border dispute essay

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Critically examine the problems of inter-State border disputes in India – UPSC Geography Optional Mains – 2021

Inter-state border disputes in India represent a complex web of historical, political, and socio-cultural issues that have persisted since the country’s independence in 1947. These disputes, often characterized by conflicting territorial claims between neighboring states, have been a source of tension, political friction, and even violence. From the northern regions of Jammu and Kashmir to the southern states of Karnataka and Tamil Nadu, these conflicts have manifested in various forms, ranging from legal battles to occasional outbreaks of violence. The intricate nature of India’s federal structure, compounded by diverse linguistic, cultural, and historical factors, further complicates the resolution of these disputes. This essay aims to critically examine the underlying problems fueling inter-State border disputes in India, shedding light on the historical context, political dynamics, legal complexities, and socio-economic ramifications that continue to impede their resolution.

Table of Contents

Introduction:

Inter-state border disputes in India refer to conflicts between different states regarding territorial boundaries. These disputes often arise due to historical, cultural, economic, or administrative reasons.

Causes of Inter-State Border Disputes:

• Historical Legacy: Many disputes trace back to the historical demarcation of regions, leading to disagreements between states. Example: Karnataka and Tamil Nadu over the Cauvery River water-sharing.
• Resource Allocation: Competition for scarce resources like water or minerals can spark conflicts. Example: Punjab and Haryana over water-sharing from the Bhakra-Nangal dam.
• Cultural and Ethnic Differences: Divergent cultural identities may contribute to disputes. as seen in the case of Assam and Nagaland.
• Political Boundaries: Changes in political boundaries over time can lead to disagreements. Example: Maharashtra and Karnataka over Belgaum.
• Administrative Decisions: Administrative decisions regarding district reorganization may create tensions. Example: Telangana and Andhra Pradesh after the bifurcation.
• Population Migration: Migration patterns can alter demographic realities, leading to disputes. Example: The Meghalaya-Assam border dispute involving demographic shifts.
• Inadequate Legal Framework: Lack of clear legal frameworks for border delineation can lead to disputes. Example: Border issues between Uttar Pradesh and Uttarakhand.

Results of Inter-State Border Disputes:

• Economic Disruption: Disputes can hinder economic development and cross-border trade, impacting the overall prosperity of the regions involved.
• Social Unrest: Border disputes often create social tensions and animosities among the affected communities, affecting the social fabric.
• Administrative Challenges: Governance becomes complicated, with overlapping jurisdictions causing administrative hurdles.
• Security Concerns: Unsettled borders can pose security challenges, leading to the deployment of security forces in sensitive areas.
• Deterioration of Relations: Prolonged disputes strain inter-state relations, hindering cooperation on various fronts.
• Environmental Impact: Disputes over natural resources may result in environmental degradation due to unsustainable resource exploitation.
• Legal Implications: Prolonged disputes may lead to legal battles, consuming resources and time in litigation.

Conclusion:

To address inter-state border disputes, a futuristic approach involves establishing clear legal frameworks, promoting dialogue, and encouraging states to collaborate on resource management. Additionally, involving neutral mediators and adopting a cooperative federalism model can contribute to lasting solutions, fostering harmony and development among states in India.

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Border Disputes of India

Recently, two Major General-level talks between India and China were held on August 18 as a follow-up to the 19th round of Corps Commander-level talks held earlier this week.

More on the News:

• The two countries have been locked in a border conflict for more than three years after fierce clash in the Galwan Valley in June 2020.
• DBO lies close to the Depsang Plains where Chinese PLA troops have continued to deny access to the patrolling points in the area from 2020.
• Chushsul lies close to the south bank of Pangong Tso , where Indian troops in a surprise operation in 2020 had occupied several heights.
• The two sides agreed to resolve the remaining issues along the LAC in the Ladakh sector in a speedy manner through continued dialogue. 

India-China Border Dispute

• The dispute stems from the legacy of British colonialism and the 1962 Sino-Indian War.
• The two countries have had several clashes and stand-offs along the LAC , most notably in 1967, 1987, 2013, 2017 and 2020-2021.
• The two countries have also been competing to b uild infrastructure and assert their claims along the border, which has increased the risk of escalation.

About India Border Dispute and Challenges

• India has a coastline of 7516.6 km and 1382 small and big offshore islands. 
• India has a total land frontier of approximately 15,200 km , which it shares with seven neighbouring countries: China, Pakistan, Bangladesh, Nepal, Bhutan, Myanmar and Afghanistan.
• India’s border with Nepal, Bhutan and Myanmar a re considered open borders.
• Constraint in Peaceful Border : India’s internal security challenges are invariably linked with the security of India’s borders especially when India faces adversary in its Northern and Western Sector.

Existing Border Dispute Settlement Mechanisms with neighbors such as: 

• For example, India and China have held several rounds of talks to resolve their long-standing border dispute.
• For example, the India-Bangladesh Joint Boundary Working Group was set up to resolve border disputes between the two countries.
• Agreements: India has signed agreements with its neighboring countries to maintain peace and tranquility along the border. 
• For example, India and China signed the Agreement on the Maintenance of Peace and Tranquility along the Line of Actual Control in 1993.
• International organizations: India has sought the involvement of international organizations such as the United Nations to facilitate peaceful resolutions to border disputes. 
• For example, India has raised the issue of Pakistan-occupied Kashmir at the UN.

Other Border Dispute of India with Neighbours

Way Forward: 

• Non-lethal Strategy: There is a need to have a humane approach towards border guarding and ensuring right to life of the border population, enabling a strong state administration to deliver the basic needs of the population and deter transborder crime syndicates from exploiting the economically weaker population. 
• Ease of Living, Trusted Trade and Trusted Travelers : Smooth movement of people and trade can be implemented by adopting technologies like use of Biometric data( facial recognition) which is used at smart borders to identify people and run random security checks. 
• Electronic Sensors : Responsive intelligence network, supported by disruptive technologies like AI powered data bases, will enable smooth and monitored movement of people and trade along the borders. 
• Command Centres: Utilize cognitive analytics and AI/ML for behavior prediction and quick interception.
• Drones and Counter Drones: Replicate the procurement of indigenous drones and develop counter drone technology for detection and interception. 
• Anti-Smuggling Syndicate Measures : Establish synergy between stakeholders for prosecution and deportation of transborder criminals. 
• Technological Training : Maintaining and sustaining new technological solutions will require upgradation of skill of the existing manpower to be bridged by use of contractors in the interim and also reviewing the recruitment intake. 
• Strategic Communication Strategy: Build narratives and sensitize forces on border management to achieve effective communication. 
• Budgeting: Increase capital outlays three to four times to modernize and adopt smart border management solutions.

News Source: The Hindu

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Essay on Management of Indian border disputes – A complex task

June 14, 2019 by Sandeep

The management of Indian Border Control is a risky subject. The former Prime Minister of India, Atal Bihari Vajpayee, once said, “We can choose our friends, but not our neighbours.” India, which is one of the fastest developing countries of the world, is on friendly terms with most of the countries.

Although India has strictly followed the policy of Non-alignment ever since she achieved freedom, and has since not belonged to any military alliance or been part of any secret treaties, she still maintains a close strategic and military relationship with most of fellow major powers. Some of her closest allies include the Russian Federation, Israel, France, the United States of America, Bangladesh and Bhutan.

All these friends prove to be very helpful in all times of crisis or otherwise to India. But the fact remains that India’s neighbours are in fact, geographically closer to her than her friends.

And some of India’s bordering countries, although claim to only uphold their personal best interests, share an atmosphere of suspicion and hostility with her, especially Pakistan and China, who we are not currently at war with, but with whom we are mutually suspicious. This is why the management of the border control of India is imperative and risky.

India and her Neighbours, and the Importance of Borders

India has several many neighbours – Bangladesh in the East, Bhutan in the North, China in the North, Myanmar in the East, Nepal in the North, Pakistan in the North-west and Sri Lanka in the South. India shares her border with all of these countries, with carrying lengths of land in common, in addition to a little stretch of land in the North which is shared with Afghanistan.

If you and your family come from a village and you are on good terms with your neighbours, you will understand how invaluable the friendship with your neighbours is. Your neighbour will share food, gifts, and other products with you when you are in any critical situation.

He will help maintain your security, and you would reciprocate all of these things. Even when you are not physically present in your house, or when some robber comes to invade your house, your neighbours will keep a watchful eye and help you out of the terrible situation. However, if you are on a bad terms with your neighbour, he will not call the robber to attention, or in fact, might even go so far as to aid the robber, and cover up his tracks.

This is why it is so important to maintain good relationships and be on good terms with both our neighbours as well as our neighbouring countries.

What is a border? Well, a border can be understood as a divider of jurisdiction between two or more nations. When it comes to borders, India shares as little as 0.1 kilometres of border with Sri Lanka, whereas the longest border is shared with Bangladesh, which stretches up to 4096.7 kilometres.

India’s boundary with Pakistan stretches 3323 kilometres, with China stretches 3488 kilometres, with Nepal stretches 1751 kilometre, with Bhutan it stretches 699 kilometres, and with Myanmar it stretches 1643 kilometres. A total of 15, 106.8 kilometres is the border areas of India shared with other countries.

There are some borders which have been naturally built, also called maritime boundaries, such as the Tigris River which separates Iran and Turkey, or the Amur River which separates Russia and China and on the other hand, there are other borders which are politically created. Most of the borders of India are political ones.

These borders are not simply lines drawn randomly. For example, consider that you and your neighbour are caught in the midst of a bad quarrel, and you only seem to be fighting the whole day long. As a solution, you draw a line to separate your house and your neighbour’s house, and the both of you make a deal to not enter the other side without permission.

But that night, your neighbour, who is still upset and wants revenge, steps over the line silently and enters your house, and damages your property.

In this analogy, you and your neighbour symbolises India and any of her neighbouring countries. The line is the border. The neighbour can easily step over the border because it is not protected, nor are there any barriers kept.

Borders are not just drawing lines on a paper. It includes drawing the line on the physical land and then enforcing and protecting the territory that is included by the line. Here is where the management of border control comes in.

Challenges of the management of Border Control and the Solutions to be applied

There are several issues and challenges posed on the subject of border control. Our border forces appear to be severely undermanned and under-equipped which is taking heavy toll on economic, social and political stability of our country. Some of the issues that India faces almost daily include illegal immigration, smuggling of cattle, smuggling of narcotics and counterfeiting of Indian currency, among many other problems.

The most important political concern is that there are large stretches of porous and unprotected land. These stretches of land are used to send in terrorists, arms, drugs, and infiltrators schooled in religious extremism.

There is also an inadequacy in police forces, both in trained manpower and effective equipment. In addition to this, there is a lack of coordination amongst the agencies operating across the borders, such as the Border Security Force (BSF), and the Central Reserve Police Force (CRPF).

Also, we cannot forget the problem of cultural, ethnic and linguistic affinity across borders and clan loyalties. There are some illicit demarcations of borders too, especially along the India and Bangladesh border which is also known as the International Border. In summation, there is almost a never ending list of challenges and problems at the border control areas.

These problems can be solved using five steps, or rather methods. All of these points should be carefully contemplated and developed by the government of India. These are:

• Setting up multiple integrated and well-manned check posts at every border area.
• Setting up and organizing multiple border area development programs.
• Creating a comprehensive integrated border management system, which has surveillance for every minute of every hour, of every day of every year. Seeing as our technology has been developed so much, this step should be easy, yet has not been done as of yet.
• Developing the fencing and floodlight system of all border areas.
• Setting up an agreement on the basic guiding principles and standard operating procedures at borders.

All in all, it is absolutely essential to guard our borders and enforce the rules so as to keep our country safe.

To conclude, we have ascertained that a well-planned strategy is required to address border issues so as to prevent further radicalisation. Border management is a very complex task in nature as it demands coordination and concentrated action between different agencies of any nation.

One more step that the government can work on is the development of population at border areas. At the current state of affairs, most of the borders are remote and distant, with no population at all. When there is activity buzzing around, the chances of infiltration will considerably reduce. This is necessary to keep the borders of India completely safe and secure.

Interpreting the India-Nepal border dispute

Constantino xavier constantino xavier nonresident fellow - foreign policy , center for asia policy studies.

June 11, 2020

• 20 min read

Content from the Brookings Institution India Center is now archived . After seven years of an impactful partnership, as of September 11, 2020, Brookings India is now the Centre for Social and Economic Progress , an independent public policy institution based in India.

On May 8, India’s defence minister virtually inaugurated a new 80 km-long road in the Himalayas, connecting to the border with China, at the Lipulekh pass. The Nepali government protested immediately, contending that the road crosses territory that it claims and accusing India of changing the status quo without diplomatic consultations.

Among the many escalatory moves since then, Nepal deployed police forces to the region, summoned the Indian ambassador in Kathmandu, and initiated a constitutional amendment to formalise and extend its territorial claims over approximately 400 sq km. India, on the other hand, has conveyed its openness to a dialogue but does not seem to share Nepal’s sense of urgency: its initial statement agreed to a dialogue, but only after the COVID-19 crisis.

Over one month later, the bilateral crisis seems to now be stuck in a stalemate, a worrisome trend in otherwise friendly India-Nepal relations. Dr. Constantino Xavier, Fellow, Brookings India, answers some of the key questions on the crisis, the possible factors that escalated the dispute, the geostrategic context, and ways to de-escalate towards a solution.

India has been in effective possession of this territory for at least sixty years, although Nepal claims it conducted a census there in the early 1950s and refers to the 1815 Sugauli Treaty as legitimising its claims. But India’s new road, up to the Lipulekh pass, is not an unprecedented change in the status quo. India has controlled this territory and built other infrastructure here before, besides conducting its administration and deploying military forces up to the border pass with China.

The region is of strategic importance, and the new road is now one of the quickest links between Delhi and the Tibetan plateau. In a 2015 statement , China also recognised India’s sovereignty by agreeing to expand trade through the Lipulekh pass. Finally, this is also an important route for thousands of Hindus who trek across the border with China every year to visit the sacred Mount Kailash. Given recurrent military tensions with China, the future potential of trade, and the religious symbolism of the region, India will certainly continue to exercise civilian and military control.

Is there any reason for the timing of the Indian announcement on May 8?

If you believe in one of Kathmandu’s many conspiracy theories, the timing was part of a secret Indian ploy to support Prime Minister Oli. His government faced a severe internal political crisis in late April and the Indian announcement threw him a sudden lifeline: opposition forces immediately rallied to support his escalatory moves against India, including the proposal of a constitutional amendment.

Most likely, however, the reality is less flattering: Nepal may not even have figured in India’s decision to time the announcement on May 8. Unless part of a larger signaling game directed at China, the Indian defence minister was probably more interested in scoring a domestic success by bringing good news during the lockdown period. Even if warned about the negative repercussions this could have on relations with Nepal, Indian decisionmakers clearly did not factor this in. From the perspective of maintaining good India-Nepal relations, any other timing would have been better than May 8.

Did Nepal’s negative reaction catch India by surprise?

The Indian government may have weighed the pros and cons and decided to go ahead despite predictable opposition from Nepal. But according to Shishir Gupta , “New Delhi was surprised when Kathmandu protested over the road.” This is possible, but difficult to believe: any observer of Nepali domestic politics would have easily predicted that the Indian announcement was poised to embolden Prime Minister Oli and fuel a cross-partisan, nationalist opposition against India.

The timing of the announcement may have thus been reflective of miscommunication, lack of coordination or even different assessments by India’s defence, security and diplomatic establishments. It is also possible that an over-confident Delhi thought it would be able to “manage” Nepal and was then caught by surprise by the gravity of the anti-India uproar in Kathmandu.

Why has this border dispute become so politically charged in Nepal?

In line with democratisation and competitive nationalism, Nepal’s foreign policy is becoming increasingly politicised. The dispute with India has been lingering for years and Delhi’s diplomatic establishment and Nepal watchers were well aware that the issue could blow up anytime. In order to look ahead and repair, revise and revive the bilateral relationship, we must first understand why and how this dispute flared up. It may be tempting to start on a clean slate, but future visions will remain void if both sides don’t learn from past mistakes.

The Indian road was not built overnight and the Nepal government was surely aware and monitoring the situation in Kalapani over the preceding months and years. The issue had come up in November last year , when India announced its new political map, after the revocation of Article 370: as for many decades before, the Indian map continued to include territories claimed by Nepal, but this time the government in Kathmandu took it up officially and publically.  It also became a popular issue in Nepal, with the hashtag #BackOffIndia trending on social media.

For the beleaguered Nepali prime minister, India’s May 8 announcement thus fell like a gift from heaven as he faced his worst internal crisis since coming to power, in 2017. He was swiftly able to mobilise public opinion, play up nationalist sentiments against India, get his internal party rivals on board, and divert attention from his failed ordinances and challenges to contain the pandemic.

Are domestic politics hindering Nepal’s foreign policy?

Nepal has one of the world’s youngest populations and, especially after India’s implicit support for the 2015 blockade on the landlocked country, anti-Indian sentiments have been running high. This offers a new generation of Nepali politicians a powerful fuel to mobilise the electorate.

This is one of the reasons why Nepal chose not to attend a multilateral BIMSTEC counter-terrorism exercise hosted by India, in 2018. Delhi had then expressed its disappointment , especially about the Nepali government caving in to popular reservations about BIMSTEC as an anti-China military alliance driven by India. Similarly, the Nepali Communist Party has also created obstacles to the implementation of a United States-sponsored MCC grant that will upgrade Nepal’s electricity transmission system and connect it to the Indian power grid. Only China has been spared from such Nepali political protests, which is paradoxical given that Beijing has hardly delivered on any of its many BRI promises.

Nepal’s foreign policy establishment has embraced an ambitious and forward-looking agenda of external balancing and diversification in recent years, especially under the leadership of its Foreign Minister, Pradeep Gyawali. His participation in the Fourth Indian Ocean Conference, held in the Maldives in 2019, reflects Kathmandu’s widening geostrategic horizons, seeking to place Nepal as a critical connectivity hub between China, South Asia and the Indian Ocean region.

Did China engineer this border dispute between India and Nepal?

No, the border dispute between India and Nepal was brewing for many months and years, so it is unreasonable to blame China for creating the crisis. The counter-factual is clear: even if we hypothetically imagined China away, Prime Minister Oli and Nepali nationalists would always have reacted negatively to the Indian road announcement. For many years, Delhi was well aware that the issue was prone to politicisation in Nepal.

India’s Chief of Army Staff, however, suggested that Nepal may be bringing up the issue “at the behest” of a third party, alluding to China. Whether India has concrete intelligence backing this up or not is less of an issue than the effect of his words in Kathmandu, suggesting that there was no merit in Nepali’s repeated and persistent demands to discuss the issue diplomatically, at least since the late 1990s. This was also contrary to India’s Ministry of External Affairs statement recognising that there is a dispute and that both parties would proceed, as agreed, to sort this out through a diplomatic dialogue.

All this does not mean that Beijing has not supported or further instigated Kathmandu to take on a more assertive position, especially against the backdrop of the China-India military standoff in Ladakh. This could have contributed to the severity of the India-Nepal crisis. But we simply don’t know enough about the China factor, and it is thus simplistic, if not outright harmful to call Prime Minister Oli’s government “pro-China” or reflexively “anti-India” because of his party’s communist credentials.

Is China’s political influence in Nepal harming Indian interests?

We know from other recent crises in the region, for example in the Maldives in the aftermath of the 2017-18 Doklam crisis, that China rarely shies away from an opportunity to use India’s neighbours as proxies, especially when its relations with Delhi are tense. Nepal and several other Indian neighbours are young democracies, developing new institutions in a political transition that can be instable, as we see in Myanmar. But Beijing’s authoritarian system and appeal is growing and may hinder further democratisation, undermine the rule of law, or curtail critical media and academic independence.

India has always seen a more democratic Nepal as being in its interest, leading to greater stability and inclusiveness, especially towards minorities in the Madhes. In 2006, after returning his ambassadorial post in Kathmandu, then Foreign Secretary Shyam Saran emphasised that “stability in Nepal is in the best interests of India” and that “democracy in Nepal is the best guarantee of such stability.”

As China’s political influence grows in Nepal, Beijing may have, at least indirectly, encouraged Prime Minister Oli to take a bolder stance against India during the current crisis. Recent examples show how China reportedly mediated between different factions to keep the CPN in power, how it put pressure on critical reporting in the Nepali media, and how it promoted the authoritarian governance model of China’s Communist Party. But often it is also Nepali’s self-censorship and over caution that has the greatest effect, seeking to please China even when Beijing doesn’t really care that much and defers to Delhi.

By playing the China balancing card as a last resort, Nepali leaders often hope to get Delhi to pay attention to festering problems that Indian diplomacy neglects or forgets about. This is a risky game because it raises alarm bells in Delhi, especially in the security and strategic establishments, which are quick to step in and tend to resort to coercive tools that can further escalate the dispute. It is also risky because it assumes China is always willing to extend indefinite support to Nepal at the cost of its relations with India.

Could this crisis have been prevented?

Yes. The border dispute has been addressed through several official channels since the 1990s, as observed by former Indian ambassador Jayant Prasad . The dispute has roots going back to the 1950s, as detailed in a deeply researched essay by Sam Cowan . Besides Kalapani, there is also a second dispute with India in the Susta river border region. While not well known, there is also a possible issue at the Eastern tri-junction with China and the Indian state of Sikkim.

Both governments agreed during Modi’s 2014 visit to discuss the issue through Foreign Secretary level talks. Nepal alleges that it tried twice to convene such talks since then, and received no positive response from Delhi. In December, there were also reports of India brushing the issue under the carpet, even allegedly refusing to receive a special envoy to discuss the dispute.

At the root of the issue may also be differing interpretations of what exactly warrants a diplomatic dialogue. On the one hand, in Nepal’s maximalist perspective, this should cover all territories it claims, now also including Limpyadhura. The thinking in Kathmandu goes that if India conveys its own territorial claims in official maps, does it have any legitimacy to pressure Nepal not to come up with its own? On the other hand, in India’s minimalist perspective, perhaps reflecting why it delayed dialogue, the issue is seen to be more of a technical nature, focused on delimitation, boundary pillars etc. The current crisis has exposed the extent to which both countries’ interpretations clash and the different levels of priority.

Does this dispute reflect a deeper problem in India-Nepal relations?

Yes, the current border dispute reflects a growing structural problem in India-Nepal relations. C. Raja Mohan thus identifies the territorial dispute as “merely a symptom of the structural changes unfolding in the external and internal context of the bilateral relationship.”

As I argued in 2017, Delhi and Kathmandu need to work hard to keep their relationship stable, even if not special. For example, India can no longer afford to focus on its past Cold War policies of right of first refusal. No longer an Indian satellite or exclusive sphere of influence, as it is often depreciatively described in Delhi, Nepal has been embracing a policy of strategic diversification to reduce its dependence on India and enhance its non-aligned autonomy.

The rising presence of China across the Himalayas, especially after the BRI, forced India to recalibrate its policy towards Nepal. Delhi has begun shifting the emphasis away from geostrategic denial and insulation towards greater economic delivery and connectivity. This has been a tough adjustment, beginning in the 2000s, but with many Indian actors pushing in different directions. Some in India still look at twenty-first century Nepal through a nineteenth century colonial prism: as a buffer state with limited sovereignty, where India’s resources should be focused on political engineering and cultivate assets to topple a pro-China “ puppet government .”

There is no better example of the larger problem in India-Nepal relations than the tragic fate of the report prepared by the Eminent Persons Group (EPG) from both countries. The EPG was mandated in 2015 by Prime Minister Modi and former Nepali Prime Minister Deuba to assess the state of bilateral relations and come up with major recommendations, whether on the 1950 Treaty or the open border.

Submitted in 2018, the EPG report has still not been accepted: sources initially noted that Prime Minister Modi had not found the time , but by now it is obvious that Delhi is uncomfortable with some of the non-binding, expert recommendations that it had commissioned itself. Such lack of confidence and openness to reassess the fundamentals of the relationship has transmitted negative signals to Nepal.

Does this crisis reflect a failure of India’s Neighbourhood First policy?

No, it is rather simplistic to assume that this crisis reflects a failure of India’s regional strategy. On Nepal, in particular, the successes have been astonishing since the 2015 course correction, after the blockade. After 2017, in particular, Prime Ministers Modi and Oli engaged at the highest level on multiple occasions and developed a direct, political and personal link that India-Nepal relations were often lacking, maybe since the 1980s.

Most importantly, driven by a new logic of interdependence and connectivity, India invested in upgrading its cross-border infrastructure and economic assistance: there are now new rail and road links, an electronic cargo system for Nepali goods to transit via Indian ports, inland waterway navigation plans, and a new cross-border pipeline for petroleum products. These are just some examples of the many achievements of India’s new connectivity strategy , focused on delivering more, better and faster to support the development objectives of Nepal and other neighbours. Unfortunately, these silent successes rarely make it to the headlines in Delhi or Kathmandu.

India’s new approach to Nepal has been gaining ground, especially in diplomatic circles, in different line ministries, in cross-border states/regions, and among a new generation of business and civil society stakeholders on both sides. But it still remains a secondary approach and work in progress. The traditional approach, focused on security, military and other geostrategic factors, continues to prevail, especially in moments of crisis and tension such as now.

As I argued in 2017, it will take some time for India to de-addict itself from the temptations of micromanaging Nepal’s internal politics . Delhi’s proactive engagement of the Nepal Communist Party (NCP) majority led by Prime Minister Oli was a welcome development, reflecting new pragmatism and a focus on delivery and connectivity. It is important for Delhi to realise that Kathmandu politics matters, but that different governments will come and go, all proclaiming an “India first” policy even while balancing with Beijing and others. India will continue to have its friendly political preferences in Nepal, but it should never forget that only its interests are permanent.

Why has India not yet taken the initiative to defuse tensions and begin a diplomatic dialogue?

India’s silence is the greatest cause for concern for the future of bilateral relations and is creating natural uneasiness in Kathmandu. After indirectly indicating its displeasure at the politically charged environment in Nepal, India has largely remained silent. The optics of the Indian ambassador in Kathmandu being summoned also conveyed India’s discontentment: the envoy simply “stated” Delhi’s position and handed over a public declaration of the MEA’s spokesperson.

One month later, we have still not seen any significant de-escalatory move from Delhi, and that betrays clear intent, especially in a context of friendly relations marked by a positive phone call between both leaders in early April. Silence speaks volumes and the relationship may now be in for a deep freeze . We do not know the exact reasons why, but it certainly transpires that Delhi does not feel comfortable to address the issue at this point or in the current context.

In recent weeks, India received the United States special representative for Afghanistan, held a virtual leaders’ summit with Australia, and participated in a border meeting with China to resolve the dispute in Ladakh. So it is certainly not for lack of time or interest that nobody in Delhi has yet found the time to talk to Nepal.

Does this mean India has lost confidence in Prime Minister Oli?

It is possible that this affected Delhi’s trust in Prime Minister Oli, especially given how long this dispute has played out and that both leaders have still not talked to each other. Whether it is because of his relations with China, his politicisation of the dispute, his jibes at India’s national symbols, or any other possible reason, it certainly looks like Delhi may now be less confident in Prime Minister Oli. This does not mean India will interfere to support any political alternative, despite what may circulate in Kathmandu’s many conspiracy corridors.

The reality, once again, is less flattering. Delhi may simply not care, having made its displeasure clear and now willing to wait it out. This would mean that India may now see Prime Minister Oli as more of a problem, rather than part of the solution to improve bilateral relations. Trust and direct communication is critical for India, and previous India-Nepal crises have generally flared up when Delhi picks up signals of anti-India rhetoric, a politically hostile environment, and extra-regional involvement – normally China. This would reflect a worrisome disruption in bilateral relations and, most importantly, a possible end to the strong personal and positive rapport both prime ministers have developed in recent years.

Are both sides really interested in a dialogue?

Not necessarily. Nepali analysts often overestimate the importance of their country in India’s foreign and security policies, or read too much into its allegedly “strategic” outlook. Not everything is planned in detail: Delhi’s decisionmaking, even on next-door Nepal, can be quite confusing and contingent. With many other urgent issues taking precedence in India, whether the COVID-19 pandemic at home or the military standoff with China, Nepal may simply not be a priority.

India’s calculation may be that it can afford to wait this out, watching how Kathmandu’s politics play out. This would be in line with the old colonial Raj tradition of “masterly inactivity.” On the other hand, Prime Minister Oli is unlikely to just get on a call with India without any significant assurance that he can present as a political victory at home, even if only to save face. So we may be in for a prolonged stalemate. As a Hindustan Times edit points out, however, this stasis may end up hurting Nepal more than India.

Will India ever give up control over the territory claimed by Nepal?

Unlikely and certainly not under any compulsion. Nepali nationalists may like to believe that passing a constitutional amendment, roping in the support of China or internationalising the issue at the United Nations will force India to back down. But it is doubtful that any realist in Kathmandu, especially Prime Minister Oli, is under the illusion that Delhi will cave in to any such demands or coercion. This is why despite all of its political rhetoric and pressure, the Nepali government has always continued to emphasise the importance of a diplomatic dialogue.

This crisis thus reflects that it is not easy for Prime Minister Oli, or any other Nepali leader, to have its cake and eat it too: having opened the pandora’s box of Nepali nationalism and anti-India rhetoric, it will be difficult to force that genie back into the bottle of policy pragmatism that is required to earn India’s trust.

Are there any possible solutions to this dispute in the long term?

Even after political trust is restored and diplomatic dialogue begins, whether in a few days, months or years, both sides will have to compromise. The border dispute has now turned into a permanent political irritant between both countries. The status quo privileges India, which is in comfortable control of the territory. India may choose to stall and brush the issue under the carpet again, but not without significant damage to its interests and influence in Nepal.

The sooner India settles this dispute with Nepal, the lesser the chances for China to get involved. Beijing has chosen to remain quiet this time, but its future calculation may change. The Kalapani dispute between India and Nepal is also an almost perfect mirror case of the 2017 Doklam crisis between China and Bhutan, where India stepped up and deployed its military forces to restore the status quo ante.

As noted by Dinesh Bhattarai , a former Nepali diplomat, the border dispute “looks minor, but allowing it to fester is likely to sow the seeds of immense competition and intense rivalry in the sensitive Himalayan frontier with far-reaching geopolitical implications.” Similarly, Indian scholar and Nepal expert S. D. Muni cautions that, sooner or later, the dispute “will be exploited by the third parties to their advantage.”

The historical, technical and cartographic claims from both sides will probably lead to a dead-end, with never-ending, clashing interpretations about river alignments and other contentious criteria. Assuming that there is political buy-in from the leadership on both sides, the only workable solution is to seek some form of co-management or shared sovereignty for the disputed territory.

There are many bold possibilities: maybe there could be joint deployment of military and police forces, as during the 1960s on the Nepal-China border. Given the trade potential, both countries could also consider establishing a special economic zone. Finally, it is in the interest of both that Indian and Nepali pilgrims can use the improved infrastructure in the Kalapani region to reach Mount Kailash.

Hostile states have been able to find such innovative solutions in other parts of the world and, at one point, India and Pakistan were close to finding solutions for Siachen or to make borders irrelevant in Kashmir.  Based on their history of friendly relations and driven by pragmatism, it should not be difficult for India and Nepal to think out of the box and find a practical solution. Delhi and Kathmandu could lead the way to liberate the subcontinent from the sovereignist, nationalist and territorial logic that continues to leave everyone in the region worse off.

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Why We Should All Worry About the China-India Border Dispute

As the rivalry between these nuclear powers heats up, long-standing border tensions risk a dangerous escalation.

By: Nishant Rajeev;  Alex Stephenson

Publication Type: Analysis

The December 2022 clash between Chinese and Indian troops along the two countries’ 2,100-mile-long contested border — known as the Line of Actual Control (LAC) — highlights a worrying “one step forward, two steps back” trend. This brawl was the worst since 2020, when fighting in the Galwan Valley took the lives of 20 Indian and at least four Chinese soldiers. Although these clashes are often followed by dialogue and other steps to reduce tensions, both sides have increasingly militarized their border policies and shown no indication of backing down. And the situation on the border remains tense, as Beijing and New Delhi are hardening their positions on either side of the LAC, with the potential for escalation between the two nuclear-armed powers.

Tensions over the border dispute are a particular cause for concern given the overall trajectory of the Sino-Indian relationship, which has soured significantly in recent years. If Beijing and New Delhi are to resolve these long-standing disputes, they have several challenges to face, many of which were only exacerbated by these recent clashes. These include militarization of the border, India’s increasingly assertive foreign policy and growing threats to regional strategic stability.  

Military Buildup Near the Border

After the Galwan incident, the two sides participated in 18 rounds of corps-commander level meetings that led to a limited withdrawal of forces and the creation of military buffer zones. Indeed, these talks helped limit unwanted escalation — a success that shouldn’t be overlooked. But real disengagement has been nominal, with huge numbers of forces remaining near the border. The most recent round of talks led to no major breakthroughs.

Despite repeated disengagement agreements since 2020, both sides have deepened their relative footholds along the border, bringing in new combined-arms brigades and building additional infrastructure. China, in particular, has focused on building up infrastructure along the LAC. In 2021, China’s legislature passed a land borders law , which stipulates that the state shall “promote coordination between border defense and social, economic development in border areas.” In line with this mandate, China has constructed significant civilian and military infrastructure near the border.

According to the Pentagon’s most recent China military power report , since the 2020 Galwan clash, the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) has “maintained continuous force presence and continued infrastructure buildup along the LAC.” This is corroborated by the latest satellite imagery of the border regions. Images from CSIS’s China Power, for example, show a division-level headquarters being developed at Pangong Lake, just south of the Gogra Hot Springs where troops disengaged last fall. Commercial satellite imagery also shows what appears to be barracks and other new infrastructure in the Galwan Valley. These new sites point to an increasingly permanent Chinese military presence along the border.

Meanwhile, the Indian military has undertaken its own military buildup along the border. In 2021, for example, New Delhi redirected approximately 50,00 troops to the LAC. The Indian Air Force also remains operationally deployed near the border. This force increase is bolstered by infrastructure projects, such as plans to construct 73 strategic roads along the LAC, including nearly 1,430 miles of road in the Indian state of Arunachal Pradesh — where the December 2022 clashes happened and which Beijing claims as “Southern Tibet” — alone, as well as several tunnels to facilitate quicker transportation to border regions. The Indian government also launched its “Vibrant Villages” campaign this year to build important infrastructure in villages on its side of the contested border.

The hard reality is that both sides are militarizing the border. In response to a persistent and growing Chinese threat, India has begun rebalancing its army away from Pakistan to the LAC. As a result, we can expect a larger and more permanent presence from both Chinese and Indian forces in the year ahead. And these developments will only be a fresh barrier in the way of resolving these perennial disputes.

India’s More Assertive Foreign Policy

Overall, New Delhi’s foreign policy in recent years has been geared more toward countering Beijing than engagement, and the border dispute has sabotaged increasingly fraught bilateral relations. Indeed, both India’s prime minister and foreign minister have said that peace at the border is a prerequisite for normalized relations.

After the Cold War, the Sino-Indian relationship warmed and included regular high-level engagement. Both countries aligned on several global issues, including desire for reform of the multilateral international order, and bilateral trade boomed. As a result, a common assumption in Indian foreign policy circles was that the boundary dispute could be kept separate from the political and economic relationship, eventually creating space to accommodate each other’s interests and stabilize the bilateral relationship.

But after the 2020 Galwan crisis these assumptions have been challenged. In the economic domain, New Delhi responded to Beijing’s border transgressions with increased scrutiny and sanctions of Chinese investments and firms. India also banned dozens of Chinese apps following the 2020 clash, including TikTok and WeChat. Since then, more bans have been implemented, resulting in hundreds of Chinese apps being prohibited from the massive Indian market. At the same time, it has prioritized economic engagement with other partners to reduce its dependence on China, including recent free trade negotiations with the European Union and the United Kingdom , as well as the Resilient Supply Chain Initiative with Japan and Australia.

These changes to its economic engagement with China have also been buttressed by India’s deepening strategic relationship with Western democracies. For example, U.S.-India defense trade has grown from “near zero in 2008 to over 20 billion USD in 2020.” Most recently, Washington and New Delhi launched the Initiative on Critical and Emerging Technologies to expand their strategic technology partnership and industrial defense cooperation. The two militaries have also regularized several exercises, including Tiger Triumph, Yudh Abhyas, and exercise Malabar, which now bring together the navies of Australia, India, Japan and the United States, collectively known as the Quad.

As New Delhi has hardened on Beijing, it has deepened its relationship with the United States and other Indo-Pacific partners. This also comes at a time of growing economic challenges and mutual mistrust between India and China. Inevitably, New Delhi’s new foreign policy direction will clash with Chinese interests and could likely lead to new challenges for managing the border disputes in 2023.

Strategic Instability in Asia?

Amid tensions between China and India, Pakistan’s political and economic turmoil, and the resurgence of great power competition, strategic stability in Asia is getting harder to manage . The region is experiencing a cascading security dilemma where nuclear-armed states — China, India and Pakistan — justify advancements to their own arsenals as a response to perceived threats from their adversaries. This dilemma heightens the risk that border disputes could cross the nuclear threshold.

At last fall’s 20th National Party Congress, Chinese leader Xi Jinping said his country needed to build a strong “strategic deterrence system.” Xi’s remarks point to Beijing’s increasingly negative perception of the international environment. This new threat perception, paired with Beijing’s expanding nuclear arsenal and investments in advanced delivery systems, may fuel New Delhi’s own nuclear build-up. At the very least, it will increase the already high levels of mutual mistrust.

While nuclear use remains unlikely, tensions along the border complicate this dangerous dilemma. Infrastructure development and military patrols along the LAC may spur new military investments, both conventional and nuclear. In turn, these investments will likely heighten tensions along the border.

A Role for the United States?

Clashes along the LAC have become all too routine in recent years, and current trends in the Sino-Indian relationship offer little hope of improvement. Both sides appear to be digging-in near the border instead of disengaging, and New Delhi’s foreign policy has evolved to become more assertive in criticizing Beijing, while Beijing has become increasingly intransigent. Despite these tensions, there are still opportunities for Washington to help lower the temperature along the Sino-Indian border.

First, Washington can and should voice support for New Delhi, but it must do so in a way that does not exacerbate an already fraught situation. Such a calibrated response will include opposing unilateral attempts by either side to change the territorial status quo, as well as championing India’s own efforts toward de-escalation. This steady and confident support, especially during a crisis, will go a long way to building trust and credibility in the U.S.-India partnership.

Second, the United States can share valuable information and intelligence about Chinese movement in border regions, as well as equipment to support India’s own intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance capabilities. The United States provided India with such support during the December 2022 border clash in Arunachal Pradesh. The intelligence allowed India to better prepare to confront the Chinese incursions. Experience from this incident can be a model to build on for future collaboration. Materiel commitments can also be bolstered by joint intelligence reviews where analysts from both countries collaboratively discuss the PLA’s activities and intentions along the border. Such action from Washington would proactively and resolutely support New Delhi’s plight without fanning the flames of conflict or conflating the issue with ongoing tensions in its own relationship with China.

Unfortunately, business as usual is likely to define the contested border in 2023. Structural challenges to China-India relations are unlikely to dissipate anytime soon, leaving ample possibility for future clashes. Military talks between Beijing and New Delhi will almost certainly continue — and may very well prevent unnecessary escalation — but they are unlikely to reach terms for large-scale disengagement. And if an incident were to snowball into a crisis, large numbers of nearby forces could also become embroiled in a conflict. Such a devastating possibility should not be ignored.

Nishant Rajeev is a senior analyst with the South Asia Program at the S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies, Nanyang Technical University in Singapore.

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By: Carla Freeman, Ph.D. ;   Naiyu Kuo

Until late October, the big questions about China’s role in the Ukraine conflict centered around whether Beijing would choose to expand its support for Russia to include lethal aid, or if it might engage in more active peacemaking to end the conflict. Then, on November 4, the Pentagon confirmed that North Korea sent more than 10,000 troops to Russia’s Kursk oblast, where Ukraine had captured some territory earlier this year. Days later, the State Department confirmed that North Korean soldiers had begun fighting Ukrainian troops.

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What to Know About Palau’s Election: Taiwan, China and Other Key Issues

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After Palau held its presidential election on November 5, incumbent President Surangel Whipps Jr. was announced as the winner this week. Palau — an archipelago of more than 300 islands to the east of the Philippines and southwest of Guam — is one of Taiwan’s few remaining diplomatic partners in the region and has seen an increasing U.S. military presence in recent years, making it a focal point for competition between the United States and China. Palau gained independence from the United States in 1994 and has maintained a close relationship with Washington ever since under the Compact of Free Association.

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Dean Cheng on What China’s Pressure on Taiwan Means for the Region

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As Beijing ratchets up military pressure along the Strait, Taiwan remains “the one area where we are most likely to see … a direct confrontation between the United States and China” because a conflict “would affect a lot of our allies [like] Japan, South Korea and the Philippines,” says USIP’s Dean Cheng. 

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Many Ways to Fail: The Costs to China of an Unsuccessful Taiwan Invasion

By: Lonnie Henley

A Chinese invasion of Taiwan would be an extremely difficult military, complex operation. China’s People’s Liberation Army (PLA) has been thinking seriously since the early 2000s about what such a landing would require. For over two decades, its force development efforts have been focused on the weapons, equipment, doctrine and operational concepts required to conquer the island in the face of full U.S. military intervention. The PLA has made considerable progress toward that goal and may deem itself fully capable by the 2027 force development target set by Xi Jinping.

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[WEEK 7] ESSAY 13: Management of Indian border disputes – a complex task | BRAINSTORMING ON ETHICS & ESSAY (BEE) by Sunil Oberoi Sir

• July 3, 2021

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As part of our new initiative, BRAINSTORMING ON ETHICS & ESSAY (BEE) , here we have come up with the Thirteenth session .

BEE is a FREE ONLINE (YOUTUBE) initiative, exclusively for Essay and Ethics curated by IASbaba’s renowned faculty member, Shri Sunil Oberoi Sir (former IAS Officer) .

The Thirteenth  essay focuses on the theme, ” .

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