tohoku tsunami case study

Case Study: How does Japan live with earthquakes?

Japan lies within one of the most tectonically active zones in the world. It experiences over 400 earthquakes every day. The majority of these are not felt by humans and are only detected by instruments. Japan has been hit by a number of high-intensity earthquakes in the past. Since 2000 there are have been 16000 fatalities as the result of tectonic activity.

Japan is located on the Pacific Ring of Fire, where the North American, Pacific, Eurasian and Philippine plates come together. Northern Japan is on top of the western tip of the North American plate. Southern Japan sits mostly above the Eurasian plate. This leads to the formation of volcanoes such as Mount Unzen and Mount Fuji. Movements along these plate boundaries also present the risk of tsunamis to the island nation. The Pacific Coastal zone, on the east coast of Japan, is particularly vulnerable as it is very densely populated.

The 2011 Japan Earthquake: Tōhoku

Japan experienced one of its largest seismic events on March 11 2011. A magnitude 9.0 earthquake occurred 70km off the coast of the northern island of Honshu where the Pacific and North American plate meet. It is the largest recorded earthquake to hit Japan and is in the top five in the world since records began in 1900. The earthquake lasted for six minutes.

A map to show the location of the 2011 Japan Earthquake

The earthquake had a significant impact on the area. The force of the megathrust earthquake caused the island of Honshu to move east 2.4m. Parts of the Japanese coastline dr[[ed by 60cm. The seabed close to the focus of the earthquake rose by 7m and moved westwards between 40-50m. In addition to this, the earthquake shifted the Earth 10-15cm on its axis.

The earthquake triggered a tsunami which reached heights of 40m when it reached the coast. The tsunami wave reached 10km inland in some places.

What were the social impacts of the Japanese earthquake in 2011?

The tsunami in 2011 claimed the lives of 15,853 people and injured 6023. The majority of the victims were over the age of 60 (66%). 90% of the deaths was caused by drowning. The remaining 10% died as the result of being crushed in buildings or being burnt. 3282 people were reported missing, presumed dead.

Disposing of dead bodies proved to be very challenging because of the destruction to crematoriums, morgues and the power infrastructure. As the result of this many bodies were buried in mass graves to reduce the risk of disease spreading.

Many people were displaced as the result of the tsunami. According to Save the Children 100,000 children were separated from their families. The main reason for this was that children were at school when the earthquake struck. In one elementary school, 74 of 108 students and 10 out of 13 staff lost their lives.

More than 333000 people had to live in temporary accommodation. National Police Agency of Japan figures shows almost 300,000 buildings were destroyed and a further one million damaged, either by the quake, tsunami or resulting fires. Almost 4,000 roads, 78 bridges and 29 railways were also affected. Reconstruction is still taking place today. Some communities have had to be relocated from their original settlements.

What were the economic impacts of the Japanese earthquake in 2011?

The estimated cost of the earthquake, including reconstruction, is £181 billion. Japanese authorities estimate 25 million tonnes of debris were generated in the three worst-affected prefectures (counties). This is significantly more than the amount of debris created during the 2010 Haiti earthquake. 47,700 buildings were destroyed and 143,300 were damaged. 230,000 vehicles were destroyed or damaged. Four ports were destroyed and a further 11 were affected in the northeast of Japan.

There was a significant impact on power supplies in Japan. 4.4 million households and businesses lost electricity. 11 nuclear reactors were shut down when the earthquake occurred. The Fukushima Daiichi nuclear power plant was decommissioned because all six of its reactors were severely damaged. Seawater disabled the plant’s cooling systems which caused the reactor cores to meltdown, leading to the release of radioactivity. Radioactive material continues to be released by the plant and vegetation and soil within the 30km evacuation zone is contaminated. Power cuts continued for several weeks after the earthquake and tsunami. Often, these lasted between 3-4 hours at a time. The earthquake also had a negative impact on the oil industry as two refineries were set on fire during the earthquake.

Transport was also negatively affected by the earthquake. Twenty-three train stations were swept away and others experienced damage. Many road bridges were damaged or destroyed.

Agriculture was affected as salt water contaminated soil and made it impossible to grow crops.

The stock market crashed and had a negative impact on companies such as Sony and Toyota as the cost of the earthquake was realised.  Production was reduced due to power cuts and assembly of goods, such as cars overseas, were affected by the disruption in the supply of parts from Japan.

What were the political impacts of the Japanese earthquake in 2011?

Government debt was increased when it injects billions of yen into the economy. This was at a time when the government were attempting to reduce the national debt.

Several years before the disaster warnings had been made about the poor defences that existed at nuclear power plants in the event of a tsunami. A number of executives at the Fukushima power plant resigned in the aftermath of the disaster. A movement against nuclear power, which Japan heavily relies on, developed following the tsunami.

The disaster at Fukushima added political weight in European countries were anti-nuclear bodies used the event to reinforce their arguments against nuclear power.

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Japan Earthquake 2011

Japan earthquake 2011 case study.

An earthquake measuring 9.0 on the Richter Scale struck off Japan’s northeast coast, about 250 miles (400km) from Tokyo at a depth of 20 miles.

The magnitude 9.0 earthquake happened at 2:46 pm (local time) on Friday, March 11, 2011.

The earthquake occurred 250 miles off the North East Coast of Japan’s main island Honshu.

Japan 2011 Earthquake map

Japan is located on the eastern edge of the Eurasian Plate. The Eurasian plate, which is continental, is subducted by the Pacific Plate, an oceanic plate forming a subduction zone to the east of Japan. This type of plate margin is known as a destructive plate margin . The process of subduction is not smooth. Friction causes the Pacific Plate to stick. Pressure builds and is released as an earthquake.

Friction has built up over time, and when released, this caused a massive ‘megathrust’ earthquake.

The amount of energy released in this single earthquake was 600 million times the energy of the Hiroshima nuclear bomb.

Scientists drilled into the subduction zone soon after the earthquake and discovered a thin, slippery clay layer lining the fault. The researchers think this clay layer allowed the two plates to slide an incredible distance, some 164 feet (50 metres), facilitating the enormous earthquake and tsunami .

2011 Japan Earthquake Map

The earthquake occurred at a relatively shallow depth of 20 miles below the surface of the Pacific Ocean. This, combined with the high magnitude, caused a tsunami (find out more about how a tsunami is formed on the BBC website).

Areas affected by the 2011 Japanese earthquake.

What were the primary effects of the 2011 Japan earthquake?

Impacts on people

Death and injury – Some 15,894 people died, and 26,152 people were injured. 130,927 people were displaced, and 2,562 remain missing.

Damage – 332,395 buildings, 2,126 roads, 56 bridges and 26 railways were destroyed or damaged. 300 hospitals were damaged, and 11 were destroyed.

Blackouts – Over 4.4 million households were left without electricity in North-East Japan.

Transport – Japan’s transport network suffered huge disruptions.

Impacts on the environment

Landfall – some coastal areas experienced land subsidence as the earthquake dropped the beachfront in some places by more than 50 cm.

Land movement – due to tectonic shift, the quake moved parts of North East Japan 2.4 m closer to North America.

Plate shifts – It has been estimated by geologists that the Pacific plate has slipped westwards by between 20 and 40 m.

Seabed shift – The seabed near the epicentre shifted by 24 m, and the seabed off the coast of the Miyagi province has moved by 3 m.

Earth axis moves – The earthquake moved the earth’s axis between 10 and 25 cm, shortening the day by 1.8 microseconds.

Liquefaction occurred in many of the parts of Tokyo built on reclaimed land. 1,046 buildings were damaged

What were the secondary effects of the 2011 Japan earthquake?

Economy – The earthquake was the most expensive natural disaster in history, with an economic cost of US$235 billion.

Tsunami –  Waves up to 40 m in high devastated entire coastal areas and resulted in the loss of thousands of lives. This caused a lot of damage and pollution up to 6 miles inland. The tsunami warnings in coastal areas were only followed by 58% who headed for higher ground. The wave hit 49% of those not following the warning.

Nuclear power – Seven reactors at the Fukushima nuclear power station experienced a meltdown. Levels of radiation were over eight times the normal levels.

Transport –  Rural areas remained isolated for a long time because the tsunami destroyed major roads and local trains and buses. Sections of the Tohoku Expressway were damaged. Railway lines were damaged, and some trains were derailed. 

Aftermath – The ‘Japan move forward committee’ thought that young adults and teenagers could help rebuild parts of Japan devastated by the earthquake.

Coastal changes – The tsunami was able to travel further inland due to a 250-mile stretch of coastline dropping by 0.6 m.

What were the immediate responses to the Japan 2011 earthquake?

• The Japan Meteorological Agency issued tsunami warnings three minutes after the earthquake.
• Scientists had been able to predict where the tsunami would hit after the earthquake using modelling and forecasting technology so that responses could be directed to the appropriate areas.
• Rescue workers and around 100,000 members of the Japan Self-Defence Force were dispatched to help with search and rescue operations within hours of the tsunami hitting the coast.
• Although many search and rescue teams focused on recovering bodies washing up on shore following the tsunami, some people were rescued from under the rubble with the help of sniffer dogs.
• The government declared a 20 km evacuation zone around the Fukushima nuclear power plant to reduce the threat of radiation exposure to local residents.
• Japan received international help from the US military, and search and rescue teams were sent from New Zealand, India, South Korea, China and Australia.
• Access to the affected areas was restricted because many were covered in debris and mud following the tsunami, so it was difficult to provide immediate support in some areas.
• Hundreds of thousands of people who had lost their homes were evacuated to temporary shelters in schools and other public buildings or relocated to other areas.
• Many evacuees came from the exclusion zone surrounding the Fukushima nuclear power plant. After the Fukushima Daiichi nuclear meltdown, those in the area had their radiation levels checked, and their health monitored to ensure they did not receive dangerous exposure to radiation. Many evacuated from the area around the nuclear power plant were given iodine tablets to reduce the risk of radiation poisoning.

What were the long-term responses to the Japan 2011 earthquake?

• In April 2011, one month after the event occurred, the central government established the Reconstruction Policy Council to develop a national recovery and reconstruction outlook for tsunami-resilient communities. The Japanese government has approved a budget of 23 trillion yen (approximately £190 billion) to be spent over ten years. Central to the New Growth Strategy is creating a ‘Special Zones for Reconstruction’ system. These aim to provide incentives to attract investment, both in terms of business and reconstruction, into the Tohoku region.
• Also, the central government decided on a coastal protection policy, such as seawalls and breakwaters which would be designed to ensure their performance to a potential tsunami level of up to the approximately 150-year recurrence interval.
• In December 2011, the central government enacted the ‘Act on the Development of Tsunami-resilient Communities’. According to the principle that ‘Human life is most important, this law promotes the development of tsunami-resistant communities based on the concept of multiple defences, which combines infrastructure development and other measures targeting the largest class tsunami.
• Japan’s economic growth after the Second World War was the world’s envy. However, over the last 20 years, the economy has stagnated and been in and out of recession. The 11 March earthquake wiped 5–10% off the value of Japanese stock markets, and there has been global concern over Japan’s ability to recover from the disaster. The priority for Japan’s long-term response is to rebuild the infrastructure in the affected regions and restore and improve the economy’s health as a whole.
• By the 24th of March 2011, 375 km of the Tohoku Expressway (which links the region to Tokyo) was repaired and reopened.
• The runway at Sendai Airport had been badly damaged. However, it was restored and reusable by the 29th of March due to a joint effort by the Japanese Defence Force and the US Army.
• Other important areas of reconstruction include the energy, water supply and telecommunications infrastructure. As of November 2011, 96% of the electricity supply had been restored, 98% of the water supply and 99% of the landline network.

Why do people live in high-risk areas in Japan?

There are several reasons why people live in areas of Japan at risk of tectonic hazards:

• They have lived there all their lives, are close to family and friends and have an attachment to the area.
• The northeast has fertile farmland and rich fishing waters.
• There are good services, schools and hospitals.
• 75% of Japan is mountainous and flat land is mainly found in coastal areas, which puts pressure on living space.
• They are confident about their safety due to the protective measures that have been taken, such as the construction of tsunami walls.

Japan’s worst previous earthquake was of 8.3 magnitude and killed 143,000 people in Kanto in 1923. A magnitude 7.2 quake in Kobe killed 6,400 people in 1995 .

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• > Extreme Natural Hazards, Disaster Risks and Societal Implications
• > The 2011 Tohoku, Japan, earthquake and tsunami

Book contents

• Extreme Natural Hazards, Disaster Risk and Societal Implications
• Series page
• Extreme Natural Hazards, Disaster Risks and Societal Implications
• Copyright page
• Acknowledgments
• Contributors
• Part I Introduction
• Part II Extreme hazards and disaster risks
• Part III Case studies: Latin America and the Caribbean region
• Part IV Case studies: Africa
• Part V Case studies: the Middle East
• Part VI Case studies: Asia and the Pacific Region
• 21 The Chao Phraya floods 2011
• 22 Environmental risk management in Australia: natural hazards
• 23 The 2008 Wenchuan, China, earthquake
• 24 The 2011 Tohoku, Japan, earthquake and tsunami
• 25 India's tsunami warning system
• Part VII Disaster risks and societal implications

24 - The 2011 Tohoku, Japan, earthquake and tsunami

from Part VI - Case studies: Asia and the Pacific Region

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  05 May 2014

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• The 2011 Tohoku, Japan, earthquake and tsunami
• By Kenji Satake
• Edited by Alik Ismail-Zadeh , Karlsruhe Institute of Technology, Germany , Jaime Urrutia Fucugauchi , Universidad Nacional Autónoma de México , Andrzej Kijko , University of Pretoria , Kuniyoshi Takeuchi , Ilya Zaliapin , University of Nevada, Reno
• Book: Extreme Natural Hazards, Disaster Risks and Societal Implications
• Online publication: 05 May 2014
• Chapter DOI: https://doi.org/10.1017/CBO9781139523905.031

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Learning from Megadisasters: A Decade of Lessons from the Great East Japan Earthquake

March 11, 2021 Tokyo, Japan

Authors: Shoko Takemoto,  Naho Shibuya, and Keiko Sakoda

Today marks the ten-year anniversary of the Great East Japan Earthquake (GEJE), a mega-disaster that marked Japan and the world with its unprecedented scale of destruction. This feature story commemorates the disaster by reflecting on what it has taught us over the past decade in regards to infrastructure resilience, risk identification, reduction, and preparedness, and disaster risk finance.  Since GEJE, the World Bank in partnership with the Government of Japan, especially through the Japan-World Bank Program on Mainstreaming Disaster Risk Management in Developing Countries has been working with Japanese and global partners to understand impact, response, and recovery from this megadisaster to identify larger lessons for disaster risk management (DRM).

Among the numerous lessons learned over the past decade of GEJE reconstruction and analysis, we highlight three common themes that have emerged repeatedly through the examples of good practices gathered across various sectors.  First is the importance of planning. Even though disasters will always be unexpected, if not unprecedented, planning for disasters has benefits both before and after they occur. Second is that resilience is strengthened when it is shared .  After a decade since GEJE, to strengthen the resilience of infrastructure, preparedness, and finance for the next disaster, throughout Japan national and local governments, infrastructure developers and operators, businesses and industries, communities and households are building back better systems by prearranging mechanisms for risk reduction, response and continuity through collaboration and mutual support.  Third is that resilience is an iterative process .  Many adaptations were made to the policy and regulatory frameworks after the GEJE. Many past disasters show that resilience is an interactive process that needs to be adjusted and sustained over time, especially before a disaster strikes.

As the world is increasingly tested to respond and rebuild from unexpected impacts of extreme weather events and the COVID-19 pandemic, we highlight some of these efforts that may have relevance for countries around the world seeking to improve their preparedness for disaster events.

Introduction: The Triple Disaster, Response and Recovery

On March 11th, 2011 a Magnitude 9.0 earthquake struck off the northeast coast of Japan, near the Tohoku region. The force of the earthquake sent a tsunami rushing towards the Tohoku coastline, a black wall of water which wiped away entire towns and villages. Sea walls were overrun. 20,000 lives were lost. The scale of destruction to housing, infrastructure, industry and agriculture was extreme in Fukushima, Iwate, and Miyagi prefectures. In addition to the hundreds of thousands who lost their homes, the earthquake and tsunami contributed to an accident at the Fukushima Daiichi Nuclear Power Plant, requiring additional mass evacuations. The impacts not only shook Japan’s society and economy as a whole, but also had ripple effects in global supply chains. In the 21st century, a disaster of this scale is a global phenomenon.

The severity and complexity of the cascading disasters was not anticipated. The events during and following the Great East Japan Earthquake (GEJE) showed just how ruinous and complex a low-probability, high-impact disaster can be. However, although the impacts of the triple-disaster were devastating, Japan’s legacy of DRM likely reduced losses. Japan’s structural investments in warning systems and infrastructure were effective in many cases, and preparedness training helped many act and evacuate quickly. The large spatial impact of the disaster, and the region’s largely rural and elderly population, posed additional challenges for response and recovery.

Ten years after the megadisaster, the region is beginning to return to a sense of normalcy, even if many places look quite different. After years in rapidly-implemented temporary prefabricated housing, most people have moved into permanent homes, including 30,000 new units of public housing . Damaged infrastructure has been also restored or is nearing completion in the region, including rail lines, roads, and seawalls.

In 2014, three years after GEJE, The World Bank published Learning from Megadisasters: Lessons from the Great East Japan Earthquake . Edited by Federica Ranghieri and Mikio Ishiwatari , the volume brought together dozens of experts ranging from seismic engineers to urban planners, who analyzed what happened on March 11, 2011 and the following days, months, and years; compiling lessons for other countries in 36 comprehensive Knowledge Notes . This extensive research effort identified a number of key learnings in multiple sectors, and emphasized the importance of both structural and non-structural measures, as well as identifying effective strategies both pre- and post-disaster. The report highlighted four central lessons after this intensive study of the GEJE disaster, response, and initial recovery:

1) A holistic, rather than single-sector approach to DRM improves preparedness for complex disasters; 2) Investing in prevention is important, but is not a substitute for preparedness; 3) Each disaster is an opportunity to learn and adapt; 4) Effective DRM requires bringing together diverse stakeholders, including various levels of government, community and nonprofit actors, and the private sector.

Although these lessons are learned specifically from the GEJE, the report also focuses on learnings with broader applicability.

Over recent years, the Japan-World Bank Program on Mainstreaming DRM in Developing Countries has furthered the work of the Learning from Megadisasters report, continuing to gather, analyze and share the knowledge and lessons learned from GEJE, together with past disaster experiences, to enhance the resilience of next generation development investments around the world. Ten years on from the GEJE, we take a moment to revisit the lessons gathered, and reflect on how they may continue to be relevant in the next decade, in a world faced with both seismic disasters and other emergent hazards such as pandemics and climate change.

Through synthesizing a decade of research on the GEJE and accumulation of the lessons from the past disaster experience, this story highlights three key strategies which recurred across many of the cases we studied. They are:

1) the importance of planning for disasters before they strike, 2) DRM cannot be addressed by either the public or private sector alone but enabled only when it is shared among many stakeholders , 3) institutionalize the culture of continuous enhancement of the resilience .

For example, business continuity plans, or BCPs, can help both public and private organizations minimize damages and disruptions . BCPs are documents prepared in advance which provide guidance on how to respond to a disruption and resume the delivery of products and services. Additionally, the creation of pre-arranged agreements among independent public and/or private organizations can help share essential responsibilities and information both before and after a disaster . This might include agreements with private firms to repair public infrastructures, among private firms to share the costs of mitigation infrastructure, or among municipalities to share rapid response teams and other resources. These three approaches recur throughout the more specific lessons and strategies identified in the following section, which is organized along the three areas of disaster risk management: resilient infrastructure; risk identification, reduction and preparednes s ; and disaster risk finance and insurance.

Lessons from the Megadisaster

Resilient Infrastructure

The GEJE had severe impacts on critical ‘lifelines’—infrastructures and facilities that provide essential services such as transportation, communication, sanitation, education, and medical care. Impacts of megadisasters include not only damages to assets (direct impacts), but also disruptions of key services, and the resulting social and economic effects (indirect impacts). For example, the GEJE caused a water supply disruption for up to 500,000 people in Sendai city, as well as completely submerging the city’s water treatment plant. [i] Lack of access to water and sanitation had a ripple effect on public health and other emergency services, impacting response and recovery. Smart investment in infrastructure resilience can help minimize both direct and indirect impacts, reducing lifeline disruptions. The 2019 report Lifelines: The Resilient Infrastructure Opportunity found through a global study that every dollar invested in the resilience of lifelines had a $4 benefit in the long run.

In the case of water infrastructure , the World Bank report Resilient Water Supply and Sanitation Services: The Case of Japan documents how Sendai City learned from the disaster to improve the resilience of these infrastructures. [ii] Steps included retrofitting existing systems with seismic resilience upgrades, enhancing business continuity planning for sanitation systems, and creating a geographic information system (GIS)-based asset management system that allows for quick identification and repair of damaged pipes and other assets. During the GEJE, damages and disruptions to water delivery services were minimized through existing programs, including mutual aid agreements with other water supply utility operators. Through these agreements, the Sendai City Waterworks Bureau received support from more than 60 water utilities to provide emergency water supplies. Policies which promote structural resilience strategies were also essential to preserving water and sanitation services. After the 1995 Great Hanshin Awaji Earthquake (GHAE), Japanese utilities invested in earthquake resistant piping in water supply and sanitation systems. The commonly used earthquake-resistant ductile iron pipe (ERDIP) has not shown any damage from major earthquakes including the 2011 GEJE and the 2016 Kumamoto earthquake. [iii] Changes were also made to internal policies after the GEJE based on the challenges faced, such as decentralizing emergency decision-making and providing training for local communities to set up emergency water supplies without utility workers with the goal of speeding up recovery efforts. [iv]

Redundancy is another structural strategy that contributed to resilience during and after GEJE. In Sendai City, redundancy and seismic reinforcement in water supply infrastructure allowed the utility to continue to operate pipelines that were not physically damaged in the earthquake. [v] The Lifelines report describes how in the context of telecommunications infrastructure , the redundancy created through a diversity of routes in Japan’s submarine internet cable system  limited disruptions to national connectivity during the megadisaster. [vi] However, the report emphasizes that redundancy must be calibrated to the needs and resources of a particular context. For private firms, redundancy and backups for critical infrastructure can be achieved through collaboration; after the GEJE, firms are increasingly collaborating to defray the costs of these investments. [vii]

The GEJE also illustrated the importance of planning for transportation resilience . A Japan Case Study Report on Road Geohazard Risk Management shows the role that both national policy and public-private agreements can play. In response to the GEJE, Japan’s central disaster legislation, the DCBA (Disaster Countermeasures Basic Act) was amended in 2012, with particular focus on the need to reopen roads for emergency response. Quick road repairs were made possible after the GEJE in part due to the Ministry of Land, Infrastructure, Transport and Tourism (MLIT)’s emergency action plans, the swift action of the rapid response agency Technical Emergency Control Force (TEC-FORCE), and prearranged agreements with private construction companies for emergency recovery work. [viii] During the GEJE, roads were used as evacuation sites and were shown effective in controlling the spread of floods. After the disaster, public-private partnerships (PPPs) were also made to accommodate the use of expressway embankments as tsunami evacuation sites. As research on Resilient Infrastructure PPPs highlights, clear definitions of roles and responsibilities are essential to effective arrangements between the government and private companies. In Japan, lessons from the GEJE and other earthquakes have led to a refinement of disaster definitions, such as numerical standards for triggering force majeure provisions of infrastructure PPP contracts. In Sendai City, clarifying the post-disaster responsibilities of public and private actors across various sectors sped up the response process. [ix] This experience was built upon after the disaster, when Miyagi prefecture conferred operation of the Sendai International Airport   to a private consortium through a concession scheme which included refined force majeure definitions. In the context of a hazard-prone region, the agreement clearly defines disaster-related roles and responsibilities as well as relevant triggering events. [x]

Partnerships for creating backup systems that have value in non-disaster times have also proved effective in the aftermath of the GEJE. As described in Resilient Industries in Japan , Toyota’s automotive plant in Ohira village, Miyagi Prefecture lost power for two weeks following GEJE. To avoid such losses in the future, companies in the industrial park sought to secure energy during power outages and shortages by building the F-Grid, their own mini-grid system with a comprehensive energy management system. The F-Grid project is a collaboration of 10 companies and organizations in the Ohira Industrial Park. As a system used exclusively for backup energy would be costly, the system is also used to improve energy efficiency in the park during normal times. The project was supported by funding from Japan’s “Smart Communities'' program. [xi] In 2016, F-grid achieved a 24 percent increase in energy efficiency and a 31 percent reduction in carbon dioxide emissions compared to similarly sized parks. [xii]

Schools are also critical infrastructures, for their education and community roles, and also because they are commonly used as evacuation centers. Japan has updated seismic resilience standards for schools over time, integrating measures against different risks and vulnerabilities revealed after each disaster, as documented in the report Making Schools Resilient at Scale . After the 2011 GEJE, there was very little earthquake-related damage; rather, most damage was caused by the tsunami. However, in some cases damages to nonstructural elements like suspending ceilings in school gymnasiums limited the possibility of using these spaces after the disaster. After the disaster, a major update was made to the policies on the safety of nonstructural elements in schools, given the need for higher resilience standards for their function as post-disaster evacuation centers [xiii] .

Similarly, for building regulations , standards and professional training modules were updated taking the lessons learned from GEJE. The Converting Disaster Experience into a Safer Built Environment: The Case of Japan report highlights that, legal framework like, The Building Standard Law/Seismic Retrofitting Promotion Law, was amended further enhance the structural resilience of the built environment, including strengthening structural integrity, improving the efficiency of design review process, as well as mandating seismic diagnosis of large public buildings. Since the establishment of the legal and regulatory framework for building safety in early 1900, Japan continued incremental effort to create enabling environment for owners, designers, builders and building officials to make the built environment safer together.

Cultural heritage also plays an important role in creating healthy communities, and the loss or damage of these items can scar the cohesion and identity of a community. The report Resilient Cultural Heritage: Learning from the Japanese Experience shows how the GEJE highlighted the importance of investing in the resilience of cultural properties, such as through restoration budgets and response teams, which enabled the relocation of at-risk items and restoration of properties during and after the GEJE. After the megadisaster, the volunteer organization Shiryō-Net was formed to help rescue and preserve heritage properties, and this network has now spread across Japan. [xiv] Engaging both volunteer and government organizations in heritage preservation can allow for a more wide-ranging response. Cultural properties can play a role in healing communities wrought by disasters: in Ishinomaki City, the restoration of a historic storehouse served as a symbol of reconstruction [xv] , while elsewhere repair of cultural heritage sites and the celebration of cultural festivals served a stimulant for recovery. [xvi] Cultural heritage also played a preventative role during and after the disaster by embedding the experience of prior disasters in the built environment. Stone monuments which marked the extent of historic tsunamis served as guides for some residents, who fled uphill past the stones and escaped the dangerous waters. [xvii] This suggests a potential role for cultural heritage in instructing future generations about historic hazards.

These examples of lessons from the GEJE highlight how investing in resilient infrastructure is essential, but must also be done smartly, with emphasis on planning, design, and maintenance. Focusing on both minimizing disaster impacts and putting processes in place to facilitate speedy infrastructure restoration can reduce both direct and indirect impacts of megadisasters.  Over the decade since GEJE, many examples and experiences on how to better invest in resilient infrastructure, plan for service continuity and quick response, and catalyze strategic partnerships across diverse groups are emerging from Japan.

Risk Identification, Reduction, and Preparedness

Ten years after the GEJE, a number of lessons have emerged as important in identifying, reducing, and preparing for disaster risks. Given the unprecedented nature of the GEJE, it is important to be prepared for both known and uncertain risks. Information and communication technology (ICT) can play a role in improving risk identification and making evidence-based decisions for disaster risk reduction and preparedness. Communicating these risks to communities, in a way people can take appropriate mitigation action, is a key . These processes also need to be inclusive , involving diverse stakeholders--including women, elders , and the private sector--that need to be engaged and empowered to understand, reduce, and prepare for disasters. Finally, resilience is never complete . Rather, as the adaptations made by Japan after the GEJE and many past disasters show, resilience is a continuous process that needs to be adjusted and sustained over time, especially in times before a disaster strikes.

Although DRM is central in Japan, the scale of the 2011 triple disaster dramatically exceeded expectations. After the GEJE, as Chapter 32 of Learning From Megadisasters highlights, the potential of low-probability, high-impact events led Japan to focus on both structural and nonstructural disaster risk management measures. [xviii] Mitigation and preparedness strategies can be designed to be effective for both predicted and uncertain risks. Planning for a multihazard context, rather than only individual hazards, can help countries act quickly even when the unimaginable occurs. Identifying, preparing for, and reducing disaster risks all play a role in this process.

The GEJE highlighted the important role ICT can play in both understanding risk and making evidence-based decisions for risk identification, reduction, and preparedness. As documented in the World Bank report Information and Communication Technology for Disaster Risk Management in Japan , at the time of the GEJE, Japan had implemented various ICT systems for disaster response and recovery, and the disaster tested the effectiveness of these systems. During the GEJE, Japan’s “Earthquake Early Warning System” (EEWS) issued a series of warnings. Through the detection of initial seismic waves, EEWS can provide a warning of a few seconds or minutes, allowing quick action by individuals and organizations. Japan Railways’ “Urgent Earthquake Detection and Alarm System” (UrEDAS) automatically activated emergency brakes of 27 Shinkansen train lines , successfully bringing all trains to a safe stop. After the disaster, Japan expanded emergency alert delivery systems. [xix]

The World Bank’s study on Preparedness Maps shows how seismic preparedness maps are used in Japan to communicate location specific primary and secondary hazards from earthquakes, promoting preparedness at the community and household level. Preparedness maps are regularly updated after disaster events, and since 2011 Japan has promoted risk reduction activities to prepare for the projected maximum likely tsunami [xx] .

Effective engagement of various stakeholders is also important to preparedness mapping and other disaster preparedness activities. This means engaging and empowering diverse groups including women, the elderly, children, and the private sector. Elders are a particularly important demographic in the context of the GEJE, as the report Elders Leading the Way to Resilience illustrates. Tohoku is an aging region, and two-thirds of lives lost from the GEJE were over 60 years old. Research shows that building trust and social ties can reduce disaster impacts- after GEJE, a study found that communities with high social capital lost fewer residents to the tsunami. [xxi] Following the megadisaster, elders in Ofunato formed the Ibasho Cafe, a community space for strengthening social capital among older people. The World Bank has explored the potential of the Ibasho model for other contexts , highlighting how fueling social capital and engaging elders in strengthening their community can have benefits for both normal times and improve resilience when a disaster does strike.

Conducting simulation drills regularly provide another way of engaging stakeholders in preparedness. As described in Learning from Disaster Simulation Drills in Japan , [xxii] after the 1995 GHAE the first Comprehensive Disaster Management Drill Framework was developed as a guide for the execution of a comprehensive system of disaster response drills and establishing links between various disaster management agencies. The Comprehensive Disaster Management Drill Framework is updated annually by the Central Disaster Management Council. The GEJE led to new and improved drill protocols in the impacted region and in Japan as a whole. For example, the 35th Joint Disaster simulation Drill was held in the Tokyo metropolitan region in 2015 to respond to issues identified during the GEJE, such as improving mutual support systems among residents, governments, and organizations; verifying disaster management plans; and improving disaster response capabilities of government agencies. In addition to regularly scheduled disaster simulation drills, GEJE memorial events are held in Japan annually to memorialize victims and keep disaster preparedness in the public consciousness.

Business continuity planning (BCP) is another key strategy that shows how ongoing attention to resilience is also essential for both public and private sector organizations. As Resilient Industries in Japan demonstrates, after the GEJE, BCPs helped firms reduce disaster losses and recover quickly, benefiting employees, supply chains, and the economy at large. BCP is supported by many national policies in Japan, and after the GEJE, firms that had BCPs in place had reduced impacts on their financial soundness compared to firms that did not. [xxiii] The GEJE also led to the update and refinement of BCPs across Japan. Akemi industrial park in Aichi prefecture, began business continuity planning at the scale of the industrial park three years before the GEJE. After the GEJE, the park revised their plan, expanding focus on the safety of workers. National policies in Japan promote the development of BCPs, including the 2013 Basic Act for National Resilience, which was developed after the GEJE and emphasizes resilience as a shared goal across multiple sectors. [xxiv] Japan also supports BCP development for public sector organizations including subnational governments and infrastructure operators. By 2019, all of Japan’s prefectural governments, and nearly 90% of municipal governments had developed BCPs. [xxv] The role of financial institutions in incentivizing BCPs is further addressed in the following section.

The ongoing nature of these preparedness actions highlights that resilience is a continuous process. Risk management strategies must be adapted and sustained over time, especially during times without disasters. This principle is central to Japan’s disaster resilience policies. In late 2011, based on a report documenting the GEJE from the Expert Committee on Earthquake and Tsunami Disaster Management, Japan amended the DCBA (Disaster Countermeasures Basic Act) to enhance its multi-hazard countermeasures, adding a chapter on tsunami countermeasures. [xxvi]

Disaster Risk Finance and Insurance

Disasters can have a large financial impact, not only in the areas where they strike, but also at the large scale of supply chains and national economy. For example, the GEJE led to the shutdown of nuclear power plants across Japan, resulting in a 50% decrease in energy production and causing national supply disruptions. The GEJE has illustrated the importance of disaster risk finance and insurance (DRFI) such as understanding and clarifying contingent liabilities and allocating contingency budgets, putting in place financial protection measures for critical lifeline infrastructure assets and services, and developing mechanisms for vulnerable businesses and households to quickly access financial support. DRFI mechanisms can help people, firms, and critical infrastructure avoid or minimize disruptions, continue operations, and recover quickly after a disaster.

Pre-arranged agreements, including public-private partnerships, are key strategies for the financial protection of critical infrastructure. The report Financial Protection of Critical Infrastructure Services (forthcoming) [xxvii] shows how pre-arranged agreements between the public sector and private sector for post-disaster response can facilitate rapid infrastructure recovery after disasters, reducing the direct and indirect impacts of infrastructure disruptions, including economic impacts. GEJE caused devastating impacts to the transportation network across Japan. Approximately 2,300 km of expressways were closed, representing 65 percent of expressways managed by NEXCO East Japan , resulting in major supply chain disruptions [xxviii] .  However, with the activation of pre-arranged agreements between governments and local construction companies for road clearance and recovery work, allowing damaged major motorways to be repaired within one week of the earthquake. This quick response allowed critical access for other emergency services to further relief and recovery operations.

The GEJE illustrated the importance of clearly defining post-disaster financial roles and responsibilities among public and private actors in order to restore critical infrastructure rapidly . World Bank research on Catastrophe Insurance Programs for Public Assets highlights how the Japan Railway Construction, Transport and Technology Agency  (JRTT) uses insurance to reduce the contingent liabilities of critical infrastructure to ease impacts to government budgets in the event of a megadisaster. Advance agreements between the government, infrastructure owners and operators, and insurance companies clearly outline how financial responsibilities will be shared in the event of a disaster. In the event of a megadisaster like GEJE, the government pays a large share of recovery costs, which enables the Shinkansen bullet train service to be restored more rapidly. [xxix]

The Resilient Industries in Japan   report highlights how diverse and comprehensive disaster risk financing methods are also important to promoting a resilient industry sector . After the GEJE, 90% of bankruptcies linked to the disaster were due to indirect impacts such as supply chain disruptions. This means that industries located elsewhere are also vulnerable: a study found that six years after GEJE, a greater proportion of bankruptcy declarations were located in Tokyo than Tohoku. [xxx] Further, firms without disaster risk financing in place had much higher increases in debt levels than firms with preexisting risk financing mechanisms in place. [xxxi] Disaster risk financing can play a role pre-disaster, through mechanisms such as low-interest loans, guarantees, insurance, or grants which incentivize the creation of BCPs and other mitigation and preparedness measures.  When a disaster strikes, financial mechanisms that support impacted businesses, especially small or medium enterprises and women-owned businesses, can help promote equitable recovery and help businesses survive. For financial institutions, simply keeping banks open after a major disaster can support response and recovery. After the GEJE, the Bank of Japan (BoJ) and local banks leveraged pre-arranged agreements to maintain liquidity, opening the first weekend after the disaster to help minimize economic disruptions. [xxxii] These strategies highlight the important role of finance in considering economic needs before a disaster strikes, and having systems in place to act quickly to limit both economic and infrastructure service impacts of disasters.

Looking to the Future

Ten years after the GEJE, these lessons in the realms of resilient infrastructure, risk identification, reduction and preparedness, and DRFI are significant not only for parts of the world preparing for tsunamis and other seismic hazards, but also for many of the other types of hazards faced around the globe in 2021. In Japan, many of the lessons of the GEJE are being applied to the projected Nankai Trough and Tokyo Inland earthquakes, for example through modelling risks and mapping evacuation routes, implementing scenario planning exercises and evacuation drills , or even prearranging a post-disaster reconstruction vision and plans. These resilience measures are taken not only individually but also through innovative partnerships for collaboration across regions, sectors, and organizations including public-private agreements to share resources and expertise in the event of a major disaster.

The ten-year anniversary of the GEJE finds the world in the midst of the multiple emergencies of the global COVID-19 pandemic, environmental and technological hazards, and climate change. Beyond seismic hazards, the global pandemic has highlighted, for example, the risks of supply chain disruption due to biological emergencies. Climate change is also increasing hazard exposure in Japan and around the globe. Climate change is a growing concern for its potential to contribute to hydrometeorological hazards such as flooding and hurricanes, and for its potential to play a role in secondary or cascading hazards such as fire. In the era of climate change, disasters will increasingly be ‘unprecedented’, and so GEJE offers important lessons on preparing for low-probability high-impact disasters and planning under uncertain conditions in general.

Over the last decade, the World Bank has drawn upon the GEJE megadisaster experience to learn how to better prepare for and recover from low-probability high-impact disasters. While we have identified a number of diverse strategies here, ranging from technological and structural innovations to improving the engagement of diverse stakeholders, three themes recur throughout infrastructure resilience, risk preparedness, and disaster finance. First, planning in advance for how organizations will prepare for, respond to, and recover from disasters is essential, i.e. through the creation of BCPs by both public and private organizations. Second, pre-arranged agreements amongst organizations for sharing resources, knowledge, and financing in order to mitigate, prepare, respond and recover together from disasters and other unforeseen events are highly beneficial. Third, only with continuous reflection, learning and update on what worked and what didn’t work after each disasters can develop the adaptive capacities needed to manage ever increasing and unexpected risks. Preparedness is an incremental and interactive process.

These lessons from the GEJE on the importance of BCPs and pre-arranged agreements both emphasize larger principles that can be brought to bear in the context of emergent climate and public health crises. Both involve planning for the potential of disaster before it strikes. BCPs and pre-arranged agreements are both made under blue-sky conditions, which allow frameworks to be put in place for advanced mitigation and preparedness, and rapid post-disaster response and recovery. While it is impossible to know exactly what future crises a locale will face, these processes often have benefits that make places and organizations better able to act in the face of unlikely or unpredicted events. The lessons above regarding BCPs and pre-arranged agreements also highlight that neither the government nor the private sector alone have all the tools to prepare for and respond to disasters. Rather, the GEJE shows the importance of both public and private organizations adopting BCPs, and the value of creating pre-arranged agreements among and across public and private groups. By making disaster preparedness a key consideration for all organizations, and bringing diverse stakeholders together to make plans for when a crisis strikes, these strengthened networks and planning capacities have the potential to bear benefits not only in an emergency but in the everyday operations of organizations and countries.

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Additional Resources

Program Overview

• Japan-World Bank Program on Mainstreaming Disaster Risk Management in Developing Countries

Reports and Case Studies Featuring Lessons from GEJE

• Learning from Megadisasters: Lessons from the Great East Japan Earthquake  (PDF)
• Lifelines: The Resilient Infrastructure Opportunity  (PDF)
• Resilient Water Supply and Sanitation Services: The Case of Japan  (PDF)
• Japan Case Study Report on Road Geohazard Risk Management  (PDF)
• Resilient Infrastructure PPPs  (PDF)
• Making Schools Resilient at Scale  (PDF)
• Converting Disaster Experience into a Safer Built Environment: The Case of Japan  (PDF)
• Resilient Cultural Heritage: Learning from the Japanese Experience  (PDF)
• Information and Communication Technology for Disaster Risk Management in Japan
• Resilient Industries in Japan : Lessons Learned in Japan on Enhancing Competitiveness in the Face of Disasters by Natural Hazards (PDF)
• Preparedness Maps for Community Resilience: Earthquakes. Experience from Japan  (PDF)
• Elders Leading the Way to Resilience  (PDF)
• Ibasho: Strengthening community-driven preparedness and resilience in Philippines and Nepal by leveraging Japanese expertise and experience  (PDF)
• Learning from Disaster Simulation Drills in Japan  (PDF)
• Catastrophe Insurance Programs for Public Assets  (PDF)
• PPP contract clauses unveiled: the World Bank’s 2017 Guidance on PPP Contractual Provisions
• Learning from Japan: PPPs for infrastructure resilience

Audiovisual Resources on GEJE and its Reconstruction Processes in English

• NHK documentary: 3/11-The Tsunami: The First 3 Days
• NHK: 342 Stories of Resilience and Remembrance
• Densho Road 3.11: Journey to Experience the Lessons from the Disaster - Tohoku, Japan
• Sendai City: Disaster-Resilient and Environmentally-Friendly City
• Sendai City: Eastern Coastal Area Today, 2019 Fall

[i]   Resilient Water Supply and Sanitation Services  report, p.63

[ii]   Resilient Water Supply and Sanitation Services  report, p.63

[iii]   Resilient Water Supply and Sanitation Services  report, p.8

[iv]   Resilient Water Supply and Sanitation Services  report, p.71

[v]   Resilient Water Supply and Sanitation Services  report, p.63

[vi]   Lifelines: The Resilient Infrastructure Opportunity  report, p.115

[vii] Lifelines: The Resilient Infrastructure Opportunity  report, p.133

[viii]   Japan Case Study Report on Road Geohazard Risk Management  report, p.30

[ix]   Resilient Infrastructure PPPs  report, p.8-9

[x]   Resilient Infrastructure PPPs  report, p.39-40

[xi]   Resilient Industries in Japan  report, p.153.

[xii]   Lifelines: The Resilient Infrastructure Opportunity  report, p. 132

[xiii]   Making Schools Resilient at Scale  report, p.24

[xiv]   Resilient Cultural Heritage  report, p.62

[xv]   Learning from Megadisasters  report, p.326

[xvi]   Resilient Cultural Heritage  report, p.69

[xvii]   Learning from Megadisasters  report, p.100

[xviii] Learning from Megadisasters  report, p.297.

[xix]  J-ALERT, Japan’s nationwide early warning system, had 46% implementation at GEJE, and in communities where it was implemented earthquake early warnings were successfully received. Following GEJE, GOJ invested heavily in J-ALERT adoption (JPY 14B), bearing 50% of implementation costs. In 2013 GOJ spent JPY 773M to implement J-ALERT in municipalities that could not afford the expense. In 2014 MIC heavily promoted the L-ALERT system (formerly “Public Information Commons”), achieving 100% adoption across municipalities. Since GEJE, Japan has updated the EEWS to include a hybrid method of earthquake prediction, improving the accuracy of predictions and warnings.

[xx]  Related resources: NHK, “#1 TSUNAMI BOSAI: Science that Can Save Your Life”  https://www3.nhk.or.jp/nhkworld/en/ondemand/video/3004665/  ; NHK “BOSAI: Be Prepared - Hazard Maps”  https://www3.nhk.or.jp/nhkworld/en/ondemand/video/2084002/

[xxi]  Aldrich, Daniel P., and Yasuyuki Sawada. "The physical and social determinants of mortality in the 3.11 tsunami." Social Science & Medicine 124 (2015): 66-75.

[xxii]   Learning from Disaster Simulation Drills in Japan  Report, p. 14

[xxiii]  Matsushita and Hideshima. 2014. “Influence over Financial Statement of Listed Manufacturing Companies by the GEJE, the Effect of BCP and Risk Financing.” [In Japanese.] Journal of Japan Society of Civil Engineering 70 (1): 33–43.  https://www.jstage.jst.go.jp/article/jscejsp/70/1/70_33/_pdf/-char/ja .

[xxiv]   Resilient Industries in Japan  report, p. 56

[xxv]  MIC (Ministry of Internal Affairs and Communications). 2019. “Survey Results of Business Continuity Plan Development Status in Local Governments.” [In Japanese.] Press release, MIC, Tokyo.  https://www.fdma.go.jp/pressrelease/houdou/items/011226bcphoudou.pdf .

[xxvi]   Japan Case Study Report on Road Geohazard Risk Management  report, p.17.

[xxvii]  The World Bank. 2021. “Financial Protection of Critical Infrastructure Services.” Technical Report – Contribution to 2020 APEC Finance Ministers Meeting.

[xxviii]   Resilient Industries in Japan  report, p. 119

[xxix]  Tokio Marine Holdings, Inc. 2019. “The Role of Insurance Industry to Strengthen Resilience of Infrastructure—Experience in Japan.” APEC seminar on Disaster Risk Finance.

[xxx]  TDB (Teikoku DataBank). 2018. “Trends in Bankruptcies 6 Years after the Great East Japan Earthquake.” [In Japanese.] TDB, Tokyo.  https://www.tdb.co.jp/report/watching/press/pdf/p170301.pdf .

[xxxi]  Matsushita and Hideshima. 2014. “Influence over Financial Statement of Listed Manufacturing Companies by the GEJE, the Effect of BCP and Risk Financing.” [In Japanese.] Journal of Japan Society of Civil Engineering 70 (1): 33–43.  https://www.jstage.jst.go.jp/article/jscejsp/70/1/70_33/_pdf/-char/ja .

[xxxii]   Resilient Industries in Japan  report, p. 145

10 years after the 2011 Tohoku earthquake: A milestone of solid earth science

Progress in Earth and Planetary Science welcomes submissions to the special issue on '10 years after the 2011 Tohoku earthquake: A milestone of solid earth science'.  

A number of new discoveries have been made in the aftermath of the 2011 Tohoku earthquake, thanks to unprecedented near-field observations as well as to the earth scientific knowledge about the northeastern Japan arc that has accumulated prior to the earthquake.  The earthquake highlighted the complexity of frictional behaviors on the shallowest part of the subduction interface, previously regarded as mostly aseismic. Several pieces of evidence have been presented that illuminate the spatial correlation between the distribution of interplate faulting events of various sizes and time scales and associated structural heterogeneities. The stress re-distribution processes after the earthquake, including viscoelastic deformation and fluid remobilization, have been revealed both in the overriding and incoming plates and provide new insights in the dynamics of the subduction zone. Abundant records of the associated tsunami clarified various processes during the generation, propagation, and inundation of tsunamis. The earthquake also provides a unique opportunity to compare the fault model constrained by modern observations with those of past earthquakes based on geological records so that we can improve the reconstructed recurrence history of massive earthquakes. It is expected that a collection of research contributions regarding the Tohoku earthquake will benefit our general understanding regarding infrequent great (M > 9) subduction earthquakes.

In this special issue of SPEPS, we invite authors to contribute their latest research or reviews on the seismotectonics along the northeastern Japan margin from disciplinary and interdisciplinary viewpoints. The scope of this issue ranges across, but is not limited to, the diversity of fault behaviors along the plate boundary and its relation to structural heterogeneity of the plate boundary zone, postseismic deformation and seismicity, behavior of tsunamis, and earthquake geology and paleoseismology along the Japan trench.

Deadline for submissions

Submission start: 1 October 2021

Submission deadline:  31 August 2022

Guest Editors

Takeshi Iinuma JAMSTEC email: [email protected]

Shuichi Kodaira JAMSTEC email: [email protected]

Masaki Yamada Shinshu University email:  [email protected]

Roland Bürgmann University of California, Berkeley email: [email protected]

Toru Matsuzawa Tohoku University, Japan email: [email protected]

Ryota Hino Tohoku University, Japan email: [email protected]

The nature of the Pacific plate as subduction inputs to the northeastern Japan arc and its implication for subduction zone processes

Devastating megathrust earthquakes and slow earthquakes both occur along subducting plate interfaces. These interplate seismic activities are strongly dependent on the nature of the plate interface, such as th...

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Marine inundation history during the last 3000 years at Lake Kogare-ike, a coastal lake on the Pacific coast of central Japan

Sediment cores collected at Lake Kogare-ike, a coastal lake on the Pacific coast of central Japan, record the marine inundation history during the last 3000 years. The sediments consist mainly of organic mud, ...

Incoming plate structure at the Japan Trench subduction zone revealed in densely spaced reflection seismic profiles

The structure of the incoming plate is an important element that is often considered to be related to the occurrence of great earthquakes in subduction zones. In the Japan Trench, where the 2011 Tohoku earthqu...

Progress in modeling the Tohoku-oki megathrust earthquake cycle and associated crustal deformation processes

This paper summarizes the results of 10 years of research on models of the megathrust earthquake cycles and crustal deformation associated with the 2011 Tohoku-oki earthquake. Several earthquake cycle models h...

Recurrence intervals for M > 7 Miyagi-ken-Oki earthquakes during an M ~ 9 earthquake cycle

The 2011 Tohoku-Oki great earthquake increased the difficulty of evaluating the long-term probability of seismic activity along the Japan Trench because of the unknown impact of the unprecedentedly large slip....

Progress and application of the synthesis of trans-oceanic tsunamis

Abundant high-quality distant tsunami records from the 2010 Maule (Chile) and 2011 Tohoku-Oki earthquakes have revealed two distinctive features compared to long-wave tsunami simulations. The records show that...

Abrupt water temperature increases near seafloor during the 2011 Tohoku earthquake

We investigated temperature records associated with seafloor pressure observations at eight stations that experienced the 2011 M w 9 Tohoku earthquake near its epicenter. The temperature data were based on the tem...

Sedimentary diversity of the 2011 Tohoku-oki tsunami deposits on the Sendai coastal plain and the northern coast of Fukushima Prefecture, Japan

This paper documents the sedimentary characteristics of the widespread deposits associated with the 2011 Tohoku-oki tsunami on the lowlands along the Pacific coast of the Sendai and Fukushima regions, northern...

Submarine paleoseismology in the Japan Trench of northeastern Japan: turbidite stratigraphy and sedimentology using paleomagnetic and rock magnetic analyses

Previous studies of sediments recovered from the Japan Trench between 37° 25′ N and 38° 30′ N document distinctive turbidite beds induced by huge earthquakes. We studied two sediment cores at 39°N to investiga...

The Correction to this article has been published in Progress in Earth and Planetary Science 2023 10 :22

Fault geometry of M6-class normal-faulting earthquakes in the outer trench slope of Japan Trench from ocean bottom seismograph observations

Since the 2011 Mw 9.0 Tohoku-oki earthquake, intra-plate normal-faulting earthquakes, including several M7-class earthquakes, have occurred in the outer trench slope area from the trench to the outer rise alon...

Heterogeneous rheology of Japan subduction zone revealed by postseismic deformation of the 2011 Tohoku-oki earthquake

The 2011 Tohoku-oki earthquake produced the most well-recorded postseismic deformation of any megathrust earthquake in the world. Over the last decade, researchers have used a dense and widespread geodetic n...

How large peak ground acceleration by large earthquakes could generate turbidity currents along the slope of northern Japan Trench

Deep-sea turbidite has been used to determine the history of occurrence of large earthquakes. Surface-sediment remobilization is a mechanism of the generation of earthquake-induced turbidity currents. However,...

The Correction to this article has been published in Progress in Earth and Planetary Science 2023 10 :15

A review on slow earthquakes in the Japan Trench

Slow earthquakes are episodic slow fault slips. They form a fundamental component of interplate deformation processes, along with fast, regular earthquakes. Recent seismological and geodetic observations have ...

Assessment of S-net seafloor pressure data quality in view of seafloor geodesy

Long-term continuous observation of seafloor pressure is effective for detecting seafloor vertical deformations that are associated with transient tectonic phenomena such as slow slip events. Since the aseismi...

Numerical estimation of a tsunami source at the flexural area of Kuril and Japan Trenches in the fifteenth to seventeenth century based on paleotsunami deposit distributions in northern Japan

Paleotsunami deposit investigations and numerical tsunami computations have been performed to elucidate the source and size of large tsunamis along the Kuril to Japan Trenches, particularly for unusual tsunami...

Washover deposits related to tsunami and storm surge along the north coast of the Shimokita Peninsula in northern Japan

A decade after the 2011 Tohoku-oki earthquake (Mw 9.0), geological surveys were conducted at multiple sites along the Pacific Coast of the tsunami-inundated Tohoku region in Japan, providing thousands of years...

Tectonic tremors immediately after the 2011 Tohoku-Oki earthquake detected by near-trench seafloor seismic observations

Temporal seismic observations from pop-up type ocean-bottom seismometers were used to detect tectonic tremors immediately following the 2011 Tohoku-Oki earthquake in the northern periphery of the aftershock ar...

A new mechanical perspective on a shallow megathrust near-trench slip from the high-resolution fault model of the 2011 Tohoku-Oki earthquake

The 2011 Tohoku-Oki earthquake generated a surprisingly large near-trench slip, and earth scientists have devoted significant attention to understanding why. Some studies proposed special rupture mechanisms, s...

To what extent tsunami source information can be extracted from tsunami deposits? Implications from the 2011 Tohoku-oki tsunami deposits and sediment transport simulations

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Continuous estimation of coseismic and early postseismic slip phenomena via the GNSS carrier phase to fault slip approach: a case study of the 2011 Tohoku-Oki sequence

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The 2011 Tohoku Tsunami on the Coast of Mexico: A Case Study

• Published: 28 June 2017
• Volume 174 , pages 2961–2986, ( 2017 )

Cite this article

• Oleg Zaytsev 1 ,
• Alexander B. Rabinovich 2 , 3 &
• Richard E. Thomson 2  

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The Tohoku (East Japan) earthquake of 11 March 2011 ( M w 9.0) generated a great trans-oceanic tsunami that spread throughout the Pacific Ocean, where it was measured by numerous coastal tide gauges and open-ocean DART (Deep-ocean Assessment and Reporting of Tsunamis) stations. Statistical and spectral analyses of the tsunami waves recorded along the Pacific coast of Mexico have enabled us to estimate the principal parameters of the waves along the coast and to compare statistical features of the tsunami with other tsunamis recorded on this coast. We identify coastal “hot spots”—Manzanillo, Zihuatanejo, Acapulco, and Ensenada—corresponding to sites having highest tsunami hazard potential, where wave heights during the 2011 event exceeded 1.5–2 m and tsunami-induced currents were strong enough to close port operations. Based on a joint spectral analysis of the tsunamis and background noise, we reconstructed the spectra of tsunami waves in the deep ocean and found that, with the exception of the high-frequency spectral band (>5 cph), the spectra are in close agreement with the “true” tsunami spectra determined from DART bottom pressure records. The departure of the high-frequency spectra in the coastal region from the deep-sea spectra is shown to be related to background infragravity waves generated in the coastal zone. The total energy and frequency content of the Tohoku tsunami is compared with the corresponding results for the 2010 Chilean tsunami. Our findings show that the integral open-ocean tsunami energy, I 0 , was ~2.30 cm 2 , or approximately 1.7 times larger than for the 2010 event. Comparison of this parameter with the mean coastal tsunami variance (451 cm 2 ) indicates that tsunami waves propagating onshore from the open ocean amplified by 14 times; the same was observed for the 2010 tsunami. The “tsunami colour” (frequency content) for the 2011 Tohoku tsunami was “red”, with about 65% of the total energy associated with low-frequency waves at frequencies <1.7 cph (periods >35 min). The “red colour” (i.e., the prevalence of low-frequency waves) in the 2011 Tohoku, as well as in the 2010 Chile tsunamis, is explained by the large extension of the source areas. In contrast, the 2014 and 2015 Chilean earthquakes had much smaller source areas and, consequently, induced “bluish” (high-frequency) tsunamis.

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DART = Deep-ocean Assessment and Reporting of Tsunamis, is an effective network of deep-ocean stations elaborated for continuous monitoring of tsunami waves in the open ocean and early tsunami warning (cf. Titov 2009 ; Mofjeld 2009 ; Mungov et al. 2013 ; Rabinovich and Eblé 2015 ).

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Acknowledgements

This work was partially supported by the Mexican Instituto Politécnico Nacional (IPN, Project SIP 20171223). Additional support for the first author was provided by SNI (Mexican National System of Investigators). For ABR, this study was partly supported by the RSF Grant 14-50-00095. We gratefully acknowledge the Mexican National Mareographic Service of the UNAM and the Laboratory of the Sea Level of the CICESE for providing us the coastal sea-level data and George Mungov (NOAA/NCEI, Boulder, Colorado) for assisting us with the DART data. We sincerely thank Isaac Fine (IOS, Sidney, BC) for useful discussions and for providing us the results of numerical modeling of the 2011 Tohoku tsunami, Paul Whitmore and Christopher Popham (NTWC, Palmer, AK) for presenting us precise ETAs for the tsunamis recorded by DARTs 46412, 43412, and 43413 offshore of Mexico, and Maxim Krassovski (IOS, Sidney, BC) for helping us with the figures.

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Zaytsev, O., Rabinovich, A.B. & Thomson, R.E. The 2011 Tohoku Tsunami on the Coast of Mexico: A Case Study. Pure Appl. Geophys. 174 , 2961–2986 (2017). https://doi.org/10.1007/s00024-017-1593-z

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HISTORIC ARTICLE

Mar 11, 2011 ce: tohoku earthquake and tsunami.

On March 11, 2011, Japan experienced the strongest earthquake in its recorded history.

Earth Science, Oceanography, Geography, Physical Geography

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• Click below to see a MapMaker Interactive map displaying tectonic activity surrounding the Tohoku earthquake and tsunami.

On March 11, 2011, Japan experienced the strongest earthquake in its recorded history. The earthquake struck below the North Pacific, 130 kilometers (81 miles) east of Sendai, the largest city in the Tohoku region , a northern part of the island of Honshu.

The Tohoku earthquake caused a tsunami . A tsunami—Japanese for “ harbor wave ”—is a series of powerful waves caused by the displacement of a large body of water. Most tsunamis, like the one that formed off Tohoku, are triggered by underwater tectonic activity , such as earthquakes and volcanic eruptions . The Tohoku tsunami produced waves up to 40 meters (132 feet) high, More than 450,000 people became homeless as a result of the tsunami. More than 15,500 people died. The tsunami also severely crippled the infrastructure of the country .

In addition to the thousands of destroyed homes, businesses, roads, and railways, the tsunami caused the meltdown of three nuclear reactors at the Fukushima Daiichi Nuclear Power Plant . The Fukushima nuclear disaster released toxic , radioactive materials into the environment and forced thousands of people to evacuate their homes and businesses.

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Related Resources

Japan's 2011 megaquake left a scar at the bottom of the sea. Scientists finally explored it.

A towering cliff in the Japan Trench of the Pacific Ocean “is unlike anything that’s been observed by science before.”

They were enveloped in an oppressive darkness. The sun, miles above, had vanished long ago. Through tiny windows, they could see the seafloor’s sediments glimmering in the submersible’s headlights. Curious fish flitted around their vessel.

Carefully navigating the inky-black waters was a little like “driving in a car at midnight along a mountain road,” says Hayato Ueda , a geoscientist at Niigata University in Japan and one of the sub’s two occupants.

Ueda and pilot Chris May searched the darkness in their claustrophobic vessel, and eventually a lofty geologic monument emerged from the shadows: an 85-foot-tall cliff climbing into the ocean above. The exposed crest of a cataclysmic rift in Earth’s crust, exactly where Ueda predicted it would be, was part of one of the worst disasters in modern history.

This cliff is a scar of the 2011 Tōhoku earthquake that struck off Japan’s eastern shores. That year, on March 11, the magnitude 9.1 temblor deep within the Pacific Ocean unleashed a catastrophic tsunami that hit Japan, killing around 20,000 people and leaving half a million homeless.

In the past decade, scientists have studied the quake by decoding its seismic waves and scanning the depths with sonar. But getting a detailed understanding of what caused the seafloor to convulse required something that initially seemed impossible: examining part of the rupture site in person, within the Japan Trench, almost five miles below the waves.

In 2022 scientists made that ambitious mission a reality. They secured a privately owned deep-sea vessel, the DSV Limiting Factor —a submersible cleared to safely take people down to the crushing, benighted seafloor.

Plunging into the Japan Trench, the divers eventually came upon the incongruous cliff. As reported in a study the journal Communications Earth and Environment , the team determined that this cliff represented the top of a section of a chunk of crust that jumped up by over 190 feet during the 2011 earthquake.

This appears to be “the very absolute tip of the fault that generated that massive earthquake,” says Harold Tobin , director of the Pacific Northwest Seismic Network at the University of Washington, who wasn’t involved in the study. “In this one place, the tip came all the way to the surface and pushed everything up. And they tagged it, they identified it directly in the field. And that’s incredible.”

Uplift features like this have been observed on land, but this is the first time one has been glimpsed by humans in a deep-sea subduction zone trench. This “is unlike anything that’s been observed by science before,” says Christie Rowe , an earthquake geologist at McGill University who was also not involved with the study.

Decoding a disaster

The entire rupture happened over a vast section of the abyss. To have created so much uplift, the fault responsible must have moved about 330 feet near the epicenter during the quake—the largest fault movement of its kind on record. The violently uprooted cliff that resulted was part of the reason the quake generated a calamitous tsunami.  

The location of this megaquake is not so surprising. The Japan Trench is a major quake-making machine ; since 1973, it has produced nine temblors above magnitude 7. This frequent shaking occurs because the trench is a subduction zone, where the colossal Pacific tectonic plate is being forced underneath the Okhotsk microplate.

But even so, the 2011 quake proved surprisingly powerful. It struck a little westward of the Japan Trench, about 18 miles below the seafloor, causing a gargantuan rupture over a 24,000-square-mile area. Seismic waves from the event and sonar-like mapping conducted by ships before and immediately after the quake suggested the fault responsible moved as much as 200 feet—an almost unbelievable amount, and still less than the recent expedition has ascertained.

“The Tohoku earthquake was obviously a massive watershed event. It’s a game changer in lots of ways,” says Tobin. Unraveling that fault’s behavior matters not just to Japan, but to anywhere in the world that will one day experience its own subduction-zone triggered tsunami, including the U.S. Pacific Northwest , which was inundated by a major tsunami three centuries ago.

The geologic jolt in Japan seemed so extreme that scientists wanted to find the physical evidence of it at the site itself. “It’s like what a geologist would do in the field,” says Tobin. “Except this happens to be eight kilometers [five miles] below the surface of the water.” At those high-pressure depths, most submersibles—including robotic ones—would malfunction or implode .

Enter: DSV Limiting Factor . Built by the American manufacturer Triton Submarines , and funded and owned by Victor Vescovo —an investor, former naval officer, and undersea explorer—this highly durable two-person vessel can dive down to 36,000 feet, making it one of the only submersibles capable of the journey into the Japan Trench.

“It’s an incredible submarine,” says Tobin.

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Illuminating the abyss.

In September 2022, drifting on the Pacific’s midnight-blue waves aboard the support boat DSSV Pressure Drop , Ueda and his colleagues perused their geologic and bathymetric charts. “I had to decide the exact point where the submersible will land,” he says. “I carefully read topography from the map and selected the most probable point where the fault features could exist.”

A proverbial X was scored on the map. They were ready. On September 4, Ueda and pilot Chris May climbed into the two cramped seats of the DSV Limiting Factor and began their quest into the depths.

After several hours they reached the seafloor within the Japan Trench. Ueda had visited oceanic depths before, but nothing this deep and dark. Throughout their dive, video cameras mounted on the outside of the submersible recorded their traversal, including the approach to the 85-foot-high cliff that did not exist prior to the 2011 quake.

“On the way floating up to the sea surface, I had much time—I don't remember well, but perhaps two hours or more—to consider about what I saw,” says Ueda. When he rewatched the video recordings from the dive, he became confident: this was something known as fault scarp, a part of the earthquake’s surface breakthrough that causes a change in elevation.

But the cliff was only the very top of the uplift. To properly measure its scale, the submersible had risen to the feature’s peak—and as it ascended, its pressure sensors were used to calculate the height difference between the basin floor at the clifftop. It was 194 feet—the seafloor’s vertical displacement at this location during the 2011 megaquake, according to the study.

The seafloor likely rose along many parts of the gigantic rupture in the Pacific, but this section jumped up by the height of a 14-story building. “That displacement is at least part of the tsunami source,” says Tobin.

Quakes of the deep

Using this new information, the team estimates that the fault slipped by 260 to 400 feet in total at this location during the earthquake—a staggering amount, perhaps twice as much as previously suspected.

It’s a reasonable calculation, says Judith Hubbard , an earthquake scientist at Cornell University not involved with the study. But reconstructing fault geometry on land is troublesome. Doing the same work on the seafloor—doubly so. And in tectonic terms, this part of the crust is a tangled nightmare. “This is a really complicated area. There’s a huge amount of stuff going on,” Hubbard says.

Crucially, though, “they didn’t overdo their claims,” says Tobin, who considers the evidence direct, robust, and elegant. Scientists knew the 2011’s rupture’s slip was tremendous. “This case is as bulletproof as you’re ever going to get,” he says.

The 2011 quake still retains much of its mystery. This site represents just a small section of an expansive rupture, and each part behaved uniquely during the fault’s mighty jolt. “It is difficult to provide an idea or story about the entire disaster,” says Ueda.

But this study has already set a new benchmark for untangling the depths and enigmas of subduction zone megaquakes. “I didn’t know it was technically possible” to make this journey to the seafloor, says Rowe. “I’m super pumped. It’s like being an astronaut.”

This work will bring protective benefits to Japan’s shores, and it will no doubt provide scientific succor to other coastal nations. Over the past two decades, an increasing number of tsunami early-warning systems have been placed in the world’s oceans. They rely on catching the seismic waves from aquatic quakes and quickly analyzing them.

But scientists are sometimes surprised. A tsunami can be forecast, but it can be more significant than predicted, or considerably smaller—or even nonexistent. The most important question is: “How big is that scarp on the seafloor? Because that’s your tsunami trigger,” says Rowe.

Using this study and other research to tweak tsunami forecast models could bolster efforts to save lives in future geologic disasters.

“It was surely fantastic to see such important features that nobody has ever seen. I'm honored to find it,” says Ueda. But he recounts his discovery with a somber note. “It might be this cliff that took more than 20,000 lives.”

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• Japan earthquake and tsunami of 2011 - Student Encyclopedia (Ages 11 and up)
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Initial reports of casualties following the tsunami put the death toll in the hundreds, with hundreds more missing. The numbers in both categories increased dramatically in the following days as the extent of the devastation—especially in coastal areas—became known and rescue operations got under way. Within two weeks of the disaster, the Japanese government’s official count of deaths had exceeded 10,000; more than one and a half times that number were still listed as missing and presumed dead. By then it was evident that the earthquake and tsunami constituted one of the deadliest natural disasters in Japanese history, rivaling the major earthquake and tsunami that had occurred off the coast of Iwate prefecture in June 1896. As the search for victims continued, the official count of those confirmed dead or still missing rose to about 28,500. However, as more people thought to be missing were found to be alive, that figure began to drop; by the end of 2011 it had been reduced to some 19,300.

Coastal cities and towns as well as vast areas of farmland in the tsunami’s path were inundated by swirling waters that swept enormous quantities of houses, boats, cars, trucks, and other debris along with them. As the extent of the destruction became known, it became clear how many thousands of people were missing—including, in some cases, half or more of a locality’s population. Among those who initially were unaccounted for were people on a ship that was washed away by the tsunami and passengers on several trains reported as missing in Iwate and Miyagi prefectures. The ship was later found (and the people on board rescued), and all trains were located as well.

Ultimately, the official total for the number of those confirmed dead or listed as missing from the disaster was about 18,500, although other estimates gave a final toll of at least 20,000. Of those, fewer than 100 were from prefectures other than Iwate, Miyagi, and Fukushima . Miyagi prefecture suffered the greatest losses, with some 10,800 killed or missing and another 4,100 injured. The great majority of those killed overall were drowning victims of the tsunami waves. In addition, more than half of the victims were age 65 years or older.

Although nearly all of the deaths and much of the destruction was caused by the tsunami waves along Japan’s Pacific coastline, the earthquake was responsible for considerable damage over a wide area. Notable were fires in several cities, including a petrochemical plant in Sendai , a portion of the city of Kesennuma in Miyagi prefecture, northeast of Sendai , and an oil refinery at Ichihara in Chiba prefecture, near Tokyo . In Fukushima, Ibaraki , and Chiba prefectures thousands of homes were completely or partially destroyed by the temblor and aftershocks. Infrastructure also was heavily affected throughout eastern Tōhoku , as roads and rail lines were damaged, electric power was knocked out, and water and sewerage systems were disrupted. In Fukushima a dam burst close to the prefectural capital, Fukushima city.

Of significant concern following the main shock and tsunami was the status of several nuclear power stations in the Tōhoku region. The reactors at the three nuclear power plants closest to the quake’s epicentre were shut down automatically following the temblor, which also cut the main power to those plants and their cooling systems. However, inundation by the tsunami waves damaged the backup generators at some of those plants, most notably at the Fukushima Daiichi (“Number One”) plant, situated along the Pacific coast in northeastern Fukushima prefecture about 60 miles (100 km) south of Sendai. With power gone, the cooling systems failed in three reactors within the first few days of the disaster, and their cores subsequently overheated, leading to partial meltdowns of the fuel rods. (Some plant workers, however, attributed at least one partial meltdown to coolant-pipe bursts caused by the earthquake’s ground vibrations.) Melted material fell to the bottom of the containment vessels in reactors 1 and 2 and burned sizable holes through the floor of each vessel, which partially exposed the nuclear material in the cores. Explosions resulting from the buildup of pressurized hydrogen gas in the outer containment buildings enclosing reactors 1, 2, and 3, along with a fire touched off by rising temperatures in spent fuel rods stored in reactor 4, led to the release of significant levels of radiation from the facility in the days and weeks following the earthquake. Workers sought to cool and stabilize the damaged reactors by pumping seawater and boric acid into them.

Because of concerns over possible radiation exposure, Japanese officials established an 18-mile (30-km) no-fly zone around the facility, and an area of 12.5 miles (20 km) around the plant was evacuated. The evacuation zone was later extended to the 18-mile no-fly radius, within which residents were asked to leave or remain indoors. The appearance of increased levels of radiation in some local food and water supplies prompted officials in Japan and overseas to issue warnings about their consumption . At the end of March, seawater near the Daiichi facility was discovered to have been contaminated with high levels of radioactive iodine-131. The contamination stemmed from the exposure of pumped-in seawater to radiation inside the facility; this water later leaked into the ocean through cracks in water-filled trenches and tunnels between the facility and the ocean.

In mid-April Japanese nuclear regulators elevated the severity level of the nuclear emergency at the Fukushima Daiichi facility from 5 to 7—the highest level on the scale created by the International Atomic Energy Agency —placing the Fukushima accident in the same category as the Chernobyl accident , which had occurred in the Soviet Union in 1986. Radiation levels remained high in the evacuation zone, and it was thought that the area might be uninhabitable for decades. However, several months after the accident, government officials announced that radiation levels in five towns located just beyond the original 12.5-mile evacuation zone had declined enough that they could allow residents to return to their homes. Although some people did come back, others stayed away, concerned about the amount of radioactive materials still in the soil. Attempts were made in several of those areas to remove contaminated soil. In December 2011 Japanese Prime Minister Noda Yoshihiko declared the Fukushima Daiichi facility stable after the cold shutdown of its reactors had been completed.

In the years following the accident, numerous leaks at the facility occurred at the site where contaminated reactor cooling water was stored. A significant leak occurred in August 2013 that was severe enough to prompt Japan’s Nuclear Regulation Authority to classify it as a level-3 nuclear incident.