ethics and critical thinking similarities

Leading in Context

Unleash the Positive Power of Ethical Leadership

How Is Critical Thinking Different From Ethical Thinking?

ethics and critical thinking similarities

By Linda Fisher Thornton

Ethical thinking and critical thinking are both important and it helps to understand how we need to use them together to make decisions.

Critical thinking helps us narrow our choices. Ethical thinking includes values as a filter to guide us to a choice that is ethical.
Using critical thinking, we may discover an opportunity to exploit a situation for personal gain. It’s ethical thinking that helps us realize it would be unethical to take advantage of that exploit.

Develop An Ethical Mindset Not Just Critical Thinking

Critical thinking can be applied without considering how others will be impacted. This kind of critical thinking is self-interested and myopic.

“Critical thinking varies according to the motivation underlying it. When grounded in selfish motives, it is often manifested in the skillful manipulation of ideas in service of one’s own, or one’s groups’, vested interest.” Defining Critical Thinking, The Foundation For Critical Thinking

Critical thinking informed by ethical values is a powerful leadership tool. Critical thinking that sidesteps ethical values is sometimes used as a weapon.

When we develop leaders, the burden is on us to be sure the mindsets we teach align with ethical thinking. Otherwise we may be helping people use critical thinking to stray beyond the boundaries of ethical business.

Unl eash the Positive Power of Ethical Leadership

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Developing ethical reasoning and/or ethical decision making

Author : Robert J. Sternberg, Cornell University

Why this Learning Objective Matters

Colleges and universities today, in their testing and even their teaching, place great emphasis on academic content knowledge, as they should. But when one considers the causes, later in people’s lives, behind failed job performance, failed relations with friends and colleagues, and even failed marriages, one is likely to find the root cause of the failure to lie not in content knowledge or even academic reasoning but rather in ethical reasoning (1).

One can have a degree in business, medicine, law, psychology, or education, and be familiar with the knowledge base of the profession, but nevertheless act in an unethical manner that undermines the utility of that knowledge. For example, if one looks at four huge and widely publicized business failures by CEOs (Kenneth Lay at Enron, Bernard Ebbers at Worldcom, Conrad Black at Hollinger International, Dennis Kozlowski at Tyco), all were related to ethics (2). Some of the CEOs took their business down with them. Then there are the huge scientific frauds, such as that of experimental psychologist Diederick Stapel, who simply made up his data (3), and even frauds in education, including Corinthian Colleges (4), which deceived students regarding graduation and job-placement rates. There are even severe ethical violations in the ministry, as shown by the denials and cover-ups of child-abuse that have made headlines over the years (5). Much of this ethically-compromised behavior starts early, when students are in school. In one survey, 86% of high school students agreed that students cheat at some point in their high-school careers (6). Great professionals, citizens, and leaders in any field of endeavor are ethical people (7). They need to learn to reason ethically before they go out in the work force and start influencing and even controlling the fate of others (8).

Colleges should teach ethical reasoning rather than just ethical principles. Ethics is a set of principles for what constitutes right and wrong behavior. These principles are generally taught in the home, through religious training in a special school, or through learning in the course of one’s life. It is challenging (although certainly not impossible) to teach ethics directly in a secular school, because different religious, cultural, and other groups have somewhat different ideas about what is right and wrong under different circumstances. There are, however, core values that are common to almost all these religions and ethical systems that schools do teach and reinforce, for example, reciprocity (the golden rule), honesty, sincerity, compassion in the face of human suffering. In addition, many professions have codes of ethics that professionals are encouraged to follow, and sometimes, are bound to follow by contract or law. But even when given a set of ethical precepts to follow, be they personal/religious or professional, knowing what to do in a particular situation is not always clear. For instance, many professions have a code of ethics that discourages conflict of interest between personal and organizational activities. But exactly what constitutes a conflict of interest is not always apparent. Is having lunch with someone who seeks to influence you a conflict of interest? In some situations, it might be. But in other situations something more egregious, such as receiving a large gift, might be necessary to be considered a violation. So the problem is not usually in knowing the precepts but in knowing how to apply them. This is especially true when there are conflicting demands being made upon one’s actions, such as one person wanting you to do one thing and another wanting you to do something else. That is why instruction in ethical reasoning is of paramount importance over just teaching a set of ethical precepts.

Ethical reasoning is how to think about issues of right or wrong. Processes of reasoning can be taught, and the college or university is an appropriate place to teach these processes because so often it is taught no place else, and because it is essential for a successful adulthood. Although parents and especially religious institutions may teach ethics, they do not always teach ethical reasoning. Academic courses are the logical place to teach the cognitive process of reasoning especially as ethical issues relate to the content of a particular discipline. No matter how knowledgeable one is about their profession, if the knowledge is not backed by ethical reasoning, long-term success in the career is likely to be severely compromised.

Can ethical reasoning actually be taught with any success? Apparently so. Richard Paul (9), of the Foundation for Critical Thinking, devised a program whereby principles of critical thinking were applied specifically to teaching ethical reasoning to young people Robert DeHaan and colleagues at Emory University successfully taught ethical reasoning to high school students (10). Catherine Myser of the University of Newcastle and her colleagues have successfully taught ethics to medical students (11). And James Weber of Marquette University found that teaching ethical awareness and reasoning to business-school students can help their ethical reasoning, although the improvements are not always long-term (12).

Ethical reasoning is hard because there are so many ways to fail. Ethical behavior is far harder to display than one would expect simply on the basis of what we learn from our parents, from school, and from our religious training (13). To intervene, individuals must go through a series of steps, and unless all of the steps are completed, they are not likely to behave in an ethical way, regardless of the amount of training they have received in ethics, and regardless of their levels of other types of skills.

Consider the skills in this model and how they apply in an ethical dilemma—whether a student, James, should turn in a fellow student, Ben, whom he saw purchase answers from an upcoming examination from an ethically compromised Internet site:

Recognize that there is an event to which to react . James has to observe Ben purchase the answers and decide that it is a situation in which he potentially might have some role other than being a passive observer.
Define the event as having an ethical dimension . James has to define the cheating as unethical. Students do not always see cheating—such as purchasing answers in advance of a test–as unethical. Many students do so; but some others may see it as a practical or utilitarian matter. On this view, it is ok if Ben or anyone else can get away with it.
Decide that the ethical dimension is significant . James has to decide that Ben’s purchasing the answers for the test is a big enough deal that it is worth James’s paying attention to it. Some students may see Bens’ purchase of the answers as an ethical issue, but not as one of sufficient importance that it is worth their doing anything about it.
Take personal responsibility for generating an ethical solution to the problem . James may decide that there is an ethical problem here, perhaps even a major big one, but that the problem is not his concern. For example, James may view it as the teacher’s responsibility, not his, to do something about Ben. Or James may believe that he cannot be responsible for the behavior because he doesn’t really know or care much about Ben.
Figure out what abstract ethical rule(s) might apply to the problem (including any codes of ethics relevant to the situation) . What rule applies? If there is no honor code, is there an institutional rule by which James should turn in Ben? Is he under any obligation? Perhaps James believes, on the contrary, that the rule is to mind his own business, or to avoid cheating himself, but not to turn in Ben. Or James may believe that student solidarity takes precedence over turning in cheaters.
Decide how these abstract ethical rules actually apply to the problem so as to suggest a concrete solution . Perhaps James believes that, in general, one should turn in cheaters, but that he cannot apply the rule in this situation, realizing that he could not prove that Ben cheated. After all, what if the supposed answers are not really answers to the test? Or what if some of them are wrong? Or perhaps he does not want to try to prove Ben cheated, feeling he has more important things to do with his time.
Prepare to counteract contextual forces that might lead one not to act in an ethical manner . James may be reluctant to turn in Ben because he believes that other students, including but not limited to Ben, will shun him or retaliate against him for being a “snitch.” And of course, he may be right. Acting ethically often comes at a cost.
Act . In the end, what matters is not how one thinks, but rather what one does. It can be very difficult to translate thought into action. Nevertheless, the ultimate test of ethical reasoning is not just in how one thinks, but also in how one acts. James may believe he should turn in Bill but just not get up the guts actually to do it.

This model applies not only to judging others but to evaluating one’s own ethical reasoning. When confronted with a situation having a potential ethical dimension, students can learn literally to go through the steps of the model and ask how they apply to a given situation. For example, suppose James himself committed an ethical transgression and now regrets it. What can he do to make amends or otherwise set things right?

Applying this Learning Objective in the Classroom

Ideally, ethics is taught not just in a course on ethics but in any course in which ethics might potentially apply. Otherwise, there is the risk that what the students learn will be inert—that students will not see how to apply it outside the one course on ethics. Students need to learn how to apply ethical principles, as well as being inoculated against pressures to behave unethically, by being confronted with ethical problems in a variety of domains.

How does one actually teach ethical reasoning in the classroom? The most effective way to teach ethical reasoning is through the case-study method, but it is important that students generate their own case studies from their own experience as well, and then apply the steps of the model to their own problems. They need to be actively involved in seeing how the steps of the model apply to their own individual problems.

A famous, perhaps now classical, case study for teaching ethical reasoning is the following (14):

A train has gone out of control and is hurtling down the tracks toward four people who are strangers. You are too far away, so that if you call out to the people, they will not hear you, and you definitely cannot get them off the tracks. However, it is in your power to pull a lever that will divert the train. But there is a problem. There is a person on the tracks onto which you would divert the train. This person will be killed if you divert the train. Thus you can touch the controls and divert the train, resulting in the death of one person; alternatively, you could not touch the controls, and four people will die. What should you do?

Consider other more realistic problems:

Your friend Jack confides to you that he has a drug problem. He begs you not to tell anyone. He says he just needs someone in whom to confide. He does not plan to stop using drugs but wants you to know in case things go badly for him. What are possible courses of action for you? What are the advantages and disadvantages of each one?
You have just found out that there is a school prize for which you are eligible. For some reason, the prize has not been well publicized. You know that your best friend Jane is also eligible. You also know that if she applies her chances of winning the prize might be better than yours. You are debating with yourself whether to tell her about the prize. What are possible courses of action for you? What are the advantages and disadvantages of each one?
You are really interested in your best friend’s significant other. The significant other has just confessed to you a secret interest in you. What are possible courses of action for you? What are the advantages and disadvantages of each one?

Through grappling with these kinds of issues through case studies, students apply ethical principles and ethical reasoning. If students are not explicitly given these kinds of ethical dilemmas to confront, they will not learn to apply process of ethical reasoning. You would not just tell algebra students about a formula for solving some mathematical question, and then move on to the next topic. You would get them to apply, to use, that formula to solve multiple problems to ensure they understand it and can use it. Likewise, it is the process of applying ethical reasoning that is the primary outcome here. Because of this, the conclusions students come to are often less important than their reasoning processes in coming to those conclusions.

There are no easy answers to any of these problems, but that is the point: Teaching ethical reasoning is not about teaching what one should do in particular circumstances, it is about teaching students how wisely to make very difficult decisions involving ethical considerations where the answers are anything but clear cut. Students need actively to discuss problems, possible solutions, and the advantages and disadvantages of these potential solutions. Then they have to decide how they would act.

Through the use of ethical case studies, students discuss various solutions to cases as well as the advantages and disadvantages of various courses of action. This can be done through structured classroom discussion, written assignments, or presentations. Using this method, students are invited to critique each other’s ideas constructively and to improve on each other’s ideas. In addition, always ensure that some of the cases are built around problems the students themselves pose. In this way students can see how what they learn is relevant not only to other people’s problems, but also to their own.

Students will enter different occupations and will need to learn the particular code of ethics for their occupation as well as how to apply that code. For example, the National Education Association Code of Ethics (15) contains two main principles: commitment to the student and commitment to the profession. The first obligation to the student is that the teacher “shall not unreasonably restrain the student from independent action in the pursuit of learning.” In higher level courses in a major, these codes can be explored and applied to case studies. In lower level courses, because students will go into different professions, it will not be possible to take account of all codes. But it would be useful, in class, to take at least one code of ethics, and use it to examine problem cases. Using the National Education Association Code of Ethics, for instance, students could explore how well the teachers they have had fulfilled the code? Where, specifically, did they succeed or fail? What could they have done better? What can the student learn from the code that would apply to his or her own life? See the list of discipline-specific codes in the resources section below.

Applying this Learning Objective Online

Teaching ethical reasoning online presents its own particular challenges. Learning how to reason ethically is a dialectical, back-and-forth process. Simply delivering content through lectures and readings are at best supplementary forms of instruction. The primary form of instruction needs to be interactive because students need to present ideas, get feedback on those ideas, and then try out re-formed ideas that themselves will be subject to further modification. So because learning ethical reasoning requires active, not passive learning (16), particular care must be given to ensuring that online courses are designed with opportunities for rich interaction between students as well as between students and instructors. Discussion boards appear to be the most common way of achieving these interactions, but doing so requires particular attention to certain dynamics:

Learning is asynchronous in most cases . There is a difference between the immediacy of a classroom discussion and the asynchronous responses in an online discussion. But given that responses are not immediate, as they are in a face to face classroom, online responses have time to “mature.” Students can think through what other students have said, and hopefully, provide more thoughtful, well-reasoned responses. So delays may actually help students do the deeper and sometimes more time-consuming reasoning that ethical problems require in comparison with many other kinds of problems.
The feeling of anonymity may lead some students to be less careful in what they say . Anyone who has dealt with online trolls knows that people often feel anonymous over the Internet, whether they are or not. Avoid this by ensuring such online discussions are not setup for anonymity, and remind students about “netiquette” in your course. You may also devise your own guidelines for appropriate, and constructive, online discussions in this context. You should identify yourself in all threads and remember that there is a record of these threads.
With discussion of ethical issues, responses can often get into matters of unreasoned opinion quite easily. In order to keep students focused on the application of ethical reasoning, and avoiding pure, personal opinion, construct online discussions deliberately with specific guidelines on what kind of responses are expected. Rubrics are often used for this purpose so that students have a clearer understanding of what is expected and how they will be graded.
Some students may be afraid to divulge much about their own ethical challenges because their statements become part of an identifiable written record . You should emphasize that one best can cope with ethical challenges if one is willing to share those challenges and solicit feedback. But students should also be informed that, if they are uncomfortable sharing something, they just should not share it.
Students may be uncomfortable sharing thoughts on ethics with people they do not know . To facilitate this, be sure to include introductory, group-building exercises early in a course.

Assessing this Learning Objective

Ethical reasoning is best evaluated through essays or oral examinations in response to specific ethical problems. They do not lend themselves well to multiple-choice or short-answer assessments. For example, a simple ethical problem is, “James saw Ben purchase answers for an exam from an Internet site. What should James do? Please give alternative courses of action for James, and the potential advantages and disadvantages of each course of action.” A strong essay in response to this problem might look like this:

“James has to decide what to do in response to Ben’s having cheated. Ben could do several things:

James could turn in Ben. The advantage is that he has not let Ben get away with unethical behavior. The disadvantage is that Ben will almost certainly get mad at James and may also turn friends against James. James could turn him in secretly but that seems sleazy—like James does not want to take responsibility. Another disadvantage is that James may have thought Ben cheated but it might turn out he didn’t cheat after all.
James could do nothing. The advantage is that James stays out of the whole thing and does not get anyone, including himself, into trouble. The disadvantage is that he has failed to respond to an ethical challenge, burying it instead.
James could talk to Ben and tell him what he saw and that if he sees it again he will turn Ben in. The advantage of this course of action is that James does not do anything to hurt Ben’s future. The disadvantage is that Ben may be offended, may deny everything, and may turn against James, just as he would have if James had turned him in.
James could seek advice from a faculty member. The advantage is that James gets the opinion of someone with more experience than he has. The disadvantage is that after a delay, he still has to decide what to do and faces the same problems as before. The second disadvantage is that if James mentions Ben’s name, James’s options may be foreclosed by the faculty member.
James could tell Ben that unless Ben does some specific thing for James, James will turn him in. This solution has no advantages. The disadvantage is that he compounds Ben’s unethical behavior with unethical blackmail of his own.

In the end, I would suggest James tell the faculty member exactly what he saw and then leave it to the faculty member to decide what to do. Ben is hurting not only himself by the cheating, but everyone else, and he ought to learn sooner rather than later not to cheat.”

Use ethical dilemmas that address those issues that are more applicable to your particular discipline and address the ethical codes of behavior most salient in your discipline (see the list of resources below for discipline-specific ideas). When using discipline codes of ethics, you should ask three questions:

How does this ethical guideline apply to behavior on the job?
How am I applying the guideline or not applying it?
If I am applying it, how can I do better?

For example, an ethical guideline for a health-care professional might be “Building relationships of trust with patients is fundamental to ethical practice in medicine.” Now you ask first if the ethical guideline applies to your behavior on the job. Certainly it does for any health-care professional. Second, are you applying the guideline? If you are spending the time with patients that they need, if you are listening attentively to them and answering their questions, if you are keeping their information confidential, and if you are giving them the very best treatment you can, you might say that, yes, you are applying the guideline. But what could you do better? Perhaps you are not always as willing to discuss very difficult issues with patients as you should be, whether for lack of time or for lack of enthusiasm to engage in difficult conversations, such as in planning for serious side effects of medication or even death. In that case, you might work on this issue in order better to apply the guideline.

In assessing quality of ethical reasoning, the key principle for instructors to remember is that you should score for quality of reasoning, not for agreement with the conclusions the student reaches. We tend to like people who are similar to, and who agree with us (17, 18), which can introduce bias into grading. So as teachers, we have to be scrupulous to make sure we are grading for quality of reasoning, not for agreement with our set of values or perspectives. What matters is how well students reason, not the exact content of what they say.

When students have written essays showing their ethical reasoning, there are some general attributes of the essays to look for, and some specific attributes as well. The general attributes are those that would apply to essays of almost any kind including how logical, coherent, organized, and persuasive the essay is. The specific attributes are relevant in particular to ethical reasoning.

The first attribute is the number of alternative solutions to an ethical problem that the student proposes. How many different solutions can the student find? It is a bad sign when a student can see only one possible solution and a good sign when the student can see multiple possible solutions.
The second attribute is the student’s evaluations of the quality of each of the solutions. Can the student differentiate better solutions from poorer ones, or does the student fall into the trap of viewing all solutions as roughly equal in quality; or worse, does the student see poorer solutions as being better ones? As noted above, you are looking not for your agreement with the student’s evaluations but rather the quality of argument for the evaluations of the potential solutions.
The third attribute is the student’s overall evaluation of what to do. Did the student well use his or her own analysis of the ethical problem to reach a high-quality solution to the ethical problem?

The sample essay above is a strong one, because it presents four alternative solutions as well as a fifth that is recognized as unethical, and it considers both the advantages and disadvantages of each potential solution.

Sternberg, R. J. (2012). A model for ethical reasoning. Review of General Psychology, 16 , 319-326.
Investopedia (2013). 5 most publicized ethics violations by CEOs. Forbes . http://www.forbes.com/sites/investopedia/2013/02/05/5-most-publicized-ethics-violations-by-ceos/#3c3ec7e92799 .
Bhattacharjee, Y. (2013). The mind of a con man. New York Times . http://www.nytimes.com/2013/04/28/magazine/diederik-stapels-audacious-academic-fraud.html?pagewanted=all&_r=0 .
Nasiripour, S. (2015). Corinthian Colleges files for bankruptcy. Huffington Post . http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2015/05/04/corinthian-colleges-bankruptcy_n_7205344.html .
Tchividjian, B. (2014). Startling statistics: Child abuse and what the church can begin doing about it. Religion News . http://religionnews.com/2014/01/09/startling-statistics/ .
Educational Testing Service (1999). Cheating is a personal foul. http://www.glass-castle.com/clients/www-nocheating-org/adcouncil/research/cheatingfactsheet.html .
Sternberg, R. J. (2003). WICS: A model for leadership in organizations. Academy of Management Learning & Education, 2 , 386–401.
Antonakis, J., Cianciolo, A. T., & Sternberg, R. J. (Eds.). (2004). Leadership: Past, present, and future. In J. Antonakis, A. T. Cianciolo, & R. J. Sternberg (Eds.) The nature of leadership (pp. 3–15). Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage Publications.
Paul, R., & Elder, L. (2005). Critical thinking: Tools for taking charge of your learning and your life (2nd ed.) . Upper Saddle River, NJ: Prentice-Hall.
DeHaan, R., & Narayan, K. M. (Eds.) (2007). Education for innovation . Rotterdam, Netherlands: Sense Publishers.
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Further Online Resources

Ethics Resource Center (ERC). www.ethics.org .
EthicsWeb. http://www.ethicsweb.ca/resources/

Discipline-specific Codes of Ethics and Resources

Academy of Criminal Justice Sciences (ACJS)
American Advertising Federation (AAF) http://www.aaf.org/imis/_PDF/AAF%20Website%20Content/513_Ethics/IAE_Principles_Practices.pdf
The American Chemical Society https://www.acs.org/content/acs/en/careers/career-services/ethics/the-chemical-professionals-code-of-conduct.html
The American Institute of Architects (AIA) Code of Ethics http://www.aia.org/about/ethicsandbylaws/
American Institute of CPAs (AICPA) http://www.aicpa.org/Pages/default.aspx
American Library Association http://www.ala.org/advocacy/proethics/codeofethics/codeethics
American Medical Association Code of Medical Ethics http://www.ama-assn.org/ama/pub/physician-resources/medical-ethics/code-medical-ethics.page
American Philosophical Practitioners Association https://www.appa.edu/code.htm
American Psychological Association. Ethics Resources. http://www.apa.org/ethics/resources/
American Society for Biochemistry and Molecular Biology http://www.asbmb.org/Advocacy/CodeOfEthics/?terms=ethics
American Society for Public Administration (ASPA) http://www.aspanet.org/public/ASPA/Code%20of%20Ethics/ASPA/Resources/Code_of_Ethics/Code_of_Ethics1.aspx?hkey=7d5473b7-b98a-48a4-b409-3efb4ceaa006
Association for Computing Machinery https://www.acm.org/about-acm/acm-code-of-ethics-and-professional-conduct
Association of Information Technology Professionals https://www.aitp.org/?page=EthicsConduct
Association of Performing Arts Presenters (APAP) http://www.apap365.org/CONNECTIONS/Documents/CODE%20OF%20ETHICS%20–2014.pdf
College Art Association (CAA) http://www.collegeart.org/guidelines/practices
Construction Management Association of America (CMAA) http://cmaanet.org/code-of-ethics
Educators http://www.aaeteachers.org/index.php/about-us/aae-code-of-ethics
Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers (IEEE) http://www.ieee.org/about/corporate/governance/p7-8.html
Music Teachers National Association (MTNA) http://www.mtna.org/about-mtna/code-of-ethics/
The National Association of Environmental Professionals (NAEP) http://www.naep.org/code-of-ethics
National Association of Social Workers https://www.socialworkers.org/About/Ethics/Code-of-Ethics/Code-of-Ethics-English
National Education Association http://www.nea.org/home/30442.htm
National Society of Professional Engineers (NSPE) https://www.nspe.org/resources/ethics/code-ethics
North American Society for Sport Management (NASSM) Ethical Creed https://www.nassm.com/InfoAbout/NASSM/Creed
Public Relations Society of America (PRSA) https://www.prsa.org/aboutprsa/ethics/codeenglish#.V4-eOLgrKM8
Society of Professional Journalists (SPJ) http://www.spj.org/ethicscode.asp
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Developing creative capacities
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Development of Moral and Ethical Reasoning: A Comparison of U.S. and International University Students’ Moral Reasoning Skills

First Online: 18 September 2021

Cite this chapter

Samuel D. Brown 2 ,
Melanie Burton 2 ,
Pamela R. Hallam 2 &
David J. Settle 2

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The research reported in this chapter was conducted at a private Christian-affiliated university in the western United States. Two samples of beginning freshmen and two samples of seniors (all groups including U.S. and international students) were given the revised version of the DIT (DIT-2) during the same semester. Post conventional thinking pscores were collected and statistically compared using a one-way ANOVA. This study of moral development using the DIT-2 test can provide useful insights into the different ways that diverse populations reason in situations of moral complexity. Findings regarding gender and language differences were consistent with previous research; however, comparing international populations studying in the U.S. with native U.S. students found differences in moral reasoning scores needing further consideration. We conclude that additional research is necessary to determine the moral development of diverse groups within international settings. This research can help school officials working with different groups to support diverse students in higher education.

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Brown, S.D., Burton, M., Hallam, P.R., Settle, D.J. (2021). Development of Moral and Ethical Reasoning: A Comparison of U.S. and International University Students’ Moral Reasoning Skills. In: Zajda, J. (eds) Third International Handbook of Globalisation, Education and Policy Research. Springer, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-66003-1_31

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Thinking Ethically

Markkula Center for Applied Ethics
Ethics Resources
Ethical Decision Making

Moral issues greet us each morning in the newspaper, confront us in the memos on our desks, nag us from our children's soccer fields, and bid us good night on the evening news. We are bombarded daily with questions about the justice of our foreign policy, the morality of medical technologies that can prolong our lives, the rights of the homeless, the fairness of our children's teachers to the diverse students in their classrooms.

Dealing with these moral issues is often perplexing. How, exactly, should we think through an ethical issue? What questions should we ask? What factors should we consider?

The first step in analyzing moral issues is obvious but not always easy: Get the facts. Some moral issues create controversies simply because we do not bother to check the facts. This first step, although obvious, is also among the most important and the most frequently overlooked.

But having the facts is not enough. Facts by themselves only tell us what is ; they do not tell us what ought to be. In addition to getting the facts, resolving an ethical issue also requires an appeal to values. Philosophers have developed five different approaches to values to deal with moral issues.

The Utilitarian Approach Utilitarianism was conceived in the 19th century by Jeremy Bentham and John Stuart Mill to help legislators determine which laws were morally best. Both Bentham and Mill suggested that ethical actions are those that provide the greatest balance of good over evil.

To analyze an issue using the utilitarian approach, we first identify the various courses of action available to us. Second, we ask who will be affected by each action and what benefits or harms will be derived from each. And third, we choose the action that will produce the greatest benefits and the least harm. The ethical action is the one that provides the greatest good for the greatest number.

The Rights Approach The second important approach to ethics has its roots in the philosophy of the 18th-century thinker Immanuel Kant and others like him, who focused on the individual's right to choose for herself or himself. According to these philosophers, what makes human beings different from mere things is that people have dignity based on their ability to choose freely what they will do with their lives, and they have a fundamental moral right to have these choices respected. People are not objects to be manipulated; it is a violation of human dignity to use people in ways they do not freely choose.

Of course, many different, but related, rights exist besides this basic one. These other rights (an incomplete list below) can be thought of as different aspects of the basic right to be treated as we choose.

The right to the truth: We have a right to be told the truth and to be informed about matters that significantly affect our choices.

The right of privacy: We have the right to do, believe, and say whatever we choose in our personal lives so long as we do not violate the rights of others.

The right not to be injured: We have the right not to be harmed or injured unless we freely and knowingly do something to deserve punishment or we freely and knowingly choose to risk such injuries.

The right to what is agreed: We have a right to what has been promised by those with whom we have freely entered into a contract or agreement.

In deciding whether an action is moral or immoral using this second approach, then, we must ask, Does the action respect the moral rights of everyone? Actions are wrong to the extent that they violate the rights of individuals; the more serious the violation, the more wrongful the action.

The Fairness or Justice Approach The fairness or justice approach to ethics has its roots in the teachings of the ancient Greek philosopher Aristotle, who said that "equals should be treated equally and unequals unequally." The basic moral question in this approach is: How fair is an action? Does it treat everyone in the same way, or does it show favoritism and discrimination?

Favoritism gives benefits to some people without a justifiable reason for singling them out; discrimination imposes burdens on people who are no different from those on whom burdens are not imposed. Both favoritism and discrimination are unjust and wrong.

The Common-Good Approach This approach to ethics assumes a society comprising individuals whose own good is inextricably linked to the good of the community. Community members are bound by the pursuit of common values and goals.

The common good is a notion that originated more than 2,000 years ago in the writings of Plato, Aristotle, and Cicero. More recently, contemporary ethicist John Rawls defined the common good as "certain general conditions that are...equally to everyone's advantage."

In this approach, we focus on ensuring that the social policies, social systems, institutions, and environments on which we depend are beneficial to all. Examples of goods common to all include affordable health care, effective public safety, peace among nations, a just legal system, and an unpolluted environment.

Appeals to the common good urge us to view ourselves as members of the same community, reflecting on broad questions concerning the kind of society we want to become and how we are to achieve that society. While respecting and valuing the freedom of individuals to pursue their own goals, the common-good approach challenges us also to recognize and further those goals we share in common.

The Virtue Approach The virtue approach to ethics assumes that there are certain ideals toward which we should strive, which provide for the full development of our humanity. These ideals are discovered through thoughtful reflection on what kind of people we have the potential to become.

Virtues are attitudes or character traits that enable us to be and to act in ways that develop our highest potential. They enable us to pursue the ideals we have adopted. Honesty, courage, compassion, generosity, fidelity, integrity, fairness, self-control, and prudence are all examples of virtues.

Virtues are like habits; that is, once acquired, they become characteristic of a person. Moreover, a person who has developed virtues will be naturally disposed to act in ways consistent with moral principles. The virtuous person is the ethical person.

In dealing with an ethical problem using the virtue approach, we might ask, What kind of person should I be? What will promote the development of character within myself and my community?

Ethical Problem Solving These five approaches suggest that once we have ascertained the facts, we should ask ourselves five questions when trying to resolve a moral issue:

What benefits and what harms will each course of action produce, and which alternative will lead to the best overall consequences?

What moral rights do the affected parties have, and which course of action best respects those rights?

Which course of action treats everyone the same, except where there is a morally justifiable reason not to, and does not show favoritism or discrimination?

Which course of action advances the common good?

Which course of action develops moral virtues?

This method, of course, does not provide an automatic solution to moral problems. It is not meant to. The method is merely meant to help identify most of the important ethical considerations. In the end, we must deliberate on moral issues for ourselves, keeping a careful eye on both the facts and on the ethical considerations involved.

This article updates several previous pieces from Issues in Ethics by Manuel Velasquez - Dirksen Professor of Business Ethics at Santa Clara University and former Center director - and Claire Andre, associate Center director. "Thinking Ethically" is based on a framework developed by the authors in collaboration with Center Director Thomas Shanks, S.J., Presidential Professor of Ethics and the Common Good Michael J. Meyer, and others. The framework is used as the basis for many programs and presentations at the Markkula Center for Applied Ethics.

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Kant and Hume on Morality

The relationship between Immanuel Kant (1724–1804) and David Hume (1711–1776) is a source of longstanding fascination. Kant credited Hume with waking him from his “dogmatic slumber”, and he describes the Critique of Pure Reason , arguably the most important work of modern philosophy, as the solution to the “Humean problem in its greatest possible amplification” (Prol 4:260–61). Much of the focus has been on their respective views in metaphysics and epistemology. Yet, as Thomas Nagel remarks, contemporary moral philosophy also “continues to be dominated by the disagreement between these two giants” (Nagel 2012). Comparing Hume and Kant therefore provides opportunity to clarify and assess two of the modern era’s most influential approaches to moral philosophy. Comparing their views also illuminates the landscape of eighteenth-century ethical thought. There are fundamental disagreements between them, but Kant and Hume share some central assumptions about morality, and Kant was directly influenced by the sentimentalist tradition to which Hume belongs (especially Francis Hutcheson’s version). The influence was most positive and pronounced early in Kant’s career, but it lingered long after he made a decisive break with this tradition.

For the sake of brevity, this article assumes familiarity with Hume’s and Kant’s main contributions to moral philosophy. The aim here is not to summarize their views or provide an exhaustive comparison. Instead, the task is to examine several key areas where we can reasonably see Kant as responding to or influenced by Hume, or where comparisons between their views are particularly fruitful.

1. Moral Philosophy and its Subject Matter

2. kant’s relationship to hume and british moral philosophy, 3. reason and emotion in morality, 4. virtues and vices, 5. freedom and necessity, 6. religion and morality, hume, david, kant, immanuel, secondary sources, other internet resources, related entries.

Hume and Kant operate with two somewhat different conceptions of morality itself, which helps explain some of the differences between their respective approaches to moral philosophy . The most important difference is that Kant sees law, duty, and obligation as the very heart of morality, while Hume does not. In this respect, Kant’s conception of morality resembles what Bernard Williams calls “the moral system”, which defines the domain of morality primarily in terms of an unconditionally binding and inescapable form of obligation (Williams 1985: 193–94). Kant believes that our moral concerns are dominated by the question of what duties are imposed on us by a law that commands with a uniquely moral necessity. Like most eighteenth-century philosophers, he also believes that our moral lives are preoccupied with the question of how to be virtuous over a lifetime, but he defines virtue in terms of the more fundamental concepts of law, obligation, and duty. By contrast, these concepts play a role in Hume’s understanding, but they are far less central. For Hume, the broader and somewhat looser notion of “personal merit” lies at the heart of morality (EPM 9.1.1). Our moral concerns are dominated by the question of which motives are virtuous, and we answer this question by looking to the responses of our fellow human beings, who—when viewing things properly—approve of those motives and character traits that are useful or immediately agreeable (EPM 9.1.13). These are the terms that characterize duty and obligation for Hume, rather than the other way around.

Two other differences are important to note. First, Kant draws a bright line between moral and non-moral phenomena, such as prudence, politics, or aesthetics. Morality’s normative standards and the nature of its demands distinguish it sharply from the non-moral. For Hume, the line between the moral and non-moral is far blurrier. He frequently assimilates moral judgment to “taste” or judgments about beauty and deformity (Gill 2007), and he explicitly argues against the strict separation of moral virtues from other personal qualities such as a quick wit or even good looks (T 3.3.4–5). According to Hume, the strict separation of moral and non-moral virtues marks one way in which modern moral thought is inferior to ancient ethics. He also seems to suspect that it reflects an unhealthy fixation on responsibility and guilt inherited from Christianity (Darwall 2013: 8–9).

A second important difference is closely related to the first. For Kant the moral is distinguished from the non-moral not only by a special form of obligation but also by its elevation above the rest of life. Morality itself has a unique status or “dignity”, as does the rational being from whose autonomous will the law springs (G 4:435). The proper response to both is a correspondingly unique form of reverence or “respect”, which morality demands equally from each of us. Kant believes that in the moral domain we take ourselves—often only implicitly—to be “persons”, elevated above mere “things” such as machines or other animals. One of our chief moral concerns is to protect this status, which requires respecting the rational autonomy at its source and avoiding behavior or patterns of thought and desire that dishonor or degrade persons by treating ourselves or others as mere things. This concern looms large in Kant’s conception of morality, and it has a profound influence on his approach to moral philosophy (Anderson 2008). We see it, for example, in his discussions of respect for persons and his characterization of ethical virtue as “love of honor” (cf. Denis 2014). We see it also in the priority given to duties to self (cf. Denis 2010a), as well as Kant’s claim that a person throws herself away and makes herself an object of “contempt” when she lies to herself or grovels before others, for example (MM 6:420). Hume does not see things this way. For Hume, the domain of morality is not particularly pure, special, or elevated. It sometimes shows us at our most benevolent or most magnanimous, but morality is continuous with the rest of life, including politics and the pursuit of wealth and status in modern commercial society. Moral virtue is undoubtedly pleasing to us, sometimes powerfully so, but it does not command a unique form of respect or reverence. Neither do the rules and ideals of morality, which spring from the same propensities, ideas, and passions that drive the rest of human behavior. Notions of honor and dignity may figure into Hume’s view of morality but they are far from central. Morality has us far more concerned with promoting pleasure and utility.

Hume and Kant both believe that philosophy should offer a theory of morality’s foundation. When it comes to morality’s foundation, they seem to agree on two things. First, morality’s foundation cannot be found in religion. Second, it cannot be found in mind-independent facts about the world. Yet they disagree about the rest of the story. Hume locates the foundation of morality in human nature, primarily in our emotional responses to the behavior of our fellow human beings. By contrast, Kant locates the foundation of morality in the rational nature that we share with all possible finite rational beings. He argues that morality’s foundation lies in the “autonomy” of the rational will. Kant’s notion of autonomy is one of the more central, distinctive, and influential aspects of his ethics. He defines autonomy as “the property of the will by which it is a law to itself (independently of any property of the objects of volition)” (G 4:440). According to Kant, the will of a moral agent is autonomous in that it both gives itself the moral law (is self-legislating) and can constrain or motivate itself to follow the law (is self-constraining or self-motivating). The source of the moral law is not in the agent’s feelings or inclinations, but in her “pure” rational will, which Kant identifies as the “proper self” (G 4:461). A heteronomous will, on the other hand, is governed by something other than itself, such as an external force or authority.

These rival conceptions of morality and its foundation correspond to two very different approaches to moral philosophy. Hume’s approach could be called naturalistic, empirical, or experimental. His moral philosophy is part of his larger endeavor to provide a naturalistic explanation of human nature as a whole. Hume’s approach relies on and reflects his philosophy of mind, which is empirical in its approach. He treats ethics, together with psychology, history, aesthetics, and politics, as the subject of his “moral science”. Hume often seems more interested in explaining morality as a natural phenomenon than in setting out a normative ethical theory, treating moral action as part of the same physical world in which we explain things in terms of cause and effect (EHU 8.1.20–22). On this view, everything we do is open to empirical investigation and explanation. In fact, Hume often compares humans with other animals, tracing the bases of human morality to features of the mind that human beings and other animals have in common (T 2.1.12).

In sharp contrast with Hume, Kant insists on the need for an a priori investigation of morality’s foundation. His detailed treatment of virtue and moral judgment draws heavily on observations and ideas about human nature. But Kant makes explicit that morality must be based on a supreme moral principle, which can only be discovered a priori , through a method of pure moral philosophy (G 4:387–92). By “pure” or a priori moral philosophy, Kant has in mind a philosophy grounded exclusively on principles that are inherent in and revealed through the operations of reason. According to Kant, the a priori approach is required because morality’s commands are unconditional. We could never discover a principle that commands all rational beings with such absolute authority through Hume’s method. An empirical approach, he argues, can tell us how people do act, but it cannot tell us how we ought to act. Once equipped with the supreme principle of morality, however, one still requires an understanding of human beings in order to apply it (MM 6:217). This is important for Kant. One can say little about what the supreme moral principle requires in concreto without knowing such things as the sorts of ends people may be inclined to adopt and the conditions under which human agency will characteristically thrive or wither. As noted below and throughout, this is one area of Kant’s moral thinking that was significantly influenced by Hume and his fellow sentimentalists.

Hume exerted a profound influence on Kant’s theoretical philosophy. (See, e.g., Guyer 2008, Kuehn 2017, Kuehn 1987b, and Kuehn 1983.) Kant reports that his “labor” in the Critique of Pure Reason was fundamentally a response to “that Humean skeptical teaching” (CPrR 5:32). But the impact of Hume’s moral philosophy was far less direct. On the one hand, Kant’s early ethical writings are filled with positive appraisals of moral sense theory or sentimentalism, and his own views reveal a significant debt to this tradition. On the other hand, Kant seems to associate the best of this tradition with Hutcheson more than with Hume (Kuehn 2001: 182). However, Hume exerted a powerful influence on Kant’s anthropological writings and lectures (Louden 2017), and the anthropological side of Kant’s enterprise shaped his thinking about the application of a priori moral philosophy to real human beings.

Sentimentalism’s positive influence on Kant’s work was strongest during the early part of his career (e.g., Walschots 2017 and Sensen 2017). The influence is most pronounced in two of his published works from the 1760s. In Observations on the Feeling of the Beautiful and Sublime (1764), Kant notes and analyzes the various feelings of pleasure or displeasure, and attraction and aversion, people feel to different traits and temperaments in themselves and others (and to different types of literature, objects in nature, etc.). His remarks about morality convey a commitment to some form of sentimentalism, however idiosyncratic. He claims, for example, that the principles of morality are “not speculative rules, but the consciousness of a feeling that lives in every human breast and that extends much further than to the special grounds of sympathy and complaisance” (OFBS 2.217). He describes this as “the feeling of the beauty and the dignity of human nature”, proclaiming that one can “bring about the noble attitude that is the beauty of virtue” only when a person “subordinates” her particular inclinations “to such an enlarged” feeling of the beauty and dignity of human nature (OFBS 2.217). Kant advances similar claims in another work from the period, Inquiry Concerning the Distinctness of the Principles of Natural Theology and Morality (1763), where he distinguishes between the faculty for representing truth and the faculty for experiencing the good, identifying the latter with feeling . “Just as there are unanalyzable concepts of the true,” Kant argues, “so too there is an unanalyzable feeling of the good… One of the tasks of the understanding is to analyze and render distinct the compound and confused concept of the good by showing how it arises from simpler feelings of the good” (I 2:299).

Other indications of sentimentalism’s influence can be found in Kant’s notes and lectures from that period. For example, in the announcement of his lectures for the winter semester of 1765–1766, he asserts that “the distinction between good and evil in actions, and the judgment of moral rightness, can be known, easily and accurately, by the human heart through what is called sentiment, and that without elaborate necessity of proofs” (WS 2:311). In the same announcement, he states his intention to develop and clarify “the attempts of Shaftesbury, Hutcheson and Hume, which, though imperfect and defective, have nevertheless come farthest in the discovery of the first principles of all morality” (WS 2:311). Similarly, in notes that appear to come from between 1764 and 1768, Kant writes, “[t]he rules of morality proceed from a special, eponymous feeling, upon which the understanding is guided…” (NF 19:93 #6581).

As Kant’s views developed over the 1760s, his view of sentimentalism grew more negative. By the late 1760s, he was arguing that this tradition could not possibly provide an adequate account of moral obligation. Morality imposes unconditional requirements, and he became increasingly convinced that sentimentalism could not explain or justify such requirements. Arguments for this conclusion became central to Kant’s later writings and lectures. In several works, Kant creates taxonomies of misguided, heteronomous ethical theories based on material determining grounds—in contrast to his theory of autonomy, in which the moral motive constitutes an objective, formal determining ground (see Wood 2005b [Other Internet Resources]; Irwin 2009: chapters 68 and 71; and Schneewind 2009). Kant distinguishes among these theories based on their accounts of the basis of moral obligation or the fundamental moral principle (G 4:441–44; CPrR 5:39–41; C 27: 252–54; M 29:621–25). Such theories may assume either subjective (empirical) or objective (rational) determining grounds for the moral principle; and within each of these categories, there are theories that assume these determining grounds are external, and others that assume they are internal. Objective, internal grounds include perfection (e.g., Wolff and the Stoics). Objective, external grounds include the will of God (e.g., Crusius). Subjective, external grounds include education (e.g., Montaigne) or civil constitution (e.g., Mandeville). Subjective, internal grounds can include physical feeling, such as self-love (e.g., Epicurus) or self-interest (e.g., Hobbes), or moral feeling (e.g., Hutcheson) (CPrR 5:40; C 27:253). Thus, Kant locates moral sense theories among those theories that assume a subjective, empirical, internal determining ground of moral feeling as the principle of morality (cf. M 29:621).

From the Groundwork on, Kant’s objections to sentimentalism concentrate on what he takes to be its fatal flaw. No empirical principles can ground moral laws because such laws bind all rational beings universally, necessarily, and unconditionally. The authority of empirical principles, by contrast, depends on contingent aspects of human nature (G 4:442–43). Furthermore, variance in moral feelings makes them an inadequate standard of good and evil (G 4:442). Moral feelings cannot be the source of the supreme moral principle because the supreme moral principle holds for all rational beings, whereas feelings differ from person to person (M 29:625). If duty were grounded in feeling, morality would bind some people (e.g., the tender-hearted) more strongly than others. Even if people were in complete agreement regarding their moral feelings, the agreement would be a contingent matter, and thus an inadequate ground for the moral law, as Kant understands it. Indeed, if morality were grounded in feeling, it would be arbitrary: God could have constituted us so that we would get from vice the pleasurable, calm feelings of approval that we now (allegedly) get from virtue (M 29:625). So for Kant, the contingency of the ground of obligation offered by moral sense theories renders those theories inadequate; only a priori determining grounds will do.

As these criticisms indicate, Kant’s mature thinking vehemently rejects sentimentalism’s approach to the foundation of morality. Yet the influence of Shaftesbury, Hutcheson, and Hume lingered long after Kant came to believe that morality’s true foundation lies in the autonomy of the will. In his notes, Kant remarks that while moral sense theories cannot justify our moral judgments, or provide the standards that should guide them, such theories do offer compelling empirical explanations of how we actually judge action (NF 19:117 #6626). In the same vein, he suggests that even if one rejects moral sense “as a principle for the judgment of moral action,” one might still accept it as a theory “of the mind’s incentives to morality” (M 29:625). Kant also continues to endorse some version of his earlier claim in Observations that some of our feelings indicate a “susceptibility of the soul which… makes it fit for virtuous impulses” (OFBS 2:208). We see this in the Metaphysics of Morals , for instance, where Kant claims that moral feeling, conscience, love of one’s neighbor, and self-respect all “lie at the basis of morality, as subjective conditions of receptiveness to the concept of duty” (MM 6:399; see Guyer 2010). The lingering influence of sentimentalism can also be seen in his emphasis on the obligation to “sympathize actively” with others, and in the claim that we have “an indirect duty to cultivate the compassionate natural (aesthetic) feelings in us, and to make use of them as so many means to sympathy based on moral principles and the feeling appropriate to them…. For this [compassion] is still one of the impulses that nature has implanted in us to do what the representation of duty alone might not accomplish” (MM 6:457).

Kant, as discussed above, underwent a decisive change of mind about the views of Shaftesbury, Hutcheson, and Hume. Early in his career, he endorsed core aspects of their approach, but Kant’s mature work is organized around the idea that reason , rather than feeling or emotion, is the highest authority in the moral domain. In this respect, many features of his moral philosophy are fundamentally opposed to Hume’s. We can see this opposition in their respective accounts of moral judgment and moral motivation. A careful look at these topics, however, also highlights sentimentalism’s residual influence on Kant.

According to Hume, moral judgments typically concern the character traits and motives behind human actions. To make a moral judgment is to detect, by means of a sentiment, the operation of a virtuous or vicious quality of mind. The sentiment here is a “peculiar” kind of feeling—namely, a feeling of approval (love, pride) or disapproval (hatred, humility) (T 3.3.1.3). We call the traits that elicit our approval “virtues”, and those that elicit our disapproval “vices”. Sentiments of approval and disapproval are passions, but they tend to be “soft and gentle” and therefore easily mistaken for thoughts or ideas (T 3.1.2.1). The real story is that “morality… is more properly felt than judg’d of” (T 3.1.2.1). Reason and experience are required for determining the likely effects of a given motive or character trait, so reason does play an important role in moral judgment. Yet reason’s role is subordinate. It is one thing to say that a given trait tends to be useful or conducive to pleasure and quite another to say that it is “good” or “virtuous”. The moral value of a trait is conferred by the sentiment of approval, which “gilding and staining all natural objects with the colours, borrowed from internal sentiment, raises, in a manner, a new creation” (EPM App. I.21). Hume argues, however, that only those sentiments experienced from a “general point of view” count as genuinely moral (T 3.1.2.4). For example, a person might hate or envy the courage of her enemy but this is not necessarily a moral response. The moral sentiment is experienced when she considers her enemy’s courage from a “general point of view” (T 3.1.2.4). When a person considers things from this point of view, she looks upon them as a “judicious spectator”, who is disinterested but still emotionally responsive to the scene she beholds (Cohon 2008: 126–58). Rather than eliminating her sentiments, the judicious spectator enlarges them by means of sympathy, which enables her to resent the misery of others or rejoice in their happiness. (On sympathy, see Owen 2009 and Taylor 2015: 189–94.)

Kant offers a very different account of moral judgment. He focuses on the first-person judgments an agent (not a spectator) must make about how to behave. In his view, the primary question is what the moral law permits, forbids, or requires. Passion or sentiment cannot answer such a question. Instead, answering it requires an operation of reason by means of which the agent determines whether her principle or “maxim” of conduct conflicts with the moral law. Because she is an imperfect and finite rational being, the law presents itself to her as a “categorical imperative” (CI). It is an imperative because it commands and constrains us; it is categorical because it commands and constrains us with ultimate authority and without regard to personal preferences or any empirically contingent ends (G 4:413–20). The two best known formulations of the CI are the formula of universal law (FUL), which commands, “ act only in accordance with that maxim through which you can at the same time will that it become a universal law ” (G 4:421), and the formula of the end in itself (FEI), which commands, “ So act that you use humanity, whether in your own person or in the person of any other, always at the same time as an end, never merely as a means ” (G 4:429). Scholars disagree about the relationship between these two formulations of the CI, as well as their relationship to the other formulations Kant provides. There is also disagreement about whether FUL or FEI has primacy in deliberation and moral judgment. Kant claims that FUL is the standard everyone actually employs in moral judgment (G 4:402; CPrR 5:69), and some scholars defend its primacy (e.g., Engstrom 2009). Others argue in favor of FEI, emphasizing, in particular, its role in the Metaphysics of Morals , where FEI seems to play the fundamental role in guiding judgment about specific ethical duties (e.g., Wood 1999).

Some passages from Kant’s work seem to suggest that moral judgment requires no experience, no knowledge of human nature and local custom, and no emotional sensitivity. A rational being equipped with the correct formal procedure has all she needs. Yet such passages are misleading when read in isolation. This is not Kant’s view of how human beings do, or even should, make moral judgments (Wood 2008: 56). First, application of the CI typically requires auxiliary or subordinate “principles of application”, which must be taken from our empirical knowledge of human nature (MM 6:217). Second, Kant frequently emphasizes that no formal procedure could specify all the principles for applying higher-order principles. Principles of application help us apply higher order principles to concrete circumstances, but there is no substitute for experience and “judgment”, which is a knack or uncodifiable talent (A138/B172). The need for judgment explains why the practice of casuistry is “woven into ethics” (MM 6:411). Furthermore, the wider the duty, the more latitude for individual judgment and experience (MM 6:390). Finally, Kant believes that moral judgment requires emotional sensitivity and an understanding of social convention. For example, without these, one might be unable to determine whether a particular act of beneficence is more condescending than kind (MM 6:453), or to prevent friendly banter from sliding into disrespectful mockery (MM 6:467). Proper moral judgment in such circumstances requires attunement to the feelings of others, but also facility with the social conventions that shape the dynamics of personal interaction.

Kant and Hume fundamentally disagree on the question of reason’s authority. Hume assigns reason to a subordinate role, while Kant takes reason to be the highest normative authority. However, it is important not to misunderstand the nature of their opposition. Hume offers an empirical explanation of the moral judgments made in “common life”, which he takes to be part of his broader science of human nature. This is his focus. By contrast, though Kant makes observations about the “common” use of reason in morality (e.g., G 4:399), this is not his focus. He says relatively little about what is going on in our heads or the surrounding social environment when we make moral judgments. As noted above, Kant at least entertained the possibility that sentimentalism provides the best empirical explanation of our patterns of approval and disapproval (NF 19:117 #6626). What Kant insists on is that such responses can be justified only by pure reason, which is the only faculty capable of understanding the unconditional necessity of the moral law’s commands. Emotion or feeling plays a crucial role in guiding our application of the law to particular maxims in concrete circumstances, but feeling’s role is fully subordinate to reason’s (Sensen 2017: 135–137).

A similar contrast between Hume and Kant can be found in their respective accounts of moral motivation. Hume famously claims that “Reason is, and ought only to be the slave of the passions, and can never pretend to any other office than to serve and obey them” (T 2.3.3.4). The claim is not that reason has no role in human action, but rather that its role is entirely subordinate to passion. Hume offers three main arguments for this claim in A Treatise of Human Nature . There is considerable debate about how these arguments work, the precise nature of Hume’s famous anti-rationalism, and whether his position changed from the Treatise to the second Enquiry . (See, e.g., Milgram 1995; Radcliffe 1997 and 2018; Cohon 2008: chapters 2 and 3; and Irwin 2008: chapter 26.)

According to the first argument, “reason alone can never be a motive to any action of the will” (T 2.3.3.1). Abstract (or demonstrative) reasoning, which involves a priori inferences and judgments pertaining to relations of ideas, cannot influence the will, but only assist us in our pursuit of an end we already have. For example, probable reasoning helps us discover causal relations among objects of experience conducive to the realization of pre-selected ends, but such information about cause and effect can never motivate action on its own: “It can never in the least concern us to know, that such objects are causes, and such others effects, if both causes and effects be indifferent to us” (T 2.3.3.3). In order to be motivated to act, we must first anticipate pleasure or pain from something. That anticipated pleasure or pain gives rise to feelings of desire or aversion for the object in question. Probable reasoning allows us to discern the causes of this object; our positive or negative feelings about the object then spread to the causes of it; and we are then motivated to pursue or to avoid them. Simply believing that one thing causes another will not motivate action (T 2.3.3.2).

A second argument, which builds on the first, aims to show that reason “can never oppose passion in the direction of the will” (T 2.3.3.1). The only thing that can oppose an impulse to action generated by one passion is a contrary impulse. Reason, then, could counteract an impulse to action generated by a passion if and only if reason could itself generate a contrary impulse. But from the first argument, we know that that reason cannot generate such an impulse. “Thus it appears, that the principle, which opposes any passion, cannot be the same with reason, and is only called so in an improper sense” (T 2.3.3.4). Hume goes on to say that whatever we feel in us running contrary to an impulse to act that we mistake for reason must be something else, such as a calm passion (e.g., a general appetite for the good, benevolence, or aversion to evil; T 2.3.3.8).

The third argument claims that a passion is an “original existence”, not an idea, or a mental copy of another object. Contradiction to truth and reason “consists in the disagreement of ideas, consider’d as copies, with those objects, which they represent” (T 2.3.3.5). Therefore, a passion cannot be contrary to truth and reason. Passions cannot, strictly speaking, be evaluated as reasonable or unreasonable, despite our practice of calling passions unreasonable or irrational when they depend in some way on poor reasoning or false beliefs. Later in the Treatise , Hume extends this argument to volitions and actions as well (T 3.1.1.9). We might view Kant’s conflict in conception and contradiction in will tests of the formula of universal law to constitute refutations of the latter argument (G 4:421–24; see Guyer 2008: ch. 5).

Hume draws important anti-rationalist moral conclusions from this line of thought. One obvious implication is that reason cannot be the motive to moral action; if reason cannot motivate any action, it cannot motivate moral action. A second further conclusion is that morality and its basic principles cannot be grounded in reason. This one follows both from his views about the “inertness” of reason generally, and from his assumption that morality has real motivational power: “Morals excite passions, and produce or prevent actions. Reason of itself is utterly impotent in this particular. The rules of morality, therefore, are not conclusions of reason” (T 3.1.1.6).

Kant never directly addresses the above arguments, but he clearly rejects Hume’s claim that reason is motivationally “impotent” or enslaved to the passions. It is a central feature of his moral philosophy that pure reason can be “practical”—that reason can “of itself, independently of anything empirical, determine the will” (CPrR 5: 42). He says of right actions that they “need no recommendation” from emotion or personal inclination. Such actions “represent the will that practices them as the object of an immediate respect, and nothing but reason is required to impose them upon the will” (G 4:435). Moreover, in the first section of the Groundwork , Kant repeatedly emphasizes the special form of “moral worth” that attaches to right actions that are performed simply because they are right—i.e., actions motivated from “from duty” or “from respect for the law” (G 4:396–401; see Timmermann 2009a).

Despite his emphasis on the motivational efficacy of pure reason, Kant’s discussion of respect makes clear that feeling plays an important role in human moral motivation (see Guyer 2008: ch. 5; and Guyer 2010). Early in the Groundwork , Kant describes respect in a manner that makes it sound like a felt aspect of the law itself: “an action from duty is to put aside entirely the influence of inclination, and with it every object of the will; hence there is left for the will nothing that could determine it the except objectively the law and subjectively pure respect for this practical law” (G 4:400). However, his subsequent account makes respect sound more like a separate feeling that arises from reason:

But although respect is a feeling, it is not one received by means of influence; it is, instead, a feeling self-wrought by a rational concept and therefore specifically different from all feelings of the first kind, which can be referred to inclination or fear. What I cognize immediately as a law for me, I cognize with respect, which signifies merely consciousness of the subordination of my will to a law without the mediation of other influences on any sense. Immediate determination of the will by means of the law and the consciousness of this is called respect , so that this is regarded as the effect of the law on the subject, and not as the cause of the law. (G 4:401 n; also see 460)

Even though we cannot know (or “make intelligible a priori”) how a thought or judgment about the morality of an action “can itself produce a sensation of pleasure or pain”, Kant thinks that this somehow does happen; it must, if moral considerations are to be motivating in beings like us. The phenomenology of respect is unusual, as it involves both pain and pleasure (or something like it). There is the humiliation an agent feels when the moral law strikes down her self-conceit; but respect also feels invigorating and ennobling, since the moral law comes from the agent’s own reason and represents her higher self and vocation (CPrR 5:73).

However one interprets the phenomenology, respect seems to function as an intermediary between reason and the will. This raises questions about the consistency of Kant’s view, since he argues repeatedly that pure reason can, and should, determine the will “immediately”. For this and other reasons, scholars are divided on how to interpret Kant’s treatment of respect. According to an “intellectualist” line of interpretation, respect is the effect of pure reason’s motivational influence on the will. In other words, we grasp the law by means of reason, are moved to act accordingly, and feel respect as a result of being so moved. According to an “affectivist” approach, however, respect is the proximate cause of reason’s influence on the will. In other words, our rational grasp of the law’s demand produces a feeling of respect or reverence, which then moves the will (or higher faculty of desire). Vexingly, both interpretations have a strong textual basis and both have been defended with great skill and insight. (For an excellent discussion of the issues, see Frierson 2014: ch. 4; see also Sensen 2017, especially 129–134. On the various forms of respect and the different roles they play, see Williamson 2018.)

In the Metaphysics of Morals , Kant argues that additional feelings also play a role in motivating virtuous conduct. He lists moral feeling, conscience, love of human beings, and respect (for oneself) as special kinds of feelings of which we are made aware only though consciousness of the moral law (MM 6:399). Kant describes these as “moral endowments” that “lie at the basis of morality” or the “ subjective conditions of receptivity to the concept of duty” (MM 6:399). Since our compliance with duty presupposes our having these feelings, there is no duty for us to have them. However, because of their indispensability to human morality, there is a duty to cultivate them. Additionally, Kant clearly sees moral value in some sensibly-grounded (“pathological”) feelings (MM 6:456–57, 458; also M 29:626; NF 19:77 #6560). Speaking of sympathy, which is perhaps the best example of this sort of feeling, Kant says “it is… an indirect duty to cultivate the natural… feelings in us, and to make use of them as so many means to sympathy based on moral principles and the feeling appropriate to them” (MM 6:457).

Sympathy allows us better to understand others’ needs, helps us to communicate our concern for them, and can act as an additional incentive to facilitate our promotion of our happiness helping others. Such sensibly-grounded feelings can work with rationally-grounded feelings to motivate action. We may cultivate sympathetic feelings from respect for the law, and then find these feelings prompting us to act in certain ways. In this context, where the focus is on virtue, Kant sounds closer to Hume than he is often taken to be. Indeed, according to one prominent interpretation, careful consideration of this and other relevant material highlights at least a few “deep affinities” between Kant on Hume on motivation and practical reason (Guyer 2008: 164). Yet the affinities should not be overstated. Kant’s view of sympathy is appreciative but wary, and sympathy for him does not play the prominent role it plays for Hume. (On Kant’s view of the upsides and downsides of sympathy, see Sorensen 2018. Cf. Sayre-McCord 2015 on sympathy’s role in Hume’s theory of moral judgment.)

Despite several surprising similarities, Kant and Hume clearly disagree on the basic question of whether pure reason, to use Kant’s expression, can be motivationally efficacious. Kant thinks it can, while Hume does not. However, one must interpret this disagreement with care. First, Kant’s account of respect makes clear that feeling or emotion is involved even when pure reason motivates action. The “affectivist” interpretation of respect, in particular, suggests that Kant and Hume may agree that reason cannot motivate action without the intervention of feeling. (For a similar point about the French and British moral rationalists Hume probably read, see Radcliffe 2019.) The crucial difference between them is that Kant believes pure reason capable of producing a motivationally efficacious feeling (respect), while Hume believes nothing of the sort. The opposition between them is even starker if the “intellectualist” interpretation of Kantian respect is correct. Second, Kant’s account of virtue makes it clear that feelings such as love and sympathy often play an important moral role in the motivation of human action. Indeed, feelings appear to be indispensable for human beings and should therefore be cultivated and strengthened through deliberate practice.

One must also keep track of the level at which these two philosophers disagree. Consider, for example, the reason why Hume would adamantly reject Kant’s attribution of a special form of “moral worth” to actions done “from duty”. According to Hume,“ no action can be virtuous, or morally good, unless there be in human nature some motive to produce it, distinct from a sense of its morality ” (T 3.2.1.7). To avoid circularity, there must be a motive to virtuous action that does not itself refer to the moral goodness of the act (T 3.2.1.4). For Hume, the only time one would have to rely on one’s sense of the goodness of an act to motivate oneself to do it is when one is deficient in the natural feelings that ordinarily prompt people to act morally (e.g., natural affection, generosity, gratitude). The two philosophers do not necessarily disagree on the empirical question of what actually motivates people. Note that Hume seems to countenance the possibility of being motivated directly by the sense of an action’s moral goodness. Kant, in fact, seems comparatively skeptical; he expresses doubt that there have ever been human actions motivated from duty alone (e.g., G 4:406–407). They disagree sharply, however, on the normative question at issue. Kant believes that the most morally admirable actions are performed “from duty” alone. These are the only actions that have true “moral worth”. By contrast, Hume believes that such actions indicate a character flaw. Indeed, if a person finds she is moved to act only by the sense that the action is good, she may very well reproach herself for a lack of generosity or gratitude, for example, and consequently form a desire to change her character.

Hume and Kant both treat the concepts of virtue and vice as central to human morality. But they differ on the basic nature of virtue, and they offer different catalogues of the virtues and vices. Kant’s discussions reflect his consistent emphasis on freedom, dignity, rationality, and purity of motive. Hume’s reflect his emphasis on utility, pleasure, and the inherently social nature of the mind. Correspondingly, the notion of internal struggle is central to Kant’s account, while Hume portrays virtue in comparatively relaxed and genial terms. Relatedly, Hume is far more comfortable with the bourgeois virtues integral to successful participation in modern commercial and political society (cf. EPM 9.1.2). By contrast, Kant is warier of society’s influence on the individual, more insistent on the need to resist the power of what Rousseau calls amour-propre .

For Hume, the concepts of virtue and vice apply primarily to character traits or “mental qualities”, and secondarily to occurrent motives and actions. According to Hume, a character trait is a virtue if, and only if, it “gives to a spectator the pleasing sentiment of approbation” (EPM App. I.10). Vices, by contrast, are those traits that generate a displeasing sentiment of disapproval. Hume’s definition builds on his account of moral judgment, and it makes virtue dependent on the responses of a “judicious” spectator who contemplates things from a general point of view. The trait of prudence, for example, is a virtue because it tends to be pleasing to such a spectator. As Hume puts it, the defining mark of a virtue is that it has the “power of producing love or pride” when surveyed from the general point of view (T 3.3.1.3). In other words, a trait is a virtue only insofar as it tends to provoke the moral sentiment of approval in a properly situated spectator. If it did not tend to provoke this response, it would not be a virtue. Note how this marks a significant departure from Aristotelian conceptions of virtue, which says instead that a character trait’s goodness is a function of the role it plays in the agent’s own flourishing (Cohon 2008: 161).

Hume operates with a capacious catalogue of virtues and vices. His account in the Treatise is organized around the distinction between “natural” and “artificial” virtues, which is easily misunderstood. The question is not whether some virtues are fake or phony and others are authentic. The question is whether some depend on social conventions and others do not. Organizing his catalogue by means of this distinction allows Hume to steer a middle path between those who see morality as entirely conventional (e.g., Bernard Mandeville) and those who believe it springs directly from features of human nature that exist independently of social convention (e.g., Francis Hutcheson). According to Hume, some virtues do depend on social convention but others do not (Cohon 2008: 162–163). In both cases, he seeks to explain why people tend to develop such traits and why they tend to be pleasing to judicious spectators. Hume drops the artificial-natural distinction from the second Enquiry , but his investigations there are motivated by the same questions and the resulting view also steers a middle course between figures such as Mandeville and Hutcheson.

According to the Treatise , artificial virtues include justice, fidelity to promises, allegiance to government, and chastity. Hume devotes much discussion to justice, which he treats as a paramount and paradigmatic artificial virtue. Hume understands justice primarily as honesty with respect to property or conformity to conventions of property (T 3.2.2.28). Establishing a system of property allows us to avoid conflict and enjoy the possession and use of various goods. The social value of conventions involving property seems obvious. Yet one reason that justice receives such attention from Hume is that it poses a problem about moral motivation and moral approval. Hume claims that there must be a natural (non-moral) motive for morally good actions. Otherwise they could only be done because they are morally good, which would be circular, since our judgment of acts as morally good reflects our approval of the motives and traits that give rise to the acts in question (T 3.2.1.7, 3.2.1.17). But this position makes it hard to see how justice can be a virtue; for it is hard to find the requisite natural, nonmoral motive for it. Self-interest is the natural motive that justifies our establishing rules regarding property (T 3.2.2.24); but self-interest is neither always satisfied by just acts, nor approved in the way that traits we call virtues generally are (T 3.2.1.9–10). Benevolence cannot be such a motive either, since it sometimes favors bending or suspending the rules of justice, and benevolence lacks the power to motivate just conduct when it’s difficult (e.g., T 3.2.1.12). Hume himself says that “ a sympathy with public interest is the source of the moral approbation, which attends that virtue ” (T 3.2.2.24). But since sympathy with the public interest itself seems neither nonmoral nor inherent in human nature, this claim redescribes the problem rather than solves it. Hume must ground sympathy for the public interest in more obviously natural sentiments, and explain its development from them (e.g., as self-interest, corrected or redirected through education or the contrivances of politicians). Otherwise, Hume must abandon his claim that all morally good actions—even those associated with artificial virtues—have non-moral, natural motives. (See Gauthier 1979; Mackie 1980: ch. 5; and Darwall 1995: 302–316.)

The natural virtues are good independently of social convention. Hume’s generous list of natural virtues includes beneficence, prudence, temperance, frugality, industry, assiduity, enterprise, dexterity, generosity, and humanity (T 3.3.1.24). In the second Enquiry , he distinguishes among virtues useful to others, virtues useful to oneself, virtues immediately agreeable to oneself, and virtues immediately agreeable to others. Among qualities useful to others are justice, fidelity, honor, allegiance, chastity, along with the other “social virtues” of humanity, generosity, charity, affability, lenity, mercy, and moderation (EPM 5.2.44). Among qualities useful to ourselves are discretion, caution, enterprise, industry, assiduity, frugality, economy, good sense, prudence, discernment (EPM 6.1.21). Among qualities contrary to our own well-being are indolence, negligence, “want of order and method”, obstinacy, fickleness, rashness, and credulity (EPM 6.1.1). Qualities immediately agreeable to oneself include cheerfulness, tranquility, benevolence, and delicacy of taste. Qualities immediately agreeable to others include good manners, politeness, wit, ingenuity, decency, cleanliness, and a graceful or genteel manner. What holds all these varied traits together as virtues is their evoking the sentiment of approval in spectators, itself grounded in sympathy.

Like Hume, Kant takes virtue to be central to human morality. But his basic conception of virtue differs from Hume’s, as does his catalogue of particular virtues and vices. According to Kant, virtue is the form in which a being with an imperfect or non-holy will expresses her supreme commitment to morality. Virtue is such a being’s continually cultivated capacity to master her inclinations so as to fulfill her duties; a capacity whose cultivation and exercise is motivated by respect for the moral law (Denis 2006; Baxley 2010; Wilson 2015a). Several related claims are integral to Kant’s view. First, virtue is a general disposition to do one’s duty out of respect for the moral law (CPrR 5:128, 160; C 27:300). Second, virtue is a kind of strength. More specifically, virtue is “a moral strength of the will” (MM 6:405) or “moral strength in adherence to one’s duty” (Ant 7:147). Third, virtue presupposes opposition and entails internal struggle. Virtue’s primary opponent is the “radical evil in human nature”—a propensity to adopt maxims that prioritize self-love (and inclinations generally) over the moral law (Rel 6:29, 35–37, 57 n., 58). It is because of radical evil that virtue implies struggle and demands strength. The fundamental task of the virtuous person is to achieve the proper ordering of her incentives, giving the moral law undisputed priority over self-love. Finally, virtue is moral self-constraint “based on inner freedom” (MM 6:408), which is the capacity to act on the autonomously chosen principles of morality, even in the face of temptation (MM 6:394, 405). Virtue both expresses and promotes inner freedom. The greater one’s moral strength and self-constraint, the more one acts on reason rather than inclination or impulse (MM 6:382 n).

Kant’s catalogue of virtues and vices is organized by his system of duties. These duties are grounded in the moral law, the supreme principle of morality, which impresses itself on us as a categorical imperative. All duties must ultimately derive from this supreme moral principle. But in the Metaphysics of Morals , Kant’s discussion of particular duties of virtue is based more directly on what he calls the “supreme principle of the doctrine of virtue”. This principle enjoins us to “act in accordance with a maxim of ends that it can be a universal law for everyone to have” (MM 6:395). As Kant explains,

In accordance with this principle a human being is an end for himself as well as for others, and it is not enough that he is not authorized to use either himself or others merely as a means (since he could then still be indifferent to them); it is in itself his duty to make the human being as such his end. (MM 6:395)

Duties of virtue pertain to the ends, principles, and attitudes of agents. They aim to protect each agent’s inner freedom, and they cannot be compelled by the state or any other external force. It is because duties of virtue alone are subject only to internal compulsion that Kant calls them “directly ethical duties.” Among these duties are the perfect duties to oneself to avoid vices of suicide, self-mutilation, gluttony, drunkenness, sexual self-degradation (duties to oneself as an animal and moral being), lying, avarice, and servility (duties to oneself as a moral being only); the imperfect duties to oneself concerning the promotion of the obligatory end of one’s own natural and moral perfection, along with duties to foster self-knowledge, compassion for animals, and appreciation of the beautiful in nature; the perfect duties to others to avoid the vices of arrogance, defamation, and ridicule (duties of respect), and the imperfect duties to promote the end of others happiness by means of beneficence, sympathy, and gratitude, as well as by avoiding malice, envy, and ingratitude (duties of love and vices opposed to them). Kant does not claim to derive these duties from the categorical imperative or the supreme principle of virtue alone. Rather, in moving from general principles of morality to moral duties, he draws on a variety of considerations regarding human nature and other aspects of the natural world.

Hume and Kant share several influences, so there are unsurprising areas of overlap. First, like most eighteenth-century philosophers, both regard the pursuit of virtue as central to human morality. Second, Kant sides with Hume and Hutcheson against the psychological egoism associated with Pufendorf, Hobbes, Locke, and Mandeville (Wilson 2015b; on this debate within British moral philosophy, see Crisp 2019 and Maurer 2019). Third, they both accept of versions of Grotius’s influential distinction between perfect and imperfect duties, though their uses of the distinction differ (see Schneewind 1990). Fourth, their respective conceptions of virtue are secular by historical standards. Neither recognizes duties to God, for example, and neither counts piety, hope, or monkish self-abasement among the virtues (e.g., EPM 9.1.3 and C 27:379–80).

Important differences stand out against this backdrop of agreement. Hume defines virtue in terms of the moral sentiments of a judicious spectator who views things from a common point of view. Kant, by contrast, defines virtue in terms of duty, obligation, and law. He thinks of virtue as moral strength, which is measured by an agent’s ability to defeat those inclinations that oppose the demands of the moral law (MM 6:405–407). Hume’s theory of virtue has a place for duty and law, but these are not the fundamental concepts in terms of which everything else must be explained or justified. Moreover, while Hume certainly recognizes virtues such as strength of mind, fortitude, and courage, they are not central to his view of virtue as such. Their status as virtues depends on the moral sentiments of a judicious spectator, as well as the exigencies and conventions of a particular age (EPM “A Dialogue”.40). For Kant, such factors are irrelevant to the basic question of what determines virtue and vice.

A few additional differences are worth noting. First, unlike Hume, Kant insists on the unitary nature of virtue: “in its Idea (objectively) there is only one virtue (as moral strength of one’s maxims)” (MM 6:447; cf. MM 6:395 and 406). Second, Hume maintains that the concepts of virtue and vice can apply to things outside our control, such as traits and motives that spring involuntarily from our basic temperament. For example, wit, good memory, and other “mental abilities” are virtues because of their power to garner the approval of a judicious spectator, even if they spring from temperament, upbringing, or other factors outside the agent’s control (T 3.3.4.1–5). Kant, by contrast, restricts the application of virtue concepts to traits, behaviors, and attitudes that are voluntarily adopted and cultivated as a matter of principle. Each virtue and each vice has its own maxim (MM 6:404). For example, being “naturally” witty is not virtuous; neither is cultivating wit for the sake of social status or power. For Kant, wittiness is not an ethical virtue unless it is voluntarily cultivated for morally admirable reasons. Third, Kant and Hume view justice quite differently. Justice is central to Hume’s picture of morality, but Kant does not treat it as an ethical virtue at all. For Kant, justice is a matter of right or law ( Recht ), which regulates actions but not their underlying motives and ends. Furthermore, Hume treats justice as an “artificial” virtue, but Kant would reject the artificial-natural distinction altogether. On his view, ethical virtues are neither artificial nor natural in Hume’s sense. Finally, their conceptions of moral vice are quite different. For Hume a vice is a mental quality that provokes disapproval from a judicious spectator. A person’s vices do not necessarily say anything about the quality of her will as a whole or her fundamental attitude toward the demands of morality. But Kant holds that vice is a propensity to act contrary to the moral law (Rel 6:37), and it implies a genuine “ contempt for moral laws” (C 27:463). As he puts it, “it is when an intentional transgression has become a principle that it is properly called a vice ” (MM 6:390).

Hume and Kant both believe that freedom is essential to morality. Moreover, both believe that a philosophical theory and vindication of human morality requires reconciling freedom with universal causal necessity (determinism). However, they offer different conceptions of freedom, different ways of reconciling it with necessity, and different views about why this reconciliation matters for morality. Scholars agree that Hume is a “compatibilist”, but there is no consensus on the correct label for Kant’s position.

Hume defends compatibilism in section eight of Enquiry concerning Human Understanding and Book Two of the Treatise (2.3.1–2). In the Treatise , Hume distinguishes between two conceptions of freedom or liberty: “liberty of indifference” and “liberty of spontaneity”. According to the idea of indifference, liberty implies “a negation of necessity and causes” (T 2.3.2.1). For illustration, consider the Anglican bishop John Bramhall’s claim that genuine liberty is “a liberty from necessity, or rather from necessitation, that is, a universal immunity from all inevitability and determination” (1645 [1999: 1]). On this view, a person is free when, and only when, her action is not necessitated by any antecedent causes. Hume rejects this idea as unintelligible (T 2.3.1.18) and destructive to morality and religion (T 2.3.2.5). By contrast, he characterizes spontaneity as that idea of liberty “which is oppos’d to violence” (T 2.3.2.1). Therefore, the liberty of spontaneity is freedom from violence, but not freedom from necessity per se . “Violence” here refers to various forms of unwanted interference with the execution of one’s will, as when a person is forced to sign a document or locked in a cell from which she wants to escape. These are cases where we lack the liberty of spontaneity. But a person has such liberty whenever she is able to do what she wants to do. In such cases, her actions are causally necessitated, just like any other event in nature; but they are caused by motives that spring from her own character. According to Hume, this is the form of liberty at issue in religion, morality, law, and common life. Hence, spontaneity is the only form of liberty “which it concerns us to preserve” (T 2.3.2.1).

The liberty of spontaneity, as just described, is perfectly compatible with causal necessity. There are two main reasons people often believe otherwise. First, we tend to conflate the two ideas of liberty. In cases where we enjoy the liberty of spontaneity, our experience suggests that we also enjoy something more. We recognize, of course, that “we were influenc’d by particular views and motives”, yet we find it difficult to “perswade ourselves we govern’d by necessity, and that ’twas utterly impossible for us to have acted otherwise” (T 2.3.2.1). This is because “[w]e feel that our actions are subject to our will on most occasions, and imagine we feel that the will itself is subject to nothing” (T 2.3.2.2). Yet the assumption that our will is subject to nothing is a mistake caused by the blind spots of introspection. An outside observer, whether a friend or a scientist, “can commonly infer our actions from our motives and character; and even where he cannot, he concludes in general, that he might, were he perfectly acquainted with every circumstance of our situation and temper” (T 2.3.2.2).

The second source of resistance to compatibilism stems from confusion about necessity. People are prone to think that necessity rules out liberty because they conflate necessity with compulsion or force. They believe that when A causes B, A compels or forces B. Hume holds that this is a mistake, however. Causal necessity is nothing more than the “constant conjunction” of similar objects and a customary inference of the mind from the one to the other (EHU 8.1.5). For example, experience shows that the vibration of a particular string is constantly conjoined with a particular sound. As a result, the mind develops the habit of immediately inferring the sound from the vibration (EHU 7.2.29). We believe that the sound is causally necessitated by the vibration, but the necessity is a product of the imagination, which associates the idea of the sound with the perception of the vibration. This feeling that there is a necessary connection between them is the whole of the matter (EHU 7.2.28). So defined, causal necessity no longer poses an obvious threat to liberty. It makes sense to follow Bramhall’s definition of liberty as “liberty from necessity” if one thinks that necessitation involves force or compulsion. But causes do not force or compel their effects. If one can accept this point, then a definition like Bramhall’s seems less tempting, and necessity per se no longer poses a threat to liberty. The only real threat is necessitation by external forces, as when a person is forced to do something she does not want to do.

Broadly speaking, the scholarship offers two ways of interpreting Hume’s compatibilism. According to the most common approach, Hume’s arguments concern the logic of the concepts at issue. On this reading, Hume analyzes the concepts of liberty and necessity to show that, properly understood, they do not conflict. We can be rationally justified in holding a person responsible for her action even though all human actions are caused. The only question is whether she , rather than some other person or external force, is the cause of her action. According to Paul Russell’s naturalist approach, however, Hume’s view is not primarily a piece of a priori reasoning about the logic of our concepts or the rational justification of attributions of moral responsibility. Above all it is an empirical explanation for why we sometimes feel that people are responsible for their conduct. Hume’s concern is with the cognitive processes that cause such attributions (Russell 1995: ch. 4). He starts with the occasions in common life when we hold people responsible for their behavior, and then asks, what happens in the mind on such occasions? On the standard reading, Hume’s treatment of liberty is a fairly self-contained set of compatibilist arguments, quite detachable from his larger project. On the naturalist reading, it is deeply connected to his theory of the passions and moral judgment, which makes it an integral part of his “science of man.”

Hume claims that liberty, understood properly, is “essential to morality” (EHU 8.31). The above interpretations provide two different explanations for why this is the case. The standard approach says that Hume’s compatibilism is about the logic of our concepts and the justification of our judgments. Our judgments about responsibility entail judgments about the causal antecedents of action, and such judgments are consistent with determinism. On this view, the liberty of spontaneity is essential to morality because attributions of responsibility, which permeate morality (as well as law and religion), are unjust and unreasonable without it. According to the naturalist approach, liberty is essential for a different reason. The naturalist reading emphasizes that, on Hume’s view, attributions of responsibility are made via feelings of approval and disapproval, not judgments (T 2.3.2.6; Russell 1995: 60–4). They are, in his terminology, impressions or sentiments rather than ideas. These sentiments are partially caused by beliefs about the source of the behavior to which we are responding. We would not feel approval or disapproval unless we had been led to think of the person as the cause of the action. If we believed that her action was either compelled or uncaused, we would neither approve nor disapprove of her . Our responses or thoughts would be about something else. Hume’s claim, on the naturalist reading, is that in approving or disapproving of the agent—in feeling gratitude or resentment, for example—we hold her responsible, and in holding her responsible we believe that her conduct is free. Hume does not argue that the latter justifies attributions of responsibility. His claim is that it causally contributes to such attributions. They are made by means of feelings of approval and disapproval, which are a core feature of human morality as we know it. Therefore, the idea of liberty, properly reconciled with necessity, is essential to morality.

Like Hume, Kant seeks to reconcile freedom with a commitment to causal determinism. Yet the two philosophers operate with different conceptions of causal necessity and very different conceptions of freedom. For present purposes, it is important to focus on the latter. Hume concentrates on the liberty of spontaneity, the only idea of freedom “which it concerns us to preserve”. His treatment looks downstream from the will to its execution in action. A person has liberty when her action is caused by her will, which Hume equates with an occurrent motive or desire (T 2.3.1.2). The question of what ultimately moves the will is irrelevant. Such causes are found in the person’s character and circumstances, and they determine her will with the same necessity that determines everything else in nature. Kant, by contrast, looks upstream to what determines the will: “It is here a question only of the determination of the will and of the determining ground of its maxims as a free will, not of its result” in bodily action (CPrR 5:45). One way of putting it is to say that Hume’s account concerns the freedom of action, while Kant’s concerns freedom of the will. Both are concerned with the freedom of the person or agent, but Kant thinks the person is not truly free unless her will is free. This is the first point about the main difference between Kant and Hume.

The second point is that Kant, unlike Hume, believes that the will is not free unless it can be determined by pure reason. This is why he repeatedly insists that the main question concerning freedom is whether pure reason “can be an immediate determining ground of the will, that is, of the causality of a rational being with respect to the reality of objects” (CPrR 5:44–45). Furthermore, Kant holds that this is a question of whether the will can be determined “independently of anything empirical” (CPrR 5:42). For when pure reason determines the will, the latter’s “ground” must be found in “the intelligible order of things” rather than in empirical order (CPrR 5:49). This is why Kant thinks that “the concept of a being that has free will” involves the concept of a “noumenal” cause (CPrR 5:55). Note that Kant’s idea of noumenal causation is not equivalent to what Hume calls the liberty of indifference, which implies a complete absence of causes or necessitation. To appreciate the point, contrast Kant’s view with what Bramhall calls “liberty from necessitation” or “immunity from all... determination.” Unlike Bramhall, Kant seems to think that the will is free if, and only if, it is necessitated. But the will must be necessitated by the right sort of thing and in the right way: namely, by pure reason rather than by an antecedent event whose causal impact on the will could be described by an empirical law. That is, the will is free if and only if can be determined by pure reason, which lies outside the realm governed by empirical laws.

Kant’s conception of freedom has profound implications for the task of reconciling freedom with causal determinism. He maintains that all events, including human actions, are causally determined by antecedent events in accordance with empirical laws. But he also seeks to show that this does not rule out free will (A536–537/B564-565). On the contrary, one and the same event can be both “a mere effect of nature” but also an “effect of freedom” (A543/B571). Kant demonstrates this possibility by distinguishing between two different “worlds” and arguing that we belong to both. On the one hand, we belong to the “phenomenal” world, where all our actions can be explained in terms of antecedent events (whether physical or psychological). On the other hand, considered as a “thing in itself”, each of us belongs to the “noumenal” world, which is not subject to “the temporal order in accord with empirical laws” (A534/B562). We cannot know whether we belong to the noumenal world, but Kant’s theoretical philosophy secures room for this possibility, and his moral philosophy tries to show that when we become aware of morality’s categorical demands, we think of ourselves as members of this noumenal or “intelligible world” (G 4:457-58).

We can see here that Kant seeks to reconcile freedom and natural necessity by means of “transcendental idealism.” Indeed, the question of whether natural necessity rules out freedom is a “transcendental problem,” and only transcendental philosophy can solve it (A535/B563, A557/B585). The appeal to transcendental idealism is controversial, of course. Some scholars of Kant’s ethics understand him to be making a metaphysical (or ontological) claim when he distinguishes between noumenal and phenomenal worlds (e.g. McCarty 2009). Others understand Kant to be distinguishing between only different standpoints we take, identifying the noumenal world with the practical standpoint that we take when we think of ourselves as autonomous, responsible beings, and the phenomenal world with the theoretical standpoint we take when we think of ourselves as part of the natural, deterministic, empirical world (see Beck 1960: 191–94; Korsgaard 1996a, esp. chs. 6–7). Both raise concerns. Many find the notion of two worlds metaphysically cumbersome (at best); but others question whether the two standpoints approach is robust enough for Kant’s purposes. (See Irwin 1984, esp. 37–38; Allison 1990; Guyer 1992: 103–107; and Wood 2005a: 99–100.)

Kant has several reasons for thinking that freedom is essential to morality. First, freedom is necessary for moral responsibility. When we hold a person responsible for blameworthy conduct, for example, we “impute” the ability to have refrained from such conduct and blame the person for her failure to exercise this ability properly. The judgment of “blame is grounded on the law of reason, which regards reason as a cause that… could have and ought to have determined the conduct of the person to be other than it is” (A555/B583). Second, Kant holds that “what is essential to any moral worth of actions is that the moral law determine the will immediately ” (CPrR 5:71). If a person’s will were necessitated by her circumstances and empirical character, as Hume maintains, it would be impossible to respond properly to the moral law, which demands a kind of purity of thought and motive that Hume would not countenance. Third, freedom is essential to morality in that freedom is the ground of a special status or “dignity” that morality commands us to respect in ourselves and others. One important but unorthodox line of interpretation suggests a fourth reason for thinking that freedom is essential to morality. According to this view, Kant holds (in at least some places) that freedom is our most fundamental value, the source from which all other moral value derives. This is “the real bedrock of Kant’s moral thought” (Guyer 2000: 203). On this view, in fact, we are commanded to obey the moral law because it “is the necessary means for the realization of human freedom” (Guyer 2016: 38).

When comparing Hume and Kant, it is a mistake to ask simply which philosopher has the best account of freedom or does the best job of reconciling freedom and necessity. They disagree about both causal necessity and the question of which idea of freedom “it concerns us to preserve”. As a result, they focus on somewhat different topics. Hume concentrates on what happens downstream from the will, that is, on how motives determine action. But Kant’s attention is focused on what happens upstream—on the question of what determines the will. It seems fair to say that from Kant’s perspective, Hume’s notion of liberty is thin gruel, no better than “the freedom of a turnspit” (CPrR 5:97) or the freedom exhibited by a self-moving clock (CPrR 5:96). It also seems fair to say that from Hume’s perspective, Kant’s notion of free will is, at best, a misguided fiction.

One important question is whether morality requires the sort of freedom Kant has in mind. Hume would deny that it does, but this is partly because his view of morality itself is so different from Kant’s. The issue here is not just about free will. It is about which conception of morality is most plausible. If Kant has convincing grounds for insisting on the unique nature of moral obligation or judgments of “moral worth”, this puts some pressure on Hume to take Kant’s notion of free will more seriously. Another important question is how to interpret Kant’s actual position, which is the subject of controversy. Standard textbooks classify Kant as a libertarian (incompatibilist) about free will, but those who study Kant most intensively often disagree about the nature of his view. Some argue that Kant offers a form of incompatibilism (e.g., Pereboom 2006; Allison 1990; Watkins 2005), while others maintain that he is some sort of compatibilist, however unorthodox (e.g., Bennett 1984; Hudson 1994). According to one influential interpretation, Kant endorses “not only the compatibility of freedom and determinism, but also the compatibility of compatibilism and incompatibilism” (Wood 1984: 74). These scholarly debates bear on the question of how Kant’s view compares to Hume’s, as does the question of whether the naturalist or traditional interpretation best captures Hume’s own position. Finally, when comparing Kant and Hume on the question of freedom, one must recognize that there is a modest and skeptical side to Kant’s view that Hume would applaud. For Kant, free will is an “inscrutable faculty” (CPrR 5:47), whose operations lie beyond the reach of human cognition. It is impossible to know whether we actually have free will (CPrR 5:72; G 4:459). Indeed, Kant’s significant debt to Hume is evident in the former’s claim that “all human insight is at an end as soon as we have arrived at basic powers or basic faculties” (CPrR 5:46). Here we find profound agreement between the two philosophers about the limits of human insight.

Discussions of religious themes can be found in most of Hume’s and Kant’s major works. Their treatments of the subject differ significantly, but they have a few important things in common, especially on the question of how religion relates to morality. Above all, both philosophers advocate a secularized approach to moral philosophy. That is, both argue for the independence of morality from religion and the importance of keeping the two distinct. They both express deep concern about the corrupting influence of false religion, including “enthusiasm” and “superstition”. And they both seek to undermine a good deal of Christian theology, including traditional arguments for the existence of God. There are also significant disagreements, however. Generally speaking, Hume is far more alert to religion’s potential costs, such as intolerance, violence, and distraction from whatever happiness is available in this life. Kant, by contrast, seems far more attuned to the benefits of religion, especially its attempts to address the human need for ultimate answers or consolation in the face of death and suffering.

On Hume’s view, the foundation of morality has nothing to do with God. This is evident from his distinctive version of sentimentalism. He argues that morality, much like our aesthetic responses to beauty, is “founded entirely on the peculiar fabric and constitution of the human species” (EPM 1.3). This claim is made in the context of arguing against a form of moral rationalism that locates the foundation of morality in immutable truths discoverable by reason (Schneewind 2010). Against rationalists like Samuel Clarke, Hume claims that morality is a distinctly and entirely human phenomenon; there are no grounds for believing that human beings exist in any kind of moral community with God or that God is answerable to the moral norms that bind us (Schneewind 2010). For present purposes, there are two additional points to appreciate. First, Hume’s claim entails a rejection of the idea that moral distinctions between good and evil are instituted by divine command, as argued by voluntarists such as Pufendorf, Luther, or Calvin. Second, Hume’s version of the above claim differs from the version found in Hutcheson. On Hutcheson’s view, human nature is essentially good and its goodness reflects the wisdom and benevolence of God. When we behave virtuously, we further the purposes for which we were created. Hume, by contrast, rejects Hutcheson’s equation of the natural with the good (T 3.1.2.10), and he rejects his predecessor’s underlying teleology (Gill 2006: 194–208).

Hume frequently draws attention to the moral and political costs of religion. He never argues that religion is inherently destructive, but he consistently claims that it tends to distort and corrupt morality. Were it not for religion’s influence, Hume claims, we would never approve of qualities such as “celibacy, fasting, penance, mortification, self-denial, humility, silence, solitude, and the whole train of monkish virtues” (EPM 9.1.3). The “delusive glosses of superstition and false religion” can cause us to approve of such qualities despite the fact that they are neither useful nor agreeable (EPM 9.1.3). Similarly, Hume emphasizes the difference between moral and religious sources of motivation. When a person pays a debt or restores a loan, for example, “his divinity is nowise beholden to him; because these acts of justice are what he was bound to perform, and what many would have performed, were there no god in the universe. But if he fast a day, or give himself a sound whipping; this has a direct reference, in his opinion, to the service of God. No other motive could engage him to such austerities” (NHR 14.6). Hume often blames these distortions of morality on particular forms of Christianity, such as Catholicism and sectarian offshoots of Calvinism and Lutheranism. But in some places Hume comes close to faulting any religion that represents God as “infinitely superior to mankind” (NHR 10.2), arguing that, “[t]he more tremendous the divinity is represented, the more tame and submissive do men become to his ministers” (NHR 14.8). He clearly believes that monotheistic religions tend to focus human attention on the one God rather than on the enjoyment of life on earth. Monotheism also tends to promote intolerance, factionalism, and even violence.

Like Hume, Kant holds that the foundation of morality is independent of religion. The main difference between them is that Hume locates that foundation in human nature, while Kant —depending on the interpretation—locates it in the structure of practical reason, the nature of rational beings, or the supreme value of freedom. On Kant’s view, morality is not only independent of religion; it is also more fundamental. One way that he gives priority to morality is by arguing that belief in God follows from a moral commitment, and by denying that recognition of the moral law follows from or must be grounded in recognition of God’s authority. A second way in which Kant treats morality as fundamental is by denying that we have any duties to God. All that God commands us to do is what morality requires: our duties to ourselves and others. A third point is that Kant insists that children not be taught about religion until they are familiar with basic moral concepts and principles; otherwise, they may think, for example, that the reason one should act rightly is to hope for God’s favor and to avoid God’s punishment. He argues that Christianity is superior to other ecclesiastical faiths because of the centrality of ethics within it from its inception (Rel 6:167). But all ecclesiastical faiths are liable to corruption, and none is the ideal form for religion to take. Ideally, we will dispense with distinct ecclesiastical faiths, along with their revealed texts and doctrinal statutes and observances, in favor of a universal, pure religion of reason, dedicated to morality.

While Kant holds that morality’s foundation is independent of religion, the two are more closely connected for him than they are for Hume. Compared with Hume, Kant is far less antagonistic to religion, and he consistently tries to preserve a place for religious belief within the strictures of his moral philosophy. Indeed, this is an important aspect of his approach to morality. Kant’s “moral theism” is one of his most significant contributions to the philosophy of religion and the question of religion’s relation to morality. Moral theism is belief in God founded on morality. By belief (or faith) [ Glaube ], Kant means something different from knowledge [ Wissen ] (A 822/B 850; WOT 8:140–41). Believing and knowing both involve holding something to be true. When one knows something, one holds it to be true on grounds that are “subjectively and objectively” sufficient, whereas when one believes something, one holds it to be true on grounds that are subjectively but not objectively sufficient (A 822/B 850). Here, Kant takes objective sufficiency to imply valid theoretical grounds, such as evidence or theoretical argument; he takes subjective sufficiency, by contrast, to imply valid practical grounds. Thus, belief entails having valid practical reasons for holding something to be true, while lacking valid theoretical reasons for doing so. Indeed, when it comes to belief in God, Kant does not think that knowledge is possible (CPJ 5:471–72).

Kant’s position contains a distinctly moral conception of God. In addition to the attributes of omniscience, omnipresence, and omnipotence, he ascribes to God the moral attributes of holiness, benevolence, and justice (LPDR 28:1073–74). God is not only author and executor of the moral law, but also as its “personification” (C 27:322; V 27:530, 723; LPDR 28:1076, 1091). Kant also says that all moral requirements can be seen as divine commands (CPrR 5:129; Rel 6:153). God knows and cares about our virtue and well-being. In particular, he cares about the realization of the highest good, in which people attain maximal virtue and, consequently, maximal happiness. This is a God who has created the world, has incorporated morality into the world, and has a moral plan for the world (CPrR 5:125; CPJ 5:450). Belief in God allows us to retain our faith that some of our moral actions will produce the intended good consequences, and that if we strive our best to promote the highest good, God will complete the task (C 27:310, 321–22; CPJ 5:450–53; Rel 6:74–77, 192, 201–202).

The relation between God and the highest good is the basis of Kant’s main argument for belief in God. (See Wood 1970.) The argument, most clearly articulated in the Critique of Practical Reason , goes like this (CPrR 5:110–14, 124–46). The moral law issues categorical demands through each agent’s own reason. If the moral law sets forth an end for us to promote, we must promote it. For our promotion of this end to be rational, the end must be one that we can rationally view as possible for us to promote through our own agency. The moral law gives rise to the highest good (i.e., virtue and conditioned, proportionate happiness), as practical reason’s ultimate end. Thus, we must promote it. Yet it is not clear that we are capable of effecting the highest good, given the limitations of our agency and the conditions and workings of the natural world. If the realization of the highest good is not possible, however, then we cannot rationally promote it as an end; indeed, we cannot even make sense of it as an end. But if we do not promote the highest good, we flout the moral law. Now, suppose that there were a supreme, eternal, all powerful, all knowing ruler of the universe (i.e., God); he could bring to completion our imperfect strivings for the highest good. Thus, if we postulate the existence of God, we can view the highest good as possible, and can rationally follow morality’s command to promote it. There is no reason not to postulate God’s existence, since his non-existence cannot be proven, and since belief in him does not conflict with any necessary beliefs (CPrR 5:135–43). In addition, since belief in God is necessary for seeing the highest good as possible, we must believe in God (CPrR 5:125–26, 142–46). Thus, belief in God is grounded in the necessity of seeing the highest good as possible, and so for the rational compliance with morality. Thus, Kant says that belief in God is morally necessary, and that morality leads ineluctably to religion (CPrR 5:125). We do not, however, have a duty to believe in God. Postulating God’s existence is a theoretical exercise of reason, which cannot be morally commanded (CPrR 5:125, 144). Rather, our duty to promote the highest good gives rise to “a need of reason” to assume the possibility of the highest good. From this need emerges the necessity of postulating God’s existence.

Kant’s practical argument differs profoundly from his contemporaries’ speculative or theoretical arguments for God’s existence. His approach grounds the necessity of believing in God in each person’s practical reason, required to “orient ourselves in thinking” (WOT 8:136–37). According to Kant, belief in God is “a postulate” of practical reason, that is, “a theoretical proposition which is not as such demonstrable, but which is an inseparable corollary of an a priori unconditionally valid practical law” (CPrR 5:122). Although practical arguments cannot provide knowledge of God’s existence, they can provide “ moral certainty” of God’s existence (A 828–30/B 856–58; CPrR 5:134, 143; LPDR 28:1011–12). Moral certainty in God’s existence is stronger than the sort of confidence one could obtain from any theoretical argument.

Hume’s influence on Kant regarding the intersection of religion and morality is evident, though difficult to measure. It is also hard to tell how much of the influence came directly from Hume’s writings. Hume is not often cited regarding religion in Kant’s major works. Kant’s Lectures on the Philosophical Doctrine of Religion , however, suggest familiarity with Hume’s Dialogues Concerning Natural Religion , a work which Kant could have read in its entirety in 1781 (Wood 1978: 14–15), and perhaps in part when it first came out, since Hamann translated the first and last parts of it for him (Kuehn 2001: 121). Kant explicitly discusses Hume’s Dialogues in the section on the physiotheological proof, which is what Kant calls the argument from design (see LPDR 28:1063–4). Furthermore, in the Danzig manuscript of these lectures, Kant cites Hume within his argument against the cosmotheological proof (Ak 28:1266; Wood 1978: 83n31). Kant was clearly also familiar with Hume’s The Natural History of Religion . In “A History of Natural Theology, according to Meiners’ Historia doctrinae de uno vero Deo ”, Kant refers briefly to Hume’s account of polytheists as tolerant in section 9 of The Natural History of Religion (LPDR 28:1125).

Finally, it is interesting to note that many philosophers and other intellectuals in Königsberg in the late 1750s and early 1760s seem to have attributed to Hume a view of religion that has significant parallels with Kant’s mature view. Hamann and others saw Hume’s skepticism as necessary for purging religion of its traditional arguments and clearing the way for true religion. One source for this view of Hume is the conclusion of book I of the Treatise , which Hamann translated into German (with some alterations and excisions to hide its origin) and published anonymously in 1771 under the title “Night Thoughts of a Sceptic” (Kuehn 2001: 198–201). Another source is the end of the Dialogue s, where Philo says, “To be a philosophical skeptic is, in a man of letters, the first and most essential step towards being a sound, believing Christian” (DR 89). This statement is out of line with Philo’s previous assertions and arguments, and it comes as a surprise at this point in the text. But, some, including Hamman, take Philo’s remark as an expression of Hume’s fideism. Whether the interpretation of Hume is correct, Philo’s remark finds deep resonance in Kant. He is no fideist, but Kant does hold that purging the traditional “proofs” from philosophical theology helps us recognize that morality itself offers a better argument for God’s existence –– one which provides the moral certainty sought by finite rational beings such as ourselves.

Primary Sources

Hume’s main works of moral philosophy are the following.

Many of Hume’s other works are also relevant to his moral philosophy. We cite or discuss the following.

Unless noted otherwise, we cite the pagination (beginning with volume number) of the Akademie Ausgabe edition of Kants Gesammelte Schriften , Berlin: Walter de Gruyter, 1900–. This pagination can be found in the margins of most scholarly English translations, including The Cambridge Edition of the Works of Immanuel Kant , Paul Guyer and Allen W. Wood (eds.), Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1992–.

Kant’s main works of moral philosophy are the following.

Many other works are also relevant to Kant’s moral philosophy. We cite or discuss the following.

Allison, Henry E., 1983, Kant’s Transcendental Idealism: An Interpretation and Defense , New Haven and London: Yale University Press.
–––, 1990, Kant’s Theory of Freedom , Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. doi:10.1017/CBO9781139172295
–––, 1996, Idealism and Freedom: Essays on Kant’s Theoretical and Practical Philosophy , Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. doi:10.1017/CBO9781139172875
–––, 2008, Custom and Reason in Hume: A Kantian Reading of the First Book of the ‘Treatise’ , Oxford: Clarendon Press. doi:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199532889.001.0001
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Introduction & Top Questions

Introduction of moral codes

Problems of divine origin
Nonhuman behaviour
Kinship and reciprocity
Anthropology and ethics
The Middle East
Ancient Greece
The Epicureans
Ethics in the New Testament
St. Augustine
St. Thomas Aquinas and the Scholastics
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Shaftesbury and the moral sense school
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Moore and the naturalistic fallacy
Modern intuitionism
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Kantian constructivism: a middle ground?
Irrealist views: projectivism and expressivism
Ethics and reasons for action
The debate over consequentialism
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An ethics of prima facie duties
Rawls’s theory of justice
Rights theories
Natural law ethics
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Ethical egoism
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Abortion, euthanasia, and the value of human life

What is ethics?

How is ethics different from morality, why does ethics matter, is ethics a social science.

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Table Of Contents

The term ethics may refer to the philosophical study of the concepts of moral right and wrong and moral good and bad, to any philosophical theory of what is morally right and wrong or morally good and bad, and to any system or code of moral rules, principles, or values. The last may be associated with particular religions , cultures, professions, or virtually any other group that is at least partly characterized by its moral outlook.

Traditionally, ethics referred to the philosophical study of morality, the latter being a more or less systematic set of beliefs, usually held in common by a group, about how people should live. Ethics also referred to particular philosophical theories of morality. Later the term was applied to particular (and narrower) moral codes or value systems. Ethics and morality are now used almost interchangeably in many contexts, but the name of the philosophical study remains ethics .

Ethics matters because (1) it is part of how many groups define themselves and thus part of the identity of their individual members, (2) other-regarding values in most ethical systems both reflect and foster close human relationships and mutual respect and trust, and (3) it could be “rational” for a self-interested person to be moral, because his or her self-interest is arguably best served in the long run by reciprocating the moral behaviour of others.

No. Understood as equivalent to morality, ethics could be studied as a social-psychological or historical phenomenon, but in that case it would be an object of social-scientific study, not a social science in itself. Understood as the philosophical study of moral concepts, ethics is a branch of philosophy , not of social science.

ethics , the discipline concerned with what is morally good and bad and morally right and wrong. The term is also applied to any system or theory of moral values or principles.

(Read Britannica’s biography of this author, Peter Singer.)

How should we live? Shall we aim at happiness or at knowledge, virtue , or the creation of beautiful objects? If we choose happiness, will it be our own or the happiness of all? And what of the more particular questions that face us: is it right to be dishonest in a good cause? Can we justify living in opulence while elsewhere in the world people are starving? Is going to war justified in cases where it is likely that innocent people will be killed? Is it wrong to clone a human being or to destroy human embryos in medical research? What are our obligations, if any, to the generations of humans who will come after us and to the nonhuman animals with whom we share the planet?

Ethics deals with such questions at all levels. Its subject consists of the fundamental issues of practical decision making , and its major concerns include the nature of ultimate value and the standards by which human actions can be judged right or wrong .

The terms ethics and morality are closely related. It is now common to refer to ethical judgments or to ethical principles where it once would have been more accurate to speak of moral judgments or moral principles. These applications are an extension of the meaning of ethics. In earlier usage, the term referred not to morality itself but to the field of study, or branch of inquiry, that has morality as its subject matter. In this sense, ethics is equivalent to moral philosophy.

Although ethics has always been viewed as a branch of philosophy , its all-embracing practical nature links it with many other areas of study, including anthropology , biology , economics , history , politics , sociology , and theology . Yet, ethics remains distinct from such disciplines because it is not a matter of factual knowledge in the way that the sciences and other branches of inquiry are. Rather, it has to do with determining the nature of normative theories and applying these sets of principles to practical moral problems.

This article, then, will deal with ethics as a field of philosophy, especially as it has developed in the West. For coverage of religious conceptions of ethics and the ethical systems associated with world religions, see Buddhism ; Christianity ; Confucianism ; Hinduism ; Jainism ; Judaism ; Sikhism .

The origins of ethics

Mythical accounts.

When did ethics begin and how did it originate? If one has in mind ethics proper—i.e., the systematic study of what is morally right and wrong—it is clear that ethics could have come into existence only when human beings started to reflect on the best way to live. This reflective stage emerged long after human societies had developed some kind of morality, usually in the form of customary standards of right and wrong conduct . The process of reflection tended to arise from such customs, even if in the end it may have found them wanting. Accordingly, ethics began with the introduction of the first moral codes .

Virtually every human society has some form of myth to explain the origin of morality. In the Louvre in Paris there is a black Babylonian column with a relief showing the sun god Shamash presenting the code of laws to Hammurabi (died c. 1750 bce ), known as the Code of Hammurabi . The Hebrew Bible ( Old Testament ) account of God’s giving the Ten Commandments to Moses (flourished 14th–13th century bce ) on Mount Sinai might be considered another example. In the dialogue Protagoras by Plato (428/427–348/347 bce ), there is an avowedly mythical account of how Zeus took pity on the hapless humans, who were physically no match for the other beasts. To make up for these deficiencies, Zeus gave humans a moral sense and the capacity for law and justice , so that they could live in larger communities and cooperate with one another.

That morality should be invested with all the mystery and power of divine origin is not surprising. Nothing else could provide such strong reasons for accepting the moral law. By attributing a divine origin to morality, the priesthood became its interpreter and guardian and thereby secured for itself a power that it would not readily relinquish. This link between morality and religion has been so firmly forged that it is still sometimes asserted that there can be no morality without religion. According to this view, ethics is not an independent field of study but rather a branch of theology ( see moral theology ).

There is some difficulty, already known to Plato, with the view that morality was created by a divine power. In his dialogue Euthyphro , Plato considered the suggestion that it is divine approval that makes an action good . Plato pointed out that, if this were the case, one could not say that the gods approve of such actions because they are good. Why then do they approve of them? Is their approval entirely arbitrary? Plato considered this impossible and so held that there must be some standards of right or wrong that are independent of the likes and dislikes of the gods. Modern philosophers have generally accepted Plato’s argument, because the alternative implies that if, for example, the gods had happened to approve of torturing children and to disapprove of helping one’s neighbours, then torture would have been good and neighbourliness bad.

Culture Development

Doing the right thing: ethical decision-making.

April 11, 2024

In today’s complex and ever-changing world, making ethical decisions is crucial. Whether in personal or professional situations, our choices can have far-reaching consequences. This article explores the process of ethical decision-making, challenges that may arise, strategies to navigate ethical dilemmas, and the impact of our choices on personal growth and society as a whole.

writing on paper that says ethical decision

Understanding Ethical Decision-Making

Before delving into the intricacies of ethical decision-making , it is essential to establish a clear understanding of what ethics entails. Ethics refers to the moral principles and values that guide our behavior and decision-making processes. It encompasses many topics, including honesty, fairness, responsibility, and respect for others.

When faced with a decision, ethical decision-making involves assessing available options and choosing the one that aligns with our personal values and societal standards. It requires careful consideration of our choices’ potential consequences and impacts on individuals and the broader community.

Defining Ethics in Decision-Making

In the context of decision-making, ethics serve as a framework to evaluate the rightness or wrongness of an action. It involves considering the immediate benefits or gains and the long-term effects and potential harm caused by our decisions.

By adhering to ethical standards, we aim to ensure fairness, justice, and the well-being of those affected by our decisions. This includes considering the rights and interests of all stakeholders involved, including employees, customers, shareholders, and the wider society.

The Importance of Ethical Choices

Every decision has consequences, and ethical choices are pivotal in shaping the world around us. Making ethical decisions strengthens our character and promotes trust and integrity.

When we consistently make ethical choices, we contribute to a more just and equitable society. Our actions inspire others to follow suit, creating a ripple effect that can lead to positive change on a larger scale.

Furthermore, ethical choices help build and maintain relationships based on trust and mutual respect. When individuals and organizations prioritize ethics, they establish a reputation for integrity, leading to increased credibility and opportunities for collaboration.

Moreover, ethical decision-making is essential for sustainable development. By considering our choices’ environmental and social impacts, we can contribute to preserving natural resources and the well-being of future generations.

Understanding ethical decision-making is crucial for navigating the complexities of today’s world. By incorporating ethical principles into our decision-making processes, we can make choices that benefit ourselves and promote the greater good of society as a whole.

The Process of Ethical Decision-Making

Ethical decision-making follows a systematic process that helps us navigate morally complex situations with clarity and integrity. It involves several key steps that allow us to identify ethical dilemmas , evaluate options and consequences, and ultimately make ethical choices.

Focused woman thinking on problem in office

Identifying Ethical Dilemmas

The first step in ethical decision-making is to recognize when we are faced with an ethical dilemma. Ethical dilemmas arise when we encounter competing values or conflicting interests. These dilemmas can manifest in various contexts, such as the workplace, personal relationships, or societal issues.

For example, imagine a scenario where a company is considering outsourcing its production to a foreign country with lower labor costs. On one hand, this decision may lead to increased company profitability and potentially lower consumer prices. On the other hand, it raises concerns about exploiting workers in a foreign country and potentially losing jobs in the company’s home country.

By acknowledging and understanding the underlying ethical concerns, we can better assess the situation and identify potential courses of action. This step requires careful reflection and consideration of the values and principles that guide our decision-making.

Evaluating Options and Consequences

Once we have identified the ethical dilemma, the next step is to evaluate the available options and their potential consequences. It is essential to consider both short-term and long-term implications and the potential impact on various stakeholders.

In the example of the company considering outsourcing, the options may include proceeding with the outsourcing plan, exploring alternative ways to reduce costs without outsourcing, or maintaining the current production practices. Each option carries its potential consequences, ranging from financial outcomes to social and environmental impacts.

During the evaluation process, gathering relevant information, consulting with experts or stakeholders, and weighing the potential benefits and harms associated with each option is crucial. This comprehensive assessment enables us to make informed decisions rooted in ethical considerations.

Making the Ethical Choice

After careful analysis and evaluation, it is time to make an ethical choice. This involves selecting the option that best aligns with our values, ethical principles, and societal norms. Making an ethical choice often requires courage, as it may involve standing up against societal pressure or personal biases.

In the case of the company considering outsourcing, making the ethical choice may involve prioritizing fair labor practices and the well-being of workers over short-term financial gains. It may require advocating for better working conditions and exploring alternative cost-saving measures that do not compromise ethical standards.

It is important to note that ethical decision-making is not always straightforward. Different individuals or groups may have differing perspectives on what constitutes an ethical choice. Engaging in open dialogue, considering diverse viewpoints, and seeking guidance from ethical frameworks or codes of conduct can help navigate these complexities.

By following a systematic ethical decision-making process, we can approach morally complex situations with clarity, integrity, and a commitment to upholding ethical principles. This process empowers us to make choices that align with our values and contribute to a more ethical and just society.

Challenges in Ethical Decision-Making

Despite the importance of ethical decision-making, it is not without its challenges. Various factors can cloud our judgment and make it difficult to navigate morally complex situations.

One of the primary challenges in ethical decision-making is the presence of personal bias. Our personal biases and beliefs can significantly influence our decision-making process.

Preconceived notions and prejudices may lead us to make choices inconsistent with ethical principles. For example, suppose someone holds a deep-seated bias against a certain group of people. In that case, they may be more likely to make decisions that discriminate against them, even if it goes against their ethical values.

Overcoming personal bias requires self-awareness and a willingness to critically examine our assumptions and perspectives. It involves recognizing that our biases can cloud our judgment and actively working to mitigate their impact on our decision-making.

In addition to personal bias, societal pressure can pose a significant challenge in ethical decision-making. Societal norms and expectations can exert considerable pressure on individuals when making ethical choices. The desire to conform or avoid conflict can sometimes compromise our ability to act ethically.

For instance, in a work environment where cutting corners and bending the rules is the norm, an individual may feel pressured to engage in unethical behavior to fit in or avoid negative consequences. By recognizing and resisting societal pressure, we can uphold our values and make decisions that align with our ethical principles. This requires courage and a strong sense of personal integrity.

Furthermore, ethical decision-making can be complicated by conflicting interests. In many situations, individuals may be torn between competing values or obligations. For example, a business owner may face a decision that pits their company’s financial success against their employees’ well-being.

Balancing these conflicting interests requires careful consideration and a deep understanding of each choice’s potential consequences. It may involve seeking stakeholder input, conducting thorough research, and weighing the decision’s long-term impact.

Another challenge in ethical decision-making is the lack of clear guidelines or standards. Sometimes, there may be no established rules or regulations to guide our choices. This can leave individuals feeling uncertain and vulnerable, as they must rely on their judgment to determine the ethical course of action.

In such cases, relying on ethical frameworks and principles to guide decision-making becomes crucial. These frameworks can provide a structured approach to evaluating the potential ethical implications of different choices and help individuals make informed decisions.

Ultimately, ethical decision-making is a complex process that requires careful consideration of various factors. Personal bias, societal pressure, conflicting interests, and the absence of clear guidelines all contribute to our challenges when making ethical choices. By recognizing and addressing these challenges, we can strive to make decisions that uphold our values and promote ethical behavior.

Strategies for Ethical Decision-Making

To navigate ethical dilemmas effectively, it is helpful to employ strategies that guide our decision-making process and ensure ethical outcomes.

When faced with ethical dilemmas, knowing the right course of action can be challenging. However, we can approach these situations with clarity and integrity by utilizing specific strategies. Let’s explore some methods that can help us make ethical decisions.

Developing a Personal Code of Ethics

Creating a personal code of ethics provides a foundation for ethical decision-making. It involves clarifying our values, principles, and priorities. By establishing a clear ethical framework, we can consistently make choices that align with our core beliefs.

When developing a personal code of ethics, we must reflect on our values and consider how they shape our decision-making process. This reflective exercise allows us to understand what is truly important to us and how we want to conduct ourselves in various situations.

Moreover, a personal code of ethics serves as a compass, guiding us through the complexities of ethical dilemmas. It helps us stay true to our principles and make decisions that align with our moral compass.

Implementing Ethical Guidelines in Decision-Making

Having a set of ethical guidelines can be a valuable tool in decision-making, especially in complex situations. These guidelines are a reference point for assessing potential options and their ethical implications. They act as a compass, helping us navigate morally challenging situations.

When implementing ethical guidelines, it is crucial to consider various factors, such as the potential impact of our decisions on others, the long-term consequences, and the ethical standards of the community or organization we belong.

By referring to ethical guidelines, we can evaluate the different options available to us and choose the one that aligns with our values and principles. These guidelines provide a framework for making informed decisions that prioritize ethical considerations.

Furthermore, ethical guidelines can also help us maintain consistency in our decision-making process. They enable us to approach each ethical dilemma systematically and thoughtfully, ensuring that our choices are grounded in ethical principles.

Employing strategies for ethical decision-making is essential in navigating complex ethical dilemmas. By developing a personal code of ethics and implementing ethical guidelines, we can make informed choices that align with our values and principles. These strategies provide us with a framework to approach ethical decision-making with integrity and ensure ethical outcomes.

The Impact of Ethical Decision-Making

Ethical decision-making goes beyond fulfilling individual responsibilities; it profoundly impacts personal growth and society as a whole.

Ethical Decisions and Personal Growth

Making ethical choices fosters personal growth and development. It enhances our ability to think critically, weigh different perspectives, and act with integrity. By consistently making ethical decisions, we cultivate moral character and become better individuals.

Ethical Choices and Their Influence on Society

The collective impact of ethical decisions shapes the fabric of society. When individuals prioritize ethics in their decision-making, they contribute to a more just and equitable world. Ethical choices ripple through communities and inspire others to follow suit, creating a positive domino effect.

Doing the right thing and engaging in ethical decision-making is not always easy, but it is essential. By understanding the ethical decision-making process, recognizing the challenges that may arise, employing effective strategies, and considering the impact of our choices, we can navigate moral complexities with integrity and contribute to a better world.

For more information on how you and your team can make ethical decisions in your organization, schedule a complimentary consultation with a senior partner at Culture Partners to discuss your goals. Let’s work together to shape your ethical culture and accelerate your journey toward success.

Forge Stronger Bonds with These Team Accountability Exercises

Powerful quotes on accountability at work, what defines a cohesive team and how to cultivate one, what can we help you find.

Mind by Design

Critical thinking vs analytical thinking: The differences and similarities

The ability to think clearly and make informed decisions is paramount to life. This article delves deep into the realms of analytical thinking and critical thinking, shedding light on their differences and how they complement each other. By understanding these thinking styles, you’ll be better equipped to tackle complex problems, evaluate information, and make well-informed decisions. Let’s dive in!

Introduction to Analytical and Critical Thinking

Analytical and critical thinking are two skills essential for solving problems and making decisions in various aspects of life. While both involve the use of logic and reasoning, they differ in their approach and outcomes. Analytical thinking involves breaking down complex information into smaller parts, while critical thinking involves taking a holistic view and evaluating information from different angles. Analytical thinking involves the ability to dissect a problem or situation into its individual components and examining each part separately. It requires careful observation and the ability to identify patterns and relationships. This type of thinking is essential for tasks such as data analysis, problem-solving, and troubleshooting.

Critical thinking, on the other hand, involves the ability to assess information objectively, evaluate its credibility, and make logical judgments. It involves questioning assumptions, examining evidence, and considering different perspectives. Critical thinking is crucial for making informed decisions, weighing pros and cons, and avoiding biases and fallacies.

Both analytical and critical thinking complement each other and are necessary for effective problem-solving and decision-making. Analytical thinking provides a structured and systematic approach to understanding complex problems , while critical thinking helps evaluate different options and make sound judgments.

Developing analytical and critical thinking skills can greatly benefit individuals in various aspects of life. In academia, these skills are necessary for understanding and interpreting complex subjects, conducting research, and writing analytical essays. In the workplace, analytical and critical thinking skills are highly valued by employers as they enable employees to solve problems efficiently and make informed decisions. In daily life, these skills are essential for evaluating information, distinguishing between fact and opinion, and making rational choices.

There are various ways to improve analytical and critical thinking skills. Engaging in activities that require logical reasoning, such as puzzles, brain teasers, and mathematical problems, can help develop analytical thinking abilities. Reading diverse sources of information, questioning assumptions, and actively seeking different perspectives can enhance critical thinking skills . Additionally, engaging in debates, discussions, and problem-solving exercises can promote both analytical and critical thinking.

Analytical and critical thinking skills are essential for problem-solving and decision-making in various aspects of life. They involve breaking down complex information and evaluating it from different angles. Developing these skills can lead to more effective problem-solving, informed decision-making, and overall improved cognitive abilities.

Traits of an Analytical Thinker

An analytical thinker is one who is adept at breaking down complex problems into smaller parts. This type of thinking is linear and involves analyzing cause and effect relationships. Analytical thinking uses logic and reasoning to come to a conclusion, often relying on data and facts. Some key traits of an analytical thinker include:

The ability to dissect complex information into smaller pieces.
A knack for recognizing patterns and relationships.
A methodical approach to problem-solving.

What Does It Mean to Think Critically?

Critical thinking, on the other hand, is a type of higher-order thinking that requires a more holistic approach. Critical thinkers are often skeptical, questioning the validity of information before accepting it. They are adept at evaluating information from various sources and are not easily swayed by outside information. Key aspects of critical thinking include :

The ability to form an opinion based on evidence.
Considering multiple perspectives before making a decision.
Recognizing biases and challenging one’s own assumptions.

Analytical Thinking vs Critical Thinking: The Major Differences

While both analytical and critical thinking are essential for solving problems, they differ in several key ways:

Approach : Analytical thinking is more linear and focuses on breaking down complex information into smaller parts. Critical thinking, however, is holistic and looks at the bigger picture.
Use of Information : Analytical thinkers rely heavily on facts and data, while critical thinkers use facts in conjunction with other pieces of information and perspectives.
Outcome : Analytical thinking often leads to a single logical conclusion, whereas critical thinking might result in multiple potential solutions or outcomes.

The Processes: Analytical Thinking Process vs Critical Thinking Process

Both styles of thinking have distinct processes:

Analytical Thinking Process : Starts with gathering data, followed by breaking down complex problems, analyzing the cause and effect relationships, and finally drawing a conclusion.
Critical Thinking Process : Begins with gathering diverse pieces of information, evaluating their validity, considering various perspectives, and finally forming an opinion or decision.

Using Analytical and Critical Thinking in Real Life Scenarios

In real-life scenarios, these thinking styles can be applied in various ways. For instance, when faced with a business decision, an analytical thinker might focus on the numbers and statistics, while a critical thinker might consider the potential impact on employees, company culture, and external stakeholders.

Analytical thinking can be particularly useful when analyzing financial data and making data-driven decisions. For example, a business owner might use analytical thinking to analyze the company’s financial statements and determine the profitability and financial health of the business. They might examine key financial ratios, such as return on investment or gross profit margin, to assess the efficiency and effectiveness of various business operations.

On the other hand, critical thinking can be applied when evaluating different options and considering the potential consequences of each option. For example, when considering a potential business expansion, a critical thinker may explore the potential impact on existing employees, the company’s culture, and the external stakeholders. They may assess the potential risks and benefits of the expansion, considering factors such as increased competition, resource allocation, and market demand.

Analytical and critical thinking can also be applied in personal decision-making. For example, when considering a major life decision such as buying a house or changing careers, analytical thinking can help weigh the financial implications, such as the monthly mortgage payments or future earning potential. Critical thinking can help evaluate the potential impact on personal goals, values, and overall satisfaction.

In everyday life, analytical thinking can be useful when evaluating product options or making purchasing decisions. For example, comparing different phone models based on features, specifications, and customer reviews can help individuals make an informed choice. Critical thinking can be applied when assessing the potential consequences of a decision, such as considering the long-term environmental impact of a product or the ethical practices of a particular company.

Both analytical and critical thinking are valuable skills in problem-solving. They can help individuals identify the root causes of a problem, analyze potential solutions, and evaluate their effectiveness. Whether it’s troubleshooting a technical issue, resolving a conflict, or devising strategies to improve personal or professional performance, these thinking styles can be instrumental in finding effective solutions.

Analytical and Critical Thinking in Problem-Solving

Problem-solving requires a combination of both analytical and critical thinking. Analytical thinking helps break the problem into manageable parts, while critical thinking helps in evaluating potential solutions and considering their implications.

The Importance of Combining Both Thinking Styles

While both styles are powerful on their own, combining analytical and critical thinking skills can lead to more robust solutions. This combination allows for a thorough analysis of a problem while also considering the broader implications and potential consequences of a decision.

Mistakes to Avoid: Misconceptions about Analytical and Critical Thinking

Many assume that analytical thinking and critical thinking are one and the same, but this is a misconception. It’s important to recognize their distinct differences and strengths. Another common mistake is over-relying on one style and neglecting the other, leading to potential oversights in decision-making.

Key Takeaways: The Future of Analytical and Critical Thinking

In summary, here are the most important things to remember:

Distinct yet Complementary : While analytical and critical thinking have distinct processes and outcomes, they are complementary and can be used together for more effective decision-making.
Real-world Applications : Both styles are essential in various aspects of life, from business decisions to personal choices.
Continuous Learning : As the world becomes more complex, honing both analytical and critical thinking skills will be crucial for success.

Embrace both styles of thinking and watch as your decision-making skills, problem-solving abilities, and overall understanding of complex situations improve dramatically.

Q: What is the difference between critical thinking and analytical thinking?

A: Critical thinking and analytical thinking are similar thinking skills, but there are some differences between the two. Critical thinking involves gathering information, evaluating and interpreting it, and then making a judgment or decision based on that information. Analytical thinking, on the other hand, focuses more on breaking down complex problems into smaller components, analyzing the relationships between these components, and coming up with solutions based on this analysis. So while both skills involve a logical and systematic approach to thinking, critical thinking is more focused on making judgments and decisions, whereas analytical thinking is more focused on problem-solving and analysis.

Q: How do I use critical thinking in everyday life?

A: Critical thinking is a valuable skill that can be applied in various aspects of everyday life. To use critical thinking, you need to approach situations and problems with an open and questioning mind. This involves challenging your own assumptions and beliefs, gathering and evaluating information from different sources, considering alternative perspectives, and making informed decisions based on evidence and logical reasoning. By using critical thinking, you can enhance your problem-solving skills, improve your decision-making abilities , and think more creatively and independently.

Q: How do I use analytical thinking in my professional life?

A: Analytical thinking is an important skill in many professional fields. To use analytical thinking, you need to be able to break down complex problems or tasks into smaller parts, analyze the relationships between these parts, and come up with logical and well-reasoned solutions. This involves gathering and evaluating relevant data, identifying patterns or trends, and using logical reasoning to draw conclusions. By using analytical thinking, you can improve your problem-solving and decision-making abilities, demonstrate a logical and organized approach to your work, and effectively communicate your analysis and solutions to others.

Q: Can critical thinking and analytical thinking be used together?

A: Yes, critical thinking and analytical thinking are complementary skills that can be used together. Both skills involve a systematic and logical approach to thinking, and they can reinforce each other in problem-solving and decision-making processes. Critical thinking provides the framework for evaluating and interpreting information, while analytical thinking provides the tools for breaking down complex problems and finding solutions. By using both skills together, you can enhance your ability to think critically and analytically, make more informed decisions, and solve problems more effectively.

Q: What are the differences between analytical reasoning and critical thinking?

A: Analytical reasoning and critical thinking are related skills that involve a logical and systematic approach to thinking. However, there are some differences between the two. Analytical reasoning is more focused on the process of breaking down complex problems or arguments, identifying logical relationships between different elements, and drawing conclusions based on this analysis. Critical thinking, on the other hand, is a broader skill that involves evaluating and interpreting information, questioning assumptions and biases, and making judgments or decisions based on evidence and logical reasoning. While analytical reasoning is an important part of critical thinking, critical thinking encompasses a wider range of cognitive processes and skills.

Q: How can I develop and improve my analytical thinking skills?

A: To develop and improve your analytical thinking skills, you can engage in activities that stimulate your logical and problem-solving abilities. This may involve practicing with puzzles and brainteasers, analyzing case studies or real-life scenarios, participating in debates or discussions, learning and applying different analytical frameworks or models, and seeking feedback on your analytical thinking from others. Additionally, you can also cultivate your analytical thinking skills by staying curious, asking thoughtful questions, and continuously seeking new knowledge and perspectives. With practice and perseverance, you can enhance your analytical thinking abilities and become a more effective problem solver and decision maker.

Q: How can I become a critical thinker?

A: Becoming a critical thinker requires a conscious effort to develop and refine your thinking skills. Here are some steps you can take to become a critical thinker : 1. Cultivate intellectual humility and open-mindedness: Be willing to consider alternative viewpoints and challenge your own assumptions and beliefs. 2. Develop strong analytical and reasoning skills: Learn to gather and evaluate evidence, identify logical fallacies, and draw logical and well-supported conclusions. 3. Practice active listening and effective communication: Listen attentively to others’ perspectives, ask thoughtful questions, and communicate your own ideas clearly and persuasively. 4. Seek out diverse sources of information: Expose yourself to different perspectives and viewpoints to broaden your understanding and avoid bias. 5. Reflect and evaluate your own thinking: Regularly reflect on your own thinking processes, identify any biases or logical gaps, and work on improving your critical thinking skills.

Q: What role does critical thinking play in problem-solving?

A: Critical thinking is a fundamental skill in problem-solving. It helps you approach problems with a logical and systematic mindset, evaluate potential solutions, and make informed decisions. Critical thinking allows you to gather and analyze relevant information, identify patterns or trends, consider different perspectives or alternatives, weigh the pros and cons, and choose the most effective solution. By using critical thinking in problem-solving, you can enhance your ability to find creative and innovative solutions, overcome obstacles, and make well-informed decisions that are based on sound reasoning and evidence.

Q: Why is critical thinking important?

A: Critical thinking is important because it enables you to think independently, make informed decisions, solve problems effectively, and evaluate information and arguments critically. In a rapidly changing and complex world, critical thinking allows you to navigate through information overload, identify biases or misinformation, and make sense of a wide range of conflicting information. It also helps you develop a deep understanding of concepts and ideas, construct well-reasoned arguments, and communicate your thoughts effectively. In both personal and professional contexts, critical thinking is a valuable skill that empowers you to be a more effective and successful individual.

Q: How does analytical thinking contribute to problem-solving?

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Headlines News and Media

Heinzig and mcmillan gift $6.75 million to department of philosophy to advance ethics and critical thinking at osu.

Friday, September 6, 2024

Media Contact: Elizabeth Gosney | CAS Marketing and Communications Manager | 405-744-7497 | [email protected]

Growing up in Prague, Oklahoma, Dennis Heinzig yearned for more than what he found in his small town of around 2,300. For him, the answers to life’s questions wouldn’t be found there.

So, Heinzig ventured out into a world that was much different than he expected — one that did not fit the perspective he started with, nor for which he was prepared. And then he found philosophy, where his quest for a broader understanding of truth and wisdom really began.

“What philosophy did for me was take the blinders off conceptually,” Heinzig said. “It allowed me to begin to think more objectively about life’s important questions. By going beyond what I was taught one must think or believe, I began to discern what is true and ethical and then live accordingly.”

Heinzig and his wife, Iona McMillan, have gained an invaluable amount from philosophy, and the couple wants as many Oklahoma State University students as possible to experience its benefits. In pursuit of that goal, Heinzig and McMillan made the largest donation ever to the OSU Department of Philosophy . Their $6.75 million gift will establish an endowed chair and fund ethics and critical thinking and an endowed general fund for philosophy. It will also continue to fund the Heinzig & McMillan Endowed Scholarship for Ethics and Critical Thinking.

“We are deeply grateful for Dennis and Iona’s visionary commitment to advancing critical thinking and ethics at OSU,” said Dr. Scott Gelfand, former philosophy department head. “This transformative gift will empower our faculty and students to engage in rigorous inquiry, ethical reflection and meaningful action, contributing to the cultivation of ethical leaders and responsible citizens.”

Ethics and critical thinking play a prominent role in OSU’s strategic plan and mission to become the nation’s preeminent land-grant university.

“At OSU, our ideal graduate demonstrates professional preparedness, engaged citizenship, ethical leadership and personal responsibility,” OSU President Kayse Shrum said. “Each of those qualities has roots in philosophy, and when demonstrated, will serve our landgrant mission by equipping graduates to positively impact their communities.

“Dennis and Iona’s generosity with this historic gift will help us ensure our graduates are prepared to make a difference in the world.”

The couple has been involved with multiple charities over the years, but it was McMillan’s idea to make an impact at OSU, where Heinzig earned his master’s degree in philosophy in 1987. During his time in Stillwater, Heinzig met philosophy professor Ed Lawry, who Heinzig remembers as always supportive and approachable. Lawry taught his students to apply philosophy to real-life issues, which guided Heinzig throughout his 30-year business career.

“As an employer, I found it much harder to train someone to approach business decisions with ethics and critical thinking than it was to teach them knowledge-based job skills,” Heinzig said. “To think carefully and be a good person — those two qualities are required to navigate life’s challenges for the good of oneself and all others.”

In the spirit of Lawry, Heinzig and McMillan hope their gift will help students and faculty in all fields appreciate the importance and relevance of philosophy. The couple wants to inspire people to face every issue with objectivity and fairness — whether in academics, their career or personal life. To that end, the department is offering a new minor, the Art and Science of Critical Thinking.

“We hope our contributions will equip people with critical thinking skills and a deeper ethical understanding that will in time make a meaningful difference in our world,” McMillan said. “Our intention is to disseminate the benefits of philosophy as broadly as possible, equipping new leaders with the tools and understanding required to grapple with a rapidly changing world.”

Philosophy and philanthropy share the same root word — phileo, or brotherly love. In Greek, philosophy means the love of wisdom, while philanthropy means the love of humanity. Heinzig and McMillan believe the two are intrinsically intertwined, and that, with conflicts raging across the globe, OSU can play a part in making the world a better place.

“OSU is a very special community and has the right mission and environment to show how philosophy is just as impactful and relevant as agriculture, technology or energy to our lives and the future of humanity,” Heinzig said. “If we approach our global challenges with deep ethical understanding and critical thinking skills, there is no problem humanity cannot solve.”

Story by: Grant Ramierez | CONNECT magazine

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Introduction Video on Online course on Ethics and Critical Thinking
Lesson 2 Ethics and Critical Thinking
Chapter 2 Lesson 2 Ethics and Critical Thinking
The Relationship between Critical Thinking and Ethics Free Essay Example
Similarities and Differences in Critical Thinking Stages
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Analytical And Critical Thinking
False Equivalence
Ancient Minds, Modern Wisdom: Aristotle, Plato, and Socrates
School Daze (Ep. 4): Ethics Boss Case Study
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Critical Thinking 20: Surveillance ethics

COMMENTS

10.1: Ethics vs. Morality
Etc. On this conception, the ethical encompasses the moral and political because ethical questions are questions about the good life and what we ought to do, whereas moral questions are about what we ought to do to and with one another. It's important to note, though, that this isn't an authoritative way to draw the distinction.
Critical Thinking
Critical Thinking is the process of using and assessing reasons to evaluate statements, assumptions, and arguments in ordinary situations. The goal of this process is to help us have good beliefs, where "good" means that our beliefs meet certain goals of thought, such as truth, usefulness, or rationality. Critical thinking is widely ...
PDF Understanding the Foundations of Ethical Reasoning
an thinking are the cause of much human suffering. Only the systematic cultivation of fair-mindedness, honesty, integrity, self-knowledge, and deep concern for the welfare of others c. n provide foundations for sound ethical reasoning.Ethical reasoning entails doing what is.
How Is Critical Thinking Different From Ethical Thinking?
Ethical thinking and critical thinking are both important and it helps to understand how we need to use them together to make decisions. Critical thinking helps us narrow our choices. Ethical thinking includes values as a filter to guide us to a choice that is ethical. Using critical thinking, we may discover an opportunity to exploit a ...
Critical Thinking
Critical Thinking. Critical thinking is a widely accepted educational goal. Its definition is contested, but the competing definitions can be understood as differing conceptions of the same basic concept: careful thinking directed to a goal. Conceptions differ with respect to the scope of such thinking, the type of goal, the criteria and norms ...
10.2: Universalism vs. Relativism
Moral reasoning focuses on the normative sense of the word: what is right and what is wrong (not what principles govern my actions and which govern the actions of people I think are wrong). This page titled 10.2: Universalism vs. Relativism is shared under a CC BY 4.0 license and was authored, remixed, and/or curated by Andrew Lavin via source ...
PDF THE THINKER'S GUIDE TO ETHICAL REASONING
system, practice, rule, or law is ethical. To be skilled at ethical reasoning means to develop a conscience not subservient to fluctuating social conventio. s, theological systems, or unethical laws. Consistently sound reasoning in any domain of thought presupposes practice in reasoni.
Ethical Thinking
1.1 Ethics and Morals. The word "ethics," which gives its name to the corresponding philosophical discipline, derives from the ancient Greek "ethos," in which three different yet related meanings can be distinguished. Firstly, it simply means the place where one lives; secondly, the socially established habits, customs, and traditions ...
PDF Critical Thinking: Ethical Reasoning as Essential to Fairminded
Critical Thinking: ning as Essential to Fairminded Critical Thinking, Part IIIBy Richard Paul and Linda ElderIn the last two co. mns we introduced the idea of ethical reasoning and discussed its importance to educ. ion. We dealt with the problem of ego-centric thinking as a barrier to ethical reasoning. And we focused on the importance of ...
PDF Critical Thinking: Ethical Reasoning and Fairminded Thinking, Part I
ning and Fairminded Thinking, Part IBy Richard Paul and Linda ElderThe development of ethical reasoning abilities is vitally impor. ant—both for living an ethical life and creating an ethical world. In columns over the last s. veral years we have focused on the foundations of critical thinking. In this and the next few columns, we set ou.
Developing ethical reasoning and/or ethical decision making
Richard Paul (9), of the Foundation for Critical Thinking, devised a program whereby principles of critical thinking were applied specifically to teaching ethical reasoning to young people Robert DeHaan and colleagues at Emory University successfully taught ethical reasoning to high school students (10).
Development of Moral and Ethical Reasoning: A Comparison of U.S. and
Critical thinking is a related consideration, as language is the medium for communicating and formulating ideas with subsequent actions. The connection between critical thought and moral development is fundamental because students' ability to reason at the highest moral level is largely predicated upon their ability to engage in abstract ...
Ethics, values and Values Based Practice in educational psychology
2) suggests that it is necessary for psychologists to engage in serious moral thinking that is congruous to their role as scientists. However, he warns about a narrow focus on 'a code-driven, ethics-driven approach to moral thinking', as it blurs the similarities between scientific thinking and moral thinking.
Thinking Ethically
This approach to ethics assumes a society comprising individuals whose own good is inextricably linked to the good of the community. Community members are bound by the pursuit of common values and goals. The common good is a notion that originated more than 2,000 years ago in the writings of Plato, Aristotle, and Cicero.
Virtue Ethics
Virtue ethics is currently one of three major approaches in normative ethics. It may, initially, be identified as the one that emphasizes the virtues, or moral character, in contrast to the approach that emphasizes duties or rules (deontology) or that emphasizes the consequences of actions (consequentialism). Suppose it is obvious that someone ...
Kant and Hume on Morality
The relationship between Immanuel Kant (1724-1804) and David Hume (1711-1776) is a source of longstanding fascination. Kant credited Hume with waking him from his "dogmatic slumber", and he describes the Critique of Pure Reason, arguably the most important work of modern philosophy, as the solution to the "Humean problem in its greatest possible amplification" (Prol 4:260-61).
Ethics
The term ethics may refer to the philosophical study of the concepts of moral right and wrong and moral good and bad, to any philosophical theory of what is morally right and wrong or morally good and bad, and to any system or code of moral rules, principles, or values. The last may be associated with particular religions, cultures, professions, or virtually any other group that is at least ...
Doing the Right Thing: Ethical Decision-Making
Defining Ethics in Decision-Making. In the context of decision-making, ethics serve as a framework to evaluate the rightness or wrongness of an action. It involves considering the immediate benefits or gains and the long-term effects and potential harm caused by our decisions. By adhering to ethical standards, we aim to ensure fairness, justice ...
Critical Thinking
Critical thinking is the discipline of rigorously and skillfully using information, experience, observation, and reasoning to guide your decisions, actions, and beliefs. You'll need to actively question every step of your thinking process to do it well. Collecting, analyzing and evaluating information is an important skill in life, and a highly ...
What Are Critical Thinking Skills and Why Are They Important?
According to the University of the People in California, having critical thinking skills is important because they are [1]: Universal. Crucial for the economy. Essential for improving language and presentation skills. Very helpful in promoting creativity. Important for self-reflection.
(PDF) A Critical Study on the Concept of Ethics and Morality in
Published Date: November 09, 2020. DOI: 10.23880/phij-16000157. Abstract. Ethics and Morality are a controversial study in comparative philosophy. In particular, both has recognized and ...
The Oxford Handbook of Thinking and Reasoning
Abstract. Humans and other animals perceive and act on the basis of similarities among things because similarities are usually informative. Similar things usually behave similarly, and because we can grasp these similarities, we can organize and predict the things in our world. Four major classes of models have been proposed for how humans ...
Critical thinking vs analytical thinking: The differences and similarities
Critical thinking vs analytical thinking can be mistaken for the same thing but they are indeed different. Critical thinking is the process of reasoning through information, concepts, or data that are acquired by sensory experience. Analytical thinking is the type of thought that typically centres on problem-solving in many areas. Analytical thinking can be applied in various ways to solve ...
Heinzig and McMillan gift $6.75 million to Department of Philosophy to
It will also continue to fund the Heinzig & McMillan Endowed Scholarship for Ethics and Critical Thinking. "We are deeply grateful for Dennis and Iona's visionary commitment to advancing critical thinking and ethics at OSU," said Dr. Scott Gelfand, former philosophy department head. "This transformative gift will empower our faculty and ...