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10 Big Findings from the 2023 IPCC Report on Climate Change

• climate change
• Climate Resilience
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March 20 marked the release of the final installment of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change’s (IPCC) Sixth Assessment Report (AR6) , an eight-year long undertaking from the world’s most authoritative scientific body on climate change. Drawing on the findings of 234 scientists on the  physical science of climate change , 270 scientists on  impacts, adaptation and vulnerability to climate change , and 278 scientists on  climate change mitigation , this  IPCC synthesis report  provides the most comprehensive, best available scientific assessment of climate change.

It also makes for grim reading. Across nearly 8,000 pages, the AR6 details the devastating consequences of rising greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions around the world — the destruction of homes, the loss of livelihoods and the fragmentation of communities, for example — as well as the increasingly dangerous and irreversible risks should we fail to change course.

But the IPCC also offers hope, highlighting pathways to avoid these intensifying risks. It identifies readily available, and in some cases, highly cost-effective actions that can be undertaken now to reduce GHG emissions, scale up carbon removal and build resilience. While the window to address the climate crisis is rapidly closing, the IPCC affirms that we can still secure a safe, livable future.

Here are 10 key findings you need to know:

1. Human-induced global warming of 1.1 degrees C has spurred changes to the Earth’s climate that are unprecedented in recent human history.

Already, with 1.1 degrees C (2 degrees F) of global temperature rise, changes to the climate system that are unparalleled over centuries to millennia are now occurring in every region of the world, from rising sea levels to more extreme weather events to rapidly disappearing sea ice.

Additional warming will increase the magnitude of these changes. Every 0.5 degree C (0.9 degrees F) of global temperature rise, for example, will cause clearly discernible increases in the frequency and severity of heat extremes, heavy rainfall events and regional droughts. Similarly, heatwaves that, on average, arose once every 10 years in a climate with little human influence will likely occur 4.1 times more frequently with 1.5 degrees C (2.7 degrees F) of warming, 5.6 times with 2 degrees C (3.6 degrees F) and 9.4 times with 4 degrees C (7.2 degrees F) — and the intensity of these heatwaves will also increase by 1.9 degrees C (3.4 degrees F), 2.6 degrees C (4.7 degrees F) and 5.1 degrees C (9.2 degrees F) respectively.

Rising global temperatures also heighten the probability of reaching dangerous tipping points in the climate system that, once crossed, can trigger self-amplifying feedbacks that further increase global warming, such as thawing permafrost or massive forest dieback. Setting such reinforcing feedbacks in motion can also lead to other substantial, abrupt and irreversible changes to the climate system. Should warming reach between 2 degrees C (3.6 degrees F) and 3 degrees C (5.4 degrees F), for example, the West Antarctic and Greenland ice sheets could melt almost completely and irreversibly over many thousands of years, causing sea levels to rise by several meters.

2. Climate impacts on people and ecosystems are more widespread and severe than expected, and future risks will escalate rapidly with every fraction of a degree of warming.

Described as an “an atlas of human suffering and a damning indictment of failed climate leadership” by United Nations Secretary-General António Guterres, one of AR6’s most alarming conclusions is that adverse climate impacts are already more far-reaching and extreme than anticipated. About half of the global population currently contends with severe water scarcity for at least one month per year, while higher temperatures are enabling the spread of vector-borne diseases, such as malaria, West Nile virus and Lyme disease. Climate change has also slowed improvements in agricultural productivity in middle and low latitudes, with crop productivity growth shrinking by a third in Africa since 1961. And since 2008, extreme floods and storms have forced over 20 million people from their homes every year.

Every fraction of a degree of warming will intensify these threats, and even limiting global temperature rise to 1.5 degree C is not safe for all. At this level of warming, for example, 950 million people across the world’s drylands will experience water stress, heat stress and desertification, while the share of the global population exposed to flooding will rise by 24%.

Similarly, overshooting 1.5 degrees C (2.7 degrees F), even temporarily, will lead to much more severe, oftentimes irreversible impacts, from local species extinctions to the complete drowning of salt marshes to loss of human lives from increased heat stress. Limiting the magnitude and duration of overshooting 1.5 degrees C (2.7 degrees F), then, will prove critical in ensuring a safe, livable future, as will holding warming to as close to 1.5 degrees C (2.7 degrees F) or below as possible. Even if this temperature limit is exceeded by the end of the century, the imperative to rapidly curb GHG emissions to avoid higher levels of warming and associated impacts remains unchanged.

3. Adaptation measures can effectively build resilience, but more finance is needed to scale solutions.

Climate policies in at least 170 countries now consider adaptation, but in many nations, these efforts have yet to progress from planning to implementation. Measures to build resilience are still largely small-scale, reactive and incremental, with most focusing on immediate impacts or near-term risks. This disparity between today’s levels of adaptation and those required persists in large part due to limited finance. According to the IPCC, developing countries alone will need $127 billion per year by 2030 and $295 billion per year by 2050 to adapt to climate change. But funds for adaptation reached just $23 billion to $46 billion from 2017 to 2018, accounting for only 4% to 8% of tracked climate finance.

The good news is that the IPCC finds that, with sufficient support, proven and readily available adaptation solutions can build resilience to climate risks and, in many cases, simultaneously deliver broader sustainable development benefits.

Ecosystem-based adaptation, for example, can help communities adapt to impacts that are already devastating their lives and livelihoods, while also safeguarding biodiversity, improving health outcomes, bolstering food security, delivering economic benefits and enhancing carbon sequestration. Many ecosystem-based adaptation measures — including the protection, restoration and sustainable management of ecosystems, as well as more sustainable agricultural practices like integrating trees into farmlands and increasing crop diversity — can be implemented at relatively low costs today. Meaningful collaboration with Indigenous Peoples and local communities is critical to the success of this approach, as is ensuring that ecosystem-based adaptation strategies are designed to account for how future global temperature rise will impact ecosystems.

4. Some climate impacts are already so severe they cannot be adapted to, leading to losses and damages.

Around the world, highly vulnerable people and ecosystems are already struggling to adapt to climate change impacts. For some, these limits are “soft” — effective adaptation measures exist, but economic, political and social obstacles constrain implementation, such as lack of technical support or inadequate funding that does not reach the communities where it’s needed most. But in other regions, people and ecosystems already face or are fast approaching “hard” limits to adaptation, where climate impacts from 1.1 degrees C (2 degrees F) of global warming are becoming so frequent and severe that no existing adaptation strategies can fully avoid losses and damages. Coastal communities in the tropics, for example, have seen entire coral reef systems that once supported their livelihoods and food security experience widespread mortality, while rising sea levels have forced other low-lying neighborhoods to move to higher ground and abandon cultural sites. 

Whether grappling with soft or hard limits to adaptation, the result for vulnerable communities is oftentimes irreversible and devastating. Such losses and damages will only escalate as the world warms. Beyond 1.5 degrees C (2.7 degrees F) of global temperature rise, for example, regions reliant on snow and glacial melt will likely experience water shortages to which they cannot adapt. At 2 degrees C (3.6 degrees F), the risk of concurrent maize production failures across important growing regions will rise dramatically. And above 3 degrees C (5.4 degrees F), dangerously high summertime heat will threaten the health of communities in parts of southern Europe.

Urgent action is needed to avert, minimize and address these losses and damages. At COP27, countries took a critical step forward by agreeing to establish funding arrangements for loss and damage, including a dedicated fund. While this represents  a historic breakthrough  in the climate negotiations, countries must now figure out the details of what these funding arrangements, as well as the new fund , will look like in practice — and it’s these details that will ultimately determine the adequacy, accessibility, additionality and predictability of these financial flows to those experiencing loss and damage.

5. Global GHG emissions peak before 2025 in 1.5 degrees C-aligned pathways.

The IPCC finds that there is a more than 50% chance that global temperature rise will reach or surpass 1.5 degrees C (2.7 degrees F) between 2021 and 2040 across studied scenarios, and under a high-emissions pathway, specifically, the world may hit this threshold even sooner — between 2018 and 2037. Global temperature rise in such a carbon-intensive scenario could also increase to 3.3 degrees C to 5.7 degrees C (5.9 degrees F to 10.3 degrees F) by 2100. To put this projected amount of warming into perspective, the last time global temperatures exceeded 2.5 degrees C (4.5 degrees F) above pre-industrial levels was more than 3 million years ago.

Changing course to limit global warming to 1.5 degrees C (2.7 degrees F) — with no or limited overshoot — will instead require deep GHG emissions reductions in the near-term. In modelled pathways that limit global warming to this goal, GHG emissions peak immediately and before 2025 at the latest. They then drop rapidly, declining 43% by 2030 and 60% by 2035, relative to 2019 levels.

While there are some bright spots — the annual growth rate of GHG emissions slowed from an average of 2.1% per year between 2000 and 2009 to 1.3% per year between 2010 and 2019, for example — global progress in mitigating climate change remains woefully off track. GHG emissions have climbed steadily over the past decade, reaching 59 gigatonnes of carbon dioxide equivalent (GtCO2e) in 2019 — approximately 12% higher than in 2010 and 54% greater than in 1990.

Even if countries achieved their climate pledges (also known as nationally determined contributions or NDCs),  WRI research  finds that they would reduce GHG emissions by just 7% from 2019 levels by 2030, in contrast to the 43% associated with limiting temperature rise to 1.5 degrees C (2.7 degrees F). And while handful of countries have submitted  new or enhanced NDCs  since the IPCC’s cut-off date,  more recent analysis  that takes these submissions into account finds that these commitments collectively still fall short of closing this emissions gap.

6. The world must rapidly shift away from burning fossil fuels — the number one cause of the climate crisis.

In pathways limiting warming to 1.5 degrees C (2.7 degrees F) with no or limited overshoot just a net 510 GtCO2 can be emitted before carbon dioxide emissions reach net zero in the early 2050s. Yet future carbon dioxide emissions from existing and planned fossil fuel infrastructure alone could surpass that limit by 340 GtCO2, reaching 850 GtCO2.

A mix of strategies can help avoid  locking in  these emissions, including retiring existing fossil fuel infrastructure, canceling new projects, retrofitting fossil-fueled power plants with carbon capture and storage (CCS) technologies and scaling up renewable energy sources like solar and wind (which are now cheaper than fossil fuels in many regions).

In pathways that limit warming to 1.5 degrees C (2.7 degrees F) — with no or limited overshoot — for example, global use of coal falls by 95% by 2050, oil declines by about 60% and gas by about 45%. These figures assume significant use of abatement technologies like CCS, and without them, these same pathways show much steeper declines by mid-century. Global use of coal without CCS, for example, is virtually phased out by 2050.

Although coal-fired power plants are starting to be retired across Europe and the United States, some multilateral development banks continue to invest in new coal capacity. Failure to change course risks stranding assets worth trillions of dollars.

7. We also need urgent, systemwide transformations to secure a net-zero, climate-resilient future.

While fossil fuels are the number one source of GHG emissions, deep emission cuts are necessary across all of society to combat the climate crisis. Power generation, buildings, industry, and transport are responsible for close to 80% of global emissions while agriculture, forestry and other land uses account for the remainder.

Take the  transport system , for instance. Drastically cutting emissions will require urban planning that minimizes the need for travel, as well as the build-out of shared, public and nonmotorized transport, such as rapid transit and bicycling in cities. Such a transformation will also entail increasing the supply of electric passenger vehicles, commercial vehicles and buses, coupled with wide-scale installation of rapid-charging infrastructure, investments in zero-carbon fuels for shipping and aviation and more.

Policy measures that make these changes less disruptive can help accelerate needed transitions, such as subsidizing zero-carbon technologies and taxing high-emissions technologies like fossil-fueled cars. Infrastructure design — like reallocating street space for sidewalks or bike lanes — can help people transition to lower-emissions lifestyles. It is important to note there are many co-benefits that accompany these transformations, too. Minimizing the number of passenger vehicles on the road, in this example, reduces harmful local air pollution and cuts traffic-related crashes and deaths.

Systems Change Lab  monitors, learns from and mobilizes action to achieve the far-reaching transformational shifts needed to limit global warming to 1.5 degrees C, halt biodiversity loss and build a just and equitable economy.

Transformative adaptation measures, too, are critical for securing a more prosperous future. The IPCC emphasizes the importance of ensuring that adaptation measures drive systemic change, cut across sectors and are distributed equitably across at-risk regions. The good news is that there are oftentimes strong synergies between transformational mitigation and adaptation. For example, in the global food system, climate-smart agriculture practices like shifting to  agroforestry  can improve resilience to climate impacts, while simultaneously advancing mitigation.  

8. Carbon removal is now essential to limit global temperature rise to 1.5 degrees C.

Deep decarbonization across all systems while building resilience won’t be enough to achieve global climate goals, though. The IPCC finds that all pathways that limit warming to 1.5 degrees C (2.7 degrees F) — with no or limited overshoot — depend on some quantity of  carbon removal . These approaches encompass both natural solutions, such as sequestering and storing carbon in trees and soil, as well as more nascent technologies that pull carbon dioxide directly from the air.

Hover over each carbon removal approach to learn more:

Note: This figure includes carbon removal approaches mentioned in countries' long-term climate strategies as well as other leading proposed approaches. The natural/biotic vs. technological/abiotic categorization shown here is illustrative rather than definitive and will vary depending on how approaches are applied, particularly for carbon removal approaches in the ocean.

The amount of carbon removal required depends on how quickly we reduce GHG emissions across other systems and the extent to which climate targets are overshot, with estimates ranging from between 5 GtCO2 to 16 GtCO2 per year needed by mid-century.

All carbon removal approaches have merits and drawbacks. Reforestation, for instance, represents a readily available, relatively low-cost strategy that, when implemented appropriately, can deliver a wide range of benefits to communities. Yet the carbon stored within these ecosystems is also vulnerable to disturbances like wildfires, which may increase in frequency and severity with additional warming. And, while technologies like bioenergy with carbon capture and storage (BECCS) may offer a more permanent solution, such approaches also risk displacing croplands, and in doing so, threatening food security. Responsibly researching, developing and deploying emerging carbon removal technologies, alongside existing natural approaches, will therefore require careful understanding of each solution’s unique benefits, costs and risks.

9. Climate finance for both mitigation and adaptation must increase dramatically this decade.

The IPCC finds that public and private finance flows for fossil fuels today far surpass those directed toward climate mitigation and adaptation. Thus, while annual public and private climate finance has risen by upwards of 60% since the IPCC’s Fifth Assessment Report, much more is still required to achieve global climate change goals. For instance, climate finance will need to increase between 3 and 6 times by 2030 to achieve mitigation goals, alone.

This gap is widest in developing countries, particularly those already struggling with debt, poor credit ratings and economic burdens from the COVID-19 pandemic. Recent mitigation investments, for example, need to increase by at least sixfold in Southeast Asia and developing countries in the Pacific, fivefold in Africa and fourteenfold in the Middle East by 2030 to hold warming below 2 degrees C (3.6 degrees F). And across sectors, this shortfall is most pronounced for agriculture, forestry and other land use, where recent financial flows are 10 to 31 times below what is required to achieve the Paris Agreement’s goals.

Finance for adaptation, as well as loss and damage, will also need to rise dramatically. Developing countries, for example, will need $127 billion per year by 2030 and $295 billion per year by 2050. While AR6 does not assess countries’ needs for finance to avert, minimize and address losses and damages,  recent estimates  suggest that they will be substantial in the coming decades. Current funds for both fall well below estimated needs, with the highest estimates of adaptation finance totaling under $50 billion per year.

10. Climate change — as well as our collective efforts to adapt to and mitigate it — will exacerbate inequity should we fail to ensure a just transition.  

Households with incomes in the top 10%, including a relatively large share in developed countries, emit upwards of 45% of the world's GHGs, while those families earning in the bottom 50% account for 15% at most. Yet the effects of climate change already — and will continue to — hit poorer, historically marginalized communities the hardest.

Today, between 3.3 billion and 3.6 billion people live in countries that are highly vulnerable to climate impacts, with global hotspots concentrated in the Arctic, Central and South America, Small Island Developing states, South Asia and much of sub-Saharan Africa. Across many countries in these regions, conflict, existing inequalities and development challenges (e.g., poverty and limited access to basic services like clean water) not only heighten sensitivity to climate hazards, but also limit communities’ capacity to adapt.  Mortality from storms, floods and droughts, for instance, was 15 times higher in countries with high vulnerability to climate change than in those with very low vulnerability from 2010 to 2020.

At the same time, efforts to mitigate climate change also risk disruptive changes and exacerbating inequity. Retiring coal-fired power plants, for instance, may displace workers, harm local economies and reconfigure the social fabric of communities, while inappropriately implemented efforts to halt deforestation could heighten poverty and intensify food insecurity. And certain climate policies, such as  carbon taxes  that raise the cost of emissions-intensive goods like gasoline, can also prove to be regressive, absent of efforts to recycle the revenues raised from these taxes back into programs that benefit low-income communities.

Fortunately, the IPCC identifies a range of measures that can support a just transition and help ensure that no one is left behind as the world moves toward a net-zero-emissions, climate-resilient future. Reconfiguring social protection programs (e.g., cash transfers, public works programs and social safety nets) to include adaptation, for example, can reduce communities’ vulnerability to a wide range of future climate impacts, while strengthening justice and equity. Such programs are particularly effective when paired with efforts to expand access to infrastructure and basic services.

Similarly, policymakers can design mitigation strategies to better distribute the costs and benefits of reducing GHG emissions. Governments can pair efforts to phase out coal-fired electricity generation, for instance, with subsidized job retraining programs that support workers in developing the skills needed to secure new, high-quality jobs. Or, in another example, officials can couple policy interventions dedicated to expanding access to public transit with interventions to improve access to nearby, affordable housing.

Across both mitigation and adaptation measures, inclusive, transparent and participatory decision-making processes will play a central role in ensuring a just transition. More specifically, these forums can help cultivate public trust, deepen public support for transformative climate action and avoid unintended consequences.

Looking Ahead

The IPCC’s AR6 makes clear that risks of inaction on climate are immense and the way ahead requires change at a scale not seen before. However, this report also serves as a reminder that we have never had more information about the gravity of the climate emergency and its cascading impacts — or about what needs to be done to reduce intensifying risks.

Limiting global temperature rise to 1.5 degrees C (2.7 degrees F) is still possible, but only if we act immediately. As the IPCC makes clear, the world needs to peak GHG emissions before 2025 at the very latest, nearly halve GHG emissions by 2030 and reach net-zero CO2 emissions around mid-century, while also ensuring a just and equitable transition. We’ll also need an all-hands-on-deck approach to guarantee that communities experiencing increasingly harmful impacts of the climate crisis have the resources they need to adapt to this new world. Governments, the private sector, civil society and individuals must all step up to keep the future we desire in sight. A narrow window of opportunity is still open, but there’s not one second to waste.

Note: In addition to showcasing findings from the IPCC’s AR6 Synthesis Report, this article also draws on previous articles detailing the IPCC’s findings on  the physical science of climate change ,  impacts, adaption and vulnerability ,  and  climate change mitigation .

Relevant Work

6 takeaways from the 2022 ipcc climate change mitigation report, 6 big findings from the ipcc 2022 report on climate impacts, adaptation and vulnerability, 5 big findings from the ipcc’s 2021 climate report, 8 things you need to know about the ipcc 1.5˚c report.

Join us on March 23 for a high-level webinar featuring IPCC authors, government representatives and leading carbon removal experts to discuss how carbon removal is a critical tool in our toolbox to address the climate crisis.

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The Latest IPCC Report: What is it and why does it matter?

The UN released a new climate report—here's what it says, and what we can do about it

Last updated March 20, 2023

This article was updated on March 20, 2023, to include findings from the most recent IPCC report.

The IPCC has released a new climate report, updating and synthesizing the findings from a series of previous reports. But what exactly is the IPCC? What do all these reports mean? Is our situation as grim as some of the news headlines make it sound?

We’ve prepared this guide to help you understand what these climate reports are, what their findings mean for our world and what we can do.

What is the IPCC and what do they do?

IPCC stands for Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change . The IPCC is the scientific group assembled by the United Nations to monitor and assess all global science related to climate change. Every IPCC report focuses on different aspects of climate change.

This latest report is the IPCC’s 6 th Synthesis report. It updates and compiles in one report findings from all the reports in the IPCC’s sixth assessment cycle, which covered the latest climate science, the threats we’re already facing today from climate change, and what we can do to limit further temperature rises and the dangers that poses for the whole planet.

What should I know about the latest IPCC report?

There is some good news in this synthesis report. There have been promising developments in low-carbon technologies. Countries are making more ambitious national commitments to reduce their emissions and doing more to help communities adapt to the effects of climate change. And we’re seeing more funding committed for all of this work.

The problem is it’s still not enough. Even if every country in the world delivers on its current climate pledges, that’s probably not enough to keep global warming to 1.5°C above pre-industrial levels—a threshold scientists believe is necessary to avoid the worst impacts of climate change.

Current adaptation efforts, too, are scattered and leave behind some of the most vulnerable communities. And if the planet gets much warmer, we may see irreversible changes to some ecosystems around the world, which would be catastrophic for the people and wildlife that depend on them.

Want to go deeper on the findings? TNC Chief Scientist Katharine Hayhoe breaks them down in this Twitter thread .

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Is there any hope then?

Yes. Climate change is here today, reshaping our world in ways big and small—but that doesn’t mean our future is predetermined. Every fraction of a degree of warming makes a big difference in how powerful the effects of climate change will be, including the frequency and intensity of heatwaves, storms, floods and droughts. That means every action we take to limit further warming makes a big difference, especially for vulnerable communities around the world.

We need bolder global climate commitments, and we need them fast so we can transition to clean energy and reach “net zero” emissions as soon possible . And as the IPCC's reports shows, we’ll not only need to cut out emissions—we’ll have to remove some of the carbon that’s already in the atmosphere. Fortunately, nature created a powerful technology that does just that: photosynthesis . Plants naturally absorb carbon from the air and store it in their roots and in the soil.

In addition to phasing out fossil fuels, we also need to protect the natural habitats around the world that store billions of tons of this “living carbon.” We can also help by changing the way we manage working lands like farms and timber forests so they retain more carbon, and restore natural habitats on lands that have been cleared or degraded.  

What can we do to stop climate change?

A global challenge like climate change requires global solutions. It will require movement-building and on-the-ground action, as well as new national policies and economic transformations. Here’s a few things that communities, governments, and business can do.  

Communities

• When it comes to working with nature to fight climate change, we cannot achieve effective action without the leadership of Indigenous Peoples and local communities (IPLCs).
• These communities are some of the most important protectors of the world’s living carbon, as lands owned or managed by IPLCs often have much lower deforestation rates than government protected areas. In fact, Indigenous-managed lands support about 80 percent of the world’s remaining biodiversity and 17 percent of the planet’s forest carbon.
• To help Indigenous groups keep playing this crucial role, governments must formally recognize their land and resource rights, and funding for climate action should include support for their communities.

Related reading: Protecting nature through authentic partnerships.  

Governments

• All countries—especially the wealthy countries that generate the most emissions— must create more ambitious climate action plans to eliminate emissions and pull more carbon from their atmosphere—and they need to follow through on them.
• In addition to cutting fossil fuel use, this can be done investing more in nature . The IPCC estimates it would cost about $400 billion to make the changes to agriculture, forestry and other land uses required to limit emissions. That sounds like a lot—but it’s less than the government subsidies these sectors are already receiving .
• The best part? Many of these natural climate solutions benefit society in other ways , like improving air and water quality, producing more food and protecting the variety of natural life we all depend on.

Related reading: Canada's new climate plan includes working with nature to reduce emissions.

• Like national governments, businesses must first and foremost commit to reaching net-zero emissions in their operations—they have to stop putting more carbon into the air.
• The most direct way to do this is to switch to clean energy sources . Transitioning to renewable energy provides a low-cost, low-carbon, low-conflict pathway to meet global energy needs without harming nature and communities.
• Those sectors that will have a hard time reducing their emissions today—like airlines, for example—should find ways to offset their impact.
• Carbon markets offer one way to achieve this. Carbon markets allow businesses and other polluters to purchase “offsets” for their unavoidable emissions, which pay to protect natural lands that would have otherwise been cleared without that funding or restore those that would not recover. 

Related reading: An illustrated guide to carbon offsets.

What can I do as an individual?

• Learn how to talk about climate change: We can all help by engaging and educating others. Our guide will help you feel comfortable raising these topics at the dinner table with your friends and family. Download our guide to talk about climate change.
• Share your thoughts: Share this page on your social channels so others know what they can do, too. Here are some hashtags to join the conversation: #IPCC #ClimateAction #NatureNow
• Join collective action : By speaking collectively, we can influence climate action at the national and global levels. You can add your name to stand with The Nature Conservancy in calling for real solutions now.
• Keep learning : Educate yourself and share the knowledge—you can start with some of these articles, videos, and other resources .

Videos: Climate Issues Explained

Climate Action Resources

Natural Climate Solutions Handbook

October 2021

A technical guide for assessing nature-based mitigation opportunities in countries More information on Natural Climate Solutions

Playbook for Climate Action

This playbook showcases five innovative pathways for reducing emissions and climate impacts. A comprehensive suite of science-based solutions, the playbook presents actions governments and companies can deploy—and scale—today. Visit the Digital Version

Further Reading

COP28: Your Guide to the 2023 UN Climate Change Conference in UAE

COP28 takes place November 30-December 12, 2023 in United Arab Emirates. This guide will tell you what to expect at COP28, why TNC will be there, and what it all means for you.

Climate Change FAQs

You asked. Our scientists answered. Use this guide to have the best info about climate change and how we can solve it together.

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Recognizing the Protective Value of Nature

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Climate Change 2023: Synthesis Report

The much-anticipated  Climate Change 2023: Synthesis Report  is based on years of work by hundreds of scientists during the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change ’s (IPCC) sixth assessment cycle which began in 2015.

The report provides the main scientific input to COP28 and the Global Stocktake at the end of this year, when countries will review progress towards the Paris Agreement goals.

The report reiterates that humans are responsible for all global heating over the past 200 years leading to a current temperature rise of 1.1°C above pre-industrial levels, which has led to more frequent and hazardous weather events that have caused increasing destruction to people and the planet. The report reminds us that every increment of warming will come with more extreme weather events. 

The report outlines that the 1.5°C limit is still achievable and outlines the critical action required across sectors and by everyone at all levels. The report focuses on the critical need for action that considers climate justice and focuses on climate resilient development. It outlines that by sharing best practices, technology, effective policy measures, and mobilising sufficient finance, any community can decrease or prevent the usage of carbon-intensive consumption methods. The biggest gains in well-being can be achieved by prioritizing climate risk reduction for low-income and marginalized communities.

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Executive Summary

Highlights of the findings of the u.s. global change research program climate science special report.

<b>Wuebbles</b>, D.J., D.W. Fahey, K.A. Hibbard, B. DeAngelo, S. Doherty, K. Hayhoe, R. Horton, J.P. Kossin, P.C. Taylor, A.M. Waple, and C.P. Weaver, 2017: Executive summary. In: <i>Climate Science Special Report: Fourth National Climate Assessment, Volume I</i> [Wuebbles, D.J., D.W. Fahey, K.A. Hibbard, D.J. Dokken, B.C. Stewart, and T.K. Maycock (eds.)]. U.S. Global Change Research Program, Washington, DC, USA, pp. 12-34, doi: <a href="http://doi.org/10.7930/J0DJ5CTG">10.7930/J0DJ5CTG</a>.

The climate of the United States is strongly connected to the changing global climate. The statements below highlight past, current, and projected climate changes for the United States and the globe.

Global annually averaged surface air temperature has increased by about 1.8°F (1.0°C) over the last 115 years (1901–2016). This period is now the warmest in the history of modern civilization. The last few years have also seen record-breaking, climate-related weather extremes, and the last three years have been the warmest years on record for the globe. These trends are expected to continue over climate timescales.

This assessment concludes, based on extensive evidence, that it is extremely likely that human activities, especially emissions of greenhouse gases, are the dominant cause of the observed warming since the mid-20th century . For the warming over the last century, there is no convincing alternative explanation supported by the extent of the observational evidence.

In addition to warming, many other aspects of global climate are changing, primarily in response to human activities. Thousands of studies conducted by researchers around the world have documented changes in surface, atmospheric, and oceanic temperatures; melting glaciers; diminishing snow cover; shrinking sea ice; rising sea levels; ocean acidification; and increasing atmospheric water vapor .

For example, global average sea level has risen by about 7–8 inches since 1900, with almost half (about 3 inches) of that rise occurring since 1993. Human-caused climate change has made a substantial contribution to this rise since 1900, contributing to a rate of rise that is greater than during any preceding century in at least 2,800 years. Global sea level rise has already affected the United States; the incidence of daily tidal flooding is accelerating in more than 25 Atlantic and Gulf Coast cities .

Global average sea levels are expected to continue to rise—by at least several inches in the next 15 years and by 1–4 feet by 2100. A rise of as much as 8 feet by 2100 cannot be ruled out . Sea level rise will be higher than the global average on the East and Gulf Coasts of the United States.

Changes in the characteristics of extreme events are particularly important for human safety, infrastructure, agriculture, water quality and quantity, and natural ecosystems. Heavy rainfall is increasing in intensity and frequency across the United States and globally and is expected to continue to increase . The largest observed changes in the United States have occurred in the Northeast.

Heatwaves have become more frequent in the United States since the 1960s, while extreme cold temperatures and cold waves are less frequent . Recent record-setting hot years are projected to become common in the near future for the United States, as annual average temperatures continue to rise. Annual average temperature over the contiguous United States has increased by 1.8°F (1.0°C) for the period 1901–2016; over the next few decades (2021–2050), annual average temperatures are expected to rise by about 2.5°F for the United States, relative to the recent past (average from 1976–2005), under all plausible future climate scenarios.

The incidence of large forest fires in the western United States and Alaska has increased since the early 1980s and is projected to further increase in those regions as the climate changes, with profound changes to regional ecosystems.

Annual trends toward earlier spring melt and reduced snowpack are already affecting water resources in the western United States and these trends are expected to continue. Under higher scenarios, and assuming no change to current water resources management, chronic, long-duration hydrological drought is increasingly possible before the end of this century .

The magnitude of climate change beyond the next few decades will depend primarily on the amount of greenhouse gases (especially carbon dioxide) emitted globally . Without major reductions in emissions, the increase in annual average global temperature relative to preindustrial times could reach 9°F (5°C) or more by the end of this century. With significant reductions in emissions, the increase in annual average global temperature could be limited to 3.6°F (2 ° C) or less.

The global atmospheric carbon dioxide (CO 2 ) concentration has now passed 400 parts per million (ppm), a level that last occurred about 3 million years ago, when both global average temperature and sea level were significantly higher than today . Continued growth in CO 2 emissions over this century and beyond would lead to an atmospheric concentration not experienced in tens to hundreds of millions of years. There is broad consensus that the further and the faster the Earth system is pushed towards warming, the greater the risk of unanticipated changes and impacts, some of which are potentially large and irreversible.

The observed increase in carbon emissions over the past 15–20 years has been consistent with higher emissions pathways. In 2014 and 2015, emission growth rates slowed as economic growth became less carbon-intensive . Even if this slowing trend continues, however, it is not yet at a rate that would limit global average temperature change to well below 3.6°F (2°C) above preindustrial levels.

Introduction

New observations and new research have increased our understanding of past, current, and future climate change since the Third U.S. National Climate Assessment (NCA3) was published in May 2014. This Climate Science Special Report (CSSR) is designed to capture that new information and build on the existing body of science in order to summarize the current state of knowledge and provide the scientific foundation for the Fourth National Climate Assessment (NCA4).

Since NCA3, stronger evidence has emerged for continuing, rapid, human-caused warming of the global atmosphere and ocean. This report concludes that “it is extremely likely that human influence has been the dominant cause of the observed warming since the mid-20th century. For the warming over the last century, there is no convincing alternative explanation supported by the extent of the observational evidence.”

The last few years have also seen record-breaking, climate-related weather extremes, the three warmest years on record for the globe, and continued decline in arctic sea ice. These trends are expected to continue in the future over climate (multidecadal) timescales. Significant advances have also been made in our understanding of extreme weather events and how they relate to increasing global temperatures and associated climate changes. Since 1980, the cost of extreme events for the United States has exceeded $1.1 trillion; therefore, better understanding of the frequency and severity of these events in the context of a changing climate is warranted.

Periodically taking stock of the current state of knowledge about climate change and putting new weather extremes, changes in sea ice, increases in ocean temperatures, and ocean acidification into context ensures that rigorous, scientifically-based information is available to inform dialogue and decisions at every level. This climate science report serves as the climate science foundation of the NCA4 and is generally intended for those who have a technical background in climate science. In this Executive Summary, green boxes present highlights of the main report. These are followed by related points and selected figures providing more scientific details. The summary material on each topic presents the most salient points of chapter findings and therefore represents only a subset of the report’s content. For more details, the reader is referred to the individual chapters. This report discusses climate trends and findings at several scales: global, nationwide for the United States, and for ten specific U.S. regions (shown in Figure 1 in the Guide to the Report). A statement of scientific confidence also follows each point in the Executive Summary. The confidence scale is described in the Guide to the Report . At the end of the Executive Summary and in Chapter 1: Our Globally Changing Climate , there is also a summary box highlighting the most notable advances and topics since NCA3 and since the 2013 Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) Fifth Assessment Report.

Global and U.S. Temperatures Continue to Rise

Long-term temperature observations are among the most consistent and widespread evidence of a warming planet. Temperature (and, above all, its local averages and extremes) affects agricultural productivity, energy use, human health, water resources, infrastructure, natural ecosystems, and many other essential aspects of society and the natural environment. Recent data add to the weight of evidence for rapid global-scale warming, the dominance of human causes, and the expected continuation of increasing temperatures, including more record-setting extremes. ( Ch. 1 )

Changes in Observed and Projected Global Temperature

• Global annual average temperature (as calculated from instrumental records over both land and oceans) has increased by more than 1.2°F (0.65°C) for the period 1986–2016 relative to 1901–1960; the linear regression change over the entire period from 1901–2016 is 1.8°F (1.0°C) ( very high confidence ; Fig. ES.1). Longer-term climate records over past centuries and millennia indicate that average temperatures in recent decades over much of the world have been much higher, and have risen faster during this time period than at any time in the past 1,700 years or more, the time period for which the global distribution of surface temperatures can be reconstructed ( high confidence ). ( Ch. 1 )

(left) Global annual average temperature has increased by more than 1.2°F (0.7°C) for the period 1986–2016 relative to 1901–1960. Red bars show temperatures that were above the 1901–1960 average, and blue bars indicate temperatures below the average. (right) Surface temperature change (in °F) for the period 1986–2016 relative to 1901–1960. Gray indicates missing data. From Figures 1.2. and 1.3 in Chapter 1.

Many lines of evidence demonstrate that it is extremely likely that human influence has been the dominant cause of the observed warming since the mid-20th century. Over the last century, there are no convincing alternative explanations supported by the extent of the observational evidence. Solar output changes and internal natural variability can only contribute marginally to the observed changes in climate over the last century, and there is no convincing evidence for natural cycles in the observational record that could explain the observed changes in climate. ( Very high confidence ) ( Ch. 1 )

Global annual average radiative forcing change from 1750 to 2011 due to human activities, changes in total solar irradiance, and volcanic emissions. Black bars indicate the uncertainty in each. Radiative forcing is a measure of the influence a factor (such as greenhouse gas emissions) has in changing the global balance of incoming and outgoing energy. Radiative forcings greater than zero (positive forcings) produce climate warming; forcings less than zero (negative forcings) produce climate cooling. Over this time period, solar forcing has oscillated on approximately an 11-year cycle between −0.11 and +0.19 W/m 2 . Radiative forcing due to volcanic emissions is always negative (cooling) and can be very large immediately following significant eruptions but is short-lived. Over the industrial era, the largest volcanic forcing followed the eruption of Mt. Tambora in 1815 (−11.6 W/m 2 ). This forcing declined to −4.5 W/m 2 in 1816, and to near-zero by 1820. Forcing due to human activities, in contrast, has becoming increasingly positive (warming) since about 1870, and has grown at an accelerated rate since about 1970. There are also natural variations in temperature and other climate variables which operate on annual to decadal time-scales. This natural variability contributes very little to climate trends over decades and longer. Simplified from Figure 2.6 in Chapter 2. See Chapter 2 for more details.

The likely range of the human contribution to the global mean temperature increase over the period 1951–2010 is 1.1° to 1.4°F (0.6° to 0.8°C), and the central estimate of the observed warming of 1.2°F (0.65°C) lies within this range ( high confidence ). This translates to a likely human contribution of 92%–123% of the observed 1951–2010 change. The likely contributions of natural forcing and internal variability to global temperature change over that period are minor ( high confidence ). ( Ch. 3 ; Fig. ES.2)

Natural variability, including El Niño events and other recurring patterns of ocean–atmosphere interactions, impact temperature and precipitation, especially regionally, over timescales of months to years. The global influence of natural variability, however, is limited to a small fraction of observed climate trends over decades. ( Very high confidence ) ( Ch. 1 )

Global climate is projected to continue to change over this century and beyond. The magnitude of climate change beyond the next few decades will depend primarily on the amount of greenhouse (heat-trapping) gases emitted globally and on the remaining uncertainty in the sensitivity of Earth’s climate to those emissions (very high confidence ). With significant reductions in the emissions of greenhouse gases, the global annually averaged temperature rise could be limited to 3.6°F (2°C) or less. Without major reductions in these emissions, the increase in annual average global temperatures relative to pre-industrial times could reach 9°F (5°C) or more by the end of this century. ( Ch.1 ; Fig ES.3 )

If greenhouse gas concentrations were stabilized at their current level, existing concentrations would commit the world to at least an additional 1.1°F (0.6°C) of warming over this century relative to the last few decades ( high confidence in continued warming, medium confidence in amount of warming. ( Ch.4 )

The two panels above show annual historical and a range of plausible future carbon emissions in units of gigatons of carbon (GtC) per year (left) and the historical observed and future temperature change that would result for a range of future scenarios relative to the 1901–1960 average, based on the central estimate (lines) and a range (shaded areas, two standard deviations) as simulated by the full suite of CMIP5 global climate models (right). By 2081–2100, the projected range in global mean temperature change is 1.1°–4.3°F under the even lower scenario (RCP2.6; 0.6°–2.4°C, green), 2.4°–5.9°F under the lower scenario (RCP4.5; 1.3°–3.3°C, blue), 3.0°–6.8°F under the mid-high scenario (RCP6.0; 1.6°–3.8°C, not shown) and 5.0°–10.2°F under the higher scenario (RCP8.5; 2.8°–5.7°C, orange). See the main report for more details on these scenarios and implications. Based on Figure 4.1 in Chapter 4.

Changes in Observed and Projected U.S. Temperature

Annual average temperature over the contiguous United States has increased by 1.2°F (0.7°C) for the period 1986–2016 relative to 1901–1960 and by 1.8°F (1.0°C) based on a linear regression for the period 1901–2016 ( very high confidence ). Surface and satellite data are consistent in their depiction of rapid warming since 1979 ( high confidence ). Paleo-temperature evidence shows that recent decades are the warmest of the past 1,500 years ( medium confidence ). ( Ch. 6 )

Annual average temperature over the contiguous United States is projected to rise ( very high confidence ). Increases of about 2.5°F (1.4°C) are projected for the period 2021–2050 relative to the average from 1976–2005 in all RCP scenarios, implying recent record-setting years may be “common” in the next few decades ( high confidence ). Much larger rises are projected by late century (2071–2100): 2.8°–7.3°F (1.6°–4.1°C) in a lower scenario (RCP4.5) and 5.8°–11.9°F (3.2°–6.6°C) in a higher scenario (RCP8.5) ( high confidence ). ( Ch. 6 ; Fig. ES.4)

In the United States, the urban heat island effect results in daytime temperatures 0.9°–7.2°F (0.5°–4.0°C) higher and nighttime temperatures 1.8°– 4.5°F (1.0°–2.5°C) higher in urban areas than in rural areas, with larger temperature differences in humid regions (primarily in the eastern United States) and in cities with larger and denser populations. The urban heat island effect will strengthen in the future as the structure and spatial extent as well as population density of urban areas change and grow ( high confidence ). ( Ch. 10 )

These maps show the projected changes in annual average temperatures for mid- and late-21st century for two future pathways. Changes are the differences between the average projected temperatures for mid-century (2036–2065; top), and late-century (2070-2099; bottom), and those observed for the near-present (1976–2005). See Figure 6.7 in Chapter 6 for more details.

Many Temperature and Precipitation Extremes Are Becoming More Common

Temperature and precipitation extremes can affect water quality and availability, agricultural productivity, human health, vital infrastructure, iconic ecosystems and species, and the likelihood of disasters. Some extremes have already become more frequent, intense, or of longer duration, and many extremes are expected to continue to increase or worsen, presenting substantial challenges for built, agricultural, and natural systems. Some storm types such as hurricanes, tornadoes, and winter storms are also exhibiting changes that have been linked to climate change, although the current state of the science does not yet permit detailed understanding.

Observed Changes in Extremes

Observed changes in the occurrence of record-setting daily temperatures in the contiguous United States. Red bars indicate a year with more daily record highs than daily record lows, while blue bars indicate a year with more record lows than highs. The height of the bar indicates the ratio of record highs to lows (red) or of record lows to highs (blue). For example, a ratio of 2:1 for a blue bar means that there were twice as many record daily lows as daily record highs that year. (Figure source: NOAA/NCEI). From Figure 6.5 in Chapter 6 .

The frequency of cold waves has decreased since the early 1900s, and the frequency of heat waves has increased since the mid-1960s (the Dust Bowl era of the 1930s remains the peak period for extreme heat in the United States). ( Very high confidence ). ( Ch. 6 )

The frequency and intensity of extreme heat and heavy precipitation events are increasing in most continental regions of the world ( very high confidence ). These trends are consistent with expected physical responses to a warming climate. Climate model studies are also consistent with these trends, although models tend to underestimate the observed trends, especially for the increase in extreme precipitation events ( very high confidence for temperature, high confidence for extreme precipitation). ( Ch. 1 )

These maps show the percentage change in several metrics of extreme precipitation by NCA4 region, including (upper left) the maximum daily precipitation in consecutive 5-year periods; (upper right) the amount of precipitation falling in daily events that exceed the 99th percentile of all non-zero precipitation days (top 1% of all daily precipitation events); (lower left) the number of 2-day events with a precipitation total exceeding the largest 2-day amount that is expected to occur, on average, only once every 5 years, as calculated over 1901–2016; and (lower right) the number of 2-day events with a precipitation total exceeding the largest 2-day amount that is expected to occur, on average, only once every 5 years, as calculated over 1958–2016. The number in each black circle is the percent change over the entire period, either 1901–2016 or 1958–2016. Note that Alaska and Hawai‘i are not included in the 1901–2016 maps owing to a lack of observations in the earlier part of the 20th century. (Figure source: CICS-NC / NOAA NCEI). Based on Figure 7.4 in Chapter 7.

Recent droughts and associated heat waves have reached record intensity in some regions of the United States; however, by geographical scale and duration, the Dust Bowl era of the 1930s remains the benchmark drought and extreme heat event in the historical record. ( Very high confidence ) ( Ch. 8 )

Northern Hemisphere spring snow cover extent, North America maximum snow depth, snow water equivalent in the western United States, and extreme snowfall years in the southern and western United States have all declined, while extreme snowfall years in parts of the northern United States have increased. ( Medium confidence ). ( Ch. 7 )

There has been a trend toward earlier snowmelt and a decrease in snowstorm frequency on the southern margins of climatologically snowy areas ( medium confidence ). Winter storm tracks have shifted northward since 1950 over the Northern Hemisphere ( medium confidence ). Potential linkages between the frequency and intensity of severe winter storms in the United States and accelerated warming in the Arctic have been postulated, but they are complex, and, to some extent, contested, and confidence in the connection is currently low. ( Ch. 9 )

Tornado activity in the United States has become more variable, particularly over the 2000s, with a decrease in the number of days per year with tornadoes and an increase in the number of tornadoes on these days ( medium confidence ). Confidence in past trends for hail and severe thunderstorm winds, however, is low ( Ch. 9 )

Projected Changes in Extremes

• The frequency and intensity of extreme high temperature events are virtually certain to increase in the future as global temperature increases ( high confidence ). Extreme precipitation events will very likely continue to increase in frequency and intensity throughout most of the world ( high confidence ). Observed and projected trends for some other types of extreme events, such as floods, droughts, and severe storms, have more variable regional characteristics. ( Ch. 1 )

Both extremely cold days and extremely warm days are expected to become warmer. Cold waves are predicted to become less intense while heat waves will become more intense. The number of days below freezing is projected to decline while the number above 90°F will rise. (Very high confidence) ( Ch. 6 )

The frequency and intensity of heavy precipitation events in the United States are projected to continue to increase over the 21st century ( high confidence ). There are, however, important regional and seasonal differences in projected changes in total precipitation: the northern United States, including Alaska, is projected to receive more precipitation in the winter and spring, and parts of the southwestern United States are projected to receive less precipitation in the winter and spring ( medium confidence ). ( Ch. 7 )

The frequency and severity of landfalling “atmospheric rivers” on the U.S. West Coast (narrow streams of moisture that account for 30%–40% of the typical snowpack and annual precipitation in the region and are associated with severe flooding events) will increase as a result of increasing evaporation and resulting higher atmospheric water vapor that occurs with increasing temperature. ( Medium confidence ) ( Ch. 9 )

Projections indicate large declines in snowpack in the western United States and shifts to more precipitation falling as rain than snow in the cold season in many parts of the central and eastern United States ( high confidence ). ( Ch. 7 )

Substantial reductions in western U.S. winter and spring snowpack are projected as the climate warms. Earlier spring melt and reduced snow water equivalent have been formally attributed to human-induced warming ( high confidence ) and will very likely be exacerbated as the climate continues to warm ( very high confidence ). Under higher scenarios, and assuming no change to current water resources management, chronic, long-duration hydrological drought is increasingly possible by the end of this century ( very high confidence ). ( Ch. 8 )

The human effect on recent major U.S. droughts is complicated. Little evidence is found for a human influence on observed precipitation deficits, but much evidence is found for a human influence on surface soil moisture deficits due to increased evapotranspiration caused by higher temperatures. ( High confidence ) ( Ch. 8 )

The incidence of large forest fires in the western United States and Alaska has increased since the early 1980s ( high confidence ) and is projected to further increase in those regions as the climate warms, with profound changes to certain ecosystems ( medium confidence ). ( Ch. 8 )

Both physics and numerical modeling simulations generally indicate an increase in tropical cyclone intensity in a warmer world, and the models generally show an increase in the number of very intense tropical cyclones. For Atlantic and eastern North Pacific hurricanes and western North Pacific typhoons, increases are projected in precipitation rates ( high confidence ) and intensity (medium confidence) . The frequency of the most intense of these storms is projected to increase in the Atlantic and western North Pacific ( low confidence ) and in the eastern North Pacific ( medium confidence ). ( Ch. 9 )

Oceans Are Rising, Warming, and Becoming More Acidic

Oceans occupy two-thirds of the planet’s surface and host unique ecosystems and species, including those important for global commercial and subsistence fishing. Understanding climate impacts on the ocean and the ocean’s feedbacks to the climate system is critical for a comprehensive understanding of current and future changes in climate.

Global Ocean Heat

• Ocean heat content has increased at all depths since the 1960s and surface waters have warmed by about 1.3° ± 0.1°F (0.7° ± 0.08°C) per century globally since 1900 to 2016. Under higher scenarios, a global increase in average sea surface temperature of 4.9° ± 1.3°F (2.7° ± 0.7°C) is projected by 2100. ( Very high confidence ). ( Ch. 13 )

Global and Regional Sea Level Rise

Human-caused climate change has made a substantial contribution to GMSL rise since 1900 ( high confidence ), contributing to a rate of rise that is greater than during any preceding century in at least 2,800 years ( medium confidence ). ( Ch. 12 ; Fig. ES.8)

Relative to the year 2000, GMSL is very likely to rise by 0.3–0.6 feet (9–18 cm) by 2030, 0.5–1.2 feet (15–38 cm) by 2050, and 1.0–4.3 feet (30–130 cm) by 2100 ( very high confidence in lower bounds ; medium confidence in upper bounds for 2030 and 2050 ; low confidence in upper bounds for 2100 ) . Future emissions pathways have little effect on projected GMSL rise in the first half of the century, but significantly affect projections for the second half of the century ( high confidence ). ( Ch. 12 )

The top panel shows observed and reconstructed mean sea level for the last 2,500 years. The bottom panel shows projected mean sea level for six future scenarios. The six scenarios—spanning a range designed to inform a variety of decision makers—extend from a low scenario, consistent with continuation of the rate of sea level rise over the last quarter century, to an extreme scenario, assuming rapid mass loss from the Antarctic ice sheet. Note that the range on the vertical axis in the bottom graph is approximately ten times greater than in the top graph. Based on Figure 12.2 and 12.4 in Chapter 12. See the main report for more details.

Emerging science regarding Antarctic ice sheet stability suggests that, for higher scenarios, a GMSL rise exceeding 8 feet (2.4 m) by 2100 is physically possible, although the probability of such an extreme outcome cannot currently be assessed. Regardless of emission pathway, it is extremely likely that GMSL rise will continue beyond 2100 ( high confidence ). ( Ch. 12 )

Relative sea level rise in this century will vary along U.S. coastlines due, in part, to changes in Earth’s gravitational field and rotation from melting of land ice, changes in ocean circulation, and vertical land motion ( very high confidence ). For almost all future GMSL rise scenarios, relative sea level rise is likely to be greater than the global average in the U.S. Northeast and the western Gulf of Mexico. In intermediate and low GMSL rise scenarios, relative sea level rise is likely to be less than the global average in much of the Pacific Northwest and Alaska. For high GMSL rise scenarios, relative sea level rise is likely to be higher than the global average along all U.S. coastlines outside Alaska. Almost all U.S. coastlines experience more than global mean sea level rise in response to Antarctic ice loss, and thus would be particularly affected under extreme GMSL rise scenarios involving substantial Antarctic mass loss (high confidence) . ( Ch. 12 )

Coastal Flooding

Annual occurrences of tidal floods (days per year), also called sunny-day or nuisance flooding, have increased for some U.S. coastal cities. The figure shows historical exceedances (orange bars) for two of the locations—Charleston, SC and San Francisco, CA—and future projections through 2100. The projections are based upon the continuation of the historical trend (blue) and under median RCP2.6, 4.5 and 8.5 conditions. From Figure 12.5 , Chapter 12.

As sea levels have risen, the number of tidal floods each year that cause minor impacts (also called “nuisance floods”) have increased 5- to 10-fold since the 1960s in several U.S. coastal cities ( very high confidence ). Rates of increase are accelerating in over 25 Atlantic and Gulf Coast cities ( very high confidence ). Tidal flooding will continue increasing in depth, frequency, and extent this century ( very high confidence ). ( Ch. 12 )

Assuming storm characteristics do not change, sea level rise will increase the frequency and extent of extreme flooding associated with coastal storms, such as hurricanes and nor’easters ( very high confidence ). A projected increase in the intensity of hurricanes in the North Atlantic ( medium confidence ) could increase the probability of extreme flooding along most of the U.S. Atlantic and Gulf Coast states beyond what would be projected based solely on relative sea level rise. However, there is low confidence in the projected increase in frequency of intense Atlantic hurricanes, and the associated flood risk amplification, and flood effects could be offset or amplified by such factors, such as changes in overall storm frequency or tracks. ( Ch.12 ; Fig. ES. 9)

Global Ocean Circulation

• The potential slowing of the Atlantic meridional overturning circulation (AMOC; of which the Gulf Stream is one component)—as a result of increasing ocean heat content and freshwater-driven buoyancy changes—could have dramatic climate feedbacks as the ocean absorbs less heat and CO 2 from the atmosphere. This slowing would also affect the climates of North America and Europe. Any slowing documented to date cannot be directly tied to human-caused forcing, primarily due to lack of adequate observational data and to challenges in modeling ocean circulation changes. Under a higher scenario (RCP8.5), models show that the AMOC weakens over the 21st century ( low confidence ). ( Ch. 13 )

Global and Regional Ocean Acidification

Higher-latitude systems typically have a lower buffering capacity against changing acidity, exhibiting seasonally corrosive conditions sooner than low-latitude systems. The rate of acidification is unparalleled in at least the past 66 million years ( medium confidence ). Under the higher scenario (RCP8.5), the global average surface ocean acidity is projected to increase by 100% to 150% ( high confidence ). ( Ch. 13 )

Acidification is regionally greater than the global average along U.S. coastal systems as a result of upwelling (e.g., in the Pacific Northwest) ( high confidence ), changes in freshwater inputs (e.g., in the Gulf of Maine) ( medium confidence ), and nutrient input (e.g., in urbanized estuaries) ( high confidence ). ( Ch. 13 )

Ocean Oxygen

• Increasing sea surface temperatures, rising sea levels, and changing patterns of precipitation, winds, nutrients, and ocean circulation are contributing to overall declining oxygen concentrations at intermediate depths in various ocean locations and in many coastal areas. Over the last half century, major oxygen losses have occurred in inland seas, estuaries, and in the coastal and open ocean ( high confidence ). Ocean oxygen levels are projected to decrease by as much as 3.5% under the higher scenario (RCP8.5) by 2100 relative to preindustrial values ( high confidence ). ( Ch. 13 )

Climate Change in Alaska and across the Arctic Continues to Outpace Global Climate Change

Residents of Alaska are on the front lines of climate change. Crumbling buildings, roads, and bridges and eroding shorelines are commonplace. Accelerated melting of multiyear sea ice cover, mass loss from the Greenland Ice Sheet, reduced snow cover, and permafrost thawing are stark examples of the rapid changes occurring in the Arctic. Furthermore, because elements of the climate system are interconnected (see Box ES.1), changes in the Arctic influence climate conditions outside the Arctic.

Arctic Temperature Increases

Rising Alaskan permafrost temperatures are causing permafrost to thaw and become more discontinuous; this process releases additional carbon dioxide and methane resulting in additional warming ( high confidence ). The overall magnitude of the permafrost-carbon feedback is uncertain ( Ch. 2 ); however, it is clear that these emissions have the potential to compromise the ability to limit global temperature increases. ( Ch. 11 )

Atmospheric circulation patterns connect the climates of the Arctic and the contiguous United States. Evidenced by recent record warm temperatures in the Arctic and emerging science, the midlatitude circulation has influenced observed arctic temperatures and sea ice ( high confidence ). However, confidence is low regarding whether or by what mechanisms observed arctic warming may have influenced the midlatitude circulation and weather patterns over the continental United States. The influence of arctic changes on U.S. weather over the coming decades remains an open question with the potential for significant impact. ( Ch. 11 )

Arctic Land Ice Loss

• Arctic land ice loss observed in the last three decades continues, in some cases accelerating ( very high confidence ). It is virtually certain that Alaska glaciers have lost mass over the last 50 years, with each year since 1984 showing an annual average ice mass less than the previous year. Over the satellite record, average ice mass loss from Greenland was −269 Gt per year between April 2002 and April 2016, accelerating in recent years ( high confidence) . ( Ch. 11 )

Arctic Sea Ice Loss

Arctic sea ice loss is expected to continue through the 21st century, very likely resulting in nearly sea ice-free late summers by the 2040s ( very high confidence ). ( Ch. 11 )

It is very likely that human activities have contributed to observed arctic surface temperature warming, sea ice loss, glacier mass loss, and northern hemisphere snow extent decline ( high confidence ). ( Ch. 11 )

September sea ice extent and age shown for (top) 1984 and (middle) 2016, illustrating significant reductions in sea ice extent and age (thickness). The bar graph in the lower right of each panel illustrates the sea ice area (unit: million km 2 ) covered within each age category (> 1 year), and the green bars represent the maximum extent for each age range during the record. The year 1984 is representative of September sea ice characteristics during the 1980s. The years 1984 and 2016 are selected as endpoints in the time series; a movie of the complete time series is available at http://svs.gsfc.nasa.gov/cgi-bin/details.cgi?aid=4489 . (bottom) The satellite-era arctic sea ice areal extent trend from 1979 to 2016 for September (unit: million mi 2 ). From Figure 11.1 in Chapter 11.

Limiting Globally Averaged Warming to 2°C (3.6°F) Will Require Major Reductions in Emissions

Human activities are now the dominant cause of the observed trends in climate. For that reason, future climate projections are based on scenarios of how human activities will continue to affect the climate over the remainder of this century and beyond (see Sidebar: Scenarios Used in this Assessment). There remains significant uncertainty about future emissions due to changing economic, political, and demographic factors. For that reason, this report quantifies possible climate changes for a broad set of plausible future scenarios through the end of the century. (Ch. 2 , 4 , 10 , 14 )

Global mean atmospheric carbon dioxide (CO 2 ) concentration has now passed 400 ppm, a level that last occurred about 3 million years ago, when global average temperature and sea level were significantly higher than today ( high confidence ). Continued growth in CO 2 emissions over this century and beyond would lead to an atmospheric concentration not experienced in tens of millions of years ( medium confidence ). The present-day emissions rate of nearly 10 GtC per year suggests that there is no climate analog for this century any time in at least the last 50 million years ( medium confidence ). ( Ch. 4 )

Warming and associated climate effects from CO 2 emissions persist for decades to millennia. In the near-term, changes in climate are determined by past and present greenhouse gas emissions modified by natural variability. Reducing net emissions of CO 2 is necessary to limit near-term climate change and long-term warming. Other greenhouse gases (e.g., methane) and black carbon aerosols exert stronger warming effects than CO 2 on a per ton basis, but they do not persist as long in the atmosphere ( Ch. 2 ); therefore, mitigation of non-CO 2 species contributes substantially to near-term cooling benefits but cannot be relied upon for ultimate stabilization goals. ( Very high confidence ) ( Ch. 14 )

Stabilizing global mean temperature to less than 3.6°F (2°C) above preindustrial levels requires substantial reductions in net global CO 2 emissions prior to 2040 relative to present-day values before 2040 and likely requires net emissions to become zero or possibly negative later in the century. After accounting for the temperature effects of non-CO 2 species, cumulative global CO 2 emissions must stay below about 800 GtC in order to provide a two-thirds likelihood of preventing 3.6°F (2°C) of warming. Given estimated cumulative emissions since 1870, no more than approximately 230 GtC may be emitted in the future in order to remain under this temperature limit. Assuming global emissions are equal to or greater than those consistent with the RCP4.5 scenario, this cumulative carbon threshold would be exceeded in approximately two decades. ( Ch. 14 )

Achieving global greenhouse gas emissions reductions before 2030 consistent with targets and actions announced by governments in the lead up to the 2015 Paris climate conference would hold open the possibility of meeting the long-term temperature goal of limiting global warming to 3.6°F (2°C) above preindustrial levels, whereas there would be virtually no chance if net global emissions followed a pathway well above those implied by country announcements. Actions in the announcements are, by themselves, insufficient to meet a 3.6°F (2°C) goal; the likelihood of achieving that depends strongly on the magnitude of global emissions reductions after 2030. ( High confidence ) ( Ch. 14 )

Climate intervention or geoengineering strategies such as solar radiation management are measures that attempt to limit or reduce global temperature increases. Further assessments of the technical feasibilities, costs, risks, co-benefits, and governance challenges of climate intervention or geoengineering strategies, which are as yet unproven at scale, are a necessary step before judgments about the benefits and risks of these approaches can be made with high confidence. ( High confidence ) ( Ch. 14 )

In recent decades, land-use and land-cover changes have turned the terrestrial biosphere (soil and plants) into a net “sink” for carbon (drawing down carbon from the atmosphere), and this sink has steadily increased since 1980 ( high confidence ). Because of the uncertainty in the trajectory of land cover, the possibility of the land becoming a net carbon source cannot be excluded ( very high confidence ). ( Ch. 10 )

There is a Significant Possibility for Unanticipated Changes

Humanity’s effect on the Earth system, through the large-scale combustion of fossil fuels and widespread deforestation and the resulting release of carbon dioxide (CO 2 ) into the atmosphere, as well as through emissions of other greenhouse gases and radiatively active substances from human activities, is unprecedented. There is significant potential for humanity’s effect on the planet to result in unanticipated surprises and a broad consensus that the further and faster the Earth system is pushed towards warming, the greater the risk of such surprises.

There are at least two types of potential surprises: compound events , where multiple extreme climate events occur simultaneously or sequentially (creating greater overall impact), and critical threshold or tipping point events , where some threshold is crossed in the climate system (that leads to large impacts). The probability of such surprises—some of which may be abrupt and/or irreversible—as well as other more predictable but difficult-to-manage impacts, increases as the influence of human activities on the climate system increases. ( Ch. 15 )

Positive feedbacks (self-reinforcing cycles) within the climate system have the potential to accelerate human-induced climate change and even shift the Earth’s climate system, in part or in whole, into new states that are very different from those experienced in the recent past (for example, ones with greatly diminished ice sheets or different large-scale patterns of atmosphere or ocean circulation). Some feedbacks and potential state shifts can be modeled and quantified; others can be modeled or identified but not quantified; and some are probably still unknown. ( Very high confidence in the potential for state shifts and in the incompleteness of knowledge about feedbacks and potential state shifts). ( Ch. 15 )

The physical and socioeconomic impacts of compound extreme events (such as simultaneous heat and drought, wildfires associated with hot and dry conditions, or flooding associated with high precipitation on top of snow or waterlogged ground) can be greater than the sum of the parts ( very high confidence ). Few analyses consider the spatial or temporal correlation between extreme events. ( Ch. 15 )

While climate models incorporate important climate processes that can be well quantified, they do not include all of the processes that can contribute to feedbacks ( Ch. 2 ), compound extreme events, and abrupt and/or irreversible changes. For this reason, future changes outside the range projected by climate models cannot be ruled out ( very high confidence ). Moreover, the systematic tendency of climate models to underestimate temperature change during warm paleoclimates suggests that climate models are more likely to underestimate than to overestimate the amount of long-term future change ( medium confidence ). ( Ch. 15 )

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The Fifth National Climate Assessment

The Fifth National Climate Assessment is the US Government’s preeminent report on climate change impacts, risks, and responses. It is a congressionally mandated interagency effort that provides the scientific foundation to support informed decision-making across the United States.

Fifth National Climate Assessment 1. Overview Understanding Risks, Impacts, and Responses

• Addressing Climate Change
• Experiencing Climate Change
• Current and Future Risks
• Determining the Future
• A Resilient Nation

How the United States Is Addressing Climate Change

The effects of human-caused climate change are already far-reaching and worsening across every region of the United States. Rapidly reducing greenhouse gas emissions can limit future warming and associated increases in many risks. Across the country, efforts to adapt to climate change and reduce emissions have expanded since 2018, and US emissions have fallen since peaking in 2007. However, without deeper cuts in global net greenhouse gas emissions and accelerated adaptation efforts, severe climate risks to the United States will continue to grow.

Future climate change impacts depend on choices made today

The more the planet warms, the greater the impacts. Without rapid and deep reductions in global greenhouse gas emissions from human activities, the risks of accelerating sea level rise, intensifying extreme weather, and other harmful climate impacts will continue to grow. Each additional increment of warming is expected to lead to more damage and greater economic losses compared to previous increments of warming, while the risk of catastrophic or unforeseen consequences also increases. { 2.3 , 19.1 }

However, this also means that each increment of warming that the world avoids—through actions that cut emissions or remove carbon dioxide (CO 2 ) from the atmosphere—reduces the risks and harmful impacts of climate change. While there are still uncertainties about how the planet will react to rapid warming, the degree to which climate change will continue to worsen is largely in human hands. { 2.3 , 3.4 }

In addition to reducing risks to future generations, rapid emissions cuts are expected to have immediate health and economic benefits (Figure 1.1 ). At the national scale, the benefits of deep emissions cuts for current and future generations are expected to far outweigh the costs. { 2.1 , 2.3 , 13.3 , 14.5 , 15.3 , 32.4 ; Ch. 2, Introduction }

US emissions have decreased, while the economy and population have grown

Annual US greenhouse gas emissions fell 12% between 2005 and 2019. This trend was largely driven by changes in electricity generation: coal use has declined, while the use of natural gas and renewable technologies has increased, leading to a 40% drop in emissions from the electricity sector. Since 2017, the transportation sector has overtaken electricity generation as the largest emitter. { 11.1 , 13.1 , 32.1 ; Figures 32.1 , 32.3 }

As US emissions have declined from their peak in 2007, the country has also seen sustained reductions in the amount of energy required for a given quantity of economic activity and the emissions produced per unit of energy consumed. Meanwhile, both population and per capita GDP have continued to grow. { 32.1 ; Figures 32.1 , 32.2 }

Recent growth in the capacities of wind, solar, and battery storage technologies is supported by rapidly falling costs of zero- and low-carbon energy technologies, which can support even deeper emissions reductions. For example, wind and solar energy costs dropped 70% and 90%, respectively, over the last decade, while 80% of new generation capacity in 2020 came from renewable sources (Figures 1.2 , 1.3 ). { 5.3 , 12.3 , 32.1 , 32.2 ; Figure A4.17 }

Across all sectors, innovation is expanding options for reducing energy demand and increasing energy efficiency, moving to zero- and low-carbon electricity and fuels, electrifying energy use in buildings and transportation, and adopting practices that protect and improve natural carbon sinks that remove and store CO 2 from the atmosphere, such as sustainable agricultural and land-management practices. { 11.1 , 32.2 , 32.3 ; Boxes 32.1 , 32.2 ; Focus on Blue Carbon }

Accelerating advances in adaptation can help reduce rising climate risks

As more people face more severe climate impacts, individuals, organizations, companies, communities, and governments are taking advantage of adaptation opportunities that reduce risks. State climate assessments and online climate services portals are providing communities with location- and sector-specific information on climate hazards to support adaptation planning and implementation across the country. New tools, more data, advancements in social and behavioral sciences, and better consideration of practical experiences are facilitating a range of actions (Figure 1.3 ). { 7.3 , 12.3 , 21.4 , 25.4 , 31.1 , 31.5 , 32.5 ; Table 31.1 }

Actions include:

Implementing nature-based solutions—such as restoring coastal wetlands or oyster reefs—to reduce shoreline erosion { 8.3 , 9.3 , 21.2 , 23.5 }

Upgrading stormwater infrastructure to account for heavier rainfall { 4.2 }

Applying innovative agricultural practices to manage increasing drought risk { 11.1 , 22.4 , 25.5 }

Assessing climate risks to roads and public transit { 13.1 }

Managing vegetation to reduce wildfire risk { 5.3 }

Developing urban heat plans to reduce health risks from extreme heat { 12.3 , 21.1 , 28.4 }

Planning relocation from high-risk coastal areas { 9.3 }

Despite an increase in adaptation actions across the country, current adaptation efforts and investments are insufficient to reduce today’s climate-related risks and keep pace with future changes in the climate. Accelerating current efforts and implementing new ones that involve more fundamental shifts in systems and practices can help address current risks and prepare for future impacts (see “Mitigation and adaptation actions can result in systemic, cascading benefits” below). { 31.1 , 31.3 }

Climate action has increased in every region of the US

Efforts to adapt to climate change and reduce net greenhouse gas emissions are underway in every US region and have expanded since 2018 (Figure 1.3 ; Table 1.1 ). Many actions can achieve both adaptation and mitigation goals. For example, improved forest- or land-management strategies can both increase carbon storage and protect ecosystems, and expanding renewable energy options can reduce emissions while also improving resilience. { 31.1 , 32.5 }

Climate adaptation and mitigation efforts involve trade-offs, as climate actions that benefit some or even most people can result in burdens to others. To date, some communities have prioritized equitable and inclusive planning processes that consider the social impacts of these trade-offs and help ensure that affected communities can participate in decision-making. As additional measures are implemented, more widespread consideration of their social impact can help inform decisions around how to distribute the outcomes of investments. { 12.4 , 13.4 , 20.2 , 21.3 , 21.4 , 26.4 , 27.1 , 31.2 , 32.4 , 32.5 ; Box 20.1 }

Meeting US mitigation targets means reaching net-zero emissions

The global warming observed over the industrial era is unequivocally caused by greenhouse gas emissions from human activities—primarily burning fossil fuels. Atmospheric concentrations of carbon dioxide (CO 2 )—the primary greenhouse gas produced by human activities—and other greenhouse gases continue to rise due to ongoing global emissions. Stopping global warming would require both reducing emissions of CO 2 to net zero and rapid and deep reductions in other greenhouse gases. Net-zero CO 2 emissions means that CO 2 emissions decline to zero or that any residual emissions are balanced by removal from the atmosphere. { 2.3 , 3.1 ; Ch. 32 }

Once CO 2 emissions reach net zero, the global warming driven by CO 2 is expected to stop: additional warming over the next few centuries is not necessarily “locked in” after net CO 2 emissions fall to zero. However, global average temperatures are not expected to fall for centuries unless CO 2 emissions become net negative, which is when CO 2 removal from the atmosphere exceeds CO 2 emissions from human activities. Regardless of when or if further warming is avoided, some long-term responses to the temperature changes that have already occurred will continue. These responses include sea level rise, ice sheet losses, and associated disruptions to human health, social systems, and ecosystems. In addition, the ocean will continue to acidify after the world reaches net-zero CO 2 emissions, as it continues to gradually absorb CO 2 in the atmosphere from past emissions. { 2.1 , 2.3 , 3.1 ; Ch. 2, Introduction }

National and international commitments seek to limit global warming to well below 2°C (3.6°F), and preferably to 1.5°C (2.7°F), compared to preindustrial temperature conditions (defined as the 1850–1900 average). To achieve this, global CO 2 emissions would have to reach net zero by around 2050 (Figure 1.4 ); global emissions of all greenhouse gases would then have to reach net zero within the following few decades. { 2.3 , 32.1 }

While US greenhouse gas emissions are falling, the current rate of decline is not sufficient to meet national and international climate commitments and goals. US net greenhouse gas emissions remain substantial and would have to decline by more than 6% per year on average, reaching net-zero emissions around midcentury, to meet current national mitigation targets and international temperature goals; by comparison, US greenhouse gas emissions decreased by less than 1% per year on average between 2005 and 2019. { 32.1 }

Many cost-effective options that are feasible now have the potential to substantially reduce emissions over the next decade. Faster and more widespread deployment of renewable energy and other zero- and low-carbon energy options can accelerate the transition to a decarbonized economy and increase the chances of meeting a 2050 national net-zero greenhouse gas emissions target for the US. However, to reach the US net-zero emissions target, additional mitigation options need to be explored and advanced (see “Available mitigation strategies can deliver substantial emissions reductions, but additional options are needed to reach net zero” below). { 5.3 , 6.3 , 32.2 , 32.3 }

Jay, A.K., A.R. Crimmins, C.W. Avery, T.A. Dahl, R.S. Dodder, B.D. Hamlington, A. Lustig, K. Marvel, P.A. Méndez-Lazaro, M.S. Osler, A. Terando, E.S. Weeks, and A. Zycherman, 2023: Ch. 1. Overview: Understanding risks, impacts, and responses. In: Fifth National Climate Assessment . Crimmins, A.R., C.W. Avery, D.R. Easterling, K.E. Kunkel, B.C. Stewart, and T.K. Maycock, Eds. U.S. Global Change Research Program, Washington, DC, USA. https://doi.org/10.7930/NCA5.2023.CH1

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How the United States Is Experiencing Climate Change

As extreme events and other climate hazards intensify, harmful impacts on people across the United States are increasing. Climate impacts—combined with other stressors—are leading to ripple effects across sectors and regions that multiply harms, with disproportionate effects on underserved and overburdened communities.

Current climate changes are unprecedented over thousands of years

Global greenhouse gas emissions from human activities continue to increase, resulting in rapid warming (Figure 1.5 ) and other large-scale changes, including rising sea levels, melting ice, ocean warming and acidification, changing rainfall patterns, and shifts in timing of seasonal events. Many of the climate conditions and impacts people are experiencing today are unprecedented for thousands of years (Figure 1.6 ). { 2.1 , 3.1 ; Figures A4.6 , A4.7 , A4.10 , A4.13 }

As the world’s climate has shifted toward warmer conditions, the frequency and intensity of extreme cold events have declined over much of the US, while the frequency, intensity, and duration of extreme heat have increased. Across all regions of the US, people are experiencing warming temperatures and longer-lasting heatwaves. Over much of the country, nighttime temperatures and winter temperatures have warmed more rapidly than daytime and summer temperatures. Many other extremes, including heavy precipitation, drought, flooding, wildfire, and hurricanes, are becoming more frequent and/or severe, with a cascade of effects in every part of the country. { 2.1 , 2.2 , 3.4 , 4.1 , 4.2 , 7.1 , 9.1 ; Ch. 2, Introduction ; App. 4 ; Focus on Compound Events }

Risks from extreme events are increasing

One of the most direct ways that people experience climate change is through changes in extreme events. Harmful impacts from more frequent and severe extremes are increasing across the country—including increases in heat-related illnesses and death, costlier storm damages, longer droughts that reduce agricultural productivity and strain water systems, and larger, more severe wildfires that threaten homes and degrade air quality. { 2.2 , 4.2 , 12.2 , 14.2 , 15.1 , 19.2 ; Focus on Western Wildfires }

Extreme weather events cause direct economic losses through infrastructure damage, disruptions in labor and public services, and losses in property values. The number and cost of weather-related disasters have increased dramatically over the past four decades, in part due to the increasing frequency and intensity of extreme events and in part due to increases in assets at risk (through population growth, rising property values, and continued development in hazard-prone areas). Low-income communities, communities of color, and Tribes and Indigenous Peoples experience high exposure and vulnerability to extreme events due to both their proximity to hazard-prone areas and lack of adequate infrastructure or disaster management resources. { 2.2 , 4.2 , 17.3 , 19.1 ; Focus on Compound Events }

In the 1980s, the country experienced, on average, one (inflation-adjusted) billion-dollar disaster every four months. Now, there is one every three weeks, on average. Between 2018 and 2022, the US experienced 89 billion-dollar events (Figure 1.7 ). Extreme events cost the US close to $150 billion each year—a conservative estimate that does not account for loss of life, healthcare-related costs, or damages to ecosystem services. { 2.2 , 19.1 ; Ch. 2, Introduction ; Figures 4.1 , A4.5 }

Cascading and compounding impacts increase risks

The impacts and risks of climate change unfold across interacting sectors and regions. For example, wildfire in one region can affect air quality and human health in other regions, depending on where winds transport smoke. Further, climate change impacts interact with other stressors, such as the COVID-19 pandemic, environmental degradation, or socioeconomic stressors like poverty and lack of adequate housing that disproportionately impact overburdened communities. These interactions and interdependencies can lead to cascading impacts and sudden failures. For example, climate-related shocks to the food supply chain have led to local to global impacts on food security and human migration patterns that affect US economic and national security interests. { 11.3 , 17.1 , 17.2 , 17.3 , 18.1 , 22.3 , 23.4 , 31.3 ; Introductions in Chs. 2 , 17 , 18 ; Focus on Compound Events ; Focus on Risks to Supply Chains ; Focus on COVID-19 and Climate Change }

The risk of two or more extreme events occurring simultaneously or in quick succession in the same region—known as compound events—is increasing. Climate change is also increasing the risk of multiple extremes occurring simultaneously in different locations that are connected by complex human and natural systems. For instance, simultaneous megafires across multiple western states and record back-to-back Atlantic hurricanes in 2020 caused unprecedented demand on federal emergency response resources. { 2.2 , 3.2 , 15.1 , 22.2 , 26.4 ; Focus on Compound Events ; Ch. 4, Introduction }

Compound events often have cascading impacts that cause greater harm than individual events. For example, in 2020, record-breaking heat and widespread drought contributed to concurrent destructive wildfires across California, Oregon, and Washington, exposing millions to health hazards and straining firefighting resources. Ongoing drought amplified the record-breaking Pacific Northwest heatwave of June 2021, which was made 2° to 4°F hotter by climate change. The heatwave led to more than 1,400 heat-related deaths, another severe wildfire season, mass die-offs of fishery species important to the region’s economy and Indigenous communities, and total damages exceeding $38.5 billion (in 2022 dollars). { 27.3 ; Ch. 2, Introduction ; Focus on Compound Events , Focus on Western Wildfires }

Climate change exacerbates inequities

Some communities are at higher risk of negative impacts from climate change due to social and economic inequities caused by ongoing systemic discrimination, exclusion, and under- or disinvestment. Many such communities are also already overburdened by the cumulative effects of adverse environmental, health, economic, or social conditions. Climate change worsens these long-standing inequities, contributing to persistent disparities in the resources needed to prepare for, respond to, and recover from climate impacts. { 4.2 , 9.2 , 12.2 , 14.3 , 15.2 , 16.1 , 16.2 , 18.2 , 19.1 , 20.1 , 20.3 , 21.3 , 22.1 , 23.1 , 26.4 , 27.1 , 31.2 }

For example, low-income communities and communities of color often lack access to adequate flood infrastructure, green spaces, safe housing, and other resources that help protect people from climate impacts. In some areas, patterns of urban growth have led to the displacement of under-resourced communities to suburban and rural areas with less access to climate-ready housing and infrastructure. Extreme heat can lead to higher rates of illness and death in low-income neighborhoods, which are hotter on average (Figure 1.8 ). Neighborhoods that are home to racial minorities and low-income people have the highest inland (riverine) flood exposures in the South, and Black communities nationwide are expected to bear a disproportionate share of future flood damages—both coastal and inland (Figure 1.9 ). { 4.2 , 11.3 , 12.2 , 15.1 , 22.1 , 22.2 , 26.4 , 27.1 ; Ch. 2, Introduction }

These disproportionate impacts are partly due to exclusionary housing practices—both past and ongoing—that leave underserved communities with less access to heat and flood risk-reduction strategies and other economic, health, and social resources. For example, areas that were historically redlined—a practice in which lenders avoided providing services to communities, often based on their racial or ethnic makeup—continue to be deprived of equitable access to environmental amenities like urban green spaces that reduce exposure to climate impacts. These neighborhoods can be as much as 12°F hotter during a heatwave than nearby wealthier neighborhoods. { 8.3 , 9.2 , 12.2 , 15.2 , 20.3 , 21.3 , 22.1 , 26.4 , 27.1 , 32.4 ; Ch. 2, Introduction }

Harmful impacts will increase in the near term

Even if greenhouse gas emissions fall substantially, the impacts of climate change will continue to intensify over the next decade (see “Meeting US mitigation targets means reaching net-zero emissions” above; Box 1.4 ), and all US regions are already experiencing increasingly harmful impacts. Although a few US regions or sectors may experience limited or short-term benefits from climate change, adverse impacts already far outweigh any positive effects and will increasingly eclipse benefits with additional warming. { 2.3 , 19.1 ; Ch. 2, Introduction ; Chs. 21–30}

Table 1.2 shows examples of critical impacts expected to affect people in each region between now and 2030, with disproportionate effects on overburdened communities. While these examples affect particular regions in the near term, impacts often cascade through social and ecological systems and across borders and may lead to longer-term losses. { 15.2 , 18.2 , 20.1 ; Figure 15.5 ; Ch. 20, Introduction }

Current and Future Climate Risks to the United States

Climate changes are making it harder to maintain safe homes and healthy families; reliable public services; a sustainable economy; thriving ecosystems, cultures, and traditions; and strong communities. Many of the extreme events and harmful impacts that people are already experiencing will worsen as warming increases and new risks emerge.

Safe, reliable water supplies are threatened by flooding, drought, and sea level rise

More frequent and intense heavy precipitation events are already evident, particularly in the Northeast and Midwest. Urban and agricultural environments are especially vulnerable to runoff and flooding. Between 1981 and 2016, US corn yield losses from flooding were comparable to those from extreme drought. Runoff and flooding also transport debris and contaminants that cause harmful algal blooms and pollute drinking water supplies. Communities of color and low-income communities face disproportionate flood risks. { 2.2 , 4.2 , 6.1 , 9.2 , 21.3 , 24.1 , 24.5 , 26.4 ; Figure A4.8 }

Between 1980 and 2022, drought and related heatwaves caused approximately $328 billion in damages (in 2022 dollars). Recent droughts have strained surface water and groundwater supplies, reduced agricultural productivity, and lowered water levels in major reservoirs, threatening hydropower generation. As higher temperatures increase irrigation demand, increased pumping could endanger groundwater supplies, which are already declining in many major aquifers. { 4.1, 4.2 ; Figure A4.9 }

Droughts are projected to increase in intensity, duration, and frequency, especially in the Southwest, with implications for surface water and groundwater supplies. Human and natural systems are threatened by rapid shifts between wet and dry periods that make water resources difficult to predict and manage. { 2.2 , 2.3 , 4.1 , 4.2 , 5.1 , 28.1 }

In coastal environments, dry conditions, sea level rise, and saltwater intrusion endanger groundwater aquifers and stress aquatic ecosystems. Inland, decreasing snowpack alters the volume and timing of streamflow and increases wildfire risk. Small rural water providers that often depend on a single water source or have limited capacity are especially vulnerable. { 4.2 , 7.2 , 9.2 , 21.2 , 22.1 , 23.1 , 23.3 , 25.1 , 27.4 , 28.1 , 28.2 , 28.5 , 30.1 ; Figure A4.7 }

Many options are available to protect water supplies, including reservoir optimization, nature-based solutions, and municipal management systems to conserve and reuse water. Collaboration on flood hazard management at regional scales is particularly important in areas where flood risk is increasing, as cooperation can provide solutions unavailable at local scales. { 4.3 , 9.3 , 26.5 ; Focus on Blue Carbon }

Disruptions to food systems are expected to increase

As the climate changes, increased instabilities in US and global food production and distribution systems are projected to make food less available and more expensive. These price increases and disruptions are expected to disproportionately affect the nutrition and health of women, children, older adults, and low-wealth communities. { 11.2 , 15.2 }

Climate change also disproportionately harms the livelihoods and health of communities that depend on agriculture, fishing, and subsistence lifestyles, including Indigenous Peoples reliant on traditional food sources. Heat-related stress and death are significantly greater for farmworkers than for all US civilian workers. { 11.2 , 11.3 , 15.1 , 15.2 , 16.1 ; Focus on Risks to Supply Chains }

While farmers, ranchers, and fishers have always faced unpredictable weather, climate change heightens risks in many ways:

Increasing temperatures, along with changes in precipitation, reduce productivity, yield, and nutritional content of many crops. These changes can introduce disease, disrupt pollination, and result in crop failure, outweighing potential benefits of longer growing seasons and increased CO 2 fertilization. { 11.1 , 19.1 , 21.1 , 22.4 , 23.3 , 24.1 , 26.2 }

Heavy rain and more frequent storms damage crops and property and contaminate water supplies. Longer-lasting droughts and larger wildfires reduce forage production and nutritional quality, diminish water supplies, and increase heat stress on livestock. { 23.2, 25.3 , 28.3 }

Increasing water temperatures, invasive aquatic species, harmful algal blooms, and ocean acidification and deoxygenation put fisheries at risk. Fishery collapses can result in large economic losses, as well as loss of cultural identity and ways of life. { 11.3 , 29.3 }

In response, some farmers and ranchers are adopting innovations—such as agroecological practices, data-driven precision agriculture, and carbon monitoring—to improve resilience, enhance soil carbon storage, and reduce emissions. Across the Nation, Indigenous food security efforts are helping improve community resilience to climate change while also improving cultural resilience. Some types of aquaculture have the potential to increase climate-smart protein production, human nutrition, and food security, although some communities have raised concerns over issues such as conflict with traditional livelihoods and the introduction of disease or pollution. { 10.2 , 11.1 , 29.6 , 25.5 ; Boxes 22.3 , 27.2 }

Homes and property are at risk from sea level rise and more intense extreme events

Homes, property, and critical infrastructure are increasingly exposed to more frequent and intense extreme events, increasing the cost of maintaining a safe and healthy place to live. Development in fire-prone areas and increases in area burned by wildfires have heightened risks of loss of life and property damage in many areas across the US. Coastal communities across the country—home to 123 million people (40% of the total US population)—are exposed to sea level rise (Figure 1.10 ), with millions of people at risk of being displaced from their homes by the end of the century. { 2.3 , 9.1 , 12.2 , 22.1 , 27.4 , 30.3 ; Figures A4.10 , A4.14 ; Focus on Western Wildfires }

People who regularly struggle to afford energy bills—such as rural, low-income, and older fixed-income households and communities of color—are especially vulnerable to more intense extreme heat events and associated health risks, particularly if they live in homes with poor insulation and inefficient cooling systems. For example, Black Americans are more likely to live in older, less energy efficient homes and face disproportionate heat-related health risks. { 5.2 , 15.2 , 15.3 , 22.2 , 26.4 , 32.4 ; Figure A4.4 }

Accessible public cooling centers can help protect people who lack adequate air-conditioning on hot days. Strategic land-use planning in cities, urban greenery, climate-smart building codes, and early warning communication can also help neighborhoods adapt. However, other options at the household scale, such as hardening homes against weather extremes or relocation, may be out of reach for renters and low-income households without assistance. { 12.3 , 15.3 , 19.3 , 22.2 }

Infrastructure and services are increasingly damaged and disrupted by extreme weather and sea level rise

Climate change threatens vital infrastructure that moves people and goods, powers homes and businesses, and delivers public services. Many infrastructure systems across the country are at the end of their intended useful life and are not designed to cope with additional stress from climate change. For example, extreme heat causes railways to buckle, severe storms overload drainage systems, and wildfires result in roadway obstruction and debris flows. Risks to energy, water, healthcare, transportation, telecommunications, and waste management systems will continue to rise with further climate change, with many infrastructure systems at risk of failing. { 12.2 , 13.1 , 15.2 , 23.4 , 26.5 ; Focus on Risks to Supply Chains }

In coastal areas, sea level rise threatens permanent inundation of infrastructure, including roadways, railways, ports, tunnels, and bridges; water treatment facilities and power plants; and hospitals, schools, and military bases. More intense storms also disrupt critical services like access to medical care, as seen after Hurricanes Irma and Maria in the US Virgin Islands and Puerto Rico. { 9.2 , 23.1 , 28.2 , 30.3 }

At the same time, climate change is expected to place multiple demands on infrastructure and public services. For example, higher temperatures and other effects of climate change, such as greater exposure to stormwater or wastewater, will increase demand for healthcare. Continued increases in average temperatures and more intense heatwaves will heighten electricity and water demand, while wetter storms and intensified hurricanes will strain wastewater and stormwater management systems. In the Midwest and other regions, aging energy grids are expected to be strained by disruptions and transmission efficiency losses from climate change. { 23.4 , 24.4 , 30.2 }

Forward-looking designs of infrastructure and services can help build resilience to climate change, offset costs from future damage to transportation and electrical systems, and provide other benefits, including meeting evolving standards to protect public health, safety, and welfare. Mitigation and adaptation activities are advancing from planning stages to deployment in many areas, including improved grid design and workforce training for electrification, building upgrades, and land-use choices. Grid managers are gaining experience planning and operating electricity systems with growing shares of renewable generation and working toward understanding the best approaches for dealing with the natural variability of wind and solar sources alongside increases in electrification. { 5.3 , 12.3 , 13.1 , 13.2 , 22.3 , 24.4 , 32.3 ; Figure 22.17 }

Climate change exacerbates existing health challenges and creates new ones

Climate change is already harming human health across the US, and impacts are expected to worsen with continued warming. Climate change harms individuals and communities by exposing them to a range of compounding health hazards, including the following:

More severe and frequent extreme events { 2.2 , 2.3 , 15.1 }

Wider distribution of infectious and vector-borne pathogens { 15.1 , 26.1 ; Figure A4.16 }

Air quality worsened by smog, wildfire smoke, dust, and increased pollen { 14.1 , 14.2 , 14.4 , 23.1 , 26.1 }

Threats to food and water security { 11.2 , 15.1 }

Mental and spiritual health stressors { 15.1 }

While climate change can harm everyone’s health, its impacts exacerbate long-standing disparities that result in inequitable health outcomes for historically marginalized people, including people of color, Indigenous Peoples, low-income communities, and sexual and gender minorities, as well as older adults, people with disabilities or chronic diseases, outdoor workers, and children. { 14.3 , 15.2 }

The disproportionate health impacts of climate change compound with similar disparities in other health contexts. For example, climate-related disasters during the COVID-19 pandemic, such as drought along the Colorado River basin, western wildfires, and Hurricane Laura, disproportionately magnified COVID-19 exposure, transmission, and disease severity and contributed to worsened health conditions for essential workers, older adults, farmworkers, low-wealth communities, and communities of color. { 15.2 ; Focus on COVID-19 and Climate Change }

Large reductions in greenhouse gas emissions are expected to result in widespread health benefits and avoided death or illness that far outweigh the costs of mitigation actions. Improving early warning, surveillance, and communication of health threats; strengthening the resilience of healthcare systems; and supporting community-driven adaptation strategies can reduce inequities in the resources and capabilities needed to adapt as health threats from climate change continue to grow. { 14.5 , 15.3 , 26.1 , 30.2 , 32.4 }

Ecosystems are undergoing transformational changes

Together with other stressors, climate change is harming the health and resilience of ecosystems, leading to reductions in biodiversity and ecosystem services. Increasing temperatures continue to shift habitat ranges as species expand into new regions or disappear from unfavorable areas, altering where people can hunt, catch, or gather economically important and traditional food sources. Degradation and extinction of local flora and fauna in vulnerable ecosystems like coral reefs and montane rainforests are expected in the near term, especially where climate changes favor invasive species or increase susceptibility to pests and pathogens. Without significant emissions reductions, rapid shifts in environmental conditions are expected to lead to irreversible ecological transformations by mid- to late century. { 2.3 , 6.2 , 7.1 , 7.2 , 8.1 , 8.2 , 10.1 , 10.2 , 21.1 , 24.2 , 27.2 , 28.5 , 29.3 , 29.5 , 30.4 ; Figure A4.12 }

Changes in ocean conditions and extreme events are already transforming coastal, aquatic, and marine ecosystems. Coral reefs are being lost due to warming and ocean acidification, harming important fisheries; coastal forests are converting to ghost forests, shrublands, and marsh due to sea level rise, reducing coastal protection; lake and stream habitats are being degraded by warming, heavy rainfall, and invasive species, leading to declines in economically important species. { 8.1 , 10.1 , 21.2 , 23.2 , 24.2 , 27.2 ; Figures 8.7 , A4.11 }

Increased risks to ecosystems are expected with further climate change and other environmental changes, such as habitat fragmentation, pollution, and overfishing. For example, mass fish die-offs from extreme summertime heat are projected to double by midcentury in northern temperate lakes under a very high scenario (RCP8.5). Continued climate changes are projected to exacerbate runoff and erosion, promote harmful algal blooms, and expand the range of invasive species. { 4.2 , 7.1 , 8.2 , 10.1 , 21.2 , 23.2 , 24.2 , 27.2 , 28.2 , 30.4 }

While adaptation options to protect fragile ecosystems may be limited, particularly under higher levels of warming, management and restoration measures can reduce stress on ecological systems and build resilience. These measures include migration assistance for vulnerable species and protection of essential habitats, such as establishing wildlife corridors or places where species can avoid heat. Opportunities for nature-based solutions that assist in mitigation exist across the US, particularly those focused on protecting existing carbon sinks and increasing carbon storage by natural ecosystems. { 8.3 , 10.3 , 23.2 , 27.2 ; Focus on Blue Carbon }

Climate change slows economic growth, while climate action presents opportunities

With every additional increment of global warming, costly damages are expected to accelerate. For example, 2°F of warming is projected to cause more than twice the economic harm induced by 1°F of warming. Damages from additional warming pose significant risks to the US economy at multiple scales and can compound to dampen economic growth. { 19.1 }

International impacts can disrupt trade, amplify costs along global supply chains, and affect domestic markets. { 17.3 , 19.2 ; Focus on Risks to Supply Chains }

While some economic impacts of climate change are already being felt across the country, the impacts of future changes are projected to be more significant and apparent across the US economy. { 19.1 }

States, cities, and municipalities confront climate-driven pressures on public budgets and borrowing costs amid spending increases on healthcare and disaster relief. { 19.2 }

Household consumers face higher costs for goods and services, like groceries and health insurance premiums, as prices change to reflect both current and projected climate-related damages. { 19.2 }

Mitigation and adaptation actions present economic opportunities. Public and private measures—such as climate financial risk disclosures, carbon offset credit markets, and investments in green bonds—can avoid economic losses and improve property values, resilience, and equity. However, climate responses are not without risk. As innovation and trade open further investment opportunities in renewable energy and the country continues to transition away from fossil fuels, loss and disposal costs of stranded capital assets such as coal mines, oil and gas wells, and outdated power plants are expected. Climate solutions designed without input from affected communities can also result in increased vulnerability and cost burden. { 17.3 , 19.2 , 19.3 , 20.2 , 20.3 , 27.1 , 31.6 }

Many regional economies and livelihoods are threatened by damages to natural resources and intensifying extremes

Climate change is projected to reduce US economic output and labor productivity across many sectors, with effects differing based on local climate and the industries unique to each region. Climate-driven damages to local economies especially disrupt heritage industries (e.g., fishing traditions, trades passed down over generations, and cultural heritage–based tourism) and communities whose livelihoods depend on natural resources. { 11.3 , 19.1 , 19.3 }

As fish stocks in the Northeast move northward and to deeper waters in response to rapidly rising ocean temperatures, important fisheries like scallops, shrimp, and cod are at risk. In Alaska, climate change has already played a role in 18 major fishery disasters that were especially damaging for coastal Indigenous Peoples, subsistence fishers, and rural communities. { 10.2 , 21.2 , 29.3 }

While the Southeast and US Caribbean face high costs from projected labor losses and heat health risks to outdoor workers, small businesses are already confronting higher costs of goods and services and potential closures as they struggle to recover from the effects of compounding extreme weather events. { 22.3 , 23.1 }

Agricultural losses in the Midwest, including lower corn yields and damages to specialty crops like apples, are linked to rapid shifts between wet and dry conditions and stresses from climate-induced increases in pests and pathogens. Extreme heat and more intense wildfire and drought in the Southwest are already threatening agricultural worker health, reducing cattle production, and damaging wineries. { 24.1 , 28.5 }

In the Northern Great Plains, agriculture and recreation are expected to see primarily negative effects related to changing temperature and rainfall patterns. By 2070, the Southern Great Plains is expected to lose cropland acreage as lands transition to pasture or grassland. { 25.3 , 26.2 }

Outdoor-dependent industries, such as tourism in Hawai‘i and the US-Affiliated Pacific Islands and skiing in the Northwest, face significant economic loss from projected rises in park closures and reductions in workforce as continued warming leads to deterioration of coastal ecosystems and shorter winter seasons with less snowfall. { 7.2 , 8.3 , 10.1 , 10.3 , 19.1 , 27.3 , 30.4 }

Mitigation and adaptation actions taken by businesses and industries promote resilience and offer long-term benefits to employers, employees, and surrounding communities. For example, as commercial fisheries adapt, diversifying harvest and livelihoods can help stabilize income or buffer risk. In addition, regulators and investors are increasingly requiring businesses to disclose climate risks and management strategies. { 10.2 , 19.3 , 26.2 }

Job opportunities are shifting due to climate change and climate action

Many US households are already feeling the economic impacts of climate change. Climate change is projected to impose a variety of new or higher costs on most households as healthcare, food, insurance, building, and repair costs become more expensive. Compounding climate stressors can increase segregation, income inequality, and reliance on social safety net programs. Quality of life is also threatened by climate change in ways that can be more difficult to quantify, such as increased crime and domestic violence, harm to mental health, reduced happiness, and fewer opportunities for outdoor recreation and play. { 11.3 , 19.1, 19.3 }

Climate change, and how the country responds, is expected to alter demand for workers and shift where jobs are available. For example, energy-related livelihoods in the Northern and Southern Great Plains are expected to shift as the energy sector transforms toward more renewables, low-carbon technologies, and electrification of more sectors of the economy. Losses in fossil fuel–related jobs are projected to be completely offset by greater increases in mitigation-related jobs, as increased demand for renewable energy and low-carbon technologies is expected to lead to long-term expansion in most states’ energy and decarbonization workforce (Figure 1.12 ). Grid expansion and energy efficiency efforts are already creating new jobs in places like Nevada, Vermont, and Alaska, and advancements in biofuels and agrivoltaics (combined renewable energy and agriculture) provide economic opportunities in rural communities. { 10.2 , 11.3 , 19.3 , 25.3 , 26.2 , 29.3 , 32.4 }

Additional opportunities include jobs in ecosystem restoration and construction of energy-efficient and climate-resilient housing and infrastructure. Workforce training and equitable access to clean energy jobs, which have tended to exclude women and people of color, are essential elements of a just transition to a decarbonized economy. { 5.3 , 19.3 , 20.3 , 22.3 , 25.3 , 26.2 , 27.3 , 32.4 }

Climate change is disrupting cultures, heritages, and traditions

As climate change transforms US landscapes and ecosystems, many deeply rooted community ties, pastimes, Traditional Knowledges, and cultural or spiritual connections to place are at risk. Cultural heritage—including buildings, monuments, livelihoods, and practices—is threatened by impacts on natural ecosystems and the built environment. Damages to archaeological, cultural, and historical sites further reduce opportunities to transfer important knowledge and identity to future generations. { 6.1 , 7.2 , 8.3 , 9.2 , 10.1 , 12.2 , 16.1 , 22.1 , 23.1 , 26.1 , 27.6 , 28.2 ; Introductions in Chs. 10 , 30 }

Many outdoor activities and traditions are already being affected by climate change, with overall impacts projected to further hinder recreation, cultural practices, and the ability of communities to maintain local heritage and a sense of place. { 19.1 }

For example:

The prevalence of invasive species and harmful algal blooms is increasing as waters warm, threatening activities like swimming along Southeast beaches, boating and fishing for walleye in the Great Lakes, and viewing whooping cranes along the Gulf Coast. In the Northwest, water-based recreation demand is expected to increase in spring and summer months, but reduced water quality and harmful algal blooms are expected to restrict these opportunities. { 24.2 , 24.5 , 26.3 , 27.6 }

Ranges of culturally important species are shifting as temperatures warm, making them harder to find in areas where Indigenous Peoples have access (see Box 1.3 ). { 11.2 , 24.2 , 26.1 }

Hikers, campers, athletes, and spectators face increasing threats from more severe heatwaves, wildfires, and floods and greater exposure to infectious disease. { 22.2 , 15.1 , 26.3 , 27.6 }

Nature-based solutions and ecosystem restoration can preserve cultural heritage while also providing valuable local benefits, such as flood protection and new recreational opportunities. Cultural heritage can also play a key role in climate solutions, as incorporating local values, Indigenous Knowledge, and equity into design and planning can help reaffirm a community’s connection to place, strengthen social networks, and build new traditions. { 7.3 , 26.1 , 26.3 , 30.5 }

The Choices That Will Determine the Future

With each additional increment of warming, the consequences of climate change increase. The faster and further the world cuts greenhouse gas emissions, the more future warming will be avoided, increasing the chances of limiting or avoiding harmful impacts to current and future generations.

Societal choices drive greenhouse gas emissions

The choices people make on a day-to-day basis—how to power homes and businesses, get around, and produce and use food and other goods—collectively determine the amount of greenhouse gases emitted. Human use of fossil fuels for transportation and energy generation, along with activities like manufacturing and agriculture, has increased atmospheric levels of carbon dioxide (CO 2 ) and other heat-trapping greenhouse gases. Since 1850, CO 2 concentrations have increased by almost 50%, methane by more than 156%, and nitrous oxide by 23%, resulting in long-term global warming. { 2.1 , 3.1 ; Ch. 2, Introduction }

The CO 2 not removed from the atmosphere by natural sinks lingers for thousands of years. This means that CO 2 emitted long ago continues to contribute to climate change today. Because of historical trends, cumulative CO 2 emissions from fossil fuels and industry in the US are higher than from any other country. To understand the total contributions of past actions to observed climate change, additional warming from CO 2 emissions from land use, land-use change, and forestry, as well as emissions of nitrous oxide and the shorter-lived greenhouse gas methane, should also be taken into account. Accounting for all of these factors and emissions from 1850–2021, emissions from the US are estimated to comprise approximately 17% of current global warming. { 2.1 }

Carbon dioxide, along with other greenhouse gases like methane and nitrous oxide, is well-mixed in the atmosphere. This means these gases warm the planet regardless of where they were emitted. For the first half of the 20th century, the vast majority of greenhouse gas emissions came from the US and Europe. But as US and European emissions have been falling (US emissions in 2021 were 17% lower than 2005 levels), emissions from the rest of the world, particularly Asia, have been rising rapidly. The choices the US and other countries make now will determine the trajectory of climate change and associated impacts for many generations to come (Figure 1.13 ). { 2.1 , 2.3 ; Ch. 32 }

Rising global emissions are driving global warming, with faster warming in the US

The observed global warming of about 2°F (1.1°C) over the industrial era is unequivocally caused by greenhouse gas emissions from human activities, with only very small effects from natural sources. About three-quarters of total emissions and warming (1.7°F [0.95°C]) have occurred since 1970. Warming would have been even greater without the land and ocean carbon sinks, which have absorbed more than half of the CO 2 emitted by humans. { 2.1 , 3.1 , 7.2 ; Ch. 2, Introduction ; Figures 3.1 , 3.8 }

The US is warming faster than the global average, reflecting a broader global pattern: land areas are warming faster than the ocean, and higher latitudes are warming faster than lower latitudes. Additional global warming is expected to lead to even greater warming in some US regions, particularly Alaska (Figure 1.14 ). { 2.1 , 3.4 ; Ch. 2, Introduction ; App. 4 }

Warming increases risks to the US

Rising temperatures lead to many large-scale changes in Earth’s climate system, and the consequences increase with warming (Figure 1.15 ). Some of these changes can be further amplified through feedback processes at higher levels of warming, increasing the risk of potentially catastrophic outcomes. For example, uncertainty in the stability of ice sheets at high warming levels means that increases in sea level along the continental US of 3–7 feet by 2100 and 5–12 feet by 2150 are distinct possibilities that cannot be ruled out. The chance of reaching the upper end of these ranges increases as more warming occurs. In addition to warming more, the Earth warms faster in high and very high scenarios (SSP3-7.0 and SSP5-8.5, respectively), making adaptation more challenging. { 2.3 , 3.1 , 3.4 , 9.1 }

How Climate Action Can Create a More Resilient and Just Nation

Large near-term cuts in greenhouse gas emissions are achievable through many currently available and cost-effective mitigation options. However, reaching net-zero emissions by midcentury cannot be achieved without exploring additional mitigation options. Even if the world decarbonizes rapidly, the Nation will continue to face climate impacts and risks. Adequately and equitably addressing these risks involves longer-term inclusive planning, investments in transformative adaptation, and mitigation approaches that consider equity and justice.

Available mitigation strategies can deliver substantial emissions reductions, but additional options are needed to reach net zero

Limiting global temperature change to well below 2°C (3.6°F) requires reaching net-zero CO 2 emissions globally by 2050 and net-zero emissions of all greenhouse gases from human activities within the following few decades (see “Meeting US mitigation targets means reaching net-zero emissions” above). Net-zero emissions pathways involve widespread implementation of currently available and cost-effective options for reducing emissions alongside rapid expansion of technologies and methods to remove carbon from the atmosphere to balance remaining emissions. However, to reach net-zero emissions, additional mitigation options need to be explored (Figure 1.16 ). Pathways to net zero involve large-scale technological, infrastructure, land-use, and behavioral changes and shifts in governance structures. { 5.3 , 6.3 , 9.2 , 9.3 , 10.4 , 13.2 , 16.2 , 18.4 , 20.1 , 24.1 , 25.5 , 30.5 , 32.2 , 32.3 ; Focus on Blue Carbon }

Scenarios that reach net-zero emissions include some of the following key options:

Decarbonizing the electricity sector, primarily through expansion of wind and solar energy, supported by energy storage { 32.2 }

Transitioning to transportation and heating systems that use zero-carbon electricity or low-carbon fuels, such as hydrogen { 5.3 , 13.1 , 32.2 , 32.3 }

Improving energy efficiency in buildings, appliances, and light- and heavy-duty vehicles and other transportation modes { 5.3 , 13.3 , 32.2 }

Implementing urban planning and building design that reduces energy demands through more public transportation and active transportation and lower cooling demands for buildings { 12.3 , 13.1 , 32.2 }

Increasing the efficiency and sustainability of food production, distribution, and consumption { 11.1 , 32.2 }

Improving land management to decrease greenhouse gas emissions and increase carbon removal and storage, with options ranging from afforestation, reforestation, and restoring coastal ecosystems to industrial processes that directly capture and store carbon from the air { 5.3 , 6.3 , 8.3 , 32.2 , 32.3 ; Focus on Blue Carbon }

Due to large declines in technology and deployment costs over the last decade (Figure 1.2 ), decarbonizing the electricity sector is expected to be largely driven by rapid growth in renewable energy. Recent legislation is also expected to increase deployment rates of low- and zero-carbon technology. To reach net-zero targets, the US will need to add new electricity-generating capacity, mostly wind and solar, faster than ever before. This infrastructure expansion may drastically increase demand for products (batteries, solar photovoltaics) and resources, such as metals and critical minerals. Near-term shortages in minerals and metals due to increased demand can be addressed by increased recycling, for example, which can also reduce dependence on imported materials. { 5.2, 5.3 , 17.2 , 25.3 , 32.2 , 32.4 ; Focus on Risks to Supply Chains }

Most US net-zero scenarios require CO 2 removal from the atmosphere to balance residual emissions, particularly from sectors where decarbonization is difficult. In these scenarios, nuclear and hydropower capacity are maintained but not greatly expanded; natural gas–fired generation declines, but more slowly if coupled with carbon capture and storage. { 32.2 }

Nature-based solutions that restore degraded ecosystems and preserve or enhance carbon storage in natural systems like forests, oceans, and wetlands, as well as agricultural lands, are cost-effective mitigation strategies. For example, with conservation and restoration, marine and coastal ecosystems could capture and store enough atmospheric carbon each year to offset about 3% of global emissions (based on 2019 and 2020 emissions). Many nature-based solutions can provide additional benefits, like improved ecosystem resilience, food production, improved water quality, and recreational opportunities. { 8.3 ; Boxes 7.2 , 32.2 ; Focus on Blue Carbon }

Adequately addressing climate risks involves transformative adaptation

While adaptation planning and implementation has advanced in the US, most adaptation actions to date have been incremental and small in scale (see Table 1.3 ). In many cases, more transformative adaptation will be necessary to adequately address the risks of current and future climate change. { 31.1 , 31.3 }.

Transformative adaptation involves fundamental shifts in systems, values, and practices, including assessing potential trade-offs, intentionally integrating equity into adaptation processes, and making systemic changes to institutions and norms. While barriers to adaptation remain, many of these can be overcome with financial, cultural, technological, legislative, or institutional changes. { 31.1 , 31.2 , 31.3 }.

Adaptation planning can more effectively reduce climate risk when it identifies not only disparities in how people are affected by climate change but also the underlying causes of climate vulnerability. Transformative adaptation would involve consideration of both the physical and social drivers of vulnerability and how they interact to shape local experiences of vulnerability and disparities in risk. Examples include understanding how differing levels of access to disaster assistance constrain recovery outcomes or how disaster damage exacerbates long-term wealth inequality. Effective adaptation, both incremental and transformative, involves developing and investing in new monitoring and evaluation methods to understand the different values of, and impacts on, diverse individuals and communities. { 9.3 , 19.3 , 31.2 , 31.3 , 31.5 }

Transformative adaptation would require new and better-coordinated governance mechanisms and cooperation across all levels of government, the private sector, and society. A coordinated, systems-based approach can support consideration of risks that cut across multiple sectors and scales, as well as the development of context-specific adaptations. For example, California, Florida, and other states have used informal regional collaborations to develop adaptation strategies tailored to their area. Adaptation measures that are designed and implemented using inclusive, participatory planning approaches and leverage coordinated governance and financing have the greatest potential for long-term benefits, such as improved quality of life and increased economic productivity. { 10.3 , 18.4 , 20.2 , 31.4 }

Mitigation and adaptation actions can result in systemic, cascading benefits

Actions taken now to accelerate net emissions reductions and adapt to ongoing changes can reduce risks to current and future generations. Mitigation and adaptation actions, from international to individual scales, can also result in a range of benefits beyond limiting harmful climate impacts, including some immediate benefits (Figure 1.1 ). The benefits of mitigation and proactive adaptation investments are expected to outweigh the costs. { 2.3 , 13.3 , 14.5 , 15.3 , 17.4 , 22.1 , 31.6 , 32.4 ; Introductions in Chs. 17 , 31 }

Accelerating the deployment of low-carbon technologies, expanding renewable energy, and improving building efficiency can have significant near-term social and economic benefits like reducing energy costs and creating jobs. { 32.4 }

Transitioning to a carbon-free, sustainable, and resilient transportation system can lead to improvements in air quality, fewer traffic fatalities, lower costs to travelers, improved mental and physical health, and healthier ecosystems. { 13.3 }

Reducing emissions of short-lived climate pollutants like methane, black carbon, and ozone provides immediate air quality benefits that save lives and decrease the burden on healthcare systems while also slowing near-term warming. { 11.1 , 14.5 , 15.3 }

Green infrastructure and nature-based solutions that accelerate pathways to net-zero emissions through restoration and protection of ecological resources can improve water quality, strengthen biodiversity, provide protection from climate hazards like heat extremes or flooding, preserve cultural heritage and traditions, and support more equitable access to environmental amenities. { 8.3 , 15.3 , 20.3 , 24.4 , 30.4 ; Focus on Blue Carbon }

Strategic planning and investment in resilience can reduce the economic impacts of climate change, including costs to households and businesses, risks to markets and supply chains, and potential negative impacts on employment and income, while also providing opportunities for economic gain. { 9.2 , 19.3 , 26.2 , 31.6 ; Focus on Risks to Supply Chains }

Improving cropland management and climate-smart agricultural practices can strengthen the resilience and profitability of farms while also increasing soil carbon uptake and storage, reducing emissions of nitrous oxide and methane, and enhancing agricultural efficiency and yields. { 11.1 , 24.1 , 32.2 }

Climate actions that incorporate inclusive and sustained engagement with overburdened and underserved communities in the design, planning, and implementation of evidence-based strategies can also reduce existing disparities and address social injustices. { 24.3 , 31.2 , 32.4 }

Transformative climate actions can strengthen resilience and advance equity

Fossil fuel–based energy systems have resulted in disproportionate public health burdens on communities of color and/or low-income communities. These same communities are also disproportionately harmed by climate change impacts. { 13.4 , 15.2 , 32.4 }

A “just transition” is the process of responding to climate change with transformative actions that address the root causes of climate vulnerability while ensuring equitable access to jobs; affordable, low-carbon energy; environmental benefits such as reduced air pollution; and quality of life for all. This involves reducing impacts to overburdened communities, increasing resources to underserved communities, and integrating diverse worldviews, cultures, experiences, and capacities into mitigation and adaptation actions. As the country shifts to low-carbon energy industries, a just transition would include job creation and training for displaced fossil fuel workers and addressing existing racial and gender disparities in energy workforces. For example, Colorado agencies are creating plans to guide the state’s transition away from coal, with a focus on economic diversification, job creation, and workforce training for former coal workers. The state’s plan also acknowledges a commitment to communities disproportionately impacted by coal power pollution. { 5.3 , 13.4 , 14.3 , 15.2 , 16.2 , 20.3 , 31.2 , 32.4 ; Figure 20.1 }

A just transition would take into account key aspects of environmental justice:

Recognizing that certain people have borne disparate burdens related to current and historical social injustices and, thus, may have different needs

Ensuring that people interested in and affected by outcomes of decision-making processes are included in those procedures through fair and meaningful engagement

Distributing resources and opportunities over time, including access to data and information, so that no single group or set of individuals receives disproportionate benefits or burdens

{ 20.3 ; Figure 20.1 }

An equitable and sustainable US response to climate change has the potential to reduce climate impacts while improving well-being, strengthening resilience, benefiting the economy, and, in part, redressing legacies of racism and injustice. Transformative adaptation and the transition to a net-zero energy system come with challenges and trade-offs that would need to be considered to avoid exacerbating or creating new social injustices. For example, transforming car-centric transportation systems to emphasize public transit and walkability could increase accessibility for underserved communities and people with limited mobility—if user input and equity are intentionally considered. { 13.4 , 20.3 , 31.3 , 32.4 ; Ch. 31, Introduction }

Equitable responses that assess trade-offs strengthen community resilience and self-determination, often fostering innovative solutions. Engaging communities in identifying challenges and bringing together diverse voices to participate in decision-making allows for more inclusive, effective, and transparent planning processes that account for the structural factors contributing to inequitable climate vulnerability. { 9.3 , 12.4 , 13.4 , 20.2 , 31.4 }

Cover image

Two volunteers help demonstrate and install solar panels in Highland Park, Michigan, in May 2021. The event was hosted by the local nonprofit Soulardarity, which teaches local residents about solar power, installs solar-powered streetlights that also provide wireless internet access, and helps local communities build a just and equitable energy system. Adopting energy storage with decentralized solutions, such as microgrids or off-grid systems, can promote energy equity in overburdened communities. Photo credit: Nick Hagen.

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The Science of Climate Change Explained: Facts, Evidence and Proof

Definitive answers to the big questions.

Credit... Photo Illustration by Andrea D'Aquino

Supported by

By Julia Rosen

Ms. Rosen is a journalist with a Ph.D. in geology. Her research involved studying ice cores from Greenland and Antarctica to understand past climate changes.

• Published April 19, 2021 Updated Nov. 6, 2021

The science of climate change is more solid and widely agreed upon than you might think. But the scope of the topic, as well as rampant disinformation, can make it hard to separate fact from fiction. Here, we’ve done our best to present you with not only the most accurate scientific information, but also an explanation of how we know it.

How do we know climate change is really happening?

• How much agreement is there among scientists about climate change?
• Do we really only have 150 years of climate data? How is that enough to tell us about centuries of change?
• How do we know climate change is caused by humans?
• Since greenhouse gases occur naturally, how do we know they’re causing Earth’s temperature to rise?
• Why should we be worried that the planet has warmed 2°F since the 1800s?
• Is climate change a part of the planet’s natural warming and cooling cycles?
• How do we know global warming is not because of the sun or volcanoes?
• How can winters and certain places be getting colder if the planet is warming?
• Wildfires and bad weather have always happened. How do we know there’s a connection to climate change?
• How bad are the effects of climate change going to be?
• What will it cost to do something about climate change, versus doing nothing?

Climate change is often cast as a prediction made by complicated computer models. But the scientific basis for climate change is much broader, and models are actually only one part of it (and, for what it’s worth, they’re surprisingly accurate ).

For more than a century , scientists have understood the basic physics behind why greenhouse gases like carbon dioxide cause warming. These gases make up just a small fraction of the atmosphere but exert outsized control on Earth’s climate by trapping some of the planet’s heat before it escapes into space. This greenhouse effect is important: It’s why a planet so far from the sun has liquid water and life!

However, during the Industrial Revolution, people started burning coal and other fossil fuels to power factories, smelters and steam engines, which added more greenhouse gases to the atmosphere. Ever since, human activities have been heating the planet.

Where it was cooler or warmer in 2020 compared with the middle of the 20th century

Global average temperature compared with the middle of the 20th century

+0.75°C

–0.25°

30 billion metric tons

Carbon dioxide emitted worldwide 1850-2017

Rest of world

Other developed

European Union

Developed economies

Other countries

United States

E.U. and U.K.

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A review of the global climate change impacts, adaptation, and sustainable mitigation measures

Kashif abbass.

1 School of Economics and Management, Nanjing University of Science and Technology, Nanjing, 210094 People’s Republic of China

Muhammad Zeeshan Qasim

2 Jiangsu Key Laboratory of Chemical Pollution Control and Resources Reuse, School of Environmental and Biological Engineering, Nanjing University of Science and Technology, Xiaolingwei 200, Nanjing, 210094 People’s Republic of China

Huaming Song

Muntasir murshed.

3 School of Business and Economics, North South University, Dhaka, 1229 Bangladesh

4 Department of Journalism, Media and Communications, Daffodil International University, Dhaka, Bangladesh

Haider Mahmood

5 Department of Finance, College of Business Administration, Prince Sattam Bin Abdulaziz University, 173, Alkharj, 11942 Saudi Arabia

Ijaz Younis

Associated data.

Data sources and relevant links are provided in the paper to access data.

Climate change is a long-lasting change in the weather arrays across tropics to polls. It is a global threat that has embarked on to put stress on various sectors. This study is aimed to conceptually engineer how climate variability is deteriorating the sustainability of diverse sectors worldwide. Specifically, the agricultural sector’s vulnerability is a globally concerning scenario, as sufficient production and food supplies are threatened due to irreversible weather fluctuations. In turn, it is challenging the global feeding patterns, particularly in countries with agriculture as an integral part of their economy and total productivity. Climate change has also put the integrity and survival of many species at stake due to shifts in optimum temperature ranges, thereby accelerating biodiversity loss by progressively changing the ecosystem structures. Climate variations increase the likelihood of particular food and waterborne and vector-borne diseases, and a recent example is a coronavirus pandemic. Climate change also accelerates the enigma of antimicrobial resistance, another threat to human health due to the increasing incidence of resistant pathogenic infections. Besides, the global tourism industry is devastated as climate change impacts unfavorable tourism spots. The methodology investigates hypothetical scenarios of climate variability and attempts to describe the quality of evidence to facilitate readers’ careful, critical engagement. Secondary data is used to identify sustainability issues such as environmental, social, and economic viability. To better understand the problem, gathered the information in this report from various media outlets, research agencies, policy papers, newspapers, and other sources. This review is a sectorial assessment of climate change mitigation and adaptation approaches worldwide in the aforementioned sectors and the associated economic costs. According to the findings, government involvement is necessary for the country’s long-term development through strict accountability of resources and regulations implemented in the past to generate cutting-edge climate policy. Therefore, mitigating the impacts of climate change must be of the utmost importance, and hence, this global threat requires global commitment to address its dreadful implications to ensure global sustenance.

Introduction

Worldwide observed and anticipated climatic changes for the twenty-first century and global warming are significant global changes that have been encountered during the past 65 years. Climate change (CC) is an inter-governmental complex challenge globally with its influence over various components of the ecological, environmental, socio-political, and socio-economic disciplines (Adger et al.  2005 ; Leal Filho et al.  2021 ; Feliciano et al.  2022 ). Climate change involves heightened temperatures across numerous worlds (Battisti and Naylor  2009 ; Schuurmans  2021 ; Weisheimer and Palmer  2005 ; Yadav et al.  2015 ). With the onset of the industrial revolution, the problem of earth climate was amplified manifold (Leppänen et al.  2014 ). It is reported that the immediate attention and due steps might increase the probability of overcoming its devastating impacts. It is not plausible to interpret the exact consequences of climate change (CC) on a sectoral basis (Izaguirre et al.  2021 ; Jurgilevich et al.  2017 ), which is evident by the emerging level of recognition plus the inclusion of climatic uncertainties at both local and national level of policymaking (Ayers et al.  2014 ).

Climate change is characterized based on the comprehensive long-haul temperature and precipitation trends and other components such as pressure and humidity level in the surrounding environment. Besides, the irregular weather patterns, retreating of global ice sheets, and the corresponding elevated sea level rise are among the most renowned international and domestic effects of climate change (Lipczynska-Kochany  2018 ; Michel et al.  2021 ; Murshed and Dao 2020 ). Before the industrial revolution, natural sources, including volcanoes, forest fires, and seismic activities, were regarded as the distinct sources of greenhouse gases (GHGs) such as CO 2 , CH 4 , N 2 O, and H 2 O into the atmosphere (Murshed et al. 2020 ; Hussain et al.  2020 ; Sovacool et al.  2021 ; Usman and Balsalobre-Lorente 2022 ; Murshed 2022 ). United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) struck a major agreement to tackle climate change and accelerate and intensify the actions and investments required for a sustainable low-carbon future at Conference of the Parties (COP-21) in Paris on December 12, 2015. The Paris Agreement expands on the Convention by bringing all nations together for the first time in a single cause to undertake ambitious measures to prevent climate change and adapt to its impacts, with increased funding to assist developing countries in doing so. As so, it marks a turning point in the global climate fight. The core goal of the Paris Agreement is to improve the global response to the threat of climate change by keeping the global temperature rise this century well below 2 °C over pre-industrial levels and to pursue efforts to limit the temperature increase to 1.5° C (Sharma et al. 2020 ; Sharif et al. 2020 ; Chien et al. 2021 .

Furthermore, the agreement aspires to strengthen nations’ ability to deal with the effects of climate change and align financing flows with low GHG emissions and climate-resilient paths (Shahbaz et al. 2019 ; Anwar et al. 2021 ; Usman et al. 2022a ). To achieve these lofty goals, adequate financial resources must be mobilized and provided, as well as a new technology framework and expanded capacity building, allowing developing countries and the most vulnerable countries to act under their respective national objectives. The agreement also establishes a more transparent action and support mechanism. All Parties are required by the Paris Agreement to do their best through “nationally determined contributions” (NDCs) and to strengthen these efforts in the coming years (Balsalobre-Lorente et al. 2020 ). It includes obligations that all Parties regularly report on their emissions and implementation activities. A global stock-take will be conducted every five years to review collective progress toward the agreement’s goal and inform the Parties’ future individual actions. The Paris Agreement became available for signature on April 22, 2016, Earth Day, at the United Nations Headquarters in New York. On November 4, 2016, it went into effect 30 days after the so-called double threshold was met (ratification by 55 nations accounting for at least 55% of world emissions). More countries have ratified and continue to ratify the agreement since then, bringing 125 Parties in early 2017. To fully operationalize the Paris Agreement, a work program was initiated in Paris to define mechanisms, processes, and recommendations on a wide range of concerns (Murshed et al. 2021 ). Since 2016, Parties have collaborated in subsidiary bodies (APA, SBSTA, and SBI) and numerous formed entities. The Conference of the Parties functioning as the meeting of the Parties to the Paris Agreement (CMA) convened for the first time in November 2016 in Marrakesh in conjunction with COP22 and made its first two resolutions. The work plan is scheduled to be finished by 2018. Some mitigation and adaptation strategies to reduce the emission in the prospective of Paris agreement are following firstly, a long-term goal of keeping the increase in global average temperature to well below 2 °C above pre-industrial levels, secondly, to aim to limit the rise to 1.5 °C, since this would significantly reduce risks and the impacts of climate change, thirdly, on the need for global emissions to peak as soon as possible, recognizing that this will take longer for developing countries, lastly, to undertake rapid reductions after that under the best available science, to achieve a balance between emissions and removals in the second half of the century. On the other side, some adaptation strategies are; strengthening societies’ ability to deal with the effects of climate change and to continue & expand international assistance for developing nations’ adaptation.

However, anthropogenic activities are currently regarded as most accountable for CC (Murshed et al. 2022 ). Apart from the industrial revolution, other anthropogenic activities include excessive agricultural operations, which further involve the high use of fuel-based mechanization, burning of agricultural residues, burning fossil fuels, deforestation, national and domestic transportation sectors, etc. (Huang et al.  2016 ). Consequently, these anthropogenic activities lead to climatic catastrophes, damaging local and global infrastructure, human health, and total productivity. Energy consumption has mounted GHGs levels concerning warming temperatures as most of the energy production in developing countries comes from fossil fuels (Balsalobre-Lorente et al. 2022 ; Usman et al. 2022b ; Abbass et al. 2021a ; Ishikawa-Ishiwata and Furuya  2022 ).

This review aims to highlight the effects of climate change in a socio-scientific aspect by analyzing the existing literature on various sectorial pieces of evidence globally that influence the environment. Although this review provides a thorough examination of climate change and its severe affected sectors that pose a grave danger for global agriculture, biodiversity, health, economy, forestry, and tourism, and to purpose some practical prophylactic measures and mitigation strategies to be adapted as sound substitutes to survive from climate change (CC) impacts. The societal implications of irregular weather patterns and other effects of climate changes are discussed in detail. Some numerous sustainable mitigation measures and adaptation practices and techniques at the global level are discussed in this review with an in-depth focus on its economic, social, and environmental aspects. Methods of data collection section are included in the supplementary information.

Review methodology

Related study and its objectives.

Today, we live an ordinary life in the beautiful digital, globalized world where climate change has a decisive role. What happens in one country has a massive influence on geographically far apart countries, which points to the current crisis known as COVID-19 (Sarkar et al.  2021 ). The most dangerous disease like COVID-19 has affected the world’s climate changes and economic conditions (Abbass et al. 2022 ; Pirasteh-Anosheh et al.  2021 ). The purpose of the present study is to review the status of research on the subject, which is based on “Global Climate Change Impacts, adaptation, and sustainable mitigation measures” by systematically reviewing past published and unpublished research work. Furthermore, the current study seeks to comment on research on the same topic and suggest future research on the same topic. Specifically, the present study aims: The first one is, organize publications to make them easy and quick to find. Secondly, to explore issues in this area, propose an outline of research for future work. The third aim of the study is to synthesize the previous literature on climate change, various sectors, and their mitigation measurement. Lastly , classify the articles according to the different methods and procedures that have been adopted.

Review methodology for reviewers

This review-based article followed systematic literature review techniques that have proved the literature review as a rigorous framework (Benita  2021 ; Tranfield et al.  2003 ). Moreover, we illustrate in Fig.  1 the search method that we have started for this research. First, finalized the research theme to search literature (Cooper et al.  2018 ). Second, used numerous research databases to search related articles and download from the database (Web of Science, Google Scholar, Scopus Index Journals, Emerald, Elsevier Science Direct, Springer, and Sciverse). We focused on various articles, with research articles, feedback pieces, short notes, debates, and review articles published in scholarly journals. Reports used to search for multiple keywords such as “Climate Change,” “Mitigation and Adaptation,” “Department of Agriculture and Human Health,” “Department of Biodiversity and Forestry,” etc.; in summary, keyword list and full text have been made. Initially, the search for keywords yielded a large amount of literature.

Methodology search for finalized articles for investigations.

Source : constructed by authors

Since 2020, it has been impossible to review all the articles found; some restrictions have been set for the literature exhibition. The study searched 95 articles on a different database mentioned above based on the nature of the study. It excluded 40 irrelevant papers due to copied from a previous search after readings tiles, abstract and full pieces. The criteria for inclusion were: (i) articles focused on “Global Climate Change Impacts, adaptation, and sustainable mitigation measures,” and (ii) the search key terms related to study requirements. The complete procedure yielded 55 articles for our study. We repeat our search on the “Web of Science and Google Scholars” database to enhance the search results and check the referenced articles.

In this study, 55 articles are reviewed systematically and analyzed for research topics and other aspects, such as the methods, contexts, and theories used in these studies. Furthermore, this study analyzes closely related areas to provide unique research opportunities in the future. The study also discussed future direction opportunities and research questions by understanding the research findings climate changes and other affected sectors. The reviewed paper framework analysis process is outlined in Fig.  2 .

Framework of the analysis Process.

Natural disasters and climate change’s socio-economic consequences

Natural and environmental disasters can be highly variable from year to year; some years pass with very few deaths before a significant disaster event claims many lives (Symanski et al.  2021 ). Approximately 60,000 people globally died from natural disasters each year on average over the past decade (Ritchie and Roser  2014 ; Wiranata and Simbolon  2021 ). So, according to the report, around 0.1% of global deaths. Annual variability in the number and share of deaths from natural disasters in recent decades are shown in Fig.  3 . The number of fatalities can be meager—sometimes less than 10,000, and as few as 0.01% of all deaths. But shock events have a devastating impact: the 1983–1985 famine and drought in Ethiopia; the 2004 Indian Ocean earthquake and tsunami; Cyclone Nargis, which struck Myanmar in 2008; and the 2010 Port-au-Prince earthquake in Haiti and now recent example is COVID-19 pandemic (Erman et al.  2021 ). These events pushed global disaster deaths to over 200,000—more than 0.4% of deaths in these years. Low-frequency, high-impact events such as earthquakes and tsunamis are not preventable, but such high losses of human life are. Historical evidence shows that earlier disaster detection, more robust infrastructure, emergency preparedness, and response programmers have substantially reduced disaster deaths worldwide. Low-income is also the most vulnerable to disasters; improving living conditions, facilities, and response services in these areas would be critical in reducing natural disaster deaths in the coming decades.

Global deaths from natural disasters, 1978 to 2020.

Source EMDAT ( 2020 )

The interior regions of the continent are likely to be impacted by rising temperatures (Dimri et al.  2018 ; Goes et al.  2020 ; Mannig et al.  2018 ; Schuurmans  2021 ). Weather patterns change due to the shortage of natural resources (water), increase in glacier melting, and rising mercury are likely to cause extinction to many planted species (Gampe et al.  2016 ; Mihiretu et al.  2021 ; Shaffril et al.  2018 ).On the other hand, the coastal ecosystem is on the verge of devastation (Perera et al.  2018 ; Phillips  2018 ). The temperature rises, insect disease outbreaks, health-related problems, and seasonal and lifestyle changes are persistent, with a strong probability of these patterns continuing in the future (Abbass et al. 2021c ; Hussain et al.  2018 ). At the global level, a shortage of good infrastructure and insufficient adaptive capacity are hammering the most (IPCC  2013 ). In addition to the above concerns, a lack of environmental education and knowledge, outdated consumer behavior, a scarcity of incentives, a lack of legislation, and the government’s lack of commitment to climate change contribute to the general public’s concerns. By 2050, a 2 to 3% rise in mercury and a drastic shift in rainfall patterns may have serious consequences (Huang et al. 2022 ; Gorst et al.  2018 ). Natural and environmental calamities caused huge losses globally, such as decreased agriculture outputs, rehabilitation of the system, and rebuilding necessary technologies (Ali and Erenstein  2017 ; Ramankutty et al.  2018 ; Yu et al.  2021 ) (Table ​ (Table1). 1 ). Furthermore, in the last 3 or 4 years, the world has been plagued by smog-related eye and skin diseases, as well as a rise in road accidents due to poor visibility.

Main natural danger statistics for 1985–2020 at the global level

Source: EM-DAT ( 2020 )

Climate change and agriculture

Global agriculture is the ultimate sector responsible for 30–40% of all greenhouse emissions, which makes it a leading industry predominantly contributing to climate warming and significantly impacted by it (Grieg; Mishra et al.  2021 ; Ortiz et al.  2021 ; Thornton and Lipper  2014 ). Numerous agro-environmental and climatic factors that have a dominant influence on agriculture productivity (Pautasso et al.  2012 ) are significantly impacted in response to precipitation extremes including floods, forest fires, and droughts (Huang  2004 ). Besides, the immense dependency on exhaustible resources also fuels the fire and leads global agriculture to become prone to devastation. Godfray et al. ( 2010 ) mentioned that decline in agriculture challenges the farmer’s quality of life and thus a significant factor to poverty as the food and water supplies are critically impacted by CC (Ortiz et al.  2021 ; Rosenzweig et al.  2014 ). As an essential part of the economic systems, especially in developing countries, agricultural systems affect the overall economy and potentially the well-being of households (Schlenker and Roberts  2009 ). According to the report published by the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC), atmospheric concentrations of greenhouse gases, i.e., CH 4, CO 2 , and N 2 O, are increased in the air to extraordinary levels over the last few centuries (Usman and Makhdum 2021 ; Stocker et al.  2013 ). Climate change is the composite outcome of two different factors. The first is the natural causes, and the second is the anthropogenic actions (Karami 2012 ). It is also forecasted that the world may experience a typical rise in temperature stretching from 1 to 3.7 °C at the end of this century (Pachauri et al. 2014 ). The world’s crop production is also highly vulnerable to these global temperature-changing trends as raised temperatures will pose severe negative impacts on crop growth (Reidsma et al. 2009 ). Some of the recent modeling about the fate of global agriculture is briefly described below.

Decline in cereal productivity

Crop productivity will also be affected dramatically in the next few decades due to variations in integral abiotic factors such as temperature, solar radiation, precipitation, and CO 2 . These all factors are included in various regulatory instruments like progress and growth, weather-tempted changes, pest invasions (Cammell and Knight 1992 ), accompanying disease snags (Fand et al. 2012 ), water supplies (Panda et al. 2003 ), high prices of agro-products in world’s agriculture industry, and preeminent quantity of fertilizer consumption. Lobell and field ( 2007 ) claimed that from 1962 to 2002, wheat crop output had condensed significantly due to rising temperatures. Therefore, during 1980–2011, the common wheat productivity trends endorsed extreme temperature events confirmed by Gourdji et al. ( 2013 ) around South Asia, South America, and Central Asia. Various other studies (Asseng, Cao, Zhang, and Ludwig 2009 ; Asseng et al. 2013 ; García et al. 2015 ; Ortiz et al. 2021 ) also proved that wheat output is negatively affected by the rising temperatures and also caused adverse effects on biomass productivity (Calderini et al. 1999 ; Sadras and Slafer 2012 ). Hereafter, the rice crop is also influenced by the high temperatures at night. These difficulties will worsen because the temperature will be rising further in the future owing to CC (Tebaldi et al. 2006 ). Another research conducted in China revealed that a 4.6% of rice production per 1 °C has happened connected with the advancement in night temperatures (Tao et al. 2006 ). Moreover, the average night temperature growth also affected rice indicia cultivar’s output pragmatically during 25 years in the Philippines (Peng et al. 2004 ). It is anticipated that the increase in world average temperature will also cause a substantial reduction in yield (Hatfield et al. 2011 ; Lobell and Gourdji 2012 ). In the southern hemisphere, Parry et al. ( 2007 ) noted a rise of 1–4 °C in average daily temperatures at the end of spring season unti the middle of summers, and this raised temperature reduced crop output by cutting down the time length for phenophases eventually reduce the yield (Hatfield and Prueger 2015 ; R. Ortiz 2008 ). Also, world climate models have recommended that humid and subtropical regions expect to be plentiful prey to the upcoming heat strokes (Battisti and Naylor 2009 ). Grain production is the amalgamation of two constituents: the average weight and the grain output/m 2 , however, in crop production. Crop output is mainly accredited to the grain quantity (Araus et al. 2008 ; Gambín and Borrás 2010 ). In the times of grain set, yield resources are mainly strewn between hitherto defined components, i.e., grain usual weight and grain output, which presents a trade-off between them (Gambín and Borrás 2010 ) beside disparities in per grain integration (B. L. Gambín et al. 2006 ). In addition to this, the maize crop is also susceptible to raised temperatures, principally in the flowering stage (Edreira and Otegui 2013 ). In reality, the lower grain number is associated with insufficient acclimatization due to intense photosynthesis and higher respiration and the high-temperature effect on the reproduction phenomena (Edreira and Otegui 2013 ). During the flowering phase, maize visible to heat (30–36 °C) seemed less anthesis-silking intermissions (Edreira et al. 2011 ). Another research by Dupuis and Dumas ( 1990 ) proved that a drop in spikelet when directly visible to high temperatures above 35 °C in vitro pollination. Abnormalities in kernel number claimed by Vega et al. ( 2001 ) is related to conceded plant development during a flowering phase that is linked with the active ear growth phase and categorized as a critical phase for approximation of kernel number during silking (Otegui and Bonhomme 1998 ).

The retort of rice output to high temperature presents disparities in flowering patterns, and seed set lessens and lessens grain weight (Qasim et al. 2020 ; Qasim, Hammad, Maqsood, Tariq, & Chawla). During the daytime, heat directly impacts flowers which lessens the thesis period and quickens the earlier peak flowering (Tao et al. 2006 ). Antagonistic effect of higher daytime temperature d on pollen sprouting proposed seed set decay, whereas, seed set was lengthily reduced than could be explicated by pollen growing at high temperatures 40◦C (Matsui et al. 2001 ).

The decline in wheat output is linked with higher temperatures, confirmed in numerous studies (Semenov 2009 ; Stone and Nicolas 1994 ). High temperatures fast-track the arrangements of plant expansion (Blum et al. 2001 ), diminution photosynthetic process (Salvucci and Crafts‐Brandner 2004 ), and also considerably affect the reproductive operations (Farooq et al. 2011 ).

The destructive impacts of CC induced weather extremes to deteriorate the integrity of crops (Chaudhary et al. 2011 ), e.g., Spartan cold and extreme fog cause falling and discoloration of betel leaves (Rosenzweig et al. 2001 ), giving them a somehow reddish appearance, squeezing of lemon leaves (Pautasso et al. 2012 ), as well as root rot of pineapple, have reported (Vedwan and Rhoades 2001 ). Henceforth, in tackling the disruptive effects of CC, several short-term and long-term management approaches are the crucial need of time (Fig.  4 ). Moreover, various studies (Chaudhary et al. 2011 ; Patz et al. 2005 ; Pautasso et al. 2012 ) have demonstrated adapting trends such as ameliorating crop diversity can yield better adaptability towards CC.

Schematic description of potential impacts of climate change on the agriculture sector and the appropriate mitigation and adaptation measures to overcome its impact.

Climate change impacts on biodiversity

Global biodiversity is among the severe victims of CC because it is the fastest emerging cause of species loss. Studies demonstrated that the massive scale species dynamics are considerably associated with diverse climatic events (Abraham and Chain 1988 ; Manes et al. 2021 ; A. M. D. Ortiz et al. 2021 ). Both the pace and magnitude of CC are altering the compatible habitat ranges for living entities of marine, freshwater, and terrestrial regions. Alterations in general climate regimes influence the integrity of ecosystems in numerous ways, such as variation in the relative abundance of species, range shifts, changes in activity timing, and microhabitat use (Bates et al. 2014 ). The geographic distribution of any species often depends upon its ability to tolerate environmental stresses, biological interactions, and dispersal constraints. Hence, instead of the CC, the local species must only accept, adapt, move, or face extinction (Berg et al. 2010 ). So, the best performer species have a better survival capacity for adjusting to new ecosystems or a decreased perseverance to survive where they are already situated (Bates et al. 2014 ). An important aspect here is the inadequate habitat connectivity and access to microclimates, also crucial in raising the exposure to climate warming and extreme heatwave episodes. For example, the carbon sequestration rates are undergoing fluctuations due to climate-driven expansion in the range of global mangroves (Cavanaugh et al. 2014 ).

Similarly, the loss of kelp-forest ecosystems in various regions and its occupancy by the seaweed turfs has set the track for elevated herbivory by the high influx of tropical fish populations. Not only this, the increased water temperatures have exacerbated the conditions far away from the physiological tolerance level of the kelp communities (Vergés et al. 2016 ; Wernberg et al. 2016 ). Another pertinent danger is the devastation of keystone species, which even has more pervasive effects on the entire communities in that habitat (Zarnetske et al. 2012 ). It is particularly important as CC does not specify specific populations or communities. Eventually, this CC-induced redistribution of species may deteriorate carbon storage and the net ecosystem productivity (Weed et al. 2013 ). Among the typical disruptions, the prominent ones include impacts on marine and terrestrial productivity, marine community assembly, and the extended invasion of toxic cyanobacteria bloom (Fossheim et al. 2015 ).

The CC-impacted species extinction is widely reported in the literature (Beesley et al. 2019 ; Urban 2015 ), and the predictions of demise until the twenty-first century are dreadful (Abbass et al. 2019 ; Pereira et al. 2013 ). In a few cases, northward shifting of species may not be formidable as it allows mountain-dwelling species to find optimum climates. However, the migrant species may be trapped in isolated and incompatible habitats due to losing topography and range (Dullinger et al. 2012 ). For example, a study indicated that the American pika has been extirpated or intensely diminished in some regions, primarily attributed to the CC-impacted extinction or at least local extirpation (Stewart et al. 2015 ). Besides, the anticipation of persistent responses to the impacts of CC often requires data records of several decades to rigorously analyze the critical pre and post CC patterns at species and ecosystem levels (Manes et al. 2021 ; Testa et al. 2018 ).

Nonetheless, the availability of such long-term data records is rare; hence, attempts are needed to focus on these profound aspects. Biodiversity is also vulnerable to the other associated impacts of CC, such as rising temperatures, droughts, and certain invasive pest species. For instance, a study revealed the changes in the composition of plankton communities attributed to rising temperatures. Henceforth, alterations in such aquatic producer communities, i.e., diatoms and calcareous plants, can ultimately lead to variation in the recycling of biological carbon. Moreover, such changes are characterized as a potential contributor to CO 2 differences between the Pleistocene glacial and interglacial periods (Kohfeld et al. 2005 ).

Climate change implications on human health

It is an understood corporality that human health is a significant victim of CC (Costello et al. 2009 ). According to the WHO, CC might be responsible for 250,000 additional deaths per year during 2030–2050 (Watts et al. 2015 ). These deaths are attributed to extreme weather-induced mortality and morbidity and the global expansion of vector-borne diseases (Lemery et al. 2021; Yang and Usman 2021 ; Meierrieks 2021 ; UNEP 2017 ). Here, some of the emerging health issues pertinent to this global problem are briefly described.

Climate change and antimicrobial resistance with corresponding economic costs

Antimicrobial resistance (AMR) is an up-surging complex global health challenge (Garner et al. 2019 ; Lemery et al. 2021 ). Health professionals across the globe are extremely worried due to this phenomenon that has critical potential to reverse almost all the progress that has been achieved so far in the health discipline (Gosling and Arnell 2016 ). A massive amount of antibiotics is produced by many pharmaceutical industries worldwide, and the pathogenic microorganisms are gradually developing resistance to them, which can be comprehended how strongly this aspect can shake the foundations of national and global economies (UNEP 2017 ). This statement is supported by the fact that AMR is not developing in a particular region or country. Instead, it is flourishing in every continent of the world (WHO 2018 ). This plague is heavily pushing humanity to the post-antibiotic era, in which currently antibiotic-susceptible pathogens will once again lead to certain endemics and pandemics after being resistant(WHO 2018 ). Undesirably, if this statement would become a factuality, there might emerge certain risks in undertaking sophisticated interventions such as chemotherapy, joint replacement cases, and organ transplantation (Su et al. 2018 ). Presently, the amplification of drug resistance cases has made common illnesses like pneumonia, post-surgical infections, HIV/AIDS, tuberculosis, malaria, etc., too difficult and costly to be treated or cure well (WHO 2018 ). From a simple example, it can be assumed how easily antibiotic-resistant strains can be transmitted from one person to another and ultimately travel across the boundaries (Berendonk et al. 2015 ). Talking about the second- and third-generation classes of antibiotics, e.g., most renowned generations of cephalosporin antibiotics that are more expensive, broad-spectrum, more toxic, and usually require more extended periods whenever prescribed to patients (Lemery et al. 2021 ; Pärnänen et al. 2019 ). This scenario has also revealed that the abundance of resistant strains of pathogens was also higher in the Southern part (WHO 2018 ). As southern parts are generally warmer than their counterparts, it is evident from this example how CC-induced global warming can augment the spread of antibiotic-resistant strains within the biosphere, eventually putting additional economic burden in the face of developing new and costlier antibiotics. The ARG exchange to susceptible bacteria through one of the potential mechanisms, transformation, transduction, and conjugation; Selection pressure can be caused by certain antibiotics, metals or pesticides, etc., as shown in Fig.  5 .

A typical interaction between the susceptible and resistant strains.

Source: Elsayed et al. ( 2021 ); Karkman et al. ( 2018 )

Certain studies highlighted that conventional urban wastewater treatment plants are typical hotspots where most bacterial strains exchange genetic material through horizontal gene transfer (Fig.  5 ). Although at present, the extent of risks associated with the antibiotic resistance found in wastewater is complicated; environmental scientists and engineers have particular concerns about the potential impacts of these antibiotic resistance genes on human health (Ashbolt 2015 ). At most undesirable and worst case, these antibiotic-resistant genes containing bacteria can make their way to enter into the environment (Pruden et al. 2013 ), irrigation water used for crops and public water supplies and ultimately become a part of food chains and food webs (Ma et al. 2019 ; D. Wu et al. 2019 ). This problem has been reported manifold in several countries (Hendriksen et al. 2019 ), where wastewater as a means of irrigated water is quite common.

Climate change and vector borne-diseases

Temperature is a fundamental factor for the sustenance of living entities regardless of an ecosystem. So, a specific living being, especially a pathogen, requires a sophisticated temperature range to exist on earth. The second essential component of CC is precipitation, which also impacts numerous infectious agents’ transport and dissemination patterns. Global rising temperature is a significant cause of many species extinction. On the one hand, this changing environmental temperature may be causing species extinction, and on the other, this warming temperature might favor the thriving of some new organisms. Here, it was evident that some pathogens may also upraise once non-evident or reported (Patz et al. 2000 ). This concept can be exemplified through certain pathogenic strains of microorganisms that how the likelihood of various diseases increases in response to climate warming-induced environmental changes (Table ​ (Table2 2 ).

Examples of how various environmental changes affect various infectious diseases in humans

Source: Aron and Patz ( 2001 )

A recent example is an outburst of coronavirus (COVID-19) in the Republic of China, causing pneumonia and severe acute respiratory complications (Cui et al. 2021 ; Song et al. 2021 ). The large family of viruses is harbored in numerous animals, bats, and snakes in particular (livescience.com) with the subsequent transfer into human beings. Hence, it is worth noting that the thriving of numerous vectors involved in spreading various diseases is influenced by Climate change (Ogden 2018 ; Santos et al. 2021 ).

Psychological impacts of climate change

Climate change (CC) is responsible for the rapid dissemination and exaggeration of certain epidemics and pandemics. In addition to the vast apparent impacts of climate change on health, forestry, agriculture, etc., it may also have psychological implications on vulnerable societies. It can be exemplified through the recent outburst of (COVID-19) in various countries around the world (Pal 2021 ). Besides, the victims of this viral infection have made healthy beings scarier and terrified. In the wake of such epidemics, people with common colds or fever are also frightened and must pass specific regulatory protocols. Living in such situations continuously terrifies the public and makes the stress familiar, which eventually makes them psychologically weak (npr.org).

CC boosts the extent of anxiety, distress, and other issues in public, pushing them to develop various mental-related problems. Besides, frequent exposure to extreme climatic catastrophes such as geological disasters also imprints post-traumatic disorder, and their ubiquitous occurrence paves the way to developing chronic psychological dysfunction. Moreover, repetitive listening from media also causes an increase in the person’s stress level (Association 2020 ). Similarly, communities living in flood-prone areas constantly live in extreme fear of drowning and die by floods. In addition to human lives, the flood-induced destruction of physical infrastructure is a specific reason for putting pressure on these communities (Ogden 2018 ). For instance, Ogden ( 2018 ) comprehensively denoted that Katrina’s Hurricane augmented the mental health issues in the victim communities.

Climate change impacts on the forestry sector

Forests are the global regulators of the world’s climate (FAO 2018 ) and have an indispensable role in regulating global carbon and nitrogen cycles (Rehman et al. 2021 ; Reichstein and Carvalhais 2019 ). Hence, disturbances in forest ecology affect the micro and macro-climates (Ellison et al. 2017 ). Climate warming, in return, has profound impacts on the growth and productivity of transboundary forests by influencing the temperature and precipitation patterns, etc. As CC induces specific changes in the typical structure and functions of ecosystems (Zhang et al. 2017 ) as well impacts forest health, climate change also has several devastating consequences such as forest fires, droughts, pest outbreaks (EPA 2018 ), and last but not the least is the livelihoods of forest-dependent communities. The rising frequency and intensity of another CC product, i.e., droughts, pose plenty of challenges to the well-being of global forests (Diffenbaugh et al. 2017 ), which is further projected to increase soon (Hartmann et al. 2018 ; Lehner et al. 2017 ; Rehman et al. 2021 ). Hence, CC induces storms, with more significant impacts also put extra pressure on the survival of the global forests (Martínez-Alvarado et al. 2018 ), significantly since their influences are augmented during higher winter precipitations with corresponding wetter soils causing weak root anchorage of trees (Brázdil et al. 2018 ). Surging temperature regimes causes alterations in usual precipitation patterns, which is a significant hurdle for the survival of temperate forests (Allen et al. 2010 ; Flannigan et al. 2013 ), letting them encounter severe stress and disturbances which adversely affects the local tree species (Hubbart et al. 2016 ; Millar and Stephenson 2015 ; Rehman et al. 2021 ).

Climate change impacts on forest-dependent communities

Forests are the fundamental livelihood resource for about 1.6 billion people worldwide; out of them, 350 million are distinguished with relatively higher reliance (Bank 2008 ). Agro-forestry-dependent communities comprise 1.2 billion, and 60 million indigenous people solely rely on forests and their products to sustain their lives (Sunderlin et al. 2005 ). For example, in the entire African continent, more than 2/3rd of inhabitants depend on forest resources and woodlands for their alimonies, e.g., food, fuelwood and grazing (Wasiq and Ahmad 2004 ). The livings of these people are more intensely affected by the climatic disruptions making their lives harder (Brown et al. 2014 ). On the one hand, forest communities are incredibly vulnerable to CC due to their livelihoods, cultural and spiritual ties as well as socio-ecological connections, and on the other, they are not familiar with the term “climate change.” (Rahman and Alam 2016 ). Among the destructive impacts of temperature and rainfall, disruption of the agroforestry crops with resultant downscale growth and yield (Macchi et al. 2008 ). Cruz ( 2015 ) ascribed that forest-dependent smallholder farmers in the Philippines face the enigma of delayed fruiting, more severe damages by insect and pest incidences due to unfavorable temperature regimes, and changed rainfall patterns.

Among these series of challenges to forest communities, their well-being is also distinctly vulnerable to CC. Though the detailed climate change impacts on human health have been comprehensively mentioned in the previous section, some studies have listed a few more devastating effects on the prosperity of forest-dependent communities. For instance, the Himalayan people have been experiencing frequent skin-borne diseases such as malaria and other skin diseases due to increasing mosquitoes, wild boar as well, and new wasps species, particularly in higher altitudes that were almost non-existent before last 5–10 years (Xu et al. 2008 ). Similarly, people living at high altitudes in Bangladesh have experienced frequent mosquito-borne calamities (Fardous; Sharma 2012 ). In addition, the pace of other waterborne diseases such as infectious diarrhea, cholera, pathogenic induced abdominal complications and dengue has also been boosted in other distinguished regions of Bangladesh (Cell 2009 ; Gunter et al. 2008 ).

Pest outbreak

Upscaling hotter climate may positively affect the mobile organisms with shorter generation times because they can scurry from harsh conditions than the immobile species (Fettig et al. 2013 ; Schoene and Bernier 2012 ) and are also relatively more capable of adapting to new environments (Jactel et al. 2019 ). It reveals that insects adapt quickly to global warming due to their mobility advantages. Due to past outbreaks, the trees (forests) are relatively more susceptible victims (Kurz et al. 2008 ). Before CC, the influence of factors mentioned earlier, i.e., droughts and storms, was existent and made the forests susceptible to insect pest interventions; however, the global forests remain steadfast, assiduous, and green (Jactel et al. 2019 ). The typical reasons could be the insect herbivores were regulated by several tree defenses and pressures of predation (Wilkinson and Sherratt 2016 ). As climate greatly influences these phenomena, the global forests cannot be so sedulous against such challenges (Jactel et al. 2019 ). Table ​ Table3 3 demonstrates some of the particular considerations with practical examples that are essential while mitigating the impacts of CC in the forestry sector.

Essential considerations while mitigating the climate change impacts on the forestry sector

Source : Fischer ( 2019 )

Climate change impacts on tourism

Tourism is a commercial activity that has roots in multi-dimensions and an efficient tool with adequate job generation potential, revenue creation, earning of spectacular foreign exchange, enhancement in cross-cultural promulgation and cooperation, a business tool for entrepreneurs and eventually for the country’s national development (Arshad et al. 2018 ; Scott 2021 ). Among a plethora of other disciplines, the tourism industry is also a distinct victim of climate warming (Gössling et al. 2012 ; Hall et al. 2015 ) as the climate is among the essential resources that enable tourism in particular regions as most preferred locations. Different places at different times of the year attract tourists both within and across the countries depending upon the feasibility and compatibility of particular weather patterns. Hence, the massive variations in these weather patterns resulting from CC will eventually lead to monumental challenges to the local economy in that specific area’s particular and national economy (Bujosa et al. 2015 ). For instance, the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) report demonstrated that the global tourism industry had faced a considerable decline in the duration of ski season, including the loss of some ski areas and the dramatic shifts in tourist destinations’ climate warming.

Furthermore, different studies (Neuvonen et al. 2015 ; Scott et al. 2004 ) indicated that various currently perfect tourist spots, e.g., coastal areas, splendid islands, and ski resorts, will suffer consequences of CC. It is also worth noting that the quality and potential of administrative management potential to cope with the influence of CC on the tourism industry is of crucial significance, which renders specific strengths of resiliency to numerous destinations to withstand against it (Füssel and Hildén 2014 ). Similarly, in the partial or complete absence of adequate socio-economic and socio-political capital, the high-demanding tourist sites scurry towards the verge of vulnerability. The susceptibility of tourism is based on different components such as the extent of exposure, sensitivity, life-supporting sectors, and capacity assessment factors (Füssel and Hildén 2014 ). It is obvious corporality that sectors such as health, food, ecosystems, human habitat, infrastructure, water availability, and the accessibility of a particular region are prone to CC. Henceforth, the sensitivity of these critical sectors to CC and, in return, the adaptive measures are a hallmark in determining the composite vulnerability of climate warming (Ionescu et al. 2009 ).

Moreover, the dependence on imported food items, poor hygienic conditions, and inadequate health professionals are dominant aspects affecting the local terrestrial and aquatic biodiversity. Meanwhile, the greater dependency on ecosystem services and its products also makes a destination more fragile to become a prey of CC (Rizvi et al. 2015 ). Some significant non-climatic factors are important indicators of a particular ecosystem’s typical health and functioning, e.g., resource richness and abundance portray the picture of ecosystem stability. Similarly, the species abundance is also a productive tool that ensures that the ecosystem has a higher buffering capacity, which is terrific in terms of resiliency (Roscher et al. 2013 ).

Climate change impacts on the economic sector

Climate plays a significant role in overall productivity and economic growth. Due to its increasingly global existence and its effect on economic growth, CC has become one of the major concerns of both local and international environmental policymakers (Ferreira et al. 2020 ; Gleditsch 2021 ; Abbass et al. 2021b ; Lamperti et al. 2021 ). The adverse effects of CC on the overall productivity factor of the agricultural sector are therefore significant for understanding the creation of local adaptation policies and the composition of productive climate policy contracts. Previous studies on CC in the world have already forecasted its effects on the agricultural sector. Researchers have found that global CC will impact the agricultural sector in different world regions. The study of the impacts of CC on various agrarian activities in other demographic areas and the development of relative strategies to respond to effects has become a focal point for researchers (Chandioet al. 2020 ; Gleditsch 2021 ; Mosavi et al. 2020 ).

With the rapid growth of global warming since the 1980s, the temperature has started increasing globally, which resulted in the incredible transformation of rain and evaporation in the countries. The agricultural development of many countries has been reliant, delicate, and susceptible to CC for a long time, and it is on the development of agriculture total factor productivity (ATFP) influence different crops and yields of farmers (Alhassan 2021 ; Wu  2020 ).

Food security and natural disasters are increasing rapidly in the world. Several major climatic/natural disasters have impacted local crop production in the countries concerned. The effects of these natural disasters have been poorly controlled by the development of the economies and populations and may affect human life as well. One example is China, which is among the world’s most affected countries, vulnerable to natural disasters due to its large population, harsh environmental conditions, rapid CC, low environmental stability, and disaster power. According to the January 2016 statistical survey, China experienced an economic loss of 298.3 billion Yuan, and about 137 million Chinese people were severely affected by various natural disasters (Xie et al. 2018 ).

Mitigation and adaptation strategies of climate changes

Adaptation and mitigation are the crucial factors to address the response to CC (Jahanzad et al. 2020 ). Researchers define mitigation on climate changes, and on the other hand, adaptation directly impacts climate changes like floods. To some extent, mitigation reduces or moderates greenhouse gas emission, and it becomes a critical issue both economically and environmentally (Botzen et al. 2021 ; Jahanzad et al. 2020 ; Kongsager 2018 ; Smit et al. 2000 ; Vale et al. 2021 ; Usman et al. 2021 ; Verheyen 2005 ).

Researchers have deep concern about the adaptation and mitigation methodologies in sectoral and geographical contexts. Agriculture, industry, forestry, transport, and land use are the main sectors to adapt and mitigate policies(Kärkkäinen et al. 2020 ; Waheed et al. 2021 ). Adaptation and mitigation require particular concern both at the national and international levels. The world has faced a significant problem of climate change in the last decades, and adaptation to these effects is compulsory for economic and social development. To adapt and mitigate against CC, one should develop policies and strategies at the international level (Hussain et al. 2020 ). Figure  6 depicts the list of current studies on sectoral impacts of CC with adaptation and mitigation measures globally.

Sectoral impacts of climate change with adaptation and mitigation measures.

Conclusion and future perspectives

Specific socio-agricultural, socio-economic, and physical systems are the cornerstone of psychological well-being, and the alteration in these systems by CC will have disastrous impacts. Climate variability, alongside other anthropogenic and natural stressors, influences human and environmental health sustainability. Food security is another concerning scenario that may lead to compromised food quality, higher food prices, and inadequate food distribution systems. Global forests are challenged by different climatic factors such as storms, droughts, flash floods, and intense precipitation. On the other hand, their anthropogenic wiping is aggrandizing their existence. Undoubtedly, the vulnerability scale of the world’s regions differs; however, appropriate mitigation and adaptation measures can aid the decision-making bodies in developing effective policies to tackle its impacts. Presently, modern life on earth has tailored to consistent climatic patterns, and accordingly, adapting to such considerable variations is of paramount importance. Because the faster changes in climate will make it harder to survive and adjust, this globally-raising enigma calls for immediate attention at every scale ranging from elementary community level to international level. Still, much effort, research, and dedication are required, which is the most critical time. Some policy implications can help us to mitigate the consequences of climate change, especially the most affected sectors like the agriculture sector;

Warming might lengthen the season in frost-prone growing regions (temperate and arctic zones), allowing for longer-maturing seasonal cultivars with better yields (Pfadenhauer 2020 ; Bonacci 2019 ). Extending the planting season may allow additional crops each year; when warming leads to frequent warmer months highs over critical thresholds, a split season with a brief summer fallow may be conceivable for short-period crops such as wheat barley, cereals, and many other vegetable crops. The capacity to prolong the planting season in tropical and subtropical places where the harvest season is constrained by precipitation or agriculture farming occurs after the year may be more limited and dependent on how precipitation patterns vary (Wu et al. 2017 ).

The genetic component is comprehensive for many yields, but it is restricted like kiwi fruit for a few. Ali et al. ( 2017 ) investigated how new crops will react to climatic changes (also stated in Mall et al. 2017 ). Hot temperature, drought, insect resistance; salt tolerance; and overall crop production and product quality increases would all be advantageous (Akkari 2016 ). Genetic mapping and engineering can introduce a greater spectrum of features. The adoption of genetically altered cultivars has been slowed, particularly in the early forecasts owing to the complexity in ensuring features are expediently expressed throughout the entire plant, customer concerns, economic profitability, and regulatory impediments (Wirehn 2018 ; Davidson et al. 2016 ).

To get the full benefit of the CO 2 would certainly require additional nitrogen and other fertilizers. Nitrogen not consumed by the plants may be excreted into groundwater, discharged into water surface, or emitted from the land, soil nitrous oxide when large doses of fertilizer are sprayed. Increased nitrogen levels in groundwater sources have been related to human chronic illnesses and impact marine ecosystems. Cultivation, grain drying, and other field activities have all been examined in depth in the studies (Barua et al. 2018 ).

• The technological and socio-economic adaptation

The policy consequence of the causative conclusion is that as a source of alternative energy, biofuel production is one of the routes that explain oil price volatility separate from international macroeconomic factors. Even though biofuel production has just begun in a few sample nations, there is still a tremendous worldwide need for feedstock to satisfy industrial expansion in China and the USA, which explains the food price relationship to the global oil price. Essentially, oil-exporting countries may create incentives in their economies to increase food production. It may accomplish by giving farmers financing, seedlings, fertilizers, and farming equipment. Because of the declining global oil price and, as a result, their earnings from oil export, oil-producing nations may be unable to subsidize food imports even in the near term. As a result, these countries can boost the agricultural value chain for export. It may be accomplished through R&D and adding value to their food products to increase income by correcting exchange rate misalignment and adverse trade terms. These nations may also diversify their economies away from oil, as dependence on oil exports alone is no longer economically viable given the extreme volatility of global oil prices. Finally, resource-rich and oil-exporting countries can convert to non-food renewable energy sources such as solar, hydro, coal, wind, wave, and tidal energy. By doing so, both world food and oil supplies would be maintained rather than harmed.

IRENA’s modeling work shows that, if a comprehensive policy framework is in place, efforts toward decarbonizing the energy future will benefit economic activity, jobs (outweighing losses in the fossil fuel industry), and welfare. Countries with weak domestic supply chains and a large reliance on fossil fuel income, in particular, must undertake structural reforms to capitalize on the opportunities inherent in the energy transition. Governments continue to give major policy assistance to extract fossil fuels, including tax incentives, financing, direct infrastructure expenditures, exemptions from environmental regulations, and other measures. The majority of major oil and gas producing countries intend to increase output. Some countries intend to cut coal output, while others plan to maintain or expand it. While some nations are beginning to explore and execute policies aimed at a just and equitable transition away from fossil fuel production, these efforts have yet to impact major producing countries’ plans and goals. Verifiable and comparable data on fossil fuel output and assistance from governments and industries are critical to closing the production gap. Governments could increase openness by declaring their production intentions in their climate obligations under the Paris Agreement.

It is firmly believed that achieving the Paris Agreement commitments is doubtlful without undergoing renewable energy transition across the globe (Murshed 2020 ; Zhao et al. 2022 ). Policy instruments play the most important role in determining the degree of investment in renewable energy technology. This study examines the efficacy of various policy strategies in the renewable energy industry of multiple nations. Although its impact is more visible in established renewable energy markets, a renewable portfolio standard is also a useful policy instrument. The cost of producing renewable energy is still greater than other traditional energy sources. Furthermore, government incentives in the R&D sector can foster innovation in this field, resulting in cost reductions in the renewable energy industry. These nations may export their technologies and share their policy experiences by forming networks among their renewable energy-focused organizations. All policy measures aim to reduce production costs while increasing the proportion of renewables to a country’s energy system. Meanwhile, long-term contracts with renewable energy providers, government commitment and control, and the establishment of long-term goals can assist developing nations in deploying renewable energy technology in their energy sector.

Author contribution

KA: Writing the original manuscript, data collection, data analysis, Study design, Formal analysis, Visualization, Revised draft, Writing-review, and editing. MZQ: Writing the original manuscript, data collection, data analysis, Writing-review, and editing. HS: Contribution to the contextualization of the theme, Conceptualization, Validation, Supervision, literature review, Revised drapt, and writing review and editing. MM: Writing review and editing, compiling the literature review, language editing. HM: Writing review and editing, compiling the literature review, language editing. IY: Contribution to the contextualization of the theme, literature review, and writing review and editing.

Availability of data and material

Declarations.

Not applicable.

The authors declare no competing interests.

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Contributor Information

Kashif Abbass, Email: nc.ude.tsujn@ssabbafihsak .

Muhammad Zeeshan Qasim, Email: moc.kooltuo@888misaqnahseez .

Huaming Song, Email: nc.ude.tsujn@gnimauh .

Muntasir Murshed, Email: [email protected] .

Haider Mahmood, Email: moc.liamtoh@doomhamrediah .

Ijaz Younis, Email: nc.ude.tsujn@sinuoyzaji .

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American Understanding of Climate Change

July 15, 2024

Bo MacInnis and Jon A. Krosnick

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Introduction

For over two decades, the Political Psychology Research Group at Stanford University and Resources for the Future (RFF) have been tracking American public opinion on climate change using high-quality scientific surveys. The most striking result of this continued polling has been the overall consistency of the results.

Many observers thought that Hurricane Katrina, Hurricane Sandy, west-coast wildfires, the unusually cold winter of 2018–2019, as well as numerous other extreme weather events might have convinced people to embrace the existence and threat of climate change (Bergquist et al. 2019; Hornsey et al. 2016; Howe 2021; Konisky et al. 2015; Sisco 2021; van der Linden 2015; Visconti and Young 2024). Likewise, tutorials such as the reports by the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change; Al Gore’s movie, An Inconvenient Truth; and relentless news media coverage of natural science research findings seemed likely to have done the same.

On the flip side, some observers thought that the so-called “pause” between 2005 and 2010 in the increase of world temperatures might have caused a decline in public acknowledgement of warming (Lewandowsky et al. 2016). Some scholars cited Maslow’s (1943, 1954) “hierarchy of needs” and the “finite pool of worry” theory (Weber 2006, 2015) to suggest that the September 11, 2001, attacks; COVID-19 pandemic; and other major events might have pulled public attention away from climate change and in other directions, perhaps reducing concern about that issue and even leading to more denial of its existence and threat (Evensen et al. 2021; Gregersen, et al. 2022; Marasco et al. 2023; Sisco et al. 2023; Smirnov and Hsieh, 2022; Stefkovics and Hortay, 2022). Yet surveys by the Political Psychology Research Group and RFF documented no short-term or long-term effects of such “shocks” (Krosnick and MacInnis 2020).

Our newest survey allows another test of the notion that shocks might alter public opinion on this issue. In this report, we not only describe the results of the 2024 survey but also compare its findings to those of prior surveys.

Although most questions asked in the new survey manifest no notable changes from 2020, a small handful of questions manifested statistically significant change from 2020 to 2024, in the direction of less endorsement of climate change’s existence and less trust in scientists who study the environment. And as compared to 2020, more Americans believe that the federal government is now taking substantial action to address climate change.

Explore the Data

Click here to explore the report's findings using our interactive data tool.

Fundamentals

In 2024, the proportion of Americans who said that the earth has probably been warming over the past 100 years is 75 percent (Figure 1). This is a statistically significant decline from 83 percent in 2020, an 8 percentage point difference. This proportion has risen and fallen over the years since our first survey in 1997, and the 2024 result is within the range of values observed in prior surveys. Thus, it would be inappropriate to say that the current figure is “unusually low.” Furthermore, the general conclusion that at least three of every four Americans acknowledge warming remains valid.

The proportion of people who are highly certain of their beliefs about global warming’s existence has increased over the past 27 years. Among people who believed that global warming has been occurring, the proportion of highly certain (extremely or very sure) individuals was 45 percent in 1997 and has reached an all-time high of 66 percent in 2024 (Figure 2).

Among people who believe that global warming has not been happening over the past 100 years, the proportion who are highly certain declined from 43 percent in 2020 to 37 percent in 2024 (Figure 2). Thus, Americans who believe global warming exists are more confident than four years ago, while people who are skeptical are less confident.

“Americans who believe global warming exists are more confident than four years ago, while people who are skeptical are less confident.”

The proportion of Americans who believe that warming will occur in the future if nothing is done to address it remains about the same as it was in 2020. In 2024, 75 percent of Americans believe that the earth’s temperature will probably go up in the next 100 years—similar to the percentages observed in 2020 (76 percent) and in 1997 (74 percent) (Figure 3).

Among Americans who believe that global temperatures will probably increase over the next 100 years if nothing is done to address it, 68 percent are extremely sure or very sure (Figure 4). This percentage was 66 percent in 2020.

Skepticism regarding future warming is held with slightly less conviction in 2024 than it was four years ago. Among people who believe that warming will not occur over the next 100 years, 33 percent are highly certain now, compared to 41 percent in 2020 (Figure 4). This difference is not statistically significant.

75% of respondents believe that the earth has been warming over the last 100 years, a decrease from 2020.

Causes and Threat

The percentage of Americans who believe humans have caused global warming has not changed notably during the twenty-first century. When asked whether global warming has been caused primarily by human activity, primarily by natural processes, or by both about equally, 83 percent of respondents pointed to human activity in 2024—nearly the same as the 81 percent observed in 1997 and the 82 percent observed in 2020 (Figure 5).

Perceived threat of warming was measured in multiple ways, one of which involved asking respondents whether an increase in global temperatures over the past 100 years has been good, bad, or neither good nor bad. 60 percent of respondents said “bad” in 2024, identical to 60 percent in 2020 (Figure 6).

When asked a similar question about future warming of 5°F 75 years from now, 64 percent of respondents said that would be “bad,” slightly up from 61 percent in 1997 but down from 70 percent in 2020 (Figure 7).

76 percent of Americans believe that global warming will be a very or somewhat serious problem for the United States if nothing is done.

In 2024, 76 percent of Americans believe that global warming will be a very or somewhat serious problem for the United States in the future if nothing is done to reduce it, slightly down from the all-time high of 83 percent in 2006 (Figure 8). More Americans believe that global warming will be a very or somewhat serious problem for the world if nothing is done to stop it: 81 percent in 2024, also down slightly from the all-time high of 85 percent in 2006 (Figure 8).

In 2024, only 55 percent of Americans believe that global warming will hurt them at least a moderate amount, down from the all-time high of 63 percent observed in 2010 (Figure 9).

Consistent with the notion that people expect the effects of warming to appear gradually over coming decades, a greater proportion of people believe that warming will affect future generations more than it will affect them personally. In 2024, 77 percent of respondents expect warming to hurt future generations at least a moderate amount, slightly down from the observed highs of 80 percent in 2010 and 2013 (Figure 9).

More people believe that warming will affect future generations more than it will affect them personally.

Issue Engagement

From 1997 to 2024, Americans believe they have become more and more knowledgeable about global warming. In 1997, 42 percent of respondents said they knew at least a moderate amount about the issue; that figure rose to 73 percent in 2024 (Figure 10).

One indicator of the crystallization and, consequently, the impact of people’s opinions on an issue, is the strength with which people say they hold those opinions. The proportion of people who said their opinions on global warming were extremely or very strong is 48 percent in 2024, up from 41 percent in 2010, but down slightly (though not statistically significantly) from 51 percent in 2020 (Figure 11).

73% of Americans say they know at least a moderate amount about climate change.

For most policy issues, there is a small group of people known as the “issue public” who consider the matter to be of great personal importance (Krosnick 1990). These are the people who pay careful attention to news on the subject, think and talk a lot about it, and give money to lobbying groups to influence policy. In 2024, the global warming issue public makes up a near all-time high of 21 percent of Americans, up from 9 percent in 1997 and down a bit (though not statistically significantly) from 26 percent in 2020 (Figure 12), showing that a growing body of people care deeply about climate change and may be likely to cast their votes based on candidates’ climate policy platforms.

“...a growing body of people care deeply about climate change and may be likely to cast their votes based on candidates’ climate policy platforms.”

Desired Effort to Deal with Global Warming

In 2024, 78 percent of respondents want the US government to do at least a moderate amount about global warming (Figure 13).

The proportions of respondents who want governments in other countries and US businesses to do at least a moderate amount to deal with climate change are similar (80 percent and 78 percent, respectively) (Figure 13).

The proportions of people who desire at least a moderate amount of effort from the federal government, foreign governments, and US businesses are slightly lower (though not statistically significantly) than they were in 2020: 82 percent, 84 percent, and 83 percent, respectively.

The proportion of Americans who want “average people” to do at least a moderate amount about global warming is 74 percent in 2024, a statistically significant decrease from 82 percent in 2020 (figure 13).

Whereas 74–80 percent of people want governments, businesses, and people to do at least a moderate amount to deal with climate change, fewer believe that these groups are actually doing that much—51 percent said so about the federal government, 41 percent said so about foreign governments, 42 percent said so about US businesses, and 37 percent said so about average people (Figure 14).

Between the Inflation Reduction Act, the CHIPS and Science Act, rejoining the Paris Agreement, federal regulations on power plant emissions, and other policy moves, the Biden administration has vocally placed climate change in a more central policy position than many if not all previous administrations. Americans seem to recognize this: in 2020, 44 percent of Americans said the federal government was doing at least a moderate amount on climate change, whereas 51 percent of Americans do now, a marginally statistically significant difference.

Most people want more action on climate change from each of the four groups mentioned. The proportions of people who want the US government, governments in other countries, and businesses to do more to deal with climate change are 67 percent, 70 percent, and 67 percent, respectively (Figure 15).

The desire for increased effort remains about what it was in 2020 (66 percent, 72 percent, and 68 percent, respectively). In 2024, 64 percent of respondents want average people to do more to deal with climate change, a statistically significant decline of 8 percentage points from 72 percent in 2020 (Figure 15).

Personal Observations of Recent Weather

73% of respondents say they have observed the effects of climate change.

When asked in 2024 whether they had observed any effects of global warming, 73 percent of respondents said they had—about the same as in 2020 (75 percent) (Figure 16).

Global weather patterns

In 2024, 66 percent of respondents believe that weather patterns around the world have been more unstable over the last three years than before that, down from the 70 percent observed in 2006 and up from 62 percent observed in 2020 (Figure 17).

Global temperatures

In 2024, 62 percent of respondents believe that world temperatures have been higher during the past three years than before— higher than the 56 percent observed in 1997 and down slightly from the 64 percent observed in 2020 (Figure 17).

Sources of Electricity

In 2024, we asked respondents to evaluate various ways to generate electricity. These questions were also asked in 2013.

Sources favored by majorities of Americans

• Sunlight: In 2024, an overwhelming majority of Americans, 83 percent, believe that it is a good idea to make electricity from sunlight. This is a statistically significant decrease of 8 percentage points from the 91 percent observed in 2013.
• Hydropower: In 2024, 80 percent of Americans believe that it is a good idea to make electricity from naturally flowing water, down slightly from the 83 percent observed in 2013 but not a statistically significant decrease.
• Wind: In 2024, 70 percent of Americans believe that it is a good idea to make electricity from wind. This is a statistically significant decline of 14 percentage points from 84 percent in 2013.

Sources favored by fewer than 50 percent of Americans

• Coal: In 2024, only 18 percent of Americans believe that it is a good idea to make electricity from coal, down slightly from 21 percent in 2013 but not a statistically significant decrease.
• Natural gas: Only 38 percent of Americans believe that making electricity from natural gas is a good idea. This is a statistically significant decrease of 10 percentage points from 48 percent in 2013.
• Nuclear power: 44 percent of Americans favor making electricity from nuclear power. This is a statistically significant increase of 11 percentage points from 33 percent in 2013.

Trust in and Agreement among Environmental Scientists

In 2024, 67 percent of respondents trust what scientists say about the environment at least a moderate amount—a statistically significant decrease from the 75 percent observed in 2020 (Figure 18).

Perceptions of agreement among climate scientists have been increasing steadily since 2010. In 2024, 68 percent of respondents said that more than half of climate scientists believe that the planet has been warming, similar to 69 percent in 2020 and up from 58 percent in 2010 (Figure 19).

Some scholars have proposed that perceptions of agreement among climate scientists is a “gateway belief,” meaning that convincing the public of near consensus among scientists will cause the public to adopt the conclusions reached by those scientists (van der Linden et al. 2019).

If this were the case, we would expect to have seen increases in the public’s endorsement of the existence and threat of climate change. But our results document no such notable increases over time, adding further disconfirmatory evidence to the literature on this matter (Kahan 2017).

The results from this survey demonstrate that, despite numerous efforts over the past 27 years to inform public opinion, Americans’ views on climate change have remained remarkably steady. This finding is consistent with the findings reported by Page and Shapiro in their landmark book, The Rational Public (1992). These researchers showed that, for numerous important issues in American politics, public opinion has changed extraordinarily slowly through the decades—if at all. As we see here, attitudes toward climate change have the same inertia.

As in 1997, the 2024 survey results show considerable and sometimes huge majorities expressing what might be called “green” views on climate change and related issues. This is the sort of public opinion that policymakers hope for, so that they can move forward with policymaking with the support of a large swath of their constituents. Not only does a majority of Americans believe that something should be done about climate change—by the federal government, world leaders, businesses, and individuals—but there is also widespread endorsement of some policy approaches to reducing future warming and coping with its likely effects, as we will outline in a subsequent report based on this survey.

Although the major theme of this new survey is consistency of public opinion over time, we did observe some small but statistically significant changes. Americans perceive the Biden administration to be doing more about climate change than they perceived the federal government to be doing at the end of the Trump administration. This seems likely to be in recognition of the climate change provisions including in legislation passed during the Biden administration, such as the Inflation Reduction Act, the Infrastructure Investment and Jobs Act, the American Rescue Plan, and the CHIPS and Science Act; as well as rejoining the Paris Agreement, and other climate-forward actions taken by the federal government.

Interestingly, the proportion of Americans who believe that the earth has been warming is slightly and statistically significantly lower now than it was four years ago (75 percent versus 83 percent). This might seem to be surprising, because 2023 was the warmest year on record (Lindsey and Dahlman 2024), and some evidence has suggested that people who do not trust climate scientists rely on average world temperature when deciding whether the earth has been warming (MacInnis and Krosnick 2016).

The proportion of Americans who want average people to do at least a moderate amount about the issue has declined significantly (82 percent versus 74 percent) but remains a large majority. We continue to see public engagement with the issue of climate change. Americans believe that they know more about this issue than they used to and are more certain of their opinions than in the past. And strikingly, the proportion of Americans who consider the issue to be extremely important to them personally remains relatively high compared to the sizes of passionate “issue publics” on other issues.

Furthermore, the results here refute the theory that perceptions of agreement among climate scientists about the existence of global warming are important determinants of public attitudes and beliefs. Despite public perceptions of scientific agreement having risen, no comparable increases were observed in people’s personal opinions on the issue.

Climate Insights 2024: American Understanding of Climate Change

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Climate Insights 2024: American Understanding of Climate Change: Methodology and Report Questions

Read the questions we asked survey respondents and learn more about the methodology

PDF — 632.1 KB

• Federal Climate Policy
• Comprehensive Climate Strategies
• Climate Insights

Bo MacInnis

Lecturer, Political Psychology Research, Stanford University

Jon A. Krosnick

University Fellow

Jon A. Krosnick is an RFF university fellow and Stanford University-based social psychologist who does research on attitude formation, change, and effects, on the psychology of political behavior, and on survey research methods.

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Urgent need to address mental health effects of climate change, says report

• Mental Health
• Applied Psychology
• Climate Change

Offers recommendations for building resilience and taking action by individuals, communities

WASHINGTON — With a large majority of Americans concerned about climate change and an increasing number expressing alarm and distress, it is past time to address this burgeoning public health crisis at the individual, community and societal levels, according to a report from the American Psychological Association and ecoAmerica.

“Our climate is changing at an unprecedented and alarming rate with profound impacts on human life,” said the report, entitled, “Mental Health and Our Changing Climate: Impacts, Inequities, and Responses” (PDF, 4.27MB) . “Climate change-fueled acute disaster events are causing deleterious impacts on human health. Longer term climate change leads to temperature-related illness and mortality, spread of vector-borne disease, respiratory issues and allergic response, compromised fetal and child development, and threats to water and food supply and safety—among other impacts.”

The effects of climate change on humans, however, go beyond physical health.

“Climate change is one of the most crucial issues facing our nation and the world today, and it is already taking a huge toll on the mental health of people around the globe,” said APA CEO Arthur C. Evans Jr, PhD. “Psychology, as the science of behavior, will be pivotal to making the wholesale changes that are imperative to slow—and, we hope, stop—its advance.”

The report, an update to a 2017 report (PDF, 3.37MB) also issued by APA and ecoAmerica, is intended to inform and empower health and medical professionals, community and elected leaders and the public to pursue solutions to climate change that will support mental health and well-being. This is particularly important as world leaders proceed with climate negotiations at COP26, the United Nations Climate Change Conference.

Over three-quarters of Americans report that they are concerned about climate change, and about 25% say they are “alarmed,” nearly double the percentage who reported feeling alarm in 2017, according to the latest report.

The most immediate effects on mental health can be seen in the aftermath of increasing disaster events fueled by climate change, such as hurricanes, wildfires and floods. These effects can include trauma and shock, post-traumatic stress disorder, feelings of abandonment, and anxiety and depression that can lead to suicidal ideation and risky behavior. At the community level, these disasters can strain social relationships, reduce social cohesion and increase interpersonal violence and child abuse.

In the long term, climate change has equally profound mental health impacts. Rising temperatures can fuel mood and anxiety disorders, schizophrenia and vascular dementia, and can increase emergency room usage and suicide rates, according to the report. Changes in the local environment can cause grief, disorientation and poor work performance, as well as harm to interpersonal relationships and self-esteem. People displaced by climate change events, such wildfires or droughts, can experience loss of personal identity, among other more severe impacts. Ultimately, mass migrations spurred by long-term climate change can lead to intergroup hostilities, political conflicts, terrorism and even war.

Concern about climate change coupled with worry about the future can lead to fear, anger, feelings of powerlessness, exhaustion, stress and sadness, often referred to as “eco-anxiety” or “climate anxiety.” Studies indicate this anxiety is more prevalent among young people; it has been linked to increases in substance use and suicidal ideation.

The destructive effects of climate change are likely to fall disproportionately on communities that are already disadvantaged by historic and current social, economic and political oppression. For example, discriminatory housing policies, such as redlining and racially restrictive covenants, mean that people of color are significantly more likely to live in areas prone to risk. Indigenous people, children, older adults, women, people with disabilities or existing mental health conditions, and outdoor workers are additional groups that may be more prone to mental health difficulties from a changing climate. These impacts can include PTSD, behavioral problems, cognitive deficits, reduced memory, poorer academic performance and lower IQ, higher exposure to violence and crime, and higher rates of incarceration.

“Like climate change itself, these mental health implications and the related inequities cannot be ignored,” said Meighen Speiser, executive director of ecoAmerica. “We need to surface and address them immediately, and we can. America and Americans have the will and wherewithal to protect our climate and our future.”

The report offers a series of constructive solutions that can be applied by individuals and whole communities to help mitigate the mental health impacts of climate change. Key among them is encouraging resilience, or the ability of a person or a community to function, survive and even thrive in the face of adversity. Strategies include fostering a sense of optimism, bolstering social connections, and incorporating personal items that can preserve or strengthen mental health into emergency preparedness plans (e.g., religious items, toys for small children, favorite foods), among many additional recommendations.

Communities should also involve mental health professionals in expanding or strengthening plans for mental health care and support in response to local and regional disasters, according to the report. Mental health professionals can help with plans to increase social cohesion in the community, such as social programs and infrastructure planning to increase communal parks and other green spaces. The report likewise recommends that members from the community, including from a diversity of backgrounds, cultures, and abilities, be included in resiliency planning to account for varying needs.

And while efforts to boost resilience are necessary to protect physical and mental health in the face of climate change, the report also emphasizes the need to address the root of the problem by enacting policies to mitigate climate change at all levels of governance. National and local policymakers, businesses and nonprofits, mental health and other professionals and individuals can all help to bring forth these policies while also advancing climate resilience and action. The report outlines these opportunities and provides related tools and resources.

The report was written by Susan Clayton, PhD, Whitmore-Williams professor of psychology, College of Wooster; Christie Manning, PhD, director of sustainability and assistant professor of environmental studies, Macalester College; Meighen Speiser, executive director, ecoAmerica; and Nicole Hill, ecoAmerica.

Jennifer Giordano for ecoAmerica

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Kim I. Mills

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The net-zero transition: What it would cost, what it could bring

In a new report, we look at the economic transformation that a transition to net-zero emissions would entail—a transformation that would affect all countries and all sectors of the economy, either directly or indirectly. We estimate the changes in demand, capital spending, costs, and jobs, to 2050, for sectors that produce about 85 percent of overall emissions and assess economic shifts for 69 countries.

Each of the six articles highlighted on this page provides a detailed look at aspects of the net-zero transition. The full report, The net-zero transition: What it would cost, what it could bring , as well as a PDF summary, can be downloaded for free here.

Six characteristics define the net-zero transition

The transformation of the global economy needed to achieve net-zero emissions by 2050 would be universal and significant, requiring $9.2 trillion in annual average spending on physical assets, $3.5 trillion more than today. To put it in comparable terms, that increase is equivalent to half of global corporate profits and one-quarter of total tax revenue in 2020. Accounting for expected increases in spending, as incomes and populations grow, as well as for currently legislated transition policies, the required increase in spending would be lower, but still about $1 trillion. Spending would be front-loaded—the next decade will be decisive—and the impact uneven across countries and sectors. The transition is also exposed to risks, including that of energy supply volatility. At the same time, it is rich in opportunity. The transition would prevent the buildup of physical climate risks and reduce the odds of initiating the most catastrophic impacts of climate change. It would also bring growth opportunities, as decarbonization creates efficiencies and opens markets for low-emissions products and services. Our research is not a projection or prediction and does not claim to be exhaustive. It is the simulation of one hypothetical and relatively orderly pathway toward 1.5°C using the Net Zero 2050 scenario from the Network for Greening the Financial System (NGFS).

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The net-zero challenge: accelerating decarbonization worldwide.

The seven energy and land-use systems that account for global emissions—power, industry, mobility, buildings, agriculture, forestry and other land use, and waste—will all need to be transformed to achieve net-zero emissions. Effective actions to accelerate decarbonization include shifting the energy mix away from fossil fuels and toward zero-emissions electricity and other low-emissions energy sources such as hydrogen; adapting industrial and agricultural processes; increasing energy efficiency and managing demand for energy; utilizing the circular economy ; consuming fewer emissions-intensive goods; deploying carbon capture, utilization, and storage technology; and enhancing sinks of both long-lived and short-lived greenhouse gases.

The economic transformation: What would change in the net-zero transition

On the basis of this scenario, we estimate that global spending on physical assets in the transition would amount to about $275 trillion between 2021 and 2050, or about 7.5 percent of GDP annually on average. The biggest increase as a share of GDP would be between 2026 and 2030. Demand would be substantially affected. For example, manufacturing of internal combustion engine cars would eventually cease as sales of alternatives (for example, battery-electric and fuel cell-electric vehicles) increase from 5 percent of new-car sales in 2020 to virtually 100 percent by 2050. Power demand in 2050 would be more than double what it is today, while production of hydrogen and biofuels would increase more than tenfold. The transition could lead to a reallocation of labor, with about 200 million direct and indirect jobs gained and 185 million lost by 2050—shifts that are notable less for their size than for their concentrated, uneven, and re-allocative nature.

Sectors are unevenly exposed in the net-zero transition

All sectors of the economy are exposed to a net-zero transition, but some are more exposed than others. The sectors with the highest degree of exposure are those which directly emit significant quantities of greenhouse gases (for example, the coal and gas power sector) and those which sell products that emit greenhouse gases (such as the fossil fuel sector and the automotive sector). Approximately 20 percent of global GDP is in these sectors. A further 10 percent of GDP is in sectors with high-emissions supply chains, such as construction. Each of the most exposed parts of the economy will be differentially affected. The total cost of ownership of EVs could be lower than ICE cars by about 2025 in most regions, even as costs for steel and cement production could rise. Job gains would be largely associated with the transition to low-emissions forms of production, such as renewable power generation. Job losses would particularly affect workers in fossil fuel–intensive or otherwise emissions-intensive sectors.

How the net-zero transition would play out in countries and regions

To decarbonize, lower-income countries and fossil fuel resource producers would spend more on physical assets as a share of their GDP than other countries—in the case of sub-Saharan Africa, Latin America, India and other Asian nations, about 1.5 times or more as much as advanced economies to support economic development and build low-carbon infrastructure. Developing countries also have relatively greater shares of their jobs, GDP, and capital stock in sectors that would be most exposed; examples include India, Bangladesh, Kenya, and Nigeria. And countries like India would also face heightened physical risk from climate change. The effects within developed economies could be uneven, too; for instance, more than 10 percent of jobs in 44 US counties are in fossil fuel extraction and refining, fossil fuel–based power, and automotive manufacturing. At the same time, all countries will have growth prospects, from endowments of natural capital such as sunshine and forests, and through their technological and human resources.

Managing the net-zero transition: Actions for stakeholders

The findings of this research serve as a clear call for more thoughtful and decisive action, taken with the utmost urgency, to secure a more orderly transition to net zero by 2050. Economies and societies would need to make significant adjustments in the net-zero transition. Many of these can be best supported through coordinated action by governments, businesses, and enabling institutions. Three categories of action stand out: catalyzing effective capital reallocation, managing demand shifts and near-term unit cost increases, and establishing compensating mechanisms to address socioeconomic impacts. The economic transformation required to achieve net-zero emissions by 2050 will be massive in scale and complex in execution, yet the costs and dislocations that would arise from a more disorderly transition would likely be far greater, and the transition would prevent the further buildup of physical risks. It is important not to view the transition as only onerous; the required economic transformation will not only create immediate economic opportunities but also open up the prospect of a fundamentally transformed global economy with lower energy costs, and numerous other benefits—for example, improved health outcomes and enhanced conservation of natural capital.

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Climate risk and response: Physical hazards and socioeconomic impacts

Solving the net-zero equation: Nine requirements for a more orderly transition

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The first in a series focused on climate change and the security environment, this report presents analysis on how climate change will affect the physical environment in the U.S. Central Command's area of responsibility in 2035, 2050, and 2070. The report highlights locations that are projected to experience the biggest changes, as well as those that are most exposed to climate hazards.

A Hotter and Drier Future Ahead

An Assessment of Climate Change in U.S. Central Command

Michelle E. Miro , Flannery Dolan , Karen M. Sudkamp , Jeffrey Martini , Karishma V. Patel , Carlos Calvo Hernandez

Research Published Nov 29, 2023

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Note: Table B.2 on page 43 was updated in July 2024 to correct the data in the Surface Water Runoff column.

Climate change is increasingly becoming a major disruptor of human and natural systems. In some areas, summer temperatures are quickly rising, droughts are deepening, and heat waves are lengthening and getting hotter. Such changes will place pressure on scarce water resources, threaten food security, disrupt fisheries, and result in direct health consequences, among other impacts. These effects can produce secondary and tertiary impacts on human systems that may destabilize societies, economies, or governments. However, these dynamics are highly complex and deeply uncertain, and the pathways from climate changes to societal disruptions that lead to conflict remain poorly understood and an area for continuing research. Still, decisionmakers must plan and act in the near term to reduce future climate-induced risks to physical and human systems.

As a first step to characterizing these pathways, this report examines climate change and its impacts on the physical environment to inform operational and longer-term decisionmaking by the U.S. Central Command (CENTCOM), with an emphasis on impacts that are relevant to food and water security in 2035, 2050, and 2070. This is the first report in a series that presents investigations into the potential impacts of climate change on the security environment in the CENTCOM area of responsibility (AOR). This report highlights locations that are projected to experience the biggest changes, as well as those that are most exposed to climate hazards.

Key Findings

• Nearly all countries in the CENTCOM AOR face the compounding effects of high temperatures and drought and long-term dryness. These effects are accelerating across the CENTCOM AOR, which spans from Egypt through the Levant and the Arabian Peninsula and from Iran to Central Asia and Pakistan.
• As the AOR becomes hotter and drier, existing water resources will become scarcer. This could be particularly acute across the region compared with other parts of the world, given existing water scarcity issues and the high degree of tension that already exists around shared water resources.
• More frequent and more severe extreme heat events, coupled with drier conditions, will make agricultural production more difficult throughout much of the AOR. This will likely be the case even in regions where warmer temperatures are lengthening the growing season, such as Central Asia.
• Many countries in the AOR, such as Yemen, Oman, and Pakistan, are experiencing aridification in concert with increases in extreme precipitation, heightening the risk of flash flooding.
• There are a few key hot spots that will see additional compounding hazards. Southern Iraq—including the Basra, Maysan, and Dhi Qar governates—is vulnerable to sea level rise, surface water losses, and extreme heat. Additionally, Alexandria and Port Said in Egypt face risks from sea level rise and declines in surface water availability from the Nile.

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Climate Change and Conflict

Nov 29, 2023

Research Brief

Planning for an Uncertain Future: What Climate-Related Conflict Could Mean for U.S. Central Command

Pathways from Climate Change to Conflict in U.S. Central Command

Conflict Projections in U.S. Central Command: Incorporating Climate Change

Mischief, Malevolence, or Indifference? How Competitors and Adversaries Could Exploit Climate-Related Conflict in the U.S. Central Command Area of Responsibility

Defense Planning Implications of Climate Change for U.S. Central Command

• Central Asia
• Food Supply
• Global Climate Change
• Middle East
• Natural Hazards
• Water Supply

Document Details

• Copyright: RAND Corporation
• Availability: Available
• Print Format: Paperback
• Paperback Pages: 60
• Paperback Price: $31.00
• Paperback ISBN/EAN: 1-9774-1237-8
• DOI: https://doi.org/10.7249/RRA2338-1
• Document Number: RR-A2338-1

Research conducted by

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This research was sponsored by the U.S. Central Command (CENTCOM) and conducted within the International Security and Defense Policy Program of the RAND National Security Research Division (NSRD).

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Strategy and justice: managing the geopolitics of climate change

This report focuses on the UK’s foreign, development and economic policies as they relate to climate. In examining the world as it may develop over the next decade in order to illuminate decisions needed in the short term, it argues that governments, including the UK’s new government, should treat climate as a first order geopolitical issue and examines the UK’s role and required actions within this context.

Main messages

• Governments should treat climate change – meaning both the transition to a net zero economy and the impacts of climate change – as a first order geopolitical issue . They must harness geopolitics in the service of the transition and work to ensure that climate change does not increase the fragmentation of the international order. That means putting the complex of climate and transition issues at the centre of statecraft.
• Managing climate-related dependencies on China will be an important geopolitical challenge for the UK and other advanced economies in the next decade. China dominates most of the key technologies and materials of the transition. The UK will face choices between maintaining access to the technologies it needs to power the transition, supporting domestic producers, developing friendly supply chains and aligning with allies.
• Advanced economies are focused on their own climate challenges, paying insufficient attention to what is needed to speed up the journeys of others or to the spillover effects their policies have on the rest of the world , in much of which emissions continue to rise as investment falls far short of needs. Unless remedied, this will delay the transition and make it more disruptive, increase the damaging impacts of climate change and skew costs and benefits to the disadvantage of the most vulnerable.
• For the UK and its close partners, the demands of strategy and justice are broadly aligned. Many emerging markets and developing countries (EMDCs) are frustrated and disillusioned with Western governments and the international order they have been instrumental in building; climate change is an important and growing factor.
• The measures necessary to promote the UK’s strategic interests are not only consistent with those to promote justice, particularly for the most vulnerable, but require them. Unaddressed, the ability of the UK and its allies to persuade other countries of their cause, not only on climate but other international issues, will continue to decline – and with it the UK’s standing and influence in the world.
• There is a common misperception among decision-makers that the public will not support the measures necessary to address climate change at home and abroad. In fact, polling and election results indicate that under reasonable conditions there are strong levels of support. Understanding the views of the public and addressing those in the design and delivery of climate-related policies will be as important in the UK’s international policies as in its domestic policies.
• The real if insufficient progress made in addressing climate change over the past 30 years has led to an increasingly clear outlook for the decade ahead. It is a realistic possibility that global emissions will peak soon, largely depending on China’s emissions. But without further action, in particular greater investment in the transition in EMDCs beyond China, the plateau in emissions could last years and the decline be long and slow, with highly damaging effects on human development and potentially on the relations between states.
• Decisions taken in the coming year will affect the outlook for the next decade. By the end of 2024, Parties to the Paris Agreement are due to agree on the finance required to address climate change over the medium term. By early 2025, they are expected to produce their emission reduction plans – so-called nationally determined contributions (NDCs) – to 2035.

Structure of the report

• Part 1 considers a world shaped by the impacts of climate change and the transition to a net zero global economy. It addresses the main systems of the transformation and the range of issues that will be impacted by climate change – from conflict to health to poverty. It identifies implications for the UK and makes recommendations for the UK’s international policies.
• Part 2 considers how these factors play out in the world’s regions, and the implications for the UK.
• Part 3 considers the role of the UK in the world in the decade ahead against this background. It examines the UK’s own net zero transition as relevant to its international policies and public attitudes towards the actions necessary to address climate change, before considering the choices this raises for the UK.
• Part 4 summarises the report’s recommendations for the UK.

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Brazil 2050: A vision for global food security

By Valentina Sader and Peter Engelke

Table of contents

Introduction, global context, forces that will shape the future global context.

The Case of Brazil: A 2050 vision for global food security  

Recommendations

Feeding a growing world population is a significant global security concern. Geopolitical instabilities, climate change, and population growth are major challenges exacerbating global food insecurity. How can the world meet this growing demand for food while also adapting to climate change? Finding solutions will require innovation, imagination, sound investments, smart policies, and cooperation.

Only a few of the world’s breadbaskets have the potential to further meet growing global food demand. Here, Brazil is at the top of the list. Over the past half century, Brazil has established itself as one of the world’s largest producers and exporters of food and ranks among the great breadbaskets of the world. Its production and exports across a wide variety of agricultural commodities, such as soybeans and corn, are critical to world trade in food and essential to the security of global food supply. Owing to its incredible natural endowment, its advanced agribusiness and research sectors, its stability within an unstable world, and its well-developed integration into global agriculture and food markets, Brazil is now and will remain a leading agricultural powerhouse and a critical partner in addressing the global food crisis.

Global population growth, changing demographics, and decarbonization efforts will shape how food is produced in the years to come, increasing the need for solutions from leading breadbaskets such as Brazil. By 2050, the world population could increase to as many as ten billion people, with higher incomes and the more protein-heavy diet often associated with them. These factors prompt rising demand for food, while a warming climate could significantly impact agricultural productivity, and geopolitical disruptions could further exacerbate global food supply chains.

Brazil is already an important and reliable breadbasket for the world. But to help create a more resilient and sustainable food system for the future, Brazil must strategically prepare its domestic capabilities to meet the projected demands of 2050—and it should do so in partnership with the private sector and the international community. 

Climate change, the COVID-19 pandemic, and Russia’s war on Ukraine have shed light on the vulnerabilities of the current global food system. The world has seen historically high temperatures and changes in precipitation patterns, impacting harvests and productivity, 1 See, e.g., a 2022 article from Brazil, “Seca causa perdas bilionárias para a safra e prejudica agronegócio,” O Globo , accessed April 1, 2024, https://oglobo.globo.com/economia/seca-causa-perdas-bilionarias-para-safra-prejudica-agronegocio-25440898 . A list of crops most affected by 2023 temperatures, recorded as the highest ever, can be found in Daphne Ewing-Chow, “Here Are the Foods Hit Hardest by Climate Change in 2023,” Forbes , December 31, 2023, https://www.forbes.com/sites/daphneewingchow/2023/12/31/here-are-the-foods-hit-hardest-by-climate-change-in-2023/?sh=c4fdd19b2872 .  along with significant supply chain disruptions, such as a shortage of fertilizer. 2 Peter S. Goodman, “Nigeria Faces Fertilizer Shortage That Imperils Farmers and Economy,” New York Times , October 15, 2023, https://www.nytimes.com/2023/10/15/business/nigeria-fertilizer-shortage.html . These forces affect both food demand and supply. Today, the world has 8.1 billion people, every one of whom needs regular access to sufficient calories and nutrients. Although the world produces enough food to meet current demand, hunger and food insecurity remain high, especially due to conflict, income, and food loss and waste, among other issues.

In 2022, between 691 million and 783 million people worldwide faced hunger, with roughly 2.4 billion people—29.6 percent of the world’s population—experiencing either moderate or severe food insecurity. 3 State of Food Security and Nutrition in the World: 2023 , FAO, International Fund for Agricultural Development, UNICEF, World Food Programme, and World Health Organization, 2023, https://www.fao.org/interactive/state-of-food-security-nutrition/en/ . From this segment of the global population, nearly twenty percent of Africa’s population faces hunger, a significantly larger proportion compared with other world regions.

Worldwide, those experiencing severe food insecurity totaled about 900 million people in 2022, or 11.3 percent of the global population. In comparison with the previous year, Africa, North America, and Europe have shown worsening food insecurity levels, while Asia improved slightly and Latin America and the Caribbean, mostly driven by South America, saw significant progress in food security. 4 See 2.1 Food Security Indicators in State of Food Security and Nutrition, Chapter 2, https://www.fao.org/3/CC3017EN/online/state-food-security-and-nutrition-2023/food-security-nutrition-indicators.html#tab1 . Addressing the amount of food lost or wasted is also imperative to food security. In 2022 alone, 19 percent of all food available to consumers was wasted, in addition to the 13 percent of food lost in the supply chain. 5 See Food Waste Index Report 2024 , United Nations Environment Programme, March 2024, https://wedocs.unep.org/20.500.11822/45230 . These figures underscore the persistent challenges faced in ensuring adequate access to food for a substantial portion of the world’s population, despite the abundance of food being produced at a global level.

Even so, the demand for food will increase as the global population grows, and as wealth increases, demand for protein typically increases as well. The United Nations Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO) projects that the global demand for food will increase by 60 percent over the next two decades, 6 José Graziano Da Silva, “Feeding the World Sustainably,” in UN Chronicle XLIX, nos. 1 and 2, “The Future We Want?,” June 2012, https://www.un.org/en/chronicle/article/feeding-world-sustainably#:~:text=According%20to%20estimates%20compiled%20by,toll%20on%20our%20natural%20resources ;  and Michiel van Dijk, “A Meta-analysis of Projected Global Food Demand and Population at Risk of Hunger for the Period 2010–2050,” Nature Food , July 21, 2021, https://www.nature.com/articles/s43016-021-00322-9 . driven by population increases and shifts in dietary patterns. To meet this increased demand, projections suggest that global food production will need to provide 47 percent more crop calories in 2050 than in 2011 to feed 9.75 billion people. Increased production will be critical to ensure that people living in population growth centers—namely Africa, the Middle East, and Asia—are fed. 7 “Population and Income Drive World Food Production Projections,” US Department of Agriculture (USDA), updated December 11, 2023, https://www.ers.usda.gov/data-products/chart-gallery/gallery/chart-detail/?chartId=108060#:~:text=Under%20medium%20population%20growth%2C%20production,calories%20from%20a%202011%20baseline .

Where is food produced?

Rice, wheat, corn, and soy make up almost half of the daily calories of the average global diet. 8 Lola Woetzel et al., “Will the World’s Breadbaskets Become Less Reliable?,” McKinsey Global Institute, May 2020, https://www.mckinsey.com/~/media/mckinsey/business%20functions/sustainability/our%20insights/will%20the%20worlds%20breadbaskets%20become%20less%20reliable/mgi-will-the-worlds-breadbaskets-become-less-reliable.pdf . These crops are mostly produced in a handful of regions located in the United States, Brazil, China, India, Ukraine, and Russia—often called the world’s breadbaskets. These producers have the agricultural capacity to grow at scale and to export the key crops to supply a significant portion of the current global demand for food. But given climate change and geopolitical disruptions (e.g., war and trade conflicts), only a few of these breadbaskets have the potential to meet 2050 food demand. Brazil tops the list.

How food is produced, consumed, and distributed will change significantly between now and 2050. While some of these disruptions pose significant challenges, others hold the promise of transformative change, offering new opportunities to enhance the resilience, sustainability, and equity of global food systems.

Geopolitical forces

The world is not a flat trading plane for agricultural products, owing in part to geopolitical forces that have made global trade in food much more challenging. Recent geopolitical disruptions have highlighted vulnerabilities of global trade systems for food. From the COVID-19 pandemic supply chain disruptions 9 “COVID-19 and the Vulnerability of Global Supply Chains,” Thomson Reuters, April 15, 2020,  https://www.thomsonreuters.com/en-us/posts/international-trade-and-supply-chain/covid-19-vulnerability-global-supply-chains/ . to wars, conflicts, and government-imposed trade restrictions, these disruptions pose a significant challenge to food security now and in the years ahead. And these forces are likely to continue, and perhaps, get worse.

Trade is an important factor toward global food security as it connects those who produce food to those who need it. “From 1995 to 2022, food and agricultural trade has more than doubled in volume and calories,” according to the UN FAO. 10 “The State of the Agricultural Commodity Markets 2022,” UN FAO, https://openknowledge.fao.org/server/api/core/bitstreams/0c7cb6df-c416-4397-b999-bf7bca819b17/content/state-of-agricultural-commodity-markets/2022/food-agricultural-trade-globalization.html . Geopolitical disruptions, including trade restrictions and bottlenecks, can have significant implications for food access and prices, and could become more common. For example, Russia’s war on Ukraine had a significant impact on fertilizer exports, affecting agricultural production global ly. 11 World Economic Forum, “How the Ukraine Crisis Could Affect Global Food Security,” World Economic Forum Agenda, March 20, 2023, https://www.weforum.org/agenda/2023/03/ukraine-fertilizer-food-security/ .  India, the largest exporter of rice, recently imposed an export ban on grain 12 CNN, “India’s Ban on Rice Exports Could Hit Global Markets and Spark Inflation,” CNN Business, August 3, 2023, https://www.cnn.com/2023/08/03/business/india-rice-export-ban/index.html . to secure its own domestic supply, causing ripple effects to the global supply and price of rice. In the Red Sea, Houthi rebels’ attacks on commercial ships have caused shipping delays and a rise in transportation costs , 13 Courtney Bonnell and David McHugh, “Yemen’s Houthis Say They Struck Saudi Oil Facility, Ports,” Associated Press, January 12, 2024, https://apnews.com/article/red-sea-yemen-houthis-attack-ships-f67d941c260528ac40315ecab4c34ca3 . and the route to the Suez Canal is of major importance to international trade between Europe and Asia. In the Americas, a drought has caused delays and raised costs for ships transiting the Panama Canal . 14 Costas Paris, “Shipping’s New Hot Spots: Panama, the Red Sea and Around the Suez Canal,” Wall Street Journal , March 10, 2024, https://www.wsj.com/business/logistics/shipping-panama-red-sea-suez-canal-edc91172 .

Policymakers in national capitals around the world will need to redouble their focus on maintaining open trade in food, especially during geopolitical crises and other shocks that will induce many states to protect domestic supplies. This is why food security and the open trade in grains and foodstuffs should be a priority agenda item for countries’ domestic and foreign policy efforts. International cooperation is imperative for food security, including at multilateral forums such as the Group of Twenty (G20) and G7 summits, where the largest economies of the world, representing a great part of global trade, discuss global priorities and ways to jointly address global issues.  

Climate change

A dramatically altered climate almost certainly will be a problem that policymakers, agronomists, researchers, agribusinesses, and farmers will be unable to avoid. Although scientists continue to debate the dates when global temperatures will broach the barriers of 1.5°C and 2°C, it is reasonable to expect that the first limit and possibly the second will be surpassed before 2050 even under lower emission scenarios. 15 Noah S. Diffenbaugh and Elizabeth A. Barnes, “Data-driven Predictions of the Time Remaining until Critical Global Warming Thresholds Are Reached,” Earth, Atmospheric, and Planetary Sciences 120, no. 6 (2023), https://doi.org/10.1073/pnas.2207183120 . Under a median projection (called SSP2-4.5 in the Sixth Assessment Report of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change), Brazil in 2050 might be up to 2.81°C warmer than preindustrial averages, with precipitation dropping by up to a quarter, depending on the region and the time of year. 16 “Brazil: Climate Projections, Mean Projections,” World Bank Climate Change Knowledge Portal, accessed April 2, 2024, https://climateknowledgeportal.worldbank.org/country/brazil/climate-data-projections .

Changes to climate are already being felt globally with direct implications for how and where food is produced. A recent example is the torrential rain that flooded most of Brazil’s southernmost state of Rio Grande do Sul in May 2024. 17 João Pedro Lamas, “Chuva em pontos do RS bate a média prevista para cinco meses: veja lista de cidades com maior acumulado,” Globo , May 7, 2024, https://g1.globo.com/meio-ambiente/noticia/2024/05/07/chuva-em-pontos-do-rs-bate-a-media-prevista-para-cinco-meses-veja-lista-de-cidades-com-maior-acumulado.ghtml . In addition to the humanitarian consequences of those floods, Rio Grande do Sul produces 70 percent of Brazil’s rice and is a significant soybean and meat-producing state 18 Agência Brasil, “Chuvas no Rio Grande do Sul prejudicam o agronegócio,” May 8, 2024 https://www.canalrural.com.br/agricultura/chuvas-no-rio-grande-do-sul-prejudicam-o-agronegocio/ . —key Brazilian exports—which can create additional pressure on Brazil’s production and trade potential and the world’s food system.

Climate resilience and adaptation should be front and center of global policy action, including in efforts to address food security and create a more sustainable and resilient food system. This requires collaboration among governments and the private sector to find solutions, and provide the tools, resources, and policies for sustainable production.  

Land use constraints

Perhaps the most obvious solution in meeting future food demand is to expand the amount of land dedicated to agriculture. But a significant portion of available arable land worldwide lies beneath grasslands and forests, which are crucial for carbon sequestration and biodiversity conservation. And while this way forward is not desirable, the pressure on forested land by 2050 will be immense. 19 Tim Searchinger et al., “Global Land Squeeze: Managing the Growing Competition for Land,” World Resources Institute, July 2023, https://doi.org/10.46830/wrirpt.20.00042 ; and Lindsey Sloat et al., “Crop Expansion: Food Security Trends,” World Resources Institute, December 20, 2022, https://www.wri.org/insights/crop-expansion-food-security-trends .

Over centuries, crop yields have increased consistently and dramatically. While the expansion of arable land has played a crucial role, productivity gains have been a central catalyst for enhancing food security globally. 20 For a comparison of population growth, productivity (in terms of cereals), yield, and land use across countries from 1961 to 2022, see Hannah Ritchie, “Yields vs. Land Use: How Has the World Produced Enough Food for a Growing Population?,” 2017, published online at Our World in Data, https://ourworldindata.org/yields-vs-land-use-how-has-the-world-produced-enough-food-for-a-growing-population . Smart public policies, along with technological gains and changes in farming practices, could limit the pressure on agricultural land expansion (see figure 2).

Brazil is a particularly interesting case.

On land regulation, the country has robust forest protection laws that allow private land in forested areas, such as the Amazon, but stipulate that up to 80 percent of native vegetation must be protected. 21 Embrapa, “Entenda a Lei 12.651 de 25 de maio de 2012,” accessed April 22, 2024, https://www.embrapa.br/codigo-florestal/entenda-o-codigo-florestal . Despite recent reductions in deforestation levels in the Amazon, 22 “Brazil and Colombia See Dramatic Reductions in Forest Loss, But New Fronts Keep Tropical Rates High,” World Resources Institute, News Release, April 4, 2024, https://www.wri.org/news/release-brazil-and-colombia-see-dramatic-reductions-forest-loss-new-fronts-keep-tropical-rates#:~:text=Brazil%20saw%20a%2036%25%20reduction,2022%20to%2030%25%20in%202023 . forests in the Cerrado and Amazon biomes—the two largest and most heavily forested regions of Brazil—have historically been retreating in the face of conversion pressures from multiple directions. 23 Rafaela Flach et al., “Conserving the Cerrado and Amazon Biomes of Brazil Protects the Soy Economy from Damaging Warming,” World Development 146 (2021), https://doi.org/10.1016/j.worlddev.2021.105582 ; see also Jake Spring, “Soy Boom Devours Brazil’s Tropical Savanna,” Reuters, August 28, 2018, https://www.reuters.com/investigates/special-report/brazil-deforestation/ . Here, enforcement of existing regulations and oversight is key, especially given illegal activities in the regions that contribute to deforestation.

Brazil is also uniquely gifted with conditions that allow farming practices that increase agricultural output without the need for more land conversion. Double cropping, for example, allows for Brazil to have two, sometimes even three crops out of the same plot of land in a season—a significant competitive advantage for global food production, which could be a model that can be adjusted for other regions of the world. 

A few factors can explain these historical gains and be positive disruptors that will foster increased productivity in a more sustainable way.

• Innovation and technological advancements: For centuries, technological adoption and innovation in agriculture have dramatically changed the way the world produces food. The mechanization of production, new crop rotation methods, and new inputs such as fertilizers, irrigation systems, and more have revolutionized how (and how efficiently) the world produces food. Brazil is an example of a country that was import-dependent for food, yet transformed itself through technological advancements, innovative practices, and targeted public policies (among other factors) into an agricultural powerhouse and leading food exporter. 24 Embrapa, “Trajectory of Brazilian Agriculture,” accessed April 9, 2024, https://www.embrapa.br/en/visao/trajetoria-da-agricultura-brasileira . To increase productivity efficiently, the development and adoption of new technologies for efficient and sustainable food productivity is imperative. These include biotechnologies, precision agriculture, on-farm robotics, and new innovations and practices (including farming practices). 
• Infrastructure: Infrastructure is critical for intranational and international trade. Lack of or unstable access to energy, poor transportation networks (i.e., roads, railways, and ports), or inadequate storage infrastructure are direct hindrances to agricultural productivity and economic growth through trade. 25 Laura Turley and David Uzsoki, “Why Financing Rural Infrastructure Is Crucial to Achieving Food Security,” International Institute for Sustainable Development, January 9, 2019, https://www.iisd.org/articles/rural-infrastructure-food-security . The lack of adequate infrastructure has been a significant challenge in Africa, for example. Investment in infrastructure is essential for more efficient agricultural production and better flow of products nationally and internationally, but also for sustainable economic development. For export-leaning countries like Brazil, strategic and early investment in transportation infrastructure will facilitate trade, and lower costs of production now and in the future.  
• Human capital: Skilled human capital leads to improved resource management and increased adoption of technological innovations. In the case of Brazil, human capital investments have positively impacted agricultural production of soybeans and maize as well as livestock operations, 26 Pedro Henrique Batista de Barros, Gustavo Henrique Leite de Castro, and Naercio Menezes-Filho, “The Human Capital Effect on Productivity and Agricultural Frontier Expansion in Brazil,” University of São Paulo Regional and Urban Economics Lab, 2022, http://www.usp.br/nereus/wp-content/uploads/TD-NEREUS-06-2022.pdf . while also improving responsiveness to external disruptions. 27 Based on interview with experts. Investing in human capital going forward is important and building partnerships that facilitate the exchange of best practices, know-how, and skill sets among farmers from different parts of the world could contribute to a virtuous cycle toward more efficient and sustainable food production. 
• Capital investment: Access to capital helps drive agricultural growth. Increasing farmers’ access to credit and investment allows them to invest in modern equipment and adopt new technologies and practices, leading to increased productivity and profitability. In addition to government subsidies for agriculture, targeted government investments, private-sector investments, and microfinancing initiatives can shift incentives toward sustainability, land restoration, and collaboration, 28 Helen Ding, Will Anderson, and René Zamora-Cristales, “Smarter Farm Subsidies Can Drive Ecosystem Restoration,” World Resources Institute, August 25, 2021, https://www.wri.org/insights/how-farm-subsidies-combat-land-degradation . while providing farmers with the necessary funding to expand their operations, diversify their crops, and adopt sustainable agriculture practices.

Given Brazil’s key role in the current global food system and, most importantly, its potential to become an even more important breadbasket to the world in the future, Brazil must be at the forefront of innovation and adoption of positive disruptors like access to capital and climate smart agricultural practices, while preemptively adapting to negative ones.  

The Case of Brazil: A 2050 vision for global food security  

The world might be facing challenges ahead when it comes to food security, but in this picture, Brazil is critical.  Brazil, the United States, and other like-minded partners must work together to ensure that global food supply grows to meet rising demand in the future in ways that are both environmentally and economically sustainable. Here, Brazil’s agricultural sector must continue to serve as one of the world’s great breadbaskets, producing more food while also becoming more sustainable—reducing its impact on land and water resources and the country’s rich biodiversity heritage—and more resilient, especially in the face of climate change. If one could paint such a portrait of the future, what might a best-case scenario for Brazil look like?

A 2050 best-case scenario is a Brazil that produces more food and remains a reliable exporter of food, including during global food crises. Brazil would grasp the diplomatic mantle, becoming a forceful voice in ensuring that food security remains a priority issue on the global stage. At home, Brazil would produce more food while preserving the integrity of its natural endowment: its increased agricultural production would go hand in hand with protection of the natural environment, including protection of its forests and enhancement of the on- and off-farm natural resources upon which its agriculture depends (e.g., soils, surface water, and groundwater).

To achieve such a hopeful vision, Brazilian food producers have the markets, incentives, technical support and capital needed to adopt advanced farming and ranching practices that enable them to produce more and be rewarded for their nature-positive practices. A Brazilian Agricultural Research Corporation (Embrapa) foresight study correctly states that future “productivity increases [in Brazilian agriculture] should . . . be associated with a decrease in the carbon footprint, water conservation, the maintenance of soil nutrients, the controlled use of antimicrobials and pesticides, [and] the reduction of losses and waste” through advanced farming techniques including regenerative agriculture. “In this process,” the report continues, “digital solutions, robotics and automation will be fundamental” to realizing such a future vision, as will more generally remote sensing, biotechnologies, nanotechnologies, and advanced computation including artificial intelligence-based applications 29 . Vision of the Future of Brazilian Agriculture , Embrapa, 2022, https://www.embrapa.br/en/visao-de-futuro ; quotations translated from a subpage (original in Portuguese), https://www.embrapa.br/en/visao-de-futuro/sustentabilidade . Here both Embrapa, a state-owned research corporation, and Brazilian agribusinesses are uniquely positioned to lead the world toward 2050, given Brazil’s history at the cutting edges of finding agricultural technology, or AgTech, solutions to farming in tropical and subtropical regions. 30 For a slightly critical yet informative history of Embrapa’s role in Brazilian agricultural history, see Lidia Cabral, “Embrapa and the Construction of Scientific Heritage in Brazilian Agriculture: Sowing Memory,” Development Policy Review 39, no. 5 (2020), https://doi.org/10.1111/dpr.12531 .

Any scenario that portrays Brazilian agriculture in 2050 as productive, sustainable, and resilient must include the conservation of natural heritage, especially forests. However, such pressure can be alleviated in the coming decades if Brazilian agriculture increases yields through adoption of ecologically sensitive yet technologically advanced practices—per the above argument—and by expanding only onto land that already has been used for other purposes. Importantly, Brazil has the land available to avoid deforestation while dramatically increasing agricultural output through improved utilization of degraded pastureland—up to seventy million hectares are suitable for conversion to cropland—and intensification of existing cropland through expanded double cropping. 31 J. Colussi et al., “ Potential for Crop Expansion in Brazil Based on Pastureland and Double-Cropping ,” in University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign Department of Agricultural and Consumer Economics’ farmdoc daily  14 (April 9, 2024): 69,  https://farmdocdaily.illinois.edu/2024/04/potential-for-crop-expansion-in-brazil-based-on-pastureland-and-double-cropping.html . Addressing illegal activities that are detrimental to the natural heritage of these regions, such as illegal mining, land grabbing, and logging, is also imperative to curb deforestation while also developing the region.

As the world grapples with ensuring that global food supply matches rising demand, Brazil’s agricultural sector can and must continue to serve as one of the world’s great breadbaskets, while also becoming more sustainable and resilient. Brazilian leaders in the public and private sectors must make choices and investments that both retain Brazil’s innovative edge and sustain the natural ecosystems that enable its agriculture to thrive out to the year 2050. But Brazil does not have to take on this task alone. As a global concern, ensuring food security in a sustainable way will require collaboration and sustained partnerships—between governments, with the private sector and multilateral institutions—to scale critical capabilities and solutions.

The recommendations that follow outline critical areas for bilateral and global cooperation to achieve such a vision.

• Retain a commitment to global food security. Perhaps the most important single recommendation is to ensure that policymakers in Brazil and other countries, including those in the G7 and G20 forums, retain a commitment to global food security, in particular during geopolitical upheavals and climate-driven drought. Given their economic and diplomatic weight, these countries must be the vanguard for maintaining a global focus on food security and finding solutions to food insecurity. Brazil’s roles as host of the G20 and the UN COP30 climate talks in 2024 and 2025, respectively, give it important platforms for marshaling that resolve. A critical component of global food security is ensuring food can move across borders.  As climate change affects where and how food will be produced, the collective goal should be to ensure that there is sufficient production, done in the right way, in the right places, and to ensure that food can be traded from places of surplus to places of deficit. Brazil’s meteoric rise to the first rank of global food producers is in part due to its adoption of an outward-facing model that has embraced global trade. During global food security crises, Brazil’s policymakers have largely recognized the dangers of and resisted protectionist measures to restrict its agricultural exports, unlike several other major producers. Policymakers in the United States, Brazil, and other major agricultural producers should sustain and deepen their leadership on sustainable food production within multilateral institutions and forums. Brazil’s President Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva has been forceful in placing hunger and food security atop Brazil’s foreign policy agenda. 32 For a review of this history under Lula, see Josh Lipsky and Mrugank Bhusari, “Brazil Aims to Advance its Bid for Leadership of the Global South through Food Security,” Econographics (blog), Atlantic Council, February 14, 2024, https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/blogs/econographics/brazil-aims-to-advance-its-bid-for-leadership-of-the-global-south-through-food-security . At the G20 Brazil Summit, Lula is expected to announce a Global Alliance Against Hunger and Poverty, the purpose of which will be to “raise resources and knowledge [globally] for implementation of public policies and social technologies” surrounding food security. 33 “Sherpa Track: Task Force for a Global Alliance against Hunger and Poverty,” G20 Brasil 2024, n.d., https://www.g20.org/en/tracks/sherpa-track/hunger-and-poverty . Such initiatives ought to be welcomed by policymakers in the G7 and G20, including by the United States and its allies and partners, and serve as a platform for collective action. Global forums, such as the G20 and COP30 meetings, provide important platforms to gather the support of the largest economies of the world to place food security at the forefront of development and strategic priorities. But perhaps most importantly, given that the demand for food will mostly come from developing countries, these forums are an important space for knowledge transfer and shared best practices on how to increase food production and trade sustainably. Here, Brazil has a lot to teach the world.
• Improve infrastructure. For decades, Brazil has been investing in its infrastructure to catch up with the rapid expansion of agriculture into the country’s interior. 34 Xi He, Guilherme DePaula, and Wendong Zhang, “Brazil’s Transportation Infrastructure and Competitiveness in the Soybean Market,” Agricultural Policy Review , Fall 2021, https://agpolicyreview.card.iastate.edu/fall-2021/brazils-transportation-infrastructure-and-competitiveness-soybean-market . A December 2023 report released by the US Department of Agriculture observed that the pacing of such investments has increased over the past decade, given the importance of reducing Brazil’s historically high transportation costs for export competitiveness. Fueled in part by Chinese capital, Brazil has sped up its investments in roads, railways, storage and processing facilities, and ports. The USDA report asserted that such investments have “significantly alter[ed] the relative competitiveness” of Brazil and the United States, in Brazil’s favor. 35 Constanza Valdes, Jeffrey Gillespie, and Erik Dohlman, Soybean Production, Marketing Costs, and Export Competitiveness in Brazil and the United States , USDA, Economic Research Service, Report No. EIB-262, 2023, 23, https://www.ers.usda.gov/webdocs/publications/108176/eib-262.pdf?v=2384.6 . As Chinese investment continues to grow in Latin America and the Caribbean, the United States should prioritize Brazil not as a competitor but an ally, ensuring greater cooperation, increased investments, and technical exchanges of best practices for better and more sustainable solutions to agriculture. Continued investment in infrastructure would allow Brazil to become an even more competitive agricultural exporter in at least some major crops, including soybeans. 
• Partner to scale the adoption of regenerative farming techniques and technologies. Brazil has a rich history of embracing new approaches to farming, including innovative technologies, stretching at least as far back as Embrapa’s founding and its success in developing approaches to tropical grain production. 36 For a provocative review of this history, see Ryan Nehring, “The Brazilian Green Revolution,” Political Geography 95 (2022): 102574, doi:10.1016/j.polgeo.2021.102574 . Despite this history, Brazil’s farms are by no means oversaturated with technology, as there appears to be significant room for on-farm growth and profit to derive from utilization of the latest technologies. 37 Peter Goldsmith and Krystal Montesdeoca, “The Productivity of Tropical Grain Production,” International Journal of Agricultural Management 6, nos. 3/4 (2018): 93, https://doi.10.5836/ijam/2017-06-90 . Advanced farming techniques present another opportunity. Regenerative agriculture and related approaches focus on integrating ecological principles into advanced farming operations to preserve biodiversity, improve soil health and prevent erosion, conserve water, and increase carbon capture and sequestration. Methods include agroforestry (introduction of trees into a farmed landscape), conservation tillage, integrated pest management (use of pest control methods beyond chemicals), integrated crop-livestock systems (the integration of animals into cropland), and intercropping (fielding multiple crops at once). 38 For a short summary of these approaches, see Sanjay Borkar, “7 Ways to Accelerate the Transition to Sustainable Agriculture,” World Economic Forum, April 25, 2023, https://www.weforum.org/agenda/2023/04/7-ways-to-accelerate-the-transition-to-sustainable-agriculture/ . Brazil already is a world leader in utilization of some of these methods, for example, no-till farming (planting crops without tilling the soil), which has great potential to preserve soils while sequestering carbon. 39 Stoecio Malta Ferreira Maia et al., “Potential of No-till Agriculture as a Nature-based Solution for Climate-change Mitigation in Brazil,” Soil and Tillage Research 220 (2022): 105368, https://doi.org/10.1016/j.still.2022.105368 . Governments can play an important role in helping to facilitate the development of transparent and high-integrity markets that provide economic rewards to farmers for such investments and practices, generating both environmental outcomes and economic opportunity.
• Prioritize underutilized pastureland. To minimize pressure on Brazil’s vast forest endowment while reducing carbon emissions, policymakers should incentivize farmers to prioritize expansion of grain and legume production (especially soybeans) on underutilized pastureland. 40 Several Brazilian experts interviewed for this study made this argument. See also Sarah Brown, “Growing Soy on Cattle Pasture Can Eliminate Amazon Deforestation in Brazil,” Mongabay , November 4, 2022, https://news.mongabay.com/2022/11/growing-soy-on-cattle-pasture-can-eliminate-amazon-deforestation-in-brazil/ . Such a strategy could succeed on all three fronts—increased production plus reduced deforestation and emissions. A recent Embrapa-led study estimated that some twenty-eight million hectares of Brazil’s degraded pastureland could be brought into grain production, increasing the total planted grain area in Brazil by a full 35 percent. 41 Édson Luis Bolfeet al., “Potential for Agricultural Expansion in Degraded Pasture Lands in Brazil Based on Geospatial Databases,” Land 13, no. 2 (2024): 200, https://doi.org/10.3390/land13020200 . Another study found that a combination of improved yields and expansion of production to current pastureland would generate one-third more soybeans with no additional deforestation and with significantly lower carbon emissions. 42 Fabio R. Marin et al., “Protecting the Amazon Forest and Reducing Global Warming via Agricultural Intensification,” Nature Sustainability 5 (2022): 1018-1026, https://www.nature.com/articles/s41893-022-00968-8 . Brazil has available arable land—from degraded pastureland and existing cropland—to increase its agricultural output without the need for further deforestation.
• Expand double cropping. Brazil has a significant advantage over competitors in temperate regions owing to weather conditions that allow year-round planting and harvesting, leading to the country’s ability to produce more than one crop per year—two crops or even three, depending on the crop and conditions. 43 The standard practice is to plant two crops, usually soybeans followed by corn, but some Brazilian farmers now produce three corn crops in a single year. See Fabio Mattos, “Notes from the Brazilian Cornfields,” University of Nebraska-Lincoln, Institute of Agriculture and Natural Resources, November 1, 2023, https://agecon.unl.edu/notes-brazilian-cornfields . This practice has been growing in Brazil, as farmers have found it economically advantageous to do so, and should continue growing into the future. 44 Joana Colussi and Gary Schnitkey, “Brazil: Corn Production in Three Crops per Year,” farmdoc daily (website), University of Illinois,April 12, 2021, https://farmdocdaily.illinois.edu/2021/04/brazil-corn-production-in-three-crops-per-year.html ; see also Ed Allen and Constanza Valdes, Brazil’s Corn Industry and the Effect on the Seasonal Pattern of U.S. Corn Exports , USDA, June 2016, https://www.ers.usda.gov/webdocs/outlooks/35806/59643_aes93.pdf . This system should encompass as high a percent of Brazil’s farmland as practically feasible, given its dual roles to expand agricultural output and limit pressures on converting Brazil’s forested land to agricultural production. While Brazil has strong forest protection laws, more effective enforcement of land use controls to reduce forest conversion combined with an appropriate mix of incentives would help to mitigate illegal activity and support farmers in shifting toward improving production on existing cropland through succession cropping. 45 Goldsmith and Montesdeoca, “The Productivity,” 93. The increased incentives argument was offered during a virtual interview between the authors and a Brazilian agricultural economist in April 2024. Brazil’s capacity to combine multiple cropping, utilizing existing degraded land, and adopting regenerative agricultural practices presents a unique and significant potential to produce food with lower carbon intensity. 
• Prioritize water-efficient irrigation. Irrigated farmland, whether in Brazil or anywhere else in the world, tends to increase crop yield. 46 The impact of irrigation on crop yields is a complex phenomenon that intersects with multiple other variables. See, e.g., Esha Zaveri and David B. Lobell, “The Role of Irrigation in Changing Wheat Yields and Heat Sensitivity in India,” Nature Communications 10, (2019): 4144, https://www.nature.com/articles/s41467-019-12183-9 . According to Brazil’s water agency, the country has sufficient water resources to allow a tenfold expansion of its irrigated crop area. 47 Yuri Clements, Daglia Calil, and Luis Ribera, “Brazil’s Agricultural Production and Its Potential as Global Food Supplier,” Choices Magazine 34, 3 (2019), https://www.choicesmagazine.org/choices-magazine/theme-articles/the-agricultural-production-potential-of-latin-american-implications-for-global-food-supply-and-trade/brazils-agricultural-production-and-its-potential-as-global-food-supplier . However, the trouble with irrigation around the world, even in Brazil, lies mostly in overuse of scarce water resources. 48 Regarding agriculture’s global water footprint, see Water for Sustainable Food and Agriculture: A Report Produced for the G20 Presidency of Germany , FAO, 2017, https://www.fao.org/3/i7959e/i7959e.pdf . Brazil has suffered from increasing drought and aridity in some regions, and from overuse of groundwater and surface water. 49 Daniel Grossman, “Water War: Is Big Agriculture Killing Brazil’s Traditional Farms?,” Yale Environment 360 , November 10, 2021, https://e360.yale.edu/features/with-traditional-farms-withering-why-is-brazil-running-dry . Brazil should prioritize adoption and expansion of water-efficient irrigated systems in those regions that can sustainably support water withdrawals from underground and surface sources. Brazil’s contribution to food security globally is undeniable—as is its potential to continue to be an even more important and resilient breadbasket for the world. But to secure sufficient food for a growing population in a sustainable way will require collaboration and global action. Ensuring that Brazil increases its food production while also protecting the environment will require the cooperation of Brazilian policymakers, the private sector, and farmers themselves as well as international support and investment. With the potential to be the largest exporter of food in the world, Brazil must strategically prepare for this role and the world should support it.

Acknowledgment s

The Atlantic Council would like to thank Cargill for its support of this publication. We would also like to thank the numerous experts that provided invaluable insights and committed their time to participate in one-on-one discussions with the authors, and also offer special recognition of Marcos Jank, Tatiana Palermo, Rodrigo C. A. Lima, Alencar Zanon, and Jake Spring for their thoughts and feedback. Finally, thank you to Jason Marczak, vice president and senior director of the Atlantic Council’s Adrienne Arsht Latin America Center, for his guidance and comments throughout the drafting of this publication.

About the authors

Valentina Sader is a deputy director at the Atlantic Council’s Adrienne Arsht Latin America Center, where she leads the Center’s work on Brazil, gender equality and diversity, and manages the Center’s Advisory Council. During her time at the Council, Valentina has managed the launch of the Center’s Advisory Council, a high-level group of former policy makers, business leaders, and influencers from the United States and the region.

Peter Engelke is a senior fellow with the Atlantic Council’s Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security as well as a nonresident senior fellow with its Global Energy Center. His diverse work portfolio spans strategic foresight, innovation and technological disruption, geopolitics and hard security, climate change and Earth systems, and urbanization, among other topics.

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• 05 January 2022

How researchers can help fight climate change in 2022 and beyond

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Devastating floods that hit Germany last July were made more likely by the warming climate. Credit: Christof Stache/AFP/Getty

Late last year, the major climate summit in Glasgow, UK — the 26th Conference of the Parties to the United Nations climate convention (COP26) — injected much-needed momentum into the political and business community in the fight to stop climate change. The year ahead represents an opportunity for scientists of all stripes to offer up expertise and ensure that they have a voice in this monumental effort.

Science is already baked into the UN’s formal climate agenda for 2022. In February, the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) is scheduled to release its assessment of the latest research into how climate warming is affecting people and ecosystems; a month later, the panel is set to provide an analysis of the options for curbing emissions and halting global warming. Combined with last year’s report on climate science , the governments of the world will have a solid review of the state-of-the-art of research on climate change. But the research community’s work stretches far beyond the IPCC.

At the top of governments’ climate agenda is innovation. Existing technologies such as wind and solar power, whose price has plummeted over the past decade, and more-efficient lighting, buildings and vehicles will help to reduce emissions. But if green energy is to push out fossil fuels and fulfil the rising demand for reliable power in low-income countries, scientists and engineers will be needed to solve a range of problems. These include finding ways to cut the price of grid-scale electricity storage and to address technical challenges that arise when integrating massive amounts of intermittent renewable energy. Research will also be required to provide a new generation of affordable vehicles powered by electricity and hydrogen, and low-carbon fuels for those that are harder to electrify, such as aircraft.

Even in the most optimistic scenarios, such clean-energy deployments are unlikely to be enough to enable countries to keep their climate commitments. More innovation will also be needed — for example, in the form of technologies that can pull carbon dioxide out of the atmosphere. These have yet to be tested and demonstrated at any significant scale. Governments and funders also need to support scientists in efforts to understand the safety and efficacy of various controversial geoengineering technologies — methods for artificially cooling the planet, such as the addition of particles to the stratosphere to reflect sunlight back into space — if only to determine whether there is sense in even contemplating such alternatives.

Give research into solar geoengineering a chance

There are signs of renewed support for research and innovation in helping to address climate change. In Glasgow, 22 countries, as well as the European Commission (EC), announced plans to cooperate on innovation focused on greening cities, curbing industrial emissions, promoting CO 2 capture and developing renewable fuels, chemicals and materials. The EC has also announced efforts to drive new funds into demonstration projects to help commercialize low-carbon technologies. And China, currently the world’s largest emitter of greenhouse gases, is creating a vast research infrastructure focused on technologies that will help to eliminate carbon emissions.

China creates vast research infrastructure to support ambitious climate goals

In the United States, under President Joe Biden, the Democrats have also made innovation a linchpin of efforts to address climate change. A bipartisan bill enacted in November will expand green-infrastructure investments, as well as providing nearly US$42 billion for clean-energy research and development at the US Department of Energy over the next 5 years, roughly doubling the current budget, according to the Information Technology and Innovation Foundation, a think tank in Washington DC. Another $550 billion for climate and clean-energy programmes is included in a larger budget bill that Democrats hope to pass this year. Economic modelling suggests that the spending surge could help to lower emissions in the coming decade while teeing up technologies that will be crucial to eliminating greenhouse-gas emissions in the latter half of the century.

In addition to enabling green innovation, scientists have an important part to play in evaluating climate policies and tracking commitments made by governments and businesses. Many of the initiatives that gained traction at COP26 need science to succeed. That includes evaluating how climate finance — money that wealthy nations have committed to help low-income nations to curb emissions and cope with climate change — is spent. Research is also needed to understand the impacts of carbon offsets and carbon trading, for which new rules were agreed at COP26.

COP26 climate pledges: What scientists think so far

Climate science, too, must continue apace, helping governments and the public to understand the impact of climate change. From floods in Germany to fires in Australia, the evolving field of climate attribution has already made it clear that global warming is partly to blame for numerous tragedies. Attribution science will also feed into an ongoing geopolitical debate about who should pay for the rising costs of climate-related natural disasters, as many low-income countries seek compensation from wealthy countries that are responsible for the bulk of the greenhouse-gas emissions so far.

These and other issues will be discussed again in November at COP27 in Sharm El-Sheikh, Egypt, where it will be crucial to make sure that everyone has a voice and that research supports climate monitoring and innovation everywhere, not just in richer nations.

A new agreement made at COP26 that requires governments to report annually on their climate progress should help to maintain pressure on them to act on climate change. But science and innovation will be equally important to driving ever-bolder climate policies.

Nature 601 , 7 (2022)

doi: https://doi.org/10.1038/d41586-021-03817-4

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Government of Canada leads major international research initiative on climate change

New international partners joining soon-to-be-launched initiative valued at more than $90 million

The Government of Canada is leading the International Initiative for Research on Climate Change Adaptation and Mitigation , with several international research funding organizations responding to Canada’s call for interest. Research funders from Brazil, Germany, Norway, South Africa, Switzerland, the United Kingdom and the United States, among others, have joined as partners. The initiative will leverage international expertise to tackle global challenges caused by climate change.

Set to be launched in January 2023, the initiative will fund transformative research with potential to deliver game-changing impacts. Funded international projects will further the design and implementation of adaptation and mitigation strategies for vulnerable groups—those currently most affected by climate change impacts, owing to both their physical and socioeconomic vulnerability. Focusing on co-production, researchers will work with vulnerable groups to address their most pressing needs.

The Canada Research Coordinating Committee (CRCC) has committed $60 million to this call, which will be administered by the Social Sciences and Humanities Research Council of Canada, through the New Frontiers in Research Fund (NFRF). International partners in the consortium will contribute more than C$30 million to this call, for a current total competition budget of more than C$90 million.

This funding opportunity will require that projects address at least two of the eight representative key risks identified in the Sixth Assessment Report of the UN Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change . The report highlights the unprecedented changes in Earth’s climate that are being observed in every region, impacting all ecosystems and societies, and will continue to intensify with further warming.

NFRF, launched in 2018, seeks to inspire innovative, high-risk, high-reward, interdisciplinary research projects that push boundaries into exciting new areas and have the potential to enhance Canada’s competitiveness and expertise in the global, knowledge-based economy. NFRF’s innovative design includes novel merit-review processes that reflect the objectives of each funding opportunity, and flexibility to support international collaboration.

Research funding organizations outside Canada are invited to join this multilateral research initiative as international partners by reaching out to [email protected] .

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Climate change and the future of property: new research reveals growing industry commitment

Climate change is no longer a distant threat. A significant majority of property professionals (over 70%) who took part in our recent survey recognise the urgent need to address its impacts.  DOWNLOAD OUR LATEST MARKET RESEARCH REPORT  To understand how the property industry is starting to adapt, Landmark conducted a comprehensive survey of 150 senior […]

05th September 2024  |  1 minute read

Climate change is no longer a distant threat. A significant majority of property professionals (over 70%) who took part in our recent survey recognise the urgent need to address its impacts. 

DOWNLOAD OUR LATEST MARKET RESEARCH REPORT  

To understand how the property industry is starting to adapt, Landmark conducted a comprehensive survey of 150 senior level employees working in estate agency, residential conveyancing, and mortgage lending across England, Scotland and Wales. Our findings have helped us gauge the growing commitment towards sustainability, and how we can help support and nurture this further.  

Our new research report, ‘ Climate change in the property sector: a cross-market perspective ‘, provides valuable insights into the current trends and future implications.  

*World Green Building Council report: Embodied Carbon – World Green Building Council (worldgbc.org)

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