essay on american foreign policy

United States Foreign Policy Analytical Essay

Introduction, united states foreign policy, usa foreign policy during (1815-1941), usa foreign policy during (1941-1989), usa foreign policy during (1989-present), works cited.

Several countries today have established legal frameworks that determine how they relate with other nations. The United States of America has a comprehensive foreign policy which governs its relationship with other countries. “Since independence, the economy of U.S. has been flourishing and it is today one of the most developed countries in the world” (Hastedt 65).

This has given it a dominant position in the world political arena and it has also influenced how it deals with other nations. “The diplomatic affairs of this country are always under the guidance of the secretary of the State” (Carter 82). However, final decisions on diplomatic affairs are only made by the president.

America’s foreign policy has always been shaped in such away that it favors its interests. It protects its corporations and other commercial organizations from any unfair treatment and competition (Kaufman 15). This has always been done to ensure that no country challenge its economic position.

U.S. has been using its power to suppress other nations that may be thinking of emerging as its competitor. For example it checked the influence of U.S.S.R. In order to continue dominating many countries, the U.S. government keeps on extending its authority and power over many nations.

“It has achieved this by simply influencing the social-economic and political institutions of some countries which are vulnerable to political influences” (Carter 130). Such practices are prevalent in countries which are poor and can not sustain themselves economically.

”Peace, prosperity, power, and principle,” have always acted as the guiding principles of U.S. foreign policy, and its interests revolve around them (Hastedt 29). The U.S. government has been striving to maintain these values, but the only thing that has been changing is the prevailing conditions which influence the manner they are achieved (Hastedt 30). We can therefore examine the foreign policies of U.S in the following phases.

America came up with the policy of “isolation” after the end of its revolutionary war. According to this policy, US did not engage in conflict resolution programs and it always remained impartial whenever some European countries had a conflict with each other (Carter 101). For example, this was demonstrated during the First World War and it continued until the beginning of the Second World War. The main interest of US during the 19 th century was to develop its economy and this influenced how it conducted its diplomatic activities with other nations.

It forged trade ties with other countries which were ready to do business with it. In addition to these, it also engaged in building its territory through bringing more territories under its control. For example in 1819 it managed to conquer Florida; in 1845 it brought Texas under its control and the Russian Empire agreed to sell Alaska to US in 1867.

Imperialism was also partially practiced by U.S. “Foreign policy themes were expressed considerably in George Washington’s farewell address; these included among other things, observing good faith and justice towards all nations and cultivating peace and harmony with all countries” (Carter 74). The US government in many cases declined to engage in signing treaties. For example it refused to be part of the “League of Nations” (Kaufman 67).

There was a remarkable increase in U.S. engagement in peace initiatives during the post World War One, and this formed its key agenda in foreign relations. President Wilson came up with guidelines that were used in ending the First World War. The European powers had a meeting in Paris in 1919 in which they discussed the ways of solving the disputes which had previously led to war among them. “The Versailles Treaty was signed by the countries that attended the conference but U.S. government did not” (Hastedt 120).

This is because the US government felt that some of the members had contradicted some of steps which governed the treaty. U.S. also managed to carry out the disarmament program successfully in 1920s and it also helped Germany to reconstruct its economy which had been ruined by over engagement in war. U.S. tried to continue pursuing the policy of “isolation” during 1930s.

However, President Roosevelt joined the Allied powers during the Second World War and they managed to win it. Japan was forcefully removed from China by U.S. and they also stopped its possible invasion of the Soviet Union. “Japan was greatly humiliated and it reacted by an attack on Pearl Harbor in December 1941, and the United States was at war with Japan, Germany, and Italy” (Carter 190).

The economy of U.S greatly improved after the second war, while the other European countries grappled with economic challenges. It was now one of the greatest countries and its power and influence was felt in many countries.

The emergence of the cold war in the post war period led to the split of the world into two spheres. These two spheres were dominated by Soviet Union and U.S. Non Aligned Movement was developed as a result of this process. The Cold War period only came to an end towards the end of the 20 th century. “A policy of containment was adopted to limit Soviet expansion and a series of proxy wars were fought with mixed results” (Kaufman 117).

The Soviet Union completely collapsed after the U.S. war against Iraq (Gulf War). America joined this war in order to dislodge Iraq from Kuwait so that peace and stability could be restored in that country. After the war, U.S. shifted its policy from Iraq because it was trying to be a threat to its interests in the region of Middle East (Carter 195).

America is still having an important role in world politics. Nonetheless, it is facing much opposition and competition from other countries like China. Its dominant role and influence has gone down and many countries from Africa are currently shifting their diplomatic relationships to the East. “U.S. foreign policy is characterized still by a commitment to free trade, protection of its national interests, and a concern for human rights”. A group of political scientists contend that the super powers seem to be having similar socio economic and political interests, and if they can find a good opportunity to pursue them together then we shall have a prosperous future.

Carter, Ralph. Contemporary cases in U.S. foreign policy: from terrorism to trade. Washington D.C: Press College, 2010.

Hastedt, Glenn. American foreign policy. New York: Longman, 2010.

Kaufman, Joyce. A concise history of U.S. foreign policy. New York: Rowman and Littlefield , 2009.

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IvyPanda. (2024, January 16). United States Foreign Policy. https://ivypanda.com/essays/united-states-foreign-policy/

"United States Foreign Policy." IvyPanda , 16 Jan. 2024, ivypanda.com/essays/united-states-foreign-policy/.

IvyPanda . (2024) 'United States Foreign Policy'. 16 January.

IvyPanda . 2024. "United States Foreign Policy." January 16, 2024. https://ivypanda.com/essays/united-states-foreign-policy/.

1. IvyPanda . "United States Foreign Policy." January 16, 2024. https://ivypanda.com/essays/united-states-foreign-policy/.

Bibliography

IvyPanda . "United States Foreign Policy." January 16, 2024. https://ivypanda.com/essays/united-states-foreign-policy/.

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Five Not-So-Easy Pieces: The Debates on American Foreign Policy

Subscribe to this week in foreign policy, richard n. haass rnh richard n. haass.

March 1, 2000

American foreign policy discussion today is not so much a single debate as debates. At least five principal debates are taking place—or at least should be. How they are resolved will go a long way toward determining both what takes the place of containment as a means of organizing international relations and what the role of the United States in the post-Cold War world will be.

The five essential sets of questions involve the proper priorities for foreign policy; the extent to which the United States should enlist others in pursuing these priorities; how the instruments of foreign policy should be used; what resources will be required and how they should be distributed; and how policy itself should be made.

The range of American foreign policy priorities is considerable. Potential emphases include encouraging democracy and markets; alleviating humanitarian distress; promoting U.S. exports; maintaining American primacy; encouraging restraint in inter-state relations; and avoiding foreign policy entanglements. Although a foreign policy can reflect more than one of these directions, priorities must be established, because trade-offs and opportunity costs are often unavoidable.

At its core the second question is how much the United States should try to do largely or entirely on its own—unilaterally—and how much in cooperation with others. The choice is a great deal more complicated than that, however, as the multilateral option in fact subsumes multiple approaches, including using the United Nations and other international institutions, alliances and other regional organizations, and coalitions of those able and willing to act.

The third set of questions involves the instruments of foreign policy, which include public and private diplomacy, military force, sanctions, incentives, and covert action. In every instance, questions arise about whether and how to use particular tools. Policymakers must constantly assess whether acting with a particular instrument in a particular fashion makes more sense than using others in other ways—or than doing nothing at all.

The fourth debate is over resources. Elsewhere in these pages Michael O’Hanlon highlights the choices facing the United States in the realm of defense. Similar assessments could be written about the dollars devoted to intelligence, foreign assistance, and diplomacy. In every case, it is necessary to address not simply how much should be spent but how it is spent.

The fifth and last debate involves how foreign policy is made. Are procedures and institutions that for the most part developed in a very different context—a world divided by Cold War and fundamentally less global than our own—still adequate for the challenges facing the United States today? If not, what changes should be made by the executive branch, Congress, or both?

All five debates are important. At the same time, they are often obscured by specific foreign policy issues. “Unpack” the debate over China policy and you will see that at the core is the question of foreign policy priorities. Much the same can be said of debates surrounding Kosovo and other humanitarian interventions. Likewise, controversy surrounding the use of economic sanctions reflects disagreements over both the wisdom of unilateral action and the relative value of particular tools.

Of the five sets of questions, the most important are the first two, which reflect the purposes of the United States and its basic approach to the world. The latter three debates—matters more of instrumentality, implementation, and process—while critical to the success of policy, are less fundamental. For that reason this essay will emphasize the debates over priorities and approaches.

To What End?

The question of priorities is another way of asking what the United States should do with its primacy. Although a world of democratic, market-oriented states would obviously be desirable, bringing it about is likely beyond our capacity. Moreover, other issues—stemming the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, avoiding the outbreak of war, protecting core economic stakes—are simply more important. Interests need to take precedence over concerns. Much the same holds for a humanitarian emphasis. However important, it too can be a luxury that can impair the ability to protect necessities.

A foreign policy based on promoting exports also has major shortcomings. Because trade and investment flows require stability, an export-based policy can all too easily be overwhelmed by political and military instability. Just as important, a focus on exports is likely to lead to policies that make little economic sense—because an export-based policy tends to increase the role of governments in trade—and can imperil the rest of relationships as trade frictions overwhelm all else.

Nor is a policy that seeks to maintain American primacy as an end in itself likely to succeed. The United States cannot dictate the course of other societies, preventing them in the process from becoming more powerful and assertive. What is more, changes taking place within American society are likely to make consensus as to the ideal means and ends of policy more difficult to achieve. This, too, is likely to weaken the position of the United States relative to others over time.

What might be described as the opposite alternative—minimalism or neo-isolationism—is arguably more doable but less desirable. Although doing less abroad would be less costly in the near term, over time it could prove terribly expensive. The United States cannot insulate itself in a world that is ever more global. Missiles, people, germs, terrorists, ideas, drugs, funds, and goods all show little respect for state boundaries. Moreover, an absence of American activism will create vacuums that will be filled by forces that in some cases will be hostile to ourselves, creating the likelihood of conflict down the road.

A final alternative, one that often comes under the banner of realism, emphasizes order among rather than within states. While rightly focusing on the greatest threats to peace and prosperity, realism has little to offer when it comes to dealing with internal sources of instability or to human problems. Indeed, its very narrowness makes it unattractive to many Americans who will only support a foreign policy with a purpose that transcends balancing power and maintaining peace devoid of justice.

Which orientation makes the most sense? Realism should be at the core, and toward that end the United States should work to bring about a world where military force is used only sparingly to resolve disputes between nations, where stocks of weapons of mass destruction are reduced, and where trade is conducted according to rules rather than results. These are the areas where the most important U.S. interests are engaged and where it is possible to design and implement policies to protect them. At the same time, the United States should promote democracy and markets to the extent feasible and do what it can to alleviate humanitarian suffering when it is truly awful, when it is possible to do some good at a reasonable cost and without jeopardizing vital interests, and when others are willing to share the burden.

Getting From Here to There

Beyond the question of the ends is the problem of approach. What is the best way to realize the preferred aims of American foreign policy?

One option would be to go it alone. Unilateralism has the advantage of minimizing the need for compromise and maximizing speed and ease of acting. But it is also expensive (in both dollars and people) and impractical. Few undertakings can be carried out by the United States alone. Major military operations require overflight rights, access to bases, and contributions of troops and equipment. Unilateral sanctions can easily be circumvented. A world trading system by definition requires the cooperation of others. Supplier clubs designed to curb the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction require near universal membership.

A second approach would lean heavily on international institutions. This notion is attractive in principle, as effective global organizations could help bring about a more prosperous, stable world at less cost to the United States. But institutions require a strong consensus to operate effectively, and in most arenas of international life such consensus is missing. In particular, major powers today do not agree on the rules of world trade, the status of Taiwan, what to do about Saddam Hussein, the desirable level of missile defenses, or the legality of intervening with military force when a government is unable or unwilling to protect its own people. This is not an argument against building organizations where and when agreement emerges—a WTO that is inclusive in membership and comprehensive in what it regulates is surely to be desired—only a call for modesty in the absence of convergence.

A third approach to American foreign policy is one that is multilateral but less formal or universal. Alliances, such as NATO, are one manifestation, although such groupings are rare and likely to become even less common in a world of few fixed adversaries. Much more common are informal coalitions of parties able and willing to work together on behalf of a common purpose—be it to rescue the Mexican economy, contain Saddam Hussein, or enter East Timor. Such groupings are not ideal—they are invariably ad hoc and reactive and lack the legitimacy of more formal regional or UN undertakings—but they are consistent with a world where the willingness of governments to cooperate varies from crisis to crisis and situation to situation, where great power consensus is unreliable, and where U.S. resources, however great, are still limited.

Making Foreign Policy Work

What this all adds up to is an American foreign policy that emphasizes relations between states more than conditions within them (on the grounds that one can have order without justice but not vice versa) and informal coalitions to promote multilateral action. In most instances, such coalitions should be headed by the United States, if only because it alone possesses adequate military, economic, and political power.

But power is not to be confused with influence. It is not simply that the United States lacks the resources to carry out a unilateral foreign policy, it lacks the capacity to compel others to follow its lead. Any attempt to do so—to assert hegemony—is bound to fail as it will stimulate resistance, something that will make the costs of acting in the world greater and the benefits smaller.

In short, leadership requires followership. Abroad, this means that the United States must be willing to consult with others as to the shape of post-Cold War international society. If negotiations were the hallmark of Cold War diplomacy, consultations are likely to characterize U.S. foreign policy in this era.

Leadership overseas also requires leadership at home. The ability of the United States to be effective requires that the American people and Congress be willing to recognize the national interest over special interests, to make the necessary resources available, and to allow them to be used. Right now, a decade after the end of the Cold War, the absence of consensus abroad as to what should constitute international order is matched by an absence of consensus at home as to what should constitute American foreign policy. Asking the candidates to articulate their vision of both seems only right given all that is at stake.

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U.S. Foreign Policy between the Wars

Written by: John E. Moser, Ashland University

By the end of this section, you will:.

• Explain the similarities and differences in attitudes about the nation’s proper role in the world

Suggested Sequencing

Use this Narrative to allow students to explore the United States’ pursuit of a unilateral foreign policy during the period between WWI and WWII.

For a long time, historians believed that, thanks to the refusal of the U.S. Senate to join the League of Nations, the United States then entered a period of “isolationism” that lasted from the 1920s to the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor in 1941. Few believe this today. Although it might fairly be argued that the United States sought to isolate itself from world affairs in the early to mid-1930s – primarily as the result of the Great Depression – the Republican administrations of the 1920s were actively engaged in managing problems abroad.

One international matter in which the United States took a leading role was naval disarmament. This was a cause that had widespread political support. Democrats tended to follow the Wilsonian tradition of regarding large armies and navies as a threat to peace. Republicans were eager to reduce spending (and taxes) and saw the navy as a prime place to cut. The Harding administration, therefore, organized an international conference in Washington, DC, in December 1921. Masterminded by Secretary of State Charles Evans Hughes, the Washington Conference yielded three treaties that helped preserve peace in East Asia and the Pacific region for the next 10 years. In the Four-Power Pact, signed by Britain, France, Japan, and the United States, each nation agreed to respect the others’ island possessions in the Pacific. The Five-Power Pact, which included the preceding powers plus Italy, set limits on the numbers and types of warships each signatory could possess. Finally, in the Nine-Power Treaty of 1922, the aforementioned five nations, joined by China, Belgium, the Netherlands, and Portugal, pledged to uphold the sovereignty and territorial integrity of China.

In 1922, delegates from nine countries gathered in Washington, DC, to discuss naval disarmament.

The war had radically altered the position of the United States in the global economy. In 1914, it had been the world’s largest debtor, but by 1920, it was the largest creditor. Postwar Europe was the most important market for American exports. Europe was also crying out for American capital, and Wall Street banks were prepared to offer it, as long as conditions appeared stable enough to bring a return on their investments. American banks and corporations thus had a strong interest in helping Europe get back on its feet.

When Germany was suffering from hyperinflation in 1924, an American banker and Harding administration official named Charles Dawes headed a commission that sought to address the situation. His solution, which became known as the Dawes Plan, lent Germany millions of dollars from New York banks, enabling Germany to pay reparations to the former Allies as mandated by the Versailles Treaty and to rebuild and modernize its heavy industry. The German economy quickly turned around, and the second half of the decade saw a general improvement in the economies of the other countries of Western Europe as well. Four years later, when the German government sought to renegotiate its reparations payments, it was once again an American business executive – Owen Young, founder of the Radio Corporation of America (RCA) – who was called in to broker a deal. The Young Plan reduced the total amount of reparations and established a payment plan by which the burden would be paid off over 58 years.

The burden of Germany’s war reparations, as portrayed in this U.S. editorial cartoon from c. 1921, showed a German man under an enormous amount of debt.

Most Americans remained opposed to any kind of formal commitment to other countries, particularly membership in the League of Nations or anything that looked like an alliance. Also, if the U.S. government had agreed to forgive the war debts of the former Allies, it is likely that Britain and France would have backed off on their demands for German reparations or at least reduced the burden considerably. As it was, collection of reparations was necessary if London and Paris were to make their own biannual debt payments. Moreover, European nations would have had an easier time recovering from the war if their products had had greater access to the U.S. market, but both Harding and Coolidge adhered to Republican orthodoxy by keeping tariffs high – even though U.S. exports to Europe during the 1920s exceeded imports by nearly a two-to-one margin. Nevertheless, there is little doubt that U.S. investment played a critical role in the postwar recovery. As President Coolidge boasted in 1925, “no positive and constructive accomplishment of the past five years compares with the support which America has contributed to the financial stability of the world.”

Millions of private citizens took a keen interest in global affairs in the 1920s, mostly through membership in one of the many peace organizations that proliferated in the country after World War I. Some of the more conservative groups, such as the World Peace Foundation, the League of Nations Association, and, most importantly, the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, spent vast sums both at home and abroad, organizing conferences, publishing newsletters, and endowing libraries and university chairs in international relations both at home and abroad. Others had more radical reputations, such as the National Council for the Prevention of War, the Fellowship of Reconciliation, and the Women’s International League for Peace and Freedom. These organizations frequently collaborated with one another, with larger groups such as the Young Men’s Christian Association (YMCA), and with similar organizations abroad to promote their view that the experience of World War I must never be repeated.

Members of the Women’s International League for Peace and Freedom protested to demand an end to war after World War I. (credit: Women’s International League for Peace and Freedom Records, Swarthmore College Peace Collection)

One specific idea that captured the imagination of the peace movement was the “outlawry of war,” the belief that war should be prohibited under international law. Indeed, by the end of the decade, the movement to outlaw war had become popular enough to be written into an international treaty. The Kellogg-Briand Pact had its origins in a proposal by French Prime Minister Aristide Briand for a bilateral agreement with the United States in which each country pledged never to go to war with the other. The U.S. secretary of State, Frank Kellogg, feared that such a deal would look too much like a formal alliance in the eyes of the Senate, so he proposed that other nations be invited to join in making the same pledge. Fifteen countries signed the Kellogg-Briand Pact on August 27, 1928, promising to “condemn recourse to war for the solution of international controversies, and renounce it, as an instrument of national policy in their relations with one another.” An additional 47 nations signed on in the following months.

But even as the world agreed to outlaw war, the spirit of internationalism on which Kellogg-Briand rested was beginning to fade. In mid-1928, American financiers were increasingly turning away from foreign investment in favor of buying stocks on Wall Street. Germany, now cut off from its primary source of capital, fell into recession before the end of that year. Similar downturns were evident in the United States and Great Britain by the middle of 1929, and after the stock market crash of October 1929, it was clear that the world was entering a period of economic distress.

The near-collapse of the global economy undermined the basis for internationalism. In July 1930, President Herbert Hoover approved the Smoot-Hawley Tariff, which increased import duties to their highest levels since 1830. America’s main trading partners quickly retaliated with new tariffs of their own, and by 1933, international commerce had come to a virtual standstill. In Europe, high unemployment led to the rise of extremist political parties on the right and the left. Japan, meanwhile, sought to solve its economic problems by invading Manchuria (part of China) in 1931, in clear violation of the Nine-Power Treaty and the Kellogg-Briand Pact. The Hoover administration refused to recognize the conquest of Manchuria as legitimate, but it did nothing more. Over the next several years, Americans abandoned the hope of abolishing war. The critical questions now were when and where the next major war would break out, and how to ensure that the United States would remain neutral when it did.

Review Questions

1. During the 1920s the United States participated in world affairs in all the following ways except

• undertaking foreign investment
• joining the League of Nations
• attending international conferences
• signing disarmament treaties

2. Although the United States remained outside the League of Nations, it did attempt to maintain world peace through all the following except

• hosting the Washington Naval Conference
• cosponsoring the Kellogg-Briand Pact
• approving the Hawley-Smoot Tariff
• promoting the Dawes Plan

3. The Four-Power Treaty was related to

• limiting the size of various world powers’ navies
• ensuring the territorial integrity of China
• easing German reparations from World War I
• respecting territorial rights in the Pacific Ocean

4. As part of their pro-business stance, the three Republican presidents of the 1920s were able to maintain

• free trade and freedom of the seas for all nations
• low tariffs between the United States and its allies and high tariffs on Germany
• low tariffs for all imports
• high tariffs for all imports

5. The Kellogg-Briand Pact

• outlawed all offensive war
• forgave Germany’s remaining war debts
• limited the size of navies around the world
• maintained the United States’ non-membership in the League of Nations

6. During the period immediately after World War I, the United States could be described as a

• global super power
• country that went from being a great debtor nation to a great creditor nation
• world peace-keeping force
• nation that isolated itself from European affairs

Free Response Questions

• Describe several ways in which the United States contributed to world peace during the 1920s.
• Explain the main objectives of U.S. foreign policy during the 1920s.
• Compare U.S. foreign policy during the 1920s with the foreign policy of the Washington Administration (1789-1797).

AP Practice Questions

“ARTICLE I The High Contracting Parties solemnly declare in the names of their respective peoples that they condemn recourse to war for the solution of international controversies, and renounce it, as an instrument of national policy in their relations with one another. ARTICLE II The High Contracting Parties agree that the settlement or solution of all disputes or conflicts of whatever nature or of whatever origin they may be, which may arise among them, shall never be sought except by pacific means. ARTICLE III The present Treaty shall be ratified by the High Contracting Parties named in the Preamble in accordance with their respective constitutional requirements, and shall take effect as between them as soon as all their several instruments of ratification shall have been deposited at Washington. This Treaty shall, when it has come into effect as prescribed in the preceding paragraph, remain open as long as may be necessary for adherence by all the other Powers of the world. Every instrument evidencing the adherence of a Power shall be deposited at Washington and the Treaty shall immediately upon such deposit become effective as; between the Power thus adhering and the other Powers parties hereto.”

Kellogg-Briand Pact, 1928

1. Which of the following most directly contributed to the creation of the treaty excerpted here?

• The building of an empire that began during the Spanish-American War
• Continued European colonization in the Americas
• The devastation of World War I
• Threats of Soviet aggression in eastern Europe

2. The United States’ agreement to sign the treaty excerpted here most directly illustrates a foreign policy that

• called for total isolation of the United States from world affairs
• allowed U.S. diplomats to initiate objectives that were successful in maintaining world peace
• gave the United States a role in world affairs without membership in the League of Nations
• permitted the United States to unilaterally maintain world peace

3. Which of the following actions best illustrates the United States’ adherence to the treaty excerpted here?

• Hosting the Washington Disarmament Conference
• Issuing a policy of refusing to recognize states created by aggression
• Resigning from the League of Nations
• Rejecting the Treaty of Versailles

Primary Sources

Merrill, David and Thomas G. Paterson. Major Problems in American Foreign Relations, Volume 2: Since 1914 . Boston: Cengage, 2009.

Suggested Resources

Herring, George C. From Colony to Superpower: U.S. Foreign Relations since 1776 . Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press, 2008.

Iriye, Akira. The New Cambridge History of American Foreign Relations: Volume 3, The Globalizing of America, 1913-1945 . Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 2013.

Rosenberg, Emily. Spreading the American Dream . New York: Hill and Wang, 1982.

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The most significant threat to united states interests in the next decade and how american foreign policy can be shaped to address the threat.

Foreign policy refers to the strategies a country uses to create good diplomatic relationships and interactions with other countries globally. It means that foreign policy works towards bringing nations together, having common goals and interests, and eliminating differences that might make countries uncooperative in their foreign policy goals. America has a well-developed foreign policy that has been applied for many years, and this foreign policy has guiding principles that align America’s foreign policy with the best interests of other countries and the world. American foreign policy currently focuses on interests such as security promotion, protecting the lives of Americans and their interests, economic prosperity, making the world better through development, and promoting international policies such as human rights and environmental policies. However, in the modern world, various issues have become a threat to the Americas’ interests, which are unavoidable due to the rapid changes taking place in the world (Myrick, 2021). These threats will continue to evolve with time and may negatively affect American foreign policy if the United States does not take precautions and address the threats. Therefore, this paper aims to unveil the most significant threat to the United States interests in the next ten years and strategies the U.S. must adopt through its foreign policy to deal with the threat.

In the modern world, there are many threats to the United States’ interests, affecting the most important interests of the American continent. These threats are expected to continue in the coming years because the U.S. cannot stop them but can only develop effective strategies to counter these threats and continue with the goal of protecting and achieving its interests. These threats include geopolitical competition, terrorism, climate change, nuclear wars, and cyber security threats (Biden, 20211). However, geopolitical competition is the most significant threat to U.S. interests in the next ten years. Geopolitical competition is the increase in political power of countries linked to some geographical regions whereby these countries have gained more economic and political powers hence competing with other countries having the same or higher powers. Geopolitical competition creates rivalry among nations competing to become influential in all areas of the world economy, such as security, political matters, global economic matters, and overall world control (Markowitz & Fariss, 2018). Currently, the United States is the leading superpower country, which shows that it controls world matters while advancing its interests. However, in recent times, China has emerged as a rapidly rising economy, and this has threated the U.S. in achieving its interests. Also, Russia, a long time enemy of the U.S., is becoming a threat to the U.S. due to its improved influence in world matters.

Therefore, China’s growing influence in the world’s economy and political matters is a threat to the U.S., and the threat is expected to continue in the next ten years as these countries continue to develop rapidly to ensure they become superpowers in the future. Stares (2019) in his study discusses China and Russia as countries that can threaten the United States’ interests in the modern world and the following years. In the article, China and Russia’s relations with the United States have deteriorated, with tensions emerging among these countries in various disputed areas. The lack of good relations between these two geopolitical regions is a significant threat to the United States as China and Russia, coming from the same geographical area, are strengthening their relations to become a great force that can challenge the dominance of the U.S. in the global arena. Thus, there is a developing competition between China, Russia, and the U.S. in all economic sectors. China has become a global economic power in the modern world taking a bigger percentage of the global markets and production of products. This has threatened the economic power of the U.S., and China’s economic transformation is expected to increase in the next ten years (Stares, 2019).

The economic growth of the Asian region is becoming a big threat to U.S. interests as the countries there, China and Russia, are cooperating to make the region an economic powerhouse, which will threaten U.S. economic power. China’s current Gross Domestic Product is $ 12.48 trillion, with the expectation of massive growth in the next ten years. This GDP compares to that of the U.S. which is at $ 24.26.24 trillion currently. Therefore, the combination of China and Russia’s economic growth will be a threat to U.S. interests in the next decade. Also, geopolitical competition threatens U.S. interests due to the technological improvements taking place in the Asian country. China has and will continue developing modern technology, such as the use of artificial intelligence, space exploration, manufacture of modern military equipment for high level espionage, which will become a threat in the future to the U.S. in its interest of global security as China may become a technological superpower. The technological advancements have made China develop a military presence in the Asian region, with Russia joining China to form military alliances that will become strong and unbeatable by the U.S. in the next. The military presence will make it hard for the U.S. to have a peaceful co-existence in case of security tensions, and this may lead to war risks in the world with these countries ready to unleash their military power to gain influence on military power.

Cyber security is another area in geopolitical competition that will threaten U.S. interests in the next decade. China is growing its cyber security space and will compete with the U.S., which is the current cyber power globally to the report of the International Institute for Strategic Studies. Dominance in cyberspace is a strategic interest for the United States, but the current rise of cyber security capabilities by China supported by Russia will become a big threat to cyberspace security currently controlled by the United States (Williams, 2021). The growth of digital technology in China will join the top-tier position currently held by the U.S., making it a threat to U.S. interest in dominating cyber space. However, the issue of geopolitical competition cannot be avoided as China and other countries have the power and resources to take over the world in various interests. Thus, the U.S. must use its foreign policy to address the issue of geopolitical competition.

The ways in which the U.S. can use its foreign policy to address geopolitical competition include the U.S. engaging in strategic competition with China. This means that the U.S. should mutually accept to cooperate with China on various global issues such as balancing economic dominance, military presence, sharing technological advancements and using them to benefit the world, and balanced trade. Diplomatic dialogue between these countries needs to focus on improving the world in a balanced manner and have diplomatic representatives focusing on eliminating any misunderstandings and tensions that may arise to ensure a collaborative existence that does not threaten the interests of the countries globally. The second area American foreign policy should focus on is engaging in balanced economic activities such as global trade by allowing trade fair trade practices between the two countries. The diplomatic representative should resolve trade disputes and encourage international trade with goods from both countries allowed to enter each other’s market to promote international trade with fair practices. American foreign policy should encourage increased cooperation in security matters by joining security alliances that promote global security and addressing security matters as a team to enhance trust. American foreign policy should ensure that security alliances such as the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) cooperate with Asian security alliances, especially China and Russia, to promote collective security intervention and adhere to international law, which will eliminate disputes and tensions that may become a threat to the United States (Lee et al., 2018).

The United States should invest more in rapidly emerging areas such as technology to continue being the leading technology power. The United States should increase cyber security research and development to be aware of all possible emerging technologies that may be a threat, such as in security and cyber-attacks. The technology upgrade will ensure that ultra-modern and the most sophisticated technologies are present to gain a technological edge over China. This will eliminate threats to cyberspace that might interfere with the United States’ interests in protecting Americans and other people globally from cyber-related problems from terrorism, which relies on cyberspace to conduct attacks. Also, technological advancements and innovation should be protected as intellectual property of the U.S. to avoid spies who may sell it to the competitors, thus becoming a threat as China can use this advantage to develop the best technological solutions thus creating a threat thus affecting the interest of American in the world (Moreland, 2019).

In conclusion, geopolitical competition is the most significant threat to United States interests in the next decade. Countries like China are becoming more powerful thanks to rapid economic growth, improved political structures, and technological advancements. Therefore, the United States can shape its foreign policy to address geopolitical competition by using diplomatic dialogues and cooperation, balancing economic dominance, fair trade practices, adherence to international law, collective security alliances, and cooperation on cyberspace matters to create a unified system to fight cyber-related issues. Using these strategies, the United States will ensure that its foreign policy effectively eliminates threats created by geopolitical competition in the next ten years.

Biden, J. R. (2022). Biden-Harris White House National Security Strategy, October 2022.  Collections ,  2022 , 10-12.

Lee, S. O., Wainwright, J., & Glassman, J. (2018). Geopolitical economy and the production of territory: The case of U.S.–China geopolitical-economic competition in Asia.  Environment and Planning A: Economy and Space ,  50 (2), 416-436.

Markowitz, J. N., & Fariss, C. J. (2018). Power, proximity, and democracy: Geopolitical competition in the international system.  Journal of Peace Research ,  55 (1), 78-93.

Moreland, W. (2019). The purpose of multilateralism: A framework for democracies in a geopolitically competitive world.

Myrick, R. (2021). Do external threats unite or divide? Security crises, rivalries, and polarization in American foreign policy.  International Organization ,  75 (4), 921-958.

Stares, P. B. (2019). Preparing for the Next Foreign Policy Crisis.

Williams, B.(2021). US ‘Retains Clear Superiority’ In Cyber; China Rising: IISS Study.  Breaking Defense. https://breakingdefense.com/2021/06/us-retains-clear-superiority-in-cyber-but-china-poised-to-challenge-study/

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Guest Essay

Where Is America’s ‘Rules-Based Order’ Now?

By Spencer Ackerman

Mr. Ackerman is a foreign-policy columnist for The Nation and the author of “Reign of Terror: How the 9/11 Era Destabilized America and Produced Trump.”

No sooner had a nearly unanimous United Nations Security Council passed a resolution demanding an “immediate cease-fire” in Gaza last month than the United States and Israel acted as if it were a meaningless piece of paper. Israel, unwilling to accept a U.N. mandate, continued bombing the overcrowded southern city of Rafah and besieging Al-Shifa Hospital in Gaza City. Shortly after the vote, Biden administration officials called the resolution, No. 2728, “nonbinding,” in what appeared to be an attempt to deny its status as international law.

It was a confounding approach from an administration that allowed the resolution to go through with an abstention after vetoing three earlier ones. It also triggered a predictable bout of hand-wringing over the value of international law. At the State Department press briefing after the resolution passed, the department’s spokesman, Matthew Miller, said the measure would neither result in an immediate cease-fire nor affect thorny hostage-release negotiations. One reporter asked , “If that’s the case, what the hell is the point of the U.N. or the U.N. Security Council?”

The question is valid, but it’s also misdirected. U.N. resolutions that are written without enforcement measures obviously cannot force Israel to stop what its leadership insists is a justified war necessary to remove Hamas and prevent another Oct. 7 massacre. But it’s just as obvious what entity can make Israel stop and isn’t doing so: the United States.

Whatever the Biden administration might have thought it was doing by permitting the resolution to pass and then undermining it, the maneuver exposed the continuing damage Israel’s war in Gaza is doing to the United States’ longstanding justification for being a superpower: guaranteeing what U.S. administrations like to call the international rules-based order.

The concept operates as an asterisk placed on international law by the dominant global superpower. It makes the United States one of the reasons international law remains weak, since a rules-based order that exempts the United States and its allies fundamentally undermines the concept of international law.

American policymakers tend to invoke the concept to demonstrate the benefits of U.S. global leadership. It sounds, on the surface, a lot like international law: a stable global order, involving the panoply of international aid and financial institutions, in which the rules of acceptable behavior reflect liberal values. And when U.S. prerogatives coincide with international law, the United States describes the two synonymously. On the eve of Russia’s illegal 2022 invasion of Ukraine, Secretary of State Antony Blinken warned of a “moment of peril” for “the foundation of the United Nations Charter and the rules-based international order that preserves stability worldwide.”

But when U.S. prerogatives diverge from international law, America apparently has no problem violating it — all while declaring its violations to ultimately benefit global stability. The indelible example is the 2003 U.S. invasion of Iraq, which the George W. Bush administration cynically justified as a means of enforcing U.N. disarmament mandates. Iraq, the supposed violator, endured military occupation, while Washington’s unmatched military and economic power ensured that America faced little consequence for an invasion without U.N. authorization. Shortly before invading, the United States passed a law vowing to use “ all means ” necessary to release Americans detained by the International Criminal Court.

A cohort of American academics and once and future U.S. officials at Princeton later advocated what they called in a 2006 paper “ a world of liberty under law .” They framed it as addressing the weaknesses of international law, suggesting that when international institutions didn’t produce the outcomes favored by the “world of liberty,” there be an “alternative forum for liberal democracies to authorize collective action.” In practice, that forum has often been the White House. During the 2011 Libyan uprising, the United States and its allies used Security Council authorization of a no-fly zone to help overthrow Muammar Qaddafi — whose regime killed far fewer opponents than Israel has killed in Gaza since Oct. 7. American troops have now operated in eastern Syria for more than eight years, long enough for everyone to forget that there is no basis in international law for their presence.

That American-exceptionalist asterisk has been on display after each U.S. veto of cease-fire resolutions at the U.N. With Gaza’s enormous death toll and imminent famine , people can be forgiven for wondering about the point of the United States’ rules-based international order.

International law is unambiguously against what Israel is doing in Gaza. Two months before resolution No. 2728, the International Court of Justice ruled that the continuing Israeli campaign could plausibly be considered genocidal and ordered Israel to take measures to prevent genocide from unfolding. Ahead of 2728’s passage, the Canadian Parliament approved a motion, however porous , to stop new arms transfers to Israel. And the day the Security Council approved the resolution, the U.N.’s special rapporteur for the occupied territories, Francesca Albanese, recommended that member states should “immediately” embargo weapon shipments to Israel, since Israel “appears to have failed to comply with the binding measures ordered” by the international court.

But after 2728 passed, the White House national security spokesman, John Kirby, clarified that U.S. weapon sales and transfers to Israel would be unaffected. To the astonishment of some Senate Democrats , the State Department averred that Israel was not violating a Biden administration policy that recipients of American weaponry comply with international law. Last week, the White House reiterated that it had not seen “any incidents where the Israelis have violated international humanitarian law” after the Israel Defense Forces repeatedly bombed a convoy of aid workers from the World Central Kitchen who had informed the Israelis of their movements, killing seven.

The reality is that Washington is now arming a combatant that the United Nations Security Council has ordered to stop fighting, an uncomfortable position that helps explain why the United States insists 2728 isn’t binding.

And that reality isn’t lost on the rest of the world. The slaughter in Gaza has disinclined some foreign officials and groups to listen to U.S. officials about other issues. Annelle Sheline, a State Department human-rights officer who recently resigned over Gaza , told The Washington Post that some activist groups in North Africa simply stopped meeting with her and her colleagues. “Trying to advocate for human rights just became impossible” while the United States aids Israel, she said.

It’s a dynamic that sounds awfully reminiscent of what happened outside Europe when U.S. diplomats fanned out globally to rally support for Ukraine two years ago. They encountered “a very clear negative reaction to the American propensity for defining the global order and forcing countries to take sides,” as Fiona Hill, a Brookings Institution scholar, observed in a speech last year.

If the United States was frustrated by that negative reaction, imagine the reaction, post-Gaza, that awaits Washington the next time it seeks global support for the target of an adversary. The dead-on-arrival passage of resolution 2728 may very well be remembered as an inflection point in the decline of the rules-based international order — which is to say the world that the United States seeks to build and maintain.

Rising powers will be happy to cite U.S. precedent as they assert their own exceptions to international law. For as Gaza shows in a horrific manner, a world with exceptions to international law is one in which the least powerful suffer the most.

Spencer Ackerman is a foreign-policy columnist for The Nation and the author of “Reign of Terror: How the 9/11 Era Destabilized America and Produced Trump.”

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