially in an elective office. Man, 12 in public trust, will much oftener act in such a manner as to render him 13 unworthy of being any longer trusted, than in such a manner as to make him 14 obnoxious to legal punishment. But the multiplication of the executive adds to the difficulty of detection in either case. It often becomes impossible, amidst mutual accusations, to determine on whom the blame or the punishment of a pernicious measure, or series of pernicious measures ought really to fall. It is shifted from one to another with so much dexterity, and under such plausible appearances, that the public opinion is left in suspense about the real author. The circumstances which may have led to any national miscarriage or misfortune are sometimes so complicated, that where there are a number of actors who may have had different degrees and kinds of agency, though we may clearly see upon the whole that there has been mismanagement, yet it may be impracticable to pronounce to whose account the evil which may have been incurred is truly chargeable.

“I was overruled by my council. The council were so divided in their opinions, that it was impossible to obtain any better resolution on the point.” These and similar pretexts are constantly at hand, whether true or false. And who is there that will either take the trouble or incur the odium of a strict scrutiny into the secret springs of the transaction? Should there be found a citizen zealous enough to undertake the unpromising task, if there happen to be a collusion between the parties concerned, how easy is it to cloath the circumstances with so much ambiguity, as to render it uncertain what was the precise conduct of any of those parties?

In the single instance in which the governor of this state is coupled with a council, that is in the appointment to offices, we have seen the mischiefs of it in the view now under consideration. 15 Scandalous appointments to important offices have been made. Some cases indeed have been so flagrant, that ALL PARTIES have agreed in the impropriety of the thing. When enquiry has been made, the blame has been laid by the governor on the members of the council; who on their part have charged it upon his nomination: While the people remain altogether at a loss to determine by whose influence their interests have been committed to hands so unqualified, and 16 so manifestly improper. In tenderness to individuals, I forbear to descend to particulars.

It is evident from these considerations, that the plurality of the executive tends to deprive the people of the two greatest securities they can have for the faithful exercise of any delegated power; first, the restraints of public opinion, which lose their efficacy as well on account of the division of the censure attendant on bad measures among a number, as on account of the uncertainty on whom it ought to fall; and secondly, the opportunity of discovering with facility and clearness the misconduct of the persons they trust, in order either to their removal from office, or to their actual punishment, in cases which admit of it.

In England the king is a perpetual magistrate; and it is a maxim, which has obtained for the sake of the public peace, that he is unaccountable for his administration, and his person sacred. Nothing therefore can be wiser in that kingdom than to annex to the king a constitutional council, who may be responsible to the nation for the advice they give. Without this there would be no responsibility whatever in the executive department; an idea inadmissible in a free government. But even there the king is not bound by the resolutions of his council, though they are answerable for the advice they give. He is the absolute master of his own conduct, in the exercise of his office; and may observe or disregard the council given to him at his sole discretion.

But in a republic, where every magistrate ought to be personally responsible for his behaviour in office, the reason which in the British constitution dictates the propriety of a council not only ceases to apply, but turns against the institution. In the monarchy of Great-Britain, it furnishes a substitute for the prohibited responsibility of the chief magistrate; which serves in some degree as a hostage to the national justice for his good behaviour. In the American republic it would serve to destroy, or would greatly diminish the intended and necessary responsibility of the chief magistrate himself.

The idea of a council to the executive, which has so generally obtained in the state constitutions, has been derived from that maxim of republican jealousy, which considers power as safer in the hands of a number of men than of a single man. If the maxim should be admitted to be applicable to the case, I should contend that the advantage on that side would not counterballance the numerous disadvantages on the opposite side. But I do not think the rule at all applicable to the executive power. I clearly concur in opinion in this particular with a writer whom the celebrated Junius 17 pronounces to be “deep, solid and ingenious,” that, “the executive power is more easily confined when it is one:” * 18 That it is far more safe there should be a single object for the jealousy and watchfulness of the people; and 20 in a word that all multiplication of the executive is rather dangerous than friendly to liberty.

A little consideration will satisfy us, that the species of security sought for in the multiplication of the executive is unattainable. Numbers must be so great as to render combination difficult; or they are rather a source of danger than of security. The united credit and influence of several individuals must be more formidable to liberty than the credit and influence of either of them separately. When power therefore is placed in the hands of so small a number of men, as to admit of their interests and views being easily combined in a common enterprise, by an artful leader, it becomes more liable to abuse and more dangerous when abused, than if it be lodged in the hands of one man; who from the very circumstance of his being alone will be more narrowly watched and more readily suspected, and who cannot unite so great a mass of influence as when he is associated with others. The Decemvirs of Rome, whose name denotes their number, † were more to be dreaded in their usurpation than any ONE of them would have been. No person would think of proposing an executive much more numerous than that body, from six to a dozen have been suggested for the number of the council. The extreme of these numbers is not too great for an easy combination; and from such a combination America would have more to fear, than from the ambition of any single individual. A council to a magistrate, who is himself responsible for what he does, are generally nothing better than a clog upon his good intentions; are often the instruments and accomplices of his bad, and are almost always a cloak to his faults.

I forbear to dwell upon the subject of expence; though it be evident that if the council should be numerous enough to answer the principal end, aimed at by the institution, the salaries of the members, who must be drawn from their homes to reside at the seat of government, would form an item in the catalogue of public expenditures, too serious to be incurred for an object of equivocal utility.

I will only add, that prior to the appearance of the constitution, I rarely met with an intelligent man from any of the states, who did not admit as the result of experience, that the UNITY of the Executive of this state was one of the best of the distinguishing features of our constitution.

The [New York] Independent Journal: or, the General Advertiser , March 15, 1788. This essay appeared in New-York Packet on March 18. In the McLean description begins The Federalist: A Collection of Essays, Written in Favour of the New Constitution, As Agreed upon by the Federal Convention, September 17, 1787. In Two Volumes (New York: Printed and Sold by J. and A. McLean, 1788). description ends edition this essay is numbered 70, in the newspapers it is numbered 69.

1 . For background to this document, see “The Federalist. Introductory Note.” October 27, 1787-May 28, 1788 .

2 . The words “first,” “secondly,” “thirdly,” and “fourthly,” omitted in McLean description begins The Federalist: A Collection of Essays, Written in Favour of the New Constitution, As Agreed upon by the Federal Convention, September 17, 1787. In Two Volumes (New York: Printed and Sold by J. and A. McLean, 1788). description ends and Hopkins description begins The Federalist On The New Constitution. By Publius. Written in 1788. To Which is Added, Pacificus, on The Proclamation of Neutrality. Written in 1793. Likewise, The Federal Constitution, With All the Amendments. Revised and Corrected. In Two Volumes (New York: Printed and Sold by George F. Hopkins, at Washington’s Head, 1802). description ends .

3 . “ingredients” substituted for “circumstances” in McLean and Hopkins.

4 . The words “Ist” and “secondly” omitted in McLean and Hopkins.

5 . “and” omitted in the newspaper; inserted in McLean and Hopkins.

6 . In the newspaper, “proceeding”; “proceedings” was substituted in McLean and Hopkins.

7 . See essay 18 .

8 . “circumstances of the” omitted in McLean and Hopkins.

9 . “peace of” omitted in McLean and Hopkins.

10 . “most” omitted in McLean and Hopkins.

11 . In the newspaper, “full”; “first” was substituted in McLean and Hopkins.

12 . “Men” substituted for “Man” in McLean and Hopkins.

13 . “them” substituted for “him” in McLean and Hopkins.

14 . “them” substituted for “him” in McLean and Hopkins.

15 . See essay 69 .

16 . “so unqualified, and” omitted in Hopkins.

17 . Junius. Stat Nominis Umbra (London: Printed for Henry Sampson Woodfall … 1772), I, xxxi.

18 . Junius referred to Jean Louis de Lolme, The Constitution of England, or An Account of the English Government; In which it is compared with the Republican Form of Government, and occasionally with the other Monarchies in Europe (3rd ed., London, 1781), 215.

19 . In the newspapers, “De Lostme”; “De Lome” substituted in McLean and Hopkins.

20 . “and” omitted in Hopkins.

Authorial notes

[The following note(s) appeared in the margins or otherwise outside the text flow in the original source, and have been moved here for purposes of the digital edition.]

* New-York has no council except for the single purpose of appointing to offices; New-Jersey has a council, whom the governor may consult. But I think from the terms of the constitution their resolutions do not bind him.

* De Lome. 19

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Federalist no. 70 by alexander hamilton (1788).

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Federalism


• • • • •

1 Background of the author
2 Full text of The Executive Department Further Considered
3 Background of the Federalist Papers
4 Full list of Federalist Papers
6 External links
7 Footnotes

Federalist Number (No.) 70 (1788) is an essay by British-American politician Alexander Hamilton arguing for the ratification of the United States Constitution . The full title of the essay is "The Executive Department Further Considered." It was written as part of a series of essays collected and published in 1788 as The Federalist and later known as The Federalist Papers . These essays were written by Alexander Hamilton , James Madison , and John Jay . They argued for ratification of the United States Constitution as a replacement for the Articles of Confederation . [1]

Author: Alexander Hamilton
Source: Originally published in the New York Packet on March 18, 1788. Republished in 1788 as part of the collection The Federalist , now referred to as The Federalist Papers .
Abstract: Hamilton argues for a unified Executive branch.

Background of the author

Alexander Hamilton (c. 1755-1804) was a British-American politician, lawyer, and military officer. He was a delegate to the Constitutional Convention of 1787 and is considered a Founding Father of the United States. Below is a summary of Hamilton's career: [2]

1775-1777: Officer in the New York Provincial Artillery Company
Including service as an adviser to General George Washington
1787: Delegate to the Constitutional Convention in Philadelphia, Pa.
1787-1788: Author of 51 of the 85 essays in The Federalist Papers
1789-1795: First secretary of the treasury of the United States

Full text of The Executive Department Further Considered

The full text of Federalist No. 70 reads as follows: [1]

“

To the People of the State of New York:

THERE is an idea, which is not without its advocates, that a vigorous Executive is inconsistent with the genius of republican government. The enlightened well-wishers to this species of government must at least hope that the supposition is destitute of foundation; since they can never admit its truth, without at the same time admitting the condemnation of their own principles. Energy in the Executive is a leading character in the definition of good government. It is essential to the protection of the community against foreign attacks; it is not less essential to the steady administration of the laws; to the protection of property against those irregular and high-handed combinations which sometimes interrupt the ordinary course of justice; to the security of liberty against the enterprises and assaults of ambition, of faction, and of anarchy. Every man the least conversant in Roman story, knows how often that republic was obliged to take refuge in the absolute power of a single man, under the formidable title of Dictator, as well against the intrigues of ambitious individuals who aspired to the tyranny, and the seditions of whole classes of the community whose conduct threatened the existence of all government, as against the invasions of external enemies who menaced the conquest and destruction of Rome.

There can be no need, however, to multiply arguments or examples on this head. A feeble Executive implies a feeble execution of the government. A feeble execution is but another phrase for a bad execution; and a government ill executed, whatever it may be in theory, must be, in practice, a bad government.

Taking it for granted, therefore, that all men of sense will agree in the necessity of an energetic Executive, it will only remain to inquire, what are the ingredients which constitute this energy? How far can they be combined with those other ingredients which constitute safety in the republican sense? And how far does this combination characterize the plan which has been reported by the convention?

The ingredients which constitute energy in the Executive are, first, unity; secondly, duration; thirdly, an adequate provision for its support; fourthly, competent powers.

The ingredients which constitute safety in the republican sense are, first, a due dependence on the people, secondly, a due responsibility.

Those politicians and statesmen who have been the most celebrated for the soundness of their principles and for the justice of their views, have declared in favor of a single Executive and a numerous legislature. They have with great propriety, considered energy as the most necessary qualification of the former, and have regarded this as most applicable to power in a single hand, while they have, with equal propriety, considered the latter as best adapted to deliberation and wisdom, and best calculated to conciliate the confidence of the people and to secure their privileges and interests.

That unity is conducive to energy will not be disputed. Decision, activity, secrecy, and despatch will generally characterize the proceedings of one man in a much more eminent degree than the proceedings of any greater number; and in proportion as the number is increased, these qualities will be diminished.

This unity may be destroyed in two ways: either by vesting the power in two or more magistrates of equal dignity and authority; or by vesting it ostensibly in one man, subject, in whole or in part, to the control and co-operation of others, in the capacity of counsellors to him. Of the first, the two Consuls of Rome may serve as an example; of the last, we shall find examples in the constitutions of several of the States. New York and New Jersey, if I recollect right, are the only States which have intrusted the executive authority wholly to single men. Both these methods of destroying the unity of the Executive have their partisans; but the votaries of an executive council are the most numerous. They are both liable, if not to equal, to similar objections, and may in most lights be examined in conjunction.

The experience of other nations will afford little instruction on this head. As far, however, as it teaches any thing, it teaches us not to be enamoured of plurality in the Executive. We have seen that the Achaeans, on an experiment of two Praetors, were induced to abolish one. The Roman history records many instances of mischiefs to the republic from the dissensions between the Consuls, and between the military Tribunes, who were at times substituted for the Consuls. But it gives us no specimens of any peculiar advantages derived to the state from the circumstance of the plurality of those magistrates. That the dissensions between them were not more frequent or more fatal, is a matter of astonishment, until we advert to the singular position in which the republic was almost continually placed, and to the prudent policy pointed out by the circumstances of the state, and pursued by the Consuls, of making a division of the government between them. The patricians engaged in a perpetual struggle with the plebeians for the preservation of their ancient authorities and dignities; the Consuls, who were generally chosen out of the former body, were commonly united by the personal interest they had in the defense of the privileges of their order. In addition to this motive of union, after the arms of the republic had considerably expanded the bounds of its empire, it became an established custom with the Consuls to divide the administration between themselves by lot one of them remaining at Rome to govern the city and its environs, the other taking the command in the more distant provinces. This expedient must, no doubt, have had great influence in preventing those collisions and rivalships which might otherwise have embroiled the peace of the republic.

But quitting the dim light of historical research, attaching ourselves purely to the dictates of reason and good se se, we shall discover much greater cause to reject than to approve the idea of plurality in the Executive, under any modification whatever.

Wherever two or more persons are engaged in any common enterprise or pursuit, there is always danger of difference of opinion. If it be a public trust or office, in which they are clothed with equal dignity and authority, there is peculiar danger of personal emulation and even animosity. From either, and especially from all these causes, the most bitter dissensions are apt to spring. Whenever these happen, they lessen the respectability, weaken the authority, and distract the plans and operation of those whom they divide. If they should unfortunately assail the supreme executive magistracy of a country, consisting of a plurality of persons, they might impede or frustrate the most important measures of the government, in the most critical emergencies of the state. And what is still worse, they might split the community into the most violent and irreconcilable factions, adhering differently to the different individuals who composed the magistracy.

Men often oppose a thing, merely because they have had no agency in planning it, or because it may have been planned by those whom they dislike. But if they have been consulted, and have happened to disapprove, opposition then becomes, in their estimation, an indispensable duty of self-love. They seem to think themselves bound in honor, and by all the motives of personal infallibility, to defeat the success of what has been resolved upon contrary to their sentiments. Men of upright, benevolent tempers have too many opportunities of remarking, with horror, to what desperate lengths this disposition is sometimes carried, and how often the great interests of society are sacrificed to the vanity, to the conceit, and to the obstinacy of individuals, who have credit enough to make their passions and their caprices interesting to mankind. Perhaps the question now before the public may, in its consequences, afford melancholy proofs of the effects of this despicable frailty, or rather detestable vice, in the human character.

Upon the principles of a free government, inconveniences from the source just mentioned must necessarily be submitted to in the formation of the legislature; but it is unnecessary, and therefore unwise, to introduce them into the constitution of the Executive. It is here too that they may be most pernicious. In the legislature, promptitude of decision is oftener an evil than a benefit. The differences of opinion, and the jarrings of parties in that department of the government, though they may sometimes obstruct salutary plans, yet often promote deliberation and circumspection, and serve to check excesses in the majority. When a resolution too is once taken, the opposition must be at an end. That resolution is a law, and resistance to it punishable. But no favorable circumstances palliate or atone for the disadvantages of dissension in the executive department. Here, they are pure and unmixed. There is no point at which they cease to operate. They serve to embarrass and weaken the execution of the plan or measure to which they relate, from the first step to the final conclusion of it. They constantly counteract those qualities in the Executive which are the most necessary ingredients in its composition, vigor and expedition, and this without any counterbalancing good. In the conduct of war, in which the energy of the Executive is the bulwark of the national security, every thing would be to be apprehended from its plurality.

It must be confessed that these observations apply with principal weight to the first case supposed that is, to a plurality of magistrates of equal dignity and authority a scheme, the advocates for which are not likely to form a numerous sect; but they apply, though not with equal, yet with considerable weight to the project of a council, whose concurrence is made constitutionally necessary to the operations of the ostensible Executive. An artful cabal in that council would be able to distract and to enervate the whole system of administration. If no such cabal should exist, the mere diversity of views and opinions would alone be sufficient to tincture the exercise of the executive authority with a spirit of habitual feebleness and dilatoriness.

But one of the weightiest objections to a plurality in the Executive, and which lies as much against the last as the first plan, is, that it tends to conceal faults and destroy responsibility. Responsibility is of two kinds to censure and to punishment. The first is the more important of the two, especially in an elective office. Man, in public trust, will much oftener act in such a manner as to render him unworthy of being any longer trusted, than in such a manner as to make him obnoxious to legal punishment. But the multiplication of the Executive adds to the difficulty of detection in either case. It often becomes impossible, amidst mutual accusations, to determine on whom the blame or the punishment of a pernicious measure, or series of pernicious measures, ought really to fall. It is shifted from one to another with so much dexterity, and under such plausible appearances, that the public opinion is left in suspense about the real author. The circumstances which may have led to any national miscarriage or misfortune are sometimes so complicated that, where there are a number of actors who may have had different degrees and kinds of agency, though we may clearly see upon the whole that there has been mismanagement, yet it may be impracticable to pronounce to whose account the evil which may have been incurred is truly chargeable. "I was overruled by my council. The council were so divided in their opinions that it was impossible to obtain any better resolution on the point.
In the single instance in which the governor of this State is coupled with a council that is, in the appointment to offices, we have seen the mischiefs of it in the view now under consideration. Scandalous appointments to important offices have been made. Some cases, indeed, have been so flagrant that ALL PARTIES have agreed in the impropriety of the thing. When inquiry has been made, the blame has been laid by the governor on the members of the council, who, on their part, have charged it upon his nomination; while the people remain altogether at a loss to determine, by whose influence their interests have been committed to hands so unqualified and so manifestly improper. In tenderness to individuals, I forbear to descend to particulars.

It is evident from these considerations, that the plurality of the Executive tends to deprive the people of the two greatest securities they can have for the faithful exercise of any delegated power, first, the restraints of public opinion, which lose their efficacy, as well on account of the division of the censure attendant on bad measures among a number, as on account of the uncertainty on whom it ought to fall; and, secondly, the opportunity of discovering with facility and clearness the misconduct of the persons they trust, in order either to their removal from office or to their actual punishment in cases which admit of it.

In England, the king is a perpetual magistrate; and it is a maxim which has obtained for the sake of the public peace, that he is unaccountable for his administration, and his person sacred. Nothing, therefore, can be wiser in that kingdom, than to annex to the king a constitutional council, who may be responsible to the nation for the advice they give. Without this, there would be no responsibility whatever in the executive department an idea inadmissible in a free government. But even there the king is not bound by the resolutions of his council, though they are answerable for the advice they give. He is the absolute master of his own conduct in the exercise of his office, and may observe or disregard the counsel given to him at his sole discretion.

But in a republic, where every magistrate ought to be personally responsible for his behavior in office the reason which in the British Constitution dictates the propriety of a council, not only ceases to apply, but turns against the institution. In the monarchy of Great Britain, it furnishes a substitute for the prohibited responsibility of the chief magistrate, which serves in some degree as a hostage to the national justice for his good behavior. In the American republic, it would serve to destroy, or would greatly diminish, the intended and necessary responsibility of the Chief Magistrate himself.

The idea of a council to the Executive, which has so generally obtained in the State constitutions, has been derived from that maxim of republican jealousy which considers power as safer in the hands of a number of men than of a single man. If the maxim should be admitted to be applicable to the case, I should contend that the advantage on that side would not counterbalance the numerous disadvantages on the opposite side. But I do not think the rule at all applicable to the executive power. I clearly concur in opinion, in this particular, with a writer whom the celebrated Junius pronounces to be "deep, solid, and ingenious, ; that it is far more safe there should be a single object for the jealousy and watchfulness of the people; and, in a word, that all multiplication of the Executive is rather dangerous than friendly to liberty.

A little consideration will satisfy us, that the species of security sought for in the multiplication of the Executive, is unattainable. Numbers must be so great as to render combination difficult, or they are rather a source of danger than of security. The united credit and influence of several individuals must be more formidable to liberty, than the credit and influence of either of them separately. When power, therefore, is placed in the hands of so small a number of men, as to admit of their interests and views being easily combined in a common enterprise, by an artful leader, it becomes more liable to abuse, and more dangerous when abused, than if it be lodged in the hands of one man; who, from the very circumstance of his being alone, will be more narrowly watched and more readily suspected, and who cannot unite so great a mass of influence as when he is associated with others. The Decemvirs of Rome, whose name denotes their number, were more to be dreaded in their usurpation than any ONE of them would have been. No person would think of proposing an Executive much more numerous than that body; from six to a dozen have been suggested for the number of the council. The extreme of these numbers, is not too great for an easy combination; and from such a combination America would have more to fear, than from the ambition of any single individual. A council to a magistrate, who is himself responsible for what he does, are generally nothing better than a clog upon his good intentions, are often the instruments and accomplices of his bad and are almost always a cloak to his faults.

I forbear to dwell upon the subject of expense; though it be evident that if the council should be numerous enough to answer the principal end aimed at by the institution, the salaries of the members, who must be drawn from their homes to reside at the seat of government, would form an item in the catalogue of public expenditures too serious to be incurred for an object of equivocal utility. I will only add that, prior to the appearance of the Constitution, I rarely met with an intelligent man from any of the States, who did not admit, as the result of experience, that the UNITY of the executive of this State was one of the best of the distinguishing features of our constitution.

PUBLIUS.

”

Background of the Federalist Papers

The Federalist Papers are the 85 articles and essays James Madison, Alexander Hamilton, and John Jay published arguing for the ratification of the U.S. Constitution and the full replacement of the Aritcles of Confederation. All three writers published their papers under the collective pseudonym Publius between 1787-1788. [4]

The Articles of Confederation were an agreement among the original thirteen states in the United States to unite under a central government consisting of the Continental Congress. The Continental Congress proposed the Articles in 1777, and they became effective in March 1781.

The Articles primarily authorized the national government to govern diplomatic foreign relations and regulate and fund the Continental Army. Under the Articles, the Continental Congress lacked the power to levy taxes and could only request funds from the states. The inability of the national government to raise money caused the government to default on pension payments to former Revolutionary War soldiers and other financial obligations, resulting in unrest. Shay's Rebellion was a prominent example of unrest related to the weakness of the central government and the Continental Congress' inability to fulfill its obligations.

The Constitutional Convention of 1787 was convened to solve the problems related to the weak national government. Federalists, including James Madison, Alexander Hamilton, and John Jay, advocated for a completely new government under the United States Constitution . They rejected the Articles of Confederation as a weak governing document that needed fully replaced. The federalists thought the strengthened national government could help protect individual rights from factional conflicts at the state and local levels. They argued the Constitution would strengthen the federal government enough to allow for effective governance but not enough to infringe on the rights of individuals. [5] [6] [4]

Anti-federalists like Patrick Henry, Melancton Smith, and George Clinton argued that the national government proposed under the Constitution would be too powerful and would infringe on individual liberties. They thought the Articles of Confederation needed amended, not replaced. [5] [6] [4]

Full list of Federalist Papers

The following is a list of individual essays that were collected and published in 1788 as The Federalist and later known as The Federalist Papers . These essays were written by Alexander Hamilton, James Madison, and John Jay. They argued for ratification of the United States Constitution as a replacement for the Articles of Confederation .

The Federalist Papers
Number	Subject	Author
No 1		Hamilton
No 2		Jay
No 3		Jay
No 4		Jay
No 5		Jay
No 6		Hamilton
No 7		Hamilton
No 8		Hamilton
No 9		Hamilton
No 10		Madison
No 11		Hamilton
No 12		Hamilton
No 13		Hamilton
No 14		Madison
No 15		Hamilton
No 16		Hamilton
No 17		Hamilton
No 18		Hamilton and Madison
No 19		Hamilton and Madison
No 20		Hamilton and Madison
No 21		Hamilton
No 22		Hamilton
No 23		Hamilton
No 24		Hamilton
No 25		Hamilton
No 26		Hamilton
No 27		Hamilton
No 28		Hamilton
No 29		Hamilton
No 30		Hamilton
No 31		Hamilton
No 32		Hamilton
No 33		Hamilton
No 34		Hamilton
No 35		Hamilton
No 36		Hamilton
No 37		Madison
No 38		Madison
No 39		Madison
No 40		Madison
No 41		Madison
No 42		Madison
No 43		Madison
No 44		Madison
No 45		Madison
No 46		Madison
No 47		Madison
No 48		Madison
No 49		Hamilton and Madison
No 50		Hamilton and Madison
No 51		Hamilton and Madison
No 52		Hamilton and Madison
No 53		Hamilton and Madison
No 54		Hamilton and Madison
No 55		Hamilton and Madison
No 56		Hamilton and Madison
No 57		Hamilton and Madison
No 58		Madison
No 59		Hamilton
No 60		Hamilton
No 61		Hamilton
No 62		Hamilton and Madison
No 63		Hamilton and Madison
No 64		Jay
No 65		Hamilton
No 66		Hamilton
No 67		Hamilton
No 68		Hamilton
No 69		Hamilton
No 70		Hamilton
No 71		Hamilton
No 72		Hamilton
No 73		Hamilton
No 74		Hamilton
No 75		Hamilton
No 76		Hamilton
No 77		Hamilton
No 78		Hamilton
No 79		Hamilton
No 80		Hamilton
No 81		Hamilton
No 82		Hamilton
No 83		Hamilton
No 84		Hamilton
No 85		Hamilton

Federalist Papers
Anti-Federalist papers

External links

Search Google News for this topic
↑ 1.0 1.1 Yale Law School , "The Federalist Papers: No. 70," accessed June 17, 2022
↑ Biography.com , "Alexander Hamilton," accessed March 6, 2018
↑ Note: This text is quoted verbatim from the original source. Any inconsistencies are attributable to the original source.
↑ 4.0 4.1 4.2 The Federalist Papers , "THE ANTIFEDERALIST PAPERS," accesses May 27, 2022
↑ 5.0 5.1 Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy Archive , "Federalism," accessed July 27, 2021
↑ 6.0 6.1 Middle Tennessee State University , "Anti-Federalists," accessed July 27, 2021

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First Amendment Exhibit Historic Graphic

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The first amendment, historic document, federalist 68, 70, 72 (1788).

Alexander Hamilton | 1788

Mezzotint color print by Thomas Hamilton Crawford of Alexander Hamilton, full-length portrait, 1932.

After the Constitutional Convention adjourned in September 1787, Alexander Hamilton spearheaded an initiative to lead the public discussion of the draft instrument through The Federalist Papers . In a single week in March 1788, there appeared the three essays from which these extracts are excerpted, discussing the nature of the executive authority under the Constitution. In these essays, we find two strands of thought. First, the executive is identified as the unique vehicle of necessary “secrecy,” “energy,” and “dispatch” in administering the affairs of government. Secondly, Hamilton identifies the executive as part of that popular basis of the government that is designed to assure that government operates on the basis of the “deliberate sense of the community.” It is further to be observed that we find here the development of that nomenclature that leads the United States uniquely to deploy the term “Administration” in defining the executive office.

Selected by

William B. Allen

Emeritus Dean of James Madison College and Emeritus Professor of Political Science at Michigan State University

Jonathan Gienapp

Associate Professor of History at Stanford University

Federalist 68:

THE mode of appointment of the Chief Magistrate of the United States is almost the only part of the system, of any consequence, which has escaped without severe censure, or which has received the slightest mark of approbation from its opponents. The most plausible of these, who has appeared in print, has even deigned to admit that the election of the President is pretty well guarded. I venture somewhat further, and hesitate not to affirm, that if the manner of it be not perfect, it is at least excellent. It unites in an eminent degree all the advantages, the union of which was to be wished for.

It was desirable that the sense of the people should operate in the choice of the person to whom so important a trust was to be confided…

It was equally desirable, that the immediate election should be made by men most capable of analyzing the qualities adapted to the station, and acting under circumstances favorable to deliberation, and to a judicious combination of all the reasons and inducements which were proper to govern their choice. A small number of persons, selected by their fellow-citizens from the general mass, will be most likely to possess the information and discernment requisite to such complicated investigations. …

Another and no less important desideratum was, that the Executive should be independent for his continuance in office on all but the people themselves… This advantage will also be secured, by making his re-election to depend on a special body of representatives, deputed by the society for the single purpose of making the important choice.

All these advantages will happily combine in the plan devised by the convention; which is, that the people of each State shall choose a number of persons as electors, equal to the number of senators and representatives of such State in the national government, who shall assemble within the State, and vote for some fit person as President...

The process of election affords a moral certainty…that there will be a constant probability of seeing the station filled by characters pre-eminent for ability and virtue. And this will be thought no inconsiderable recommendation of the Constitution, by those who are able to estimate the share which the executive in every government must necessarily have in its good or ill administration. Though we cannot acquiesce in the political heresy of the poet who says: “For forms of government let fools contest That which is best administered is best,”…the true test of a good government is its aptitude and tendency to produce a good administration.”

Federalist 70:

There can be no need, however, to multiply arguments or examples on this head. A feeble Executive implies a feeble execution of the government. A feeble execution is but another phrase for a bad execution; and a government ill executed, whatever it may be in theory, must be, in practice, a bad government.

Taking it for granted, therefore, that all men of sense will agree in the necessity of an energetic Executive, it will only remain to inquire, what are the ingredients which constitute this energy? How far can they be combined with those other ingredients which constitute safety in the republican sense? And how far does this combination characterize the plan which has been reported by the convention?

The ingredients which constitute energy in the Executive are, first, unity; secondly, duration; thirdly, an adequate provision for its support; fourthly, competent powers.

The ingredients which constitute safety in the republican sense are, first, a due dependence on the people, secondly, a due responsibility.

Those politicians and statesmen who have been the most celebrated for the soundness of their principles and for the justice of their views, have declared in favor of a single Executive and a numerous legislature. They have with great propriety, considered energy as the most necessary qualification of the former, and have regarded this as most applicable to power in a single hand, while they have, with equal propriety, considered the latter as best adapted to deliberation and wisdom, and best calculated to conciliate the confidence of the people and to secure their privileges and interests.

That unity is conducive to energy will not be disputed. Decision, activity, secrecy, and despatch will generally characterize the proceedings of one man in a much more eminent degree than the proceedings of any greater number; and in proportion as the number is increased, these qualities will be diminished.

This unity may be destroyed in two ways: either by vesting the power in two or more magistrates of equal dignity and authority; or by vesting it ostensibly in one man, subject, in whole or in part, to the control and co-operation of others, in the capacity of counsellors to him…. They are both liable, if not equal, to similar objections, and may in most lights be examined in conjunction. …

Wherever two or more persons are engaged in any common enterprise or pursuit, there is always danger of difference of opinion. If it be a public trust or office, in which they are clothed with equal dignity and authority, there is peculiar danger of personal emulation and even animosity. From either, and especially from all these causes, the most bitter dissensions are apt to spring. Whenever these happen, they lessen the respectability, weaken the authority, and distract the plans and operation of those whom they divide…. And what is still worse, they might split the community into the most violent and irreconcilable factions, adhering differently to the different individuals who composed the magistracy. …

But one of the weightiest objections to a plurality in the Executive, and which lies as much against the last as the first plan, is, that it tends to conceal faults and destroy responsibility. Responsibility is of two kinds to censure and to punishment. The first is the more important of the two, especially in an elective office. Man, in public trust, will much oftener act in such a manner as to render him unworthy of being any longer trusted, than in such a manner as to make him obnoxious to legal punishment. But the multiplication of the Executive adds to the difficulty of detection in either case. It often becomes impossible, amidst mutual accusations, to determine on whom the blame or the punishment of a pernicious measure, or series of pernicious measures, ought really to fall. …

It is evident from these considerations, that the plurality of the Executive tends to deprive the people of the two greatest securities they can have for the faithful exercise of any delegated power, first, the restraints of public opinion, which lose their efficacy, as well on account of the division of the censure attendant on bad measures among a number, as on account of the uncertainty on whom it ought to fall; and, secondly, the opportunity of discovering with facility and clearness the misconduct of the persons they trust, in order either to their removal from office or to their actual punishment in cases which admit of it. …

[I]n a republic, where every magistrate ought to be personally responsible for his behavior in office the reason which in the British Constitution dictates the propriety of a council, not only ceases to apply, but turns against the institution. In the monarchy of Great Britain, it furnishes a substitute for the prohibited responsibility of the chief magistrate, which serves in some degree as a hostage to the national justice for his good behavior. In the American republic, it would serve to destroy, or would greatly diminish, the intended and necessary responsibility of the Chief Magistrate himself.”

Federalist 72:

THE administration of government, in its largest sense, comprehends all the operations of the body politic, whether legislative, executive, or judiciary; but in its most usual, and perhaps its most precise signification. it is limited to executive details and falls peculiarly within the province of the executive department. The actual conduct of foreign negotiations, the preparatory plans of finance, the application and disbursement of the public moneys in conformity to the general appropriations of the legislature, the arrangement of the army and navy, the directions of the operations of war, these, and other matters of a like nature, constitute what seems to be most properly understood by the administration of government. The persons, therefore, to whose immediate management these different matters are committed, ought to be considered as the assistants or deputies of the chief magistrate, and on this account, they ought to derive their offices from his appointment, at least from his nomination, and ought to be subject to his superintendence. This view of the subject will at once suggest to us the intimate connection between the duration of the executive magistrate in office and the stability of the system of administration. To reverse and undo what has been done by a predecessor, is very often considered by a successor as the best proof he can give of his own capacity and desert; and in addition to this propensity, where the alteration has been the result of public choice, the person substituted is warranted in supposing that the dismission of his predecessor has proceeded from a dislike to his measures; and that the less he resembles him, the more he will recommend himself to the favor of his constituents. These considerations, and the influence of personal confidences and attachments, would be likely to induce every new President to promote a change of men to fill the subordinate stations; and these causes together could not fail to occasion a disgraceful and ruinous mutability in the administration of the government.

With a positive duration of considerable extent, I connect the circumstance of re-eligibility. The first is necessary to give to the officer himself the inclination and the resolution to act his part well, and to the community time and leisure to observe the tendency of his measures, and thence to form an experimental estimate of their merits. . . .

Nothing appears more plausible at first sight, nor more ill-founded upon close inspection, than a scheme which in relation to the present point has had some respectable advocates, I mean that of continuing the chief magistrate in office for a certain time, and then excluding him from it, either for a limited period or forever after. This exclusion, whether temporary or perpetual, would have nearly the same effects, and these effects would be for the most part rather pernicious than salutary.

One ill effect of the exclusion would be a diminution of the inducements to good behavior. There are few men who would not feel much less zeal in the discharge of a duty when they were conscious that the advantages of the station with which it was connected must be relinquished at a determinate period, than when they were permitted to entertain a hope of OBTAINING, by MERITING, a continuance of them. This position will not be disputed so long as it is admitted that the desire of reward is one of the strongest incentives of human conduct; or that the best security for the fidelity of mankind is to make their interests coincide with their duty. Even the love of fame, the ruling passion of the noblest minds, which would prompt a man to plan and undertake extensive and arduous enterprises for the public benefit, requiring considerable time to mature and perfect them, if he could flatter himself with the prospect of being allowed to finish what he had begun, would, on the contrary, deter him from the undertaking, when he foresaw that he must quit the scene before he could accomplish the work, and must commit that, together with his own reputation, to hands which might be unequal or unfriendly to the task. The most to be expected from the generality of men, in such a situation, is the negative merit of not doing harm, instead of the positive merit of doing good. …

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Lesson Plan: Federalist No. 70 Publius (Alexander Hamilton) The Executive Department

Federalist No. 70 Executive Power Hamilton's Belief

Professor discusses Hamilton understanding of Executive Power

Description

Federalist No. 70 is the fourth of eleven essays written by Hamilton defending the Presidency against the “unfairness” of the Antifederalist “representations.” The essay opens with the Antifederalist concern “that a vigorous Executive is inconsistent with the genius of republican government.” Hamilton’s response is that “energy in the executive is a leading character in the definition of good government.” Author Robert Scigliano communicates Hamilton’s belief that there is a need for Executive power and the office requires an energetic presence to hold it together. Law Professor John Yoo analyses Federalist No. 70 and makes modern connections to the actions of presidents and the repercussions of those actions.

Ask students to write down what elements must exist in order to allow a leader to function. This can be a leadership position on a sports team, school club, at work, or in political office.

Allow the students to share their thoughts.

The teacher can record the student responses on the board as a reference point when the students read through Federalist No. 70.

As a class, view video clip one and engage in a discussion to set the context of Federalist No. 70.

Video Clip 1: Federalist No. 70 Executive Power Hamilton’s Belief (00:36)

If you would like more information on the context of the Federalist Papers Professor Elizabeth Cobbs Hoffman lectures about Alexander Hamilton’s role in the creation of the federal government in video clip two.

Video Clip 2. Alexander Hamilton (49:56)

Group students in teams of three or four and direct them to watch the video clip one again.

Assign each group three or four paragraphs to read from Federalist No. 70. Adjust group size and number of paragraphs as you see fit. There are 25 paragraphs in Federalist No. 70. Overlap will allow for multiple perspectives but be sure to assign all 25 paragraphs in order to cover the document in its entirety.

Allow each group to create a snap using the Snapchat app for each paragraph. Snapchat allows students to act out events, draw, and photograph items and events then enhance those images with text and clip art. Instruct the students to use their creativity to illustrate the main idea of each of the paragraphs they were assigned.

Ask one student to set up a geographic location for your classroom. This will allow the students to share their work with everyone in that area. This provides students with an opportunity to review the work of others. The teacher does not need a Snapchat account to utilize this formative assessment. Allow the students to show you the snaps they created on their phones or have them send you a screenshot of their creation through email.

Provide students with an opportunity to share their work as a class. If the students established a geographic location and shared their work with peers they may have begun this process. Have each group share their work with the class. Be sure the students explain what they believe the main idea of the paragraph was. Allow the groups to present in order of the writing of Federalist No. 70.

As the groups present be sure you make the class aware of how their work fits together as part of Federalist No. 70.

Once each of the groups has presented their snaps ask the students to review the elements they thought were necessary to allow a leader to function.

Discuss what the students thought was necessary and what Hamilton thought was necessary.

Ask the students to speculate on how the effectiveness of the Executive would be altered if a provision from Federalist No. 70 was eliminated?

To conclude the lesson view the video clip Federalist No. 70 Executive Power. (3:26)

Ask each of the students to create a snap that communicates Dr. John Yoo’s views on Federalist No. 70 and how modern presidents have overstepped Hamilton’s intentions.

Students could use a notecard to draw pictures and add text that communicates ideas as a substitution for the use of Snapchat in this lesson.

EXTENSION ACTIVITIES:

Argumentative Essay Free Response Question- Informal Powers Respond to this writing prompt (Google Doc) presented in the style of the Argumentative Question component of the redesigned AP Government and Politics exam.

Additional Resources

Transcript of Federalist No. 70

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Essential Documents
Federalist No. 70
Separation Of Powers

The American Founding

Federalist No. 70

March 15, 1788

There is an idea, which is not without its advocates, that a vigorous executive is inconsistent with the genius of republican government. The enlightened well-wishers to this species of government must at least hope that the supposition is destitute of foundation; since they can never admit its truth, without at the same time admitting the condemnation of their own principles. Energy in the executive is a leading character in the definition of good government. It is essential to the protection of the community against foreign attacks; it is not less essential to the steady administration of the laws; to the protection of property against those irregular and high-handed combinations which sometimes interrupt the ordinary course of justice; to the security of liberty against the enterprises and assaults of ambition, of faction, and of anarchy. Every man the least conversant in Roman history knows how often that republic was obliged to take refuge in the absolute power of a single man, under the formidable title of dictator, as well against the intrigues of ambitious individuals who aspired to the tyranny, and the seditions of whole classes of the community whose conduct threatened the existence of all government, as against the invasions of external enemies who menaced the conquest and destruction of Rome.

There can be no need, however, to multiply arguments or examples on this head. A feeble executive implies a feeble execution of the government. A feeble execution is but another phrase for a bad execution; and a government ill executed, whatever it may be in theory, must be, in practice, a bad government.

Taking it for granted, therefore, that all men of sense will agree in the necessity of an energetic executive; it will only remain to inquire, what are the ingredients which constitute this energy? How far can they be combined with those other ingredients which constitute safety in the republican sense? And how far does this combination characterize the plan which has been reported by the convention?

The ingredients which constitute energy in the executive are unity; duration; an adequate provision for its support; and competent powers.

The ingredients which constitute safety in the republican sense are a due dependence on the people, secondly a due responsibility.

Those politicians and statesmen who have been the most celebrated for the soundness of their principles and for the justness of their views have declared in favor of a single executive and a numerous legislature. They have with great propriety, considered energy as the most necessary qualification of the former, and have regarded this as most applicable to power in a single hand; while they have, with equal propriety, considered the latter as best adapted to deliberation and wisdom, and best calculated to conciliate the confidence of the people and to secure their privileges and interests.

That unity is conducive to energy will not be disputed. Decision, activity, secrecy, and dispatch will generally characterize the proceedings of one man in a much more eminent degree than the proceedings of any greater number; and in proportion as the number is increased, these qualities will be diminished.

This unity may be destroyed in two ways: either by vesting the power in two or more magistrates of equal dignity and authority, or by vesting it ostensibly in one man, subject in whole or in part to the control and co-operation of others, in the capacity of counselors to him. Of the first, the two consuls of Rome may serve as an example; of the last, we shall find examples in the constitutions of several of the States. New York and New Jersey, if I recollect right, are the only States which have entrusted the executive authority wholly to single men. Both these methods of destroying the unity of the executive have their partisans; but the votaries of an executive council are the most numerous. They are both liable, if not to equal, to similar objections, and may in most lights be examined in conjunction.

The experience of other nations will afford little instruction on this head. As far, however, as it teaches anything, it teaches us not to be enamored of plurality in the executive. We have seen that the Achaeans on an experiment of two Praetors, were induced to abolish one. The Roman history records many instances of mischiefs to the republic from the dissentions between the consuls, and between the military tribunes, who were at times substituted to the consuls. But it gives us no specimens of any peculiar advantages derived to the state from the circumstance of the plurality of those magistrates. That the dissentions between them were not more frequent or more fatal is matter of astonishment, until we advert to the singular position in which he republic was almost continually placed and to the prudent policy pointed out by the circumstances of the state, and pursued by the consuls, of making a division of the government between them. The patricians engaged in a perpetual struggle with the plebians for the preservation of their ancient authorities and dignities; the consuls, who were generally chosen out of the former body, were commonly united by the personal interest they had in the defense of the privileges of their order. In addition to this motive of union, after the arms of the republic had considerably expanded the bounds of its empire, it became an established custom with the consuls to divide the administration between themselves by lot—one of them remaining at Rome to govern the city and its environs; the other taking the command in the more distant provinces. This expedient must no doubt have had great influence in preventing those collisions and rivalships which might otherwise have embroiled the peace of the republic.

Wherever two or more persons are engaged in any common enterprise or pursuit, there is always danger of difference of opinion. If it be a public trust or office in which they are clothed with equal dignity and authority, there is peculiar danger of personal emulation and even animosity. From either, and especially from all these causes, the most bitter dissentions are apt to spring. Whenever these happen, they lessen the respectability, weaken the authority, and distract the plans and operations of those whom they divide. If they should unfortunately assail the supreme executive magistracy of a country, consisting of a plurality of persons, they might impede or frustrate the most important measures of the government in the most critical emergencies of the state. And what is still worse, they might split the community into the most violent and irreconcilable factions, adhering differently to the different individuals who composed the magistracy.

Men often oppose a thing merely because they have had no agency in planning it, or because it may have been planned by those whom they dislike. But if they have been consulted, and have happened to disapprove, opposition then becomes, in their estimation an indispensable duty of self-love. They seem to think themselves bound in honor, and by all the motives of personal infallibility, to defeat the success of what has been resolved upon, contrary to their sentiments. Men of upright, benevolent tempers have too many opportunities of remarking, with horror, to what desperate lengths this disposition is sometimes carried, and how often the great interests of society are sacrificed to the vanity, to the conceit, and to the obstinacy of individuals, who have credit enough to make their passions and their caprices interesting to mankind. Perhaps the question now before the public may, in its consequences, afford melancholy proofs of the effects of this despicable frailty, or rather detestable vice, in the human character.

Upon the principles of a free government, inconveniences from the source just mentioned must necessarily be submitted to in the formation of the legislature; but it is unnecessary, and therefore unwise, to introduce them into the constitution of the executive. It is here too that they may be most pernicious. In the legislature, promptitude of decision is oftener an evil than a benefit. The differences of opinion, and the jarrings of parties in that department of the government, though they may sometimes obstruct salutary plans, yet often promote deliberation and circumspection, and serve to check excesses in the majority. When a resolution too is once taken, the opposition must be at an end. That resolution is a law, and resistance to it punishable. But no favorable circumstances palliate or atone for the disadvantages of dissention in the executive department. Here they are pure and unmixed. There is no point at which they cease to operate. They serve to embarrass and weaken the execution of the plan or measure to which they relate, from the first step to the final conclusion of it. They constantly counteract those qualities in the executive which are the most necessary ingredients in its composition—vigor and expedition, and this without any counterbalancing good. In the conduct of war, in which the energy of the executive is the bulwark of the national security, everything would be to be apprehended from its plurality.

It must be confessed that these observations apply with principal weight to the first case supposed—that is, to a plurality of magistrates of equal dignity and authority, a scheme, the advocates for which are not likely to form a numerous sect; but they apply, though not with equal yet with considerable weight to the project of a council, whose concurrence is made constitutionally necessary to the operations of the ostensible executive. An artful cabal in that council would be able to distract and to enervate the whole system of administration. If no such cabal should exist, the mere diversity of views and opinions would alone be sufficient to tincture the exercise of the executive authority with a spirit of habitual feebleness and dilatoriness.

But one of the weightiest objections to a plurality in the executive, and which lies as much against the last as the first plan is that it tends to conceal faults and destroy responsibility. Responsibility is of two kinds—to censure and to punishment. The first is the most important of the two, especially in an elective office. Men in public trust will much oftener act in such a manner as to render them unworthy of being any longer trusted, than in such a manner as to make him obnoxious to legal punishment. But the multiplication of the executive adds to the difficulty of detection in either case. It often becomes impossible, amidst mutual accusations, to determine on whom the blame or the punishment of a pernicious measure, or series of pernicious measures, ought really to fall. It is shifted from one to another with so much dexterity, and under such plausible appearances, that the public opinion is left in suspense about the real author. The circumstances which may have led to any national miscarriage or misfortune are sometimes so complicated that where there are a number of actors who may have had different degrees and kinds of agency, though we may clearly see upon the whole that there has been mismanagement, yet it may be impracticable to pronounce to whose account the evil which may have been incurred is truly chargeable.

“I was overruled by my council. The council were so divided in their opinions that it was impossible to obtain any better resolution on the point.” These and similar pretexts are constantly at hand, whether true or false. And who is there that will either take the trouble or incur the odium of a strict scrutiny into the secret springs of the transaction? Should there be found a citizen zealous enough to undertake the unpromising task, if there happened to be a collusion between the parties concerned, how easy is it to cloth the circumstances with so much ambiguity as to render it uncertain what was the precise conduct of any of those parties?

In the single instance in which the governor of this state is coupled with a council—that is, in the appointment to offices, we have seen the mischiefs of it in the view now under consideration. Scandalous appointments to important offices have been made. Some cases indeed have been so flagrant that ALL PARTIES have agreed in the impropriety of the thing. When inquiry has been made, the blame has been laid by the governor on the members of the council; who on their part have charged it upon his nomination; while the people remain altogether at a loss to determine by whose influence their interests have been committed to hands so unqualified and so manifestly improper. In tenderness to individuals, I forbear to descend to particulars.

It is evident from these considerations that the plurality of the executive tends to deprive the people of the two greatest securities they can have for the faithful exercise of any delegated power, first , the restraints of public opinion, which lose their efficacy as well on account of the division of the censure attendant on bad measures among a number as on account of the uncertainty on whom it ought to fall; and, second , the opportunity of discovering with facility and clearness the misconduct of the persons they trust, in order either to their removal from office or to their actual punishment in cases which admit of it.

In England, the king is a perpetual magistrate; and it is a maxim which has obtained for the sake of the public peace that he is unaccountable for his administration, and his person sacred. Nothing, therefore, can be wiser in that kingdom than to annex to the king a constitutional council, who may be responsible to the nation for the advice they give. Without this, there would be no responsibility whatever in the executive department—an idea inadmissible in a free government. But even there the king is not bound by the resolutions of his council, though they are answerable for the advice they give. He is the absolute master of his own conduct in the exercise of his office and may observe or disregard the council given to him at his sole discretion.

But in a republic where every magistrate ought to be personally responsible for his behavior in office, the reason which in the British Constitution dictates the propriety of a council not only ceases to apply, but turns against the institution. In the monarchy of Great Britain, it furnishes a substitute for the prohibited responsibility of the Chief Magistrate, which serves in some degree as a hostage to the national justice for his good behavior. In the American republic, it would serve to destroy, or would greatly diminish, the intended and necessary responsibility of the Chief Magistrate himself.

The idea of a council to the executive, which has so generally obtained in the State constitutions, has been derived from that maxim of republican jealousy which considers power as safer in the hands of a number of men than of a single man. If the maxim should be admitted to be applicable to the case, I should contend that the advantage on that side would not counterbalance the numerous disadvantages on the opposite side. But I do not think the rule at all applicable to the executive power. I clearly concur in opinion, in this particular, with a writer whom the celebrated Junius pronounces to be “deep, solid and ingenious,” that “the executive power is more easily confined when it is one”; that it is far more safe there should be a single object for the jealousy and watchfulness of the people; and, in a word, that all multiplication of the executive is rather dangerous than friendly to liberty.

A little consideration will satisfy us that the species of security sought for in the multiplication of the executive is unattainable. Numbers must be so great as to render combination difficult, or they are rather a source of danger than of security. The united credit and influence of several individuals must be more formidable to liberty than the credit and influence of either of them separately. When power, therefore, is placed in the hands of so small a number of men as to admit of their interests and views being easily combined in a common enterprise, by an artful leader, it becomes more liable to abuse and more dangerous when abused, than if it be lodged in the hands of one man, who, from the very circumstance of his being alone, will be more narrowly watched and more readily suspected, and who cannot unite so great a mass of influence as when he is associated with others. The decemvirs of Rome, whose name denotes their number, were more to be dreaded in their usurpation than any ONE of them would have been. No person would think of proposing an executive much more numerous than that body; from six to a dozen have been suggested for the number of the council. The extreme of these numbers is not too great for an easy combination; and from such a combination America would have more to fear than from the ambition of any single individual. A council to a magistrate, who is himself responsible for what he does, are generally nothing better than a clog upon his good intentions, are often the instruments and accomplices of his bad, and are almost always a cloak to his faults.

I forbear to dwell upon the subject of expense; though it be evident that if the council should be numerous enough to answer the principal end aimed at by the institution, the salaries of the members, who must be drawn from their homes to reside at the seat of government, would form an item in the catalogue of public expenditures too serious to be incurred for an object of equivocal utility.

I will only add that, prior to the appearance of the Constitution, I rarely met with an intelligent man from any of the States who did not admit, as the result of experience, that the UNITY of the executive of this State was one of the best of the distinguishing features of our Constitution.

Source: The Federalist: The Gideon Edition, eds. George W. Carey and James McClellan (Indianapolis: Liberty Fund, 2001), 362-369.

Presidential Power in Hamilton’s Federalist No. 70 Essay

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The most significant argument presented in the Federalist paper number seventy involves giving the executive absolute power to make it strong and prevent any mischievous encroachment from both external and internal forces. It was presented by Alexander Hamilton on March 15, 1788. In his presentation, Hamilton emphasizes on the need to have an energetic executive over any other arm of government. To him, a vigorous executive defines the qualities of a good government. When absolute authority is vested in the executive, it will be able to carry out its functions properly. The analogy presented in the Federalist paper number seventy formed the basis of the present-day powerful executive in the United States.

It is common knowledge that an American president is the most powerful figure in the world. The paper outlines that anything contrary to a powerful executive that is led by a president is a recipe for a weak government. Hamilton explains in the second paragraph that people apply in their practical life what is written in theory. Therefore, a feeble executive means that the government will be weak, and as such the execution of functions will be bad. The question of whether there is a need for an energetic executive remains inconsequential as all well-wishers who are open-minded will agree that it is the only way the citizens can be served to the fullest. What is significant is to assess the constituents of the energy that should propel a strong executive to a level of becoming very vigorous. The process demands an evaluation of the degree to which the factors of energy can be joined to make sure that the republicans are safe.

The Federalist paper number seventy states that there are four qualities of a strong executive. They include harmony, time, satisfactory support, and proficient powers. Authority without power is useless. The safety of American people can be guaranteed if the executive relies on the service to humanity and having due responsibility that is accountable. Hamilton elaborates that the duty of checking the executive should be left to the legislature. In the distribution of power, the paper quotes the structure of Rome that was divided into two. Absolute power remained in Rome.

Rome could set the policy and agenda for its people while the second arm was left to the small distant institutions that helped in the running of the nation’s affairs. In the American case, the interests of the people will be brought through the legislature where the citizens’ own elected representatives would sit to deliberate on issues. Absolute power cannot be shared by two or more centers. If this happens then, unity will be destroyed because of the wrangles that would emerge. This could come from rivalry, competition, or normal human selfish interests. They may also be expressions of frustrations.

The eighth passage in the article explains why Hamilton feared for a nation whose executive was feeble. Political systems including parties were run in fear and were full divisive politics before the American Revolution. The founders of the nation of America hoped to strike unity of purpose across the entire U.S. They included Thomas Jefferson, George Washington, and Alexander Hamilton. They, however, did not find this an easy ride as only thirteen states were prepared to take part in the war of the revolution.

Different competing interests from different states and leaders led to this tough journey towards unity. The fight for a united country is what led to Abraham Lincoln declaring war on states such as California that had defied the call for unity. The president had to be powerful to meet the cause of unity. This is captured in the eighth passage when Hamilton salutes the ideology of New York and New Jersey posting the center of power to one solitary entity. This is the ingredient of enhancing unity according to Alexander Hamilton. The act of distributing executive power led to the collapse of Rome.

The emphasis on ensuring that power is vested on one spot is to avoid the pitfalls that are highlighted in passage eleven. The paper identifies that any engagements involving more than one person will likely experience the impact of differing opinions. The situation is very precarious if the different parties are entrusted with a public or state office because the outcome could cause animosity. This will make the authority weak and distract the plans of execution by the feuding parties. Delivery of service in such a case will be impractical as important government functions will be curtailed.

The reoccurrence of such actions could split the nation into factions that oppose each other and the consequences could be violent war. Eventually, the nation may be forced to split because the warring factions could be irreconcilable. The remedy that would avoid all these likely occurrences is to have a strong executive office with absolute powers and a big legislature to check the executive. Up to date, the U.S. has an imperial presidency. What the Federalists and Democratic-Republicans who were the founders of the nation of America fought to meet that is Unity through an energetic executive is now being enjoyed by all Americans.

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Bibliography

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Federalist 70 Explained | Why Does the U.S. Have a Unitary Executive?

Description

Why does the Constitution call for a unitary executive? In this episode of BRI’s Primary Source Close Reads, Kirk looks at Federalist 70 and the debate between adopting a singular or plural executive. How does Publius argue that unity and energy are embodied in a unitary executive? How does the role of disagreement differ between the legislature and the executive?

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A Primary Source Close Reads Video Playlist

Dive into some of the most important speeches and documents from United States history. These videos dissect these documents, define key terms, and explore the lasting impact of the featured documents.

Federalist 70

In this Federalist Paper, Alexander Hamilton argues for a strong executive leader, as provided for by the Constitution, as opposed to the weak executive under the Articles of Confederation. He asserts, “energy in the executive is the leading character in the definition of good government.

Federalist 70 Excerpts

Federalist Papers

In order to help convince their fellow Americans of their view that the Constitution would not threaten freedom, James Madison, Alexander Hamilton, and John Jay teamed up in 1788 to write a series of essays in defense of the Constitution. The essays, which appeared in newspapers addressed to the people of the state of New York, are known as the Federalist Papers. They are regarded as one of the most authoritative sources on the meaning of the Constitution, including constitutional principles such as checks and balances, federalism, and separation of powers.

All Subjects

Federalist No. 70

Federalist No. 70 is an essay written by Alexander Hamilton arguing for a single, energetic executive in the U.S. government, which ultimately influenced the structure of the American presidency.

Related terms

Federalist Papers : A collection of 85 articles and essays written by Alexander Hamilton, James Madison, and John Jay promoting the ratification of the United States Constitution.

Executive Branch : The branch of federal and state government that is broadly responsible for implementing, supporting, and enforcing the laws made by the legislative branch and interpreted by the judicial branch.

Unitary Executive Theory : A theory that supports a strong executive power held by the President, which includes control over all executive branches without interference from other branches.

" Federalist No. 70 " appears in:

Study guides ( 1 ).

AP US Government - 2.6 Expansion of Presidential Power

Subjects ( 1 )

The American Presidency

Practice Questions ( 2 )

According to Federalist No. 70, what is the primary argument in favor of having a single executive in the government?
What is the main idea presented in Federalist No. 70?

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Federalist No. 69 & Federalist No. 70 – Cathy Gillespie

Greetings from Long Beach Island New Jersey! What fun I’ve been having reading the Federalist Papers on the beach! And what interesting looks I get from passersby who take the time to glance at the cover of my book.

Federalist Papers 68-77 are especially interesting to me personally, as I have been fascinated by the Presidency for as long as I can remember. My first “political” experience was writing to President Nixon when I was in grade school, telling him I was praying for him during his struggles. In Junior high, I begged my father to take me to SMU, in Dallas near where I grew up, to stand in a rope line in order to catch a glimpse of President Gerald Ford. I voted for the first time in 1980, proudly casting my ballot for Ronald Reagan. My first college course in political science at Texas A&M was taught by an expert in the Presidency, and although regretfully I can’t remember his name, I loved the course so much, I switched my major from business to political science that semester!

During the last decade, I got an even closer look at the Presidency through my husband’s work with President George W. Bush, and opportunities our family had to interact with him. I had always admired President Bush’s steady leadership, and his unwavering commitment to certain values and principles, most notably keeping America safe. But getting to know him personally, I admired the way he carried the office of the Presidency. When you are President, you are always President, whether relaxing in a small group or at public events. President Bush respected the office, and lived every day in a way that could make our country proud.

Thank you to Professor Joerg Knipprath for your enlightening and thorough essays on Federalist Papers No. 69 (The Real Character of the Executive ) and 70 (The Executive Department Further Considered ). The historical background you provide gives a useful prism from which to view these two papers that explore the President’s powers versus those of the British Monarch and the New York Governor, and the decision of the founders to have a unified executive, versus two or more heading that branch.

In Federalist No. 69 Publius makes a convincing argument that the United States Presidency, while powerful enough to head the country, is not as powerful as the King, or even the New York Governor (with the exception of the power to make treaties). This is a fascinating comparison, and reveals the founders’ thought process on why the Presidency of our country is vested with certain powers and limited in others.

Some of the President’s powers originally outlined by the founders have waned, while others have increased. The President’s term in office still remains at four years, but is now limited to two terms by the twenty-second Amendment.

The President’s power to

“nominate, and, WITH THE ADVICE AND CONSENT OF THE SENATE, to appoint ambassadors and other public ministers, judges of the Supreme Court, and in general all officers of the United States established by law, and whose appointments are not otherwise provided for by the Constitution,”

has been expanded over the years by the President’s ability to create “Czar” positions. These “Czar” positions sound eerily similar to the power Publius ascribes to the King, and denies the President having:

” The king of Great Britain is emphatically and truly styled the fountain of honor. He not only appoints to all offices, but can create offices.”

Time Magazine provides an interesting history of “Czars” in the United States at this link: http://www.time.com/time/politics/article/0,8599,1925564,00.html

Time states the first Czar existed in President Woodrow Wilson’s cabinet during World War I, when Wilson appointed Bernard Baruch to head the War Industries board, and was known as the Industry Czar. This must have been the proverbial camel’s nose under the tent, as the use of “Czars” has mushroomed from that point forward.

In Federalist No. 70, Publius defends the decision of the founders to have a single executive in the office of the Presidency head the executive branch, versus two or more individuals. The benefits of a unified executive make an extraordinary amount of sense, especially in protecting the people’s liberty through transparency, and accountability. As difficult as it was to pinpoint blame in Watergate, for example, imagine how much more difficult it might have been had there been two Chief Executives. Professor Knipprath quotes Harry Truman’s famous line, “the buck stops here,” and that indeed is one of the most important attributes of the United States Presidency.

The founders’ grasp of history, as they detail the failures of past plural executives, such as the Achaens, or the dissensions between the Consuls and the military Tribunes in Roman history once again illuminates their arguments. And their grasp of human nature is equally as profound –

“Wherever two or more persons are engaged in any common enterprise or pursuit, there is always danger of difference of opinion. If it be a public trust or office, in which they are clothed with equal dignity and authority, there is peculiar danger of personal emulation and even animosity.”

“Men often oppose a thing, merely because they have had no agency in planning it, or because it may have been planned by those whom they dislike. But if they have been consulted, and have happened to disapprove, opposition then becomes, in their estimation, an indispensable duty of self-love. They seem to think themselves bound in honor, and by all the motives of personal infallibility, to defeat the success of what has been resolved upon contrary to their sentiments. Men of upright, benevolent tempers have too many opportunities of remarking, with horror, to what desperate lengths this disposition is sometimes carried, and how often the great interests of society are sacrificed to the vanity, to the conceit, and to the obstinacy of individuals, who have credit enough to make their passions and their caprices interesting to mankind. Perhaps the question now before the public may, in its consequences, afford melancholy proofs of the effects of this despicable frailty, or rather detestable vice, in the human character.”

Our United States Presidency is a unique institution, crafted thoughtfully and skillfully by our founding fathers!

On to Federalist #71!

Good night and God Bless,

Cathy Gillespie

Tuesday, August 3rd, 2010

Join the discussion! Post your comments below.

Federalist No. 70 Explained

Federalist No. 70
Border:	yes
Author:	Alexander Hamilton
Title Orig:	The Executive Department Further Considered
Country:	United States
Language:	English
Publisher:	The New York Packet
Pub Date:	March 15, 1788
Media Type:	Newspaper
Preceded By:
Followed By:

Federalist No. 70 , titled " The Executive Department Further Considered ", is an essay written by Alexander Hamilton arguing for a single, robust executive provided for in the United States Constitution. [1] [2] [3] [4] [5] [6] [7] [8] It was originally published on March 15, 1788, in The New York Packet under the pseudonym Publius as part of The Federalist Papers and as the fourth in Hamilton's series of eleven essays discussing executive power. [9]

Hamilton argues that unity in the executive branch is a main ingredient for both energy and safety. [1] [6] [7] Energy arises from the proceedings of a single person, characterized by, "decision, activity, secrecy, and dispatch," while safety arises from the unitary executive's unconcealed accountability to the people. [3] [4] [6] [7] [10]

Historical and philosophical influences

Before ratifying the Constitution in 1787, the thirteen states were bound by the Articles of Confederation , which authorized the Congress of the Confederation to conduct foreign diplomacy and granted sovereignty to the states. [11] By 1779, both Congress and the states had accumulated considerable debt from the Revolutionary War , but the Articles of Confederation denied Congress the powers of taxation and regulation of foreign and interstate commerce. [12] [13] Alexander Hamilton, along with many other Framers , believed the solution to this and problems of federal law enforcement could be solved with a strong general government. [12] [14] [15]

Alexander Hamilton greatly admired the British monarchy, and sought to create a similarly strong unitary executive in the United States. [16] [17] One of the major influences on his thinking was political theorist, Jean-Louis de Lolme who praised the English monarchy for being "sufficiently independent and sufficiently controlled." [17] [18] In Federalist No. 70, Hamilton cites De Lolme to support his argument that a unitary executive will have the greatest accountability to the people. [19] Hamilton was also inspired by William Blackstone and John Locke , who favored an executive who would act on his own prerogative while maintaining respect for constitutional obligations. [20] [21] Montesquieu , Machiavelli, and Aristotle , all of whom argued for strength in the executive, also served as inspiration for the arguments in Federalist No. 70. [20] [21] Hamilton's call for energy in the executive, as described in Federalist No. 70, mirrors Montesquieu's preference for "vigor" in the executive. [22] [23]

During the Constitutional Convention in May 1787, Hamilton proposed a plan of government, dubbed the "British Plan," featuring a powerful unitary executive serving for life, or during good behavior. [18] [24] [25] [26] Though this plan was rejected, James Wilson 's proposal for a unitary executive, which Hamilton supported, was upheld with a vote of seven to three. [27] As part of the Federalists' effort to encourage the ratification of the Constitution, Hamilton published Federalist No. 70 to convince the states of the necessity of unity in the executive branch. [19]

Hamilton's arguments for a unitary executive

Federalist No. 70 argues in favor of the unitary executive created by Article II of the United States Constitution . [12] [1] [2] [3] [4] [5] [6] [7] [8]

According to Hamilton, a unitary executive is necessary to:

ensure accountability in government
enable the president to defend against legislative encroachments on his power
ensure "energy" in the executive. [1] [6] [7]

Hamilton argues that a unitary executive structure will best permit purpose, direction, and flexibility in the executive branch—especially necessary during times of emergency and warfare. [3] [4] [10] [28] [29]

Accountability

According to Hamilton, a unitary executive is best-suited to promoting accountability in government because it is easier to point blame at one person than to distinguish fault among members of a group. [4] [6] [7] [10] Because a unitary executive cannot "cloak" his failings by blaming council members, he has a strong incentive towards good behavior in office. [1] [5] [10] Accountability, made easier by the existence of a unitary executive, thus promotes effective and representative governance. [1] [4] [5]

Hamilton bolsters his argument by claiming that misconduct and disagreements among members of the council of Rome contributed to the Roman Empire's decline. [2] [30] He warns at the end of Federalist No. 70 that America should be more afraid of reproducing the plural executive structure of Rome than of the "ambition of a single individual." [1]

Defense against encroachments

Beyond supporting a unitary executive, Hamilton recommends strength in the executive branch. [6] Hamilton justifies executive strength by claiming that the slow-moving Congress, a body designed for deliberation, will be best-balanced by a quick and decisive executive. [6] [31] Hamilton also maintains that governmental balance can only be achieved if each branch of government (including the executive branch) has enough autonomous power such that tyranny of one branch over the others cannot occur. [4] [6] [32]

Alexander Hamilton writes that energy in the executive is "the leading character in the definition of good government." [1] [3] [33] Some scholars equate Hamiltonian "energy" to presidential "activity," while others describe energy as a president's eagerness to act on the behalf of his constituents. [5] [6] [34]

In Federalist No. 70, Hamilton lists four ingredients that constitute this energy:

an adequate provision for its support (salary)
competent powers [1] [4]

Hamilton's core argument revolves around unity in the executive, meaning the Constitution's vesting of executive power in a single president by Article II of the United States Constitution. [12] [5] [35] [36] [37] His argument also centers upon unity's promotion of executive energy. [1] [4] [5] [33] [37] In Federalist No. 70, Alexander Hamilton writes:

Those politicians and statesmen who have been the most celebrated for the soundness of their principles and for the justice of their views, have declared in favor of a single Executive... .They have with great propriety, considered energy as the most necessary qualification (of the former) and have regarded this as most applicable to power in a single hand... [1]

According to Hamilton, unity contributes to energy by permitting necessary "decision, activity, secrecy, and dispatch" in the executive branch. [1] [4] [5] [33] [37] At the same time, a unitary executive is incentivized to act on behalf of his constituents. [1] [6] As scholar Steven Calabresi writes, "a unitary executive would both cause power and energy to accrue to the office and facilitate public accountability for and control over how that power and energy was exercised." [6]

Hamilton also makes the case for duration, meaning a presidential term long enough to promote stability in the government. [1] [4] While Hamilton elaborates on the importance of duration in Federalist No. 73 , he argues briefly in Federalist No. 70 that the prospect of more time in office will motivate a president to act in concert with the views of the public. [1] [5] [6]

Hamiltonian support can be defined as a presidential salary, which insulates government officials from corruption by attracting capable, honest men to office. [1] [4] [38] According to Hamilton, public service does not provide men with fame or glory, so ample pay is necessary to attract talented politicians. [1] [38] Hamilton further expands upon his arguments for executive support in his essay Federalist No. 73 . [1]

Competent powers

The President's competent powers, or his powers guaranteed by the Constitution, are mentioned in Federalist No. 70 and more fully discussed in Federalist No. 73 in the context of executive and legislative interactions, specifically the executive veto power. [1] Hamilton argues that the executive veto provides stability by preventing "the excess of lawmaking" [1] [39] and that the executive veto and judicial review will "shield...the executive" from legislative misbehavior. [1] [40] This argument is tied to Madison's praise of the separation of powers in Federalist No. 51 , which he contends will permit the president to execute the laws and act as commander in-chief without fear of legislative encroachment on his powers. [1] [40]

Scholars have differing views on the president's competent powers. [12] [5] [35] [36] [37] Proponents of the Unitary Executive Theory assert that all executive power is vested in the president, and that the President has "unilateral authority, impervious to congressional or judicial scrutiny." [36] [41] [42] [43] Conversely, others read Article II of the United States Constitution as an "empty grant" that does not explicitly give the President the power to execute the laws. [35] [43] [44]

Contemporaneous opposition to the unitary executive

After independence.

Resistance to the unitary executive began well before the emergence of the Anti-Federalist Papers. [45] [46] After the Declaration of Independence in 1776, eleven of the thirteen states established constitutions to replace their charter governments. [46] In a reaction to colonial rule, most of these constitutions were primarily concerned with a declaration of rights and weakening executive power. [45] With the exception of New York , all of these states formed executive councils appointed by their respective legislatures. [46]

Virginia's Constitution of 1776 provided for an executive and an eight-member privy council elected by ballot in the bicameral legislature. [46] It mandated that the privy council be involved in nearly all executive decisions:

Let a Privy Council, or Council of State, consisting of eight members, be chosen by joint ballot of both Houses of Assembly, promiscuously from their members, or the people at large, to assist in the administration of government. Let the Governour be President of this Council… [46]

Pennsylvania's 1776 Constitution , which lasted until 1790, provided for a Supreme Executive Council consisting of twelve members chosen by popular ballot. [46] The council and the unicameral legislature would elect a president from the members of the council, but the president would hold little authority over the council even in regards to military power. [45] [46]

The Constitutional Convention

During the Constitutional Convention in 1787, several delegates opposed the unitary executive first recommended by James Wilson , and supported by Hamilton. [27] [47] [48] Both Charles Pinckney of South Carolina and Gouverneur Morris of Pennsylvania had suggested advisory councils that would serve as a support rather than a check on the executive. [47] Upon an invitation to dissent from Benjamin Franklin, who served as President of Pennsylvania's executive council , Roger Sherman of Connecticut stated his preference for the executive to be appointed by and directly accountable to the legislature, regardless of whether it was to be unitary or plural. [27] [48] Before the vote to approve the unitary executive, Sherman also commented that advisory councils in the majority of the states and even in Great Britain served to make the executive acceptable to the people. [27]

Edmund Randolph , who had presented the Virginia Plan , was the most outspoken opponent of the unitary executive, arguing that it would be unpopular with the people and could easily become monarchical. [27] [48] He warned against using the British government as a model for the Constitution, noting that energy, dispatch, and responsibility could be found in three men drawn from three different regions of the country just as well as in one. [27] [48] The single executive was nonetheless approved by a vote of 7 to 3. [27]

Later in the convention, Hugh Williamson of North Carolina stated his preference for Randolph's suggestion that executive power be shared between three men representing three regions into which the states would be divided. [48] He argued that this triumvirate would be the best way to assure that neither the Northern nor the Southern states' interests would be sacrificed at the expense of the others'. [48]

The Anti-Federalist Papers and opposition to the Constitution

While most of the Anti-Federalists ' arguments did concern the presidency, some Anti-Federalist publications did directly contest Hamilton's position in Federalist 70 for unity in the executive branch. [49] [50]

In response to the exclusion of an executive council in the Constitution, Mason published his "Objections to the Constitution" on November 22, 1787, in the Virginia Journal. [51] In this manuscript, originally written on the back of an early draft of the Constitution, Mason warned that the lack of a council would make for an unadvised president, who would act within the interests of friends, rather than the people at large: [51]

The President of the United States has no Constitutional Council, a thing unknown in any safe and regular government. He will therefore be unsupported by proper information and advice, and will generally be directed by minions and favorites... [51]

Richard Henry Lee , another prominent Anti-Federalist, exchanged letters with Mason, in which he too expressed concern about the unitary executive, supporting the constitutional addition of a privy council. [52] In Anti-Federalist No. 74 , titled "The President as a Military King," Philadelphiensis (likely, Benjamin Workman) wrote primarily against the president's military powers, but added that the lack of a constitutional executive council would add to the danger of a powerful presidency:

And to complete his uncontrolled sway, [the President] is neither restrained nor assisted by a privy council, which is a novelty in government. I challenge the politicians of the whole continent to find in any period of history a monarch more absolute. . . . [53]

On December 18, 1787, after the Convention of Pennsylvania, which ultimately ratified the Constitution, the minority published its reasons for dissent to its constituents. [54] In this address, written most likely by Samuel Bryan and signed by twenty-one members of the minority, the lack of an executive council is enumerated as the twelfth of fourteen reasons for dissent:

12. That the legislative, executive, and judicial powers be kept separate; and to this end that a constitutional council be appointed, to advise and assist the president, who shall be responsible for the advice they give, hereby the senators would be relieved from almost constant attendance; and also that the judges be made completely independent. [54]

Though he was in England at the time of the Anti-Federalist Papers, Thomas Paine, whose pamphlet Common Sense served as motivation for independence from British rule during the American Revolution , also opposed the unitary executive. [55] While this position was already evidenced from his role as Clerk to the Pennsylvania Assembly during the writing of Pennsylvania's 1776 Constitution, [56] he clearly stated it in a letter to George Washington in 1796. [55] In this letter, Paine argued for a plural executive on the grounds that a unitary executive would become head of a party and that a republic should not debase itself by obeying an individual. [55]

Hamilton's rebuttals to contemporaneous counterarguments

In Federalist No. 70, Alexander Hamilton not only lays down an argument for a unitary executive, but also provides rebuttals to contemporaneous counterarguments in favor of a plural executive. [1] Hamilton employs historical examples and the rhetoric of common sense to warn the American people of the weaknesses of a plural executive structure. [2]

Unitary executive as a monarch

Hamilton anticipates and refutes the argument that a unitary executive is too similar to the British monarchy. [34] Some academics have noted that Hamilton viewed the British monarchy as a superior system of government and potential model for its consent for appointments and treaties. [4]

Governance by too few

Hamilton similarly anticipate and refutes the counterargument that more opinions in government lead to better decision-making. [1] [4] [10] In rejecting this view, Hamilton writes that a plural executive would actually "conceal faults and destroy responsibility" [1] and be a "clog" to the system. [1] [10] He argues in Federalist No. 70 that a plural executive leads to a lack of accountability because there is no single person to blame for misconduct. [4] [10] Furthermore, decision making becomes difficult because a council may propose an agenda contrary to that of the executive. Hamilton reminds the public that in times of warfare especially, the executive must not be slowed down by deliberation and disagreements. [4] [6] [10] [31] Finally, he reminds America that a unitary executive structure promotes energy in the executive and that "duration" of the presidential term gives the executive a strong incentive to make policy in conformity with public opinion. [5] [6] [10] The executive will be held accountable to his constituents and act with "due dependence" and "due responsibility." [1] He claims that the two will foster liberty and "safety in the republican sense." [1] [4] [6] [7] [10] [57]

Applications and modern relevance

Historical applications.

Because Federalist No. 70 argues for a strong, unitary executive, it has often been used as a justification for expanding executive and presidential power, especially during times of national emergency. [4] [28] [29] For example, scholars have argued that Federalist No. 70 influenced:

George Washington 's declaration of neutrality towards Britain and France without Congressional Consent [29]
Abraham Lincoln 's decision to use executive authority to suspend Habeas Corpus and create a naval blockade without congressional approval during the American Civil War [4] [58]
Theodore Roosevelt's resolution to intervene in the Coal Strike of 1902 [59]
Woodrow Wilson 's heavy use of executive power during and in the aftermath of World War I . [59]

The War on Terror

Federalist no.70 as a justification for executive power.

Federalist No. 70's arguments for an energetic, unitary executive are often cited in the context of national security. [60] [61] After 9/11, executive power and secrecy took on a more central role in the pursuit of national security. [61] In this regard, members of the post 9/11 United States Department of Justice have argued that foreign policy is most effectively conducted with a single hand, meaning that Congress should defer to the president's authority. [60]

John Yoo , legal advisor to the Bush administration, has explicitly invoked Federalist No. 70 in his support for executive power over foreign policy. [60] Referencing Hamilton, Yoo has claimed that "the centralization of authority in the President is particularly crucial in matters of national defense, war, and foreign policy, where a unitary executive can evaluate threats, consider policy choices, and mobilize national resources with a speed and energy that is far superior to any other branch." [60] Yoo has also cited Federalist No. 70 in his support of the President's right to unilaterally conduct operations against terrorists without congressional consent. [60] [62] He claims that this power applies to operations against both individuals and states. [60] [62] At least one scholar has also argued that, because the president has the most access to national security information, only the president can know when the War on Terror is over and no longer mandates an expansive executive authority. [28]

President George W. Bush explicitly invoked the discourse of Federalist No. 70 in declaring that he was allowed to operate outside of the law when it conflicted with his prerogatives as the head of "the unitary executive branch." [4] [63] [64] For example, when signing the 2005 Detainee Treatment Act , Bush applied Hamilton's unitary executive theory to claim the right to work outside the provisions of the Act when they conflicted with his responsibilities as Commander in Chief. [63] [64]

President Obama has also used signing statements to expand his executive power, specifically by issuing a 2011 statement on an omnibus year-end spending bill. [64] [65] It has been speculated that this statement was made to nullify provisions of the bill that limited Obama's ability to deal with prisoners at Guantanamo Bay, thus expanding Obama's executive power. [65] This action has been explicitly compared to Bush's 2005 signing of the Detainee Treatment Act. [65]

Controversy

Not all scholars agree that Federalist No. 70 justifies the role that the President has played in the war on terror up to this point. [4] Some scholars contend that President Bush's foreign policy decisions exceeded his presidential powers granted by the Constitution. [4] [66] [67] [68] Further, critics of the Bush Administration argue that any executive, as envisioned by Alexander Hamilton in Federalist No. 70, must act within the limits imposed by other provisions of the United States Constitution [4] [66] [67] [68] and that the concept of the unitary executive does not allow the president to work outside laws passed by Congress, even when they conflict with national security interests. [63] [68] These critics argue that President Bush could have asked Congress to amend existing law or retroactively obtain warrants for surveillance and that he violated the constitution when he did not. [4] [67] [68] President Obama has been similarly criticized for operating outside the law, despite statements at the beginning of his presidency which showed a desire to limit the use of signing statements to expand executive power. [64] [69] [70]

One of Hamilton's primary arguments for a unitary executive was that it increases accountability for executive action, thereby protecting liberty. [4] [6] [7] [10] [57] Many have argued that the Bush administration's and Obama administration's use of secrecy and unilateral executive action has violated American liberty. [71] [72] [73] [74] One scholar, James Pffifner, claims that if Hamilton were alive today, he would amend Federalist No. 70 to say that the "energy of the executive needs to be balanced by the 'deliberation and wisdom that only the legislature can provide.'" [4]

Judicial applications

Executive unity.

Recently, Federalist No. 70 has become associated with Unitary Executive Theory , and has been invoked to support the claim that the president should have primary responsibility over the entire executive branch. [36] This theory was particularly relevant to Justice Antonin Scalia's 1988 dissent in the Supreme Court Case Morrison v. Olson , in which he argued that an investigation of the executive branch by independent counsel was unconstitutional because criminal prosecution was purely an executive power, held in its entirety by the president. [75] Scalia also cited Federalist No. 70 in his decision on Printz v. United States . Printz v. United States concerned the constitutionality of the Brady Handgun Violence Prevention Act , a federal law that would have obligated state law enforcement officers to help enforce federal gun regulations. [76] Scalia argued:

The Brady Act effectively transfers this responsibility to thousands of CLEOs [chief law enforcement officers] in the 50 States, who are left to implement the program without meaningful Presidential control (if indeed meaningful Presidential control is possible without the power to appoint and remove). The insistence of the Framers upon unity in the Federal Executive--to ensure both vigor and accountability--is well known. See The Federalist No. 70. [77]

Executive power

Federalist No. 70 has been cited in several Supreme Court dissents as a justification for the expansion of executive power. [78] [79] For example, in his 1952 dissenting opinion in Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, chief justice Fred M. Vinson wrote:

This comprehensive grant of the executive power to a single person was bestowed soon after the country had thrown the yoke of monarchy… Hamilton added: 'Energy in the Executive is a leading character in the definition of good government. It is essential to the protection of the community against foreign attacks; it is not less essential to the steady administration of the law, to the protection of property against those irregular and high-handed combinations which sometimes interrupt the ordinary course of justice...' It is thus apparent that the Presidency was deliberately fashioned as an office of power and independence. Of course, the Framers created no autocrat capable of arrogating any power unto himself at any time. [79]

Vinson referenced Federalist No. 70's arguments about energy in the executive to argue that the president should be allowed to seize private property in a time of national crisis. [80] In a more recent 2004 case, Hamdi v. Rumsfeld , Justice Clarence Thomas used Federalist No. 70 to make the case that the president should have the power to suspend Habeas Corpus for American citizens in order to fight the war on terror . [81] [82]

In both cases, the majority of the court was not persuaded that the expansions in executive power in question were justified. [78] [79] [82]

Presidential accountability

Federalist No. 70 has also been cited by the Supreme Court as an authority on the importance of presidential accountability. [83] In its 1997 opinion in Clinton v. Jones , the court weighed whether or not a sitting president could delay addressing civil litigation until the end of his or her term. [83] [84] The court cited Federalist No. 70, stating that the president must be held accountable for his or her actions, and thus cannot be granted immunity from civil litigation. [85] However, in the 2010 case of Free Enterprise Fund v. Public Company Accounting Oversight Board , the court cited the need for executive accountability as a basis to expand presidential power. Writing the majority opinion, Chief Justice John Roberts stated:

The Constitution that makes the President accountable to the people for executing the laws also gives him the power to do so. That power includes, as a general matter, the authority to remove those who assist him in carrying out his duties. Without such power, the President could not be held fully accountable for discharging his own responsibilities; the buck would stop somewhere else. Such diffusion of authority "would greatly diminish the intended and necessary responsibility of the chief magistrate himself." The Federalist No. 70, at 478. [86]

Roberts argued that the act in question deprived the president of the ability to hold members of an independent board accountable, thus freeing him or her of responsibility over the independent board's actions and depriving the people of their ability to hold the president accountable. [86] [87]

External links

Text of The Federalist No. 70 : congress.gov

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Crouch . Jeffrey . Rozell . Mark J. . Sollenberger . Mitchel A. . The Law : President Obama's Signing Statements and the Expansion of Executive Power: President Obama . Presidential Studies Quarterly . December 2013 . 43 . 4 . 883–899 . 10.1111/psq.12071 . . 43285355 . 2027.42/100285 . free .
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The Federalist Papers

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Thomas Jefferson described The Federalist Papers as “the best commentary on the principles of government, which ever was written.”

In this free ten-lecture course you will gain a deeper understanding of the purpose and structure of the American Founding by studying the arguments of America’s most influential Founders. Written between October 1787 and August 1788, The Federalist Papers is a collection of newspaper essays written by James Madison, Alexander Hamilton, and John Jay in defense of the Constitution.

Taught by Hillsdale College’s politics faculty, this course explores the major themes of this classic work of American politics, such as the problem of majority faction, the importance of separation of powers, the nature of the three branches of government, and the argument concerning the Bill of Rights.

By enrolling in this course you will receive free access to the course lectures, readings, and quizzes to aid you in this examination of the greatest Constitution ever written.

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Introduction: Articles of Confederation and the Constitutional Convention

Written following the Constitutional Convention of 1787, The Federalist Papers is the foremost American contribution to political thought. Originally published as newspaper essays in New York, they were written by Alexander Hamilton, James Madison, and John Jay under the pen name Publius. The essays defended the merits of the Constitution as a necessary and good replacement for the Articles of Confederation, which had proven defective as a means of governance.

The Improved Science of Politics

Publius argued that the “science of politics . . . has received great improvement” in his own day. These improvements include separation of powers, legislative checks and balances, judges who serve a life term during good behavior, and what he called “the ENLARGEMENT of the ORBIT” of government. Contrary to the practice of previous republics, Publius argued that a republic had a much greater chance of achieving success if it is spread out over a large or extended territory, rather than a small or contracted one.

The Problem of Majority Faction

In Federalist 10, Publius confronts one of the most important Anti-Federalist arguments against ratification: Republican government is impossible on a territory as large as the United States. In fact, such an undertaking had never been successful. In response, Publius proposes that the principal remedy for the political disease of faction—a disease “most incident to republican government”—is the large or extended sphere or territory.

Federalism and Republicanism

In the summer of 1787, the Framers labored to set up a political regime that would not only secure liberty and republicanism, but also bring energy and stability to the national government. Because of the failures of government under the Articles of Confederation, American political institutions were at risk. In order to secure these institutions, the Framers constructed a republican form of government that—among many other important features—instituted a new form of federalism.

Separation of Powers

In constituting a new government, the Framers knew that written rules—what Publius calls “parchment barriers”—would not be enough by themselves to protect liberty and prevent tyranny. Instead, Publius looks to the “interior structure” as the best means for keeping the branches properly and effectively separated. Separation of powers, the most important of the Constitution’s “auxiliary precautions,” works to prevent governmental tyranny, and by keeping each branch within its proper sphere of authority allows each branch to do its job well.

The Legislative: House and Senate

The Founders understood that the legislative branch is by nature the most powerful in a republican government. Experience of government under the Articles of Confederation, when state legislatures routinely encroached on executive and judicial powers, confirmed this. Thus, the Framers divided the legislative branch into two parts—the House and the Senate. In addition, they differentiated them as much as possible, consistent with the principles of republican government, with the goal of preventing tyranny and encouraging good government.

The Executive

Following their experience under the Articles of Confederation, and armed with the improved science of politics, the Framers instituted a unitary executive in the office of the president. Unlike the executive office in any previous republic, it was designed so as to ensure energy and responsibility in the executive, which are absolutely essential for good execution of the laws, and therefore for good government.

The Judiciary

In the Declaration of Independence, one charge leveled against King George III was that he had “made Judges dependent on his Will alone.” In framing a republican government, the Founders believed that an independent judiciary was indispensable. Publius argues that the term of life tenure during good behavior and a protected salary ensure this independence.

“The Constitution Is Itself . . . a Bill of Rights”

In Federalist 84, Publius writes, “The truth is, after all the declamation we have heard, that the constitution is itself, in every rational sense, and to every useful purpose, A BILL OF RIGHTS.” In other words, the structure of the Constitution protects the rights of the people. In addition, the American people retain all powers not granted to the federal and state governments.

Conclusion: Constitutionalism Today

American government today is much different from the constitutional republic outlined in The Federalist Papers —which relies on structure, representation, and limitations on the functions of the federal government. Administrative regulations and entitlements are two distinguishing features of modern government. These new features require a kind of government that is unlimited, disregards separation of powers, and violates the supreme law under which it claims to operate.

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The Federalist Papers Essay 70 Summary and Analysis
The Federalist Papers Summary and Analysis of Essay 70. >Summary. Many people think that a vigorous and strong president is incompatible with a republican form of government. Hamilton, however, does not agree. An energetic and forceful president is essential to good government. National defense, sound administration of the law, and the ...
The Federalist No. 70, [15 March 1788]
The [New York] Independent Journal: or, the General Advertiser, March 15, 1788.This essay appeared in New-York Packet on March 18. In the McLean description begins The Federalist: A Collection of Essays, Written in Favour of the New Constitution, As Agreed upon by the Federal Convention, September 17, 1787. In Two Volumes (New York: Printed and Sold by J. and A. McLean, 1788). description ends ...
Federalist No. 70
Federalist No. 70, titled " The Executive Department Further Considered ", is an essay written by Alexander Hamilton arguing for a single, robust executive provided for in the United States Constitution. [1][2][3][4][5][6][7][8][9] It was originally published on March 15, 1788, in The New York Packet under the pseudonym Publius as part of The ...
Federalist 70
Writing Federalist 70. In this Federalist Paper, Alexander Hamilton argues for a strong executive leader, as provided for by the Constitution, as opposed to the weak executive under the Articles of Confederation. He asserts, "energy in the executive is the leading character in the definition of good government.
PDF Publius: The Federalist 70 New York Independent Journal, 15 March 1788
[ DC6-04-70_Federalist 70_15Mar88 ] csac.history.wisc.edu > Document Collections > Constitutional Debates: Federalist and Antifederalist Essays > The Complete Federalist Papers Publius: The Federalist 70 New York Independent Journal, 15 March 1788 This essay was written by Alexander Hamilton. It is number 70 in the M'Lean edition
Federalist No. 70 by Alexander Hamilton (1788)
Federalist Number (No.) 70 (1788) is an essay by British-American politician Alexander Hamilton arguing for the ratification of the United States Constitution. The full title of the essay is "The Executive Department Further Considered." It was written as part of a series of essays collected and published in 1788 as The Federalist and later ...
Federalist 68, 70, 72 (1788)
After the Constitutional Convention adjourned in September 1787, Alexander Hamilton spearheaded an initiative to lead the public discussion of the draft instrument through The Federalist Papers.In a single week in March 1788, there appeared the three essays from which these extracts are excerpted, discussing the nature of the executive authority under the Constitution.
Federalist No. 70 Publius (Alexander Hamilton) The Executive Department
Federalist No. 70 is the fourth of eleven essays written by Hamilton defending the Presidency against the "unfairness" of the Antifederalist "representations.". The essay opens with the ...
PDF Federalist No. 70: Is the President Too Powerful?
Federalist No. 70 sets the stage for a powerful chief executive through its emphasis on energy in the executive. Th is essay reviews the challenges of holding this energy accountable in a republican form of government and concludes that recent presidents have stretched their authorities beyond even the most aggressive defense of the concept.
PDF The Federalist Papers Summary and Analysis of Essay 70
The Federalist Papers 70 Summary and Analysis of Essay 70 Summary: Many people think that a vigorous and strong president is incompatible with a republican form of government. Hamilton, however, does not agree. ... Conflict and argument are dangerous in the executive branch where decisions must be prompt; in the Congress, on the other hand ...
Federalist No. 70
Federalist No. 70. There is an idea, which is not without its advocates, that a vigorous executive is inconsistent with the genius of republican government. The enlightened well-wishers to this species of government must at least hope that the supposition is destitute of foundation; since they can never admit its truth, without at the same time ...
PDF Federalist 70 Argument
Federalist 70 Argument Alexander Hamilton,James Madison,John Jay,Samuel Bryan,Patrick Henry The Federalist Papers Alexander Hamilton,John Jay,James Madison,2018-08-20 Classic Books Library presents this brand new edition of "The Federalist Papers", a collection of separate essays and articles compiled in 1788 by Alexander Hamilton.
Federalist No. 70
Federalist 70 is the heart of Hamilton's investigation of the nature of executive power. Publius returns to "energy," a theme that he has addressed frequently in his essays as a necessary attribute of government generally, and the Union in particular. As executive power is the essence of government, energy is the essence of executive power.
Presidential Power in Hamilton's Federalist No. 70 Essay
Presidential Power in Hamilton's Federalist No. 70 Essay. The most significant argument presented in the Federalist paper number seventy involves giving the executive absolute power to make it strong and prevent any mischievous encroachment from both external and internal forces. It was presented by Alexander Hamilton on March 15, 1788.
Federalist 70 Explained
The essays, which appeared in newspapers addressed to the people of the state of New York, are known as the Federalist Papers. They are regarded as one of the most authoritative sources on the meaning of the Constitution, including constitutional principles such as checks and balances, federalism, and separation of powers.
Federalist No. 70
Federalist No. 70. Tuesday, March 18, 1788. Author: Alexander Hamilton. To the People of the State of New York: THERE is an idea, which is not without its advocates, that a vigorous Executive is inconsistent with the genius of republican government. The enlightened well-wishers to this species of government must at least hope that the ...
Federalist No. 70
Federalist Papers: A collection of 85 articles and essays written by Alexander Hamilton, James Madison, and John Jay promoting the ratification of the United States Constitution.. Executive Branch: The branch of federal and state government that is broadly responsible for implementing, supporting, and enforcing the laws made by the legislative branch and interpreted by the judicial branch.
Federalist No. 69 & Federalist No. 70
In Federalist No. 69 Publius makes a convincing argument that the United States Presidency, while powerful enough to head the country, is not as powerful as the King, or even the New York Governor (with the exception of the power to make treaties). This is a fascinating comparison, and reveals the founders' thought process on why the ...
Federalist No. 70 Explained
Federalist No. 70, titled "The Executive Department Further Considered", is an essay written by Alexander Hamilton arguing for a single, robust executive provided for in the United States Constitution. It was originally published on March 15, 1788, in The New York Packet under the pseudonym Publius as part of The Federalist Papers and as the fourth in Hamilton's series of eleven essays ...
PDF AP United States Government and Politics
"The Federalist 70 defends the idea of a single executive. A weak executive is less responsive to ... Students were also expected to write in the form of an argumentative essay, demonstrating each of the skills mentioned above. Sample: 4A Claim/Thesis: 1 Evidence: 3 Reasoning: 1 Alternative Perspectives: 1 : A. The response earned the thesis ...
The Federalist Papers
Written following the Constitutional Convention of 1787, The Federalist Papers is the foremost American contribution to political thought.Originally published as newspaper essays in New York, they were written by Alexander Hamilton, James Madison, and John Jay under the pen name Publius.
Argumentative Essay: Federalist 70
Vy Tran Professor Matthew Freeman November 16th, 2015 Argumentative essay: Federalist 70 In my perspective, the most significant argument made in Federalist...
The Avalon Project : Federalist No 70: Version A
The Federalist Papers : No. 70. From the New York Packet. Tuesday, March 18, 1788. To the People of the State of New York: THERE is an idea, which is not without its advocates, that a vigorous Executive is inconsistent with the genius of republican government. The enlightened well-wishers to this species of government must at least hope that ...

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Lesson Plan: Federalist No. 70 Publius (Alexander Hamilton) The Executive Department

Federalist No. 70 Executive Power Hamilton's Belief

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Federalist No. 69 & Federalist No. 70 – Cathy Gillespie

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Federalist No. 70 Explained

Historical and philosophical influences

Hamilton's arguments for a unitary executive

Accountability

Defense against encroachments

Competent powers

Contemporaneous opposition to the unitary executive

The Constitutional Convention

The Anti-Federalist Papers and opposition to the Constitution

Hamilton's rebuttals to contemporaneous counterarguments

Unitary executive as a monarch

Governance by too few

Applications and modern relevance

The War on Terror

Controversy

Judicial applications

Executive power

Presidential accountability

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The Federalist Papers

Discover the Genius of the Constitution

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