thesis about rational choice theory

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Rational Choice Theory

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Matthias Wurtenberger

This thesis will scrutinise to what extent theories of collective- or team-reasoning could solve some of the main dilemmas (the prisoners' dilemma, stag-hunt and hi-lo) of game theory and subsequently improve its foundations. The theories of Bacharach [1999;2006], Hollis [1987;1998] and Sugden [1993;2000;2003] will be analysed in detail. The main contribution of this thesis will lie in the attempt to combine a theory of collective reasoning with a reason-based theory of rational choice, building up on the work of Dietrich & List [2013].

SSRN Electronic Journal

Herbert Gintis

Journal of the History of Economic Thought

Nicola Giocoli

The goal of this paper is to analyze the relationship between the two notion of rationality devised by John von Neumann in his classic Theory of Games and Economic Behavior, namely, the minimax and the expected utility rule. It is argued that, when account is taken of von Neumann’s real goal in developing game theory, it turns out that no decision theory is contained in the 1944 book and that the expression “rational behavior” had to him one and only one meaning, that is, to abide by the minimax criterion.

2004) The Oxford Handbook of Rationality

Cristina Bicchieri

American Economic Review

Holger Herz , Tom Wilkening

Behavioral and Brain Sciences

Andrew M Colman

Herbert Gintis , Andrew M Colman , Richard Shiffrin , Paul Weirich , PJB Hancock

Aki Lehtinen

Authority structures are a key determinant of incentives and efficiency in organi-zations. However, little is known empirically about how individuals allocate authority within organizations and how they respond to authority assignment. We conducted a laboratory experiment to study the interplay between authority, the delegation of authority and effort. We find that authority structures lead to an under-provision of effort by subordinates and an over-provision of effort by controlling parties. We also find that individuals retain authority even when it is strongly in their interest to dele-gate. This finding cannot be explained by preferences defined over monetary outcomes only, suggesting a preference for power that goes beyond monetary incentives.

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• > Journals
• > The Review of Politics
• > Volume 53 Issue 2
• > The Rational Choice Approach to Politics: A Challenge...

Article contents

The rational choice approach to politics: a challenge to democratic theory.

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  05 August 2009

In just three decades rational choice theory has emerged as one of the most active, influential, and ambitious subfields in the discipline of political science. Rational choice theory contends that political behavior is best explained through the application of its supposedly “value-neutral” assumptions which posit man as a self-interested, purposeful, maximizing being. Through the logic of methodological individualism, assumptions about human nature are treated as empirical discoveries. My central argument is that by assuming that self-interest is an empirically established component of human nature, rational choice theory supports and perpetuates a political life which is antithetical to important tenets of normative democratic theory. Rational choice theory offers an incoherent account of democratic citizenship and produces a political system which shows a constant biased against political change and pursuit of the public interest. This article concludes by discussing the merits of democratic deliberation for achieving these transformative ends.

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I would like to thank Kristen Renwick Monroe for encouraging me to turn my thoughts on this topic into a suitable written presentation and for her many substantive comments on earlier versions of this paper. It was also a pleasure to have the wise counsel of Benjamin I. Page, David Easton, and Gabriel Almond at various stages of this paper as well as the research assistance of Catheryn K. Markline. The comments and suggestions of three anonymous reviewers are also greatly appreciated.

1. For the purposes of this article rational choice includes and refers to those approaches to the study of political life influenced by the economic model of man captured under the various headings of public choice, social choice, and collective choice.

2. Three new edited volumes are particularly rich sources of such omissions and suggested modifications. See Monroe , Kristen Renwick , ed., The Economic Approach to Politics: A Reexamination of the Theory of Rational Action ( New York : Scott-Foresman/Harper and Row-Collins , 1991 ); Google Scholar Mansbridge , Jane J. , ed., Beyond Self-interest ( Chicago : University of Chicago Press , 1990 ); Google Scholar and Cook , Karen Schweers and Levi , Margaret , eds., The Limits of Rationality ( Chicago : University of Chicago Press , 1990 ). CrossRef Google Scholar The list of omissions is easily expanded by considering the rigorous attacks on rational choice theory presented variously by Ball , Terence , “The Economic Reconstruction of Democratic Discourse,” in Transforming Political Discourse , ed. Ball , Terence ( Oxford : Basil Blackwell , 1988 ); Google Scholar Bluhm , William T. , “Liberalism as the Aggregation of Individual Preferences: Problems of Coherence and Rationality in Social Choice,” in The Crisis of Liberal Democracy: A Straussian Perspective , ed. Deutsch , Kenneth L. and Soffer , Walter ( Albany, NY : State University of New York at Albany Press , 1987 ); Google Scholar Hindess , Barry , Choice, Rationality and Social Choice ( London : UnwinHyman , 1988 ); Google Scholar MacIntyre , Alasdair C. , Whose Justice? Which Rationality? ( South Bend, IN : University of Notre Dame Press , 1988 ); Google Scholar Macpherson , C. B. , Democratic Theory: Essays in Retrieval ( Oxford : Oxford University Press , 1973 ); Google Scholar Macpherson , C. B. , The Life and Times of Liberal Democracy ( Oxford : Oxford University Press , 1977 ); Google Scholar Plamenatz , John , Democracy and Illusion ( London : Longman , 1973 ); Google Scholar Ricci , David M. , The Tragedy of Political Science ( New Haven : Yale University Press , 1984 ); Google Scholar Self , Peter , Politica Theories of Modem Government ( London : George Allen and Unwin , 1985 ); Google Scholar Simon , Herbert , “ Human Nature in Politics: The Dialogue of Psychology with Political Science ,” American Political Science Review 79 ( 06 1985 ): 293 – 304 ; CrossRef Google Scholar and Slote , Michael , Beyond Optimizing ( Cambridge, MA : Harvard University Press , 1989 ). CrossRef Google Scholar

3. See Ordeshook , Peter C. , Game Theory and Political Theory ( Cambridge : Cambridge University Press , 1986 ), p. ix CrossRef Google Scholar ; Downs , Anthony , An Economic Theory of Democracy ( New York : Harper and Row , 1957 Google Scholar ); Black , Duncan , Theory of Committees and Elections ( Cambridge : Cambridge University Press , 1958 ) Google Scholar ; Riker , William H. , The Theory of Political Coalitions ( New Haven : Yale University Press , 1962 ) Google Scholar ; and Buchanan , James M. and Tullock , Gordon , The Calculus of Consent ( Ann Arbor, MI : University of Michigan , 1962 ) CrossRef Google Scholar . This claim is juxtaposed to the conventional wisdom of political philosophers that “modern political philosophy” or “modern political thought” begins in the 1500s with the writings of Machiavelli. See Strauss , Leo , What Is Political Philosophy? ( Westport, CT : Greenwood , 1973 ) Google Scholar , and Strauss , Leo , Natural Right and History ( Chicago : University of Chicago Press , 1953 ) Google Scholar ; on the “new political science,” see Strauss , Leo , The Political Philosophy of Hobbes ( Chicago : University of Chicago Press , 1952 ) Google Scholar . A good summary of the Straussian perspective is provided by Tarcov , Nathan and Pangle , Thomas , “Epilogue,” in History of Political Philosophy , ed. Strauss , Leo and Cropsey , Joseph ( Chicago : University of Chicago Press , 1987 ). Google Scholar

4. Becker , Gary S. , The Economic Approach to Human Behavior ( Chicago : University of Chicago Press , 1976 ), p. 8 . Google Scholar

5. Posner , Richard A. , The Economics of Justice ( Cambridge, MA : Harvard University Press , 1983 ), pp. 1 and 3. Google Scholar

6. Olson , Mancur Jr. , The Rise and Decline of Nations ( Cambridge, MA : Harvard University Press , 1982 ), p. ix . Google Scholar

7. Buchanan , James M. , “Politics Without Romance: A Study of Positive Public Choice Theory and Its Normative Implications,” in The Theory of Public Choice — II , ed. Buchanan , James M. and Tollison , Robert D. ( Ann Arbor, MI : University of Michigan Press , 1984 ), pp. 20 – 21 . CrossRef Google Scholar

8. Buchanan , James M. , “Constitutional Restrictions on the Power of Government,” in Buchanan and Tollison, Theory of Public Choice — II , p. 442 . Google Scholar

9. For further elaborations on the conservative policy recommendations of the so-called Virginia School of public choice, see Mitchell , William C. , “ Virginia, Rochester, and Bloomington: Twenty-five Years of Public Choice and Political Science ,” Public Choice 56 ( 1988 ): 101 – 119 . CrossRef Google Scholar

10. Abrams , Robert , Foundations of Political Analysis: An Introduction to the Theory of Collective Choice ( New York : Columbia University Press , 1980 ), p. 1 . Google Scholar Cf. Mitchell , , “Virginia, Rochester, and Bloomington,” p. 115 . Google Scholar

11. According to Popper , Karl R. , “The task of social theory is to construct and to analyze our sociological models carefully in descriptive or nominalist terms, that is to say, in terms of individuals, of their attitudes, expectations, relations, etc. — a postulate which may be called ‘methodological individualism'” ( The Poverty of Historicism [ New York : Harper and Row , 1957 ], p. 157 ). Google Scholar Popper is probably the best single source on this approach to social theory. However, like so many great innovators he is much less certain about the virtues of deductive reasoning than contemporary theorists who appear quite unfamiliar with the subtle nature of Popper's analysis.

12. See Hindess , , Choice, Rationality and Social Choice , p. 96 . Google Scholar

13. See Buchanan , and Tullock , , Calculus of Consent , p. 1 . Google Scholar

14. See Ordeshook , , Game Theory and Political Theory , p. 1 . Google Scholar

15. See Hindess , , Choice, Rationality and Social Choice , pp. 36 – 39 . Google Scholar

16. See Bluhm, “Liberalism as the Aggregation of Individual Preferences”; Strauss, Political Philosophy of Hobbes ; Strauss, What Is Political Philosophy? ; and Bloom , Allan , “Political Science and the Undergraduate,” in Teaching Political Science: The Professor and the Polity , ed. Dyke , Vernon Van ( Atlantic Highlands, NJ : Humanities Press , 1977 ). Google Scholar

17. These examples are presented to counter the claims of rational choice theorists that the theory has moved away from the economic man model of human nature postulated by micro-economics. These citations evidence the rather consistent attention given to the motive of self-interest throughout the history of rational choice theory.

18. David Hume is quoted in Collini , Stefan , Winch , Donald , and Burrow , John , That Noble Science of Politics ( Cambridge : Cambridge University Press , 1984 ), p. 30 . Google Scholar

19. Smith , Adam , The Wealth of Nations , ed. Cannon , Edwin ( Chicago : University of Chicago Press , 1976 ), p. 18 . Google Scholar

20. Downs , , Economic Theory of Democracy , p. 27 . Google Scholar

21. Ibid. , p. 28.

22. Buchanan , and Tullock , , Calculus of Consent , pp. 25 and 30. Google Scholar

23. Riker , , Theory of Political Coalitions , p. 22 . Google Scholar

24. Arrow , Kenneth J. , Social Choice and Individual Values , 2nd ed. ( New Haven : Yale University Press , 1963 ), p. 3 . Google Scholar

25. Olson , Mancur Jr. , The Logic of Collective Action ( Cambridge, MA : Harvard University Press , 1965 ), p. 2 . Google Scholar

26. Riker , William H. and Ordeshook , Peter C. , An Introduction to Positive Political Theory ( Englewood Cliffs, NJ : Prentice-Hall, Inc. , 1973 ), p. 10 . Google Scholar

27. Fiorina , Morris P. , “Formal Models in Political Science,” in Theory-Building and Data Analysis in the Social Sciences , ed. Asher , Herbert , Weisberg , Herbert F. , Kessel , John H. , and Shively , W. Phillips ( Knoxville, TN : University of Tennessee Press , 1984 ), p. 84 . Google Scholar

28. Mueller , Dennis C. , “Public Choice: A Survey,” in Buchanan and Tollison, Theory of Public Choice — II , p. 23 . Google Scholar

29. Buchanan , , “Politics Without Romance,” p. 13 . Google Scholar

30. Brams , Steven J. , Rational Politics ( Washington, D.C. : Congressional Quarterly Press , 1985 ), p. 2 . Google Scholar

31. Fiorina , Morris P. , Congress: Keystone of the Washington Establishment , 2nd ed. ( New Haven : Yale University Press , 1989 ), p. 37 . Google Scholar

32. See Slote , , Beyond Optimizing , p. 7 . Google Scholar

33. See Orren , Gary R. , “Beyond Self-interest,” in The Power of Public Ideas , ed. Reich , Robert B. ( Cambridge, MA : Ballinger Publishing Co. , 1988 ), pp. 13 – 29 Google Scholar ; Kelman , Steven , “Why Public Ideas Matter,” in The Power of Public Ideas , ed. Reich , Robert B. ( Cambridge, MA : Ballinger Publishing Co. , 1988 ), pp. 31 – 53 Google Scholar ; and Kelman , Steven , Making Public Policy ( NY : Basic Books , 1987 ). Google Scholar

34. Almond , Gabriel A. , “Rational Choice Theory and the Social Sciences,” in A Discipline Divided , ed. Almond , Gabriel A. ( Beverly Hills, CA : Sage , 1990 ), p. 135 . Google Scholar

35. Buchanan , and Tullock , ( Calculus of Consent , p. 3 ) Google Scholar and Buchanan , (“Politics Without Romance,” p. 13 ) Google Scholar claim that their analysis does not depend for its elementary logical validity upon any narrowly hedonistic or self-interest motivation of individuals in their behavior in social-choice processes. However, given their great reliance upon the market oriented model of homo economicus , which does rely on the assumption of self-interest, it is difficult to view their work as examples of Almond's “blank tile.” A less suspect source who accepts the blank tile thesis is the sociologist Michael Hector who argues that “There is nothing in rational choice that denies that individuals can pursue altruistic or prosocial ends. Indeed, the theory tends to be mute about the genesis of individual ends.” See Hecter , Michael , Principles of Group Solidarity ( Berkeley, CA : University of California Press , 1987 ), p. 11 . Google Scholar While widely conceded that rational choice theory does not have a theory of preference formation, this is different from the claim that rational choice theory is compatible with public spirited or other-regarding motivations by individuals. The possibilities for altruism is treated wisely by Amartya K. Sen, Jon Elster, Christopher Jencks, and Jane J. Mansbridge in Mansbridge, Beyond Self-Interest ; and by Monroe et al. in Monroe, Economic Approaches to Politics .

36. See Mayhew , David , Congress: The Electoral Connection ( New Haven : Yale University Press , 1974 ) Google Scholar ; and Fiorina , Morris , Congress: Keystone to the Washing Establishment ( New Haven : Yale University Press , 1977 ) Google Scholar . For a critique of Fiorina that argues for a Congress motivated by public spiritedness, see Kelman , , Making Public Policy Google Scholar . Fiorina's response to Kelman may be found in Chapter 11 of Fiorina , , Congress: Keystone to the Washington Establishment , 2nd ed. Google Scholar

37. I thank Benjamin I. Page for bringing this point to my attention.

38. Tullock , Gordon , The Vote Motive ( London : Institute for Economic Affairs , 1976 ). Google Scholar

39. Gordon , Tullock , “Public Choice in Practice,” in Collective Decision Making: Applications From Public Choice Theory , ed. Russell , Clifford S. ( Baltimore : The Johns Hopkins University Press , 1979 ), pp. 31 and 33. Google Scholar

40. See Russell , Hardin , Collective Action ( Baltimore : The Johns Hopkins University Press , 1982 ), p. 11 Google Scholar ; and Barry , Brian , Sociologists, Economists, and Democracy ( Chicago : University of Chicago Press , 1978 ). Google Scholar

41. This discussion draws heavily on Kelman, “Why Public Ideas Matter”; and Kelman, Making Public Policy .

42. See Derthick , Martha and Quirk , Paul L. , The Politics of Deregulation ( Washington, D.C. : Brookings Institution , 1985 ). Google Scholar

43. Sen , Amartya , “ Rational Fools: A Critique of the Behavioral Foundation of Economic Theory ,” Philosophy and Public Affairs 6 ( 1977 ): 66 . Google Scholar Also consider, Barry , Brian , Theories of Justice , p. 285 Google Scholar ; and Marquand , David , “ Preceptoral Politics, Yeoman Democracy and the Enabling State ,” Government and Opposition 23 ( Summer 1988 ): 262 –65. CrossRef Google Scholar

44. Marquand , , “Preceptoral Politics,” p. 266 . Google Scholar

45. See Simon , , “Human Nature in Politics,” p. 303 Google Scholar ; Downs , Anthony , The Evolution of Modern Democracy (Unpublished Manuscript, The Brookings Institution , Washington, D.C. , 1988 ) Google Scholar ; and March , James and Olsen , Johan , “ The New Institutionalism: Organizational Factors in Political Life ,” American Political Science Review 78 ( 09 1984 ): 738 and 744. Google Scholar

46. See Brams , , Rational Politics , p. 2 Google Scholar ; and Laver , Michael , The Politics of Private Desires: The Guide to the Politics of Rational Choice ( Middlesex : Penguin , 1981 ), pp. 1 – 2 . Google Scholar

47. Buchanan , , “Politics Without Romance,” pp. 13 – 14 . Google Scholar

48. There are many competitive and supplemental understandings of human nature. For examples, see Bellah , Robert N. et al. , Habits of the Heart ( New York : Harper and Row , 1985 ) Google Scholar ; Diamond , Martin , “Ethics and Politics: The American Way,” in The Moral Foundations of the American Republic , 3rd ed. , ed. Horowitz , Robert H. ( Charlottesville, VA : University of Virginia Press , 1986 ), pp. 75 – 108 Google Scholar ; Duncan , Graeme , “Human Nature and Radical Democratic Theory,” in Democratic Theory and Practice , ed. Duncan , Graeme ( Cambridge : Cambridge University Press , 1983 ): 187 – 203 Google Scholar ; Hofstadter , Richard , “The Founding Fathers: An Age of Realism,” in Horowitz , , Moral Foundations of the American Republic , pp. 62 – 74 Google Scholar ; Strauss , Leo , The Political Philosophy of Hobbes Google Scholar , and Strauss , Leo , The Rebirth of Classic Political Rationalism , ed. and intro. Pangle , Thomas L. ( Chicago : University of Chicago Press , 1989 ). Google Scholar

49. In economics, see Collard , David , Altruism and Economy ( Oxford : Martin Robinson , 1978 ) Google Scholar , and Kalt , Joseph and Zupan , Mark A. , “ Capture and Ideology in the Economic Theory of Politics ,” American Economic Review 74 ( 1984 ): 279 – 300 Google Scholar ; in cognitive psychology, see Kahneman , Daniel , Knetsch , Jack L. , and Thaler , Richard , “ Fairness and the Assumptions of Economics ,” Journal of Business 59 ( 1986 ): 285 – 300 CrossRef Google Scholar ; in political psychology, see Sears , David O. and Funk , Carolyn L. , “Self-interest in Americans' Public Opinions Google Scholar ,” in Mansbridge , , Beyond Self-Interest , pp. 147 –70 Google Scholar ; and Tyler , Tom R. , Why People Obey the Law ( New Haven : Yale University Press , 1990 ) Google Scholar ; in sociology, see Etzioni , Amitai , The Moral Dimension: Toward a New Economics ( New York : Free Press , 1988 ) Google Scholar ; in sociobiology, see Campbell , Donald , “ Rationality and Utility from the Standpoint of Evolutionary Biology ,” Journal of Business 59 ( 1986 ): 355 –63 CrossRef Google Scholar and Jencks , Christopher , “Varieties of Altruism Google Scholar ,” in Mansbridge , , Beyond Self-Interest , pp. 54 – 67 Google Scholar ; in policy analysis, see Kelman , , Making Public Policy; Kelman, “Why Public Ideas Matter Google Scholar ”; and Reich , , Power of Public Ideas Google Scholar ; and in political science, see essays by Monroe , Kristen R. et al. , in Monroe, Economic Approach to Politics . Google Scholar

50. Mansbridge , Jane J. , “Self-Interest in the Explanation of Political Life,” in Mansbridge , , Beyond Self-Interest , p. 16 . Google Scholar

51. Orren , Gary , “Beyond Self-interest,” p. 24 . Google Scholar A more extensive treatment is this issue occurs in Verba , Sidney and Orren , Gary , Equality in America ( Cambridge, MA : Harvard University Press , 1985 ), chap. 11. Google Scholar

52. Tyler , , Why People Obey The Law , p. 178 Google Scholar . See also, Tyler , Tom R. , Rasinski , Kenneth A. , and Griffin , Eugene , “ Alternative Images of the Citizen ,” American Psychologist 41 ( 09 , 1986 ): 970 –78. CrossRef Google Scholar

53. See Maclntyre , , Whose Justice? Which Rationality? , p. 123 Google Scholar ; and Berger , Peter L. and Luckmann , Thomas , The Social Construction of Reality ( Garden City, NY : Doubleday , 1967 ). Google Scholar

54. In what Foucault calls the episteme are the conditions of knowledge within which organized knowledges are structured. This project is carried out by Foucault , primarily in The Order of Things ( New York : Vintage Books , 1970 ). Google Scholar For Foucault, there is no unequivocal sense which may be accorded to the relation of words to things. “Before any definite value can be attached to “words” or “things” it must be recognized that as terms, they will find themselves in a space of knowledge which is always already organized. How words exist, what sort of things there will be, will depend upon that space and its organization. Foucault calls that space an episteme, a configuration of relations which functions as the conditions of existence of particular forms of knowledges and sciences” (see Cousins , Mark and Hussidn , Athar , Michel Foucault [ New York : St. Martin's Press , 1984 ], p. 15 ). CrossRef Google Scholar

55. See Hindess , , Choice, Rationality and Social Choice , p. 4 Google Scholar ; and Simon , , “Human Nature in Politics,” p. 303 . Google Scholar

56. See Scaff , Lawrence A. and Ingram , Helen , “ Politics, Policy, and Public Choice: A Critique and Proposal ,” Polity 19 ( Summer 1987 ): 613 –36. CrossRef Google Scholar

57. Allison , Graham T. , Essence of Decision ( Boston : Little, Brown and Co. , 1977 ), p. 245 . Google Scholar

58. Simon , , “Human Nature in Politics,” p. 303 . Google Scholar

59. See Diamond, “Ethics and Politics”; and Diggins , John P. , The Lost Soul of American Politics ( Chicago : University of Chicago Press , 1986 ). Google Scholar

60. Hamilton , Alexander , Madison , James , and Jay , John , The Federalist Papers , ed. and intro. Rossiter , Clinton ( NY : New American Library , 1961 ), pp. 80 , 79, and 82. CrossRef Google Scholar

61. The political effects of teaching rational choice theory to university students is treated provocatively in Steiner , Jurg , “ Rational Choice Theories and Politics: A Research Agenda and a Moral Question ,” PS: Political Science and Politics 23 ( 03 1990 ): 46 – 50 . Google Scholar

62. Hallowell , John H. , The Moral Foundations of Democracy ( Chicago : University of Chicago Press , 1954 ), p. 89 . Google Scholar

63. For social, political, and psychological accounts of this phenomena, see Lasch , Christopher , The Culture of Narcissism ( New York : W. W. Norton , 1979 ) Google Scholar ; Lasch , Christopher , The Minimal Self ( New York : W. W. Norton , 1984 ) Google Scholar ; and Sennet , Richard , The Fall of Public Man ( New York : Vintage Books , 1976 ). Google Scholar

64. Ball , , “The Economic Reconstruction of Democratic Discourse,” p. 124 . Google Scholar

65. Farr , James , “Understanding Conceptual Change Politically,” in Political Innovation and Conceptual Change , ed. Ball , Terence , Farr , James , and Hanson , Russell L. ( Cambridge : Cambridge University Press , 1989 ), p. 30 . Google Scholar

66. Hanson , Russell L. , The Democratic Imagination ( Princeton : Princeton University Press , 1985 ), p. 7 . Google Scholar

67. Ball , , “The Economic Reconstruction of Democratic Discourse,” p. 142 . Google Scholar

68. Barry , Brian , Political Argument ( London : Routledge and Kegan Paul , 1965 ), p. 280 . Google Scholar

69. Lockyer , Andrew , “Aristotle: The Politics,” in A Guide to the Political Classics ed. Forsyth , Murray and Keens-soper , Maurice ( Oxford : Oxford University Press , 1988 ), p. 46 . Google Scholar Ironically, in appropriating the notion of “rational action” to the instrumental advance of self-interest, rational choice theorists have done a disservice to the rationalist tradition. As Self , Peter , Political Theories of Modem Government , explains: “This tradition stresses the significant role of reason over the harmonization of interests and the responsible exercise of individual freedom. Stripped of these conditions, the individual is a bundle of desires and tastes, not a person capable of meaningful choice” (p. 190 ). Google Scholar

70. Keens-soper , Maurice , “Jean-Jacques Rousseau: The Social Contract,” in Forsyth and Keens-Soper, Guide to Political Classics , p. 179 . Google Scholar

71. Quoted in Philp , Mark , Paine ( Oxford : Oxford University Press , 1989 ), p. 69 . Google Scholar

72. In various ways these themes were also pursued by the American antifederalists and federalists, despite their many other differences. Following the traditional principles of civic republicanism, the antifederalists believed that civil society should educate, not merely regulate, private conduct so as to move the citizenry away from the pursuit of self-interest, at least in politics. As Cass Sunstein explains, “The federalists' suspicion of civic virtue and their relative skeptical attitude towards the possibility that citizens could escape their self-interest led them to reject the traditional republican structure without rejecting important features of its normative understanding of politics.” The Constitution they created and defended was a synthesis of traditional republicanism and emergent pluralism; created to “bring about public-spirited representation, to provide safeguards in its absence, and to ensure an important measure of popular control.” See Sunstein , Cass R. , “ Interest Groups in American Public Law ,” Stanford Law Review 38 ( 11 1985 ): 29 – 87 . CrossRef Google Scholar

73. This discussion of Tocqueville relies heavily on Sullivan , William M. , Reconstructing Public Philosophy ( Berkeley, CA : University of California Press , 1986 ). Google Scholar

74. Mill , John Stuart , Considerations on Representative Government ( Chicago, IL : Henry Regnery Co. , 1962 , originally published in 1861), p. 71 . Google Scholar

75. Through participation, says Mill, the individual “is called upon, while so engaged to weigh interests not his own; to be guided, in case of conflicting claims, by another rule than his private partialities; to apply, at every turn, principles and maxims which have for their reason of existence the common good…. He is made to feel himself one of the public, and whatever is for their benefit to be for his benefit.” Quoted in Ball , , “The Economic Reconstruction of Democratic Discourse,” p. 134 . Google Scholar

76. As Terence Ball observes: “The beau ideal of the economic theory is nothing less than Mill's passive character actively searching after his own ‘material or world interest.’ The language of moral development, of character, of education cannot even begin to be translated into the vocabulary of this theory.... That theory, or rather various versions of it, have as their ancestors the very perspective that Mill meant to criticize. If their characters are of the ‘active' type, citizens are not just voters, and voters are not simply consumers; citizenship is not equivalent to consumership. Yet it is this doubtful equivalence that the economic theory of democracy insists upon asserting” ( Ball , , “The Economic Reconstruction of Democratic Discourse,” p. 135 ). Google Scholar

77. Pateman , Carole , Participation and Democratic Theory ( Cambridge : Cambridge University Press , 1970 ), p. 3 . CrossRef Google Scholar

78. See Schumpeter , Joseph A. , Capitalism, Socialism, and Democracy ( NewYork : Harper Colophon Books , 1975 , originally published in 1942). Google Scholar

79. A sample of these new works include: Barber , Benjamin , Strong Democracy ( Berkeley, CA : University of California Press , 1985 ) Google Scholar ; Barber , Benjamin , The Conquest of Politics ( Princeton : Princeton University Press , 1988 ); Google Scholar Bellah et al., Habits of the Heart ; Bobbio , Norberto , The Future of Democracy ( Minneapolis, MN : University of Minnesota Press , 1987 ); Google Scholar Dahl , Robert A. , A Preface to Economic Democracy ( Berkeley, CA : University of California Press , 1985 ); Google Scholar Dahl , Robert A. , Democracy and Its Critics ( New Haven : Yale University Press , 1989 ); Google Scholar Duncan, “Human Nature and Radical Democratic Theory”; Green , Philip , Retrieving Democracy ( Totowa, NJ : Rowman and Allanhead , 1985 ); Google Scholar Harris , David , “Returning the Social to Democracy,” in Duncan, Democratic Theory and Practice , pp. 218 –34; Google Scholar essays by Cochrane , Allan , Rowbotham , Sheila , Mclean , Iain and Burnheim , John in New Forms of Democracy , ed. Held , David and Pollitt , Christopher ( Beverly Hills, CA : Sage , 1986 ); Google Scholar Jordon, The Common Good , Macedo , Stephen , Liberal Virtues ( Oxford : Clarendon Press , 1990 ); Google Scholar Mansbridge , Jane , Beyond Adversary Democracy ( Chicago : University of Chicago Press , 1983 ); Google Scholar Mansbridge , Jane , “A Dynamic Theory of Interest Representation,” in The Politics of Interests: Interest Groups Transformed , ed. Petracca , Mark P. ( Boulder, CO : Westview Press , 1991 ); Google Scholar Marquand, “Preceptoral Politics”; Miller , David , “The Competitive Model of Democracy,” in Duncan, Democratic Theory and Practice , pp. 133 –55; Google Scholar Schmitter , Philippe C. “Corporative Democracy” (Paper presented at the Conference on Politische Institutionen und Interessenvermittlung, Konstanz, Deutchland, 1988 ); Google Scholar Sullivan, Reconstructing Public Philosophy , and Unger , Roberto M. , The Critical Legal Studies Movement ( Cambridge, MA : Harvard University Press , 1983 ); Google Scholar and Unger , Roberto M. , False Necessity ( Cambridge : Cambridge University Press , 1987 ). Google Scholar

80. Bellah , et al. , Habits of the Heart , p. 211 . Google Scholar

81. See Marquand, “Preceptoral Politics”; Green, Retrieving Democracy ; Dahl Preface to Economic Democracy ; and Dahl, Democracy and Its Critics .

82. Barber , , Conquest of Politics , pp. 210 –11. Google Scholar

83. Of course, it is easy to imagine how rational choice theorists might respond to Barber's indictment and vision. Consider the view of Brams , Steven , Rational Politics : “In my opinion, it is better to have an understanding of what values are at stake, which rational-choice models can clarify, than to engage in a fruitless debate over the oft-touted virtues of democracy” (pp. 205 – 206 ). Google Scholar Barber's work is far more than a celebration of democracy's virtues, it is a plan for the development of strong democracy informed by a vision of a democratic polity. Unfortunately, the same cannot be said of this prolific rational choice theorist.

84. Some liberal theorists also concede that liberal citizenship is not “simply the pursuit of self-interest, individually or in factional collusion with others of like mind.” See Galston , William A. , “ Liberal Virtues ,” American Political Science Review 82 ( 12 1988 ): 1284 . CrossRef Google Scholar

85. As we see in the next section these inequalities are also helped along by the assumptions and logic of rational choice.

86. MacPherson , C. B. , The Real World of Democracy ( Oxford : Oxford University Press , 1966 ), p. 38 . Google Scholar

87. See Sullivan , , Reconstructing Political Philosophy , p. 222 . Google Scholar

88. Quoted in Barry , , Sociologists, Economists, and Democracy , p. 176 . Google Scholar

89. Kelman , , “Why Public Ideas Matter,” p. 31 . Google Scholar

90. Barber , , Conquest of Politics , p. 201 . Google Scholar

91. Bluhm , , “Liberalism as the Aggregation of Individual Preferences,” p. 289 . Google Scholar

92. Cropsey , Joseph , “On the Relation of Political Science and Economics,” in Political Philosophy and the Issues of Politics , ed. Cropsey , Joseph ( Chicago : University of Chicago Press , 1977 ), p. 39 . Google Scholar

93. I am persuaded by Slote, Beyond Optimizing ; Bellah et al., Habits of the Heart; Bluhm, “Liberalism as the Aggregation of Individual Preferences”; and Steiner, “Rational Choice Theories and Politics,” that there is not much of a moral difference between the assumptions of self-interest, maximization, or optimization; all of which create and encourage individuals who are self-regarding and insensitive to the interconnected nature of social existence.

94. Self , , Political Theories of Modern Government , p. 70 . Google Scholar

95. This often leads some rational choice theorists to a myopic defense of property rights. Buchanan, for example, gives the “status quo a privileged status, since he maintains that nobody can rightfully be deprived (even by legislation) of what he now has” (see Barry , , Theories of Justice , [ Berkeley : University of California Press , 1989 ], p. 174 ) Google Scholar .

96. This is a problem which is just beginning to receive attention from friendly critics like Simon and practitioners such as Hector. See Simon, “Human Nature in Politics,” and Hector, Principles of Group Solidarity .

97. Plamenatz , , Democracy and Illusion , p. 150 . Google Scholar

98. Ricci , , Tragedy of Political Science , p. 241 . Google Scholar

99. See Self , , Political Theories of Modern Government , p. 178 Google Scholar ; and Ricci , , Tragedy of Political Science , p. 243 . Google Scholar

100. See Riker , William H. , Liberalism Against Populism ( San Francisco : W. H. Freeman and Co. , 1982 ). Google Scholar

101. Ibid. , p. 137. Saviors of the public interest around the world — past and present — can take great comfort in Riker's authoritative and scientifically derived conclusion.

102. See Mclean , Iain , Public Choice: An Introduction ( Oxford : Basil Blackwell , 1987 ), p. 186 . Google Scholar

103. Riker , , Liberalism Against Populism , p. 252 . Google Scholar For a lively critique of Riker's comparison, see Weale , A. , “ Social Choice Versus Populism: An Interpretation of Riker's Political Theory ,” British Journal of Political Science 14 ( 1982 ): 369 –85. CrossRef Google Scholar

104. As an individual committed to scientific inquiry, Riker's catty and openly evocative discussion of C. B. McPherson, Karl Marx and Marcus Raskin is rather unbecoming. See Riker , , Liberalism Against Populism , pp. 12 – 16 . Google Scholar

105. Buchanan , James M. , “From Private Preferences to Public Philosophy: The Development of Public Choice,” in The Economics of Politics , ed. Institute of Economic Affairs ( West Sussez : Institute of Economic Affairs , 1978 ), p. 17 . Google Scholar This is also similar to Robert Dahl's notion of “Madisonian democracy.” See Dahl, Preface to Democratic Theory . For different positions on Madison, see Diamon “Ethics and Politics”; and Sunstein, “Interest Groups in American Public Law.”

106. See Ricci , , Tragedy of Political Science , p. 242 . Google Scholar

107. Tullock , Gordon , Private Wants, Public Needs ( New York : Basic Book 1970 ), pp. 32 – 33 . Google Scholar

108. Buchanan , and Tullock , ( Calculus of Consent , pp. 300 – 301 ) Google Scholar believe that one of the more significant doctrinal implications of their theory “lies in its implicit rationalization of a political structure that has never seemed to possess rigorous theoretical foundation.” As is the case for Riker, this political structure is the American experiment in constitutional democracy.

109. Self , , Political Theories of Modern Government , p. 74 . Google Scholar

110. See Mitchell, “Virginia, Rochester, and Bloomington: Twenty-five Years of Public Choice and Political Science.”

111. Since threats do exist to the stability of the American regime — from the populists according to Riker and from the Leviathan-state according to Buchanan — rational choice theory has also been invoked to support the political agenda of neoconservatism. While I agree that it would be a mistake to identify rational choice analysis with some version of the New Right, there is a strong and disturbing tendency by rational choice theorists to deploy their “scientific” prowess on behalf of the New Right's political agenda. Examples to illustrate this point are abundant: Riker's support of fiscal reform at the constitutional level, Buchanan and Wagner's attack on deficit spending, Buchanan's defense of property rights; Olson's call for open and competitive markets; and the “Virginians” principled rejection of governmental intervention in matters of regulation and social policy. See Riker , William H. , “Constitutional limitations as a self-denying ordinances,” in The Constitution and the Budget, 85–90 , ed. Moore , W. S. and Penner , R. G. ( Washington, D.C. : American Enterprise Institute , 1980 ) Google Scholar ; Buchanan , James M. and Wagner , Richard E. , Democracy in Deficit ( New York : Academic Press , 1977 ) Google Scholar ; Buchanan , James M. , Freedom in Constitutional Contract ( College Station, Texas : Texas A&M Press , 1977 ) Google Scholar ; Olson, Rise and Decline of Nations ; and Mitchell, “Virginia, Rochester, and Bloomington: Twenty-five Years of Public Choice and Political Science.”

112. Jordon , , Common Good , p. 16 . Google Scholar

113. Jane J. Mansbridge, “Preface,” in Mansbridge , , Beyond Self-interest , p. x . Google Scholar

114. Reich, “Introduction,” in Reich , , Power of Public Ideas , p. 3 . Google Scholar

115. Mansbridge , , “Self-interest in the Explanation of Political Life,” p. 9 . Google Scholar

116. For example, see Dahl, Preface to Democratic Theory .

117. See Mansbridge, “A Dynamic Theory of Interest Representation.”

118. See Reich, Power of Public Ideas ; Mansbridge, “Self-Interest in the Explanation of Political Life”; Mansbridge, “A Dynamic Theory of Interest Representation”; Sunstein, “Interest Groups in American Public Law”; Bessette , Joseph M. , “Deliberative Democracy: The Majority Principle in Republica Government,” in How Democratic Is the Constitution? eds., Goldwin , Robert A. and Schambra , William A. ( Washington : American Enterprise Institute , 1980 ), pp. 102 – 116 Google Scholar ; and Bessette , Joseph M. , “Is Congress a Deliberative Body?” in The United States Congress: Proceedings of the Thomas P. O'Neill Symposium , ed. Hale , Dennis ( Chestnut Hill, MA : Boston College , 1982 ). Google Scholar

119. Sunstein , , “Interest Groups in American Public Law,” pp. 46 – 47 . Google Scholar

120. Sunstein , , “Interest Groups in American Public Law,” pp. 84 – 85 . Google Scholar

121. Mansbridge , , “Self-Interest in the Explanation of Political Life,” p. xii . Google Scholar

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The many faces of rational choice theory

• Catherine Herfeld Ludwig-Maximilians-University, Germany

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Catherine herfeld, ludwig-maximilians-university, germany.

Catherine Herfeld obtained her PhD in April 2013 at the economics faculty of Witten/Herdecke University. The dissertation committee consisted of Professor Chrysostomos Mantzavinos (University of Athens and Witten/Herdecke University), and Professor Philip Kitcher (Columbia University). Catherine Herfeld is currently a postdoctoral research fellow at the Munich Center for Mathematical Philosophy at the Ludwig-Maximilians-University, Germany. She finished her dissertation while she was a research fellow at the Center for the History of Political Economy at Duke University, United States.

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Rational Choice Theory

Rational Choice Theory is a theoretical framework that has been developed to understand the behavior of individuals and groups in various settings. It posits that individuals make rational choices based on their preferences and constraints, with the aim of maximizing their utility. The theory has been widely applied in various fields such as economics, political science, sociology, and psychology.

One of the main strengths of Rational Choice Theory is that it provides a rigorous framework for analyzing individual behavior. By assuming that individuals act rationally, the theory provides a clear and systematic way to analyze the motivations and decisions of individuals. This makes it possible to develop models and predictions about individual behavior in a wide range of settings.

Another strength of the theory is its flexibility. Rational Choice Theory can be applied to a wide range of settings, from consumer behavior to political decision-making. This has allowed researchers to apply the theory in a variety of fields, leading to a large body of research on the topic.

However, the theory also has some limitations. One of the main criticisms of Rational Choice Theory is that it assumes that individuals have perfect information and that they always act in their own self-interest. In reality, individuals often have imperfect information and may not always act in their own best interest. This means that the predictions made by Rational Choice Theory may not always match the behavior of individuals in real-world settings.

Another criticism of the theory is that it is often difficult to empirically test. Since it relies on assumptions about individual preferences and constraints, it can be difficult to test these assumptions in practice. This means that the theory is often based on theoretical models rather than empirical data, which can limit its applicability in certain contexts.

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Rational choice theory in political decision making.

• Scott H. Ainsworth Scott H. Ainsworth School of Public and International Affairs, University of Georgia
• https://doi.org/10.1093/acrefore/9780190228637.013.1019
• Published online: 28 September 2020

Rational choice theory builds from a very simple foundation. To wit: individuals are presumed to pursue goal-oriented behavior stemming from rational preferences. Rational choice theory benefits from the very precise formulations of its assumptions. Individual-level rationality is generally defined as having complete and transitive preferences. Both completeness and transitivity have precise, formal definitions. From complete and transitive preferences, one can develop utility function presentations reflecting those preferences. Utility functions have the advantage of establishing a measure and allowing one to assess attitudes toward risk. That is, utility functions can reflect risk acceptance, risk neutrality, or risk aversion.

Although some rational choice theorists focus on individual-level decision making, most rational choice theorists consider the ways in which individuals’ decisions are aggregated into some sort of social outcome or social preference order. The aggregation of individuals’ preferences occurs in both social choice and game theoretic models. Arrow’s theorem is the best-known result in social choice theory. Arrow showed that the rationality of individuals’ preferences could not be readily preserved at the group level when those individuals’ preferences were aggregated. That is, individual-level rationality does not ensure group-level rationality. Put slightly differently, irrationality at the group level cannot impugn rationality at the individual level. Other examples highlighting the difficulty of aggregating individuals’ preferences into a collective outcome abound. For instance, game theoretic presentations of the collective action problem highlight how individually rational decisions can lead to suboptimal outcomes.

Rational choice models have been used to model interactions in a wide array of political institutions. Rational choice models have been developed to tackle some of the most challenging concepts in the social sciences, even in areas long thought impenetrable to rational choice theorizing. For instance, concepts such as ideology or personal identification have typically been used as preestablished descriptors. In contrast to treating those concepts as extant descriptors, rational choice theorists have modeled the endogenous development of ideologies and personal identification. Given the complexity of social phenomena, the relative parsimony and the clarity of rational choice models can be particularly helpful. The usefulness of rational choice models stems from their parsimony and their applicability to a wide range of settings.

• preferences
• loss aversion
• Arrow’s theorem
• Black’s theorem
• structure-induced equilibria
• information cascades
• collective action problems
• information asymmetries
• political decision making

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Rational Choice Theory: Why Irrationality Makes More Sense for Comparative Politics

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Rational Choice Theory (RCT) has emerged as one of the leading methodologies in political science. RCT studies have permeated the field since the 1950s. With the increasing quantification of the social sciences, RCT provided the way in which economic models and approaches were transferred to political science in an attempt to improve consistency and analysis. Economic theories prior to this were generally applied to the economic policies and behaviors of countries related to trade and commerce.

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Always Rational Choice Theory? Lessons from Conventional Economics and Their Relevance and Potential Benefits for Contemporary Sociologists

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The rise of rational choice theory as a scientific/intellectual movement in sociology.

Gerardo L. Munck, “Rational Choice Theory in Comparative Politics,” in New Directions in Comparative Politics , ed. Howard J. Wiarda, 3rd ed. (Boulder: Westview, 2002), 166.

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Nakaska, J.D.J. (2010). Rational Choice Theory: Why Irrationality Makes More Sense for Comparative Politics. In: Wiarda, H.J. (eds) Grand Theories and Ideologies in the Social Sciences. Palgrave Macmillan, New York. https://doi.org/10.1057/9780230112612_8

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Rational Choice theory includes a broad body of research that attempts to account for how people act in a variety of contexts, including economic, political and even moral situations. By proposing, most generally, that individuals rationally pursue their self-interests regardless of the context, rational choice has had extensive theoretical and empirical success, on the one hand, and has also faced wide criticism when applied in a variety of disciplines, on the other hand. While there is disagreement over what the defining assumptions of rational choice theory are, in this dissertation I focus on three on which there is widespread agreement. These three features of rational choice theory are: its assumption of egoism or self-interest as the central motivation of individuals; its reliance on consequences as part of a comparative decision-making framework; and finally, its focus on the individual and not on groups as the methodological and normative unit of analysis.

In correspondence to these three features, my dissertation is divided into three parts and explores the separate topics of (I) egoism and altruism; (II) consequentialism and ethical decision-making; and, (III) individualism and group identity. The dissertation is not an exercise in showing the extensive problems of rational choice theory, although there are many. The dissertation rather engages these three topics with differing results, some of which in fact attempts to revitalize rational choice, or at least features of rational choice. For the part on altruism, my goal is to demonstrate why the central assumption of egoism in rational choice theory is problematic. More broadly, I argue for a different way of defining genuine altruistic motivation. A result of my analysis there is that altruism appears to be more widespread than has been traditionally assumed and is more amenable to empirical examination. For my discussion on consequentialism, my aim is to re-characterize rational choice as a mode of moral decision-making. I argue that the moral agent is one who frequently compares her particular moral ends in a stable fashion and for this reason cost-benefit analysis is a fully moral framework, one that encourages the agent to genuinely care for her ends and values. For the topic of individualism and group identity, my objective is to show how a previously dismissed topic, once unpacked, is fully consistent with rational choice theory and ought to be of interest to the rational choice theorist. I show that if the liberal political theorist, including the rational choice theorist, is to value group identity, the commitment is only limited to valuing a form of group identity--particularized identity--that is individualist in character.

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Akhtar, Sahar Z (2008). Topics in Rational Choice Theory . Dissertation, Duke University. Retrieved from https://hdl.handle.net/10161/605 .

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The dominant school of thought in political science in the late 20th century was rational choice theory . For rational choice theorists, history and culture are irrelevant to understanding political behaviour; instead, it is sufficient to know the actors’ interests and to assume that they pursue them rationally. Whereas the earlier decision-making approach sought to explain the decisions of elite groups (mostly in matters of foreign policy), rational choice theorists attempted to apply their far more formal theory (which sometimes involved the use of mathematical notation) to all facets of political life. Many believed they had found the key that would at last make political science truly scientific. In An Economic Theory of Democracy (1957), an early work in rational choice theory, Anthony Downs claimed that significant elements of political life could be explained in terms of voter self-interest. Downs showed that in democracies the aggregate distribution of political opinion forms a bell-shaped curve, with most voters possessing moderate opinions; he argued that this fact forces political parties in democracies to adopt centrist positions. The founder of rational choice theory was William Riker , who applied economic and game-theoretic approaches to develop increasingly complex mathematical models of politics. In The Theory of Political Coalitions (1962), Riker demonstrated by mathematical reasoning why and how politicians form alliances. Riker and his followers applied this version of rational choice theory—which they variously called rational choice, public choice, social choice, formal modeling, or positive political theory—to explain almost everything, including voting, legislation, wars, and bureaucracy . Some researchers used games to reproduce key decisions in small-group experiments.

Rational choice theory identified—or rediscovered—at least two major explanatory factors that some political scientists had neglected: (1) that politicians are endlessly opportunistic and (2) that all decisions take place in some type of institutional setting. Rational choice theorists argued that political institutions structure the opportunities available to politicians and thus help to explain their actions.

By the early 21st century, rational choice theory was being stiffly challenged. Critics alleged that it simply mathematized the obvious and, in searching for universal patterns, ignored important cultural contexts , which thus rendered it unable to predict much of importance; another charge was that the choices the theory sought to explain appeared “rational” only in retrospect. Reacting to such criticisms , some rational choice theorists began calling themselves “new institutionalists” or “structuralists” to emphasize their view that all political choices take place within specific institutional structures. U.S. congressmen, for example, typically calculate how their votes on bills will help or hurt their chances for reelection. In this way, rational choice theory led political science back to its traditional concern with political institutions, such as parliaments and laws. In more recent years, increasing numbers of rational choice theorists have backed away from claims that their approach is capable of explaining every political phenomenon.

Late in the 20th century, some political scientists rediscovered their Aristotelian roots by returning to the question of how to achieve the good, just, and stable polity—that is, by returning to the study of democracy . Although the approaches taken were highly diverse , most researchers attempted to identify the factors by which democracies are established and sustained. Democratic theory was revived in earnest in the late 1980s, when communist regimes were collapsing throughout eastern Europe, and was accompanied by the founding of the influential Journal of Democracy in 1990.

The American political theorist Robert Dahl , who had long been a scholar of the topic, viewed democracy as the pluralist interplay of groups in what he called a “polyarchy.” Historical-cultural thinkers such as Lipset traced the origins of democracy to the values that democratic societies developed long ago. Samuel Huntington , perhaps the most influential post-World War II American political scientist, worried about a “democratic distemper” in which citizens demand more than the system can deliver. Huntington also viewed democracy as coming in waves—the most recent having started in 1974 in Greece and Portugal and having subsequently washed over Spain and Latin America—but warned of a potential reverse wave toward authoritarianism . The Spanish American political scientist Juan Linz explored how democracies can decline, and the Dutch-born American scholar Arend Lijphart considered the institutional arrangements (political parties and electoral systems, executives and parliaments) that were most likely to produce stable political systems.

Modernization theorists noted the connection between democracy and economic development but were unable to determine whether economic development typically precedes democracy or vice versa. Few of them regarded democracy as inevitable, and many noted its philosophical, psychological, and social prerequisites, suggesting that democracy may be a largely Western phenomenon that is not easily transplanted to non-Western cultures . Others, however, argued that democracy is a universal value that transcends culture. Some worried that the legitimacy of established democracies was eroding in the late 20th and early 21st centuries, as citizens became disenchanted with the political process and many moved away from political participation in favour of private pursuits. Voter turnout fell in most countries, in part because citizens saw little difference between the major political parties, believing them to be essentially power-seeking and self-serving. Some attributed this trend to a supposed abandonment of ideology as most parties hewed to centrist positions in order to capture the large moderate vote . Still others argued that party systems, ossified for at least a generation and based on social and political conflicts that had long been resolved, failed to address in a coherent fashion new social issues (e.g., feminism, environmentalism, civil rights) that concerned many citizens. Some blamed the media for focusing on political scandals instead of issues of substance, and some cited the inability of governments to fully address society’s ills (e.g., crime, drug abuse , unemployment). Nevertheless, not all scholars viewed this change with alarm. Some argued that citizens were generally better-educated and more critical than they were given credit for, that they were simply demanding better, cleaner government, and that these demands would eventually lead to long-term democratic renewal.