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Antithesis Definition

What is antithesis? Here’s a quick and simple definition:

Antithesis is a figure of speech that juxtaposes two contrasting or opposing ideas, usually within parallel grammatical structures. For instance, Neil Armstrong used antithesis when he stepped onto the surface of the moon in 1969 and said, "That's one small step for a man, one giant leap for mankind." This is an example of antithesis because the two halves of the sentence mirror each other in grammatical structure, while together the two halves emphasize the incredible contrast between the individual experience of taking an ordinary step, and the extraordinary progress that Armstrong's step symbolized for the human race.

Some additional key details about antithesis:

• Antithesis works best when it is used in conjunction with parallelism (successive phrases that use the same grammatical structure), since the repetition of structure makes the contrast of the content of the phrases as clear as possible.
• The word "antithesis" has another meaning, which is to describe something as being the opposite of another thing. For example, "love is the antithesis of selfishness." This guide focuses only on antithesis as a literary device.
• The word antithesis has its origins in the Greek word antithenai , meaning "to oppose." The plural of antithesis is antitheses.

How to Pronounce Antithesis

Here's how to pronounce antithesis: an- tith -uh-sis

Antithesis and Parallelism

Often, but not always, antithesis works in tandem with parallelism . In parallelism, two components of a sentence (or pair of sentences) mirror one another by repeating grammatical elements. The following is a good example of both antithesis and parallelism:

To err is human , to forgive divine .

The two clauses of the sentence are parallel because each starts off with an infinitive verb and ends with an adjective ("human" and "divine"). The mirroring of these elements then works to emphasize the contrast in their content, particularly in the very strong opposite contrast between "human" and "divine."

Antithesis Without Parallelism

In most cases, antitheses involve parallel elements of the sentence—whether a pair of nouns, verbs, adjectives, or other grammar elements. However, it is also possible to have antithesis without such clear cut parallelism. In the Temptations Song "My Girl," the singer uses antithesis when he says:

"When it's cold outside , I've got the month of May ."

Here the sentence is clearly cut into two clauses on either side of the comma, and the contrasting elements are clear enough. However, strictly speaking there isn't true parallelism here because "cold outside" and "month of May" are different types of grammatical structures (an adjective phrase and a noun phrase, respectively).

Antithesis vs. Related Terms

Three literary terms that are often mistakenly used in the place of antithesis are juxtaposition , oxymoron , and foil . Each of these three terms does have to do with establishing a relationship of difference between two ideas or characters in a text, but beyond that there are significant differences between them.

Antithesis vs. Juxtaposition

In juxtaposition , two things or ideas are placed next to one another to draw attention to their differences or similarities. In juxtaposition, the pairing of two ideas is therefore not necessarily done to create a relationship of opposition or contradiction between them, as is the case with antithesis. So, while antithesis could be a type of juxtaposition, juxtaposition is not always antithesis.

Antithesis vs. Oxymoron

In an oxymoron , two seemingly contradictory words are placed together because their unlikely combination reveals a deeper truth. Some examples of oxymorons include:

• Sweet sorrow
• Cruel kindness
• Living dead

The focus of antithesis is opposites rather than contradictions . While the words involved in oxymorons seem like they don't belong together (until you give them deeper thought), the words or ideas of antithesis do feel like they belong together even as they contrast as opposites. Further, antitheses seldom function by placing the two words or ideas right next to one another, so antitheses are usually made up of more than two words (as in, "I'd rather be among the living than among the dead").

Antithesis vs. Foil

Some Internet sources use "antithesis" to describe an author's decision to create two characters in a story that are direct opposites of one another—for instance, the protagonist and antagonist . But the correct term for this kind of opposition is a foil : a person or thing in a work of literature that contrasts with another thing in order to call attention to its qualities. While the sentence "the hare was fast, and the tortoise was slow" is an example of antithesis, if we step back and look at the story as a whole, the better term to describe the relationship between the characters of the tortoise and the hare is "foil," as in, "The character of the hare is a foil of the tortoise."

Antithesis Examples

Antithesis in literature.

Below are examples of antithesis from some of English literature's most acclaimed writers — and a comic book!

Antithesis in Charles Dickens' A Tale of Two Cities

In the famous opening lines of A Tale of Two Cities , Dickens sets out a flowing list of antitheses punctuated by the repetition of the word "it was" at the beginning of each clause (which is itself an example of the figure of speech anaphora ). By building up this list of contrasts, Dickens sets the scene of the French Revolution that will serve as the setting of his tale by emphasizing the division and confusion of the era. The overwhelming accumulation of antitheses is also purposefully overdone; Dickens is using hyperbole to make fun of the "noisiest authorities" of the day and their exaggerated claims. The passage contains many examples of antithesis, each consisting of one pair of contrasting ideas that we've highlighted to make the structure clearer.

It was the best of times , it was the worst of times , it was the age of wisdom , it was the age of foolishness , it was the epoch of belief , it was the epoch of incredulity , it was the season of Light , it was the season of Darkness , it was the spring of hope , it was the winter of despair , we had everything before us, we had nothing before us, we were all going direct to Heaven , we were all going direct the other way —in short, the period was so far like the present period, that some of its noisiest authorities insisted on its being received, for good or for evil, in the superlative degree of comparison only.

Antithesis in John Milton's Paradise Lost

In this verse from Paradise Lost , Milton's anti-hero , Satan, claims he's happier as the king of Hell than he could ever have been as a servant in Heaven. He justifies his rebellion against God with this pithy phrase, and the antithesis drives home the double contrast between Hell and Heaven, and between ruling and serving.

Better to reign in Hell than serve in Heaven.

Antithesis in William Shakespeare's Othello

As the plot of Othello nears its climax , the antagonist of the play, Iago, pauses for a moment to acknowledge the significance of what is about to happen. Iago uses antithesis to contrast the two opposite potential outcomes of his villainous plot: either events will transpire in Iago's favor and he will come out on top, or his treachery will be discovered, ruining him.

This is the night That either makes me or fordoes me quite .

In this passage, the simple word "either" functions as a cue for the reader to expect some form of parallelism, because the "either" signals that a contrast between two things is coming.

Antithesis in William Shakespeare's Hamlet

Shakespeare's plays are full of antithesis, and so is Hamlet's most well-known "To be or not to be" soliloquy . This excerpt of the soliloquy is a good example of an antithesis that is not limited to a single word or short phrase. The first instance of antithesis here, where Hamlet announces the guiding question (" to be or not to be ") is followed by an elaboration of each idea ("to be" and "not to be") into metaphors that then form their own antithesis. Both instances of antithesis hinge on an " or " that divides the two contrasting options.

To be or not to be , that is the question: Whether 'tis nobler in the mind to suffer The slings and arrows of outrageous fortune Or to take arms against a sea of troubles, And by opposing end them ...

Antithesis in T.S. Eliot's "Four Quartets"

In this excerpt from his poem "Four Quartets," T.S. Eliot uses antithesis to describe the cycle of life, which is continuously passing from beginning to end, from rise to fall, and from old to new.

In my beginning is my end . In succession Houses rise and fall , crumble, are extended, Are removed, destroyed, restored, or in their place Is an open field, or a factory, or a by-pass. Old stone to new building , old timber to new fires ...

Antithesis in Green Lantern's Oath

Comic book writers know the power of antithesis too! In this catchy oath, Green Lantern uses antithesis to emphasize that his mission to defeat evil will endure no matter the conditions.

In brightest day , in blackest night , No evil shall escape my sight. Let those who worship evil's might Beware my power—Green lantern's light!

While most instances of antithesis are built around an "or" that signals the contrast between the two parts of the sentence, the Green Lantern oath works a bit differently. It's built around an implied "and" (to be technical, that first line of the oath is an asyndeton that replaces the "and" with a comma), because members of the Green Lantern corps are expressing their willingness to fight evil in all places, even very opposite environments.

Antithesis in Speeches

Many well-known speeches contain examples of antithesis. Speakers use antithesis to drive home the stakes of what they are saying, sometimes by contrasting two distinct visions of the future.

Antithesis in Patrick Henry's Speech to the Second Virginia Convention, 1775

This speech by famous American patriot Patrick Henry includes one of the most memorable and oft-quoted phrases from the era of the American Revolution. Here, Henry uses antithesis to emphasize just how highly he prizes liberty, and how deadly serious he is about his fight to achieve it.

Is life so dear, or peace so sweet, as to be purchased at the price of chains and slavery? Forbid it, Almighty God! I know not what course others may take: but as for me, give me liberty or give me death .

Antithesis in Martin Luther King Jr.'s Oberlin Commencement Address

In this speech by one of America's most well-known orators, antithesis allows Martin Luther King Jr. to highlight the contrast between two visions of the future; in the first vision, humans rise above their differences to cooperate with one another, while in the other humanity is doomed by infighting and division.

We must all learn to live together as brothers —or we will all perish together as fools .

Antithesis in Songs

In songs, contrasting two opposite ideas using antithesis can heighten the dramatic tension of a difficult decision, or express the singer's intense emotion—but whatever the context, antithesis is a useful tool for songwriters mainly because opposites are always easy to remember, so lyrics that use antithesis tend to stick in the head.

Antithesis in "Should I Stay or Should I Go" by The Clash (1981)

In this song by The Clash, the speaker is caught at a crossroads between two choices, and antithesis serves as the perfect tool to express just how confused and conflicted he is. The rhetorical question —whether to stay or to go—presents two opposing options, and the contrast between his lover's mood from one day (when everything is "fine") to the next (when it's all "black") explains the difficulty of his choice.

One day it's fine and next it's black So if you want me off your back Well, come on and let me know Should I stay or should I go ? Should I stay or should I go now? Should I stay or should I go now? If I go, there will be trouble If I stay it will be double ...

Antithesis in "My Girl" by the Temptations (1965)

In this song, the singer uses a pair of metaphors to describe the feeling of joy that his lover brings him. This joy is expressed through antithesis, since the singer uses the miserable weather of a cloudy, cold day as the setting for the sunshine-filled month of May that "his girl" makes him feel inside, emphasizing the power of his emotions by contrasting them with the bleak weather.

I've got sunshine on a cloudy day When it's cold outside I've got the month of May Well I guess you'd say, What can make me feel this way? My girl, my girl, my girl Talkin' bout my girl.

Why Do Writers Use Antithesis?

Fundamentally, writers of all types use antithesis for its ability to create a clear contrast. This contrast can serve a number of purposes, as shown in the examples above. It can:

• Present a stark choice between two alternatives.
• Convey magnitude or range (i.e. "in brightest day, in darkest night" or "from the highest mountain, to the deepest valley").
• Express strong emotions.
• Create a relationship of opposition between two separate ideas.
• Accentuate the qualities and characteristics of one thing by placing it in opposition to another.

Whatever the case, antithesis almost always has the added benefit of making language more memorable to listeners and readers. The use of parallelism and other simple grammatical constructions like "either/or" help to establish opposition between concepts—and opposites have a way of sticking in the memory.

Other Helpful Antithesis Resources

• The Wikipedia page on Antithesis : A useful summary with associated examples, along with an extensive account of antithesis in the Gospel of Matthew.
• Sound bites from history : A list of examples of antithesis in famous political speeches from United States history — with audio clips!
• A blog post on antithesis : This quick rundown of antithesis focuses on a quote you may know from Muhammad Ali's philosophy of boxing: "Float like a butterfly, sting like a bee."

• Climax (Figure of Speech)
• Figure of Speech
• Juxtaposition
• Parallelism
• Protagonist
• Rhetorical Question
• Internal Rhyme
• Figurative Language
• Verbal Irony
• Antimetabole
• Falling Action
• Anachronism
• Formal Verse

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What Is the Antithesis?

Camden m. bucey.

• August 8, 2022

In the field of Reformed apologetics we sometimes speak about the antithesis. The antithesis is a theological principle that is meant to describe the difference between believers and unbelievers. There are many ways that we could describe that difference, but we must at the very least describe that difference covenantally. That is, it describes a distinction between those who are in Adam and under the terms of the covenant of works and those who are in Christ—those who Christ has redeemed and brought into the covenant of grace. There is a covenantal distinction between these groups.

But we should also recognize that not only is this antithesis covenantal, it is absolute in the sense that there are no other categories of human beings. There is no one who is in some third group. We have those in Adam and those in Christ; there are none others. There is no middle ground. There is no neutrality. There are the two groups of people: those who are still children of wrath and those who have been redeemed by God’s grace and brought into the covenant of grace by the Holy Spirit applying the life death and resurrection of Christ unto them.

The antithesis is covenant and absolute. The antithesis is also ethical. We should not in other words understand this drastic divide between believers and unbelievers as an ontological difference. We should not understand the antithesis as meaning believers are human beings while unbelievers are something other than human beings. Certainly, we recognize that the Holy Spirit works in the hearts and minds of believers. He enlightens their minds and renews their wills so that they would embrace Jesus Christ as he is offered to us in the gospel. We also know that all those born in sin have had their minds darkened. Their hearts are turned against God, and they serve in active rebellion against God, seeking to suppress the truth in unrighteousness. Those are legitimate and significant differences—not merely a figure of speech or words used to describe something that isn’t actually there. Nevertheless, all humans are indeed still humans after the fall into sin.

Still, once Adam fell into sin there’s a great divide, an absolute ethical antithesis that is covenantally determined between those who are in Adam and those who are in Christ. In other words, there is a distinction between those who are children of wrath and those who have been redeemed, are being sanctified, and will arrive at the final day to meet their savior. Christ will bring them as fully sanctified and holy people, fully redeemed, consummate, and glorified people into the New Heavens and the New Earth.

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Definition of Antithesis

Examples of antithesis in everyday speech, common examples of antithesis from famous speeches, examples of proverbs featuring antithesis, utilizing antithesis in writing, antithesis and parallelism, antithesis and juxtaposition, use of antithesis in sentences  , examples of antithesis in literature.

Antithesis is an effective literary device and figure of speech in which a writer intentionally juxtaposes two contrasting ideas or entities. Antithesis is typically achieved through parallel structure, in which opposing concepts or elements are paired in adjacent phrases , clauses , or sentences. This draws the reader’s attention to the significance or importance of the agents being contrasted, thereby adding a memorable and meaningful quality to the literary work.

Example 1:  Hamlet (William Shakespeare)

Give every man thine ear, but few thy voice ; Take each man’s censure, but reserve thy judgment.

Example 2:  Paradise Lost  (John Milton)

Here at least We shall be free; the Almighty hath not built Here for his envy, will not drive us hence: Here we may reign secure, and in my choice To reign is worth ambition though in Hell: Better to reign in Hell, than serve in Heaven.

Example 3:  Fire and Ice  (Robert Frost)

Some say the world will end in fire, Some say in ice. From what I’ve tasted of desire I hold with those who favor fire. But if it had to perish twice, I think I know enough of hate To say that for destruction ice Is also great And would suffice.

In his poem, Frost utilizes antithesis to contrast fire and ice as elements with devastating and catastrophic potential to end the world. Frost effectively demonstrates the equal powers for the destruction of these elements, despite showcasing them as opposing forces. In this case, the poet’s antithesis has a literal as well as figurative interpretation. As the poem indicates, the world could literally end in the fire as well as ice. However, fire and ice are contrasting symbols in the poem as well. Fire represents “desire,” most likely in the form of greed, the corruption of power, domination, and control. Conversely, ice represents “hate” in the form of prejudice, oppression, neglect, and isolation.

Example 4: The Gettysburg Address by Abraham Lincoln

We have come to dedicate a portion of that field, as a final resting place for those who here gave their lives so that nation might live.

The brave men, living and dead, who struggled here, have consecrated it, far above our poor power to add or detract.

The world will little note, nor long remember what we say here, but it can never forget what they did here.

Function of Antithesis

Synonyms of antithesis, post navigation.

• Grace Chapel, TN
• A Puritan’s Mind
• Puritan Publications

Apologetics

At war with the word: the necessity of biblical antithesis by greg l. bahnsen.

The following discussion is an excerpt from the 1987 Van Til Lectures, delivered by Dr. Bahnsen at Westminster Seminary, Philadelphia.

The antithesis between followers of God and followers of Satan is sovereignly inflicted as God’s judicial curse. This enmity is not only social but also intellectual in nature, and, therefore, to ignore it in our apologetic is to compromise the gospel. Without the ingredient of antithesis, Christianity is not simply anemic, it has altogether forfeited its challenge to all other worldviews. Anyone who is familiar with the corpus of Van Til’s publications and writings will recognize that the subject of antithesis is one fitting hallmark of his scholarly contribution to twentieth century apologetical theory. Contents

Antithesis in Van Til’s Apologetic

1. The Antithesis is Crucial to the Biblical Understanding of Man

A. The Biblical Narrative B. The Significance for Apologetics

2. But Modern Thought Disregards and Disdains the Antithesis 3. The Systematic Nature of Antithesis 4. Antithesis in Apologetic Method 5. Unbelievers Eventually at War With the Word Conclusion Notes

It was in the interest of antithesis that Van Til wrote his first major classroom syllabus, now entitled A Survey of Christian Epistemology, stating that, “It is necessary to become clearly aware of the deep antithesis between the two main types of epistemology,” Christian and non-Christian.[1] It was in the interest of antithesis that Van Til published his first major book on the “Crisis Theology” of Barth and Brunner, entitled The New Modernism, hoping to alert the Christian church to the fact that Barth’s dialectical theology was fundamentally one with modernistic theology — and that “the new Modernism and the old alike are destructive of historic Christian theism and with it of the significant meaning of human experience.”[2]

It was with the interest of a proper understanding of antithesis that Van Til, in the next year, published his second book on the subject of Common Grace, where the fundamental premise was that “the believer and the non-believer differ at the outset of every self-conscious investigation.”[3] And perhaps the most memorable section of Van Til’s basic text in apologetics, The Defense of the Faith, is precisely his treatment of the mock dialogue in which Mr. Grey, the evangelical apologist, does not appreciate, to his detriment, the significance of the philosophical antithesis between belief and unbelief.[4]

This theme of the principial, epistemological and ethical antithesis between the regenerate, Bible-directed mind of the Christian and the autonomous mind of the sinner (whether expressed by the avowed unbeliever or by the unorthodox modern theologian), remained part of Van Til’s distinctive teaching throughout his career. Indeed, his festschrift bears the pertinent title Jerusalem and Athens — based on Tertullian’s famous antithetical quip “what indeed has Athens to do with Jerusalem? What concord is there between the Academy and the Church?”

In his own essay for that volume, entitled “My Credo,” Van Til condensed his conception of apologetics, guided by the thought of antithesis, into a concluding summary, where he wrote:

My own proposal, therefore, for a consistently Christian methodology of apologetics is this… That we no longer make an appeal to “common notions” which the Christian and non-Christian agree on, but to the “common ground” which they actually have because man and his world are what Scripture says they are. That we… set the non-Christian principle of the rational autonomy of man against the Christian principle of the dependence of man’s knowledge on God’s knowledge as revealed in the person and by the Spirit of Christ. That we claim, therefore, that Christianity alone is reasonable for men to hold…That we argue, therefore, by “presupposition.”[5]

The aim of the present discussion is to address the subject of the antithetical nature of Christianity and its significance for apologetics. It was one of the burdens of Van Til’s later work, Toward a Reformed Apologetics, to urge Reformed apologists not to be philosophical (or speculative) first, then Biblical afterwards. Rather, said Van Til, if we would be true to the Christ of the Scriptures, we must first listen to his word in the Bible and from that starting point proceed to think through all philosophical issues. Van Til ended this pamphlet with these words:

Rather than wedding Christianity to the philosophies of Aristotle or Kant, we must openly challenge the apostate philosophic constructions of men by which they seek to suppress the truth about God themselves, and the world…It is only if we demand of men complete submission to the living Christ of the Scriptures in every area of their lives that we have presented to men the claims of the Lord Christ without compromise. It is only then that we are truly Biblical first and speculative afterwards. Only then are we working toward a Reformed apologetic.[6]

Following Van Til’s exhortation, I will begin with a survey of the Biblical view of the antithesis between believer and unbeliever. 1. The Antithesis is Crucial to the Biblical Understanding of Man A. The Biblical Narrative

1. Geneis 3:15 — We read in this verse, “I will put enmity between you [Satan] and the woman, and between your seed and her seed; he shall bruise your head, and you will bruise his heel.” A correct view of man, his historical setting and problem, and God’s resultant relationship to man is tied up with the Biblical presentation of man’s Fall and God’s response to it. Genesis 3:15 is often designated the protoevangelium, the first proclamation of good news for man’s salvation. However, that good news of the victorious confrontation of the Saviour with Satan cannot be understood except against the background of what precedes it. There is preceding it, of course, (1) the fact that man’s guilty conscience created alienation between him and his wife, as well as a desire to flee from the presence of God (vv. 7-8), and (2) the fact that God’s curse was pronounced against the serpent precisely because he dared to beguile man into repudiating the self-establishing authority of God’s word (v.14). Both of these facts point to the spiritual antithesis inherent in the present human situation.

But more pointedly, the antithesis is explicitly declared by God in verse fifteen, where He said that He “will put enmity” between the seed of the woman and the seed of the serpent — between the children of God (who are united with their Savior, the Messiah: cf. Gal. 3:16,29) and the children of the devil (cf. John 8:44). It is worth noting that the emphasis falls upon the word “enmity” as the first word in the Hebrew of Genesis 3:15 (“Enmity will I put”). And God himself is said to constitute, establish, and deliberately impose this enmity between men.

The opposition and antithesis between followers of God and followers of Satan is not simply predicted by God and is not simply commanded; it is sovereignly inflicted as God’s judicial curse. The distinction and antipathy between the two seeds must and indeed will be maintained. Only in that light do we properly understand and hope in the Messiah’s crushing defeat of the tempter. Were that antithesis disregarded, diluted or dispelled, the very meaning of the gospel of salvation would be lost — either by consigning all men indiscriminately to the perdition of Satan, or by neglecting the discriminating love of God, which Paul says in Colossians 1:13, “delivered us out of the power of darkness and transferred us into the kingdom of His beloved son.”

The entire Biblical message of redemption and the historical establishing of God’s kingdom both presuppose “the antithesis,” then, between the people of God and the culture of unbelief, between the regenerate and the unregenerate. Therefore, throughout history Satan has tempted God’s people to compromise “the antithesis” — whether by intermingling in ungodly marriages (Gen. 5:2), or by showing unwarranted tolerance toward the enemies of God (Joshua 23:11-13; Judges 1:21,27-36; Ps 106:34-35), or by departing from the authority of God’s word so that “every man does what is right in his own eyes,” (Judges 21:25), by committing spiritual adultery with other gods (e.g. Ps. 106:36,39; Hosea 2:2-13, 4:12; Exek. 16:15-25), by trusting in some power other than God (e.g. Kings 18:21; Chron. 16: 7-9; Isa 30:7, 31:1; Ezek 16:26-29), or by repudiating the Messiah along with the world (John 1:10-11), or by bowing the knee both to Christ and to Caesar (cf. Acts 17:7; Rev 13:8,11-17).

In fact, Satan even dared to tempt Jesus, the Son of God, to achieve God’s ends by compromising the antithesis with Satan himself. In Matt 4:8-10, you remember how Satan showed Jesus the kingdoms of the world, and he said all of them would belong to Jesus if He would just bow his knee to Satan. (Of course, they belonged to Jesus anyway. Satan was proposing a shortcut.) So if we would live up to Paul’s assessment that Christians “are not ignorant of his [Satan’s] devices” (II Corinthians 2:11), then we must be sure not to ignore the tempter’s persistent device of suggesting that we can tone down or disregard the antithesis which God has imposed between His people and the world.

2. Genesis 4 — In the fourth chapter of Genesis, we read that Cain murdered his brother, Abel, because God had respect unto Abel’s offering instead of Cain’s. The antagonism between those who please God and those who do not was already at work then in human history. And John tells us specifically that this event illustrated the enmity which arises between the two seeds, for he says, “Cain was of the evil one.” He was of the seed of the serpent, and he slew his brother precisely “because his works were evil and his brother’s righteous” (I John 3:12).

3. Subsequent Portions of Genesis — The antithesis continues to be pressed in the literature of the Bible as the descendants of Cain and their accompanying culture are now distinguished from those of Seth in the fourth Chapter of Genesis. The family of Noah is set apart from the rest of mankind for preservation through the flood in Genesis 5-9. The seed of Shem is set apart from the seed of his brothers in Genesis 10. The ungodly attempt to unify all mankind at the tower of Babel is thwarted by God in Genesis 11. Abraham and his seed are specifically chosen out of all the other families of the earth in Genesis 12-15. The line of Isaac is chosen over that of Ishmael in Genesis 16-18. The line of Jacob is chosen over that of Esau in Genesis 25.

4. Exodus through Joshua — Eventually the children of Israel are called out of the land of Egypt, as the Book of Exodus shows us, to displace the Canaanite tribes and be established as a holy people unto God (as we read in the Book of Joshua).

Accompanying these Biblical stories, we read repeatedly of the hostility which exists between God’s children and those of the world. We see this whether we look at Ishmael’s persecuting mockery of Isaac in Gen 21:9 (cf. Gal 4:29) or Pharoah’s harsh and murderous oppression of the Jewish slaves in Exod. 1:18-22 (cf. Heb. 11:23-27), or Israel’s military campaigns against Canaan’s abominable places of worship in Deuteronomy 7:24-25, 12:2-3.

5. The Psalms and Prophetic Literature — The theme of antithesis thus runs through the Biblical drama like a subtle, unifying thread. We hear the theme of antithesis in the imprecatory psalms against God’s enemies, and in the prophetic denunciation of the nations, especially against the ruthless empires of Assyria and Babylon which took God’s chosen people into captivity.

6. The Law — The necessity of living in terms of “the antithesis” is buttressed by the Mosaic laws’ demand that God’s chosen people be a “holy” people, separated from pagan unbelief and practices (e.g. Leviticus 11:44-45; I Pet 1:15-16). On this basis Peter says in the New Testament that we are to be sanctified in all manner of living. It was reiterated in the call of the prophets to “come out from among them and be separate” and “touch no unclean thing,” (Isa 52:11; Jer 31:1), which is quoted by Paul in II Corinthians 6:17-7:1. We’re to be cleansed from all defilement of flesh and spirit. Now both of these moral injunctions assume and endorse an antithesis between the lifestyle of believers and unbelievers, and both injunctions are repeated for us in the New Testament. We had better take them seriously.

7. The New Testament — In the New Testament we see further evidence of, and a demand for, the antithesis between the church and the world. Jesus emphasized and called for a clear observation of that antithesis when He proclaimed “he who is not with me is against me.” (Matt. 12:30), because, he said, “no man can serve two masters” (Matt. 6:24). And Jesus identified “the enemy,” (that language is conspicuous), the enemy of the Kingdom (Matt. 13:39), as Satan. Peter called him the believer’s “adversary” (I Pet. 5:8).

And Paul utilized military imagery to rouse us to withstand the principalities and powers and spiritual hosts of wickedness (Eph 6:10-17). There is, according to the New Testament outlook, clearly a hostile encounter taking place in the world.

A graphic illustration of the antithesis, or enmity, between the seed of the serpent and the seed which belongs to God, is found in the account of Elymas the sorcerer, whom Paul denounced as “a son of the devil,” because he “opposed” the apostles by trying to turn aside Sergius Paulus from the faith, and by always “perverting the right ways of the Lord” (Acts 13).

We must call Genesis 3:15 to mind again when Jesus calls those who oppose the kingdom of God, “the sons of the evil one” (Matt. 13:38), and when Paul identifies them as the “enemies” of Christ’s cross who mind earthly things, in contrast to the Christians’ heavenly citizenship (Phil.3:18-20).

The apostle John reinforces the necessity of the antithesis by issuing the following command to believers in I John 2:15: “Love not the world…If any man loves the world, the love of the Father is not in him.” And James drives home the antithesis pungently by declaring, “whoever would be a friend of the world makes himself an enemy of God” (James 4:4).

To end our short survey, we can finally observe that the antithesis will, once and for all, be ultimately confirmed by the eternal separation of all men into either heaven or hell, as Jesus taught in Matthew 25:31-33,40. B. The Significance for Apologetics

The primary significance for apologetics of the Biblical teaching that there is a fundamental, everlasting and irreconcilable antithesis between the regenerate and unregenerate is found in the observation that this antithesis applies just as much to the mental life and conduct of men as it does to their other affairs. The “enmity” between Satan’s seed and God’s seed which is seminally spoken of in Genesis 3:15 is intellectual in nature, as well as social, or familial, or economic, or military, or political, or what have you.

Consider the words of Paul in Romans 8:7: “the mind of the flesh is enmity against God; for it is not subject to the law of God, neither indeed can it be.” The mentality of those who are unregenerate (those who are in the flesh) cannot subject itself to the truth of God’s Word. There is, then, no peace between the mindset of the unbeliever and the mind of God (which believers seek to reflect, cf. John 15:15; I Cor. 2:16). They are rather at “enmity” with each other.

Paul similarly describes the unregenerate, unreconciled spiritual condition of unbelievers in Colossians 1:21, when he says “they are alienated and enemies in their mind” (enemies in their mind) against God. The “enmity” is specifically one which is worked out “in the mind” or thinking of the unbeliever. The unbeliever is unable to be subject to the law’s greatest command, which is to “love the Lord your God with all your heart, with all of your soul and with all of your mind” (Matt. 22:36-37). Instead, the unbeliever “hates the wisdom and instruction” of God, as Proverbs 1:7 puts it. Although the fear of the Lord is the beginning — the very starting point — of knowledge, there is no fear of God before the unbeliever’s eyes (Rom 3:18). He is, as such, kept from realizing any of the “treasures of wisdom and knowledge” which are deposited in Christ. (Colossians 2:3) The unbeliever’s intellectual enmity against God is simultaneously his epistemological undoing.

Paul concisely lays out the epistemological enmity of which we are speaking, and he plainly points to its consequences, in Colossians 2:8 — “take heed, lest anyone rob you [that is, rob you of the wisdom of the treasures of knowledge spoken of in verse three preceding] through his philosophy, even vain deceit, which is after the traditions of men, after the rudimentary assumptions of the world, and not after Christ.” Here, Paul sets a philosophy which is “after Christ” in antithesis to one that is “after worldly” presuppositions (his word is “rudiments”: the elementary principles of learning) and human traditions. And Paul says that the latter will have the effect of depriving those who maintain it of knowledge. Those who “suppress the truth in unrighteousness,” are not only “without excuse” for their line of reasoning, but they also become “vain in their reasoning, their senseless hearts being darkened” (Rom 1:18,20-21).’ Unbelieving philosophy is not “philosophy”, (etymologically “the love of wisdom”) at all. The arguments of unregenerate men against the Christian faith are thus only “the oppositions of knowledge falsely-so-called” (I Tim 6:20), the foolish reasoning of those “that oppose themselves” (II Tim 2:25) in the process of prosecuting their enmity or hostility against God.

Now the apologist must realize these implications and thereby seek to expose the utter epistomologetical futility of the unbeliever’s reasoning. Paul’s challenge was this : “Has not God made foolish the wisdom of this world?” (I Cor. 1:20). It was his conviction that, because the unregenerate mind is at enmity with God s Word and Spirit — and thus also with the thinking of God’s people who are “renewed in the spirit of their minds” (Ephesians 4:23) — unbelievers, whether they are scholars or not, “walk in the vanity of their mind, being darkened in their understanding, alienated from the life of God, because of the ignorance that is in them, because of the hardening of their hearts.” If ever there was an indictment, line after line, Paul gives it in Ephesians 4:17-18.

The defender of the faith who is faithful to the Biblical faith he defends, will not seek to abandon or diminish the crucial antithesis which exists between the philosophical reasoning of the regenerate mind and the self-destructive reasoning of the unregenerate mind. He will, as Paul says in II Corinthians 10:5, “cast down reasonings and every lofty thing exalted against the knowledge of God, taking every thought captive to the obedience of Christ.” The antithesis must be central and indispensable to the work of the apologist as an ambassador for Christ in the intellectual arena, who beseeches men to be reconciled to God (II Corinthians 5:20). 2. But Modern Thought Disregards and Disdains the Antithesis

The spirit of our age or culture, however, is not only antithetical to the perspective of God’s Spirit as generally revealed in the Scriptures; it is in particular antithetical to the Biblical view of antithesis itself. The enmity or antithesis between the regenerate and unregenerate mind, as presaging the final antithesis of heaven and hell is renounced by the modern spirit in the hope that all the world might some day “live as one.”

This erasing of the antithesis was the motivating theme and arousing sentiment of the song popularized by ex-Beatle John Lennon, in which he proposed, “Imagine there’s no heaven; it’s easy if you try, no hell below us, above us only sky. Imagine all the people living for today.” The song went on to preach that we should imagine that there is no country, no possessions, and “no religion too” — so that we might finally achieve a “brotherhood of man” where any and all antithesis, especially that proclaimed by the Bible, will be eliminated forever in a social, political, economical and religious monism of perpetual peace. It all begins, sings the modern siren, by imagining that there is no heaven and no hell. The God-ordained antithesis must not be conceded.

Even where the expression of the modern spirit is not as pronounced or poetic as John Lennon’s song, we see the subtle disregard for the Biblical antithesis exhibited around us everyday in the media. The contemporary spirit is one of egalitarian democracy and enlightened tolerance, and these attributes are nothing if not meant to be all encompassing. It is not enough that political democracy permits one to believe as he sees fit; there is as well the “epistemological democracy” which insists that no belief-system is inherently superior to any other.

The Biblical antithesis between light and darkness, between God-honoring wisdom and God-defying foolishness, between the mind of the Spirit and the mind of the flesh is an offense to the modern mentality. Nobody has the warrant to deem his perspective as more authoritative or imbued with any special epistemological privilege over others. All philosophical points of view must be rendered equal honor as worthy of our attention and having something worthwhile to contribute to our thinking. We must respect each other.

Accordingly, our age is characterized by intellectual pluralism and the spirit of rapprochement, not at all by a recognition of, or a regard for, a categorical antithesis between Christian and non-Christian viewpoints.

The result of neglecting the God-ordained perspectival antithesis between Christianity and the world is, as one might naturally expect, a failure of nerve in maintaining any distinctive and unqualified religious truth, a truth which would stand out clearly against every view which falls short of it or runs counter to it. “Nobody is wrong if everybody is right” has become the unwitting operating premise of modern theology.

The cognitive agnosticism of post-Kantian religious thought precludes identifying any clear-cut line of demarcation between truth and error — and renders the advocating of one a disreputable social faux pas’. Modern theology is, accordingly, simply loath to press the fundamental antithesis between scholarship which submits to the revealed word of God and autonomous reasoning which either ignores or denies it. The inevitable result of suppressing this antithesis is that Christian theology loses its basic character and joins hands with what should be its very opposite: religious relativism. That is what has transpired in our age of anti-antithesis. For instance, there are no genuine “heretics” in the thinking of modern theologians — for the same reason there are no citations for indecent exposure in a nudist colony: viz., the preconditions for making those charges simply do not hold.

This is candidly illustrated by the text which I consider the most thorough and descriptively competent survey available for contemporary theology and philosophy of religion, one that was written by no less a scholar than the Lady Margaret Professor of Divinity in the University of Oxford. In his book, Twentieth Century Religious Thought, John Macquarrie demonstrates a remarkable familiarity with the wide-ranging scope of philosophical trends which have interfaced with religious reflection since 1900.

Macquarrie has undoubtedly mastered the field of modern theological thought, and admittedly his insights and evaluations of particular themes or particular authors are often beneficial. But what has Macquarrie learned from all this? What conclusion would he draw from his study of twentieth-century religious thought? He is quite open about that matter in his chapter on “Concluding Comments” in the first subsection, entitled, “Some Findings and Suggestions.” The Oxford scholar writes:

Our survey, however, has undoubtedly pointed us in the direction of a degree of relativism. Absolute and final truth on the questions of religion is just unattainable…Although absolute truth is denied us, we can have partial insights of varying degrees of adequacy, glimpses that would make us less forlorn…

What we are driving at is that just as we have no absolute answers, so we have no absolute questions, in which everything would be noticed at once. Only God could ask or answer such questions. Our questions arise out of our situation, and both questions and answers are relative to that situation. This need not distress us for it could not be otherwise — it is part of what it means to be finite.

[We] have seen, there are many possible ways of understanding religion, and…no one way is likely to be the final truth…This is the situation in which finite man has got to make up his mind — an agonizing situation, if you like but also a challenging and adventurous one. So Kierkegaard viewed Christianity — not as a cozy convention but as a decision to be taken and a leap to be made.[7]

Macquarrie, who I think is representative of the modern mentality, is unwilling to countenance the radical antithesis (the God-imposed enmity) between belief grounded in God’s holy Word and unbelief. At best he sees the theological situation as a “dialogue among free men” who, adrift together in religious relativism and uncertainty, must make an adventuresome “leap” of faith since there is no “final truth” regarding religion for us or finite creatures whose thinking is dependent upon our local situation. Of course, as Macquarrie recognizes, God himself might provide “absolute answers” which would lift us above our human limitations. And Macquarrie is well aware that, “some theologians talk of a divine revelation to which they have access,” but then he promptly dismisses that “dogmatic and arrogant” perspective (due to difficulties connected with interpreting the revelation).

The farce in all this, I hope, is only too apparent. Macquarrie himself is no less dogmatic and arrogant in pronouncing that “absolute and final truth” on religious questions is “just unattainable.” He is absolute in his declaration that nothing is absolute! On the question of religious insight, Macquarrie s own final truth is that there can be no final truth. This flagrant contradiction complements the subtle, but just as real, contradiction in his statement that “varying degrees of adequacy” can be recognized in different religious insights, despite the fact that “absolute truth” is denied us. When a final truth or religious standard is ruled out, on what basis could anyone judge the “degree” of approximation to the truth in any proposed religious idea? What kind of “adequacy” does Macquarrie expect religious insights to achieve, if not adequacy regarding their veracity? (Is it a religious truth that truth is irrelevant to religious adequacy?) The modern mind prefers such unpardonable lapses of intellectual cogency to the fearsome antithesis which an absolute divine revelation would represent and necessitate.

Dr. Van Til taught us that the tendency toward irrationalism in modern thought (the tendency toward skepticism, uncertainty, relativism, the acceptance of incoherence) is in fact allied with the tendency toward autonomous rationalism in modern thought (the tendency to exalt man’s natural intellect as a final judge using the standards of logic and science). The reflective modern man wants it both ways: his intellect is adequate and authoritative, but not really adequate enough or finally authoritative. The arrogant demands of rationalism are counter-balanced by the humble concessions of irrationalism, and then the humble misgivings of irrationalism are shored up by the assurances of rationalism. Van Til pointed out that, ironically, the two tendencies toward rationalism and irrationalism actually call for each other:

There is nothing surprising in the fact that modern man is both utterly irrationalist and utterly rationalist at the same time. He has to be both in order to be either. And he has to be both in order to defend his basic assumption of his own freedom or ultimacy…The determinists and rationalists are what they are in the interest of defending the same autonomy of freedom of man that the indeterminists and rationalists are defending[8]

The non-Christian presupposes a dialectic between “chance” and “regularity,” the former accounting for the origin of matter and life, the latter accounting for the current success of the scientific enterprise…The non-Christian…attempts nevertheless to use “logic” to destroy the Christian position. On the one hand, appealing to the non-rationality of “matter,” he says that the chance-character of “facts” is conclusive evidence against the Christian position. Then, on the other hand, he maintains like Parmenides that the Christian story cannot possibly be true. Man must be autonomous, “logic” must be legislative as to the field of “possibility,” and possibility must be above God[9]

And this is precisely what we see in the example of Dr. Macquarrie. Leaning toward irrationalism, he rules out absolute or final truth in religion, affirms that all of our questions and answers are relative, says we must be content with a leap of faith, and settles for glaring contradictions in the course of telling us so. He then turns around on the very next page and asserts an autonomous rationalism as his intellectual guide:

Our understanding of religion should be a reasonable one. By this is not meant that some conclusive proof is to be given, for we have already rejected the possibility of absolute certitude…In asking for a reasonable understanding of religion, we simply mean that it should involve no sacrificium intellectus, no flagrant contradictions, no violation of natural reason, no conflict with what we believe about the world on scientific or common-sense grounds.[10]

This conspicuous exhibition of the rational-irrational tension in the thinking of a learned, modern thinker is pertinent to our subject matter in this discussion, for we can discern here the same suppression of antithesis on both sides of Macquarrie’s dialectic. On the irrationalist side, there can be no antithesis between divine truth and rebellious unbelief, for all religious insights are relative; all men are together in the same situation: a common dialogue where final and absolute truth is unattainable. Likewise, on the rationalist side of the dialectic, there can be no antithesis between divine truth and rebellious unbelief, for (again) all men are together in the same situation: refusing to sacrifice the autonomy of their “intellect,” honoring the demands of “natural” reason and “common” sense, and never believing anything contrary to what “we” (any man) believe(s) about the world on the basis of (generic) “science.” All men alike, whether servants or enemies of Jesus Christ, are lumped together by Macquarrie in his rationalist methodology (autonomous intellect is judge), even as they are lumped together in his irrationalist conclusion (there is no final truth). A fundamental religious antithesis in method and conclusion cannot be recognized by him.

A similar rejection of antithesis is found in the writings of one of the leading analytical philosophers of our age, Stephen Toulmin. In Toulmin’s The Return to Cosmology, which addresses the interplay of science and the theology of nature, Toulmin argues, in the face of the modern antagonism to the idea, that questions of the universe as a whole and man’s place in it should not be dismissed. Toulmin wants to return to comprehensive questions about the nature of the universe as a whole, to cosmological reflection which benefits from the dual input of natural science and religious philosophy.

At the very end of the book, where he discusses “The Future Cosmology,” he makes the following observation: “If there is to be a renewal of contacts between science and theology along the lines suggested here — if the cosmological presuppositions involved in talking about the overall scheme of things are to be scrutinized jointly from both sides of the fence — we shall quickly encounter some knotty problems of jurisdiction.”[11] Toulmin is sharp enough to realize that “sectarian” disagreement and doctrinal particularism stand in the way of developing an effective, common cosmology in terms of which men can agree about their place and responsibility in the universe. The cosmology whose pursuit he endorses, therefore, is one which will not offend “the natural reason” of man. In the second to last paragraph of his book he writes:

Yet does this put us in a position to claim, quite baldly, that the entire scheme of Creation by which our moral and religious ideas are to be guided is transparent to “the natural reason” without regard for the doctrinal considerations of particular religions and sects? Preachers who exhort good Christians to let their Christianity permeate all their thinking, so that they may even end up with (say a “Christian arithmetic”) invite Leibniz’s objection that arithmetic is just not like that — even God himself cannot alter, or contravene, the truths of mathematics. And, if we were told that good Christians must subscribe to a different science of ecology from other people, a parallel objection might well be pressed. God intervenes in the World (Leibniz declared) within the realm of grace, not within the realm of nature. So perhaps the time has come to take our courage in both hands, and declare for a fully common and ecumenical theology of nature.[12]

Toulmin is willing to return to cosmological thinking, just so long as any antithesis between a Christian theology of nature and any non-Christian conception is ruled out in advance. The Christian perspective is to be confined to the realm of grace, not allowed to create sectarian disputes within the realm of nature. The last thing that the modern mind is willing to accept is a distinctively Christian mathematics, a distinctively Christian natural science, a distinctively Christian anything. No special place may be afforded the Christian perspective. “The antithesis” must be removed if Christians are to dialogue with other religionists, philosophers, or scientists. Everyone must be respected for having a perspective which contributes to the rich understanding of this ultimately mysterious universe.

Toulmin immediately states that his fully ecumenical enterprise — what he calls a “theology of nature accessible to the common reason” will not bring universal support due to the intolerance of “fundamentalist theology.” But, even if it did, if all perspectives would accept the rationalist requirement of a common, autonomous intellectual method, would Toulmin’s ecumenical theology of nature prove successful? Would it bring us an assured knowledge of the grand scheme of things and man’s place in the universe? In the very last paragraph of his book, Toulmin asks, “Just how far, then, can the natural reason alone inform us in detail about what the overall scheme of things — the cosmos, or Creation — really is?” His answer (or non-answer) ends the book: “We have reached the threshold of some painfully difficult and confusing questions, but answering them is a task for the future.”[13]

Toulmin, the philosopher, has thus returned — along with the theologian Macquarrie — to the irrationalist modern tendency toward uncertainty and skepticism. The questions are so tough that nobody can really know for sure. The substitute for a distinctively Christian answer turns out to be, as always, the eschatological cop-out invoked by autonomous thought: answering the ultimate questions must ever remain a task for the future.

The modern repudiation of the antithesis between the regenerate and unregenerate minds, between the Christian worldview and its competitors, is itself (ironically) a reiteration of that very antithesis. Macquarrie’s promotion of religious relativism and Toulmin’s rejection of any distinctively Christian cosmology both take their stand over against the Christ speaking in the Scriptures. Contrary to the thesis proclaimed by Christ, the modern man asserts its anti-thesis. The God-ordained “enmity” between belief and unbelief (cf. Genesis 3:15) cannot ever be successfully overcome. In its effort to supplant it, unbelieving scholarship simply ends up supporting it.

However, that such a vain effort to eliminate antithesis between Biblical Christianity and its opponents is made by worldly scholars should come as no surprise. After all, respect for, and condoning of, that antithesis would be implicitly self-condemning. John 3:20 tells us that it is precisely an escape from God’s condemnation which unbelievers seek.

The remarkable thing is that even professedly “Christian” scholars would likewise make the vain effort to eliminate the antithesis between Biblical philosophy and unbiblical speculation.

The penchant of modern theologians and churchmen to ignore the inherent antagonism between the perspective of God’s holy word and the perspectives developed by men who suppress or dispute Biblical truth agonized Van Til to the depth of his God-fearing soul. By stressing commonality rather than conflict, such theologians surely find themselves more pleasing to men, said Van Til, but they do so at the price of coming under the displeasure of God — the God who, in the garden of Eden, Himself imposed the inescapable enmity between His people and the world.

Thus in The Great Debate Today, Van Til eschewed the lead of liberal and neo-orthodox pundits in order to follow Augustine, teaching that the “City of God” and the “city of man” stand over against one another in their total outlook with respect to the whole course of history. In the Reformed Pastor and Modern Thought,[14] Van Til argued against the apostate and man centered ecumenism of contemporary speculation — an ecumenism which, to be consistent, must acknowledge that even the radically anti-Christian proposals of Teilhard de Chardin and the God-is-dead proponents (about whom, see Van Til’s analyses in separate pamphlets from 1966), should not be kept out of the church (cf. Toward a Reformed Apologetics). In books such as The Sovereignty of Grace[15] and The New Hermeneutic,[16] Van Til warned against the synthesis between Christianity and post-Kantian thought which is the dangerous drift in the teaching of the later Berkouwer and Kuitert.

We cannot help but notice, then, that the message of antithesis is disregarded by worldly thinkers and theologians of perspectival synthesis. However, the one who above all wishes to see a dissolving of the antithesis of regenerate and unregenerate thinking in favor of synthesis, ecumenism, and a “common faith” of an autonomous or humanistic character is the one upon whom that antithesis was originally pronounced as a curse — Satan himself (cf. Genesis 3:14-15). This is, in fact, his most effective tool against the redemptive plan of God and the maturation of the Messiah’s kingdom. This is his “last, best hope” that the gates of hell might after all prevail against the church of Christ (cf. Matt. 16:18), for according to philosophical reflection which disregards the antithesis between the “two seeds,” there is in principle no necessity for a fundamental clash between the church and hell’s gates anyway. Satan gladly works through the polemics of autonomous philosophers and relativistic, ecumenical theologians to badger or tempt God’s people to compromise “the antithesis” in their reasoning and scholarship, and he would especially have us lay aside any theoretical or practical application of the fact that the unbeliever’s “enmity” against God and His people comes to expression precisely in his intellectual life or thinking. Satan does so just because the Bible’s message of redemption, as well as the historical work of Christ and His Spirit in establishing God’s kingdom, both presuppose a powerful, systematically basic and intrinsic antithesis between the cultures of regenerate and unregenerate men.

[At this point in the original lecture, Dr. Bahnsen enters into an extended critique of Francis Schaeffer’s notion of antithesis. Bahnsen argues that “one might think, then, that we would welcome any Christian scholar or writer who makes the summons back to antithesis central to his encounter with modern culture. But, this is not entirely the case. In a rather odd way, some conceptions of the antithesis can unwittingly, but, nevertheless, truly work to undermine the very antithesis which is presented in and essential to the Biblical viewpoint…this is what we find the case of Francis Schaeffer’s apologetical work and writings.”

Moreover, Bahnsen argues, Schaeffer not only offers a false conception of antithesis, but he also seriously misconstrues the nature and importance of the philosophy of Hegel. Schaeffer embarrassingly imputes various blatantly “unHegelian” views to Hegel. Christian scholarship must rise above this sort of mistake. Antithesis will publish Dr. Bahnsen’s important critique of Schaeffer in its June/July issue (Vol. I, No.3, 1990).] 3. The Systematic Nature of Antithesis

In terms of theoretical principle and eventual outworking, the unbeliever opposes the Christian faith with a whole antithetical system of thought, not simply with piecemeal criticisms. His attack is aimed, not at random points of Christian teaching, but at the very foundation of Christian thinking. The particular criticisms which are utilized by an unbeliever rest upon his basic, key assumptions which unify and inform all of his thinking. And it is this presuppositional root which the apologist must aim to eradicate, if his defense of the faith is to be truly effective.

Abraham Kuyper well understood that all men conduct their reasoning and their thinking in terms of an ultimate controlling principle — a most basic presupposition. For the unbeliever, this is a natural or naturalistic principle, in terms of which man’s thinking is taken to be intelligible without recourse to God. For the believer, it is a supernatural principle based on God’s involvement in man’s history and experience, notably in regeneration — perspective that provides the framework necessary for making sense of anything. These two ultimate commitments — call them naturalism and Christian supernaturalism — are logically incompatible and seek to cancel each other out. They must, as Kuyper argued in Principles of Sacred Theology, create “two kinds of science,” where each perspective (in principle) contradicts whatever the other perspective says and denies to it the noble name of “science.”[17] The natural principle develops its science, and the supernatural principle develops its science — and the two will not honor each other as being genuine sciences. And thus the unbeliever is bent on distorting, reinterpreting, or rejecting any evidence or argumentation which is set forth in support of, or which is controlled by, the believer’s ultimate commitment. To be consistent, the unbeliever cannot even allow for the possibility that the Christian proclamation is true.

There are two fundamentally different worldviews in terms of which men conduct their thinking and in terms of which they understand the use of reason itself.

Let’s just take that word “reason” for a moment. In the generic sense “reason” simply refers to man’s intellectual or mental capacity. Christians believe in reason, and non-Christians believe in reason; they both believe in man’s intellectual capacity. However, for each one, his view of reason and his use of reason is controlled by the worldview within which reason operates. A worldview is, very simply, a network of presuppositions which is not verified by the procedures of natural science, but in terms of which every aspect of man’s knowledge and experience is interpreted and interrelated.

The unbeliever’s worldview, according to Kuyper, is characterized by being autonomous. That is, it is characterized by self-sufficiency or an independence from outside authority, especially any transcendent authority (one that originates beyond man’s temporal experience or exceeds man’s temporal experience). The autonomous man, as Van Til puts it, wants to be “a law unto himself.” And this leads, then, to what our society calls, “secularism” or “humanism:” the view that man is the highest value, as well as the highest authority, in terms of knowledge and behavior, rather than some transcendent reality or transcendent revelation. Rationalism is humanistic or autonomous in its basic character, maintaining the general attitude that man’s autonomous reason is his final authority — in which case divine revelation may be denied or ignored in whatever area a person is studying. 4. Antithesis in Apologetic Method

Now because the unbeliever has such an implicit system of thought or worldview — an autonomous, rationalistic, secular worldview — directing his attack on the faith, the Christian can never be satisfied to defend the hope that is in him by merely stringing together isolated evidences which offer a slight probability of the Bible’s veracity. Each particular item of evidence — whether it is historical evidence as John Warwick Montgomery wants to present, or logical evidence as Alvin Plantinga wants to present, or existential evidence like Francis Schaeffer was very adept at presenting — each particular item of evidence will be evaluated by the unbeliever (as to both its truthfulness and its degree of probability) by that unbeliever’s tacit assumptions. His general world-and-life-view will provide the context in which the evidential claim is understood and weighed.

For this reason the apologetical strategy that we see illustrated in Scripture calls for argumentation at the presuppositional level. When all is said and done, it is worldviews that we need to be arguing about, not simply evidences or experiences. When Paul stood before Agrippa and offered his defense for the hope that was in him, he declared the public fact of Christ’s resurrection. We see that in Acts 26:2,6-7. There is no doubt that Paul was adamant to proclaim the public facto of the resurrection of Christ: “for the King knows of these things unto whom also I speak freely; for I am persuaded that none of these things are hidden from him, for this has not been done in the corner” (v.26). However, what you must make note of is the presuppositional groundwork and context which Paul provided for his appeal to fact. The very first point Paul endeavored to make in his defense of the faith was not an observational truth about what was a public fact, but rather a pre-observational point (something that preceded observation and is not based on observation) — a transcendental matter (about what is possible). Thus we read in verse eight: “Why is it judged impossible with you that God should raise the dead?” Paul wanted to deal first of all with the question of pre-observational worldview — what is possible and what is impossible — and in terms of that he dealt with the historical fact of Christ’s resurrection.

God was taken as the sovereign determiner of what can and what cannot happen in history. Paul then proceeded to explain that the termination of hostility to the message of the resurrection requires not that we consult more eyewitnesses, but rather requires submission to the Lordship of Jesus Christ (vv.9,15). “I verily thought with myself that I ought to do many things contrary to the name of Jesus of Nazareth…” [later] “I said, Who art thou Lord? And the Lord said, I am Jesus whom thou persecuteth.” There was an antithesis that Jesus sovereignly overcame in Paul’s life. The unbeliever, like Paul, must understand who the genuine and ultimate authority is: It is Jesus whom the unbeliever would persecute. Paul went on to explain that the message he declared called for a “radical change of mind.” That is, etymologically, what metanoeo means — the changing, the turning around of, the mind — turning from darkness to true light, from the domination of Satan to God, as Paul says in verses 18-20. The unbeliever must renounce his antagonistic reasoning and embrace a new system of thought. His mind must be turned around, and thus his presuppositional commitments must be altered.

Finally we notice that Paul placed his appeal to the fact of the resurrection within the context of Scripture’s authority to pronounce and interpret what happens in history, verses 22-23: “Having therefore obtained the help that is from God I stand unto this day testifying both to small and great, saying nothing but what the prophets and Moses did say should come: how that the Christ must suffer, and that He first by the resurrection of the dead should proclaim light both to the people and the Gentiles.” In verse 27, Paul says, “King Agrippa, do you believe the prophets?”

Paul’s apologetic did not deal with just isolated evidences. He dealt with transcendental matters (what is possible), with ultimate authority (“it is Jesus you are persecuting”), with Scripture, (“don’t you believe the prophets?”). The ultimate ground of the Christian certainty and the authority that backs up his argumentation must be the Word of God. Paul could go to the facts then, but only in terms of an undergirding philosophy of fact and in accordance with the foundational presuppositions of a Biblical epistemology.

We see that most clearly when Paul went to Athens and there met the learned unbelievers of his day — the philosophers in the capital city of philosophy, Athens. On Mars hill, (actually before the Areopagus council, I believe) Paul defended his Christian faith, as we read in Acts 17. We must make special note of what Acts 17 says. Paul pressed the antithesis, and Luke draws that to our attention.

Acts 17:16 tells us that Paul was provoked at the idolatry of that city. The citizens who heard the disputation of Paul disdained him as an intellectual scavenger, some sort of pseudo philosopher (v. 18). They called him a “seed picker,” someone who just stands around and picks up scraps here and there. “This man is no real philosopher.” And so as verse 32 tells us, in the end they mocked him. Here is Paul provoked at idolatry. Here are the idolators mocking Paul. This does not look like commonality; it looks like conflict. We need to see that Paul did not bring with him common philosophical perspectives that he shared with Plato and Aristotle, or more particularly with the Stoic and Epicurean philosophers. Rather, they saw him as bringing something “new” and something “strange,” (vv. 19, 20). It was just because they saw a difference with Paul that he was scrutinized by the Areopagus council.

When Paul appeared before the council he did not ask the philosophers to simply add a bit more information to their systems. He rather challenged the controlling presuppositions of those very systems. And as verse 30 says, he ended by calling them (as he did Agrippa) to “repentance,” to a change of mind, not just to the supplementation of what they already believed.

Paul recognized their strange religiosity, their “superstitious” ways (as verse 22 puts it). In verse 23 admittedly Paul says, “you worship what you admit is unknown.” Over against this, Paul set forth his ability to declare the divine truth against their ignorance. Consider verse 23 in Acts 17. Paul put this very antithetically: “what therefore you worship in ignorance, this I set before you,” — i.e., what you don’t know about, I have the ability, I have the position and the authority to declare to you. And when you look at what Paul said to the Areopagus council, if you have any knowledge of ancient Greek philosophy (especially that of the Stoics and Epicureans) you will notice that virtually everything Paul said stands over against the philosophical themes and premises of these schools of thought.

But now someone will say, nevertheless, that it is in this particular apologetical encounter where we see Paul explicitly making common cause with the philosophers because in verses 27 and 28 he cites them in favor of the Christian message! In Acts 17:27, speaking of all men seeking God (or that they should seek God if aptly they might feel after Him and find Him) Paul says “though He is not far from each one of us, for in Him we live and move and have our being as certain even of your own poets have said; we are also His offspring.” Doesn’t Paul then make common cause with the Greek philosophers at this particular point?

What Paul actually says in these verses though is that men will try to seek God, “if perhaps they might feel after Him.” The subordinate clause that is used in that particular verse expresses an unlikely contingency; it’s not likely that they are going to seek after God. Indeed Paul tells us in Rom 3 that “there is none that seek God; they have all turned aside and become unprofitable.” But even if they should seek after God, Paul says that what they do is “grope” or feel after Him. The Greek word that is used is the same word used by Homer for the groping around of the blinded cyclops. Plato used that word for what he called amateur guesses at the truth. Paul says, even if men might seek after God, their groping in darkness, their amateur guesses, give no authority to what they are doing. And so far from showing what Lightfoot thought was a clear appreciation of the elements of truth contained in their philosophy, at Athens Paul taught that the eyes of the unbeliever are blinded to the light of God’s revelation. As he says in Rom 1, unbelievers have a knowledge of God, but it’s one that they suppress, thereby meriting God’s condemnation. Commenting on this, the earlier Berkouwer, writes: “The antithesis looms larger in every encounter with heathendom. It is directed, however, against the maligning that heathendom does to the revealed truth of God in nature, and it calls for conversion to the revelation of God in Christ.”[18]

Then in verse 27, Paul explains that this inept groping of the unbeliever is not due to any deficiency in God — not due to any deficiency in God’s revelation. Verse 28 begins with the word “for.” It is offering a clarification, an illustration, of the statement that God is quite near at hand, even for blinded, pagan thinkers. If perhaps they might grope after Him, Paul says, God is not far from any one of us. And how do you know that? Well, you see, even pagans like yourselves are able to say things which are formally true.

The strange idea that these quotations of the pagan philosophers stand as proof, in the same way as Biblical quotations do for Paul elsewhere in Acts, is not only contrary to Paul’s decided emphasis in his theology upon the unique authority of God’s Word, but it simply will not comport with the context of the Areopagus address, where the groping, unrepentant ignorance of pagan religiosity is forcefully declared.

Paul was quoting the pagan writers not to enlist their support, not to make common cause with them, but to manifest their guilt. Since God is near at hand for all men, his revelation impinges on them continually, and they can’t escape the knowledge of Him as their Creator and as their Sustainer. And what Paul says is that even your philosophers know this. Even pantheistic Stoics are aware of, and obliquely express, God’s nearness and man’s dependence upon Him. And so Paul quotes Epimenides and Aretus (who himself was repeating Cleanthes’ hymn to Zeus).

Knowing the historical and philosophical context in which Paul spoke, and noting the polemical thrusts of the Areopagus address, we can not accept any intrepreter’s hasty pronouncement to the effect that Paul “cites these teachings with approval unqualified by allusion to a totally different frame of reference.” That is what Gordon Lewis says, arguing against Van Til’s understanding of Acts 17.[19] Those who make these remarks eventually are forced to acknowledge the qualification anyway. Lewis goes on to say that Paul is not commending their Stoic doctrine and did not reduce his categories to theirs. I think Berkouwer is correct here, when he says “There is no hint here of a point of contact, in the sense of a preparation for grace, as though the Athenians were already on the way to true knowledge of God.”[20]

Berkouwer says of Paul’s quotation of the Stoics:

This is to be explained only in connection with the fact that the heathen poets have distorted the truth of God…Without this truth there would be no false religiousness. The should not be confessed with the idea that false religion contains elements of the truth and gets its strength from those elements. This kind of quantitative analysis neglects the nature of the distortion carried on by false religion. Pseudo religion witnesses to the truth of God in its apostasy.[21]

Surely Paul was not committing the logical fallacy of equivocation, by using pantheistically conceived premises to support a Biblically conceived theistic conclusion. Rather Paul appealed to the distorted teaching of the pagan authors as evidence that the process of theological distortion cannot fully rid men of their natural knowledge of God. Certain expressions of the pagans thus manifest this knowledge of God, but manifest it as suppressed — as distorted. Ned B. Stonehouse in his excellent discussion of the Areopagus address, observed:

The apostle Paul, reflecting upon their creaturehood, and their religious faith and practice, could discover within their pagan religiosity evidences that the pagan poets in the very act of suppressing and perverting the truth presupposed a measure of awareness of it.[22]

And so their own statements unwittingly convicted the pagan philosophers of the knowledge of God, the knowledge they suppressed in unrighteousness. About these pagan quotations, Van Til observed:

They could say this adventitiously only. That is, that it would be in accord with what they deep down in their hearts knew to be true in spite of their systems. It was that truth which they sought to cover up by means of their professed systems, which enabled them to discover truth as philosophers and scientists.[23]

Men are engulfed by the revelation of God. Try as they may, the truth which they possess in their heart of hearts cannot be escaped, and it will inadvertently come to expression. They do not explicitly understand it properly (to be sure), and yet those expressions are a witness to their inward conviction and their culpability. Consequently, Paul could take advantage of pagan quotations, not as an agreed upon ground for erecting the message of the gospel, but as a basis for calling unbelievers to repentance for their flight from God.

In I Corinthians 1:17, Paul says, “For Christ sent me not to baptize, but to preach the gospel; not in the wisdom of words lest the cross of Christ should be made void.” Paul says that to use the unbeliever’s worldly wisdom — the wisdom of words in his apologetic — would be to make void the word of the cross. This is a very strong statement. Paul says he cannot make common cause with worldly wisdom because, to the degree that he does the cross of Christ is emptied of its meaning.

In II Corinthians 11:3 Paul wrote “But I fear lest by any means as the serpent beguiled Eve in his craftiness, your minds should be corrupted from the simplicity and purity that is toward Christ.” Paul wanted us to have our minds free from corruption. He wanted us to be pure toward Christ, to have a simple devotion to Him and not (like Eve) to be deceived by the serpent. We are not to put our authority above the authority of God’s Word or challenge it.

Paul, as we have seen above then, could use facts or evidences in his apologetic. He could quote unbelieving philosophers. But he never lost sight of the presuppositional antithesis in defending the faith. The apologist needs to recognize that because of “the antithesis,” the debate between believer and unbeliever is fundamentally a dispute or clash between two complete world views, between ultimate commitments and assumptions which are contrary to each other. An unbeliever is not simply an unbeliever at separate points; his antagonism is rooted in an overall “philosophy” of life. (As Paul says in Colossians 2:18, “beware lest any man take you captive through his philosophy.”) Two philosophies or two systems of thought are in collision with each other. One submits to the authority of God’s word as a matter of presuppositional commitment; one does not. The debate between the two perspectives will eventually work down to the level of one’s ultimate authority. The presuppositional apologist realizes that every argument chain must end, and must end in a self-authenticating starting point. If the starting point is not self-authenticating, the chain just goes on and on. Every worldview has its unquestioned and its unquestionable assumptions, its primitive commitments. Religious debate is always a question of ultimate authority.

What is the apologetical method that results from these observations? It will be contrary to that method which we see in men like John Warwick Montgomery, Gordon Clark, or even Francis Schaeffer. When worldviews collide the truly presuppositional and antithetical approach will involve two steps. It will involve first of all an internal critique of the unbeliever’s philosophical system, demonstrating that his outlook really is masking a foolish destruction of knowledge. And then, secondly, it will call for a humble, yet bold, presentation of the reason for the believer’s presuppositional commitment to God’s Word. We see this illustrated in Proverbs 26:4-5. “Answer a fool according to his folly, lest he be wise in his own conceit.” Show the fool his folly — where his thinking leads — so he does not think he has anything going for him, “lest he be wise in his own eyes.” And then as Proverbs says, “Don’t answer a fool according to his folly, lest you be like unto him,” lest you end up in the same situation of destroying all possibility of knowledge. In the apologist’s case: lest you be like the fool, don’t answer him according to his folly, foolish presuppositions, but answer him according to your own revealed presuppositions and outlook. Such a procedure can resolve the tension, the debate, the antithesis, between competing authorities and conflicting starting points because it asks, in essence, which position provides the preconditions for observation in science, for reasoning and logic, for absolutes in ethics, and for meaningful discourse between the believer and the unbeliever. The presuppositional approach is basically a setting out of the preconditions of intelligibility for all human thinking.

In Toward a Reformed Apologetic, Van Til puts it this way:

In seeking to follow the example of Paul, Reformed Apologetics needs, above all else, to make clear from the beginning that it is challenging the wisdom of the natural man on the authority of the self-attesting Christ speaking in Scripture. Doing this the Reformed apologist must place himself on the position of his “opponent,” the natural man, in order to show him that on the presupposition of human autonomy human predication cannot even get underway. The fact that it has gotten underway is because the universe is what the Christian, on the authority of Christ, knows it to be. Even to negate Christ, those who hate him must be borne up by Him.[24]

The Christian, by placing himself on the unbeliever’s position can show how it results then in the destruction of intelligible experience and rational thought. The unbeliever must be unmasked of his pretentions. Paul challenges “where is the disputer of this age? Has not God made foolish the wisdom of this world?” (I Corinthians 1:18-20). The unbeliever must be shown that he has “no apologetic” for his viewpoint (Rom 1:20). In Rom 1:20, Paul says that unbelievers are left “without excuse,” but etymologically one could actually translate it into English that “they are without an apologetic.” They have no defense of the position they have taken. Non-believers are left, as Paul says in Ephesians 4:17-24, with vain, darkened, ignorant minds that need renewal. The Christian should then teach the unbeliever that all wisdom and knowledge must take Jesus Christ as its reference point (Colossians 2:3) — that Jesus Christ is the self-validating starting point of all knowledge. Christian apologists should press the antithesis in debating with unbelievers. 5. Unbelievers Eventually at War With the Word

Jesus, of course, categorically claimed to be the truth, “I am the way, the truth and the life” (John 14:6). John himself reveals Christ as the very word, the logos, of God (John 1:1). And thus Jesus, who categorically claims to be the truth, Jesus who is the very word and logos of God, becomes the starting point, the self-vindicating foundation of the Christian’s worldview and reasoning. Due to the antithesis between the believer and unbeliever, all unbelieving reasoning must then take its stand in opposition to the Word of God and to the truth of God. To put it briefly, the unbeliever must be “at war with the Word.”

The unbeliever’s enmity against the Word of God is not narrowly a religious matter. Sometimes I think we understand this enmity as though the unbeliever just does not like the religious idea of Jesus being the Son of God and our Saviour. But far more, the unbeliever’s enmity entails opposition to the very worldview which is the context and foundation of any particular, Biblical message or applications. Now since only the Christian worldview makes language and rationality (logic) intelligible, unbelievers will be led, if they are consistent, to oppose language and rationality themselves in order to oppose the Christian worldview which alone sustains their intelligibility and possibility.

To put it somewhat by way of pun, the unbeliever’s war with the Word (that is to say, their war with Scripture and Christ) will lead them to be at war with the word — all human language and meaning. Because they reject the transcendent Word of God, Jesus, who is the very Truth of God, they are led in the immanent domain to reject the idea of the word, meaning, truth, and logic as well. This is just what we see, for instance, in the modern, literary Deconstructionist movement.

[At this point in the original lecture, Dr. Bahnsen turns to criticize the contemporary literary/philosophical movement known as Deconstructionism. Dr. Bahnsen uses contemporary Deconstructionism as a primary example of the non-Christian “war against the Word.” Since Deconstructionists reject the transcendent Word of God, they are led to war against the immanent “word” — all human language and meaning. Jacques Derrida and his disciples do this by attempting to display the radical indeterminacy of linguistic meaning due to the putative absence of any objective norms, universals, or Truth. Dr. Bahnsen argues that Deconstructionism fails to meet its claims and is self-defeating. Deconstructionism, nevertheless, is valuable in that it can be used to demonstrate the failure of non-Christian viewpoints in general.] Conclusion

The conclusion I wish to draw from this discussion is that the “antithetical” nature of Christianity calls for a presuppositional method of defending the faith. According to Dr. Van Til, “the antithesis” revealed in the Bible must be pressed with unbelievers in order to guard Christianity’s uniqueness, exclusivity, and indispensability.

First of all, the antithesis must be pressed to guard Christianity’s uniqueness. Christ cannot be presented to men as simply another Bodhidsatva, another Avatar. He cannot be absorbed into a larger philosophical coherence with other religions.

Secondly, Christianity must not be presented to men as just a general axiom. It is rather an historical particular. Christianity deals with a specific individual, the Christ of history who did particular things at a particular time. It is not just a philosophy understood in the idealist sense. John 14:6 tells us that there is no other way to God. Acts 4:12 tells us that there is no other name under Heaven whereby we must be saved. In Toward a Reformed Apologetic Van Til says:

Romanism and Arminianism have, to some extent, adjusted the gospel of the sovereign grace of God, so as to make it please sinful man in his would-be independence of God. Romanism and Arminianism have a defective theology. Accordingly, they also adjust their method of reasoning with men so as to make it please sinful men. They also have a defective apologetic. They tell the natural men that he has the right idea about himself, the world and God so far as it goes, but that he needs some additional information about these subjects.[25]

What Van Til is getting at is that our task is not to show that Christianity does justice to rationality and to the facts. Van Til says that Christianity alone saves rationality and the facts. It is not simply better than the non-Christian view, it is the the only option available to a rational man. And for that reason the apologist does not need the autonomous man’s “favors.” In The Intellectual Challenge of the Gospel, Van Til declares:

Instead of accepting the favors of modern man, as Romanism and Arminianism do, we should challenge the wisdom of this world. It must be shown to be utterly destructive of predication in any field. It has frequently been shown to be such. It is beyond the possibility of the mind of man to bind together the ideas of pure determinism and of pure indeterminism and by means of that combination to give meaning to life.[26]

To put it briefly, Van Til says do not allow your apologetic to be absorbed into a larger coherence. Rather present it antithetically — as the only way that any coherence can be saved.

Thirdly, Van Til wanted to guard Christianity’s indispensability. Christianity does not need to satisfy autonomous man’s test of logic and facts. It does not need to bow before the authority of the autonomous mind of men. In Toward a Reformed Apologetic, he says:

Romanism and Arminianism try to show Christianity can meet the requirements of the natural man with respect to logic and fact…The rational man must be told that it is not he that must judge Christ but it is Christ who judges him.[27]

And he is told that when the natural man has it explained to him, that when he goes to war with the Word of God, he goes to war with the word of man as well. In The Intellectual Challenge of the Gospel, Van Til uses these stirring words:

The implication of all this for Christian apologetics is plain. There can be no appeasement between those who presuppose in all their thought the sovereign God and those who presuppose in all their thought the would-be sovereign man. There can be no other point of contact between them than that of head-on collision.[28]

So, if we are true to the antithetical nature of Christianity, we must engage in a presuppositional challenge to unbelievers to show them that in terms of their worldview they cannot make sense of logic, facts, meaning, value, ethics or human significance.

An objection is sometimes raised that if you press the antithesis, then you will scuttle communication. Interestingly, only presuppositional argumentation can actually handle the antithesis. If someone thought that the antithesis really undermined apologetical argumentation, then he would face the choice of (1) denying the antithesis which the Bible so clearly presents, or (2) giving up apologetics altogether.

But does the antithesis scuttle apologetics? Kuyper thought it did. Kuyper clearly saw the antithesis and recognized that because of it there would be the development of two sciences or cultures. But from that fact he drew the fallacious conclusion that Christian apologetics was useless. He states in Principles of Sacred Theology, that “It will be impossible to settle the difference of insight. No polemic between these two kinds of science…can ever serve any purpose. This is the reason why apologetics has always failed to reach results.”[29]

This conclusion does not follow, however, when other equally Biblical insights are taken into account. For instance, the unbeliever’s intention may be to follow his naturalistic principle consistently. He may claim to be doing so. But to do so in practice is actually not possible. He cannot escape the persuasive power of God’s revelation around and within him. Indeed, by the common grace of the Holy Spirit, he is restrained from successfully obliterating the testimony of God. And so, he ends up conducting his life and reasoning in terms of God’s revelation, since there is no other way for man to learn and make sense of the truth about him or the world. He does that, all the while, verbally denying it, and convincing himself that it is not so.

In The Defense of the Faith, Van Til writes, “I am unable to follow [Kuyper] when from the fact of the mutually destructive character of the two principles he concludes to uselessness of reasoning with natural man.”[30] Van Til says the spiritually dead man cannot in principle even count and weigh and measure. Van Til says that unbelievers cannot even do math or the simplest operations in science. By that he means the unbeliever’s espoused worldview or philosophy cannot make counting or measuring intelligible. Now why is that? Briefly, because counting involves an abstract concept of law, or universal, or order. If there is no law, if there is no universal, if there is no order, then there is no sequential counting. But the postulation of an abstract universal order contradicts the unbeliever’s view of the universe as a random or chance realm of material particulars. Counting calls for abstract entities which are in fact uniform and orderly. The unbeliever says the world is not abstract — but that the world is only material; the universe is not uniform, but is a chance realm and random. And so by rejecting God’s word — which account for a universal order or law — the unbeliever would not in principle be able to count and measure things. As it is, believers do in fact count and do in fact measure and practice science, but they cannot give a philosophical explanation of that fact. Or as Van Til loved to put it: unbelievers can count, but they cannot account for counting.

In light of these concerns, the antithesis we have been discussing is not an insurmountable impediment to apologetical argumentation. It is, ironically, what makes successful apologetics possible! Not only is the apologist able to mount a compelling argument against the cogency of the unbeliever’s espoused philosophy and the adequacy of his interpretation of the facts, but the unbeliever can also be expected to understand and feel the force of the apologist’s reasoning. Apologetical argument — intellectual reasoning which goes beyond mere testimony — must not therefore be disparaged or ignored by those of us who honor the antithesis. It must not be reduced to a futile effort made vain by the perspectival antithesis between the regenerate and the unregenerate.

Van Til says that Christianity must be presented to men as the objective truth — objective because it has an public nature. That is the common ground between us, believer and unbeliever: the truth that is objectively, publicly there. It is true independent of our feelings; it is true independent of anyone’s belief. We must present the gospel as objective truth and provably true. Warfield was right in that regard. It is not only a moral lapse, but it is also an unjustifiable, intellectual error to reject the message of God’s revealed Word. Because of the antithetical nature of Christianity, only a presuppositional method of argument is able to press home that transcendental challenge with consistency and clarity (arguing from the philosophical impossibility of the contrary position).

The approach to apologetics which gives us piece-meal evidences (e.g. John Warwick Montgomery), or the approach to apologetics which gives us pragmatic, personal appeals (e.g. Francis Schaeffer) or the approach to apologetics which begins with voluntaristic, fideistic axioms (e.g. Gordon Clark) do not adequately deal with the antithesis — thus with Christianity’s indispensability for making sense of rational thought, history, science, or human personality. It is not a matter of whether we should choose between those approaches and the presuppositionalist approach. Given the fact of antithesis, the only approach that will be usable is the presuppositional one. The situational perspective advanced by Montgomery and the existential perspective advanced by Schaeffer cannot compete with the normative apologetical approach of Cornelius Van Til. Only that perspective challenges the unbeliever with Christianity’s indispensability. Van Til wrote at the end of Toward a Reformed Apologetic:

Finally, it is my hope for the future, as it has always been my hope in the past, that I may present Christ without compromise to men who are dead in trespasses and sins, that they might have life and that they might worship and serve the Creator more than the creature…Rather than wedding Christianity to the philosophies of Aristotle or Kant, we must openly challenge the apostate philosophic constructions of men by which they seek to suppress the truth about God, themselves, and the world.[31]

Van Til says we are children of the King. To us, not to the world, do all things belong. It is only if we demand of men complete submission to the living Christ of the Scriptures in every area of their lives that we have presented to them the claims of the Lord Christ without compromise. In short, we must not synthesize Christ’s words with unbelieving philosophies, but rather present Him antithetically in apologetics. Only then do we do so without compromise. Notes

[1] Van Til, Cornelius, A Survey of Christian Epistemology [Originally “Metaphysics of Apologetics,”] (New Jersey: Presbyterian and Reformed Publ. Co., 1969), v.

[2] (New Jersey: Presbyterian and Reformed Publ. Co., 1946), p. 364.

[3] (New Jersey: Presbyterian and Reformed Publ. Co., 1947), p.3.

[4] (New Jersey: Presbyterian and Reformed Publ. Co., 1955), pp. 319ff.

[5] Geehan, E.R., Jerusalem and Athens, (New Jersey: Presbyterian and Reformed Publ. Co., 1955), pp. 20,21.

[6] (n.p., n.d.) pp. 24-28.

[7] (London:SCM Press, rev. 1971) pp. 372,373.

[8] Van Til, C., The Intellectual Challenge of the Gospel, (New Jersey: L.J. Grotenhuis, 1953) p. 17.

[9] Geehan, pp. 19,20.

[10] Macquarrie, p. 373.

[11] (Berkeley: Univ. of Calif. Press, 1982), p.273.

[12] Toulmin, p.274.

[13] ibid. p.274.

[14] (New Jersey: Presbyterian and Reformed Publ. Co., 1955)

[15] (New Jersey: Presbyterian and Reformed Publ. Co., 1969)

[16] (New Jersey: Presbyterian and Reformed Publ. Co., 1974)

[17] Kuyper, A., Principles of Sacred Theology, trans. J. Hendrik De Vries (Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 1968 [1898]), pp. 150-156.

[18] Berkouwer, G.C., General Revelation, (Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 1955), p.145.

[19] “Mission to the Athenians,” Part IV, Seminary Service, (Denver: Conservative Baptist Theological Seminary, 1964), p.7.

[20] Berkouwer, p. 143.

[21] ibid. p.144.

[22] Stonehouse, N.B., Paul Before the Areopagus and Other New Testament Studies, (Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 1957), p. 30.

[23] Van Til, C., Paul at Athens, (Phillipsburg : L. J. Grotenhuis, n.d.) p. 12.

[24] Van Til, Reformed Apologetic, p. 20.

[25] ibid. p.3.

[26] Van Til, Intellectual Challenge, p.40.

[27] Van Til, Reformed Apologetic, p.6, 7.

[28] Van Til, Intellectual Challenge, p.19.

[29] Kuyper, Principles, p. 160.

[30] Van Til, Defense, p.363.

[31] Van Til, Reformed Apologetic, p. 28.

Greg L. Bahnsen, Th.M., Ph.D. (Philosophy; USC) is a pastor of Covenant Community Church, Advisory Dean of Newport Christian Schools, and a senior editor of Antithesis.

Copyright © by Covenant Community Church of Orange County 1990

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• Literary Terms
• Definition & Examples
• How to Use Antithesis

I. What is an Antithesis?

“Antithesis” literally means “opposite” – it is usually the opposite of a statement, concept, or idea. In literary analysis, an antithesis is a pair of statements or images in which the one reverses the other. The pair is written with similar grammatical structures to show more contrast. Antithesis (pronounced an-TITH-eh-sis) is used to emphasize a concept, idea, or conclusion.

II. Examples of Antithesis

That’s one small step for a man – one giant leap for mankind .  (Neil Armstrong, 1969)

In this example, Armstrong is referring to man walking on the moon. Although taking a step is an ordinary activity for most people, taking a step on the moon, in outer space, is a major achievement for all humanity.

To err is human ; to forgive , divine . (Alexander Pope)

This example is used to point out that humans possess both worldly and godly qualities; they can all make mistakes, but they also have the power to free others from blame.

The world will little note , nor long remember , what we say here, but it can never forget what they did  (Abraham Lincoln, The Gettysburg Address )

In his speech, Lincoln points out that the details of that moment may not be memorable, but the actions would make history, and therefore, never entirely forgotten.

Antithesis can be a little tricky to see at first. To start, notice how each of these examples is separated into two parts . The parts are separated either by a dash, a semicolon, or the word “but.” Antithesis always has this multi-part structure (usually there are two parts, but sometimes it can be more, as we’ll see in later examples). The parts are not always as obvious as they are in these examples, but they will always be there.

Next, notice how the second part of each example contains terms that reverse or invert terms in the first part: small step vs. giant leap; human vs. divine; we say vs. they do. In each of the examples, there are several pairs of contrasted terms between the first part and the second, which is quite common in antithesis.

Finally, notice that each of the examples contains some parallel structures and ideas in addition to the opposites. This is key! The two parts are not simply contradictory statements. They are a matched pair that have many grammatical structures or concepts in common; in the details, however, they are opposites.

For example, look at the parallel grammar of Example 1: the word “one,” followed by an adjective, a noun, and then the word “for.” This accentuates the opposites by setting them against a backdrop of sameness – in other words, two very different ideas are being expressed with very, very similar grammatical structures.

To recap: antithesis has three things:

• Two or more parts
• Reversed or inverted ideas
• (usually) parallel grammatical structure

III. The Importance of Verisimilitude

Antithesis is basically a complex form of juxtaposition . So its effects are fairly similar – by contrasting one thing against its opposite, a writer or speaker can emphasize the key attributes of whatever they’re talking about. In the Neil Armstrong quote, for example, the tremendous significance of the first step on the moon is made more vivid by contrasting it with the smallness and ordinariness of the motion that brought it about.

Antithesis can also be used to express curious contradictions or paradoxes. Again, the Neil Armstrong quote is a good example: Armstrong is inviting his listeners to puzzle over the fact that a tiny, ordinary step – not so different from the millions of steps we take each day – can represent so massive a technological accomplishment as the moon landing.

Paradoxically, an antithesis can also be used to show how two seeming opposites might in fact be similar.

IV. Examples of Verisimilitude in Literature

(adsbygoogle = window.adsbygoogle || []).push({}); Forgive us this day our trespasses as we forgive those who trespass against us . (The Lord’s Prayer)

The antithesis is doing a lot of work here. First, it shows the parallel between committing an evil act and being the victim of one. On the surface, these are opposites, and this is part of the antithesis, but at the same time they are, in the end, the same act from different perspectives. This part of the antithesis is basically just an expression of the Golden Rule.

Second, the antithesis displays a parallel between the speaker (a human) and the one being spoken to (God). The prayer is a request for divine mercy, and at the same time a reminder that human beings should also be merciful.

All the joy the world contains has come through wanting happiness for others . All the misery the world contains has come through wanting pleasure for yourself . (Shantideva, The Way of the Bodhisattva )

The antithesis here comes with some pretty intense parallel structure. Most of the words in each sentence are exactly the same as those in the other sentence. (“All the ___ the world contains has come through wanting ____ for ____.”) This close parallel structure makes the antithesis all the more striking, since the words that differ become much more visible.

Another interesting feature of this antithesis is that it makes “pleasure” and “happiness” seem like opposites, when most of us might think of them as more or less synonymous. The quote makes happiness seem noble and exalted, whereas pleasure is portrayed as selfish and worthless.

The proper function of man is to live , not to exist . I shall not waste my days in trying to prolong  (Jack London, Credo )

The opening antithesis here gets its punch from the fact that we think of living and existing as pretty similar terms. But for London, they are opposites. Living is about having vivid experiences, learning, and being bold; simply existing is a dull, pointless thing. These two apparently similar words are used in this antithesis to emphasize the importance of living as opposed to mere existing.

The second antithesis, on the other hand, is just the opposite – in this case, London is taking two words that seem somewhat opposed (waste and prolong), and telling us that they are in fact the same . Prolonging something is making it last; wasting something is letting it run out too soon. But, says London, when it comes to life, they are the same. If you try too hard to prolong your days (that is, if you’re so worried about dying that you never face your fears and live your life), then you will end up wasting them because you will never do anything worthwhile.

V. Examples of Verisimilitude in Pop Culture

Everybody doesn’t like something, but nobody doesn’t like Sara Lee. (Sara Lee pastry advertisement)

This classic ad uses antithesis to set up a deliberate grammatical error. This is a common technique in advertising, since people are more likely to remember a slogan that is grammatically incorrect. (Even if they only remember it because they found it irritating, it still sticks in their brain, which is all that an ad needs to do.) The antithesis helps make the meaning clear, and throws the grammatical error into sharper relief.

What men must know , a boy must learn . (The Lookouts)

Here’s another example of how parallel structure can turn into antithesis fairly easily. (The structure is noun-“must”-verb. ) The antithesis also expresses the basic narrative of The Lookouts , which is all about kids learning to fend for themselves and become full-fledged adults.

Shut Your Mouth and Open Your Eyes (the band “AFI” – album title)

The antithesis here is a juxtaposition of two different actions (opening and shutting) that are actually part of the same sort of behavior – the behavior of somebody who wants to understand the world rather than be the center of attention. It’s basically a restatement of the old adage that “those who speak the most often have the least to say.”

VI. Related Terms

• Juxtaposition

Antithesis is basically a form of juxtaposition . Juxtaposition, though, is a much broader device that encompasses any deliberate use of contrast or contradiction by an author. So, in addition to antithesis, it might include:

• The scene in “The Godfather” where a series of brutal murders is intercut with shots of a baptism, juxtaposing birth and death.
• “A Song of Ice and Fire” (George R. R. Martin book series)
• Heaven and Hell
• Mountains and the sea
• Dead or alive
• “In sickness and in health”

Antithesis performs a very similar function, but does so in a more complicated way by using full sentences (rather than single words or images) to express the two halves of the juxtaposition.

Here is an antithesis built around some of the common expressions from above

• “ Sheep go to Heaven ; goats go to Hell .”
• “Beethoven’s music is as mighty as the mountains and as timeless as the sea .”
• “In sickness he loved me; in health he abandoned ”

Notice how the antithesis builds an entire statement around the much simpler juxtaposition. And, crucially, notice that each of those statements exhibits parallel grammatical structure . In this way, both Juxtaposition and parallel structures can be used to transform a simple comparison, into antithesis.

List of Terms

• Alliteration
• Amplification
• Anachronism
• Anthropomorphism
• Antonomasia
• APA Citation
• Aposiopesis
• Autobiography
• Bildungsroman
• Characterization
• Circumlocution
• Cliffhanger
• Comic Relief
• Connotation
• Deus ex machina
• Deuteragonist
• Doppelganger
• Double Entendre
• Dramatic irony
• Equivocation
• Extended Metaphor
• Figures of Speech
• Flash-forward
• Foreshadowing
• Intertextuality
• Literary Device
• Malapropism
• Onomatopoeia
• Parallelism
• Pathetic Fallacy
• Personification
• Point of View
• Polysyndeton
• Protagonist
• Red Herring
• Rhetorical Device
• Rhetorical Question
• Science Fiction
• Self-Fulfilling Prophecy
• Synesthesia
• Turning Point
• Understatement
• Urban Legend
• Verisimilitude
• Essay Guide
• Cite This Website

Antithesis Definition Antithesis, which literally means “opposite,” is a rhetorical device wherein opposite thoughts are prepare in a sentence to obtain a contrasting effect. Antithesis emphasizes the idea of assessment through parallel structures of the contrasted terms or clauses. The structures of terms and clauses are similar, so that it will draw the attention of the listeners or readers. For example: “Setting foot on the moon may be a small step for a person but a giant step for mankind.” The use of contrasting thoughts, “a small step” and “a massive step,” within the sentence above emphasizes the importance of one of the most important landmarks of human history. Common Antithesis Examples Some well-known antithetical statements have become part of our everyday speech, and are regularly used in arguments and discussions. Below is a listing of some commonplace antithetical statements: Give every man thy ear, however few thy voice. Man proposes, God disposes. Love is a really perfect thing, marriage a actual thing. Speech is silver, but silence is gold. Patience is bitter, however it has a sweet fruit. Money is the foundation of all evil: poverty is the fruit of all goodness. You are smooth on the eyes, but tough on the heart. Examples of Antithesis in Literature In literature, writers rent antithesis not simplest in sentences, but additionally in characters and events. Thus, its use is extensive. Below are a few examples of antithesis in literature: Example #1: A Tale of Two Cities (By Charles Dickens) The establishing lines of Charles Dickens’ novel A Tale of Two Cities provides an unforgettable antithesis example: “It become the first-class of times, it become the worst of times, it became the age of wisdom, it was the age of foolishness, it become the epoch of belief, it turned into the epoch of incredulity, it changed into the season of Light, it was the season of Darkness, it changed into the spring of hope, it was the wintry weather of despair, we had everything before us, we had nothing earlier than us, we were all going direct to Heaven, we were all going direct the opposite way.” The contrasting thoughts, set in parallel structures, markedly spotlight the battle that existed within the time discussed in the novel. Example #2: Julius Caesar (By William Shakespeare) In William Shakespeare’s Julius Caesar, we note antithesis within the characters of Mark Antony and Marcus Brutus. Brutus is portrayed as the “noblest of Romans,” near Caesar, and someone who cherished Rome and Caesar. Antony, at the contrary, is proven as a person with the evil intentions of harming Caesar, and taking charge of Rome. These antithetical characters spotlight the battle inside the play. Example #3: An Essay on Criticism (By Alexander Pope) Alexander Pope, in his An Essay on Criticism, says: “To err is human; to forgive divine.” Fallibility is a trait of humans, and God – the Creator – is most forgiving. Through those antithetical thoughts, Pope exhibits the simple nature of human beings. He wants to say that God is forgiving because his creation is erring. Example #4: Community (By John Donne) We find antithesis in John Donne’s poem Community: “Good we must love, and must hate ill, For unwell is ill, and correct desirable still; But there are things indifferent, Which we may neither hate, nor love, But one, and then another prove, As we shall discover our fancy bent.” Two contrasting words “love” and “hate” are combined within the above lines. It emphasizes that we love right due to the fact it is always top, and we hate bad due to the fact it's far always bad. It is a matter of desire to love or hate things that are neither good nor bad. Example #5: Paradise Lost (By John Milton) John Milton, in Paradise Lost, says: “Better to reign in Hell than serve in Heav’n.” The contrasting thoughts of reign/serve, and Hell/Heav’n are positioned on this sentence to acquire an antithetical effect. Function of Antithesis A literary tool, like antithesis, makes use of phrases to convey ideas in exceptional methods from the commonplace words and expressions of daily life. Thus, it conveys meaning greater vividly than regular speech. When contrasting thoughts are brought together, the concept is expressed extra emphatically. As a literary device, antithesis makes contrasts in an effort to observe pros and cons of a subject below discussion, and facilitates to bring on judgment on that precise subject.

• Alliteration
• Anachronism
• Antimetabole
• Aposiopesis
• Characterization
• Colloquialism
• Connotation
• Deus Ex Machina
• Didacticism
• Doppelganger
• Double Entendre
• Flash Forward
• Foreshadowing
• Internal Rhyme
• Juxtaposition
• Non Sequitur
• Onomatopoeia
• Parallelism
• Pathetic Fallacy
• Personification
• Poetic Justice
• Point of View
• Portmanteau
• Protagonist
• Red Herring
• Superlative
• Synesthesia
• Tragicomedy
• Tragic Flaw
• Verisimilitude

Antithesis Definition & Examples in Speech and Literature

Antithesis does not have to be a difficult thing to understand, despite its complicated name, it is a relatively simple form on English grammar which can be easily explained. We are going to take a look at what antithesis is and how it is to be used. We will look at various examples of antithesis in both written and spoken language to further assist us to understand it.

Antithesis Definition

Antithesis is, in fact, a word from ancient Greek that directly translates as ‘ opposite .’ When we talk about antithesis in the English language we are referring to a phrase that contains two contrasting ideas. Antithesis is used to express opposing ideas in a more vivid fashion in order that it has more of an impact on the person listening to or reading the language.

Antithesis in Figures of Speech

Antithesis used in figures of speech might sound something like the famous phrase made by Neil Armstrong on his moon landing, he said: “that’s one small step for man and one giant leap for mankind.” The small step and giant step are the antitheses because they are the direct opposite of one another and yet contrast in the sentence.

Antithesis in Rhetorical Devices

Antithesis in rhetoric, when two opposite statements are juxtaposed to create a contrasting notion, can be seen in the speech made by Martin Luther King, in the sentence “ I hope that one day my children will be judged not by their skin colour but by their character. ” When used in a rhetorical device , antithesis is designed to paint a picture of the concept.

Antithesis in Figurative Language

Antithesis can be used in figurative language , a good example of this is the phrase “ man proposes, God disposes. ” The two ideas are completely opposite to each other and yet when put in a sentence together create a contrasting idea.

Antithesis in a Literary Device

When used as a literary device , antithesis is designed to be used to sway the opinion of the reader or listener through the statement itself. An example of this comes once again from Martin Luther King when he said: “ we must learn to come together as brethren or perish together as fools. ” In this context, the antithesis is being used to point out the bad thing and highlight the good thing.

Antithesis Examples

Examples of antithesis in speech.

There will be many occasions when you are likely to hear antithesis during everyday conversations. We will now take a look at some examples of sentences in which antithesis is present.

• Give all men your ear, but few men your voice.
• Love is an ideal thing but marriage is a real thing.
• Speech is silver but silence is golden .
• Patience is bitter but it bears sweet fruit.
• Money is the root of all evil, poverty is the fruit of all goodness.
• She is easy on the eyes but hard on the heart.
• Everybody doesn’t like something but nobody doesn’t like this.
• Integrity without knowledge is frail and has no use and knowledge without integrity is risky and awful.
• People who have no vices also have not many virtues.
• Burning a fire to stay cool.
• Shutting a door in order to leave.
• Even though the sun shines, I can feel the rain.
• It is never too late but it is never too soon.

Examples of Antithesis in Literature

Many authors have used antithesis in their work in order to provide the reader with a thought-provoking, contrasting statement. We are now going to take a look at some examples of times when writers have used antithesis within poetry, fiction and other types of written work.

• A tale of two cities by Charles Dickens opens with the use of antithesis in the line “ Twas the very best in times, Twas the very worst in times. That was a time of wisdom and yet a time of foolishness. ” In this example, antithesis is used to imply the conflict of the time in which the story was set.
• “ To err is human, to forgive is divine, ” This is a line from the play Julius Caesar written by William Shakespeare. Here antithesis is used to refer to the fact that God the creator is forgiving yet he created a race of humans who were far from perfect.
• In the poem ‘community’ written by John Donne, we see the use of antithesis to compare love and hate. “ Good we must love and must hate ill. “
• Paradise lost written by John Milton features the use of antithesis when it compares the opposing ideas of heaven and hell alongside the opposing ideas of serving and reigning , in the sentence: “ It is better to reign in hell than to serve in heaven. “
• In the Holy Bible, we see the use of antithesis in the book of Matthew, where we can read the line “ many are called but few are chosen .”
• “ Give me a bit of sunshine, give me a bit of rain. ” This is an example of antithesis from the song Give me some sunshine by Swanand Kirkire. The notion of wanting sunshine is completely opposite to the idea of wanting rain and yet both are contained within the same sentence.
• In the song “My girl” by the band The Temptations we see antithesis being used in the line “ When it is cold outside, I have got the month of May .”
• “ In my beginning is my end .” This is an example of the use of antithesis within the poem Four Quartets which was written by T S Elliot.
• In the comic book featuring the character Green Lantern, an oath is written and the first line of this oath contains antithesis. “ In the brightest of days and in the blackest of nights .”

As we have seen, antithesis can be used in various ways in order to compare and contrast two opposing ideas. It can be used in a variety of ways depending on how it is being used, whether that be in the rhetorical, as a literary device or in a figure of speech.

Antithesis Infographic

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The Six Antitheses of Jesus

Talking Points:

The law says don’t murder but Jesus says to be reconciled. Instead of being fueled by hatred, direct your energy towards peace. The law says don’t commit adultery but Jesus says to be radically pure. Get to the root of sexual sin and remove temptation before it leads to sin. Matthew 5:27-30, 1 Corinthians 6:18 The law says a man can divorce but Jesus says be selfless in marriage. Rather than looking for a loophole, spend your energy building a healthy marriage. Matthew 5:31-32 The law says don’t break a vow but Jesus says be a truth teller. Always tell the truth whether you’ve made commitments or not. The law says eye for an eye but Jesus says be a blessing. Rather than seeking revenge, find ways to bless others whether they deserve it or not. Matthew 5:38-44 The law says hate your enemies but Jesus says to be like Him. Choose love and grace for those that wrong you.

• Initial reactions to this topic? What jumped out at you?
• What do you think the audience was thinking hearing these antitheses?
• Read Matthew 5:17-18. What was the purpose of the law? What had the law become to the Jews?
• Read Matthew 5:27-30 and 1 Corinthians 6:18. What is Jesus’ point in these verses? What does Paul say about sexual sin?
• Read Matthew 5:31-32. Why was a decision to divorce selfish back then? What’s the better way to deal with a struggling marriage?
• Read Matthew 5:38-44. In your opinion, what does it look like to live out these words with your “enemies”?
• Is there a step you need to take based on today’s topic?

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Frame-Poythress.org

Triperspectival Theology for the Church

Van Til on Antithesis

June 7, 2012 By John Frame

by John M. Frame

As we seek to make the best use of Cornelius Van Til’s thought in our own time, it is especially important that we come to grips with his concept of antithesis, the diametrical opposition between belief and unbelief and therefore between belief and any compromise of revealed truth. The concept of antithesis is one of Van Til’s own major concerns, and it is that element in his thought which has brought him the most severe criticism. In the present pluralistic theological climate, it seems particularly difficult to draw lines sharply enough to support Van Tilian talk of antithesis: lines between denominational traditions, between liberal and conservative, between Christianity and other religions, between belief and unbelief. Universalism is taken for granted in contemporary liberal theology, and conservative Christian thinkers, if not going that far, often tend nevertheless to play down the differences between themselves and others. Is it possible, even necessary, to maintain Van Til’s emphasis in our time and to repudiate all these tendencies toward accommodation? Or did Van Til overstate his case, unnecessarily inhibiting biblical ecumenism? Or is the truth to be found somewhere between these two evaluations?

As we consider the matter of antithesis, we must simultaneously consider the doctrine of common grace, which teaches that God restrains sin in the unregenerate. On the basis of common grace, Van Til maintains that unbelievers know some truth despite their sin and its effects. It might seem at first glance that antithesis and common grace are opposed to one another, at least in the sense that one limits the other. Whether or not that is the best way to look at it, it is certainly true that there are temptations to imbalance on either side.

Van Til’s concept of antithesis can be understood as a continuation of the work of two men who had great influence upon him: Abraham Kuyper and J. Gresham Machen. Kuyper devoted much thought both to antithesis and to common grace. Indeed, he also devoted much action to the application of these concepts in church and society. Machen’s fundamental insight was the highly antithetical point that orthodox Christianity and theological liberalism are not two differing Christian theological positions, as Calvinism and Lutheranism, but are rather two different religions, radically opposed to one another. For Machen, liberalism was not Christian at all, but was fundamentally opposed to

WTJ  57:1 (Spring 1995) p. 82

Christianity as it is defined in Scripture and history. 1  Van Til applied this “antithetical” thinking to neo-orthodoxy 2  and other theological movements.

Van Til applied the concept of antithesis not only to unbelief in general and to the more recent variations of liberal theology, but also to the historic divisions within the Christian church. The problem with Roman Catholicism, Lutheranism, Arminianism, even “less consistent Calvinism,” is that they compromise with unbelief, understood as the antithesis to true Christianity. Compromise, of course, is different from capitulation, and Van Til recognized that. In  Jerusalem and Athens , he charges John Warwick Montgomery, a Lutheran who opposes Van Til’s apologetic, with “straddling the fence.” 3  Nevertheless, he often uses the language of antithesis (“great gulf” language) to describe, not only unbelief as such, but also those Christians who are not in his estimation fully Reformed. Consider these remarkable words, describing Stuart Hackett, an Arminian critical of Van Til’s apologetic:

Indeed, the issues between us are total. There are no “fundamentals” in common between us.… Hackett’s Christian faith and my Christian faith, which we both desire non-Christians to accept, are radically different. They are different not only in their content  but also in the very  method  of their construction. 4

And the concept plays another, still broader, role in Van Til’s thought. For to Van Til, “antithesis” is not only a means of criticizing others; it is also a key to the very formulation of Christian truth. Van Til rethinks the whole system of Christian theology and reformulates it with the concept of antithesis in view. How does he do that? By showing that Christian theology is a  system  of truth, that its elements are so profoundly interrelated that to deny one doctrine is implicitly to deny the whole. 5  This demonstration, if successful, leaves us with a choice between that system (Van Tilian Reformed Christianity) and rank unbelief, with a great gulf in between. Any attempt to cross that gulf, to mediate between those two positions, is doomed from the start, logically incoherent and spiritually bankrupt. Hence, Van Til’s theological formulations all reinforce Machen’s antithesis.

WTJ  57:1 (Spring 1995) p. 83

All of this is by way of introduction to the central role of antithesis in Van Til’s distinctive apologetic method. Van Til is important as a theologian, a philosopher, and a preacher, as well as an apologist, but apologetics was the center of his work and the key to understanding the rest of his thought.

His apologetic may be described in four parts: First, he offers us a view of the “metaphysics of knowledge,” the basic relationship between creator and creature as it affects human knowledge of God and of the world. Second, he explores the “ethics of knowledge,” particularly the noetic effects of sin and regeneration. Third, he constructs an argument for Christian theism which he believes to be consistent with his conclusions in the first two areas. Fourth, he develops a critique of non-Christian thought and of its detrimental influence upon Christian thought. In this paper I shall refer briefly to the first of these and spend most of my time on the second. The third and fourth will not directly concern us here.

Van Til’s view of the “metaphysics of knowledge” 6  is, to my mind, entirely unproblematic. If one desires to reason as a Christian, he must recognize that human thought is servant-thinking; that like all human activities it is to be subordinate to God’s revelation. Our present concern with Van Til’s metaphysics of knowledge is to note its relations to the concept of antithesis.

(1) It presents a justification for presuppositional thinking entirely apart from considerations about the noetic effects of sin and therefore of antithesis. Van Til is quite explicit that “even in paradise” Adam had the obligation to interpret the world in submission to God’s personal address to him, and that indeed he could not “read nature aright” except “in connection with and in the light of supernatural positive revelation.” 7  Even if the Fall had not taken place, Van Til says, we would still find it necessary to presuppose God’s word as the ultimate standard of truth. Therefore it is possible to hold a distinctively Van Tilian epistemology even if one differs with him concerning the effects of the fall and the nature of antithesis.

(2) Nevertheless, Van Til’s metaphysics of knowledge provides a foundation for the doctrine of antithesis. For if all meaning and truth are based upon divine thought and all human knowledge upon the subordination of human thought to divine thought, then even apart from the biblical teaching about the Fall we know that any deviation from the servant-thinking will produce drastic distortions in human thought.

Let us now move to Van Til’s “ethics of knowledge,” which includes his specific teaching about antithesis and common grace. Here Van Til seeks to describe concretely how the Fall affects human thought. Sinful man, according to Van Til, “sought his ideals

WTJ  57:1 (Spring 1995) p. 84

of truth, goodness and beauty somewhere beyond God, either directly within himself or in the universe about him.” 8  He “tried to interpret everything with which he came into contact without reference to God.” 9  In this connection, Van Til often refers to the process described in Romans 1: that fallen man suppresses what he knows to be true about God, exchanging it for a lie.

Instead of presupposing God’s revelation as the ultimate criterion of truth, the sinner presupposes (as Kant advocated so clearly and explicitly) that his own autonomy is the ultimate principle of being and knowledge. Thus fallen man stands in “antithesis” with God and with God’s people as well. In regeneration, the human consciousness “has  in principle  been restored to the position of the Adamic consciousness.” 10  The qualification “in principle” implies that the “relatively evil” remains “in those who are absolutely good in principle.” 11

Van Til also asserts that there is “relative good in those who are evil in principle.” 12  Thus he defends the doctrine of common grace. The noetic implications of common grace are as follows:

But in the course of history the natural man is not fully self-conscious of his own position. The prodigal cannot altogether stifle his father’s voice. There is a conflict of notions within him. But he himself is not fully and self-consciously aware of this conflict within him. He has within him the knowledge of God by virtue of his creation in the image of God. But this idea of God is suppressed by his false principle, the principle of autonomy. This principle of autonomy is, in turn, suppressed by the restraining power of God’s common grace. Thus the ideas with which he daily works do not proceed consistently from the one principle or from the other. 13

An important problem, however, emerges at this point. Despite Van Til’s affirmation of the ambiguity of the unbeliever’s position under common grace, he nevertheless often writes as though the unbeliever knows and affirms no truth at all and thus is not at all affected by common grace. Note:

The natural man cannot will to do God’s will. He cannot even know what the good is. 14

It will be quite impossible then to find a common area of knowledge between believers and unbelievers unless there is agreement between them as to the nature of man himself. But there is no such agreement. 15

WTJ  57:1 (Spring 1995) p. 85

But without the light of Christianity it is as little possible for man to have the correct view about himself and the world as it is to have the true view about God. On account of the fact of sin man is blind with respect to the truth wherever the truth appears. And truth is one. Man cannot truly know himself unless he truly knows God. 16

[The unbeliever] interprets all the facts and all the laws that are presented to him in terms of [his unbelieving] assumptions. 17

The unbeliever does not even find Christian truth to be  meaningful : “it is precisely Christianity as a whole, and therefore each of these doctrines as part of Christianity, that are meaningless to him as long as he is not willing to drop his own assumptions of autonomy and chance.” 18

And since the unbeliever’s depravity excludes all common notions, we can be sure, we can safely predict, what the unbeliever will do with an apologetic argument. When a Christian presents the historical argument for the resurrection of Christ, a pragmatist philosopher, says Van Til, “will refuse to follow this line of reasoning. Granted he allows that Christ actually arose from the grave, he will say that this proves nothing more than that something very unusual took place in the case of that man Jesus.” 19  Contrary to Hodge, who speaks of “reason” as “something that seems to operate rightly wherever it is found,” Van Til insists that “the ‘reason’ of sinful man will invariably act wrongly.… The natural man will invariably employ the tool of his reason to reduce these contents to a naturalistic level.” 20  Note here the twofold “invariably.” 21

On this extreme antithetical view, it would almost seem as if no unbeliever can utter a true sentence. It would also seem as if no communication is possible between believer and unbeliever. Unregenerate man cannot know what the good is, so how can he understand sin and the need for redemption in Christ? Since he cannot know his own nature, and cannot know God, and since truth is one, he literally cannot know anything. But how does a Christian present a witness to somebody who literally knows nothing? And why should we witness? For we can be safely assured that the unbeliever will be quite indifferent to any facts which we set before him. Is there any role at all here for common grace to play?

I believe that Van Til was at least sometimes sensitive to the difficulty of the problem, though at many points in his writings he seems quite unaware of it. The peak of his awareness of this issue can be found in  Theology , where he uncharacteristically admits

WTJ  57:1 (Spring 1995) p. 86

to having some difficulty in formulation. Here he concedes that the fact that unbelievers have knowledge which is “true as far as it goes” “has always been a difficult point,” and indeed he even adds that “we cannot give any wholly satisfactory account of the situation as it actually obtains.… All that we can do with this question as with many other questions in theology, is to hem it in in order to keep out errors, and to say that truth lies within a certain territory.” 22  His conclusion:

The actual situation is therefore always a mixture of truth with error. Being “without God in the world” the natural man yet knows God, and, in spite of himself, to some extent recognizes God. By virtue of their creation in God’s image, by virtue of the ineradicable sense of deity within them and by virtue of God’s restraining general grace, those who hate God, yet in a restricted sense know God, and do good. 23

A “mixture”! But that view of the unbeliever’s mentality provides a rather weak basis for all the strong antithetical language. If there is such a mixture, how can we be so sure that the unbeliever might not agree with us, at times, about flowers and trees, or even about the good, or the nature of man, or the existence of God, or that the resurrection was more than a “strange event”? How can we declare in advance what the unbeliever will or will not agree with?

As we have seen, Van Til is aware of this problem. His statements indicate a certain agnosticism as to its precise solution. Yet he does not leave this matter as a paradox, as he urges us to do in connection with the Trinity and with the relation of predestination to free agency. He rather tries to alleviate it by describing the situation more concretely, using various concepts, illustrations, images. 24  One problem, however, is that there are quite a number of these explanations, and they are rather different from one another. Van Til’s intent is that these explanations of the paradox should be taken as additive and supplementary, perhaps as perspectivally related to one another, though he does not use that language. My evaluation is that nevertheless these formulations are not altogether consistent with one another, and some of them can be rejected on other grounds. Thus, if we are to build upon Van Til’s work we will have to adopt or modify some of these formulations and reject others.

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We may call these formulations “strategies for reconciling antithesis with common grace.” I classify them as follows: extreme antithetical, normative, situational, existential, and practical.

I. Extreme Antithetical Formulations

We have seen already that Van Til often speaks in ways that suggest the unbeliever knows no truth at all and therefore has literally no area of agreement with the believer. This extreme antithetical position is reflected in some of Van Til’s strategies for reconciling antithesis and common grace.

1. Revelation/Interpretation

Van Til sometimes asserts that divine revelation is given to all, but that the unbeliever always  interprets  it wrongly. We have already seen this in earlier quotations. Note also:

By using the term “general revelation” we emphasize the fact that this revelation is accessible to all men and valid for all men even though only believers interpret it truly. 25 When the unbeliever  interprets  the world, he interprets it in terms of his assumption of human autonomy.… The unbeliever is the man with yellow glasses on his face. He sees himself and his world through these glasses. He cannot remove them. His interpretation  of himself and of every fact in the universe relating to himself is, unavoidably, a  false  interpretation. 26

On this account, common grace, if there is any role for it at all, would be seen only in God’s gracious provision of revelation. There is, evidently, no divine restraint of sin in the unbeliever’s process of interpretation.

To my knowledge, Van Til never defines “interpretation,” but I gather he uses it fairly broadly to describe all of a person’s activity in his attempts to understand the world. The contrast, then, is between the revelation inherent in the creation, and the distortion which enters whenever the unbeliever tries to understand that creation. Van Til’s assertion that all the unbeliever’s efforts to know (as all his efforts generally) are tainted by sin is simply an application of his Reformed view of total depravity and thus may be accepted as cogent in the present context. But does that depravity entail, as Van Til suggests, that all the unbeliever’s interpretive activity results in false conclusions? To say that it does is not part of the historic doctrine of total depravity, nor is it consistent with Van Til’s own view of common grace. On this strategy, there is no “mixture,” only unmitigated falsehood.

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One can, of course, try to patch up this strategy by employing some of the others listed below. One can say that the unbeliever’s interpretation is incorrect only “on an ultimate level,” or “insofar as he is self-conscious,” etc. My present point, however, is that the distinction between revelation and interpretation is not in itself sufficient to describe the relation of antithesis to common grace. Common grace is not merely an objective revelation of God. Rather, if it is anything, it is a divine restraint upon the sinful  activity  of the unbeliever. In this context, it must be a divine restraint upon the unbeliever’s sinful distortion of revelation. To deny that restraint, as Van Til appears to do in the present context, is to deny common grace itself.

2. Metaphysical/Epistemological

In  Defense , Van Til asks how unbelievers can agree with believers as to weights and measures and answers:

If sin is to be ethical alienation only, and salvation as ethical restoration only, then the question of weighing and measuring or that of logical reasoning is, of course, equal on both sides. All men, whatever their ethical relation to God, can equally use the natural gifts of God.… As far as natural ability is concerned the lost can and do know the truth and could contribute to the structure of science except for the fact that for them it is too late. 27

Here he argues that weighing and measuring are created human capacities and that, as such, they are not affected by the Fall. This is similar to his illustration of the buzz saw 28  which he uses to indicate that the unbeliever’s created faculties (such as the logical faculty) may work very efficiently while working in the wrong direction. On this analysis, common grace would be seen in God’s preservation of the metaphysical situation, the unbeliever’s epistemic faculties, and antithesis would be seen in that the unbeliever always makes a faulty  use  of his created equipment. 29

However, this view contradicts Van Til’s emphasis elsewhere that common grace is  not  needed to preserve the metaphysical situation, nor is it the source of the unbeliever’s natural knowledge of God. 30  And Van Til also takes issue with Abraham Kuyper’s view of weighing and measuring by saying that “Weighing and measuring are but aspects of one

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unified act of interpretation.” 31  Therefore, weighing and measuring cannot be taken as natural, “metaphysical” abilities that are somehow prior to and independent of that interpretive activity which is affected by sin. To the extent that all epistemic or interpretive activity is affected by the Fall, to that extent weighing and measuring must also be affected.

3. Form/Content

Often, Van Til describes the unbeliever’s knowledge as “formal.” In criticism of C. S. Lewis’s concept of the  Tao , an objective knowledge common to all men, Van Til replies, “But surely this general objectivity is common to Christians and non-Christians in a formal sense only.” 32  The non-Christian can “formally understand” the truth, 33  even give “formal assent” to the “intellectual argument for the existence of God.” 34  But it is wrong to say that the unbeliever has, concerning God, “correct notions as to content, not merely as to form.” 35

Van Til uses the word “formal” to describe cases in which two people use the same words, but with different meanings, and thus tend to misunderstand one another. He points out that “There can be no intelligible reasoning unless those who reason together understand what they mean by their words,” 36  and he adds that although the unbeliever may actually construct theistic proofs, the god he proves will always be something different from the God of Scripture. Indeed, the unbeliever differs with the believer over the meaning of “soul,” 37  the meanings of “is” and “is not,” 38  and the meaning of “supreme” in the phrase “supreme being.”  39  As for “miracle,” there is “nothing but formal agreement between the scientist and the Christian.” 40  Traditional apologists err because “they attribute to the natural man not only the ability to make formally correct statements about ‘nature’ or themselves, but also to mean by these statements what the Christian means by them.” 41

Put all of these statements together, and the conclusion seems to be that Christians and non-Christians speak entirely different languages. Although both groups use words like “God,” “soul,” “nature,” “miracle,” “self,” even “is,” the meanings of these words differ radically between them. But how, then, is communication possible between believers and unbelievers? If I say to you “good morning” and mean by that “hooray for the San

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Diego Padres,” what have I communicated?

Indeed, Van Til himself insists that the unbeliever’s knowledge is  not  “merely formal.” In a context which, oddly enough, directly adjoins one of the above passages, he speaks against Lockean empiricism:

Accordingly we cannot say that the innate knowledge of God in man is the merely formal ability, the capacity or potentiality, in view of man’s creation as an intellectual being, to recognize revelation if and when it comes. There can be no human consciousness that is not stirred to its depths by the revelational content within itself as well as about itself. Thus the innate knowledge deals with a thought content, and not with a mere formality. The finite human consciousness is itself revelational of God. 42

One might defend Van Til’s consistency at this point by saying that for him the unbeliever has a true revealed thought-content in his  knowledge  but never expresses it in words except “formally.” However, that would be a highly artificial distinction, one which Van Til, to his credit, never makes explicitly. 43  Certainly it would be hard to justify such a distinction from Scripture. Jesus, for example, commends the  words  of the Pharisees in Matt 23:2, 3, not just their inner knowledge, and Paul speaks similarly about pagans in Acts 17:28 and Titus 1:12, 13.

It is this insistence of Van Til that the unbeliever is in “actual possession” of revealed knowledge 44  that leads me to reject all of these “extreme antithetical formulations.” For if any of these formulations is true, then it cannot be maintained that the unbeliever has an actual knowledge of God. To have knowledge, it is not enough to be exposed to revelation, to have efficient epistemic capacities, to be able to speak with formal correctness. Subhuman creatures are exposed to revelation; animals and computers have efficient epistemic capacities; and parrots can speak with formal correctness. But none of these have the knowledge of God in the sense of Romans 1. We must say something more about the unbeliever if we are to credit him with a genuine knowledge of God (even a knowledge suppressed by sin).

II. Normative Formulations

Van Til often expresses the antithesis as an opposition between two “principles” 45  at war with one another. The unbeliever is in principle sold out to Satan, the believer to God. But neither is perfect in his allegiance: “As the Christian has the incubus of his “old

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man” weighing him down and therefore keeping him from realizing the “life of Christ” within him, so the natural man has the incubus of the sense of deity weighing him down and keeping him from realizing the life of Satan within him.” 46  Therefore, “insofar as men are aware of their basic alliances, they are wholly for or wholly against God at every point of interest to man.” 47

That “insofar” is crucial to what I am calling Van Til’s “normative” formulations. In these formulations, the antithesis is essentially between two “principles,” “systems,” “allegiances,” or “norms.” Individual unbelievers are opposed to Christianity only “insofar as” they are true to their “principle.” Note: “But  to the extent that  [the unbeliever] interprets nature according to his adopted principles, he does not speak the truth on any subject.” 48  Van Til criticizes S. J. Ridderbos because he fails to distinguish

clearly between the knowledge of the natural man that comes from his creation and his knowledge as it is implied in the idea of autonomy. He thinks it is a mistake to distinguish between common notions derived from the image of God in man and common notions that proceed from the idea of autonomy. Thus he cannot take the principle of autonomy in its full seriousness of opposition to the truth. 49

Autonomy is the unbeliever’s “principle.” Insofar as he is true to that principle, says Van Til, he knows nothing truly.

This kind of formulation is very important in Van Til’s thought. When I was his student, I wrote a paper quoting and criticizing what seemed to me to be rather extreme expressions of antithesis in his writings. Alongside my quotations, Van Til wrote in the margin several times “according to their principle,” “in their systems,” etc. Note: “it is of these systems of their own interpretation that we speak when we say that men are as wrong in their interpretation of trees as in their interpretation of God.” 50

It should be noted, however, that this strategy for reconciling antithesis and common grace is very different from those “extreme antithetical” approaches noted earlier in section 1. Under the normative approach, there is no suggestion that believer and unbeliever are speaking different languages, or that all the unbeliever’s interpretive activity will lead to false conclusions, or that the unbeliever will never utter a true sentence except “formally.” Rather, here Van Til recognizes quite explicitly that the unbeliever may well grant many truths of Christianity. All that antithesis requires in this strategy is that when

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the unbeliever speaks such truth we should regard him as inconsistent with his own principle.

And the unbeliever is inconsistent. To the objection that Van Til is denying that the unbeliever can discover truth, he replies, “we mean nothing so absurd as that. The implication of the method here advocated is simply that non-Christians are never able and therefore never do employ their own methods consistently.” 51  Not that this formulation makes the antithesis a dead letter. Certainly the concept of antithesis has the very practical function of warning apologists not to assume too much about the unbeliever. The unbeliever is operating on a basic assumption or presupposition opposite to that of the Christian. And the unbeliever has a strong motivation to interpret all of reality according to his own presupposition. Thus when the unbeliever finds in his own thinking some uncomfortable bit of Christian truth, his inclination will be somehow to twist it, suppress it, deny it, domesticate it, or simply to change the subject.

I believe this formulation is much more adequate scripturally than those listed in the first section, though we shall see in subsequent sections that it needs to be supplemented. As Van Til establishes in his “metaphysics of knowledge,” God does expect us to honor him as the ultimate source and standard of knowledge. The nature of sin is to deny such honor to God. The unbeliever seeks, through his words and thoughts, to deny God’s rightful honor. Thus there is antithesis. But there is no need to assume that either believer or unbeliever is fully consistent with his “principle.” Rather, the opposite is the case.

This formulation has some significant consequences. On this formulation, as opposed to the extreme antithetical formulations, we cannot predict the response of the unbeliever to an apologetic, whether that apologetic be traditional or Van Tilian. As we have seen, Van Til always  thought  that the unbeliever’s response was in general predictable. He insisted, for example, that the unbeliever will necessarily reject the evidences for the Resurrection. But that may not be so on a normative interpretation of the antithesis. For one thing, the unbeliever may simply be inconsistent in such a situation, granting the evidential arguments. 52  For another thing, of course, special grace may intervene: the Holy Spirit may choose to regenerate a person on the occasion of such an apologetic presentation.

A somewhat parenthetical observation: Van Til often uses the noetic effects of sin to show that the Christian apologist should always go beyond the presentation of evidence and present a transcendental, “presuppositional” argument. His contention is that the unbeliever will always repress the evidence, and so something other than evidence must also be presented. Although I do believe in the use of transcendental argumentation, and I

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accept some of Van Til’s other justifications for it, I do not defend it on this particular ground. For (a) we do not know for sure that the unbeliever will reject the evidence, and (b) to the extent that sin leads the unbeliever to repress evidence, it may equally lead him to repress the force of a transcendental argument.

III. Situational Formulations

Another type of Van Tilian strategy for reconciling antithesis with common grace is represented by the following:

It should be remembered that the universe has actually been created by God and is actually sustained by his providence. This precludes the possibility of any non-Christian philosopher, however profound, offering a system of interpretation of the universe that would seem satisfactory even to himself. 53

Here, the unbeliever’s suppression of the truth is limited in the very nature of the case. Since this is God’s world, no unbelieving system can adequately account for it; such a system therefore will of its own nature generate problems. The main problem, of course, is that the unbeliever misses what is obvious, since God is revealed clearly in creation.

Together with this we should note Van Til’s statement that “even in [the non-Christian’s] virtual negation of God, he is still really presupposing God…he cannot deny God unless he first affirm him, and that his own approach throughout its history has been shown to be destructive of human experience itself.” 54  Here the verb “presupposing” is used with a meaning different from Van Til’s usual concept of “presupposition.” Usually, Van Til uses “presupposition” to indicate the fundamental religious direction of a person’s thought. Here it cannot mean that. It does, however, mean that the unbeliever’s natural knowledge of God cannot be suppressed away. Nor does it fail to influence the unbeliever’s explicit thoughts and words. One cannot deny God without affirming him, because apart from God, denials are meaningless. So, to use Van Til’s frequent illustration, the unbeliever is like a child slapping her father while being supported by her father’s lap.

Though Van Til does not enumerate here the specific types of problems that inevitably arise from an attempt to construe the world nontheistically, we may assume that they include inconsistencies (as we saw earlier), factual inaccuracies, existential dissatisfactions, etc. Where the unbeliever’s antitheism is inconsistent, there is then by logical necessity some affirmation of the truth; for the contradictory of anti-theism is theism. Whatever may be the type of inadequacy, Van Til here tells us that the unbeliever himself is capable of recognizing that inadequacy to some extent; for his system will not “seem satisfactory even to himself.”

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When Van Til recognizes such insight in the unbeliever, he is, as in the normative formulations, contradicting his own more extreme antithetical formulations. The situational formulations are, however, compatible with the normative ones. For in both, we have a picture of the unbeliever  attempting  to understand reality apart from God, and yet failing. The situational formulations add to the normative the following: (a) The unbeliever’s thought is deficient in ways other than logical inconsistency. (b) These deficiencies are not merely accidental, nor are they simply the result of the unbeliever’s intellectual failures. Rather, deficiencies are necessitated by the very nature of the situation. An unbelieving system  cannot  adequately describe God and his world. (c) Just as his depravity affects everything the unbeliever thinks and says, so does common grace.

The point of (c) is that the relation between truth and falsehood in the unbeliever’s consciousness is somewhat paradoxical. We can certainly distinguish between some assertions of unbelievers that are true and others that are false. But in doing that we do not thereby neatly distinguish the noetic effects of sin from those of common grace. The fact is that depravity attaches to everything the unbeliever says and does, for depravity is, after all, total. And common grace also attaches to everything; for everything the unbeliever thinks and says “presupposes” truth in the atypical sense of “presuppose” noted earlier.

The normative formulation alone might encourage us to distinguish sharply between the unbeliever’s denials of revelation, which reflect depravity, and his inconsistent affirmations of it, which reflect common grace. What we see now, however, is that the unbeliever is not only inconsistent in certain assertions he makes, but in his thought as a whole. For everything he thinks and says “presupposes” a truth which all his thought seeks to deny.

IV. Existential Formulations

Still another approach to the relation of antithesis to common grace is found in Van Til’s examination of the unbeliever’s heart-condition. Consider the following:

The question of knowledge is an ethical question at the root. It is indeed possible to have theoretically correct knowledge about God without loving God. The devil illustrates this point. Yet what is meant by knowing God in scripture is  knowing and loving  God: this is  true  knowledge of God: the other is  false . 55

Knowing God, then, is not a merely intellectual matter. It includes love; it also is closely connected with the emotional component of regeneration. Notice how Van Til uses Charles Hodge’s exegesis of Eph 4:24 and Col 3:10: “Regeneration secures right knowledge as well as right feeling; and right feeling is not the effect of right knowledge,

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nor is right knowledge the effect of right feeling. The two are inseparable effects of a work which affects the whole soul.” 56

Therefore, the antithesis is regeneracy versus unregeneracy, a good heart versus a bad one; and that in turn is, as Van Til always insists, an  ethical  issue. As Van Til defines it in  Christian-Theistic Ethics , the works of the unbeliever are not done to the glory of God, based on the scriptural standard, motivated by faith. So it is with knowledge; for in his view, “the intellectual itself is ethical.” 57  Knowledge itself must be sought with the proper goal, standard, and motive if it is to be “true” in the fullest sense. Recall the statement we quoted earlier that for Van Til knowledge and love are not separable.

So the unbeliever may say many things which in themselves the believer cannot fault; but those things, like all the words of sinful man, spring from sinful motives within. Even the devil has knowledge after a fashion, as we have seen. The unbeliever, too, like his father the devil, speaks truth, but falsifies it by the way he lives: “Formal assent to the intellectual argument for Christianity, and pharisaical punctiliousness in living up to the form of the law, are in themselves perhaps the most diabolical falsification of the truth.” 58  Thus Van Til often speaks of the unbeliever giving “intellectual assent” to the truths of Christianity: “we may hold that [the children of Cain] ‘knew’ the truth intellectually as fully as did the children of God.” 59  Evidently, some unbelievers, like the Pharisees or the devil, can be quite orthodox!

We might be inclined here toward a formulation like the following: unbelievers may accept the truth intellectually, but are morally opposed to it. Their problem is “not intellectual but moral.” This is the way Gerstner, Sproul, and Lindsley formulate the noetic effects of sin in their  Classical Apologetics . 60  Certainly there is much truth in this formulation. Certainly Van Til would agree with the intention of this formulation to place the unbeliever’s depravity in the ethical as opposed to the metaphysical realm. The buzz-saw illustration mentioned earlier teaches that the intellectual capacities of the unbeliever as such may work quite efficiently; sin does not destroy them physically or metaphysically.

However, Van Til also says,

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When we say that sin is ethical we do not mean, however, that sin involved only the will of man and not his intellect. Sin involved every aspect of man’s personality. All of man’s reactions in every relation in which God had set him were ethical and not merely intellectual; the intellectual itself is ethical. 61

Similarly, “It will not do to separate the logical powers of man from his moral powers and say that though man is morally unwilling to serve God, he can intellectually know God aright.” 62  In this context, he concedes that in one sense Satan and human sinners like Cain know God very well. “But herein exactly lies the contradiction of Satan’s personality that though he knows God he yet does not really know God. His very intellect is devising schemes by which he thinks he may overthrow God, while he knows all too well that God cannot be overthrown.” 63

Thus, like the situational formulation, the existential formulation is paradoxical. We cannot neatly divide the personality of the unbeliever into one portion which is affected and another which is unaffected by the Fall. To be sure, sin does not necessarily destroy our rational capacity to formulate propositions and make inferences. Unbelievers may and often do excel believers in those capacities. But in all the unbeliever’s assertions and reasoning, he acts as a sinner; and in all his assertions and reasoning, he reflects God’s common grace.

At the same time, he knows God in one sense and fails to know him in another. The two senses of knowledge here are difficult to define and distinguish. 64  Perhaps the most helpful elucidation of this distinction is for us, with Van Til in the preceding quotation, to simply observe the biblical figure of Satan: brilliant and knowledgeable, but brought by his sinful hatred into a hopelessly stupid project, the project of trying to overthrow the kingdom of the living God. The interplay of his brilliance and stupidity is exceedingly difficult to describe, except by the narratives of Scripture and history. But it rings true. We have all known brilliant people who have in this way made fools of themselves. Satan is like them, to the nth degree, and non-Christians in general are like him in turn.

Of course, there are important differences between Satan and human unbelievers and between some unbelievers and others. One difference to which Van Til often refers is a difference in “self-consciousness.” “There is therefore a gradation between those who sin more and those who sin less self-consciously.” 65  Self-consciousness in this sense is sometimes a function of learning: unbelievers tend to be more explicitly antagonistic to

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Christianity when they are philosophizing than when they are speaking from common sense. 66  Sometimes it is also a function of historical differentiation:

Paul speaks of the ignorance of men to whom the gospel has not been preached. There is therefore a gradation between those who sin more and those who sin less self-consciously, as some are closer and others are further removed in history from the original direct supernatural revelation of God to men. 67

Here the normative and existential formulations overlap. Here Van Til speaks of “self-consciousness.” Earlier we saw that he often speaks of the “systems” or “principles” of the unbeliever being the specific locus of noetic sin. I take it that these formulations are pretty much equivalent. 68  To say that the unbeliever’s suppression of the truth is “in his system” or “insofar as he is true to his principle” is the same as saying “to the degree that he is epistemologically self-conscious.” Still, this is not to say that sin has no effects upon people who are relatively unconscious or unsystematic in their thought. For in such people we still find knowledge without love, which is the heart of noetic sin.

Van Til occasionally used formulations which pressed the concept of “self-consciousness” in a psychological direction, as if the unbeliever’s knowledge of the truth were unconscious or subconscious. The Reformed apologist “must seek his point of contact with the natural man in that which is beneath the threshold of his working consciousness, in the sense of deity which he seeks to suppress.” 69  However, Van Til also writes, “We should, however, be on our guard not to make too much of the distinction between preconscious and self-conscious action… [as if intuition] were something quite different and something more elemental than ratiocination.” 70  In general he does not insist that all of our agreements with unbelievers must be limited to the unbelievers’ subconsious beliefs. In general, when Van Til talks about an unbeliever’s level of “self-consciousness,” he is talking about the unbeliever’s intentions and sophistication rather than his psychological self-awareness. Depravity and common grace are both displayed at all levels of psychological consciousness, as is clearly implied by the normative and situational formulations.

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Depravity and common grace are both pervasive realities. Therefore, we should be able to understand at this point why Van Til makes use of “extreme antithetical formulations.” If depravity is pervasive, it will not do to suggest without qualification that the unbeliever knows a collection of truths which he holds in common with the believer. There is no commonality without difference.

On the other hand, we can also understand why the extreme antithetical formulations are themselves inadequate without considerable qualification: (a) These suggest that the unbeliever literally errs in every statement he makes. As we have seen, depravity does not necessarily work that way. Depravity works in many ways. It sometimes leads unbelievers literally to deny the teachings of Scripture. Sometimes, however, it leads them to affirm those teachings hypocritically—without love, without a heart to serve God. (b) They suggest that the specifically intellectual aspects of human depravity always appear in the discrete statements the unbeliever makes, rather than in the stupidity of his entire life-direction. (c) They fail to convey the fact that the unbeliever’s very denial of the truth is in some respects an affirmation of it: it is inconsistent and therefore conveys truth along with error (normative formulation), it presupposes the truth (situational), and it recognizes the truth intellectually while responding to it foolishly (existential).

V. Practical Formulations

We have seen that Van Til’s view of the unbeliever is actually very complex, a complexity which he appears to deny in his extreme antithetical formulations, but which we certainly must take into account if we are to build well on Van Til’s foundation. Bearing this complexity in mind, how shall we practically prepare ourselves for apologetic encounters? What should we expect of the unbeliever?

I questioned earlier Van Til’s assertion that we can  predict  how the unbeliever will respond to an apologetic challenge, for example, by twisting the evidence for the resurrection of Christ into a naturalistic scheme. I believe it is evident now that no such prediction is possible. The unbeliever may well twist the evidence in this way, or he may not. He may confess that Jesus is risen, but confess it hypocritically or with hatred of the God who so triumphed over his lord Satan. These are alternatives within the sphere of common grace. We should recognize also that special grace may intervene and use the presentation of such evidences to bring conversion. Thus the actual response of the unbeliever to an apologetic argument is quite unpredictable.

Van Til’s most practical formulations, then, are formulations which (contrary to the extreme antithetical formulations) leave the situation fairly open and flexible. I referred earlier to Van Til’s assertion that there is a “mixture” of truth and falsehood in the

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unbeliever’s mentality. The non-Christian’s statements “do not consistently proceed from the one principle or the other.”

In the same vein, Van Til often urges apologists to avoid the assumption that the unbeliever can form a “basically proper judgment on any question.” 71  “Basically” and “essentially” seem like rather vague terms. In a thinker as conscious of principle as Van Til, one would not expect to find that sort of vagueness. We ask, are the unbeliever’s judgments proper or improper? When the issue is principial, how can we introduce terms that suggest differences of degree? 72

But Van Til does, and perhaps that is where we should leave the matter for practical purposes. Unbelievers do speak truth sometimes, but their overall understanding of the world is “basically” wrong. Nor can this basic wrongness always be demonstrated in a purely conceptual way. Is Einstein’s relativity theory wrong because it was devised by a non-Christian? Is it “basically” wrong? To say so without further explanation would be misleading. The wrongness of an unbeliever’s mentality is essentially a wrongness of the heart; and that wrongness of the heart may be expressed actively and conceptually in various ways. A non-Christian scientist may discover facts and report them accurately; the wrongness of his perspective may appear in his  use  of those facts or in his inner motivation for discovering those facts, rather than in his statement of them. His theory as such may be “basically right,” though his overall outlook on life will be “basically wrong.”

When the apologist approaches an unbeliever, he should expect to find one who represses the truth of God in one way or another, so that the overall configuration of his life is wrong and wrong-headed. But the specific forms this repression takes are so many and varied that it is not possible to predict just how an apologetic confrontation will go. To use a currently popular phrase, apologetics must therefore be “person variable.” It must deal with each inquirer according to his own special needs, concerns, interests, problems. Van Til himself thought it was possible to predict the course of such encounters. But his own account of the complexities of the unbeliever’s consciousness cannot be reconciled with such predictability.

And it may be that he was not actually so rigid on this question as some of his formulations suggest. As a student I used to press him on the literal force of his view of antithesis. It seemed to me then that a literal account of it (“we may never agree with an unbeliever”) would require all sorts of absurdities, for example, that Van Til would not even have the right to accept Kant’s critiques of some of Leibniz’s arguments, which he

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certainly wanted to do. Van Til’s replies to me were always of a rather common-sense variety. Of course, he said, we can agree with Kant, or Plato, or Aristotle, about this or that, but not about their “basic” ideas. He was not hesitant to express agreement with unbelievers on various points, such as the importance of the one-and-many problem. 73  He could even speak of the “lofty ethics of idealism,” 74  and he speaks of how we should “apply the method of the idealist logicians in a way these idealist logicians, because of their own anti-theistic assumptions, cannot apply it,” 75  thus implying some level of agreement with the idealists as to how concepts cohere in a system of thought. But he felt that the “basic” structure of these philosophies was antithetical to Christianity, and he presented cogent argumentation to show that was so. Van Til would challenge me to find one actual case in the history of non-Christian philosophy in which someone attained an authentically theistic world-view. I was, of course, unable to produce any examples.

His point seemed to be, not some rigid conviction that we must never agree with unbelievers on any proposition, but rather the empirical observation that as a matter of fact depravity tends to produce systems of thought which deny biblical truth in significant ways. Perhaps there are one or two unbelievers who repress the truth more subtly than that, devising intellectual systems which actually affirm Christianity, but who hold these truths hypocritically. That is possible, and it may have happened; but we must agree that it does not happen very often.

I would suggest that although Van Til’s talk of antithesis often appears very rigid (perhaps necessarily so, since we are talking about differences in “principle”), his use of the concept was fairly flexible. Following the example of his practice rather than of his more extreme formulations, we may (and in my judgment should) do the same.

Thus far, I have discussed five ways in which Van Til describes the relation of antithesis and common grace. Putting together what we have learned, I would suggest that the extreme antithetical formulations with which Van Til’s thought is most commonly identified and for which it is most commonly criticized do not represent Van Til at his best or at his most typical. Nor do they represent the full complexity of Van Til’s thinking on these subjects. Indeed, it would, I believe, be very wrong for us to go into apologetic encounters taking these statements literally.

No doubt Van Til himself was fond of his more extreme antithetical formulations. To those he devoted his greatest eloquence, his greatest illustrative cleverness (the buzz-saw, the man made of water, the jaundiced eye). Why? In my view, he saw himself as the

WTJ  57:1 (Spring 1995) p. 101

heir to Kuyper and Machen, and he saw his responsibility as that of maintaining the antithesis mentality in the Machen movement and promoting it throughout the larger church. His greatest concern was that that sense of opposition to unbelief might lose its sharpness. Further, his more careful analyses of antithesis (normative, situational, and existential) did warrant the view that the effects of depravity upon the unbeliever were comprehensive, so that it could be said in one sense that the unbeliever “knows nothing truly.” He very likely felt that these considerations justified his extreme formulations.

But as we have seen, although the noetic effects of sin are comprehensive, we must give attention to the  nature  of those comprehensive effects. And it is simplistic to hold that those effects amount to a propositional falsification of every utterance of the unbeliever. Van Til recognized that in his better moments; but his formulations do not always reflect that level of insight.

The point is not that we (we Van Tilians) must de-emphasize Van Til’s doctrine of antithesis in favor of his doctrine of common grace. To do that would be to rob Van Tilian thought of all its distinctiveness. Rather, what we must do is to understand and make use of the full dimensions of Van Til’s thinking about the antithesis, rather than to practice a “Van Tilian apologetics” which simply takes his most extreme formulations at face value. Such extreme and literalist uses of Van Tilian antithesis actually tend to  weaken Van Til’s teaching in this area, for they tend to describe “antithesis” largely in intellectual terms, as if it were merely about one group of propositions logically contradicting another. In fact, Van Til’s “antithesis” is far more than that. It is a teaching about the whole life of man, believing and unbelieving, about the conflict of the ages between the kingdom of God and the kingdom of the wicked one. This conflict embraces the intellect, but it also embraces every other area of human life. And we do not see adequately  how  the antithesis affects the intellect until we see how sin places the intellect, together with all the rest of life, into the service of an idol.

When we understand the antithesis in its full dimensions, we will see more fully the legitimacy of the “great gulf” language in certain contexts. To be sure, there is a great gulf between Christianity and unbelief, and between authentic Christianity and deformations of it. Is there also a “great gulf” between Reformed Christians and non-Reformed Christians, or between Van Tilian apologists and non-Van Tilian apologists? I confess I would be more conservative than Van Til was with this kind of language, maintaining that the chief antithesis is between belief and unbelief as such, rather than between varieties of belief or with various formulations of the truth. Arminianism and non-Van Tilian apologetics systems are erroneous in some measure, I would say; but they have much in common with the Reformed faith, and at the deepest level; thus we should not criticize them in the same terms we use to criticize unbelief.

Do Reformed believers really share “no fundamentals in common” with Arminian Christians like Stuart Hackett? In my view, statements like this are unwise and untrue if taken in their natural meaning. The issue of antithesis is essentially an issue of the heart,

WTJ  57:1 (Spring 1995) p. 102

and I am confident that Reformed believers are, in general, of one heart with their Arminian brothers and sisters.

The problem is this: Van Til sometimes forgot that his doctrine of antithesis was a doctrine about the human heart. He sometimes thought that he could identify it exhaustively with various conceptual oppositions. In this belief he was wrong. If we are to maintain fully Van Til’s “presuppositionalism of the heart” in our own day, we must avoid such confusion. 76  I am not, of course, saying that one’s doctrine has nothing to do with his heart-condition. Doctrine proceeds from the heart as do all of our words (Matt 12:34). But as we have seen, the precise relation between heart condition and verbal confession in individual cases is rather complex.

The notion is abroad in some circles that Van Til’s thought forbids us to seek to learn anything at all from unbelievers, or even from non-Reformed Christians. 77  Van Til does give some aid and comfort to that position by means of his extreme antithetical formulations. I take it, however, that my analysis decisively refutes such applications of Van Til’s thought. Van Til himself learned plenty from non-Christian and non-Reformed thinkers, and he taught his students to do the same. Wooden application of Van Til’s more extreme antithetical statements misses entirely the subtlety of Van Til’s teaching, and it takes as its operative starting point those statements of Van Til which are least defensible scripturally and which contradict Van Til’s own fuller formulations.

Still, in my view, the great need in our time is for more, not less, recognition of antithesis. Here, Van Til can continue to make an important contribution to Christian thought, as long as we focus on the richness of his teaching rather than carelessly employing his more colorful formulations.

Westminster Theological Seminary in California 1725 Bear Valley Parkway Escondido, California 92027

1 See J. Gresham Machen,  Christianity and Liberalism  (New York: Macmillan, 1923)

2  The title of Van Til’s work,  Christianity and Barthianism  (Philadelphia: Presbyterian and Reformed, 1962), intentionally reflects that of Machen’s  Christianity and Liberalism . Compare his earlier work,  The New Modernism  (Philadelphia: Presbyterian and Reformed, 1946), the title of which also reflects Machen’s thesis.

3 Cornelius Van Til, “Reply” to Montgomery’s “Once upon an A Priori,” in  Jerusalem and Athens: Critical Discussions on the Theology and Apologetics of Cornelius Van Til  (ed. E. R. Geehan; Nutley, NJ: Presbyterian and Reformed, 1971) 403.

4 Van Til, in  Jerusalem and Athens , 15–16; emphasis his.

5 I have documented and explored Van Til’s concept of a “theological system” in my article, “The Problem of Theological Paradox,”  Foundations of Christian Scholarship  (ed. Gary North; Vallecito, CA: Ross House Books, 1976) 295-330, also published as the pamphlet  Van Til: The Theologian  (Phillipsburg, NJ: Pilgrim, 1976).

6 Van Til’s clearest account of these matters, in my view, is found in his  Introduction to Systematic Theology , hence  Theology  (n.p.: Presbyterian and Reformed, 1974) 22-23.

7 Van Til,  The Defense of the Faith  (3d ed.; Philadelphia: Presbyterian and Reformed, 1967) 106.

8 Van Til,  Defense , 15.

9 Ibid., 47.

10 Ibid., 49.

12 Ibid., 50.

13 Ibid., 170.

14 Ibid., 54.

15 Ibid., 67.

16 Ibid., 73.

17 Ibid., 203.

18 Ibid., 150.

19 Ibid., 8.

20 Ibid., 83.

21 Cf. Cornelius Van Til,  A Christian Theory of Knowledge , hence,  Knowledge  (n.p.: Presbyterian and Reformed, 1969) 297-98. For similarly extreme statements of the antithesis, see id.,  Defense , 203, 228; see also p. 296 in the first edition of  Defense  (1955);  Theology , 14, 22, 56, 75, 146, 189;  Knowledge , 262, 293.

22 Van Til,  Theology , 26. Compare his statement on p. 25 that this is a matter of “great complexity.”

23 Ibid., 27. With regard to the odd grammar, or perhaps punctuation, in the last sentence,  sic . On the “mixture” idea, cf.  Defense , 170: “Thus the ideas with which (the unbeliever) daily works do not proceed consistently either from the one principle or from the other.”

24 I suspect that his inner perception of the issue varied considerably from time to time through his career. The apparent agnosticism of  Theology , 26, and  Defense , 170, is hard to reconcile with the sense of assurance permeating many of his discussions of this issue.

25 Van Til,  Theology , 75.

26 Van Til,  Knowledge , 258–59, emphasis his; cf. 265, 301–2.

27 Van Til,  Defense , 171.

28 Ibid., 74.

29 I take the term “epistemological” here to be roughly synonymous with the term “interpretive” discussed in the preceding section. I believe also that the “psychological/epistemological” contrast found in Van Til,  Common Grace and the Gospel  (Nutley, NJ: Presbyterian and Reformed, 1972) 52-53, is more or less synonymous with the distinction under consideration.

30 Ibid., 159.

31 Ibid., 44.

32 Van Til,  Defense , 59.

33 Ibid., 74.

34 Van Til,  Theology , 198.

35 Van Til,  Knowledge , 296; cf.  Theology , 194.

36 Van Til,  Defense , 77. He does not actually use the word “formal” in this context.

37 Van Til,  Knowledge , 265–72.

38 Van Til,  Theology , 37.

39 Ibid., 194.

40 Ibid., 114.

41 Ibid., 113.

42 Ibid., 195; cf. p. 196, where he makes some fairly tortuous distinctions in this regard.

43 However, see later the discussion of Van Til’s half-suggestions that the unbeliever’s knowledge is somehow subconscious.

44 See also Van Til,  Defense,  91–92.

45 Ibid., 209.

46 Van Til,  Theology , 27. In response to John Murray’s criticism, Van Til came to abandon this idea as a theological formulation; but it still serves as a good illustration of how Van Til understood the nature of the unbeliever’s knowledge of God. It is, to the unbeliever, as sin is to the believer, a distraction from the main direction of his life.

47 Ibid., 29.

48 Ibid., 113, emphasis mine.

49 Van Til,  Defense , 170.

50 Van Til,  Theology , 84.

51 Ibid., 103; cf. pp. 173-75 and  Theology , 27, 60.

52 We shall see, and Van Til recognized this, that unregeneracy is compatible with a certain amount of doctrinal orthodoxy, the Pharisees and Satan being cases in point.

53 Van Til,  Theology , 75. In this connection, he refers to Job 28:12–14 and 20–22.

54 Van Til,  Knowledge , 13.

55 Van Til,  Defense , 17, emphasis his.

56 Ibid., 75. Here Van Til is quoting Charles Hodge’s  Systematic Theology  (3 vols.; Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 1952) 3.36. Cf. my treatment of the emotions in  Doctrine of the Knowledge of God  (Phillipsburg, NJ: Presbyterian and Reformed, 1987) 335-40.

57 Van Til,  Defense , 46.

58 Van Til,  Theology , 198.

59 Ibid., 78; cf.  Defense , 299, and  Knowledge , 19, 226, 292.

60 R. C. Sproul, John H. Gerstner, and Arthur Lindsley,  Classical Apologetics: A Rational Defense of the Christian Faith and a Critique of Presuppositional Apologetics  (Grand Rapids: Zondervan, 1984) 52; cf. my critique in “Van Til and the Ligonier Apologetic,”  WTJ  47 (1985) 279-99, reprinted in my  Apologetics to the Glory of God  (Phillipsburg: Presbyterian and Reformed, 1994) 219-43.

61 Van Til,  Defense , 46.

62  Van Til,  Theology , 92.

64 For an attempt to do this roughly and approximately, see my  Doctrine of the Knowledge of God , 49–61.

65 Van Til,  Knowledge,  46.

66 Van Til,  Defense , 82.

67 Van Til,  Knowledge , 46. Cf. the account in  Common Grace  of the process by which unbelievers and believers become more and more clearly differentiated from one another as history progresses to its consummation. I confess I have reservations about the scripturality of this theological construction, but I do not doubt that there are differences between people as to the degree of self-consciousness with which they repress the truth.

68 See Van Til’s own equation of them in  Theology , 83–84.

69 Van Til,  Defense , 98. Van Til frequently appeals to what is “deep down” in the heart of the unbeliever (ibid., 94, 231). Cf. also his emphasis on the “involuntary” nature of the unbeliever’s recognition of truth, as in  Theology , 88.

70 Van Til,  Theology , 90

71 Van Til,  Defense , 83. Cf. p. 93: “we cannot admit…that [the unbeliever’s] claim to interpret at least some area of experience in a way that is essentially correct, is mistaken.”

72 Cf. also the statement, “formally and incidentally, [unbelievers] have said many things that are true” (Van Til,  Theology , 32). We discussed “formally” earlier. “Incidentally” suggests that unbelievers speak truths, but not on the main drift of a topic of conversation.

73 Ibid., 24.

74 Ibid., 63.

75 Ibid., 115.

76 See my  Apologetics , 57–88, where I attempt to show some other ways in which Van Til confuses heart-attitudes with propositional formulations.

77 Understandably, this sort of view is not usually found in print, but I think many  WTJ  readers will recall private conversations and presbytery speeches to this effect. For one published example, see the exchange among William Dennison, the William White, and myself, in  Journey , Sept-Oct, 1987, Mar-Apr, May-June, and July-Oct, 1988, and Jan-Feb 1989.

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Philosophical Theology

A Non-Rationalistic Rational Theology

Unbelievers require a “neutral” investigation into the claims of Christianity. Unbelievers employ autonomous reasoning, i.e. reasoning from a mindset that does not acknowledge God’s epistemic Lordship over the possibility of human reason itself, without which unbelievers cannot judge whether the Bible should be deemed reliable for its claims let alone authoritative over all of life. Apart from judging the Bible from a throne of autonomy, the Bible and all it claims cannot be assessed as true. The problem with such a philosophical posture, which touches upon a concept that is difficult for both unbelievers and many believers to grasp, is that if the Bible must first be validated by the unbeliever as authoritative, then it cannot be intrinsically authoritative. Yet if the Bible is in itself authoritative by virtue of its divine origin, then no such human validation is permissible (or even possible when one is in submission to God’s word). As long as the unbeliever behaves this way – as long as he remains a judge of God’s word – the unbeliever remains his own authority, which means God‘s word is rejected while the unbeliever believes he is being neutral in his evaluation of that word. With hat in hand, God remains in the dock awaiting the unbeliever’s favor.

What is built into the unbeliever’s make-up is something from which the unbeliever cannot extricate himself. That is, there is an ethically driven intellectual bias , a deep seated antithesis that rejects the authority of God’s voice in Scripture (and nature!). If God’s Word is authoritative, then it may not be judged. It must be obeyed for what it truly is, God’s word. But like Eve who placed God’s word on the same level of Satan’s and then rose above both to judge what is true, so it is with the posture of the unbeliever. He sits in the place of God.

It is not as though in conversion the unbeliever chooses to grant approval to God’s word and then by way of reason decides for himself to submit to what he himself has decided to be authoritative. Rather, in biblical conversion God subdues the sinner’s will, causing him to believe and to receive God’s word aright, as authoritative . (Then from a recreated posture of belief and submission, the believer can can choose to submit to the authority of what Scripture has to say.) Since we don’t choose to accept truth, the converted sinner doesn’t choose to believe and receive God’s word as being authoritative. Instead, by the grace of God the sinner’s rejection of the voice of God is overcome whereby he finally  receives it for what it really is, the authoritative Word of God. 

As noted above, the unbeliever cannot free himself from his bondage and rebellious stance against God and his word. He is not neutral toward God. He is at enmity with his Maker. And although the apologist needn’t necessarily inform the unbeliever of this rebellion, it is nonetheless something of which the apologist should be aware lest his apologetic methodology likely suffers.

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Ron DiGiacomo

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Reformed churches have historically taught the doctrine of the . Specifically, the Protestant Reformed Churches in America teach and preach this doctrine and its implications. Yet sadly, many Reformed believers do not understand this doctrine. An antithesis is an opposite, or a contrast, of something else. In his book Rev. Ronald Hanko identifies the antithesis as “the separation and opposition between darkness and light, believer and unbeliever, church and world” (page 209). Although the word is not found in Scripture, the doctrine of the antithesis is taught in Scripture. A classic statement regarding the antithesis is found in 2 Corinthians 6:14-18 (“Be ye not unequally yoked together with unbelievers: for what fellowship hath righteousness with unrighteousness? and what communion hath light with darkness? And what concord hath Christ with Belial? or what part hath he that believeth with an infidel? And what agreement hath the temple of God with idols? for ye are the temple of the living God; as God hath said, I will dwell in them, and walk in them; and I will be their God, and they shall be my people. Wherefore come out from among them, and be ye separate, saith the Lord, and touch not the unclean thing; and I will receive you, And will be a Father unto you, and ye shall be my sons and daughters, saith the Lord Almighty”). This passage teaches that God has created a distinction between His church of godly believers on the one hand, and the world of ungodly unbelievers on the other. This distinction is pictured by the distinction between light and darkness. Light and darkness are antithetical contrasts; they are always separate from each other. Antithetical contrasts such as light and darkness, or the believing church and the unbelieving world, cannot be combined. Yet some do attempt to combine believers with unbelievers, and to join the church and the world. Such a joining is called a . The common way to attempt this synthesis is that of convincing the church that society’s values, views, and morals are actually pleasing to God; thus the church becomes more like the world, and less like the church as God intended her to be. But just as it is impossible to combine light and darkness, so it is ultimately impossible to synthesize the world with the church. Man’s attempts to do so manifest man’s hatred of God, of His covenant, and of His church. That church which does join herself to the world shows herself not to be God’s church. Fundamentally, the doctrine of the antithesis teaches that God is perfect and holy, the opposite of everything sinful. So we read in Scripture that “God is light, and in Him is no darkness at all” (1 John 1:5). God reveals His perfect holiness by His Word to us - both His Word incarnate, Jesus Christ, who is “the light of the world” (John 8:12), and His written Word, the Scriptures, which are compared to “a light that shineth in a dark place” (2 Peter 1:19). Antithetically opposite this holy God - unable to exist in harmony and fellowship with Him - are the devil, the lie which the devil speaks, and the whole human race as it is corrupted by sin through the influence of the devil. Regarding God”s gracious work of salvation, the doctrine of the antithesis teaches that God calls His people out of the darkness of sin and unbelief, into the light of the knowledge of the truth and fellowship with God (I Peter 2:9). In saving His church, God does not destroy the antithesis between Himself and sinful humanity; rather, He creates an antithesis among men, separating one part of humanity (His church of believers) from the other part (the world of unbelievers), and drawing His church into fellowship with Him in the way of knowing the truth and turning from sin. God’s creation of this antithesis among men is rooted in His sovereign eternal decree of election and reprobation, based on Christ’s limited atonement, and realized by the work of His Spirit applying all the blessings of salvation to the elect for whom Christ died. All of this is taught in a nutshell in Genesis 3:15. The doctrine of the antithesis has application to the lives of God’s people and church. First, as regards God’s people, this doctrine requires us to serve God in faith and obedience, and to avoid serving the devil in unbelief and disobedience. Already Adam was required to do this, by eating of the tree of life, and not eating of the tree of knowledge of good and evil (Genesis 2:9, 17). Likewise we must say “Yes” to God, and “No” to the devil. So God commanded His covenant people: “Ye shall be holy; for I the LORD your God am holy” (Leviticus 19:2, I Peter 1:15-16). This also is why God calls His people to a life of separation from the world of ungodly unbelievers (2 Corinthians 6:14-18), being not conformed, but transformed (Romans 12:2). Notice, God does not call us to separation from the world, as if the church is required to live geographically apart from unbelievers in Christian communes. Rather, God calls us to separation from the world - to live a life of faith and obedience in the midst of ungodly unbelievers. This is the idea of walking in the light (Ephesians 5:8, 1 John 1:7), and of our being a light unto the world (Matthew 5:14-16). Practically speaking, this means that God’s children must avoid sinful activities such as drunkenness, sexual immorality (that is, any sexual relations with a person other than one’s God-given spouse), and rebellion against any rightful authority. This also means that God’s children must not join ungodly organizations, such as lodges and even labor unions (the latter promote rebellion against one’s employer). Finally, this means that although believers must necessarily interact with unbelievers, we must avoid close friendships with any unbelievers. Second, as regards God’s church as a body, this doctrine requires the church to preach the truth of Scripture and to warn God’s people against the many devilish lies that men promote (2 Timothy 4:2ff). It requires her to call men everywhere to faith and repentance. It requires churches to join themselves in federation with other churches which preach the same truth over against the lie, and to avoid ecumenical relations with other churches which no longer preach the truth. To say this is not to ignore or work against Jesus’ prayer “that they may be one” (John 17:11), for here Jesus prays for the true, spiritual unity of those whom the Father gave Him (the elect for whom He died), in the way of confessing the truth about Jesus Christ. For the church to join forces with those who deny the truth is for her to live , not . Always God’s church and people are to avoid the synthesis, and to manifest the antithesis. Manifesting the antithesis in her life, the church shows forth the virtues of Jehovah, for which purpose God saved her: “that ye should show forth the praises of him who hath called you out of darkness into his marvelous light” (I Peter 2:9). , (Grandville, MI: Reformed Free Publishing Association) volume 4, page 353: “Antithesis, Synthesis, and Dualism” by Rev. Herman Hoeksema. , volume 62, pages 97-120 (Special issue on the subject of the antithesis). , volume 73, pages 157f, 275f, and 301f: “Antithesis” by Rev. Steven Key. Herman Hanko, (Grandville, MI: Reformed Free Publishing Association), chapter 10: “Doctrine of the Antithesis.” Ronald Hanko, (Grandville, MI: Reformed Free Publishing Association), pages 209-210: “The Antithesis” [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [Antithesis] [ ] [ ] Atheism and Anti-Theism: What's the Difference? Are All Atheists Anti-Theists? Is Atheism Inherently Anti-Theistic? Belief Systems Key Figures in Atheism M.A., Princeton University B.A., University of Pennsylvania Atheism and anti-theism so often occur together at the same time and in the same person that it's understandable if many people fail to realize that they aren't the same. Making note of the difference is important, however, because not every atheist is anti-theistic and even those who are, aren't anti-theistic all the time. Atheism is simply the absence of belief in gods; anti-theism is a conscious and deliberate opposition to theism. Many atheists are also anti-theists, but not all and not always. Atheism and Indifference When defined broadly as simply the absence of belief in gods, atheism covers territory that isn't quite compatible with anti-theism. People who are indifferent to the existence of alleged gods are atheists because they don't believe in the existence of any gods, but at the same time, this indifference prevents them from being anti-theists as well. To a degree, this describes many if not most atheists because there are plenty of alleged gods they simply don't care about and, therefore, they also don't care enough to attack belief in such gods. Atheistic indifference towards not only theism but also religion is relatively common and would probably be standard if religious theists weren't so active in proselytizing and expecting privileges for themselves , their beliefs, and their institutions. When defined narrowly as denying the existence of gods, the compatibility between atheism and anti-theism may appear more likely. If a person cares enough to deny that gods exist, then perhaps they care enough to attack belief in gods as well — but not always. Lots of people will deny that elves or fairies exist, but how many of these same people also attack belief in such creatures? If we want to limit ourselves to just religious contexts, we can say the same about angels: there are far more people who reject angels than who reject gods, but how many nonbelievers in angels attack the belief in angels? How many a-angel-ists are also anti-angel-ists? Of course, we also don't have people proselytizing on behalf of elves, fairies, or angels very much and we certainly don't have believers arguing that they and their beliefs should be privileged very much. It's thus only to be expected that most of those who deny the existence of such beings are also relatively indifferent towards those who do believe. Anti-theism and Activism Anti-theism requires more than either merely disbelieving in gods or even denying the existence of gods. Anti-theism requires a couple of specific and additional beliefs: first, that theism is harmful to the believer, harmful to society, harmful to politics, harmful, to culture, etc.; second, that theism can and should be countered in order to reduce the harm it causes. If a person believes these things, then they will likely be an anti-theist who works against theism by arguing that it be abandoned, promoting alternatives, or perhaps even supporting measures to suppress it. It's worth noting here that, however, unlikely it may be in practice, it's possible in theory for a theist to be an anti-theist. This may sound bizarre at first, but remember that some people have argued in favor of promoting false beliefs if they are socially useful. Religious theism itself has been just such a belief, with some people arguing that because religious theism promotes morality and order it should be encouraged regardless whether it is true or not. Utility is placed above truth-value. It also happens occasionally that people make the same argument in reverse: that even though something is true, believing it is harmful or dangerous and should be discouraged. The government does this all the time with things it would rather people not know about. In theory, it's possible for someone to believe (or even know) that but also believe that theism is harmful in some manner — for example, by causing people to fail to take responsibility for their own actions or by encouraging immoral behavior. In such a situation, the theist would also be an anti-theist. Although such a situation is incredibly unlikely to occur, it serves the purpose of underscoring the difference between atheism and anti-theism. Disbelief in gods doesn't automatically lead to opposition to theism any more than opposition to theism needs to be based on disbelief in gods. This also helps tell us why differentiating between them is important: rational atheism cannot be based on anti-theism and rational anti-theism cannot be based on atheism. If a person wishes to be a rational atheist, they must do so on the basis of something other than simply thinking theism is harmful; if a person wishes to be a rational anti-theist, they must find a basis other than simply not believing that theism is true or reasonable. Rational atheism may be based on many things: lack of evidence from theists, arguments which prove that god-concepts are self-contradictory, the existence of evil in the world, etc. Rational atheism cannot, however, be based solely on the idea that theism is harmful because even something that's harmful may be true. Not everything that's true about the universe is good for us, though. Rational anti-theism may be based on a belief in one of many possible harms which theism could do; it cannot, however, be based solely on the idea that theism is false. Not all false beliefs are necessarily harmful and even those that are aren't necessarily worth fighting. Antireligion and Anti-Religious Movements What Does It Mean to Be an Atheist? What is Agnostic Theism? What's the Difference Between Nontheism and Atheism? Militant Atheist Definition and Examples Anti-Clericalism Movements Have Helped Shape History The Difference Between a 'Nontheist' and an Atheist Definition of Fundamentalist Atheist What if Atheists are Wrong? Aren't You Afraid of Hell? Can You Take the Chance? The Difference Between Atheists and Agnostics What Is Theism? Strong Atheism vs. Weak Atheism Apatheist: Definition Should "Under god" Be in the Pledge of Allegiance Agnosticism for Beginners - Basic Facts About Agnosticism and Agnostics What is Agnosticism? Archive | Library | Bookstore | Index | Web Lectures | Ecclesia Gnostica | Gnostic Society ANTITHESIS Contradictions Between the Old Testament Deity and the New Testament God. By Daniel Mahar O Timothy, keep that which is committed to thy trust, avoiding profane and vain babblings, and Contradictions [antithesis] of gnosis falsely so called. -- From the Pseudo-Pauline Epistle I Timothy 6:20 (circa.150 C.E.). This page represents a short exercise on my part (rather loose and by no means comprehensive)- the purpose of which is to provide a brief glimpse into Marcion's lost work, "Antithesis", which can be best described as a Marcionite commentary on the New Testament, which set forth contrasts on passages( via narrative commentary, or by the presentation of OT and NT scriptures side-by-side) between the Hebrew deity and the Alien God. It is not certain how this work was actually arranged, whether a separate work apart from Marcion's canon, or a commentary incorporated into it. For the first part of this exercise, an attempt is made here to extract and construct from Tertullian's hostile witness (Adversus Marcionem) a Marcionite narrative, so as to allow the Marcionite voice to express its views on the following three subjects: I. The Creator God and the Supreme God, II. The Inconsistencies of the Creator God, and III. The Two Christs. For the second half of this exercise, a simple side-by-side presentation of OT and NT scriptures is given, which demonstrates the contradictions between the OT Creator God and the NT Supreme God. I must emphasize that this is a loose presentation, in that I have not confined myself to citing only passages which appeared in Marcion's canon, but have made free use of other canonical material as well. In any event, this will at least provide the reader a general idea of what Marcion's work "Antithesis" may have been like. For a further in-depth discussion on Marcion's "Antithesis", see Adolf Von Harnack's work, "Marcion: The Gospel of the Alien God" (pp.53-63; E.T. Labyrinth Press, 1990). I. The Creator God and the Supreme God For an evil tree bringeth forth not good fruit; neither does a good tree bring forth evil fruit. For every tree is known by his own fruit. Luke 6:43,44a I am the Lord, and there is none else; I form the light, and create darkness; I make peace, and create evil... Isaiah 45:6,7 I create evil - This god is the author of evil - there must be another God, after the analogy of the good tree producing its good fruit. In Christ is found a different disposition, one of a simple and pure benevolence - which differs from the Creator. In Christ a new God is revealed. The Creator God is judicial, harsh, and mighty in war. The Supreme God is gentle and simply good and excellent. The title "God" is a vague one, and applied to other Beings as well; as it is written, " He standeth in the congregation of the mighty"; "He judgeth among the gods" (Psalm 82:1,6), "Ye are gods". Thus as the attribute of supremacy would be inappropriate to these, although they be called gods, so it is to the Creator. Jesus Christ and none else revealed a new God, who, in the Old world and in the Old time and under the Old God was unknown and unheard of ; Whom is accounted by no one through long centuries back, and ancient in men's very ignorance of Him - even in ancient names He was unknown and concealed. He had remained unknown by any works from the beginning. Even the Creator was unaware of the Supreme God being above himself, Who, although He did not manifest Himself from the beginning and by means of the creation, has yet revealed Himself in Christ Jesus. To be sure, this world is a grand work, worthy of a god. Yet the Supreme God has a creation of His own, and His own world, and His own sky. One work is sufficient for our God: He has delivered man by His supreme and most excellent goodness, which is preferable to the creation of all the locusts. A primary and perfect goodness is shed voluntarily and freely upon strangers without any obligation of friendship, on the principle that we are bidden to love our enemies, who as such on that very account are strangers to us. The Supreme God is susceptible to no feeling of rivalry, or anger, or damage, or injury . He inflicts no punishment and takes no offence, and is not feared, as a good being ought not to be an object of fear, as a judicial being, in whom resides the grounds for fear - anger, severity, judgements, vengeance, and condemnation. II. The Inconsistencies of the Creator God The Creator God is inconsistent, in respect of persons, sometimes disapproving where approbation is deserved; or else lacking in foresight, bestowing approbation on men who ought rather be reprobated, as if he either censured his own past judgements, or could not forecast his future ones. With fickleness and improvidence he repented, or on some recollection of some wrong-doing, because the Creator actually says "It repenteth me that I have set up Saul to be king" (1 Samuel 15:11), his repentance in the sense of an acknowledgement of some evil work or error. This is also the case in the matter of the Ninevites, when the Book of Jonah (3:10) states, "And God repented of the evil that he had said he would do unto them; and he did not." The Creator called out to Adam, "Where art thou?" as if ignorant of where Adam was; and when Adam alleged that the shame of his nakedness was the reason for hiding himself, the Creator inquired whether he had eaten of the tree, as if he were in doubt (Genesis 3:9-11). In the case of Sodom and Gomorrah, he says "I will go down now, to see whether they have done altogether according to the cry of it which is come to me; and if not, I will know"; another instance of his uncertainty in ignorance. The Creator God was even mean enough in his very fierceness, when, in his wrath against the people for their consecration of the golden calf, he makes this request to Moses: "Let me alone, that my wrath may wax hot against them, and that I may consume them; and I will make thee a great nation" (Exodus 32:10). Moses is better than his God, as the deprecator and indeed, the averter of his anger, "For Thou shalt not do this; or else destroy me along with them" (Exodus 32:32). III. The Two Christs The Christ who in the days of Tiberius was, by a previously unknown God, revealed for the salvation of all nations, is a different being from him who was ordained by the Creator God for the restoration of the Jewish state, and who is yet to come. The Creator's Christ is to be a warrior, a bearer of arms, and mighty in war. The Christ of the Good God, who has come, is a far different being from the Creator's Christ. Isaiah's description of Christ in no point suits the Christ of the Good God. Isaiah's Christ is to be called Emmanuel (Isaiah 7:14); then, he takes the riches of Damascus and the spoils of Samaria against the king of Assyria (Isaiah 8:4). But yet, He who is come was neither born under such a name, nor ever engaged in such a war-like enterprise. A Christ had come who had never been foreannounced, but the Christ predicted had not yet appeared. The Jews were themselves quite certain that it was some other who came; so they not only rejected Him as a stranger, but slew Him as an enemy, though they would have acknowledged Him, and with all religious devotion followed Him, if He had been one of them. The difference between the two Christs, is that the Jewish Christ was ordained by the Creator for the restoration of the people alone from its dispersion, while our Christ was appointed by the supremely Good God for the liberation of the whole human race. Who among the nations can turn to the Creator, when those whom the prophets name are proselytes of individually different and private conditions? It is the Christ of the Other, Supreme God Who was driven to the cross by the hostile powers and authorities of the Creator. The suffering of the cross was not predicted of the Creator's Christ; moreover, it should not be believed that the Creator would expose his son to that kind of death on which he himself had pronounced a curse. "Cursed" says he, "is everyone who hangeth on a tree" (Deuteronomy 21:3, Galatians 3:13). | GNOSIS ARCHIVE | GNOSTIC SOCIETY LIBRARY | The Antithesis Contradictions between the old testament diety and the new testament god.. Go to the Chronological List of all Early Christian Writings Please buy the CD to support the site, view it without ads, and get bonus stuff! 1 Corinthians 2 Corinthians Philippians 1 Thessalonians 2 Thessalonians Letter to the Hebrews Gospel of Thomas Egerton Gospel Gospel of Peter Oxyrhychus 840 Gospel of Mary Epistula Apostolorum Infancy Gospel of James Infancy Gospel of Thomas Acts of Pilate Diatessaron Oxyrhynchus 1224 Fayyum Fragment Gospel of the Egyptians Gospel of the Hebrews Gospel of the Ebionites Gospel of the Nazoreans Traditions of Matthias Dura-Europos Gospel Harmony Preaching of Peter Acts of Peter Acts of John Acts of Paul Acts of Andrew Acts of Peter and the Twelve Book of Thomas the Contender Acts of Thomas Martyrdom of Polycarp Fifth and Sixth Books of Esra Acts of Carpus, Papylus, and Agathonice Letter from Vienna and Lyons Passion of the Scillitan Martyrs Acts of Apollonius Acts of Perpetua and Felicitas Apocalypse of Peter Sophia of Jesus Christ Secret James Dialogue of the Savior Gospel of the Savior Books of Jeu Pistis Sophia 2nd Apocalypse of James Coptic Apocalypse of Paul 1st Apocalypse of James Coptic Apocalypse of Peter Letter of Peter to Philip Apocryphon of John Gospel of Truth Treatise on the Resurrection Gospel of Philip Trimorphic Protennoia Authoritative Teaching Discourse on the Eighth and the Ninth Melchizedek Naassene Fragments Ophite Diagrams Gospel of Judas Julius Cassianus Epistle of Barnabas First Clement Shepherd of Hermas Ignatius of Antioch Polycarp to the Philippians Second Clement Epistle of Mathetes to Diognetus Justin Martyr Minucius Felix Athenagoras of Athens Theophilus of Antioch Aristo of Pella Claudius Apollinaris Melito of Sardis Dionysius of Corinth Theophilus of Caesarea Maximus of Jerusalem Polycrates of Ephesus Anonymous Anti-Montanist Serapion of Antioch Irenaeus of Lyons Hippolytus of Rome Clement of Alexandria Mara bar Serapion Pliny the Younger Lucian of Samosata Marcus Aurelius Philostratus The Twelve Patriarchs Non-Pagan Sibyllines Odes of Solomon Book of Elchasai Ascension of Isaiah Passion Narrative Sayings Gospel Q Signs Gospel Anti-Marcionite Prologues Muratorian Canon Kerygmata Petrou Inscription of Abercius Screen Rant Mcu's phase four secretly introduced the 1 god who can beat galactus. Your changes have been saved Email is sent Email has already been sent Please verify your email address. You’ve reached your account maximum for followed topics. Galactus' Most Powerful Herald of All Time Makes Silver Surfer Look Weak 10 most epic galactus fights that rocked marvel's entire cosmos, galactus' new herald reveals the final fate of a seemingly innocent mcu hero. Galactus will soon make his MCU debut in the upcoming film Fantastic Four: First Steps , which is pretty grim news for the residents of the Marvel Cinematic Universe. Galactus is the Devourer of Worlds, after all, meaning the Earth (or any planet) is never truly safe so long as he exists. However, that shouldn’t suggest that the MCU is totally doomed, as one god - who was secretly introduced in Thor: Love and Thunder - already proved powerful enough to beat him: Amatsu-Mikaboshi aka King Chaos. In the Marvel Comics event Chaos War by Greg Pak, Fred van Lente, and Khoi Pham, Amatsu-Mikaboshi decides that playing the role of a mere god of Earth is no longer acceptable, especially considering the nature of his origin. Amatsu-Mikaboshi is actually King Chaos, the manifestation of the void that existed before the formation of the universe, whose existence is the perfect antithesis of Eternity. Before there was light, there was only darkness, and that darkness was King Chaos. King Chaos begins the systematic slaughter of every god across the cosmos, claiming their power as his own, in order to snuff out all life in existence and return the universe to his original void. After killing the entire Greek God Pantheon, King Chaos possesses the corpse of Zeus and uses his power to take down Galactus himself. While Amatsu-Mikaboshi isn’t able to kill Galactus during their first fight, the fact that he could down the Devourer of Worlds with a single blow all but confirms that the Chaos King could put Galactus down permanently. Galactus has had many Heralds over the years, and out of them all, only one stands above them as the most powerful - and it's not the Silver Surfer. King Chaos is Ready to Put Galactus Down if He Becomes a Problem in the MCU Amatsu-mikaboshi made a cameo appearance in 2022’s thor: love and thunder. Amatsu-Mikaboshi made a blink-and-you’ll-miss-it cameo appearance in the MCU’s Thor: Love and Thunder when Thor and the gang traveled to Omnipotence City to seek help from the Council of Godheads. Amatsu-Mikaboshi was sitting on that council, and while his King Chaos identity was still shrouded by the facade of the Japanese God of Death, Marvel Comics fans know who was really sitting on that council, and what this ‘god’ is truly capable of. With Galactus about to make his live-action debut, having a character in the MCU that has proven capable of taking him down is somewhat reassuring, just in case nothing else can do the trick. Of course, if that happened, then the Marvel Cinematic Universe would have the unleashed Chaos King to deal with (which is infinitely worse), but at least Galactus wouldn’t be a problem. However, there is a simpler way to beat Galactus in the MCU if he steps out of line, as there’s another god who has done that before as well. Amatsu-Mikaboshi isn’t the Only MCU God who has Defeated Galactus: Thor Thor #6 by donny cates and nic klein. When considering MCU gods who have defeated Galactus in the comics, fans don’t have to look further than the main roster of the Avengers, as Thor has actually killed Galactus in a single blow before. As King Thor, the God of Thunder drains Galactus of his Power Cosmic, and then hurls Mjolnir through his chest, killing the Devourer of Worlds in an instant. In the MCU, Thor is also technically the rightful King of Asgard through familial succession, and should therefore have access to a comparable level of power, meaning he, too, is a Galactus-killing god in the MCU. While Thor may become powerful enough to kill Galactus in the MCU if he ever needed to, fans haven’t seen the God of Thunder wield that level of power quite yet, meaning it’s unlikely that the MCU’s version of Thor would be able to pull off the same feat as his Marvel Comics counterpart. However, being a disguised primordial god, Amatsu-Mikaboshi would have no problem downing the Devourer of Worlds, making King Chaos the one god who can definitely beat Galactus in the MCU . 217 IMAGES Antithesis Mark Forsyth Quote: “For though one antithesis is grand, a long list of Brenda Marie Davies Quote: “Plainly, evil is the antithesis of God Mark Forsyth Quote: “For though one antithesis is grand, a long list of PPT Antithesis Definition & Examples in Speech and Literature • 7ESL VIDEO Defeating Atheism with Science by Spike Psarris. Who is God? De Earste Psalm: Earste Sesje: Twa Soarten Minsken KA ZODIAK Monotheism, Paganism & Allah 1256: 3 Levels of God Realization: Brahman, Paramatma & Bhagavan Status Quo ft. G-Natural COMMENTS The Six Antitheses With six powerful examples in Matthew 5:21-47, Jesus compared the demands of the law of the gospel with the requirements of the Mosaic law. In each, the Master cited an earlier proposition of the law, a thesis, and made an authoritative counterproposition, or antithesis, that called disciples to a higher standard of belief, motivation, and observance. Antithesis Antithesis - Definition and Examples Antithesis and the Doctrine of Scripture Nevertheless, wisdom and not foolishness is the mentality proper to believers in the Lord. Foolishness really belongs outside God's people. In a believer, foolishness contradicts his belief in God. In the consummation glory, all believers will be wise, not foolish. The antithesis of belief/unbelief and elect/nonelect, is also a distinction ... Antitheism The word antitheism (or hyphenated anti-theism) has been recorded in English since 1788. [3] The etymological roots of the word are the Greek anti and theos.. The Oxford English Dictionary defines antitheist as "One opposed to belief in the existence of a god". The earliest citation given for this meaning dates from 1833. [4] [2] The term was likely coined by Pierre-Joseph Proudhon. What Is the Antithesis? August 8, 2022. In the field of Reformed apologetics we sometimes speak about the antithesis. The antithesis is a theological principle that is meant to describe the difference between believers and unbelievers. There are many ways that we could describe that difference, but we must at the very least describe that difference covenantally. Antithesis Examples and Definition of Antithesis as a Literary Device Antithesis Antithesis - Wikipedia ... Antithesis At War With the Word: The Necessity of Biblical Antithesis ... The antithesis between followers of God and followers of Satan is sovereignly inflicted as God's judicial curse. This enmity is not only social but also intellectual in nature, and, therefore, to ignore it in our apologetic is to compromise the gospel. Without the ingredient of antithesis, Christianity is not simply anemic, it has altogether ... The Antithesis: Godly Living in Ungodly Times The antithesis is an essential element of the Reformed worldview, because it is a truth that is taught throughout Scripture. The antithesis is that spiritual separation God has created by saving His people, the children of light, out of the world of darkness. God separates His people from the world by saving them. Antithesis: Definition and Examples Second, the antithesis displays a parallel between the speaker (a human) and the one being spoken to (God). The prayer is a request for divine mercy, and at the same time a reminder that human beings should also be merciful. Example 2. ... Antithesis performs a very similar function, but does so in a more complicated way by using full sentences ... Antithesis in Literature: Definition & Examples Antithesis in Literature: Definition & Examples Examples and Definition of Antithesis Fallibility is a trait of humans, and God - the Creator - is most forgiving. Through those antithetical thoughts, Pope exhibits the simple nature of human beings. He wants to say that God is forgiving because his creation is erring. Example #4: Community (By John Donne) We find antithesis in John Donne's poem Community: Antithesis Definition & Examples in Speech and Literature Antithesis can be used in figurative language, a good example of this is the phrase "man proposes, God disposes. " The two ideas are completely opposite to each other and yet when put in a sentence together create a contrasting idea. The Six Antitheses of Jesus The six antitheses are part of The Sermon on the Mount. Jesus called into question the oral tradition of the Pharisees and how they were teaching the law. The law says don't murder but Jesus says to be reconciled. Instead of being fueled by hatred, direct your energy towards peace. The law says don't commit adultery but Jesus says to be ... Van Til on Antithesis In fact, Van Til's "antithesis" is far more than that. It is a teaching about the whole life of man, believing and unbelieving, about the conflict of the ages between the kingdom of God and the kingdom of the wicked one. This conflict embraces the intellect, but it also embraces every other area of human life. Antithesis Antithesis. Unbelievers require a "neutral" investigation into the claims of Christianity. Unbelievers employ autonomous reasoning, i.e. reasoning from a mindset that does not acknowledge God's epistemic Lordship over the possibility of human reason itself, without which unbelievers cannot judge whether the Bible should be deemed reliable ... The Doctrine of the Antithesis The doctrine of the antithesis has application to the lives of God's people and church. First, as regards God's people, this doctrine requires us to serve God in faith and obedience, and to avoid serving the devil in unbelief and disobedience. Already Adam was required to do this, by eating of the tree of life, and not eating of the tree of ... Atheism and Anti-Theism: What's the Difference? Atheism and Anti-Theism: What's the Difference? ANTITHESIS: Marcion and Contradictions Between the Old ... ANTITHESIS. Contradictions Between the Old Testament Deity. and the New Testament God. By Daniel Mahar. O Timothy, keep that which is committed to thy trust, avoiding profane and vain babblings, and Contradictions [antithesis] of gnosis falsely so called. -- From the Pseudo-Pauline Epistle I Timothy 6:20 (circa.150 C.E.). PDF The Six Antitheses: Attaining the Purpose of the Law through the Of course God himself—or Jesus, as the premortal Jehovah present at Mount Sinai—also established the original propositions, a fact suggested by a nuance of the Greek grammar of a phrase beginning each antithesis. Each starts with a variation of the formula "Ye have heard that it was said The Antithesis: Godly Living in Ungodly Times It is also an important and timely subject because the truth of the antithesis is very practical. That is expressed in the subtitle for this pamphlet, "Godly Living in Ungodly Times.". The antithesis, you see, has to do with how we live, and more specifically, with how we do so in relation to the world in which God has placed us. The Antithesis of Marcion ANTITHESIS Contradictions Between the Old Testament Diety and the New Testament God. O Timothy, keep that which is committed to thy trust, avoiding profane and vain babblings, and Contradictions [antithesis] of gnosis falsley so called. - from the pseudo-Pauline epistle of I Timothy 6:20 (circ.150 C.E.). MCU's Phase Four Secretly Introduced the 1 God Who Can Beat Galactus Galactus will soon make his MCU debut in the upcoming film Fantastic Four: First Steps, which is pretty grim news for the residents of the Marvel Cinematic Universe.Galactus is the Devourer of Worlds, after all, meaning the Earth (or any planet) is never truly safe so long as he exists. However, that shouldn't suggest that the MCU is totally doomed, as one god - who was secretly introduced ... assignment essay homework paper phd report resume review speech thesis