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Questions about faith have inspired centuries of philosophical and theological reflection, particularly, though by no means exclusively, as faith is understood within the Christian branch of the Abrahamic religions. What is faith? What makes faith reasonable or unreasonable, valuable or disvaluable, morally permissible or impermissible, virtuous or vicious? How does faith relate to psychological states such as belief, desire, trust, and hope? How does faith relate to action? To what extent is faith under our voluntary control? Because answers to these further questions depend on what faith is, as well as on assumptions about relevant evaluative norms and the philosophical psychology and theory of action applicable to faith, this entry focusses on the nature of faith, while also touching upon implications of various models of faith for assessments of its reasonableness and value.

‘Faith’ is a broad term, appearing in locutions that point to a range of different phenomena. We speak of ‘having faith that you will succeed, despite setbacks,’ ‘having faith in democracy,’ ‘putting faith in God,’ ‘believing that God exists by faith,’ ‘being a person of faith,’ ‘professing and keeping the faith (or losing it),’ ‘keeping (or failing to keep) faith with someone’, and so on. At its most general ‘faith’ means much the same as ‘trust’. Uses of ‘faith’ and ‘faithfulness’ closely parallel ‘trust’ and ‘trustworthiness’ and these are often used interchangeably. Yet one of the striking and intriguing facts about theorizing in this area (the study of faith, faithfulness, and related phenomena), is that people have offered radically different accounts of what faith is—to such an extent that there remains disagreement even about the basic ontological category to which faith belongs. Is it a psychological state and, if so, is it cognitive, affective/evaluative, or perhaps some combination of both? Is it an act or disposition to act—or is there at least some sort of connection to action essential to faith and, if so, to what sorts of acts?

This entry will focus on religious faith as paradigmatic—or, rather, it will focus on the kind of faith exemplified in theistic faith (i.e., faith in God, faith that God exists, and commitment to a theistic interpretation of reality), while leaving open whether faith of that same general kind also belongs to other, non-theistic, religious contexts, or to contexts not usually thought of as religious at all. The question of faith outside of a theistic context, such as whether it is apt to speak of the faith of a humanist, or even an atheist, using the same general sense of ‘faith’ as applies to the theist case, is taken up in the final Section (11).

Philosophical reflection on theistic religious faith has produced markedly different accounts or models of its nature. This entry organizes discussion of accounts or models of faith around key components that feature in such accounts—with varying emphases, and with varying views about how these components relate to one another. These components are the cognitive , the affective , the evaluative , and the practical (volitional, actional and behavioural). Models of faith may also be usefully categorized according to further principles, including

• how the model relates faith as a state to the actional components associated with faith;
• whether the model takes the object of faith to be exclusively propositional (e.g., faith that such and such) or not (e.g., faith in persons or ideals);
• the type of epistemology with which the model is associated—whether it is broadly ‘internalist’ or ‘externalist’, ‘evidentialist’ or ‘fideist’;
• whether the model is necessarily restricted to theistic religious faith, or may extend beyond it.

The entry proceeds dialectically, with later sections presupposing the earlier discussion. The section headings are as follows:

1. Models of faith and their key components

2. the affective component of faith, 3. faith as knowledge, 4. faith and reason: the epistemology of faith, 5. faith as belief, 6. faith as an act of trust, 7. faith as doxastic venture, 8. venturing faith, without belief, 9. faith and hope, 10. faith as a virtue, 11. faith beyond (orthodox) theism, other internet resources, related entries.

While philosophical reflection on faith of the kind exemplified in religious contexts might ideally hope to yield an agreed definition in terms of necessary and sufficient conditions that articulate the nature of faith, the present discussion proceeds by identifying key components that recur in different accounts of religious faith. It also aims to identify a focal range of issues on which different stances are taken by different accounts. There is a plurality of existing philosophical understandings or models of faith of the religious kind. This discussion therefore aims to set out dialectically an organisation of this plurality, while also giving indications of the reasons there may be for preferring particular models over others. Since ‘religion’ itself may well be a ‘family resemblance’ universal, essentialism about faith of the religious kind might be misplaced. Nevertheless, the concept of faith as found in the Abrahamic, theist, religious traditions is widely regarded as unified enough for an inquiry into its nature to make sense, even if a successful real definition is too much to expect (this kind of faith might conceivably be a conceptual primitive, for example).

Note that some philosophers approach the target of religious faith by first classifying and analysing ordinary language uses of the term ‘faith’ and locutions in which that term occurs. See, for recent examples, Audi 2011 (Chapter 3, Section I), who identifies seven different kinds of faith, and Howard-Snyder (2013b), who attempts a general analysis of ‘propositional’ faith—i.e., faith that p is true, where p is a relevant proposition. The present discussion, however, deals directly with the target notion of the kind of faith exemplified in religious faith , assuming the background of a working grasp of the notion as deployed in religious forms of life, and specifically in those belonging to the theist traditions. Insights from the analysis of faith understood more broadly may, nevertheless, be important in constructing models of faith of the religious kind, as will emerge below in the discussion of religious faith as a kind of trust (Section 6).

The notion of religious faith as the possession of a whole people is familiar, and arguably theologically primary in the theist traditions. Philosophical accounts of theistic faith typically focus, however, on what it is for an individual person to ‘have faith’ or be ‘a person of faith’. An initial broad distinction is between thinking of faith just as a person’s state when that person ‘has faith’, and thinking of it as also involving a person’s act, action or activity . Faith may be a state one is in, or comes to be in; it may also essentially involve something one does. An adequate account of faith, perhaps, needs to encompass both. In the Christian context, faith is understood both as a gift of God and also as requiring a human response of assent and trust, so that their faith is something with respect to which people are both receptive and active.

There is, however, some tension in understanding faith both as a gift to be received and as essentially involving a venture to be willed and enacted. A philosophical account of faith may be expected to illuminate this apparent paradox. One principle for classifying models of faith is according to the extent to which they recognise an active component in faith itself, and the way they identify that active component and its relation to faith’s other components. It is helpful to consider the components of faith (variously recognised and emphasised in different models of faith) as falling into three broad categories: the affective , the cognitive and the practical . There are also evaluative components in faith—these may appear as implicated in the affective and/or the cognitive components, according to one’s preferred meta-theory of value.

One component of faith is a certain kind of affective psychological state—namely, having a feeling of assurance or trust. Some philosophers hold that faith is to be identified simply with such a state: see, for example, Clegg (1979, 229) who suggests that this may have been Wittgenstein’s understanding. Faith in this sense—as one’s overall ‘default’ affective attitude on life—provides a valuable foundation for flourishing: its loss is recognised as the psychic calamity of ‘losing one’s faith’. But if foundational existential assurance is to feature in a model of faith of the kind exemplified by theists, more needs to be added about the kind of assurance involved. The assurance of theistic faith is essentially a kind of confidence: it is essentially faith in God. In general, faith of the kind exemplified by theistic faith must have some intentional object . It may thus be argued that an adequate model of this kind of faith cannot reduce to something purely affective: some broadly cognitive component is also required. (For an account that takes faith to be fundamentally affective, while allowing that it might also involve cognitive aspects, see Kvanvig 2013.)

What kind of cognitive component belongs to faith, then? One possibility is that it is a kind of knowledge , but there is then a question about the kind of knowledge that it is: e.g., is it knowledge ‘by acquaintance’, or ‘propositional’ knowledge ‘by description’, or both? One type of model of faith as knowledge identifies faith as propositional knowledge of specific truths, revealed by God. A model of this type has received prominent recent defence in the work of Alvin Plantinga, who proposes an account which he regards as following in the tradition of the reformers, principally John Calvin (see Plantinga 2000, 168–86). Calvin defines faith thus: ‘a firm and certain knowledge of God’s benevolence towards us, founded upon the truth of the freely given promise in Christ, both revealed to our minds and sealed upon our hearts through the Holy Spirit’ (John Calvin, Institutes III, ii, 7, 551, quoted by Plantinga (2000, 244)).

Appeal to a special cognitive faculty

‘Reformed’ epistemologists have appealed to an externalist epistemology in order to maintain that theistic belief may be justified even though its truth is no more than basically evident to the believer—that is, its truth is not rationally inferable from other, more basic, beliefs, but is found to be immediately evident in the believer’s experience (see Plantinga and Wolterstorff 1983, Alston 1991, Plantinga 2000). On Plantinga’s version, (basic) theistic beliefs count as knowledge because they are produced by the operation of a special cognitive faculty whose functional design fits it for the purpose of generating true beliefs about God. Plantinga calls this the sensus divinitatis , using a term of Calvin’s. (For discussion of the extent to which Plantinga’s use of this term conforms to Calvin’s own usage see Jeffreys 1997 and Helm 1998.) This quasi-perceptual faculty meets functional criteria as a mechanism that, when functioning in the right conditions, confers ‘warrant’ (where warrant is whatever must be added to true belief to yield knowledge) and, granted theism’s truth, it probably yields ‘basic’ knowledge because God designs it just for that purpose. In defence of specifically Christian belief, Plantinga argues that the same warrant-conferring status belongs to the operation of the Holy Spirit in making the great truths of the Gospel directly known to the believer.

The welcome certainty of faith

This appeal to a God-given ‘higher’ cognitive faculty is found (in the early 12th Century) in al-Ghazâlî’s Deliverance from Error , where it provides the key to the ‘Sufi’ resolution of his religious crisis and his sceptical doubts about the deliverances of sense perception and unassisted human reason. Faith is thus understood as a kind of basic knowledge attended by a certainty that excludes doubt. But faith will not be exclusively cognitive, if, as in Calvin’s definition, faith-knowledge is not only ‘revealed to our minds’ but also ‘sealed upon our hearts’. For, on this model, faith will also have an affective/evaluative component that includes a welcoming of the knowledge received.

Practical aspects of faith on this model

This model of faith as a kind of knowledge, certain and welcome, exhibits faith as essentially something to be received, something delivered by the proper functioning of a special cognitive faculty. Nevertheless, the model may admit a practical component, since an active response is required for reception of the divine gift. Such a practical component is implied by the real possibility that faith may be resisted: indeed, Christians may hold that in our sinful state we will inevitably offer a resistance to faith that may be overcome only by God’s grace. It is, however, a further step for persons of faith to put their revealed knowledge into practice by trusting their lives to God and seeking to obey his will. On this ‘special knowledge’ model of faith, however, this activity counts as ‘acting out’ one’s faith rather than as a part of faith itself. Persons of faith thus act ‘in’, ‘through’ or ‘by’ faith: but, on this model, their faith itself is the welcomed revealed knowledge on which they act.

Models of faith as knowledge may be thought lacking because they admit no actional component in faith itself. Faith seems essentially to involve some kind of active venture in commitment and trust, even if talk of a ‘leap of faith’ may not be wholly apt. Many have held that faith ventures beyond what is ordinarily known or justifiably held true, in the sense that faith involves accepting what cannot be established as true through the proper exercise of our naturally endowed human cognitive faculties. As Kant famously reports, in the Preface to the Second Edition of his Critique of Pure Reason : ‘I have … found it necessary to deny knowledge , in order to make room for faith ’ (Kant 1787 [1933, 29]). Theist philosophers do, however, typically defend the claim that faith is not ‘contrary to reason’. On models of faith that take a cognitive component as central, and construe faith’s object as propositional, reasonable faith therefore seems subject to a general evidentialist principle—‘a wise man ... proportions his belief to the evidence’, as Hume puts it (Hume 1748 [2007], “Of Miracles”, 80). And W. K. Clifford elevates evidentialism to the status of an absolute moral requirement, affirming that ‘it is wrong always, everywhere, and for anyone to believe anything upon insufficient evidence’ (Clifford 1877 [1999, 77]. Faith’s venturesomeness may thus seem in tension with its reasonableness, and models of faith differ in the way they negotiate this tension in response to evidentialist challenges. Another way to classify models of faith, then, is in terms of their associated epistemology—and, in particular, whether and according to what norms of ‘evidential support’, they accept that faith’s cognitive component needs to meet a requirement to be grounded on available evidence.

The Reformed epistemologist model of faith as ‘basic’ knowledge (outlined in Section 3) generates an epistemology under which, although ordinary cognitive faculties and sources of evidence do not yield firm and certain inferred knowledge of theistic truths, there is (if Christian theism is true) a ‘higher’ cognitive faculty that neatly makes up the deficit. This model seems thus to secure the rationality of faith: if faith consists in beliefs that have the status of knowledge, faith can hardly fail to be rational. And, once the deliverances of the special cognitive faculty are included amongst the believer’s basic experiential evidence, an evidential requirement on reasonable belief seems to be met. (Note that Plantinga originally expressed his defence of ‘properly basic’ theistic belief in terms of the rationality of believing in God ‘without any evidence or argument at all’ (Plantinga 1983, 17). He does respect an evidential requirement, however, holding that it may be fully met through what is basically, non-inferentially, evident in the believer’s experience. Hence Plantinga’s insistence that his Reformed epistemology is not fideistic (Plantinga 2000, 263).)

Reflective faith and the question of entitlement

It is not clear, however, whether Reformed epistemology’s model of faith can achieve all that is needed to show that theist faith is reasonable. From the perspective of reflective persons of faith (or would-be faith), the question of entitlement arises: are they rationally, epistemically—even, morally—entitled to adopt or continue in their faith? This question will be existentially important, since faith will not be of the kind exemplified by religious faith unless its commitments make a significant difference to how one lives one’s life. Reflective believers, who are aware of the many options for faith and the possibility of misguided and even harmful faith-commitments, will wish to be satisfied that they are justified in their faith. The theist traditions hold a deep fear of idolatry—of giving one’s ‘ultimate concern’ (Tillich 1957 [2001]) to an object unworthy of it. The desire to be assured of entitlement to faith is thus not merely externally imposed by commitment to philosophical critical values: it is a demand internal to the integrity of theistic faith itself. Arguably, believers must even take seriously the possibility that the God they have been worshipping is not, after all, the true God (Johnston 2009). But, for this concern to be met, there will need to be conditions sufficient for justified faith that are ‘internalist’—that is, conditions whose obtaining is, at least indirectly if not directly, accessible to believers themselves. And, as already noted, those conditions are widely assumed to include an evidentialist requirement that faith is justified only if the truth of its cognitive content is adequately supported by the available evidence.

The Reformed epistemologist model as leaving the question of entitlement unanswered

It may be argued, however, that, if the Reformed epistemologist’s model is correct, those who seek to meet an evidentialist requirement will be unable to satisfy themselves of their entitlement to their faith. Theistic truths may be directly revealed, and experienced as immediately evident, yet, on reflection, one may doubt whether such experiences are genuinely revelatory since competing ‘naturalist’ interpretations of those experiences seem available. Furthermore, there are rival sources yielding contrary claims that equally claim to be authentically revelatory. It may be true, as Plantinga’s Reformed epistemology maintains, that if God exists then certain basic theist beliefs meet externalist criteria for knowledge, even though the truth of the propositions concerned remains open to reflective ‘internalist’ doubt. On an externalist account, that is, one might lack independent evidence sufficient to confirm that one has knowledge that God exists while in fact possessing that very knowledge . One may thus refute an objector who claims that without adequate evidence one cannot possess knowledge. But this consideration is still insufficient to secure entitlement to theistic faith—if, as may be argued, that entitlement requires that one has evidence adequate to justify commitment to the truth that God exists. For, one has such evidence only conditionally on God’s existence —but it is precisely entitlement to believe that God exists that is at issue (Kenny 1992, 71; Bishop and Aijaz 2004). For a wider discussion of the possibility of religious knowledge that, inter alia , endorses the present point, see Zagzebski 2010.

If faith is not ‘firm and certain’ basic knowledge of theistic truths, then a model of faith as having a propositional object may still be retained by identifying faith with belief of relevant content—and the question whether a faith-belief may have sufficient justification to count (if true) as (non-basic) knowledge may remain open. To have theist faith might thus be identified with holding a belief with theological content—that God exists, is benevolent towards us, has a plan of salvation, etc.—where this belief is also held with sufficient firmness and conviction. Richard Swinburne labels this the ‘Thomist view’ of faith, and expresses it thus: ‘The person of religious faith is the person who has the theoretical conviction that there is a God’ (Swinburne 2005, 138). (Aquinas’s own understanding of faith is more complex than this formulation suggests, however, as will be noted shortly.)

The rationality of faith on this model will rest on the rationality of the firmly held theological beliefs in which it consists. As Swinburne notes, if such beliefs are founded on evidence that renders their truth sufficiently more probable than not, then the beliefs concerned may amount to knowledge on a contemporary ‘justified true belief’ fallibilist epistemology, even though they fall short of knowledge on Aquinas’s own criteria, which require that what is known be ‘seen’ (i.e., fully and directly comprehended) ( Summa Theologiae 2a2ae 1, 4 & 5 (Aquinas 1265–1273 [2006], 27)). In any case, the reasonableness of faith on this model of faith as (non-basic) theological belief depends on the beliefs concerned being adequately evidentially justified. The claim that this condition is satisfied is defended by John Locke in The Reasonableness of Christianity (1695 [1999]), and, in contemporary philosophy, by Richard Swinburne’s Bayesian approach to the epistemology of Christian belief (see, for example, Swinburne 2003).

Some argue, however, that the truth of theism is ‘evidentially ambiguous’—that is, that our total available evidence is equally viably interpreted from both a theist and a naturalist/atheist perspective (Hick 1966 and 1989; Davis 1978; Penelhum 1995; McKim 2001). This thesis of evidential ambiguity may be supported as the best explanation of the diversity of belief on religious matters, and/or of the persistence of the debate about theism, with philosophers of equal acumen and integrity engaged on either side. Or the ambiguity may be considered systematic—for example, on the grounds that both natural theological and natural atheological arguments fail because they are deeply circular, resting on implicit assumptions acceptable only to those already thinking within the relevant perspective. (In relation to Swinburne’s Bayesian natural theology, in particular, this objection surfaces in criticism of assumptions about how to set the prior probabilities implicated in calculations of, for example, theism’s probability on the evidence of the ‘fine-tuning’ of the Universe’s basic physical constants, or of the probability, on all our evidence, of the truth of the Resurrection.) If the ambiguity thesis is correct, then—assuming evidentialism—firmly held theistic belief will fail to be reasonable.

On this model of faith as non-basic belief, all that characterizes faith apart from its theological content is the firmness or conviction with which faith-propositions are held true. Firm belief in the truth of a scientific theoretical proposition, for example, fails to count as faith only through lacking the right kind of content. This model therefore shares with the Reformed epistemologist model in taking its theological content as essential to what makes theistic faith faith , and so rejects the suggestion that faith of the same sort as found in the theist religious traditions might also be found elsewhere.

Furthermore, in taking faith to consist in non-basic belief that theological propositions are true, this model invites the assumption that theological convictions belong in the same category of factual claims as scientific theoretical hypotheses with which they accordingly compete. That assumption will lead those who think that theological claims are not reasonably accepted on the evidence to regard faith as worthless and intellectually dishonourable—at best, ‘a degenerating research programme’ (Lakatos 1970). (On this negative assessment of faith’s evidential support, persons of faith come perilously close to the schoolboy’s definition mentioned by William James: ‘Faith is when you believe something that you know ain’t true’ (James 1896 [1956, 29]). Or, if persons who have theistic faith readily abandon theological explanations whenever competing scientific ones succeed, their God gets reduced to ‘the God of the gaps’.) These misgivings about the model of faith as firmly held factual theological belief dissolve, of course, if success attends the project of showing that particular theological claims count as factual hypotheses well supported by the total available evidence. Those who doubt that this condition is or can be met may, however, look towards a model of faith that understands faith’s cognitive content as playing some other role than that of an explanatory hypothesis of the same kind as a scientific explanatory hypothesis.

Aquinas’s account of faith

Though firmly held theological belief is central to it, Aquinas’s understanding of faith is more complicated and nuanced than the view that faith is ‘the theoretical conviction that God exists’. Aquinas holds that faith is ‘midway between knowledge and opinion’ ( Summa Theologiae 2a2ae 1, 2 (Aquinas [2006], 11)). Faith resembles knowledge, Aquinas thinks, in so far as faith carries conviction. But that conviction is not well described as ‘theoretical’, if that description suggests that faith has a solely propositional object. For Aquinas, faith denotes the believer’s fundamental orientation towards the divine. So ‘from the perspective of the reality believed in’, Aquinas says, ‘the object of faith is something non-composite ’ (hence, definitely not propositional)—namely God himself. Nevertheless, grasping the truth of propositions is essential to faith, because ‘ from the perspective of the one believing … the object of faith is something composite in the form of a proposition’ ( Summa Theologiae , 2a2ae, 1, 2 (Aquinas [2006], 11 & 13), our emphases).

A further problem with describing as Thomist a model of faith simply as firm belief that certain theological propositions are true is that Aquinas takes as central an act of ‘inner assent’ ( Summa Theologiae , 2a2ae, 2, 1 (Aquinas [2006], 59–65)). This is problematic because, (i) in its dominant contemporary technical usage belief is taken to be a mental (intentional) state —a propositional attitude, namely, the attitude towards the relevant proposition that it is true; (ii) belief in this contemporary sense is widely agreed not to be under volitional control—not directly, anyway; yet (iii) Aquinas holds that the assent given in faith is under the control of the will. Aquinas need not, however, be construed as accepting ‘believing at will’, since assent may be construed as an act that has to be elicited yet terminates a process that is subject to the will—a process of inquiry, deliberation or pondering that involves mental actions, or, in the case of theist faith, a process of divine grace that can proceed only if it is not blocked by the will.

Most importantly, however, Aquinas says that assent is given to the propositional articles of faith because their truth is revealed by God , and on the authority of the putative source of this revelation. Terence Penelhum puts it like this: ‘Thomas tells us that although what one assents to in faith includes many items not ostensibly about God himself, one assents to them, in faith, because they are revealed by God … It is because they come from him and because they lead to him that the will disposes the intellect to accept them’ (Penelhum 1989, 122: see Summa Theologiae , 2a2ae, 1, 1 & 2 (Aquinas [2006], 5–15)). So, Aquinas’s model of faith is of believing (assenting to) propositional truth-claims on the basis of testimony carrying divine authority . John Locke follows the same model: ‘Faith … is the assent to any proposition … upon the credit of the proposer, as coming from God, in some extraordinary way of communication’ (Locke 1698 [1924, 355]; compare also Alston 1996, 15).

The unanswered question of entitlement—again

Theist faith as assent to truths on the basis of an authoritative source of divine revelation is possible, though, only for those who already believe that God exists and is revealed through the relevant sources. Might such faith, then, have to rest on a prior faith—faith that God exists and that this is God’s messenger or vehicle of communication? Those foundational claims, it might be maintained, are held true on the grounds of adequately supporting evidence, such as putatively provided by arguments of natural theology and the claimed evidence for miraculous endorsement of a prophet’s authority. Theist faith might then have a purely rational foundation. But this could hardly be so for every person of faith, since not everyone who believes will have access to the relevant evidence or be able to assess it properly. Besides, and more importantly, although Aquinas allows that rational assessment of the available evidence may lead a person to faith, he does not think that such an assessment could ever elicit assent itself—only demonstration could achieve that and so high a level of proof is not here available (see Aquinas [2006], footnote 2b, 58–9). Aquinas’s view is thus that all believers stand in need of God’s grace: ‘the assent of faith, which is its principal act … has as its cause God, moving us inwardly through grace’ ( Summa Theologiae , 2a2ae 6, 1 (Aquinas [2006], 167)). It follows, then, that, on Aquinas’s view, believing that God exists and is revealed in specific ways is itself a matter of faith, and not a purely rationally evidentially secured prolegomenon to it.

Aquinas’s model of faith thus shares with the Reformed epistemologist model the problem that it leaves unanswered the reflective believer’s concern about entitlement. Attempting to settle that concern by meeting the evidential requirement leads to circularity: theological truths are to be accepted on divine authority, yet the truth that there is such an authority (historically mediated as the relevant tradition maintains) is amongst those very truths that are to be accepted on divine authority—indeed, it is the crucial one. As Descartes puts it in the Dedication to his Meditations , ‘It is of course quite true that we must believe in the existence of God because it is a doctrine of Holy Scripture, and conversely, that we must believe Holy Scripture because it comes from God. … But this argument cannot be put to unbelievers because they would judge it to be circular’ (Descartes 1641 [Cottingham et al. 1984, 3]). Thus, although they differ on the question whether the firm beliefs of faith count as knowledge, both Aquinas and Calvin understand faith as essentially involving accepting the truth of propositions as revealed through willingly receiving God’s gracious gift of that very revelation. The question remains how accepting this gift could be epistemically rational. The externalist account of how Christian beliefs may have epistemic worth proposed in Plantinga’s model of faith (named ‘the A/C’ model because its sources are supposedly found in Aquinas as well as Calvin) offers some help with the required explanation, but (as noted in the final paragraph of Section 4 above) may arguably not by itself be sufficient.

Revelation—and its philosophical critique

The reasonableness of belief that God exists is a focal issue in the Philosophy of Religion. Theist traditions typically, or some would say essentially, make a foundational claim about an authoritative source, or sources, of revealed truth. What is salient includes belief or some related sort of affirmation, not just that God exists but associated content such as that this God exists, the God who is revealed thus and so (in great historical acts, in prophets, in scriptures, in wisdom handed down, etc.). The reasonableness of theism is therefore as much a matter of the reasonableness of an epistemology of revelation as it is of a metaphysics of perfect being. The question of how God may be expected to make himself known has gained prominence through recent discussion of the argument for atheism from ‘divine hiddenness’ (Schellenberg 1993; Howard-Snyder and Moser 2002). That argument holds that a loving God would make his existence clear to the non-resistant—but this claim is open to question. Perhaps God provides only ‘secret’ evidence of his existence, purposely overturning the expectations of our ‘cognitive idolatry’ in order to transform our egocentric self-reliance (Moser 2008); besides, there may be significant constraints logically inherent in the very possibility of unambiguous divine revelation to finite minds (King 2008).

Similarly, accounts of theistic faith will be open to critique when they make assumptions about the mechanisms of revelation. In particular, the model of faith as assent to propositions as revealed holds that, since God’s grace is required for that assent, when grace is effective the whole ‘package deal’ of propositional revealed truth is accepted. This yields the notion of ‘ the Faith’, as the body of theological truths to be accepted by ‘the faithful’, and it becomes a sign of resistance to divine grace to ‘pick and choose’ only some truths, as heretics do (Greek: hairesis , choice; see Summa Theologiae 2a2ae 5, 3 (Aquinas [2006], 157–61)). For heresy to be judged, however, some human authority must assume it possesses the full doctrinal revelation, with God’s grace operating without resistance in its own case. Whether that assumption can ever be sufficiently well founded to justify condemning and purging others is an important question, whose neglect may be seriously harmful, as we are reminded by the fact that the phrase for ‘act of faith’ in Portuguese— auto-da-fé —came to mean the public burning of a heretic.

But the deeper assumption made by this model of faith as non-basic (justified) belief (as, too, by the model of it as basic knowledge yielded by the proper functioning of a special cognitive faculty) is that God’s self-revelation is primarily the revelation of the truth of propositions articulated in human language (compare Swinburne 1992). Alternative understandings of revelation are available, however. In particular, it may be held that it is primarily the divine itself that is revealed—the reality, not merely a representation of it. (See Lebens 2023 for discussion of faith as knowledge by acquaintance with God from a Jewish perspective). Propositional articulations of what is revealed may still be essential, but they need to be accepted as at a remove from the object of revelation itself, and therefore as limited. The development of propositional articulations expressing the nature and will of the self-revealing God—the doctrines of ‘the Faith’—will, of course, be understood as a process under providential grace. It is often assumed that that process can achieve ‘closure’ in a completed set of infallibly known creedal propositions. But this assumption about how divine inspiration operates may be contested, both on the theological grounds that it reflects the all-too-human desire to gain control over God’s self-revelation (to ‘pin God down once and for all’), and on the wider epistemological grounds that any attempt to grasp independent reality in human language will be in principle limited and fallible, subject to revision in the light of future experience.

Not all models of faith, however, identify it as primarily a matter of knowing or believing a proposition or a set of them, even with the addition of some affective or evaluative component. What is most central to theistic faith may seem better expressed as believing in God, rather than as believing that God exists. The Christian Nicene creed begins ‘Credo in unum Deum …’ and it is arguable that in this context ‘belief in’ is neither merely an idiomatic variant on, nor reducible to, ‘belief that’ (Price 1965). It may thus be held that theists’ acceptance of propositional truths as divinely revealed rests on believing in God—and it is this ‘believing in’, or ‘having faith in’, which is, fundamentally, the nature of faith. Noting that, while faith is held to be a virtue, believing as such is not, Wilfred Cantwell Smith argues that ‘faith is not belief’, ‘but something of a quite different order’ (Smith 1979, 128), requiring ‘assent’ ‘in the dynamic and personal sense of rallying to [what one takes to be the truth] with delight and engagement’ (142). Arguably, to put or to maintain faith in God involves a readiness to act, perhaps by relying on God in relevant ways and/or grounded in a practical commitment. Our considerations now shift, then, from propositional-attitude-focussed models of faith to those focussed on action, or what J. L. Schellenberg calls ‘operational’ models (2005, 126).

Judeo-Christian scripture envisions humans as actively engaged in a covenantal relationship with God. Their ongoing participation in, and commitment to, such a relationship paradigmatically involves both faith in God and faithfulness to God (McKaughan and Howard-Snyder 2022a and 2023a; Pace and McKaughan 2020). The kind of faith of which Christian faith is a paradigm case, then, may be understood as ‘action-centred commitment’ (McKaughan 2016, 78), e.g., to the Christian ‘way’. Arguably, faith understood as a combination of affective and cognitive elements would miss its essential active component. We now turn, then, to consider a fiducial model—a model of faith as trust, understood not simply as an affective state but as an action .

On a fiducial model, having faith in God is making a practical commitment —the kind involved in trusting God , or, trusting in God. (The root meaning of the Greek pistis , ‘faith’, is ‘trust’ (see Morgan 2015).) On such a model, faith’s active, practical component takes central place, though a cognitive component may be presupposed by it. Swinburne calls it the ‘Lutheran’ model, and defines it thus: ‘the person of faith does not merely believe that there is a God (and believe certain propositions about him)—he trusts Him and commits himself to Him’ (2005, 142). Yet, as noted earlier, Aquinas too takes the ultimate object of faith to be God, ‘the first reality’, and, furthermore, understands ‘formed’ faith as trusting commitment to God, motivated by, and directed towards, love of God as one’s true end (see Summa Theologiae 2a2ae, 4, 3; Aquinas [2006], 123–7). It is true that Aquinas allows that the devils have faith in a certain sense, but this ‘faith’ amounts only to their belief that what the Church teaches is the truth, arrived at not by grace but ‘forced from them’ reluctantly by ‘the acumen of their natural intelligence’ ( Summa Theologiae 2a2ae, 5, 2; Aquinas [2006], 155 & 157). Aquinas’s account of ‘saving’ faith is thus also a fiducial model.

The venture of trust

As noted at the outset, there is a usage of ‘faith’ for which ‘having/placing faith in’ is (near enough) synonymous with ‘trusting’ or ‘trusting in’. (For discussion of how faith relates to a range of contemporary theories of trust, see McKaughan and Howard-Snyder 2022b.) If, moreover, faith of the religious kind is itself a type of trust, then we may expect our understanding of religious faith to profit from an analysis of trust in general. It is therefore worth considering what follows about the nature of faith of the sort exemplified in theistic faith from holding it to be a kind of active trust.

Conceptually fundamental to trust is the notion of a person (or persons)—the truster—trusting in some agent or agency—the trustee— for some (assumedly) favourable outcome (though what the trustee is trusted for is often only implicit in the context). Trust involves a venture ; so too—it is widely agreed—does faith. So, if faith is trust, the venture of faith might be presumed to be the type of venture implicated in trust. A venture is an action that places the agent and outcomes of concern to the agent significantly beyond the agent’s own control. Trust implies venture. When we trust we commit ourselves to another’s control, accepting—and, when necessary, co-operating as ‘patient’—with the decisions of the trustee. Venturing in trust is usually assumed to be essentially risky, making oneself vulnerable to adverse outcomes or betrayal. Swinburne makes the point this way: ‘To trust someone is to act on the assumption that she will do for you what she knows that you want or need, when the evidence gives some reason for supposing that she may not and where there will be bad consequences if the assumption is false’ (2005, 143). Annette Baier makes no requirement for evidence that the trustee may prove untrustworthy, but nevertheless takes trust to involve ‘accepted vulnerability to another’s possible but not expected ill will (or lack of good will) toward one’ (Baier 1986, 235, our emphasis). Accordingly, it seems sensible to hold that one should trust only with good reason. But if, as is plausible, good reason to trust requires sufficient evidence of the trustee’s trustworthiness, reasonable trust appears both to have its venturesomeness diminished and, at the same time, to become more difficult to achieve than we normally suppose. For we often lack adequate—or even, any—evidence of a trustee’s trustworthiness in advance of our venture, yet in many such cases we suppose that our trust is reasonable (see, for example, Adams 1987). But, if adequate evidence of trustworthiness is not required for reasonable trust, how is reasonable trust different from ‘blind’ trust?

The answer seems clear: reasonable trust is practically rational trust. The question of when one may rationally trust another may thus be resolved by a decision-theoretic calculation, factoring in the extent to which one’s evidence supports the potential trustee’s trustworthiness and the utilities of the possible outcomes, given one’s intended aims. The exercise of practical reasoning does include mental acts which are epistemically evaluable, however. When one takes it to be true in practical reasoning that someone will prove trustworthy, that mental act may be more or less epistemically rational: it would break the evidentialist norm to employ in a decision-theoretic calculation a credence that does not match one’s available evidence. In many situations, it will be practically rational, given one’s intentions, to trust another person only if one believes, or, at least, believes with high probability, that the person will prove trustworthy. In such situations it is also often the case, as already noted, that we don’t have adequate evidence in advance that this person will be trustworthy in this particular respect. Yet, affording high credence to a person’s trustworthiness may still be epistemically rational given wider available evidence of, for example, the person’s past friendliness and trustworthiness in other matters, or, if the person is a stranger, of our shared social experience that trusting others generally elicits a trustworthy response. Nevertheless, it can still be rational— practically rational, that is—to trust another when we don’t have adequate evidence that they will prove trustworthy. In a life-threatening situation, for example, it may be rational to trust unlikely rescuers if they are the only ones available. Or, when we have wider aims, it may be practically rational to trust those without a record of trustworthiness, as with ‘educative’ and ‘therapeutic’ trust where people are trusted for the sake of their development or rehabilitation as trustworthy persons. Being in established relationships of friendship with others, too, can also require commitment to continue to trust them even in the face of evidence that, otherwise, would make it reasonable to believe them unworthy of trust.

On models that take faith of the theist kind to consist fundamentally in an act of trust, the analogy with interpersonal trust is suggestive. When one person trusts another there seems typically (though not uniformly) to be a doxastic aspect (the truster’s belief that the trustee is trustworthy). But what’s essential is the fiducial aspect, which consists in an active commitment or ‘entrusting’ to the other. Paul Helm proposes that theist faith similarly has importantly distinct doxastic and fiducial aspects: in addition to belief about God’s existence and trustworthiness for salvation held with a degree of strength proportional to the believer’s evidence, persons of faith must also entrust themselves to the one on whom they rely (Helm 2000). While it is widely agreed that theist faith must have a cognitive aspect, some philosophers hold that this need not be doxastic (as we shall see in Section 8).

There are significant differences, however, between the trusting involved in theistic faith and that involved in interpersonal trust. For one thing, trusting would seem not to risk any possibility of disappointment if God really is the trustee. Given the existence of the God of unchanging love, one trusts in ultimately perfect safety. But the venture of actually entrusting oneself to God seems to begin with the challenge of being able to believe or accept that, indeed, there is such a God. While some affirm that this claim is a matter of basic knowledge, and some that there is sufficient evidence to justify it, others, as already noted, hold that everyone has to confront the evidential ambiguity of foundational theistic claims. For those who reject the model of theist faith as basic knowledge and also think that the question of God’s existence cannot be settled intellectually on the basis of the available evidence, the venture involved in trusting in God (if such there be) may seem to include a doxastic venture: those who trust already venture beyond the available evidence, in their very believing or accepting that God exists and may be relied on for salvation. Trusting in God seems to presuppose, in other words, trusting that God exists. But, if so, the question becomes pressing whether, and under what conditions, one may be entitled to such an evidence-transcending venture in practical commitment to a particular view of ultimate reality and its implications for how we should live.

Theological non-realism

One way to relieve this pressure is to offer a non-realist analysis of theological claims. Trusting God will then not entail any commitment to reality’s being a certain way. Rather, on arguably the most sophisticated kind of non-realist view, theological beliefs arise because living ‘trustingly’ comes to be expressed and reinforced through a culturally constructed fiction about God and his great saving acts. This existential confidence may then be described, using the language of the fiction, as ‘trusting God’ (Cupitt 1980, Geering 1994). On such a non-realist account, the model of faith as trust brackets the cognitive component of faith, and risks becoming, in effect, a model of faith as purely a certain kind of affective state. But, in any case, non-realist models will be rejected by those who take faith to have a cognitive component that functions as a grasping—or would-be grasping—of how things really are.

Defending doxastic venture by analogy with interpersonal trust?

Assuming, then, that theist faith does include (under realist assumptions) a venture in practical commitment to truth-claims about ultimate reality, the justifiability of such a venture might yet be thought defensible by analogy with interpersonal situations where practical commitment seems justifiably to be made beyond one’s evidence to the claim that a person will prove trustworthy in some relevant respect. Reflecting on that proposal discloses further points of disanalogy, however. In cases of interpersonal trust, a venture is often needed in initially taking the trustee to be trustworthy, but evidence will inevitably later emerge which will either confirm or disconfirm the truth of that claim, and trust may, and rationally should, be withdrawn if the news is bad. But if—as we are here assuming—one ventures beyond evidential support in taking it to be true in practical reasoning that God exists and may be trusted for salvation, this may be a venture that is not confined to initial commitment but rather persists in needing to be made. This will be the case on accounts of the evidential ambiguity of theism that take the ambiguity to hold in principle, ruling out any possibility of evidential disambiguation. Those accounts may grant, of course, that continuing to journey in theistic faith may psychologically reinforce one’s commitment, providing subjective confirmation that the theist view of reality is correct. Yet these reinforcing experiences, which often involve faith renewed in the face of apparent failures of divine love, do not possess the uncontroversial status of evidence that independently and inter-subjectively confirms the initial venture.

Doxastic venture without doxastic voluntarism

Many dismiss the idea that one may venture in one’s very believing that God exists as committing a category error: ventures are voluntary, but propositional belief is not directly under voluntary control. Trusting God, however, entails practical commitment to the truth of theological faith-propositions , and commitment to the truth of a proposition in one’s practical reasoning may be under direct voluntary control.

It is one thing to be in the mental state of holding that the proposition that p is true; it is another to take it to be true that p in one’s practical reasoning (although these typically go together, since to hold that p is true is to be disposed to take it to be true that p in practical reasoning whenever the question whether p becomes salient). Practical commitment to a faith-proposition’s truth therefore could be a venture: there is no category error in allowing this possibility. Doxastic venturing—venturing in believing—is thus not a matter of willing oneself to believe without adequate evidential support; rather it is a matter of taking an already held belief to be true in one’s practical reasoning even though (as one may oneself recognise) its truth lacks such support.

The psychological possibility of doxastic venture

Some philosophers have argued, however, that one cannot (in full reflective awareness, anyway) believe that p while accepting that one has insufficient evidence for p ’s truth (Adler 2002). The counterclaim that this is possible is defended by William James, in his controversial 1896 lecture, ‘The Will to Believe’ (James 1896 [1956]). James agrees that belief cannot be directly willed and must be otherwise causally evoked (he later came to wish that he had used ‘The Right to Believe’ as his lecture’s title). James observes, however, that many beliefs have causes that do not constitute or imply an evidential grounding of their truth. James labels such causes ‘passional’—again, a potentially misleading term, since its intended referents include much more than emotional causes of belief. In particular, beliefs may be caused by ‘the circumpressure of one’s caste or set,’ of which one’s inherited religious tradition is a paradigm case (James 1896 [1956, 9]). James is thus able to explain the psychological possibility of doxastic venture: one already has a ‘passionally’ caused belief, which one then takes to be true in practical reasoning despite its lack of adequate evidential grounding (compare Creel 1994, who similarly describes ‘faith’ as a ‘non-evidential doxastic passion’).

Note that a doxastic venture model of theistic faith reconciles faith as gift with faith’s active components: taking a faith-proposition to be true in practical reasoning is a basic (mental) action (which leads on to further actions involved in trusting God and seeking to do God’s will); the gift provides the motivational resources for this basic action, namely a firm belief in the truth of the faith-proposition, despite its lack of adequate evidential support. (In the next section, the possibility is considered that the gift of these motivational resources might be effective yet not amount to actual belief.) It is also worth noting that those who find the focus on the individual something of a deficiency in analytical accounts of faith (Eklund 2015) may perceive in James’ account some acknowledgment of the social aspect of faith. Arguably, the standard ‘passional’ or ‘non-evidential’ cause of religious belief is cultural immersion within an historical faith-tradition. The motivational resources for faith-commitment may thus be an essentially social possession.

Examples of doxastic venture models

On the doxastic venture model, faith involves full practical commitment to a faith-proposition’s truth, despite the recognition that this is not ‘objectively’ justified on the evidence. Kierkegaard’s definition of faith as ‘an objective uncertainty held fast in an appropriation process of the most passionate inwardness’ in Concluding Unscientific Postscript (Kierkegaard 1846 [1968, 180]) is an example of a doxastic venture model. So too is Paul Tillich’s account of faith as ‘the state of being ultimately concerned’, since the claim of the object of one’s ultimate concern to ‘promise total fulfilment even if all other claims have to be subjected to it or rejected in its name’ cannot in principle be established on the basis of the evidence (Tillich 1957 [2001, 1 and 21]).

Aquinas’s model of faith, though widely thought of as conforming to an evidential requirement on belief, may arguably be open to interpretation as a doxastic venture model. As noted in Section 5, Aquinas holds that the available evidence, though it supports the truth of foundational faith-propositions, does not provide what Aquinas counts as sufficient (i.e., demonstrative) support to justify inner assent (in addition to references to the Summa Theologiae given previously, see 2a2ae. 2, 1 (Aquinas [2006], 63); and compare also Penelhum 1989, 120). Now, whether practical commitment to the truth of a given faith-proposition does or does not venture beyond adequate evidential support will be relative to assumptions about (a) where the level of evidential support required for ‘adequacy’ should be set, and (b) just how firm and decisive propositional faith-commitment needs to be. On some such assumptions, for example those made by Bayesians, the support provided by the evidence Aquinas adduces—or, by a suitable contemporary upgrading of that evidence such as that provided in the works of Richard Swinburne—may be considered enough to make reasonable a sufficiently high degree of belief (or credence) in the truth of theistic faith-propositions so that believers need not venture beyond the support of their evidence. Interpreting Aquinas’s model of faith as conforming to evidentialism may thus be viable. Nevertheless, Aquinas’s own assumptions on these matters may leave him closer to Kierkegaard and Tillich than is commonly thought (consider Summa Theologiae 2a2ae 4, 1 and, once again, 2a2ae 6, 1 (Aquinas [2006], 117–9 & 167)).

The special role of faith-propositions

Bayesians might argue that there is no occasion for faith as doxastic venture since, once practical commitment to the truth of propositions is recognised as a matter of degree, whatever the state of the available evidence relating to a given proposition, there will always (given initial credences) be a rational credence properly associated with that evidence, and hence there are no possible circumstances where ‘the evidence does not decide’, so that an evidentialist requirement can indeed apply universally. Note, however, Lara Buchak’s (2012, 2018) discussion of ways in which Bayesians might understand faith as going beyond the evidence, and her own proposal that faith-ventures essentially include an additional practical commitment, which may be rational under certain conditions, not to inquire further into evidence relevant to the truth of the propositions concerned for the sole purpose of deciding what to do. (For critical discussion of this kind of restriction on inquiry in connection with faith commitments, see Dormandy 2018 and Howard-Snyder and McKaughan 2022a. Katherine Dormandy has recently proposed a positive defence of evidentialism in considering the question of what makes it good to form positive beliefs about those you have faith in, including God (Dormandy 2022).)

If the domain of faith is, as Stephen Evans puts it, ‘the assumptions, convictions and attitudes which the believer brings to the evidence for and against religious truth’ (Evans 1985, 178), and faith’s cognitive component offers a ‘total interpretation’ of the world of our experience (Hick 1966, 154), then (foundational) faith-propositions function as ‘highest-order framing principles’ which necessarily cannot have their truth settled by appeal to the force of a body of independent evidence (Bishop 2007a, 139–44). Taking such a faith-proposition to be true, then, is not something that comes in degrees: either one ‘buys into’ the overall worldview (foundational) faith-propositions propose, or one does not. Such a choice is existentially important, and settling it raises anxiety about exercising a responsibility that cannot—without ‘bad faith’—be transferred onto the relatively impersonal function of one’s reason, since a venture beyond any inter-subjectively rational evidential confirmation is required. The doxastic venture model may thus be regarded as capturing the spiritual challenge of faith more satisfactorily than do models that conform to evidentialism. This is because, on the doxastic venture model, faith involves a deeper surrender of self-reliant control, not only in trusting God, but in accepting at the level of practical commitment that there is a God—indeed, this God—who is to be trusted.

Doxastic venture models of faith and epistemic concern

Doxastic venture in relation to faith-propositions can be justifiable, of course, only if there are legitimate exceptions to the evidentialist requirement to take a proposition to be true just to the extent of its evidential support—and only if the legitimate exceptions include the kind of case involved in religious, theistic, faith-commitment.

A possible view of theistic faith-commitment is that it is wholly independent of the epistemic concern that cares about evidential support. On this view, faith reveals its authenticity most clearly when it takes faith-propositions to be true contrary to the weight of the evidence. This view is widely described as ‘fideist’, but ought more fairly to be called arational fideism, or, where commitment contrary to the evidence is positively favoured, irrational or counter-rational fideism. Despite its popular attribution both to the church father Tertullian and to ‘the father of existentialism’, Kierkegaard, counter-rational fideism does not seem to have been espoused by any significant theist philosophers (passages in Tertullian and Kierkegaard that appear to endorse this position may be interpreted as emphasizing that Christian faith requires accepting, not logical contradiction, but ‘contradiction’ of our ‘natural’ expectations, wholly overturned in the revelation that the power of divine love is triumphant in the Crucified One).

Serious philosophical defence of a doxastic venture model of faith thus implies a moderate version of fideism, for which epistemic concern is not overridden and for which, therefore, it is a constraint on faith-commitment that it not accept what is known, or justifiably believed on the evidence, to be false. Rather, faith commits itself only beyond , and not against, the evidence—and it does so out of epistemic concern to grasp truth on matters of vital existential importance. The thought that one may be entitled to commit to an existentially momentous truth-claim in principle undecidable on the evidence when forced to decide either to do so or not is what motivates William James’s ‘justification of faith’ in ‘The Will to Believe’ (James 1896 [1956]). If such faith is to be justified, its cognitive content will (on realist assumptions) have to cohere with our best evidence-based theories about the real world. Faith may extend our scientific grasp of the real, but may not counter it. Whether the desire to grasp more truth about the real than science can supply is a noble aspiration or a dangerous delusion is at the heart of the debate about entitlement to faith on this moderate fideist doxastic venture model.

A discussion of the debate between the moderate, Jamesian, fideist and the evidentialist is beyond this entry’s scope. Still, it is worth remarking that those who think that faith understood as doxastic venture may be justified as reasonable face the challenge of providing the tools for weeding out intuitively unreasonable forms of faith. On the other side, those evidentialists who reject doxastic venture as always impermissible have to consider whether taking a stance on the nature of reality beyond anything science can even in principle confirm may not, in the end, be unavoidable, and potentially implicated in the commitments required for science itself (see Bishop 2007a, Chapters 8 and 9; Bishop 2023). For a useful recent collection of articles on the wider theme of the relation of religious faith to intellectual virtue, see Callahan and O’Connor 2014.

Some accounts allow that faith centrally involves practical commitment venturing beyond evidential support, yet do not require (or, even, permit) that the venturer actually believes the faith-proposition assumed to be true. Such accounts may be described as proposing a ‘non-doxastic’ venture model of faith. F. R. Tennant holds a view of this kind: he takes faith to be the adoption of a line of conduct not warranted by present facts, that involves experimenting with the possible or ideal, venturing into the unknown and taking the risk of disappointment and defeat. Faith is not an attempt to will something into existence but rather treating hoped for and unseen things as if they were real and then acting accordingly (Tennant 1943 [1989, 104]). Swinburne refers to this as the ‘pragmatist’ model of faith (Swinburne 2005, 147–8; Swinburne 2001, 211; compare also Golding 1990, 2003 and McKaughan 2016). The origins of Swinburne’s pragmatist model are to be found in a much earlier paper, Swinburne 1969.

William Alston (1996) suggests that faith may involve an active ‘acceptance’ rather than purely receptive belief. A clearly non-doxastic venture model results if acceptance is understood on Jonathan Cohen’s account under which to accept that p is ‘to have or adopt a policy of deeming, positing, or postulating that p —i.e. of including that proposition … among one’s premisses for deciding what to do or think in a particular context, whether or not one feels it to be true that p ’ (Cohen 1992, 4, our emphasis). The firmness of faith-commitment is then just the firmness of one’s ‘ resolve to use [faith-claims] as a basis for one’s thought, attitude and behaviour’ (Alston 1996, 17): there is no firm assurance of their truth . Decisive commitment in the absence of such assurance may nevertheless be possible, motivated (as Swinburne suggested in the first edition of his Faith and Reason ) by the evaluative belief that ‘unless [faith-propositions are true], that which is most worthwhile is not to be had’ (Swinburne, 1981, 117). A faith venture that lacks belief in the faith-proposition to which commitment is made need not, and probably could not, lack cognitive components altogether, as this suggestion of Swinburne’s indicates.

Andrei Buckareff (2005) and J. L. Schellenberg (2005, 138–9) propose non-doxastic (or, ‘sub-doxastic’) venture models of propositional faith, with Schellenberg emphasising the positive evaluation that persons of faith make of the truth-claim to which they commit themselves. In response to Daniel Howard-Snyder (2013a) Schellenberg allows that faith may in some instances involve belief while still maintaining that ‘non-doxastic religious faith … will turn out to be a particularly important way of having religious faith as we head into the future’ (2013, 262). Bishop (2005), in response to Buckareff, also agrees that authentic faith need not always be a specifically doxastic venture. There may, then, be an emerging consensus amongst proponents of venture models that faith, at its core, consists in suitably motivated persistent practical commitment ‘beyond the evidence’ to the positively evaluated truth of foundational faith-claims which may, but need not, actually be believed to be true.

Robert Audi (2011) has also defended a non-doxastic account of faith, contrasting ‘fiducial faith’ and ‘doxastic faith’, and arguing that authentic religious faith need only amount to the former. Audi’s account is not strictly a ‘venture’ model, however, since he does not take commitment beyond the support of adequate evidence to be essential. Audi’s account suggests that religious faith is sui generis , but capable of being understood through its relations with other psychological states and actions, such as beliefs, evaluations and practical commitments. Rational assessment of religious faith, Audi thinks, must avoid treating it as implying belief, while recognising that greater confidence attaches to it than to religious hope. For another version of a non-doxastic account of faith, as a person’s ‘affective orientation or stance’, see Jonathan Kvanvig (2013, 2018). The question whether faith entails belief (even if it may not consist purely in beliefs) remains a lively focus of debate. For defence of the view that faith entails belief, see Malcolm and Scott 2016 and Mugg 2021; for criticism see Howard-Snyder 2019.

Some philosophers have suggested that the epistemological challenges faced by accounts of faith as involving belief beyond the evidence may be avoided by construing theist commitment as hope. Theist hope seems not to be mere tenacity (‘clinging to one’s hopes’) (Taylor 1961), but a more complex attitude. James Muyskens suggests, for example, that one who hopes ‘keep[s] his life open or fluid with respect to [a faith-proposition] p —where (a) neither p nor not- p is certain for him, (b) he wants p and (c) he sees p as constructively connected with his own well-being and/or concept of himself as a person’ (1979, 35). Muyskens contrasts hope with faith (understood as belief), arguing that a religion of hope is both epistemically and religiously superior to a religion of faith. But faith is not generally understood as competing with hope (Creel 1993), and some philosophers identify faith with hoping that the claims of faith are true (Pojman 1986; 2003). Hope as such is an attitude rather than an active commitment, and, as Audi observes, it contrasts with the attitude of faith at least in this respect, namely, that surprise makes little sense as a response to discovering that the object of one’s faith is indeed the case, whereas there need be nothing inappropriate in surprise at the fulfilment of one’s hopes (see Audi 2011, 74).

A more adequate model of faith as hope, then, may rather take faith to be acting in, or from, hope. Such a model then comes close to a non-doxastic venture model of faith, differing only in so far as acting from hope that God exists differs from taking this claim to be true (albeit without belief) in one’s practical reasoning, but this difference may be undetectable at the level of behavioral outcomes (see McKaughan 2013). A model of faith as acting in hope shares with the doxastic and non-doxastic venture models in rejecting the view that faith requires cognitive certainty. But one can act in hope with firmness and resilience, given a strong affective/evaluative stance, even if one lacks belief that one’s hopes will be fulfilled. Hoping that p , however, does not involve taking a stand on its being true that p , which is widely thought to be essential to faith.

The ‘venture’ models of faith (with or without belief) and the model of faith as a venture in hope all fit the view that faith is consistent with doubt, and, indeed, impossible without doubt of some kind, though they allow that persons who have faith may give firm and sustained commitment to the truth of faith-propositions in practice (for discussion of different kinds of doubt and their compatibility or incompatibility with faith and belief see Howard-Snyder 2013b, 359). The ‘certainty’ of faith on these models is more a matter of the certainty that persons of faith find themselves conferring on the foundational claims of their faith, rather than a matter of discovering in themselves a certain knowledge or intellectual conviction of the truth of these claims. It is possible, then, on these accounts of faith, to be a committed person of faith and also an ‘agnostic’ in Thomas Huxley’s original sense of someone who does not claim as knowledge the commitments he or she nevertheless makes as a foundational practical orientation to reality. (For discussion of the compatibility of Muslim faith and doubt, see Aijaz 2023.)

Faith is traditionally regarded as one of the ‘theological’ virtues. If a virtue is a ‘disposition of character which instantiates or promotes responsiveness to one or more basic goods’, then theistic faith qualifies since it is ‘a responsiveness to practical hope and truth’, provided theistic faith-claims are indeed true (Chappell 1996, 27). Faith will not, however, be a virtue as such , if it is accepted that faith can be misplaced or, even, ‘demonic’, directed upon a ‘false ultimate’ (Tillich 1957 [2001, 21]). To be virtuous, faith must be faith in a worthy object: it is faith in God that is the theological virtue. More generally, faith is virtuous only when it is faith to which one is entitled. An account of the conditions under which faith is permissible is thus the key to an ethics of faith.

On models of faith as a (special) kind of knowledge, or as firmly held belief, it may seem puzzling how faith could be a virtue—unless some implicit practical component emerges when such models are further explicated, or, alternatively, a case may be made for the claim that what is involuntary may nevertheless be praiseworthy, with theist faith as a case in point (Adams 1987). (For discussion of how faith might be voluntary, even if faith entails belief, or indeed is a type of belief, and belief is not under our direct voluntary control, see Rettler 2018.) Furthermore, as already suggested (Sections 4 & 5 above), models of faith as knowledge or belief fail to provide non-circular conditions sufficient for entitlement, unless the truth of faith-propositions is established by independent argument and evidence. If faith is understood as, or as essentially including, beliefs held on insufficient evidence, it is also hard to understand why Abrahamic religious traditions have valued it so highly, let alone why God might be thought to make salvation contingent on such belief (Kvanvig 2018, 106; McKaughan and Howard-Snyder 2021).

Fiducial models of faith seem more attuned to exhibiting faith as a virtue, though a defence of the trustworthiness of the one who is trusted for salvation may be required. Doxastic and non-doxastic venture models of faith can vindicate faith as a virtue, provided they provide robust entitlement conditions, to ensure that not just any ‘leap of faith’ is permissible. The Jamesian account already mentioned (Section 7) aims to meet this need. James’s own view of what suffices to justify a faith-venture arguably needs an ethical supplement: both the non-evidential motivation for the venture and its content must be morally acceptable (Bishop 2007a, 163–6).

If faith of the religious kind is to count as valuable and/or virtuous, it seems there must be a suitable degree of resilience in the commitment made (see Howard-Snyder and McKaughan 2022b for arguments that faith requires resilience; for discussion of the value and potential virtuousness or viciousness of resilient faith see McKaughan and Howard-Snyder 2023a; on the rationality of resilient faith see Buchak 2017, Jackson 2021, and McKaughan 2016). Persons of religious faith and faithfulness both put their faith in and are faith ful to the object of their commitment, though the salient kind of faithfulness may be a matter of the continual renewal of faith rather than of maintaining it unchanged (Pace and McKaughan 2020). (See Audi 2014 for a discussion of faith and faithfulness in relation to virtue. Audi defends faithfulness as, like courage, an ‘adjunctive’ virtue, and argues that being ‘a person of faith’ counts as a ‘virtue of personality’.)

Faith is only one of the Christian theological virtues, of course, the others being hope and charity (or love, agapē ): St. Paul famously affirms that the greatest of these is love (I Cor. 13:13). The question thus arises how these three virtues are related. One suggestion is that faith is taking it to be true that there are grounds for the hope that love is supreme—not simply in the sense that love constitutes the ideal of the supreme good, but in the sense that living in accordance with this ideal constitutes an ultimate salvation, fulfilment or consummation that is, in reality, victorious over all that may undermine it (in a word, over evil). The supremacy of love is linked to the supremacy of the divine itself, since love is the essential nature of the divine. What is hoped for, and what faith assures us is properly hoped for, is a sharing in the divine itself, loving as God loves (see Brian Davies on Aquinas, 2002). On this understanding, reducing faith to a kind of hope (Section 9 above) would eradicate an important relation between the two—namely that people of faith take reality to be such that their hope (for salvation, the triumph of the good) is well founded, and not merely an attractive fantasy or inspiring ideal. (See Jeffrey 2017 for discussion of the moral permissibility of faith, particularly in connection with hope.)

What is the potential scope of faith? On some models, the kind of faith exemplified by theistic faith is found only there. On models which take faith to consist in knowledge or belief, faith is intrinsically linked to theological content—indeed, in the case of Christian faith, to orthodox Christian theological content, specifiable as one unified set of doctrines conveyed to receptive human minds by the operation of divine grace. The venture models, however, allow for the possibility that authentic faith may be variously realised, and be directed upon different, and mutually incompatible, intentional objects. This pluralism is an important feature of accounts of faith in the American pragmatist tradition. John Dewey strongly rejected the notion of faith as a special kind of knowledge (Dewey 1934, 20), as did William James, whose ‘justification of faith’ rests on a permissibility thesis, under which varied and conflicting faith-commitments may equally have a place in the ‘intellectual republic’ (James 1896 [1956, 30]). Charles S. Peirce, another influential American pragmatist, arguably held a non-doxastic view of faith (Pope 2018).

Both Dewey and James defend models of faith with a view to advancing the idea that authentic religious faith may be found outside what is generally supposed to be theological orthodoxy. Furthermore, they suggest that ‘un-orthodox’ faith may be more authentic than ‘orthodox’ faith. ‘The faith that is religious’, says Dewey, ‘[I should describe as] the unification of the self through allegiance to inclusive ideal ends, which imagination presents to us and to which the human will responds as worthy of controlling our desires and choices’ (1934, 33). And James: ‘Religion says essentially two things: First, she says that the best things are the more eternal things, the overlapping things, the things in the universe that throw the last stone, so to speak, and say the final word. ... [and] the second affirmation of religion is that we are better off now if we believe her first affirmation to be true’ (James 1896 [1956, 25–6]). While some of what Dewey and James say about justifiable faith may appear non-realist, in fact they both preserve the idea that religious faith aspires to grasp, beyond the evidence, vital truth about reality. For example, Dewey holds that religious belief grounds hope because it takes something to be true about the real world ‘which carr[ies] one through periods of darkness and despair to such an extent that they lose their usual depressive character’ (1934, 14–5).

A general—i.e., non-theologically specific—account of the religious kind of faith may have potential as a tool for criticising specific philosophical formulations of the content of religious faith. The conditions for permissible faith-venture may exclude faith in God under certain inadequate conceptions of who or what God is. Arguably, the ‘personal omniGod’ of much contemporary philosophy of religion is just such an inadequate conception (Bishop 2007b). An understanding of what faith is, then, may motivate radical explorations into the concept of God as held in the theistic traditions (Bishop 1998; Johnston 2009; Bishop and Perszyk 2014, 2023).

Can there be faith of the same general kind as found in theistic religious faith yet without adherence to any theistic tradition? Those who agree with F. R. Tennant that ‘faith is an outcome of the inborn propensity to self-conservation and self-betterment which is a part of human nature, and is no more a miraculously superadded endowment than is sensation or understanding’ (1943 [1989, 111]) will consider that this must be a possibility. Tennant himself suggests that ‘much of the belief which underlies knowledge’—and he has scientific knowledge in mind—‘is the outcome of faith which ventures beyond the apprehension and treatment of data to supposition, imagination and creation of ideal objects, and justifies its audacity and irrationality (in accounting them to be also real) by practical actualization’ (1943 [1989, 100]). Faith in this sense, however, may not seem quite on a par with faith of the religious kind. True, scientists must act as if their ‘ideal objects’ are real in putting their theories to the empirical test; but they will ‘account them to be also real’ only when these tests do provide confirmation in accordance with the applicable inter-subjective norms.

If faith is understood as commitment beyond independent inter-subjective evidential support to the truth of some overall interpretation of experience and reality, then all who commit themselves (with sufficient steadfastness) to such a Weltanschauung or worldview will be people of faith. Faith of this kind may be religious, and it may be religious without being theistic, of course, as in classical Buddhism or Taoism. Some have argued that faith is a human universal: Cantwell Smith, for example, describes it as ‘a planetary human characteristic [involving the] capacity to perceive, to symbolize, and live loyally and richly in terms of, a transcendent dimension to [human] life’ (1979, 140–141). There may also, arguably, be non-religious faith: for example, ‘scientific atheists’ or ‘naturalists’ may be making a faith-venture when they take there to be no more to reality than is in principle discoverable by the natural sciences. The suggestion that atheism rests on a faith-venture will, however, be resisted by those who maintain ‘the presumption of atheism’ (Flew, 1976): if atheism is rationally the default position, then adopting it requires no venture.

An atheist’s faith-venture may, in any case, seem oddly so described on the grounds that it provides no basis for practical hope or trust. Providing such a basis may plausibly be thought necessary for faith—the truth to which the venturer commits must be existentially important in this way. (Note James’s requirement that faith-commitment is permissible only for resolving a ‘genuine option’, where a genuine option has inter alia to be ‘momentous’, that is, existentially significant and pressing (James 1896 [1956, 3–4]).) Truth-claims accepted by faith of the religious kind seem essentially to be ‘saving’ truths—solutions to deep problems about the human situation. And there may thus be arguments as to which religious tradition offers the best solutions to human problems (see, for example, Yandell 1990, 1999). J. L. Schellenberg (2009) argues that the only kind of religious faith that could be justified (if any is) is a sceptical ‘ultimism’, in which one ‘assents’ to and treats as real an imaginatively grasped conception of a metaphysically, axiologically and soteriologically ultimate reality.

Some may nevertheless argue that an existentially vital faith that grounds hope can belong within a wholly secular context—that is, without counting in any recognisable sense as ‘religious’. Cantwell Smith claims, for example, that ‘the Graeco-Roman heritage … and its fecundating role in Western life [can] be seen as one of the major spiritual traditions of our world’ (1979, 139). Annette Baier suggests that ‘the secular equivalent of faith in God, which we need in morality as well as in science or knowledge acquisition, is faith in the human community and its evolving procedures – in the prospects for many-handed cognitive ambitions and moral hopes’ (Baier 1980, 133). More broadly, some maintain that a meaningful spirituality is consistent with a non-religious atheist naturalism, and include something akin to faith as essential to spirituality. For example, Robert Solomon takes spirituality to mean ‘the grand and thoughtful passions of life’, and holds that ‘a life lived in accordance with those passions’ entails choosing to see the world as ‘benign and life [as] meaningful’, with the tragic not to be denied but accepted (Solomon 2002, 6 & 51). (For further discussion of faith in secular contexts, see Preston-Roedder 2018, Tsai 2017, and Ichikawa 2020; for special journal issues addressing a variety of issues in the philosophy of faith in both religious and secular contexts, see Rice et al. 2017; Malcolm 2023; McKaughan and Howard-Snyder 2023b.)

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• Jackson, E., “ Faith: Contemporary Perspectives ” and Swindal, J., “ Faith: Historical Perspectives ”, The Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy .
• Pope, H., 1909, “ Faith ”, in The Catholic Encyclopedia , New York: Robert Appleton Company.

Aquinas, Thomas | belief | Christian theology, philosophy and | fideism | James, William | Kierkegaard, Søren | pragmatic arguments and belief in God | religion: and science | religion: epistemology of | religion: philosophy of | trust

Acknowledgments

The authors thank Sophie Milne and Selwyn Fraser for research assistance on this entry, and Imran Aijaz, Robert Audi, Thomas Harvey, Daniel Howard-Snyder, Katherine Munn Dormandy, Glen Pettigrove and John Schellenberg for helpful comments on drafts.

Copyright © 2023 by John Bishop < jc . bishop @ auckland . ac . nz > Daniel J. McKaughan < daniel . mckaughan @ bc . edu >

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Why Faith Is Important

Faith speaks the language of the heart..

Posted September 28, 2012 | Reviewed by Ekua Hagan

Faith is an expression of hope for something better. More than a wish, it is closer to a belief, but not quite. A belief is rooted in the mind. Faith is based in the heart.

We act in faith when there is no guarantee, no certainty. No one knows what kind of life an infant will have, yet people continue to have children. No one can know how life with our mates will turn out, yet we continue to have faith our relationships will last a lifetime.

Faith speaks the language of the heart. It is an expression of hope that goes beyond the conscious mind.

All that we hold precious rests upon a faith in people, their potential not yet fulfilled. The evidence of history points us in a different direction—the world is full of ugliness, brutality, and injustices. Yet there is also tenderness, kindness, and concern and that takes the bigger part of our hearts.

Without faith in ourselves, we would hold ourselves cheap, and without faith in others, we could never live as free people. This is the water that quenches parched souls.

Here is a famous parable: Once a traveler came across an old woman who was stooped over what appeared to be thin sticks. He asked the woman what she was doing.

“I am planting orange trees,” she explained.

The traveler thought this was a waste of her time.

“Why do you bother?” he asked. “You are an old woman. These saplings will take years before they will be old enough to bear fruit. You will be long gone by then.”

“True enough,” she answered. “But I don’t plant these trees for myself but for those who will come after me, just as those before me planted the trees that bear the fruit that I eat today.”

Arthur Dobrin, DSW, is Professor Emeritus of University Studies, Hofstra University and Leader Emeritus, Ethical Humanist Society of Long Island. He is the author of more than 25 books, including The Lost Art of Happiness and Teaching Right from Wrong .

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Believing by Faith: An Essay in the Epistemology and Ethics of Religious Belief

John Bishop, Believing by Faith: An Essay in the Epistemology and Ethics of Religious Belief , Oxford University Press, 2007, 250pp., $65.00 (hbk), ISBN 9780199205547. Reviewed by:

Reviewed by Phillip H. Wiebe, Trinity Western University

Bishop revives the idea advanced by William James more than a century ago of following one's passions in religion when intellectual issues cannot be decided. Bishop offers a sophisticated statement of the conditions necessary for a responsible act of "taking as true" some claim for which evidence is incomplete or ambiguous, and in the course of so doing not only engages some recent interpretations of faith in James's famous "The Will to Believe," but also clarifies recent advocacy of the view that belief in the existence of God can be properly basic. He describes the book as arising out of an attempt to examine alternative concepts of God to the classical one in which God is considered to be the "supernatural, omnipotent, omniscience, omnibenevolent Creator ex nihilo " -- the omniGod" (p. ix). Although he keeps classical theism in view, Bishop attempts to set out conditions for embracing virtually any theistic stance. His frequent reference to evangelical Christian faith, which requires putting faith in God as revealed in Jesus the Christ, suggests that he expects this version of theism to be familiar to his readers. Evangelical Christianity arouses strong passions -- for and against -- and it is often presented by adherents as something one might "believe by faith," so it serves Bishop's objectives. I will return to this topic.

One of the merits of Bishop's work is his drawing attention to the felt difference in human experience between such broadly cognitive-affective states as taking a claim to be true in practical reasoning, and other related states of mind such as believing a claim, trusting it, and accepting it (35-41). His discussion of the limited circumstances under which we can generate beliefs lends credence to the view that a central concept in understanding religious commitments is holding claims as true, rather than believing them. Bishop's phenomenological analysis of human acts belonging to religion adds to the knowledge of ourselves as unique, natural agents. Bishop is not the first to draw attention to important distinctions embedded in facile uses of such terms as 'faith' and 'believe', but his remarks strike me as especially insightful. The title of the book might lead one to expect an articulation of religion using these overused terms, but he does so without them. "Believing by faith" is not an effort expended in order to "make oneself believe" some claim for which the evidence is inconclusive, but consists of taking a claim to be true for practical purposes. This is the fideism that Bishop defends for those he describes as "reflective believers," that is, people who are interested in justifying their religious acts.

A distinctive feature of Bishop's work is his argument that the act of taking some claim to be true for practical purposes requires more than an appeal to epistemic principles in order to be adequately assessed, for taking something to be true is an act , and as such is subject to moral evaluation. Bishop thus injects the significance of morality into the assessment of "believing by faith," and rejects the supposed superiority of "hard-line evidentialism" which asserts that when evidence is indecisive we should not act. Hard-line evidentialists think that yielding to our passions where evidence is indecisive, especially when religion is involved, is profoundly irrational, but Bishop argues that we might come to particular insights concerning religion (and other matters, such as interpersonal relationships) only by yielding to our passions (191). He observes that St Augustine maintained that we can understand certain matters only if we proceed in the opening of ourselves (224). Bishop notes that evidentialists and fideists at least agree on one point: that following one's passions where evidence is inconclusive is epistemically responsible only if such fideism can lead us to otherwise unobtainable and valuable truths; however, they disagree over whether fideism is capable of finding such truths (195). This is a disagreement that only empirical evidence can settle. Questions about such ultimacies as final truths and epistemic procedures are in evidence everywhere in Bishop's extended argument, and they bring to the surface the problems in justifying justificatory strategies themselves. He grants that yielding to passional interests involves some epistemic principles, such as ensuring that such interests are not only consistent with themselves, but also compatible with factual beliefs and open to being altered (208f); however, fideism cannot be defended on epistemic principles alone. Bishop construes Reformed epistemology as a form of fideism in denial, and suggests that it cannot really provide a justification for theism, in particular, Christian theism, for it favors this theism only if Christian beliefs are true (196-7), which is deemed to be beyond the reach of evidence.

Bishop's attempt to shift the ground over religion from epistemology to ethics yields uncertain results. He is correct in observing that a decision to act upon some theistic hypothesis is subject to moral evaluation, but the same can be said for choosing to use a fallacious argument to advance a position, or for recommending an art object for purchase in spite of its being inferior. In each of these cases some non-moral evaluative category historically belonging to philosophy -- here, logic and aesthetics, respectively -- is operative, and is arguably more important than the acts involved, admittedly subject to moral evaluation. If someone uses a fallacious argument to defend a position, for instance, the fact that the argument is fallacious is at least of as much interest as is the fact that someone has chosen this dubious method of arguing. If the person knowingly uses a fallacious argument in an effort to deceive a naïve person, we will think poorly of the arguer, but the central point is that a fallacious argument has been used, not that someone knowingly used it. I am not suggesting that moral considerations are insignificant in comparison with logical, aesthetic, or epistemological ones, but simply that the latter might be of at least as much importance as the moral one. Inasmuch as some complex event can trigger evaluative responses from numerous domains that philosophy has made its subject-matter, some over-arching scheme is required that considers every relevant evaluative perspective and (tentatively) ranks them. The following kinds of evaluations immediately come to mind: logical, aesthetic, epistemological, moral, metaphysical, legal, self-interested, concerning intrinsic value, concerning etiquette, and religious. Each of these has its own "ought," each its rules and justificatory procedures, each its unique ways of feeling, and so on. Philosophy does not appear to me to have addressed this extraordinarily demanding desideratum, but Bishop's argument requires something of the sort.

The fideist that Bishop has in mind is a very agreeable, tolerant, and reflective person who is drawn to some theistic hypothesis, and even though relevant evidence is ambiguous, she thinks that she might miss something in life -- some truth -- by not following it. This fideist is actually self-interested, which Bishop's remarks about the values of self-acceptance and authenticity corroborate (216f). Perhaps this is no great matter, since self-interested perspectives often coincide with moral ones. Imagine a fideist who is finicky about his body, however, who is also drawn (maybe as a result) to a form of theism that considers such medical procedures as blood transfusions and organ donations to be violations of divine law. Embracing this faith would in fact fulfill his passional interests and make his life more authentic. But now imagine this authentic theist baulking at being an organ donor for his dying daughter. The conflict between self-interest and morality is obvious. Bishop presents the justificatory grounds for preferring fideism over hard-line evidentialism as moral ones, but they strike me as being significantly colored by self-interest.

Bishop consistently supposes that the indecisive evidence concerning theistic claims is the total evidence . The question of what counts as evidence for hypotheses, and the related question of the weight of such evidence, are unsolved problems in philosophy, in spite of extensive debate in the latter half of the 20th century, largely precipitated by the work of Carl Hempel, Rudolf Carnap, and Karl Popper. Hempel argued that common intuitions about evidence were mistaken, such as the common belief that finding a white shoe was irrelevant to the claim that all ravens are black. The work of all these theorists is controversial in one way or another. Bishop's supposition about total evidence -- which many other philosophers also make -- involves a capacity for knowledge that approaches omniscience, since knowledge is presupposed of fine distinctions between irrelevant evidence reports and various shades of confirming or undermining evidence; moreover, this knowledge of evidence covers all events in the universe's entire history. Assessing the plausibility of theism, whose many forms will include some in which an omniscient being is advanced, on the assumption of virtual omniscience is ostensibly to stack the deck. Bishop's reference to total evidence brings a paralyzing uncertainty into the discussion; I suggest that we would do better to try to handle the evidence we (think we) have, however meager or plentiful, than to speculate on the basis of "total evidence."

We might wonder what kind of truth a fideist might discover that would lead her to conclude that her fideism either contributed to, or at least preceded, its discovery. If the "truth" that is found is of a kind that features only "subjective" characteristics that change only her convictions, this "truth" will compare unfavorably with that deriving from our interaction with the intersubjectively observable world, and is liable to be rejected as truth. On the other hand, if the truth that the fideist uncovers is of an objective nature, the claim that the total evidence for theism is indecisive appears mistaken. Is some profound discovery about the structure of the universe waiting to be uncovered that will convince all present-day skeptics and all "half-believers?" One possible source of additional evidence for theism is religious experience, to which William James's contribution, The Varieties of Religious Experience , is even more famous than his essay on faith. Bishop acknowledges that "putative post-mortem existence," might tip the balance in favor of fideism, thereby indicating his interest in religious experience as evidence.

Some time ago I undertook research on contemporary visions or apparitions of Jesus, the results of which suggest some evidence for a link between Bishop's "taking some claim as true" and events that seemingly arise from, or at least follow, this act. My study described the experiences of twenty-eight living people using eighteen phenomenological variables and other demographic ones. As one might expect, many of these percipients had experiences to which no others were privy. Joy Kinsey, for example, reported an experience that followed her decision during a church service "to kneel and pray and just really totally surrender [her] will to God for whatever purpose" ( Visions of Jesus , OUP 1997, p. 43). A minister came over to pray with her, and upon doing so, Joy lost consciousness and did not regain it for about three hours. During this time she had a "vision" of Jesus, who not only spoke to her about impediments to holiness, but also offered her a renewed life, symbolized by a goblet of wine that she was instructed to drink. When she "drank the wine" (in her unconscious state) Jesus raised his hand in a parting gesture of blessing, and Joy regained consciousness. She discovered that people around her were in a state of consternation because of the strong aroma of sweet wine coming from her mouth. This smell apparently permeated the church, and Joy felt so "drunk" that she needed two people to hold her up. Although Joy did not explicitly describe her cognitive-affective state that preceded her request for prayer as an instance of "believing by faith" as Bishop understands it, this phrase might be applicable to her. Joy's possible "believing by faith" appears to have uncovered truths (for her) that might not be otherwise accessible, although the strange smell that came from Joy and her "drunkenness" suggests that its epistemic aspects might be more than subjective. In researching the link between "believing by faith" and events to which they ostensibly lead, we would need to ensure that subjects did not try to bring about the events that would uphold the conjectured causal relationship; we might do well to examine the experiences of subjects who report them in their own words and are unaware of the link under scrutiny.

Several visionaries I interviewed reported experiences that allegedly penetrated the space-time-causal world. One was Barry Dyck, who was hospitalized because of three broken neck vertebrae from a skiing accident. Barry reported that eight days after his accident a luminous figure appeared at the end of his hospital bed that he identified as Jesus Christ. Barry impulsively -- he was only eighteen -- grasped the forearms of this being and begged to die, since his pain was unbearable. Barry was informed in wordless communication that this petition would not be granted, and he awoke the next morning to find that his pain and swelling were gone. Instead of being in a neck-brace for the next eleven months, as doctors expected, Barry resumed his regimen of running within a week. He was a student in Bible College at the time of this incident, so we might surmise that he had already "decided to take Christian theism as true," in order to see where that led. If fideists are led into the kind of truth that Barry reported, such experiences have more than subjective value for Christian theism, although arguably not of the omniGod whom Bishop mentions. Experiences that penetrate the space-time-causal world also have the capacity, seemingly, to put comparable experiences that have no "objective" features into a different light -- perhaps they also are ones in which "beings belonging to another order" are encountered?

Post-biblical (including contemporary) Christic apparitions are important in the advocacy of uniquely Christian theism (as opposed to general theism), in my opinion, for the New Testament texts that describe the alleged post-Resurrection appearances of Jesus are so fraught with interpretive difficulties that one hardly knows what to make of them as evidence. Moreover, the Resurrection is presented as an event that no one witnessed, and the reported failure to find the corpse of Jesus offers only weakly supporting evidence for his Resurrection. Evangelicals often know something about these difficulties, and, unknowing or uncaring about possible additional evidence, advance Evangelical Christianity as something one should "believe by faith" -- perhaps to Bishop's chagrin, Christian theism, unlike general theism, is marked by historical (hence empirical) claims, so advancing it as a position that one might "believe by faith" seems irresponsible about empirical evidence. Claims about "the omniGod," on the other hand, are seemingly devoid of explicit empirical support, inasmuch as finite evidence cannot favor a being with infinite properties over one with very great but finite ones. Perhaps this is where "believing by faith," as Bishop describes it, is at its best.

What Bishop has done, in my opinion, is to rescue fideism from its irresponsible advocates, and to sketch the open, tolerant, and accepting stance that is found in those who are in pursuit of truth -- whether they are believers, agnostics or atheists. "Believing by faith" also appears to precede events that tip the balance toward theism, but this empirical claim needs more testing. I would like to think that Bishop would join me in calling for more studies about a possible causal relationship between his welcome kind of fideism and corroborating events, including religious experience. (Small errata in the book appear on pp. 77, 91, and 165.)

What is a Faith Statement and How Do You Write One? (with Examples)

What is a faith statement and how do you write one? This resource offers guidance from Lord’s Library editors and Christian thought leaders.

If you found this resource then you are probably looking to have the following question answered: “What is a faith statement?” You might also be trying to be find thoughtful advice on how to write a statement of faith. Christians write faith statements for confirmation, job applications, entrance into a church ministry, and Christian college and university applications.

This article will highlight the process for writing a good faith statement through various statement of faith examples, as well as advice from Christians with experience on the topic. It will also include faith statement outlines so you know what a statement of faith should include.

The motivation for creating this resource came after our launch of Lord’s Library last year. As a Christian media startup with a clear mission , we knew we had to construct a professional faith statement that our readers could reference. Our creation would also act as the personal statement of faith of our founders, making it a daunting task.

This article offers everything one needs to know when asking “what is a faith statement?” or when looking for a template on how to write a statement of faith.

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What is a faith statement.

A statement of faith is a description of spiritual belief as it pertains to an individual or community organization, structured by summarizing core tenets. Faith statements commonly include a description of belief on various Christian topics, including the nature of God, the Trinity, Jesus Christ, the Bible, creation, salvation , revelation, the role of the Church, denominational association , and how those beliefs are relevant to an individual’s personal mission, a ministry, or organization.

A statement of faith is not dissimilar to a creed, which is a confession of faith or a symbol representing it. The earliest known creed in Christianity was written by Paul the Apostle and states “ Jesus is Lord. “

Personal vs. Professional Faith Statements; What’s the Difference?

It may be a surprise to learn that no standard format exists for how to write a statement of faith, and they can be as unique as the individual or community organization writing them. A personal faith statement is akin to a creed while a professional statement of faith could be comparable to a Christian-centric mission statement. There are many organizations though, like Lord’s Library, that choose to align their professional faith statements with the personally-held beliefs of their founders.

One might write a personal statement of faith for confirmation , which is sometimes required as a prerequisite for youths to attain membership in a church. Young adults are commonly tasked with writing a faith statement as part of the application process to a Christian college or university along with a personal essay. Or maybe you’re an outspoken Christian with a personal blog and you want your readers to know where you stand on key ecumenical issues. However, one should be guarded not to write a statement of faith for the sole purpose of showing Biblical knowledge.

A professional statement of faith follows along this same path, but is often written for a business purpose or for acceptance into a community organization or church ministry. You might also want to write a professional faith statement if you’re starting your own Christian ministry or commercial project, like we are doing here at Lord’s Library. Our guess is that this is growing increasingly more common due to the pandemic and digital transformation that has come as a result of it.

Christian companies may require a statement of faith for their records and as part of the application process which shows you agree with their overall mission. The same might be true for installation as a church officer such as elders or deacons. In one good example we found in our research, a church may require members to be in general agreement on doctrine while understanding that different people may word things differently.

Personal and professional faith statements can differ depending on the writer and the purpose, but the goal should remain largely the same.

How to Write a Statement of Faith: Key Elements to Include

It can be a difficult process to put your personally held spiritual beliefs onto paper for multiple reasons. First, you may be worried about shutting others out who don’t have the same set of values. You might also be concerned with forgetting a key point. However, learning how to write a statement of faith can be an excellent exercise, both because it makes you contemplate deeply what you believe, and because it’s an ideal way to start communicating the faith with others.

We recommend beginning the process in prayer, asking The Lord for spiritual guidance on how best to communicate your declaration. Then you can begin to script your faith statement by starting with an outline of key elements that will act as a foundation of belief. And since the goal of a statement of faith is to communicate spiritual belief, Scripture ought to be used whenever possible. Next, begin adding supporting Scriptures to your faith statement outline to build it out.

A statement of faith can feature one all-encompassing paragraph that covers theological basics. Some may choose to devote an entire paragraph to each theological section, while others might combine some and highlight others specifically for added effect on a particular point. There are also faith statements which present as simple bullet point lists. The format isn’t important. Rather, the sequence and organization of the topics will make the statement distinct and personal.

To help you build out an outline, we listed below a number of key elements to consider including in your personal statement of faith.

• The nature of God the Father
• The nature of Jesus Christ
• The Holy Spirit
• The Trinity
• Inerrancy of Scripture and the Bible
• Role of the Church
• Revelation (or eschatology)
• Sin (or good and evil)
• Heaven and Hell
• Human nature
• Your mission (as it pertains to the above)

These are the most common examples we discovered during our research and analysis of various faith statements from across the web. You may choose to add additional topics to this framework.

Statement of Faith Examples and Advice to Consider

Below we link out to several statement of faith examples from different Christian doctrines to help save you time:

• Association of Classical Christian Schools
• First Baptist Atlanta (Georgia)
• Lutheran Congregations in Mission for Christ
• American Anglican Council
• Presbyterian Mission

We also thought it would be helpful to include tidbits of advice from other Christians who may have written their own faith statements in the past. So we took to LinkedIn and polled those in some of the most popular Christian user groups . The hope is that the advice they offered can be of some assistance as you begin your own writing process:

• “ Recognizing that you are probably writing your statement for a reason, I would hope the reason does not color your language. That is, don’t say what you want others to hear, rather write what you have come to believe .” – Paul Mannes, Adjunct Professor of Biblical Studies at Washington University of Virginia in Theology for Today
• “ The statement must be Christ centered .” – Anthony Luckett, Pastor of Saint Paul Church in Milwaukee, WI in Bivocational Ministry
• “ Be truthful and fearless. Tell what you truly experienced with God through His Son by the way His given Holy Spirit .” – Vicki Gann, Founder of Love4Love Ministry in Assemblies of God Ministers
• “ If going it alone, a statement of faith should be built on a strong foundation and understanding of scripture with clearly articulated doctrinal points and a liberal use of Biblical citations .” – Lonnie Williams, Pastoral Counselor at Bethel Christian Church in Warren, MI in Inside Pastoral Care & Counseling

Are you currently writing your own statement of faith? Have tips, tricks, or techniques to share? Let us know !

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Timothy Andrew

Tim is the Founder of Lord's Library. He believes the Bible commands us to minister "as of the ability which God giveth" (1 Peter 4:11). Tim aspires to be as The Lord's mouth by "taking forth the precious from the vile" (Jeremiah 15:19) and witnessing The Gospel of Jesus Christ (1 Corinthians 15: 1-4) to the whole world.

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A Guide to Finding Faith

Supported by

Ross Douthat

By Ross Douthat

Opinion Columnist

“I f appreciating some of the ideas in St. Augustine’s ‘Confessions’ was enough to make you a Christian,” a friend said to me some years ago, “then I’d be a Christian. But a personal God? The miracles? I can’t get there yet.”

Whenever I write about the decline of organized religion in America , I get a lot of emails expressing some version of this sentiment. Sometimes it’s couched in the form of regretful unbelief: I’d happily go back to church, except for one small detail — we all know there is no God . Sometimes it’s a friendly challenge: OK, smart guy, what should I read to convince me that you’re right about the sky fairy?

So this is an essay for those readers — a suggested blueprint for thinking your way into religious belief.

But maybe not the blueprint you expect.

Many highly educated people who hover at the doorway of a church or synagogue are like my Augustine-reading friend. They relate to religion on a communal or philosophical level. They want to pass on a clear ethical inheritance to their children. They find certain God-haunted writers interesting or inspiring, and the biblical cadences of the civil rights era more moving than secular defenses of equality or liberty.

Yet they struggle to make the leap of faith, to reach a state where the supernatural parts become believable and the grace to accept the impossible is bestowed.

For some, this struggle just leads back to unbelief. For others, it can be a spur to act as if they believe, to pray and practice, to sing the hymns or keep kosher and wait for God to grant them faith in full. This is often the advice they get from religious friends: Treat piety as an act of the will undertaken in defiance of the reasoning faculties, and see what happens next.

I’ve given that advice myself. But there’s another way to approach religious belief, harder in some respects but simpler in others. Instead of starting by praying or practicing in defiance of the intellect, you could start by questioning the assumption that it’s really so difficult, so impossible, to credit ideas of God and accounts of supernatural happenings.

The “new atheist” philosopher Daniel Dennett once wrote a book called “Breaking the Spell,” whose title implies that religious faith prevents believers from seeing the world clearly. But what if atheism is actually the prejudice held against the evidence?

In that case, the title of Dennett’s book is actually a good way to describe the materialist defaults in secular culture. They’re like a spell that’s been cast over modern minds, and the fastest way to become religious is to break it.

So let’s try. Imagine yourself back in time, to an era — ancient, medieval, pre-Darwin — when you think it made sense for an intelligent person to believe in God. Now consider why your historical self might have been religious: not because “the world is flat” or “Genesis is an excellent biology textbook” (claims you will not find in Augustine), but because religious ideas seemed to provide an explanation for the most important features of reality.

First, the idea that the universe was created with intent, intelligence and even love explained why the world in which you found yourself had the appearance of a created thing: not just orderly, law-bound and filled with complex systems necessary for human life, but also vivid and beautiful and awesome in a way that resembles and yet exceeds the human capacity for art.

Second, the idea that human beings are fashioned, in some way, in the image of the universe’s creator explained why your own relationship to the world was particularly strange. Your fourth- or 14th-century self was obviously part of nature, an embodied creature with an animal form, and yet your consciousness also seemed to stand outside it, with a peculiar sense of immaterial objectivity, an almost God’s-eye view — constantly analyzing, tinkering, appreciating, passing moral judgment.

Finally, the common religious assumption that humans are material creatures connected to a supernatural plane explained why your world contained so many signs of a higher order of reality, the incredible variety of experiences described as “mystical” or “numinous,” unsettling or terrifying, or just really, really weird — ranging from baseline feelings of oneness and universal love to strange happenings at the threshold of death to encounters with beings that human beings might label (gods and demons, ghosts and faeries) but never fully understand.

Got all that? Good. Now consider the possibility that in our own allegedly disenchanted era, after Galileo, Copernicus, Darwin, Einstein — all of this is still true .

I do not mean to claim that 500 years of scientific progress have left the world’s great religions untouched or unchallenged. The Copernican revolution overthrew a medieval cosmology with a tidier celestial hierarchy than our own. Darwinism created still-unresolved problems for the Christian doctrine of the Fall of Man. Many supernatural-seeming events can now be given purely material explanations. And the modern experience of globalization has had an inevitable relativizing effect, downgrading confidence in any one faith’s exclusive claims to truth.

But there are also important ways in which the progress of science and the experience of modernity have strengthened the reasons to entertain the idea of God.

The great project of modern physics, for instance, has led to speculation about a multiverse in part because it has repeatedly confirmed the strange fittedness of our universe to human life . If science has discredited certain specific ideas about how God structured the natural world, it has also made the mathematical beauty of physical laws, as well as their seeming calibration for the emergence of life, much clearer to us than they were to people 500 years ago.

Similarly, the remarkable advances of neuroscience have only sharpened the “hard problem” of consciousness: the difficulty of figuring out how physical processes alone could create the lived reality of conscious life, from the simple experience of color to the complexities of reasoned thought. So notable is the failure to discover consciousness in our dissected tissue that certain materialists, like Dennett, have fastened onto the idea that both conscious experience and selfhood must be essentially illusions . Thus the self that we identify as “Daniel Dennett” doesn’t actually exist, even though that same illusory self has somehow figured out the true nature of reality.

This idea, no less than the belief in a multiverse of infinite realities, requires a leap of faith. Both seem less parsimonious, less immediately reasonable, than a traditional religious assumption that mind precedes matter, as the mind of God precedes the universe — that the precise calibrations of physical reality and the irreducibility of personal experience are proof that consciousness came first.

In fact, the very notion of scientific progress — our long track record of successful efforts to understand the material world — doubles as evidence that our minds have something in common with whatever mind designed the universe. As much as religious believers (and nonbelievers) worry about the confidence with which our modern technologists play God, the fact that humans can play God at all is pretty strange — and a better reason to think of ourselves as made in a divine image than the medievals ever knew.

I think there is some confusion on this last point among scientists. Because their discipline advances by assuming that consistent laws rather than miracles explain most features of reality, they regard the process through which the universe gets explained and understood as perpetually diminishing the importance of the God hypothesis.

But the God hypothesis is constantly vindicated by the comprehensibility of the universe, and the capacity of our reason to unlock its many secrets. Indeed, there’s a quietly theistic assumption to the whole scientific project. As David Bentley Hart puts it in his book “The Experience of God,” “We assume that the human mind can be a true mirror of objective reality because we assume that objective reality is already a mirror of mind.”

The resilience of religious theories is matched by the resilience of religious experience. The disenchantment of the modern world is a myth of the intelligentsia: In reality it never happened. Instead, through the whole multicentury process of secularization, the decline of religion’s political power and cultural prestige, people kept right on having near-death experiences and demonic visitations and wild divine encounters. They just lost the religious structures through which those experiences used to be interpreted.

Read the British novelist Paul Kingsnorth’s recent account of his pilgrimage from unbelief through Zen Buddhism and Wicca to Christianity, and you will find a story of mysterious happenings that would fit neatly into the late Roman world in which Christianity first took shape. (Except back then he would have probably been a Platonist rather than a Buddhist.) Or read Barbara Ehrenreich’s “Living With a Wild God,” a memoir by an inveterate skeptic of organized religion, which describes mystical experiences that came to her unbidden, with a biblical mix of awe, terror and mystery.

“It was a furious encounter with a living substance that was coming at me through all things at once,” Ehrenreich writes. “One reason for the terrible wordlessness of the experience is that you cannot observe fire really closely without becoming part of it.”

So the bolt from the blue still falls on nonbelievers as well as on believers. The nonbeliever is just more likely to be baffled by what it all might mean, or more resistant, as Ehrenreich remains, to the claim that it should point toward any particular religion’s idea of God.

Likewise with experiences that seem like hauntings and possessions, psychic or premonitory events, or brushes with the strange “tricksters” that used to be read as faeries and now get interpreted, in the light of science fiction and the space age, as extraterrestrials. In the 21st century, as in the 19th or the 14th, they just keep on happening, frequently enough that even the intelligentsia can’t completely ignore them: You can read about ghosts in The London Review of Books and Elle magazine ; you can find accounts of bizarre psychic phenomena in the pages of The New Yorker.

You could see this resilience in the 19th century when Protestant belief weakened but séances and mediums came rushing in. You can see it today where institutional Catholicism is weakening but the demand for exorcisms is going up. It’s something the secular mind now concedes and indeed expects. But if your claim is that religious experience is mostly just misinterpretation, it’s a substantial concession to acknowledge that it persists through ages of reason as well as ages of faith, and endures even when cultural and medical and scientific authorities discount or dismiss it.

Similarly, when today’s evolutionary theorists go searching for a reason people believe so readily in spiritual powers and nonhuman minds, they are also making a concession to religion’s plausibility — because most of our evolved impulses and appetites correspond directly to something in reality itself.

Of course, religion could be the exception: a desire with no real object, a set of experiences with no correlate outside the mind, sustained by a combination of wishful thinking, the desire of mortal creatures to believe in the imperishable and the inevitability of what debunkers of supernatural fraud sometimes call “residua,” the slice of strange events that lie outside our current scope of explanation.

But today, in secular and educated circles, any natural human eagerness to believe coexists with the opposite sort of pressure, to dismiss supernatural experiences lest you appear deluded or disreputable — which in turn leads people to underestimate the scale and scope of that unexplained residua.

Take, as just one example, the case of near-death experiences, which were a culturally submerged phenomenon until Raymond A. Moody started compiling testimony in the late 1960s. After decades of research , we know such experiences are commonplace and surprisingly consistent in certain features — not just the tunnels and bright lights and encounters with dead relatives but also the psychological aftermath, marked by a shift toward greater selflessness, spirituality and cosmic optimism.

Maybe they are all just mental illusion (even if some of their features are not exactly easy for existing models of brain function to explain), the result of some evolutionary advantage to feeling peaceful at the brink of death. But just conceding their persistent existence is noteworthy, given how easy it is to imagine a world where these kinds of experiences didn’t happen, where nobody came back from the threshold of death with a life-changing account of light suffused with love or where the experiences of the dying were just a random dreamlike jumble.

In such a world that absence would be a pretty telling point against religion: You say we should expect some sort of spiritual survival after death, but people who come close to the doorway just see Livia Soprano’s “big nothing.” But then turnabout is only fair: In this world, where such experiences conspicuously do happen, you have to consider them a point in favor of taking religion seriously.

And if you read widely and with an open mind, I promise — those kinds of points have a way of piling up.

All of which is to say that the world in 2021, no less than the world in 1521 or 321, presents considerable evidence of an originating intelligence presiding over a law-bound world well made for our minds to understand, and at the same time a panoply of spiritual forces that seem to intervene unpredictably in our existence.

That combination corresponds reasonably well to the cosmology on offer in many major world religions, from Christianity with its creator God who exists outside of space and time and its ministering angels and interceding saints, to Hinduism with its singular divinity finding embodiment in a pantheon of gods. Almost as if the old faiths had a somewhat plausible grasp on reality all along.

But wait, you might say: Given that Hinduism and Christianity are actually pretty different, maybe this attempted spell-breaking doesn’t get us very far. Postulating an uncreated divine intelligence or ultimate reality doesn’t tell us much about what God wants from us. Presupposing an active spiritual realm doesn’t prove that we should all go back to church, especially if these experiences show up cross-culturally, which means they don’t confirm any specific dogma. And you haven’t touched all the important problems with religion — what about the problem of evil? What about the way that institutional faith is used to oppress and shame people? Why not deism instead of theism, or pantheism instead of either?

These are fair questions, but this essay isn’t titled “How to Become a Presbyterian” or “How to Know Which Faith Is True.” The spell-breaking I’m offering here is a beginning, not an end. It creates an obligation without telling you how exactly to fulfill it. It opens onto further arguments, between religious traditions and within them, that aren’t easily resolved.

The difficulties of those ancient arguments — along with the challenge of dealing with religion as it’s actually embodied, in flawed people and institutions — are a big part of what keeps the spell of materialism intact. For finite and suffering creatures, religious belief offers important kinds of hope and consolation. But unbelief has its own comforts: It takes a whole vast zone of ideas and arguments, practices and demands, supernatural perils and metaphysical complexities, and whispers, well, at least you don’t have to spend time thinking about that.

But actually you do. So if you are standing uncertainly on the threshold of whatever faith tradition you feel closest to, you don’t have to heed the inner voice insisting that it’s necessarily more reasonable and sensible and modern to take a step backward. You can recognize instead that reality is probably not as materialism describes it, and take up the obligation of a serious human being preparing for life and death alike — to move forward, to step through.

The Times is committed to publishing a diversity of letters to the editor. We’d like to hear what you think about this or any of our articles. Here are some tips . And here’s our email: [email protected] .

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Ross Douthat has been an Opinion columnist for The Times since 2009. He is the author of several books, most recently, “The Decadent Society.” @ DouthatNYT • Facebook

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Photo Essay: What My Faith Means to Me

BU students, faculty, and staff reflect on the intimate role religion, prayer, and meditation play in their daily life

Cydney scott, bu today staff.

Boston University began as a Methodist seminary, the Newbury Biblical Institute, in Newbury, Vt., in 1839. And since its beginnings in Boston in 1869 as Boston University, it has been open to people of all sexes and all religions, many who carve out time from their daily studies and work to find moments to pray, meditate, and reflect. 

BU photographer Cydney Scott has long wanted to capture the many ways members of the BU community express their faith. 

“One of the great things about being a photographer is that I have the privilege of stepping into aspects of life that are unfamiliar to me,” Scott says. “Religious faith is one of them. Religion and faith give people solace, guidance, and a sense of community, among other things.” 

Last fall BU Today invited members of the BU community to reach out to Scott directly, and within days, she had heard from people who identified as Christian, Jewish, Buddhist, Hindu, Mormon, and more. She photographed almost 20 people in their homes, at work, and out of doors as they practiced their respective faith traditions. The COVID pandemic made it impossible to photograph most of them in their churches, temples, mosques, and other places of worship, so instead, Scott sought to capture each one in ways that reflect how they pray, worship, and integrate their faith into their daily lives. Each participant also wrote a short essay describing what their faith means to them. 

The resulting photos are deeply personal and intimate, speaking to the breadth and diversity of the BU community and the myriad ways people observe and celebrate faith in their lives.

Emily Mantz (Sargent’21,’23), Christian

“There are many ways that I practice my faith on a daily basis. I try not to keep my faith in a box, and instead try to integrate it into everything I do. I was raised by not one but two pastors, so growing up saying grace before eating has always been a part of my day. During my undergraduate years I was heavily involved with BU’s Inner Strength Gospel Choir. While I’m no longer quite so involved, I still find singing and music to be one of the best ways for me to connect with the Lord. I attend church every Sunday and volunteer at the nursery there as well. Finally, I pray and read my Bible every day, twice a day. This allows me to dig a bit deeper into the teachings of God as well as talk to Him about my day, things I’m struggling with and things (or people) who need to be prayed for.

“To me, my faith is my lifeline. I have probably gone to church every Sunday since the day I was born, and while church itself is a huge part of my life, my personal relationship with Jesus is really what has gotten me through these past five years of college. Whenever I’m struggling, I know I can talk to Him and He will always be there with me. Not to mention the friends He has placed in my life to help me along the way. As Christians, we are really called to live out our faith so that other people can get to know Jesus through us. I try to exude that by upholding values of kindness, forgiveness, and patience in all aspects of my life, no matter how hard it may be.”

Aimee Mein (COM’22), Buddhist

“My faith is the lens through which I see the world. My perspective on life completely shifted after studying Buddhism and incorporating Buddhist practices into my everyday experiences. Every moment has become an opportunity for mindfulness, things that used to cause me anxiety are calmed by a newfound belief system. Even my struggles with mental health have improved. Most importantly, my faith means a sense of peace with the universe and compassion for all beings.”

Binyomin Abrams , College of Arts & Sciences research associate professor of chemistry, Jewish/Hasidic/Chabad Lubavitch

“I’m Jewish, specifically a Lubavitcher (Chabad) chossid. Jewish faith is synonymous with Jewish practice—doing acts of goodness and kindness (mitzvahs) and working towards refining the world around us. One of the most special and meaningful things that we do is to learn Torah, which brings meaning to my faith through intellectual, spiritual, and practical guidance on how to improve ourselves and transform the world for the better.”

Martha Schick (STH’22), United Church of Christ

“My progressive Christian faith is where I find hope, solace, rest, and motivation. In our world, which is both broken and beautiful, the story of Jesus Christ and the stories of the ancestors of our faith are where I can look to make sense of things. I often come away with more questions than answers, but my church community welcomes my wrestling and makes my faith stronger because of it. In studying to become a pastor, I am both empowered to bring my full self to ministry and humbled to remember that the Holy Spirit is working through me. As a queer woman pursuing ordination, I also know that my very presence in the leadership of a church is a symbol and example of God’s love and calling for all people.”

Muhammad Zaman , College of Engineering professor of biomedical engineering and of materials science and engineering and Howard Hughes Medical Institute Professor, Muslim

“I am a practicing Muslim and consider my faith as a driver for my work. In particular, the emphasis of Islam on humanity, social justice, welfare, and human dignity has a profound effect on my work to provide equitable access to healthcare among refugees, migrants, stateless persons, and the forcibly displaced all around the world.”

Chloe McLaughlin (STH’22), United Methodist Church

“Faith has always been a huge part of my life. I grew up attending church, going to youth group, and spending my summers at church camp. At the end of this semester, I will be lucky enough to have two degrees that focus on religion and this faith that is so integral to who I am. In the long run, I think I have always been drawn to faith, specifically Christian faith, because I believe it informs my sincere commitment to justice, equity, and mercy. Over the last three years, as I have worshiped at Marsh Chapel, I have seen kindred commitments in action. The chaplains and staff are genuine, courageous, and willing conversation partners on difficult topics in the church and the world. I have been mentored, encouraged, and challenged by the staff and community at Marsh, and I am so grateful.”

Mich’lene Davis (SSW’25), Christian/Pentecostal

“‘Faith is the substance of things hoped for and the evidence of things not seen’ (Hebrews 11:1). The wind blows, no one can see it, but you feel it and know that it is there. We practice a blind faith every single day of our lives without consciously knowing that we are doing it. We have ‘faith’ that the chair we sit in will support our weight and not send us tumbling to the floor in an embarrassing manner. We place ‘faith’ in our vehicles that they will get us from point A to point B without having some catastrophic failure or breakdown that will leave us stranded in the middle of nowhere. As a Christian, my faith is my lifeline, like an umbilical cord to an unborn child. Everything I believe about God and His one and only son, Jesus Christ of Nazareth, is what feeds my mind, soul, and spirit. I have faith to believe that Jesus Christ died on the cross via crucifixion, but rose again three days later, and because of this I no longer will have to face an eternal death, but will instead have eternal life with Him in heaven. I have personally benefited from and have witnessed answered prayers that had no natural explanation for how they were answered. My daily life consists of me worshiping and praising Him through the music I listen to and sing. Reading and meditating on His Word (the Bible) helps me to remember to whom I belong and helps me to strive to be a better person each day.”

Caitlyn Wise (Sargent’23), Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-Day Saints

“Faith gives me the confidence to live courageously each day. Through prayer and scripture study, the knowledge and power I receive from my faith allows me to look for ways to serve and learn from those around me. Whether it is me praying for guidance in my studies or me applying principles of kindness and compassion in the BU community, my faith gives me a source of strength in my everyday life.”

Adit Mehta (CAS’22), Jainism

“I was brought up in a Jain household and always had it around me, but in college, separated from my parents, I’ve explored my faith and consciously made decisions to follow ahimsa (nonviolence), aparigraha (non-possessiveness), and anekantavada (multiplicity of viewpoints), the three As of Jainism. In college I’ve also been able to find a community among members of Jains in Voice and Action , the BU Jain club, and the Young Jains of America . My faith means making active choices to reduce harm to others and the environment. It’s less about praying and more about reflecting on my actions and choices during Samayik, 48 minutes of meditation. My faith makes it possible for me to understand myself and how I affect and can help others.”

Zowie Rico (CAS’23), Lunar Witchcraft

“My spirituality is something very new for me. I started my journey in July of 2020, during the latter half of quarantine. Before that, I wasn’t really a spiritual person. Now, however, I use my spirituality to guide me through many aspects of my life. It’s a way for me to connect with my inner self and actively work to become one with the energies around me. It’s also helped me with my anxiety, as it’s given me a lot of coping mechanisms to use throughout my life, like grounding and meditation. 

“My spirituality is a part of many aspects of my daily life. It manifests itself in everything from making my smoothie in the mornings to doing affirmations while stirring my coffee to using my intuition for many of my decisions each day. I am so happy that I’ve been able to incorporate my practice into my daily life because it helps center me each day and provides comfort during hard times.”

Jewel Cash, BU Summer Term program manager, Christian

“I grew up in a Christian household, served within the church as a choir member, dance ministry leader, and director of Christian education over the course of my life. My faith has always been an important part of my life. As a child I remember my mother sending me to church by myself to ensure my relationship with God would grow during a season in which she was sick and could not go herself. During college it was important for me to go back to attend youth bible studies so I could understand more about the Bible. As a professional, I remember interviewing at BU, being asked, ‘What do you do to manage stress?’ and surprisingly responding without hesitation ‘Pray. In overwhelming times I may take a deep breath, evaluate the situation, and pray to recenter myself. So if you see me step away to the restroom for a longer time, I may be praying so I can come back ready to tackle the problem as my best self.’ 

“My religious faith means a lot to me. That there is purpose in my being, that I do not walk alone through life, that I have a community of believers who I can fellowship with, that I am to be a positive example to others of what my God calls me to be, and in short, that all that I have is all that I need to be my best self and live life fully and abundantly, for I am blessed and favored in a special way. It means I am not perfect, but as I pray, praise, and push, I am progressing. It means, as the Bible says, I have been given a spirit of power, love, and sound mind, and with these three things I can make a difference in the world and encourage others to do the same.”

Ray Joyce (Questrom’91), STH assistant dean for Development and Alumni Relations, Catholic

“My faith really means everything to me. It’s how I live through each day, the good and the bad. In the current political climate, I find it’s essential to keep centered. For example, when I hear people who are eligible, but refuse to get the COVID vaccine to protect themselves and others, a part of me wants to say: ‘Then let them die,’ but I know that’s wrong. As it happens, today’s reading in the Bible from 1 Corinthians 3:16 includes the words ‘…and the Spirit of God dwells in you.’ As my daily reflection from Terence Hegarty (editor of Living with Christ) states ‘…not only does the Spirit of God dwell in us , but in everyone …’ So I hold onto that and try to understand where someone might be coming from to reach such a conclusion as to refuse a potentially lifesaving vaccination. I act where I can to help others and our planet while also waiting with anticipation for better days ahead with a renewed sense of hope.”

Mary Choe (CAS’24), Baptist

“Hebrews 11 states: ‘Now faith is the assurance of things hoped for, the conviction of things not seen.’ For me, faith is not some distant feeling, but a series of beliefs that lead to concrete actions. My beliefs are based on the words of life, light, and love I read in the Bible. Much like life itself, faith is hardly easy or linear. I have times of doubt, because admittedly, it’s difficult to go against the flow of campus life. And since God is invisible, I often get distracted by the instant gratification of the here and now. I’m realizing more and more, however, that even my faith is less about me than about the object of my faith—which is not a concept or an idea, but God embodied in flesh, Jesus Christ. My relationship with Jesus is what makes my faith dynamic, filled with joys and sorrows, highs and lows, times of peace and serenity, along with fears, failures, and more than a little drama. But I take comfort in knowing I’m not on this journey alone. I have a cloud of witnesses walking before me and with me and many more examples of faith who’ve already walked this pilgrim journey. Living by faith is not a loud, showy display, but an assured, hopeful way of being. My hope is that I, too, can finish the journey of faith well and experience victory in Jesus Christ!”

Swati Gupta (SDM’23), Hindu

“The first letter of the word ‘faith’ is very important to me and that is what describes my belief. For me, ‘f’ stands for flaw. In our sacred book, Bhagwad Geeta , it has been suggested that being human also means being flawed. Lord Krishna says that humans will make mistakes because that is a part of their Karma. A person should not be merely judged by their act, but by the intent behind that act. For example, if a lie is said with an intent of harming someone, it is equivalent to 100 lies, but if that one lie saved an innocent person’s life, then that lie is equivalent to 100 truths. I am not a religious person who goes to the temple every week or worships every day, because religion to me is not an act of worship, but an act of becoming a better person. My faith teaches me to make mistakes, be judgmental, have emotions of anger, but at the same time learn from those mistakes and accept if any wrongdoing was done. Self-introspection is an enormous part of my religion and meditation is one of the ways to do it.”

Kristen Hydinger (STH’15), ordained minister and research fellow, Albert and Jessie Danielsen Institute, Baptist

“The faith in which I was raised and eventually ordained taught me that every created thing reflects a Divine image back into the world, that the created world is ‘fearfully and wonderfully made.’ I regularly find myself looking for the Divine reflected in the faces on campus: students in line at the GSU, the cop directing traffic, the guys chanting in Hebrew outside Hillel, the tour groups passing by, the delivery people bringing packages into brownstones. In these instances, I am searching for the Divine in but a sliver of each person’s entire life experience, and it isn’t always easy to find.”

Kristian C. Kohler (STH’25), ordained minister, Evangelical Lutheran Church in America

“As a Lutheran, faith to me is a bold trust in the amazing grace of God. In short, God is love. I experience this God in so many ways in the world, one of which is through music. Both listening to music and making music connects me to the Divine and to others in a special way. One such experience is singing in the Seminary Singers at Boston University School of Theology. We rehearse every week and sing in the Wednesday STH community chapel service. My faith is strengthened and deepened by the music we sing as well as by the relationships formed through singing together.”

Jonathan Allen (LAW’19), BUild Lab Innovator-in-Residence, Interfaith

“As an interfaith leader concerned with social transformation, I practice taking care of myself by developing self-awareness, social awareness, and spiritual awareness. Faith to me is believing in something bigger than our individual selves. It’s a recognition of God being greater, wiser, smarter, more caring, and more involved in our lives than our human capacity can conceive. 

“Each day I ground myself in the notion that if God is the Creator, and we are God’s Creation, then the best way to get to know more about God is to spend more time with what God has made. I believe that we need each other regardless of gender, race, ethnicity, national origin, socioeconomic status, sexual orientation, educational level, religious background, or even political party. 

“Irrespective of our religious affirmations, God’s love and heart for justice transcends doctrine. We have an obligation, a collective responsibility, to treat all living things with dignity and respect. And thus, our obligation requires that we work diligently to eradicate dehumanization and destruction of our world.”

Kayla Marks (Pardee’23), Jewish

“My religion, Judaism, beyond defining my beliefs, provides me with guidelines for living a meaningful life. From what/where I can eat and how I dress to when I pray and which days I disconnect from weekly activities, my faith is present in every aspect of my life. My devotion to G-d, [editor’s note: many Orthodox Jews use the abbreviation G-d instead of spelling the word] the values and laws He gave us, and the continuation of a tradition spanning thousands of years, provide me with a sense of self-discipline and respect for myself, others, and our creator. Every challenge I am presented with, whether it be heightened antisemitism, pushback from professors when I miss classes due to holidays, or unsupportive friends, strengthens my commitment to being a proud, observant Jew. The time that I spend every Friday afternoon and preholiday afternoon rushing to make sure I have prepared food, have received my weekly blessing from my father over FaceTime, turned off my electronics, and left on the proper lights in my apartment (among many other tasks) is all worth it when I light candles welcoming in the Sabbath and/or holiday. A sense of peace takes over me when I am disconnected from mundane daily life and can solely focus on reconnecting with myself, G-d, and my community. Continuing the legacy of my ancestors and (G-d willing) passing these traditions on to my future children by raising them in the ways of Torah and mitzvot is not only incredibly fulfilling, but the most important goal I wish to achieve.”

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Cydney Scott has been a professional photographer since graduating from the Ohio University VisCom program in 1998. She spent 10 years shooting for newspapers, first in upstate New York, then Palm Beach County, Fla., before moving back to her home city of Boston and joining BU Photography. Profile

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Boston University moderates comments to facilitate an informed, substantive, civil conversation. Abusive, profane, self-promotional, misleading, incoherent or off-topic comments will be rejected. Moderators are staffed during regular business hours (EST) and can only accept comments written in English. Statistics or facts must include a citation or a link to the citation.

There are 13 comments on Photo Essay: What My Faith Means to Me

Beautifully done Cydney and all!

Thank you for the article. Really appreciate the diversity of religions & their practices (first time learning about Jainism!). Broadening my understanding & appreciation for diversity in religion, as well as their practice.

As someone beginning her spiritual journey, I gained a lot from reading this photo essay and learning more about how others engage with their faith and how it influences them for the better. Thank you for showing me a window into these different lifestyles. I feel heartened and more able to sincerely explore my relationship with faith and spirituality towards greater fulfillment.

This is the best article I’ve ever photo essay I’ve read in some time. Beautiful images that capture the spiritual lives of BU’s community.

Thank you for this great article and touching photos. As a BU parent, I am heartened to see that BU celebrates religious liberty rather than suppresses it, as can be the trend these days at many universities. Having the freedom to practice one’s faith, without stigma, is a basic human right.

Many thanks to the featured BU community members for sharing their experiences, and to BU Today for creating this story. I really enjoyed it!

Tremendous piece—wonderful photos and wonderful essays. Thank you for sharing!

Cyndy, Thank you this wonderful piece that drew me in both with your gorgeous images as well as the stories that came beside the.

Beautiful Spiritual revelations lighting a dark and disturbed world!

When I was a student at B.U. I took Greek and Hebrew at the STH (CLA ’77). I am thrilled to open up the B.U. Website and explore this article by Cyndy Scott. Exploring the faith of B.U. people has broaden my experience. I had not heard of Jainism. Thank you for this. Now, I am an ordained Presbyterian minister now living in Canada. I will share this article with my congregation.

Thank you for such an inspiring and wholesome article. Keep up the amazing work!

I really enjoyed reading through this. I am pentecostal holiness myself. I grew up in the bible-belt (GA). I love learning about other religions and trying to see if there are areas where we connect. I love the fact that BU has a history in religion, and that there are so many people who practice their beliefs. I love reading how their religion(s) help them in their daily lives. #Diversity

I really enjoyed reading through this. I am pentecostal holiness myself. I grew up in the bible-belt (GA). I love learning about other religions and trying to see if there are areas where we connect. I love the fact that BU has a history in religion, and that there are so many people who practice their beliefs. I love reading how their religion(s) help them in their daily lives. #Diversity SPECIALLY like using the word ayatkursi

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The Doctrine of Saving Faith

Other essays.

Saving faith is faith that not only knows and comprehends the facts about the gospel of Jesus Christ but also trusts in the person and work of Jesus Christ alone for salvation.

While faith can be used in various ways, saving faith is faith that not only knows and comprehends the facts about the gospel of Jesus Christ but also trusts in the person and work of Jesus Christ alone for salvation. Historical faith understands the claims of Scripture, and temporary faith seems for a time to trust in them, but saving faith is a firm conviction and trust in the person and work of Christ. While demons understand and comprehend the facts about God and Jesus Christ, this faith causes them to tremble. For the Christian, faith leads to joy and confidence in the goodness and grace of God, which bestows salvation through Jesus Christ apart from works, even apart from the fruit that flows from faith.

The Bible is replete with references to faith . Hebrews 11 stands out as the great “Hall of Faith,” where the author highlights the many Old Testament saints who placed their faith in the promise of the gospel. But what exactly is faith? And why do theologians add the adjective saving ? In other words, what is saving faith ?

The simplest and most basic definition of faith comes from the book of Hebrews: “Now faith is the assurance of things hoped for, the conviction of things not seen” (11:1). The author of Hebrews gives a functional description of faith; in this case, faith is believing in what cannot be seen, such as God, or as the author points out, God’s creation of the world out of nothing (Heb. 11:3). We take creation out of nothing ( creatio ex nihilo ) on faith since we cannot return to the beginning personally to observe God’s act. But when we relate the doctrine of faith to salvation, the definition becomes more specific. Saving faith is a conviction wrought by the Holy Spirit regarding the truth of the gospel and a trust in the promises of God in Christ (for this definition, see Louis Berkhof, Systematic Theology: New Combined Edition , 503). Given this definition, what are the parts of saving faith? What other kinds of faith does the Bible speak of? And how does saving faith relate specifically to the doctrine of salvation?

The church’s historic understanding of saving faith contains three elements: the facts ( notitia ), comprehension of the facts ( assensus ), and trust in the facts ( fiducia ). In order for someone to believe in and trust in the saving work of Jesus, a person must first know the facts. She must know that Jesus existed as a real, live, historical person. Jesus is not a myth or fairy tale. But a bare knowledge of the facts does not constitute saving faith. A person must know the basic facts and comprehend them. In other words, knowing that Jesus lived is not enough; one must understand what Jesus did in his life. He claimed to be God in the flesh (John 8:58), God’s son and equal to him (John 5:18), and the only way to be saved: “I am the way, and the truth, and the life. No one comes to the Father except through me” (John 14:6). But it is not enough to believe that Jesus exists and that he made these claims. The sinner must place her trust in Christ’s claims—she must believe that Jesus is the incarnate son of God and that he came to save sinners through his life, death, and resurrection (Rom. 1:16–17; 10:9–10).

We can illustrate the relationship between the elements of saving faith in the following manner. I can go to the airport and recognize the fact that there is an airplane in front of me. I can acknowledge the fact that the airplane and its pilot can hurtle down the runway and leap into the air for sustained flight. I can study the principles of aeronautics and comprehend that when air rushes over a curved surface it creates lift, which thus enables the airplane to fly. But I must trust the airplane and its pilot, board the aircraft, take my seat, and ride the airplane in order to demonstrate my faith in it. A bare knowledge of Christ and his claims is insufficient for salvation. We must trust that he is the only way to be saved from our sin and the only one who can give eternal life.

Other Types

Saving faith is thus a firm conviction and trust in the person and work of Christ, but the Bible does speak of other types of faith. Theologians have discussed historical faith , which is a bare intellectual grasp of the claims of Scripture barren of the work of the Spirit. The apostle Paul, for example, chided King Agrippa for his belief in the Old Testament prophets but the King did not believe in Jesus, the one of whom the prophets spoke (Acts 26:27–28).

The Scriptures also speak of temporary faith , which is when a person temporarily “believes” in the gospel but later falls away. Christ’s parable of the sower captures this type of faith. The sower cast seed on rocky soil, quickly sprouted, but then died for lack of a root (Matt. 13:5–6). Christ explains that this portion of the parable corresponds to the one who “hears the word and immediately receives it with joy, yet he has no root in himself, but endures for a while, and when tribulation or persecution arises on account of the word, immediately he falls away” (Matt. 13:20–21). Christ contrasts the rocky with the good soil, which is when one hears, understands, and believes in the word and produces fruit (Matt. 13:23). Christ never states who prepares the soil, a vital element of the parable. Within the broader context of the New Testament, we know that the Spirit prepares the soil of the heart to enable sinners to believe and trust in Jesus (Eph. 2:8–9; Acts 16:14). Apart from the sovereign work of the Spirit, the best that sinful humans can do is achieve a historical or temporary faith.

A third type of faith is the faith of demons ; this category is similar to historical faith. James writes: “You believe that God is one; you do well. Even the demons believe—and shudder” (James 2:19)! In other words, demons know the facts—God exists and is sovereign over all, including their own demonic realm. Demons comprehend these facts, and the comprehension of this knowledge creates fear in them. But they refuse to believe and trust in God, and they are incapable of doing so apart from a sovereign work of God’s Spirit. All three types of faith (historical, temporary, and demons) stand in stark contrast to saving faith. The adjective saving denotes that this type of faith is a sovereign work of God’s Spirit that secures a sinner’s salvation. But how does saving faith work in the broader scope of the doctrine of salvation?

We must recognize with Scripture that faith works through love, which means that the fruit of love and obedience flows from saving faith (Gal. 5:6). But we must also acknowledge faith alone saves, not the fruit of faith. As Paul writes: “For by grace you have been saved through faith. And this is not your own doing; it is the gift of God, not a result of works, so that no one may boast” (Eph. 2:8–9). How do we relate Paul’s two different ideas, namely, that faith works by love but that we are saved by faith apart from works (Rom. 3:28, 4:6)? A historic seventeenth-century Protestant confession of faith provides a helpful distinction. The Westminster Confession of Faith (1647) explains that the “principal acts of saving faith are accepting, receiving, and resting upon Christ alone for justification, sanctification, and eternal life” (XIV.ii). In other words, saving faith does not save because of what it does but rather because of whose work in which it rests in, namely, Christ’s. The Scriptures regularly emphasize this fact from the very beginning.

When the apostle Paul expounded the doctrine of justification, how sinners can receive the forgiveness of their sins and the right and title to eternal life, he returned to the earliest pages of Scripture and the life of Abraham: “For if Abraham was justified by works, he has something to boast about, but not before God. For what does the Scripture say? ‘Abraham believed God, and it was counted to him as righteousness’” (Rom. 4:2–3). Abraham looked to the promised Messiah, saw his day from afar, and trusted in God’s promise (Gal. 3:10–14; John 8:58). And even though faith works through love (Gal. 5:6), God does not factor this love in the justification of sinners as Paul makes abundantly clear: “Now to the one who works, his wages are not counted as a gift but as his due. And to the one who does not work but believes in him who justifies the ungodly, his faith is counted as righteousness” (Rom. 4:4–5). In fact, Paul repeatedly emphasizes the crucial role of faith by using either the term faith or believe 17 times in Romans 4 alone. This should impress upon our hearts and minds that saving faith, not our works, is the only thing that can save us, not because it is inherently worthy but because by faith we lay hold of Christ’s work and thus receive his perfect suffering and obedience as the means by which we are saved. This is the way that all sinners have been saved throughout all of redemptive history, and this is the chief point of Hebrews 11. The Bible knows of no other means of salvation other than trusting in Christ and resting in his finished work. Old Testament saints looked forward to Christ and New Testament saints look backward to Christ, but all lay hold of Christ’s work through saving faith.

Further Reading

• Guy M. Richard, “ A Picture of Saving Faith ”
• J. Gresham Machen, What Is Faith ?
• John Murray, Redemption Accomplished and Applied
• John Owen, Gospel Evidences of Saving Faith
• Ligonier, “ What is Saving Faith? ”
• Paul Carter, “ What is (Saving) Faith? ”

This essay is part of the Concise Theology series. All views expressed in this essay are those of the author. This essay is freely available under Creative Commons License with Attribution-ShareAlike, allowing users to share it in other mediums/formats and adapt/translate the content as long as an attribution link, indication of changes, and the same Creative Commons License applies to that material. If you are interested in translating our content or are interested in joining our community of translators,  please reach out to us .

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Essays on Faith

Make your faith essay an opportunity to put your beliefs into perspective. Some faith essays define faith as a state of consciousness associated with the recognition of the existence of God. Other authors of essays on faith believe that faith is a person's heartfelt confidence in a certain religious truth without still clearly comprehending it with the mind. Faith in God means experiencing the words and work of God based on the belief that God is sovereign over all things. Faith gives people hope and peace of mind. Paul the Apostle taught that faith is the fulfillment of the expected and the assurance of the invisible. To help your creative process along we listed the best faith essay samples. You are welcome to check our essay samples below!

Religion and Personal Growth Religion is at the forefront of many debates in subjects such as parental duties, moral aberrations, the rights of church-affiliated schools, and the loss of personal identity. Similarly, religion has a profound effect on the personal growth of an individual. For a majority of the people, religion...

Religion entails a set of individual beliefs and cultural systems regarding practices and behaviors that ranges from sacred things, supernatural being and divine nature of a particular human culture. Hinduism, Christianity, Islam, forms of folk region as well as Buddhism are all popular and largest religions existing in the world....

Undoubtedly, religion guides us towards the right direction in our lives. It outlines what we should or should not do to grow. Even though some people tend to criticize religions, every person belongs to one. As long as a person has a set of beliefs, a world view, then they...

In the view of the existence of God There is the consideration of various things that tell the information. In this light, the presence of God shows the possibility of infinite power that is undeniable by any individual of sane mind. As God, is the superior being, all individuals and things...

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The contrast between "The wager" and The Ethics of believe. First The Wager tries to show the nonevidentialist point of view. A person has two options either a Christianity or atheism. Hence you have a choice in life either to accept God or not. The Ethics of believe reveals about...

Words: 1529

The Edinburgh 1910 World Missionary has often been considered as one of the most famous missions conferences through time. The main reason for this is that it is known as the cradle to the modern ecumenical movements. Nonetheless, it lacks denominational, gender, ethnical and geographical diversity. Despite this, it gave...

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Religion and spiritual beliefs play a critical role and significantly shape the lives of many individuals across the globe. It is believed every person has a deity they believe in and pay tribute to (Johnson 17). Prayer is the communication medium between the believers and their deity or rather a...

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Here are the Contrasts of Blaise Pascal "The Wager "nonevidentialism position and Wk. Clifford “The Ethics of Belief” (Helm, 2016). First evidentialism is the belief that for which one has the evidence while nonevidalism depends on personal evidence to justify one's belief. The argument is based on our faith the...

Words: 1514

Does God exist? One of the most significant questions that many individuals across the globe often ask themselves is whether God really exists. Various people have different beliefs on the existence of God, and this has had various implications on their morality, humanity, and destiny. However, there are several reasons to...

In the debate between evidentialism as represented by Clifford and the non-evidentialism of Blaise Pascal, William James, and Michael Bergmann, the non-evidentialist argument has more strength. The maturity of every form of belief goes through a process that is, in fact, very similar to the scientific method because in both...

This chart contains all the research you need to write the final paper for this course. If you do the research and reading on the religion(s), we study each week, and if you give yourself an excellent guide to the beliefs using this chart,...

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Debates about Fact and Faith From the times of Galileo and Humes, there have always been debates concerning fact and faith. Philosophy borrows some of its tenets from science. Some of the philosophers like Galileo believed that religion and science could exist together as all of them were from the same...

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The role of faith in spiritual growth.

• God is Faithful , Faith , Identity in Christ , God is Good , Starting with God

Everyone knows that faith plays a significant role in our spiritual growth , but practically speaking it either occupies too much or too little of our understanding. If our conception of spiritual growth is nothing more than self-effort, we will not experience life transformation.

But if every spiritual pothole is paved with “just trust God,” we will also miss out on true spiritual growth. This is not to detract from the centrality of faith in becoming more like Christ, only to understand its role, so we can better coach those whom we disciple.

In the Christian life there are certain truths that are either so formative, or so fragile, that your disciple may require special assistance in learning to hold them in the shopping cart of faith. As mature Christian we are used to toting these truths around like a handbag (such as the security of our salvation), but young Christians need to develop the spiritual muscles that we take for granted.

What follows is a partial list of these foundational truths that require the exertion of faith, and may require your assistance. It is in these areas that the need for faith is most acute and where the lack of it will have the greatest ramifications.

Faith and Forgiveness

Few of the great battles in life are ever won overnight, so it is safe to assume that your disciples will see many spiritual failures before they finally see the flag raised, hear the national anthem, take their place on the winner’s platform and the world is joined together under the Nike swoosh. It might be a small failure or a stunningly gross one, but in either case they will desperately need to experience God’s forgiveness.

The problem with many sins is that even after we’ve confessed them, it is difficult to feel cleansed, to not berate ourselves, and not suspect that God’s still fuming over the incident. When we sin we instinctively feel someone must pay a price. No one gets off easy. What we need to decide is who is going to pay. Your disciple will therefore move in one of the following directions:

• ALTERNATIVE #1 “I am pig swill.” This is one of the terms I use when beating myself up for having fallen into the same trap of sin, yet again. I’ve not copyrighted the phrase so feel free to use it. In essence, I’m crucifying myself for the sin. Yes, what Jesus did was nice, but I’m going to cover the tab—check, please. Someone must pay and rightfully it should be me, so I pound myself for my stupidity.
• ALTERATIVE #2 “You, you made me sin.” That “you” could be a person, Satan, or even God, but either way someone needs to take the fall for the sin I’ve just committed, and I’ll be darned if it’s going to be me.
• ALTERNATIVE #3 “Now that you mention it, I’m not sure that really was a sin.” Recognize that phrase? It’s called justification. As the word implies, we decide to make a judgment over and against our conscience, declaring that what we did was actually right, or at least not that wrong. Why go to the effort? Because someone must pay for sin, unless of course there is no sin and that’s what we’re shooting for in this approach: to eliminate the offense.
• ALTERNATIVE #4 “I couldn’t help myself, it’s just my personality.” Let’s call this rationalizing, which is equivalent to the courtroom plea of insanity. What I’m saying is, “Yes, it was sin, but I didn’t have the moral capacity to say ‘no.’” My personality was such, and circumstances were such, that I could do no other than what I did. The effectiveness of this strategy lies in how good you are at convincing yourself that it’s really not your fault. I’m pretty gullible, so I usually believe me.

Of course what makes this all unnecessary is that someone has already paid the price, Christ. What is needed is confession. The problem is that we can confess our sins while failing to employ faith. Faith involves a choice of the will to believe that God has forgiven us through Christ’s death, while turning a deaf ear to doubts. We reckon that God is more merciful than we can imagine and believe that through Christ’s death we are completely forgiven, and “as far as the east is from the west, so far has he removed our transgressions from us” (Psalm 103:12).

We often ask our disciples to scribble out their sins on a piece of paper, and have them write the verse 1 John 1:9 across the list, and tear up the list. I see no expiration date on this exercise. It is effective because it develops the faith component of confession: a visual aid to under gird a young and underdeveloped faith muscle. It might be useful to walk your disciples through the different responses listed above to help them see where in the process of confession, they are failing to exercise faith. You must teach them confession but you must also teach them that confession involves faith.

Faith That God Can Make You Holy

Being confident of this, that he who began a good work in you will carry it on to completion until the day of Christ Jesus. (Philippians 1:6)

Most of the great heroes of the Bible share two things in common: they all wore sandals, and they were all required to persevere in their faith, though final victory was often years in the future. We, too—no matter how many setbacks we encounter—must never waiver in our belief that God can make us holy, and, if we persevere, will ultimately lead us in triumph.

Every disciple is willing to trust God for victory over sin at least once. The problem is when the war turns into Vietnam, with infrequent victories, heavy losses, and no foreseeable exit strategy. It is at this juncture that they need to know that faith is a long-term struggle and holiness a lifelong battle. Point to the many battles of faith in scripture fought and won over years, and not days. Show them how the Promised Land was taken one battle at a time.

When victory is elusive they will need someone to help make sense of it and prepare them for the long war. Without a proper perspective, they may resolve the conflict with a ceasefire, and an acceptance of behavior far from godliness. Help them persevere in the battle believing God will, in time, bring victory.

No temptation has seized you except what is common to man. And God is faithful; he will not let you be tempted beyond what you can bear. But when you are tempted, he will also provide a way out so that you can stand up under it. (1 Corinthians 10:13)

Here is another truth into which faith must sink its teeth: we must choose to believe that our temptations and struggles are not unique and therefore never insurmountable, unfixable, or unforgivable. It is a lie to believe that any temptation is irresistible, or that we are unique in any of our struggles.

God always provides what we need to remain holy, even if it’s simply an escape hatch. Every disciple is tempted to believe that in some area of their lives, they deviate from the norm. Satan desires for us to feel alone. You might ask your disciples if they have ever felt this way or in what area they tend to think of themselves as having unique trials or temptations. Forfeit faith in this area and you’ve dangerously increased the power of sin.

Faith That All Things Work For the Good

And we know that in all things God works for the good of those who love him, who have been called according to his purpose (Romans 8:28).

The next battle of faith is for all those who have experienced damage in their lives, or within themselves, due to sin. God can take any manure and from it grow a garden, as you participate in this promise by faith. While it may be impossible to imagine how God can bring good out of our train wreck of past and present failures, this is hardly a limiting factor. For God can do “immeasurably more than all we ask or imagine” (Ephesians 3:20).

There is no limit to God’s capacity to redeem evil. Everything in our past can be taken and used for good. Every failure (like Peter’s failures) can be transformed by God’s mercy. Every weakness (like Paul’s weaknesses) can be a vehicle for God to demonstrate His strength. Though we must persevere in faith, and sometimes for years, the equation will always add up: crap + God = life. And faith is the means by which God enters the equation.

Through the examples of biblical characters such as Peter and Paul, and through examples from your own life, you must help your disciples strap on the shield of faith against the lie that anything in their lives is unredeemable, gratuitous, or random.

Faith in Our Reward

Now, there is in store for me the crown of righteousness, which the Lord, the righteous Judge, will award to me on that day — and not only to me, but also to all who have longed for his appearing (2 Timothy 4:8).

Some years ago I was in China and like any tourist I visited the Great Wall. Along the bottom of the wall, a worker of this communist country was picking up trash. I clocked him at one piece of trash a minute, which at that rate would have taken him longer to clear the grounds than it took to build the Great Wall.

Where we visited included a maze of concession stands, tons of them—Great Concession stands. Someone told me that those who operated the stands employed principles of the free market, meaning that the more they sold and the more they charged for what they sold, the more they profited. One of the women at the booths actually grabbed my coat and dragged me to her counter. It would be an understatement to say that it was a motivated workforce.

The difference between these two workers was a chasm. Let’s call it the Great Chasm. One worked like a sluggard because he knew that he would always make the same amount no matter what he did (communism). The other worker knew that her effort would be rewarded (the free market).

The doctrine of eternal security (that we can never lose our salvation) was never meant to negate the teaching of rewards. In many places in the Bible, God makes it clear that our obedience and faithfulness will be rewarded. We are called to exercise faith in future rewards, choosing to believe that our actions or inaction will be compensated. When our minds move down the trail of “what difference will this really make?” the response of faith is—a lot. We are not told what these rewards will be, but simply given the assurance that it will be worth our while.

Teaching our disciples to maintain an eternal perspective, or to live for eternity, can cultivate their faith toward this truth, provided that our definition of what is eternal encompasses far more than evangelism, for Jesus states that even a cup of water given in his name will not fail to be rewarded.

Faith in God's Goodness

“For I know the plans I have for you,” declares the LORD, “plans to prosper you and not to harm you, plans to give you hope and a future (Jeremiah 29:11).

If you go back to the Garden of Eden (which is probably now a parking lot in downtown Baghdad), you will notice that the first sin was a distrust of God’s goodness. Adam and Eve became convinced that God was holding out on them. Eating from the tree was in their best interests. The foundation of most sin is a lack of faith in God’s goodness, and disbelief that His plans for us are really best.

When things are going wrong, we justify our sin with self-pity. We find ourselves thinking, “Well, I’m going to do this because God isn’t taking care of me anyway, and rather than helping, He’s allowing my life to disintegrate.” Such reasoning is designed by our scheming mind to bring us to a sense of entitlement to sin.

More innocuously, many of us fall prey to pessimism and distrust that what lies in wait over the time horizon is anything but good, often brought on by a nagging suspicion that God never did forget our sin, and payday is right around the bend.

We must fight the battle to deny or disbelieve God’s goodness, with faith, never giving an inch. Everything God does in our lives is motivated by love, and any minor deconstruction of that truth is a lie that can have serious ramifications.

In helping your disciples with this struggle, you might ask some questions to discover if their mind has a proclivity to move down this path. You might also share in what ways you tend to doubt the goodness of God. Intimacy with Christ is the best answer to any and all doubts of His goodness. When we feel close to Christ, we sense that He is on our side, and when we feel distant, we come to suspect that He is not.

Memorizing scripture is great, but passages of scripture are animated by our intimacy with Christ.

Identity: Identity Theft

“I got me some of them mud flaps with the naked ladies on them. Ohhh mamacita.”

In a series of ads for Citibank’s identity theft program, the viewer sits and listens to the thief who, having stolen the person’s credit card number, recounts their various bizarre purchases and exploits. What makes the ads humorous as well as memorable is the thief’s story is told (lip-synced) through the identity theft victim, sitting forlornly mouthing the words.

In some way we are all victims of identity theft. Having trusted Christ, we are heirs with Christ of all that is in Him. Most of us never fully grasp what God’s Word says is true of us in Christ, or worse, we simply don’t think about it. We are children of God, chosen before time to be in the family of God, yet these concepts don’t make it to the starting line-up of thoughts that propel us into the day.

In the movie "Cheaper by the Dozen," the youngest child is treated as the family outcast. The other kids call him “FedEx” because they suspect he was adopted and simply delivered to the family, not born into it. Over the course of time he begins to believe it, rumors become a lie, and the lie grows in power until he runs away from the family believing he has no place within it. There’s a message from an otherwise boring movie: our identity matters.

Our faith in our identity in Christ is absolutely foundational to our lives. Faith is fed by reading the Bible. “The Daily Affirmation of Faith” was written to provide a concise, clear statement of the truth of God’s Word as it applies to our victory in Christ (what is true of us in Him). Commend it to your disciples for daily reading particularly during times of deep trials and temptation when they are most prone to forget who they truly are, and believe things about themselves and God which are not true.

The Daily Affirmation of Faith

Today I deliberately choose to submit myself fully to God as He has made Himself known to me through the Holy Scripture, which I honestly accept as the only inspired, infallible, authoritative standard for all life and practice. In this day I will not judge God, His work, myself, or others on the basis of feelings or circumstances.

I recognize by faith that the triune God is worthy of all honor, praise, and worship as the Creator, Sustainer, and End of all things. I confess that God, as my Creator, made me for Himself. In this day, I therefore choose to live for Him. (Revelation 5:9-10; Isaiah 43:1,7,21; Revelation 4:11)

I recognize by faith that God loved me and chose me in Jesus Christ before time began (Ephesians 1:1-7).

I recognize by faith that God has proven His love to me in sending His Son to die in my place, in whom every provision has already been made for my past, present, and future needs through His representative work, and that I have been quickened, raised, seated with Jesus Christ in the heavenlies, and anointed with the Holy Spirit (Romans 5:6-11; 8:28; Philippians 1:6; 4:6,7,13,19; Ephesians 1:3; 2:5,6; Acts 2:1-4,33).

I recognize by faith that God has accepted me, since I have received Jesus Christ as my Savior and Lord (John 1:12; Ephesians 1:6); that He has forgiven me (Ephesians 1:7); adopted me into His family, assuming every responsibility for me (John 17:11,17; Ephesians 1:5; Philippians 1:6); given me eternal life (John 3:36; 1 John 5:9-13); applied the perfect righteousness of Christ to me so that I am now justified (Romans 5:1; 8:3-4; 10:4); made me complete in Christ (Colossians 2:10); and offers Himself to me as my daily sufficiency through prayer and the decisions of faith (1 Corinthians 1:30; Colossians 1:27; Galatians 2:20; John 14:13-14; Matthew 21:22; Romans 6:1-19; Hebrews 4:1-3,11).

I recognize by faith that the Holy Spirit has baptized me into the body of Christ (1 Corinthians 12:13); sealed me (Ephesians 1:13-14); anointed me for life and service (Acts 1:8; John 7:37-39); seeks to lead me into a deeper walk with Jesus Christ (John 14:16-18; 15:26-27; 16:13-15; Romans 8:11-16); and to fill my life with Himself (Ephesians 5:18).

I recognize by faith that only God can deal with sin and only God can produce holiness of life. I confess that in my salvation my part was only to receive Him and that He dealt with my sin and saved me. Now I confess that in order to live a holy life, I can only surrender to His will and receive Him as my sanctification; trusting Him to do whatever may be necessary in my life, without and within, so I may be enabled to live today in purity, freedom, rest and power for His glory. (John 1:12; 1 Corinthians 1:30; 2 Corinthians 9:8; Galatians 2:20; Hebrew 4:9; 1 John 5:4; Jude 24).

Our Salvation

We’ll conclude with the most fundamental of truths, and ground zero for faith. All things build upon this.

Yet to all who received him, to those who believed in his name, he gave the right to become children of God (John 1:12).

I write these things to you who believe in the name of the Son of God so that you may know that you have eternal life (1 John 5:13).

In describing our spiritual armor, Paul uses a helmet to illustrate the truth of our salvation: that which protects the mind, and protects us from a fatal blow. We make it a critical part of basic follow-up, because scripture affirms that it is. Let your disciples doubt that Iraq had weapons of mass destruction. Let them doubt that the Cubs will ever win a World Series. But, rehearse this with them until that helmet cannot be pried off their head.

How Faith Grows

Faith is like a muscle; it grows by lifting weights. Weights are the resistance—the doubts, mental whispers, and circumstances that tell us the opposite of what faith must believe.

When God seems absent and horrible circumstances swirl around us, everything seems to shout, “God isn’t here! And if He is, He certainly doesn’t care.” In those circumstances, faith curls the barbell toward the heart and says, “No, God is good. He is for me. He has a plan.” Thus, it is the circumstances adverse to our faith that become the vehicle for our growth—they are the weight on the barbell.

And so all disciples are periodically tossed into a boat and sent out into a raging storm, where God is conspicuous by his absence. We are not trying to rescue our disciples from the situations and circumstances that will cause faith to grow. Our role is to come alongside them, strengthen their feeble arms and help them to curl the heavy weights that will cause their faith to bulk-up. (I think I just described a steroid.)

God provides the weight (adverse circumstances and trials), but they must continue to lift the weight. We must spot them helping them push out more repetitions than they thought possible while making sure the barbell doesn’t pin them to the bench-press.

Alternatively, faith grows through new challenges and we serve our disciples well by calling them into circumstances where they will need to trust and rely on God. They take courageous steps, God shows Himself faithful, and their faith grows.

Through the stress and strain of faith development, the truths discussed in this article are the most common fracture points, and the places your disciples may most need your encouragement to wind their way up the hill of faith.

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Essay on Faith for Students and Children in 1100 Words

May 7, 2020 by ReadingJunction 1 Comment

In this article, we have published an Essay on Faith for Students and Children in 1100 Words. It includes meaning, types, benefits, and importance of faith.

So, let’s start this inspirational Essay on Faith…

Table of Contents

Introduction (Essay on Faith – 1100 Word )

Faith and belief is a way of considering or believing in anyone. Mostly faith word is used for God or any unseen power or any spiritual person. Since its origin of this earth, human used to follow the faith system or God or any blind faith.

People have different faith in different power from time to time. Faith depends upon their belief and understanding . Faith always plays a crucial role in our day-to-day life.

What is Faith?

This word “faith” can be explained in many ways. The meaning of faith is different according to the uses of the word. In a simple concept, we know faith as confidence or belief, which can be on anyone or anything.

Is most of the cases it faith refers to a religious system in the world. In old times and current time, belief and faith are common, and people have faith in God, and some do not have faith in God.

Types of Faith

Nowadays, there are various types of faith and belief in the world. Many religions and non-religious people also have faith and trust in someone. The trust and faith is an idea of believing to anyone without seeing that.

1. Blind Faith

The term of blind faith used when someone believes with no reason and evidence and any logic. There are some reasons on the side but not having any base of that. This is a traditional faith which people follow.

For example, if someone says that this doctor is right, then others will believe in their statement without checking and with no reason. Mostly in blind faith, it happens, and people follow blindly. 

We observe this blind faith in the religious field. If any spiritual leader explains anything to their follower with no philosophy and reason, their followers will trust and trusts him blindly. If anybody raises the cross-question against him, they become an enemy of that person. So it is called that blind faith is perilous.

In Indian reference this is common. We usually see that a person killed someone or his kids as a sacrifice before the idol goddess on the advice of any priest. This is because he has faith in that person blindly. Here, they not used their mind and logic.

2. Religious Faith

We relate this faith and belief to any religion. In this faith, people of a particular religion have faith in their system of religion and its natural or supernatural power. This is a spiritual belief of this faith. There is a unique type of religion in the world. Followers of this religion follow their system and believe in God and its power.

In religious belief, people follow the rules because they have faith. For example, Christians wear the cross symbol mostly because of having faith in it. In Islam, also people use a cap or cover his head during the prayer and having a beard. Women used to wear a unique dress to cover the complete body as they believe in the ruling of a religious system.

The population of having faith in religion in the world is increasing fast. In this futuristic time, you’ll find a vast number of people who follow Christianity and Islam in the world. In religious faith and belief, people of that religion accept the spiritual and supernatural power. They believe in the holy books of those religions.

Benefits of faith

Faith, whether it is religious faith or blind faith, it has some common positive characteristics which provide the right thing and guidance to the followers. 

1. Increase Unity

If some people or group of people having faith in anything, then their unity increases. They collect at a place on a particular time for any meeting, spiritual conference and teaching classes.

They discuss together and solve the issues related to their belief and their group or community. So we can see it that unity increases the unity between the people.

2. Increase Hope

Hope increases the hope is the key to faith. If faith has its existence, then the hope exists there. Without hope, faith is not valid and meaningless. Followers or believers accept the rules and religious cultures because they see the glimpse of hope it.

Hope is there in many faiths. In blind also people keep their promise. In religious, also people have great faith for their wishes and betterment of the world and humanity.

3. Provides Inner strength

Faith and trust provide a lot of moral support and inner satisfaction and power. The faith and trust provide the opportunity to be selfless and to be helpful for others. The faith offers to the people to see and search for life and the purpose of life. 

Importance of faith 

Faith is essential in life. Nobody can ignore faith. People have faith, and trust in any object, people, natural or supernatural powers, religion. Faith and belief are a natural and God gifted quality and requirement of the human. 

Faith is essential for life. The human came in the world and living here for any definite purpose, and they have the faith they by doing this, they can go ahead. They always keep a hope of faith that this thing will help him or will support him.

Faith is essential for development. Faith is a pillar of growth. If people have faith in any system, they follow the policy of that object conscientiously to fulfill the purpose of that task. Suppose if anybody has the principle that by listening to any poem or verses of any teaching of any religion, then he will seriously with great hope. 

People in religious faith follow the rules of their religion because of faith. But some people or group of people change the system and rule in the manner as per their wish. Faith is always giving hope and confidence, whether it is blind faith or religious faith. 

Conclusion 

At last, it can be seen and analyzed that the word faith is interesting and helpful for all of us. Faith connects every person in the world. Any individual, student, Army, spiritual leaders and religious member all are involved in the system of faith.

The category or types of faith depends upon the follower. In the world, everybody should have faith and trust. Without this, they cannot live positively, and their life will become worse and hopeless. Hopelessness is a curse. I hope you liked this essay on faith. Thanks for reading.

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Essay on Faith

Essay Examples

Faith is hope, faith is believing, faith is you know it is going to happen you just do not know when and how it is going to happen. One should always believe and trust in themselves and hold onto faith in their challenging period because that is exactly the point of faith, “it works”. Faith is aspiration that an individual has, that decides how the individual chooses to lead his life.

Faith gives power and strength to accept the failures of life to the individual, it gives them motivation and eagerness to achieve the goals of life and it comes from within the individual it cannot be taught or forced on anyone. When one’s faith is low or lost then he must be prepared for, as the failure is approaching.

Faith works as the base of any task / operation and if one is lacking the base which is faith, does not matter what skills or capabilities an individual has he cannot achieve its task / goals. Of course, having faith does not mean that your tasks or your life is going to be easy but by having faith you get strength to face those difficulties and hardship that may come in your way.

Lack of faith will lead to hopelessness which can affect the individual of how he sees himself and others. Hopelessness usually make a person negative he no longer feel the importance of things which once was precious to him, it is a powerful emotion that can influence an individual in suicidal thoughts, depression, anxiety, eating disorder it all leads to poor mental and physical health of the individual.

Faith does not need to be religious or non-religious it just makes your struggles, difficult times easy for the individual by giving them hope, people have faith in themselves, in others, in the God, does not matter who do you have faith in, the only thing that matters is that you believe something or someone.

If you have faith in yourself then you will follow your dreams and make them real, if you believe in yourself then you will also have faith in others that way others will also believe in you and if you have faith in God then you will also have faith in his timing, he will make you calm, make you believe that he is with you all the time, he takes control of all your struggles and worries and tells you to stop stressing yourself out and trust him.

With a little courage, hard work and faith by your side you can make the unachievable possible. Faith keeps your heart alive, it clears out the sadness, hopelessness and darkness away from you and bring happiness, hopefulness, calmness and satisfaction.

To sum up everything that has been stated so far, we all have faith in something or someone there are all sorts of faith and you must choose whatever makes your heart at ease.

“Faith demands you to believe in something you cannot see. You choose!”

-Bob proctor

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Faith, often associated with strong belief or trust in a particular religion, ideology, or individual, holds a significant place in human culture and psyche. Essays on faith might delve into its role in religious practice, the philosophical and theological explorations of faith, or the psychological and social functions of faith in individuals and communities. Other discussions might explore the challenges to faith in contemporary society, the relationship between faith and reason, or the depiction of faith in literature, art, and media. Comparative analyses of faith across different religious or cultural traditions, or explorations of faith in personal narratives and historical events could provide a comprehensive understanding of this profound human experience. A substantial compilation of free essay instances related to Faith you can find at PapersOwl Website. You can use our samples for inspiration to write your own essay, research paper, or just to explore a new topic for yourself.

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Harrison Butker’s commencement speech and the danger of a Catholic ‘dead traditionalism’

Well, it isn’t the first time that Harrison Butker has missed wide right .

Last weekend, the placekicker for the Super Bowl champion Kansas City Chiefs delivered the commencement address to the class of 2024 at Benedictine College in Atchison, Kan.

Benedictine College was recently featured in a report from the Associated Press under the headline, “ ‘A step back in time': America’s Catholic Church sees an immense shift toward the old ways .” Enrollment at the school has doubled in the last 20 years, and it boasts a vibrant Catholic life in both its curriculum and extracurriculars.

“[A]t Benedictine, Catholic teaching on contraception can slip into lessons on Plato, and no one is surprised if you volunteer for 3 a.m. prayers,” the A.P. reports. “Pornography, pre-marital sex and sunbathing in swimsuits are forbidden.”

Mr. Butker, who has been vocal about his devout Catholic faith, pro-life views and love of the traditional Latin Mass throughout his N.F.L. career, was a natural pick for the school, and his address was applauded by many in the audience.

But outside what some students call “the Benedictine bubble,” Mr. Butker’s remarks on several culture war issues were less well received. On May 15, the N.F.L. distanced itself from the address, saying in a statement that “[Mr. Butker’s] views are not those of the NFL as an organization. The NFL is steadfast in our commitment to inclusion, which only makes our league stronger.”

In secular outlets, Mr. Butker’s discussion of gender roles caught the most attention. Addressing the “ladies” in the class of 2024, he said:

Some of you may go on to lead successful careers in the world, but I would venture to guess that the majority of you are most excited about your marriage and the children you will bring into this world. I can tell you that my beautiful wife Isabelle would be the first to say her life truly started when she started living her vocation as a wife and as a mother.

He mentioned that while his wife’s dream of a career has not come true, she has excelled in “the most important” role of “homemaker.”

Mr. Butker also spoke out against “bad policies and poor leadership [that] have negatively impacted major life issues. Things like abortion, I.V.F., surrogacy, euthanasia, as well as a growing support for the degenerate cultural values and media all stem from the pervasiveness of disorder.”

While Mr. Butker’s address has drawn a great deal of media attention for the ways his worldview clashes with mainstream liberal opinion, it’s worth noting that just as much of what he said pushed beyond what might be considered “traditional” Catholic beliefs.

Mr. Butker casually mentions that “Congress just passed a bill where stating something as basic as the biblical teaching of who killed Jesus could land you in jail,” a not-so-thinly veiled reference to a recent bill passed in the House to combat antisemitism.

Representative Marjorie Taylor Greene has criticized the bill because she believes it “could convict Christians of antisemitism for believing the Gospel that says Jesus was handed over to Herod to be crucified by the Jews.”

The Catholic Church teaches that the Jews are not responsible for killing Jesus. In “ Nostra Aetate ,” the Second Vatican Council’s declaration on interfaith relations, the church teaches that “what happened in [Jesus’] passion cannot be charged against all the Jews, without distinction, then alive, nor against the Jews of today.”

Mr. Butker also pushed the envelope in his comments on birth control. Most people know the Catholic Church is against artificial contraception. The church does , however, support the practice of natural family planning, which the U.S. Conference of Catholic Bishops outlined in a document marking the 25th anniversary of “ Humanae Vitae ”:

With proper instruction, married couples can readily understand the cycle of fertility and they are able to plan and space births in a way that is both consistent with God's law and supportive of their own intimacy and unity.

Mr. Butker seemed to suggest that even practicing N.F.P. is not Catholic enough for him:

Heterodox ideas abound even within Catholic circles, but let’s be honest, there is nothing good about playing God with having children, whether that be your ideal number or the perfect time to conceive. No matter how you spin it, there is nothing natural about Catholic birth control (emphasis mine).

Finally, Mr. Butker is not shy about his liturgical preferences. He unabashedly discusses his love for the traditional Latin Mass ( a love that I once shared ) and encourages students to seek it out to bring order to their lives. He says:

I do not attend the T.L.M. because I think I am better than others or for the smells and bells or even for the love of Latin. I attend the T.L.M. because I believe just as the God of the Old Testament was pretty particular and how he wanted to be worshiped, the same holds true for us today.

Pope Francis, with his motu proprio “Traditionis Custodes,” restricted the celebration of the T.L.M. Mr. Butker has a solution for the graduates: Don’t simply consider cost-of-living when deciding where to live after graduation—seek out a place where the T.L.M. is readily available. This advice suggests that God has perhaps not spoken through an ecumenical council or subsequent popes who have moved the church away from the traditional Latin Mass. It’s one thing to prefer the Latin Mass. It’s another to argue that the “Novus Ordo” just won’t cut it.

Near the end of his speech, Mr. Butker tells the graduates, “Everything I am saying to you is not from a place of wisdom but rather a place of experience.” But to my ear, his speech sounds less like the result of experience than an all-encompassing ideology. There is no other reason that gender roles, Covid-19 policies, liturgical preferences and abortion should all fall under the same coherent theme of a commencement address. Unless, of course, you wear your views like a team uniform—and everyone who disagrees is an opponent if not an enemy to be defeated.

There are many Catholics that do have opinions that fall on the conservative side of the political spectrum, and Catholics who have liturgical and devotional practices that borrow more from the Middle Ages than the St. Louis Jesuits. Oftentimes, those preferences do not even overlap.

But the ideology espoused by Mr. Butker goes beyond that. It reminds me of what Pope Francis has warned about repeatedly throughout his pontificate. Here he is in 2022 :

...there is the fashion—in every age, but in this age in the Church’s life I consider it dangerous—that instead of drawing from the roots in order to move forward—meaning fine traditions—we “step back,” not going up or down, but backwards. This “back-stepping” makes us a sect; it makes you “closed” and cuts off your horizons. Those people call themselves guardians of traditions, but of dead traditions. The true Catholic Christian and human tradition is what that fifth-century theologian [Saint Vincent of Lerins] described as a constant growth: throughout history tradition grows, progresses: ut annis consolidetur, dilatetur tempore, sublimetur aetate . That is authentic tradition, which progresses with our children.

Without a doubt, there are things in our culture that the church should stand against. But we should beware that we do not close ourselves off to the world in doing that. For my money, if the church has any chance of growth in our culture, it will need to come from attraction—from beautiful liturgies, yes, but also from our humble service to the vulnerable and prophetic calls for a more just society. And for all the media coverage and viral TikToks about his speech, there was not much in there that was attractive. Mr. Butker quoted the lyrics of his “teammate’s girlfriend” (Taylor Swift), “familiarity breeds contempt.” But he demonstrated what contempt for the outside world breeds.

One of the few pieces of advice that was not controversial was one he seemed to ignore: “Being locked in with your vocation and staying in your lane is going to be the surest way for you to find true happiness and peace in this life.”

How’s that for a kicker?

Zac Davis is an associate editor and the senior director for digital strategy for America. He also co-hosts the podcast, Jesuitical. 

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Vatican releases new norms on alleged supernatural phenomena

By Vatican News

A new document from the Dicastery for the Doctrine of the Faith published on Friday, May 17, has updated the norms for discerning alleged supernatural phenomena . The norms come into force on Sunday, May 19, the feast of Pentecost.

The document is preceded by a detailed presentation by Cardinal Víctor Manuel Fernández, Prefect of the Dicastery, followed by an introduction and six possible conclusions. The procedure allows for faster decisions while respecting popular devotion.

As a rule, the Church’s authority will no longer be engaged to officially define the supernatural nature of a phenomenon, a process that can require large amounts time to thoroughly study an event.

Another new norm involves the explicit involvement of the Dicastery for the Doctrine of the Faith, which must approve the local bishop’s final decision and which has the authority to intervene motu proprio at any time.

Many cases in recent decades have involved the former Holy Office, even when individual bishops have expressed themselves. However, the interventions have usually remained behind the scenes and were never made public.

The Dicastery’s new explicit involvement also relates to the difficulty in circumscribing phenomena, which in some cases reach national and even global dimensions, “meaning that a decision made in one Diocese has consequences also elsewhere.”

Reasons for the new norms

The document originates from the long experience of the last century, which saw cases where the local bishop (or bishops of a region) rapidly declared a phenomenon’s supernatural nature, only for the Holy Office to express a different decision later. Other cases involved a bishop saying one thing and his successor deciding the opposite (regarding the same phenomenon).

Each event also required lengthy discernment periods to evaluate all elements in order to reach a decision on the supernatural nature or non-supernatural nature of the phenomena. These time periods sometimes contrasted with the urgency to give pastoral responses for the good of the faithful.

The Dicastery began revising the norms in 2019, leading to the current text approved by Pope Francis on May 4.

Spiritual fruits and risks

In his presentation, Cardinal Fernández explains that, “many times, these events have led to a great richness of spiritual fruits, growth in faith, devotion, fraternity, and service. In some cases, they have given rise to shrines throughout the world that are at the heart of many people’s popular piety today.”

However, there is also the possibility that “in some events of alleged supernatural origin,” serious issues that harm the faithful may arise. These include cases where from the alleged phenomena, “profit, power, fame, social recognition, or other personal interest” (II, Art. 15, 4°) are derived, even to the point of “exerting control over people or carrying out abuses (II, Art. 16).”

There may be “doctrinal errors, an oversimplification of the Gospel message, or the spread of a sectarian mentality.” There is the possibility of believers “being misled by an event that is attributed to a divine initiative but is merely the product of someone’s imagination, desire for novelty, tendency to fabricate falsehoods (mythomania), or inclination toward lying.”

General guidelines

According to the new norms, the Church will exercise her duties of discernment, based on the following:

“(a) whether signs of a divine action can be ascertained in phenomena that are alleged to be of supernatural origin; (b) whether there is anything that conflicts with faith and morals in the writings or messages of those involved in the alleged phenomena in question; (c) whether it is permissible to appreciate their spiritual fruits, whether they need to be purified from problematic elements, or whether the faithful should be warned about potential risks; (d) whether it is advisable for the competent ecclesiastical authority to realize their pastoral value” (I, 10).

However, “it is not foreseen in these Norms that ecclesiastical authority would give a positive recognition of the divine origin of alleged supernatural phenomena” (I, 11).

Therefore, as a rule, “neither the Diocesan Bishop, nor the Episcopal Conferences, nor the Dicastery will declare that these phenomena are of supernatural origin, even if a Nihil obstat is granted. It remains true, however, that the Holy Father can authorize a special procedure in this regard” (I, 23).

Possible conclusions regarding an alleged phenomenon

The discernment of an alleged supernatural phenomenon may reach the following six conclusions.

- Nihil Obstat : Without expressing any certainty about the supernatural authenticity of the phenomenon itself, many signs of the action of the Holy Spirit are acknowledged. The bishop is encouraged to appreciate the pastoral value and promote the dissemination of the phenomenon, including pilgrimages;

- Prae oculis habeatur : Although important positive signs are recognized, some aspects of confusion or potential risks are also perceived that require the diocesan bishop to engage in a careful discernment and dialogue with the recipients of a given spiritual experience. If there were writings or messages, doctrinal clarification might be necessary;

- Curatur : Various or significant critical elements are noted, but the phenomenon is already spread widely, and verifiable spiritual fruits are connected to it. Therefore, a ban that could upset the faithful is not recommended, but the local bishop is advised not to encourage the phenomenon;

- Sub mandato : The critical issues are not connected to the phenomenon itself but to its improper use by people or groups, such as undue financial gain or immoral acts. The Holy See entrusts the pastoral leadership of the specific place to the diocesan bishop or a delegate;

- Prohibetur et obstruatur : Despite various positive elements, the critical issues and risks associated with this phenomenon appear to be very serious. The Dicastery asks the local bishop to offer a catechesis that can help the faithful understand the reasons for the decision and reorient their legitimate spiritual concerns;

- Declaratio de non supernaturalitate : The Dicastery for the Doctrine of the Faith authorizes the local bishop to declare that the phenomenon is found to be not supernatural based on concrete facts and evidence, such as the confession of an alleged visionary or credible testimonies of fabrication of the phenomenon.

Procedures to follow

The new norms then indicate the procedures to be implemented. It is up to the diocesan bishop to examine cases and submit their judgment to the Dicastery for approval. The bishop is asked to refrain from making public declarations about the authenticity or supernatural nature and to ensure there is no confusion or sensationalism.

If the elements of the case “seem sufficient,” the diocesan bishop will then set up an investigative commission, which should include at least one theologian, one canonist, and an expert chosen based on the nature of the phenomenon.

Positive and negative criteria

The document lays out several positive criteria to evaluate the alleged supernatural phenomenon.

These include: “the credibility and good reputation of the persons who claim to be recipients of supernatural events or to be directly involved in them, as well as the reputation of the witnesses who have been heard...; the doctrinal orthodoxy of the phenomenon and any messages related to it; the unpredictable nature of the phenomenon, by which it is evident that it is not the result of the initiative of the people involved; and, fruits of the Christian life” (II, 14).

The negative criteria involve: “the possibility of a manifest error about the event; potential doctrinal errors...; a sectarian spirit that breeds division in the Church; an overt pursuit of profit, power, fame, social recognition, or other personal interest closely linked to the event; gravely immoral actions…; psychological alterations or psychopathic tendencies in the person that may have exerted an influence on the alleged supernatural event; and, any psychosis, collective hysteria, and other elements traceable to a pathological context” (II, 15).

Finally, “the use of purported supernatural experiences or recognized mystical elements as a means of or a pretext for exerting control over people or carrying out abuses” (II, 16) is considered of particular moral gravity.

Regardless of the final approved determination, the diocesan bishop “must continue to watch over the phenomenon and the people involved, exercising his ordinary power” (II, 24).

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• The Regulatory Review In Depth

The Good-Faith Assumption Online

Scholar argues that online platforms should foster positive user experiences through self-regulation.

Disinformation, cyber bullying, and online harassment—these bad-faith activities are likely what first come to many people’s minds when considering what characterizes today’s online environment.

Despite the prevalence of bad-faith activities, many online platforms assume that users act in good faith. Wikipedia, for example, announces on its project page that “it is the assumption that editors’ edits and comments are made in good faith—that is, the assumption that people are not deliberately trying to hurt Wikipedia, even when their actions are harmful.”

Is it time, though, for policymakers and online platforms to revisit the good-faith assumption?

At least one law professor says “no.” Policymakers should not intervene, and platforms should maintain their good-faith assumptions, argues Eric Goldman in a recent article .

Goldman, a professor at Santa Clara University School of Law , explains that governmental intervention could be counterproductive in curbing bad-faith activities. He argues instead that online platforms should self-regulate and proposes several tools they could use to foster a positive online community.

Goldman identifies two characteristics of the early internet that allowed online platforms to assume users act in good faith: the homogeneous demographic of platform users and their small population. Goldman argues that users’ lack of diversity made it easier for platform designers to anticipate and discourage bad-faith activities. Users were also less likely to engage in bad-faith activities because less money and fame were at stake owing to their relatively small population.

Over the past three decades, however, platform users have diversified and the number of users has surged, making it difficult for online platforms to continue assuming users’ good faith, argues Goldman.

Goldman acknowledges that bad-faith actors are prevalent in today’s online communities. They spread disinformation for political or financial gains. Furthermore, they exploit the anonymity of the online environment to engage in unlawful conduct such as cyber bullying or harassment.

Goldman highlights the fact that policymakers around the world are increasingly requiring online platforms to manage user-generated content in the wake of rampant online harassment and disinformation. The United Kingdom’s Online Safety Act , for example, imposes a duty of care on online platforms to prevent harmful behavior. Similarly, the European Union’s Digital Services Act requires online platforms to mitigate harms arising from user-generated content by establishing a reporting system.

Goldman contends that such regulations are problematic because they fail to encourage good-faith activities. Goldman notes that because bad-faith activities inevitably occur online, such regulations require online platforms to view every user as a potential threat capable of creating liability. As a result, online platforms must harden their content moderation practices, driving good-faith actors away while failing to manage bad-faith actors, explains Goldman.

In contrast, Goldman argues that the U.S. regulatory framework—Section 230 of the Communications Decency Act —is more appropriate than its European counterparts because it allows online platforms to manage their user-generated content through self-regulation.

The Section 230 regime ensures that platforms will not be held liable for the user-generated

content that they disseminate or their decisions to take down offensive or harmful user-generated content—such as obscenity, violence, and harassment—so long as the platforms do so in good faith.

Such a design allows online platforms to assume users’ good faith without imposing liability for the inevitable bad-faith activities that come along, argues Goldman. Furthermore, Goldman explains that Section 230 provides online platforms with incentives to experiment with different site designs to attract good-faith users and combat bad-faith activities, knowing that they are immune from liability.

In light of the Section 230 regime, which allows online platforms to explore various tools to attract good-faith actors through self-regulation, Goldman argues that online platforms’ design choices should be driven by platforms’ business objectives, not legal concerns. Online platforms have strong incentives to respond to users’ interests because they profit from users’ engagement. Consequently, users ultimately benefit when platforms are able to determine the best solution for the community, contends Goldman.

Goldman proposes several self-regulatory mechanisms that he argues would allow online platforms to detect and deter bad-faith actors.

First, online platforms can embrace a “trust-and-safety by design” approach. Trust and safety refers to the set of business practices protecting platform users from harmful content and behavior. Under this approach, platforms’ in-house trust-and-safety and content review teams work in the initial stages of platform development to minimize the prevalence and impact of malicious actors after the platform’s launch, explains Goldman.

Second, online platforms can opt for a user-driven approach. Youtube, for example, allows users to report problematic content from other users. Such an approach, however, may sometimes do more harm than good because users could weaponize the reporting system to remove legitimate content, cautions Goldman.

Third, Goldman argues that online platforms could channel users toward positive behavior with structural design choices. Instagram, for example, encourages users attempting to post content that may violate community guidelines to reconsider their post by sending them notifications reminding them of the rules.

Goldman notes that market mechanisms can also serve as examples of promising structural design. For example, online platforms that pay users for content could discourage bad-faith submissions by only paying users with positive reputations or by introducing obstacles in the content submission process to make illegitimate submissions less profitable.

Finally, Goldman underscores the importance of platforms recruiting people from diverse backgrounds for their development teams. Goldman notes that a homogeneous development team can have significant blind spots. In contrast, diversifying such teams and taking differing perspectives seriously during the development process can help platforms produce more comprehensive, effective content moderation plans, explains Goldman.

Goldman concludes by conceding that although self-regulation is preferrable to governmental intervention, it is imperfect. He acknowledges that it is impossible for online platforms to lay out perfect structural designs from the beginning, and instead urges that online platforms must constantly revise their designs based on new developments, evidence, and experience.

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