james madison federalist essays

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Federalist Papers

By: History.com Editors

Updated: June 22, 2023 | Original: November 9, 2009

The Federalist Papers are a collection of essays written in the 1780s in support of the proposed U.S. Constitution and the strong federal government it advocated. In October 1787, the first in a series of 85 essays arguing for ratification of the Constitution appeared in the Independent Journal , under the pseudonym “Publius.” Addressed to “The People of the State of New York,” the essays were actually written by the statesmen Alexander Hamilton , James Madison and John Jay . They would be published serially from 1787-88 in several New York newspapers. The first 77 essays, including Madison’s famous Federalist 10 and Federalist 51 , appeared in book form in 1788. Titled The Federalist , it has been hailed as one of the most important political documents in U.S. history.

Articles of Confederation

As the first written constitution of the newly independent United States, the Articles of Confederation nominally granted Congress the power to conduct foreign policy, maintain armed forces and coin money.

But in practice, this centralized government body had little authority over the individual states, including no power to levy taxes or regulate commerce, which hampered the new nation’s ability to pay its outstanding debts from the Revolutionary War .

In May 1787, 55 delegates gathered in Philadelphia to address the deficiencies of the Articles of Confederation and the problems that had arisen from this weakened central government.

A New Constitution

The document that emerged from the Constitutional Convention went far beyond amending the Articles, however. Instead, it established an entirely new system, including a robust central government divided into legislative , executive and judicial branches.

As soon as 39 delegates signed the proposed Constitution in September 1787, the document went to the states for ratification, igniting a furious debate between “Federalists,” who favored ratification of the Constitution as written, and “Antifederalists,” who opposed the Constitution and resisted giving stronger powers to the national government.

The Rise of Publius

In New York, opposition to the Constitution was particularly strong, and ratification was seen as particularly important. Immediately after the document was adopted, Antifederalists began publishing articles in the press criticizing it.

They argued that the document gave Congress excessive powers and that it could lead to the American people losing the hard-won liberties they had fought for and won in the Revolution.

In response to such critiques, the New York lawyer and statesman Alexander Hamilton, who had served as a delegate to the Constitutional Convention, decided to write a comprehensive series of essays defending the Constitution, and promoting its ratification.

Who Wrote the Federalist Papers?

As a collaborator, Hamilton recruited his fellow New Yorker John Jay, who had helped negotiate the treaty ending the war with Britain and served as secretary of foreign affairs under the Articles of Confederation. The two later enlisted the help of James Madison, another delegate to the Constitutional Convention who was in New York at the time serving in the Confederation Congress.

To avoid opening himself and Madison to charges of betraying the Convention’s confidentiality, Hamilton chose the pen name “Publius,” after a general who had helped found the Roman Republic. He wrote the first essay, which appeared in the Independent Journal, on October 27, 1787.

In it, Hamilton argued that the debate facing the nation was not only over ratification of the proposed Constitution, but over the question of “whether societies of men are really capable or not of establishing good government from reflection and choice, or whether they are forever destined to depend for their political constitutions on accident and force.”

After writing the next four essays on the failures of the Articles of Confederation in the realm of foreign affairs, Jay had to drop out of the project due to an attack of rheumatism; he would write only one more essay in the series. Madison wrote a total of 29 essays, while Hamilton wrote a staggering 51.

Federalist Papers Summary

In the Federalist Papers, Hamilton, Jay and Madison argued that the decentralization of power that existed under the Articles of Confederation prevented the new nation from becoming strong enough to compete on the world stage or to quell internal insurrections such as Shays’s Rebellion .

In addition to laying out the many ways in which they believed the Articles of Confederation didn’t work, Hamilton, Jay and Madison used the Federalist essays to explain key provisions of the proposed Constitution, as well as the nature of the republican form of government.

'Federalist 10'

In Federalist 10 , which became the most influential of all the essays, Madison argued against the French political philosopher Montesquieu ’s assertion that true democracy—including Montesquieu’s concept of the separation of powers—was feasible only for small states.

A larger republic, Madison suggested, could more easily balance the competing interests of the different factions or groups (or political parties ) within it. “Extend the sphere, and you take in a greater variety of parties and interests,” he wrote. “[Y]ou make it less probable that a majority of the whole will have a common motive to invade the rights of other citizens[.]”

After emphasizing the central government’s weakness in law enforcement under the Articles of Confederation in Federalist 21-22 , Hamilton dove into a comprehensive defense of the proposed Constitution in the next 14 essays, devoting seven of them to the importance of the government’s power of taxation.

Madison followed with 20 essays devoted to the structure of the new government, including the need for checks and balances between the different powers.

'Federalist 51'

“If men were angels, no government would be necessary,” Madison wrote memorably in Federalist 51 . “If angels were to govern men, neither external nor internal controls on government would be necessary.”

After Jay contributed one more essay on the powers of the Senate , Hamilton concluded the Federalist essays with 21 installments exploring the powers held by the three branches of government—legislative, executive and judiciary.

Impact of the Federalist Papers

Despite their outsized influence in the years to come, and their importance today as touchstones for understanding the Constitution and the founding principles of the U.S. government, the essays published as The Federalist in 1788 saw limited circulation outside of New York at the time they were written. They also fell short of convincing many New York voters, who sent far more Antifederalists than Federalists to the state ratification convention.

Still, in July 1788, a slim majority of New York delegates voted in favor of the Constitution, on the condition that amendments would be added securing certain additional rights. Though Hamilton had opposed this (writing in Federalist 84 that such a bill was unnecessary and could even be harmful) Madison himself would draft the Bill of Rights in 1789, while serving as a representative in the nation’s first Congress.

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Ron Chernow, Hamilton (Penguin, 2004). Pauline Maier, Ratification: The People Debate the Constitution, 1787-1788 (Simon & Schuster, 2010). “If Men Were Angels: Teaching the Constitution with the Federalist Papers.” Constitutional Rights Foundation . Dan T. Coenen, “Fifteen Curious Facts About the Federalist Papers.” University of Georgia School of Law , April 1, 2007. 

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Course: US history   >   Unit 3

• The Articles of Confederation
• What was the Articles of Confederation?
• Shays's Rebellion
• The Constitutional Convention
• The US Constitution

The Federalist Papers

• The Bill of Rights
• Social consequences of revolutionary ideals
• The presidency of George Washington
• Why was George Washington the first president?
• The presidency of John Adams
• Regional attitudes about slavery, 1754-1800
• Continuity and change in American society, 1754-1800
• Creating a nation
• The Federalist Papers was a collection of essays written by John Jay, James Madison, and Alexander Hamilton in 1788.
• The essays urged the ratification of the United States Constitution, which had been debated and drafted at the Constitutional Convention in Philadelphia in 1787.
• The Federalist Papers is considered one of the most significant American contributions to the field of political philosophy and theory and is still widely considered to be the most authoritative source for determining the original intent of the framers of the US Constitution.

The Articles of Confederation and Constitutional Convention

• In Federalist No. 10 , Madison reflects on how to prevent rule by majority faction and advocates the expansion of the United States into a large, commercial republic.
• In Federalist No. 39 and Federalist 51 , Madison seeks to “lay a due foundation for that separate and distinct exercise of the different powers of government, which to a certain extent is admitted on all hands to be essential to the preservation of liberty,” emphasizing the need for checks and balances through the separation of powers into three branches of the federal government and the division of powers between the federal government and the states. 4 ‍  
• In Federalist No. 84 , Hamilton advances the case against the Bill of Rights, expressing the fear that explicitly enumerated rights could too easily be construed as comprising the only rights to which American citizens were entitled.

What do you think?

• For more on Shays’s Rebellion, see Leonard L. Richards, Shays’s Rebellion: The American Revolution’s Final Battle (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 2002).
• Bernard Bailyn, ed. The Debate on the Constitution: Federalist and Anti-Federalist Speeches, Articles, and Letters During the Struggle over Ratification; Part One, September 1787 – February 1788 (New York: Penguin Books, 1993).
• See Federalist No. 1 .
• See Federalist No. 51 .
• For more, see Michael Meyerson, Liberty’s Blueprint: How Madison and Hamilton Wrote the Federalist Papers, Defined the Constitution, and Made Democracy Safe for the World (New York: Basic Books, 2008).

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The federalist number 10, [22 november] 1787, the federalist number 10.

[22 November 1787]

Among the numerous advantages promised by a well constructed union, none deserves to be more accurately developed than its tendency to break and control the violence of faction. 1 The friend of popular governments, never finds himself so much alarmed for their character and fate, as when he contemplates their propensity to this dangerous vice. He will not fail therefore to set a due value on any plan which, without violating the principles to which he is attached, provides a proper cure for it. The instability, injustice and confusion introduced into the public councils, have in truth been the mortal diseases under which popular governments have every where perished; as they continue to be the favorite and fruitful topics from which the adversaries to liberty derive their most specious declamations. The valuable improvements made by the American constitutions on the popular models, both antient and modern, cannot certainly be too much admired; but it would be an unwarrantable partiality, to contend that they have as effectually obviated the danger on this side as was wished and expected. Complaints are every where heard from our most considerate and virtuous citizens, equally the friends of public and private faith, and of public and personal liberty; that our governments are too unstable; that the public good is disregarded in the conflicts of rival parties; and that measures are too often decided, not according to the rules of justice, and the rights of the minor party; but by the superior force of an interested and over-bearing majority. However anxiously we may wish that these complaints had no foundation, the evidence of known facts will not permit us to deny that they are in some degree true. It will be found indeed, on a candid review of our situation, that some of the distresses under which we labour, have been erroneously charged on the operation of our governments; but it will be found at the same time, that other causes will not alone account for many of our heaviest misfortunes; and particularly, for that prevailing and increasing distrust of public engagements, and alarm for private rights, which are echoed from one end of the continent to the other. These must be chiefly, if not wholly, effects of the unsteadiness and injustice, with which a factious spirit has tainted our public administration.

By a faction I understand a number of citizens, whether amounting to a majority or minority of the whole, who are united and actuated by some common impulse of passion, or of interest, adverse to the rights of other citizens, or to the permanent and aggregate interests of the community.

There are two methods of curing the mischiefs of faction: The one, by removing its causes; the other, by controlling its effects.

There are again two methods of removing the causes of faction: The one by destroying the liberty which is essential to its existence; the other, by giving to every citizen the same opinions, the same passions, and the same interests.

It could never be more truly said than of the first remedy, that it is worse than the disease. Liberty is to faction, what air is to fire, an aliment without which it instantly expires. But it could not be a less folly to abolish liberty, which is essential to political life, because it nourishes faction, than it would be to wish the annihilation of air, which is essential to animal life because it imparts to fire its destructive agency.

The second expedient is as impracticable, as the first would be unwise. As long as the reason of man continues fallible, and he is at liberty to exercise it, different opinions will be formed. As long as the connection subsists between his reason and his self-love, his opinions and his passions will have a reciprocal influence on each other; and the former will be objects to which the latter will attach themselves. The diversity in the faculties of men from which the rights of property originate, is not less an insuperable obstacle to an uniformity of interests. The protection of these faculties is the first object of government. From the protection of different and unequal faculties of acquiring property, the possession of different degrees and kinds of property immediately results: And from the influence of these on the sentiments and views of the respective proprietors, ensues a division of the society into different interests and parties.

The latent causes of faction are thus sown in the nature of man; and we see them every where brought into different degrees of activity, according to the different circumstances of civil society. A zeal for different opinions concerning religion, concerning government, and many other points, as well of speculation as of practice; an attachment to different leaders ambitiously contending for pre-eminence and power; or to persons of other descriptions whose fortunes have been interesting to the human passions, have in turn divided mankind into parties, inflamed them with mutual animosity, and rendered them much more disposed to vex and oppress each other, than to co-operate for their common good. So strong is this propensity of mankind to fall into mutual animosities, that where no substantial occasion presents itself, the most frivolous and fanciful distinctions have been sufficient to kindle their unfriendly passions, and excite their most violent conflicts. But the most common and durable source of factions, has been the various and unequal distribution of property. Those who hold, and those who are without property, have ever formed distinct interests in society. Those who are creditors, and those who are debtors, fall under a like discrimination. A landed interest, a manufacturing interest, a mercantile interest, a monied interest, with many lesser interests, grow up of necessity in civilized nations, and divide them into different classes, actuated by different sentiments and views. The regulation of these various and interfering interests forms the principal task of modern legislation, and involves the spirit of party and faction in the necessary and ordinary operations of government.

No man is allowed to be a judge in his own cause; because his interest would certainly bias his judgment, and, not improbably, corrupt his integrity. With equal, nay with greater reason, a body of men, are unfit to be both judges and parties, at the same time; yet, what are many of the most important acts of legislation, but so many judicial determinations, not indeed concerning the rights of single persons, but concerning the rights of large bodies of citizens; and what are the different classes of legislators, but advocates and parties to the causes which they determine? Is a law proposed concerning private debts? It is a question to which the creditors are parties on one side, and the debtors on the other. Justice ought to hold the balance between them. Yet the parties are and must be themselves the judges; and the most numerous party, or, in other words, the most powerful faction must be expected to prevail. Shall domestic manufactures be encouraged, and in what degree, by restrictions on foreign manufactures? are questions which would be differently decided by the landed and the manufacturing classes; and probably by neither, with a sole regard to justice and the public good. The apportionment of taxes on the various descriptions of property, is an act which seems to require the most exact impartiality, yet there is perhaps no legislative act in which greater opportunity and temptation are given to a predominant party, to trample on the rules of justice. Every shilling with which they over-burden the inferior number, is a shilling saved to their own pockets.

It is in vain to say, that enlightened statesmen will be able to adjust these clashing interests, and render them all subservient to the public good. Enlightened statesmen will not always be at the helm: Nor, in many cases, can such an adjustment be made at all, without taking into view indirect and remote considerations, which will rarely prevail over the immediate interest which one party may find in disregarding the rights of another, or the good of the whole.

The inference to which we are brought, is, that the causes of faction cannot be removed; and that relief is only to be sought in the means of controlling its effects .

If a faction consists of less than a majority, relief is supplied by the republican principle, which enables the majority to defeat its sinister views by regular vote: It may clog the administration, it may convulse the society; but it will be unable to execute and mask its violence under the forms of the constitution. When a majority is included in a faction, the form of popular government on the other hand enables it to sacrifice to its ruling passion or interest, both the public good and the rights of other citizens. To secure the public good, and private rights against the danger of such a faction, and at the same time to preserve the spirit and the form of popular government, is then the great object to which our enquiries are directed. Let me add that it is the great desideratum, by which alone this form of government can be rescued from the opprobrium under which it has so long labored, and be recommended to the esteem and adoption of mankind.

By what means is this object attainable? Evidently by one of two only. Either the existence of the same passion or interest in a majority at the same time, must be prevented; or the majority, having such co-existent passion or interest, must be rendered, by their number and local situation, unable to concert and carry into effect schemes of oppression. If the impulse and the opportunity be suffered to coincide, we well know that neither moral nor religious motives can be relied on as an adequate control. They are not found to be such on the injustice and violence of individuals, and lose their efficacy in proportion to the number combined together; that is, in proportion as their efficacy becomes needful. 2

From this view of the subject, it may be concluded that a pure democracy, by which I mean a society, consisting of a small number of citizens, who assemble and administer the government in person, can admit of no cure for the mischiefs of faction. A common passion or interest will, in almost every case, be felt by a majority of the whole; a communication and concert results from the form of government itself; and there is nothing to check the inducements to sacrifice the weaker party, or an obnoxious individual. Hence it is, that such democracies have ever been spectacles of turbulence and contention; have ever been found incompatible with personal security, or the rights of property; and have in general been as short in their lives, as they have been violent in their deaths. Theoretic politicians, who have patronized this species of government, have erroneously supposed, that by reducing mankind to a perfect equality in their political rights, they would, at the same time, be perfectly equalized, and assimilated in their possessions, their opinions, and their passions.

A republic, by which I mean a government in which the scheme of representation takes place, opens a different prospect, and promises the cure for which we are seeking. Let us examine the points in which it varies from pure democracy, and we shall comprehend both the nature of the cure, and the efficacy which it must derive from the union.

The two great points of difference between a democracy and a republic, are first, the delegation of the government, in the latter, to a small number of citizens elected by the rest; secondly, the greater number of citizens, and greater sphere of country, over which the latter may be extended.

The effect of the first difference is, on the one hand, to refine and enlarge the public views, by passing them through the medium of a chosen body of citizens, whose wisdom may best discern the true interest of their country, and whose patriotism and love of justice, will be least likely to sacrifice it to temporary or partial considerations. Under such a regulation, it may well happen that the public voice pronounced by the representatives of the people, will be more consonant to the public good, than if pronounced by the people themselves convened for the purpose. On the other hand, the effect may be inverted. Men of factious tempers, of local prejudices, or of sinister designs, may by intrigue, by corruption, or by other means, first obtain the suffrages, and then betray the interests of the people. The question resulting is, whether small or extensive republics are most favourable to the election of proper guardians of the public weal; and it is clearly decided in favour of the latter by two obvious considerations.

In the first place it is to be remarked, that however small the republic may be, the representatives must be raised to a certain number, in order to guard against the cabals of a few; and that however large it may be, they must be limited to a certain number, in order to guard against the confusion of a multitude. Hence the number of representatives in the two cases not being in proportion to that of the constituents, and being proportionally greatest in the small republic, it follows, that if the proportion of fit characters be not less in the large than in the small republic, the former will present a greater option, and consequently a greater probability of a fit choice.

In the next place, as each representative will be chosen by a greater number of citizens in the large than in the small republic, it will be more difficult for unworthy candidates to practise with success the vicious arts, by which elections are too often carried; and the suffrages of the people being more free, will be more likely to centre on men who possess the most attractive merit, and the most diffusive and established characters.

It must be confessed, that in this, as in most other cases, there is a mean, on both sides of which inconveniencies will be found to lie. By enlarging too much the number of electors, you render the representative too little acquainted with all their local circumstances and lesser interests; as by reducing it too much, you render him unduly attached to these, and too little fit to comprehend and pursue great and national objects. The federal constitution forms a happy combination in this respect; the great and aggregate interests being referred to the national, the local and particular to the state legislatures.

The other point of difference is, the greater number of citizens and extent of territory which may be brought within the compass of republican, than of democratic government; and it is this circumstance principally which renders factious combinations less to be dreaded in the former, than in the latter. The smaller the society, the fewer probably will be the distinct parties and interests composing it; the fewer the distinct parties and interests, the more frequently will a majority be found of the same party; and the smaller the number of individuals composing a majority, and the smaller the compass within which they are placed, the more easily will they concert and execute their plans of oppression. Extend the sphere, and you take in a greater variety of parties and interests; you make it less probable that a majority of the whole will have a common motive to invade the rights of other citizens; or if such a common motive exists, it will be more difficult for all who feel it to discover their own strength, and to act in unison with each other. Besides other impediments, it may be remarked, that where there is a consciousness of unjust or dishonourable purposes, communication is always checked by distrust, in proportion to the number whose concurrence is necessary.

Hence it clearly appears, that the same advantage, which a republic has over a democracy, in controlling the effects of faction, is enjoyed by a large over a small republic—is enjoyed by the union over the states composing it. Does this advantage consist in the substitution of representatives, whose enlightened views and virtuous sentiments render them superior to local prejudices, and to schemes of injustice? It will not be denied, that the representation of the union will be most likely to possess these requisite endowments. Does it consist in the greater security afforded by a greater variety of parties, against the event of any one party being able to outnumber and oppress the rest? In an equal degree does the encreased variety of parties, comprised within the union, encrease this security. Does it, in fine, consist in the greater obstacles opposed to the concert and accomplishment of the secret wishes of an unjust and interested majority? Here, again, the extent of the union gives it the most palpable advantage.

The influence of factious leaders may kindle a flame within their particular states, but will be unable to spread a general conflagration through the other states: A religious sect, may degenerate into a political faction in a part of the confederacy; but the variety of sects dispersed over the entire face of it, must secure the national councils against any danger from that source: A rage for paper money, for an abolition of debts, for an equal division of property, or for any other improper or wicked project, will be less apt to pervade the whole body of the union, than a particular member of it; in the same proportion as such a malady is more likely to taint a particular county or district, than an entire state. 3

In the extent and proper structure of the union, therefore, we behold a republican remedy for the diseases most incident to republican government. And according to the degree of pleasure and pride, we feel in being republicans, ought to be our zeal in cherishing the spirit, and supporting the character of federalists.

McLean description begins The Federalist, A Collection of Essays, written in favour of the New Constitution, By a Citizen of New-York. Printed by J. and A. McLean (New York, 1788). description ends , I, 52–61.

1 .  Douglass Adair showed chat in preparing this essay, especially that part containing the analysis of factions and the theory of the extended republic, JM creatively adapted the ideas of David Hume (“‘That Politics May Be Reduced to a Science’: David Hume, James Madison, and the Tenth Federalist,” Huntington Library Quarterly , XX [1956–57], 343–60). The forerunner of The Federalist No. 10 may be found in JM’s Vices of the Political System ( PJM description begins William T. Hutchinson et al., eds., The Papers of James Madison (10 vols. to date; Chicago, 1962——). description ends , IX, 348–57 ). See also JM’s first speech of 6 June and his first speech of 26 June 1787 at the Federal Convention, and his letter to Jefferson of 24 Oct. 1787 .

2 .  In Vices of the Political System JM listed three motives, each of which he believed was insufficient to prevent individuals or factions from oppressing each other: (1) “a prudent regard to their own good as involved in the general and permanent good of the Community”; (2) “respect for character”; and (3) religion. As to “respect for character,” JM remarked that “in a multitude its efficacy is diminished in proportion to the number which is to share the praise or the blame” ( PJM description begins William T. Hutchinson et al., eds., The Papers of James Madison (10 vols. to date; Chicago, 1962——). description ends , IX, 355–56 ). For this observation JM again drew upon David Hume. Adair suggests that JM deliberately omitted his list of motives from The Federalist . “There was a certain disadvantage in making derogatory remarks to a majority that must be persuaded to adopt your arguments” (“‘That Politics May Be Reduced to a Science,’” Huntington Library Quarterly , XX [1956–57], 354). JM repeated these motives in his first speech of 6 June 1787, in his letter to Jefferson of 24 Oct. 1787 , and alluded to them in The Federalist No. 51 .

3 .  The negative on state laws, which JM had unsuccessfully advocated at the Federal Convention, was designed to prevent the enactment of “improper or wicked” measures by the states. The Constitution did include specific prohibitions on the state legislatures, but JM dismissed these as “short of the mark.” He also doubted that the judicial system would effectively “keep the States within their proper limits” ( JM to Jefferson, 24 Oct. 1787 ).

Index Entries

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The Federalist Papers

The Federalist Papers are a series of 85 essays arguing in support of the United States Constitution . Alexander Hamilton , James Madison , and John Jay were the authors behind the pieces, and the three men wrote collectively under the name of Publius .

Seventy-seven of the essays were published as a series in The Independent Journal , The New York Packet , and The Daily Advertiser between October of 1787 and August 1788. They weren't originally known as the "Federalist Papers," but just "The Federalist." The final 8 were added in after.

At the time of publication, the authorship of the articles was a closely guarded secret. It wasn't until Hamilton's death in 1804 that a list crediting him as one of the authors became public. It claimed fully two-thirds of the essays for Hamilton. Many of these would be disputed by Madison later on, who had actually written a few of the articles attributed to Hamilton.

Once the Federal Convention sent the Constitution to the Confederation Congress in 1787, the document became the target of criticism from its opponents. Hamilton, a firm believer in the Constitution, wrote in Federalist No. 1 that the series would "endeavor to give a satisfactory answer to all the objections which shall have made their appearance, that may seem to have any claim to your attention."

Alexander Hamilton was the force behind the project, and was responsible for recruiting James Madison and John Jay to write with him as Publius. Two others were considered, Gouverneur Morris and William Duer . Morris rejected the offer, and Hamilton didn't like Duer's work. Even still, Duer managed to publish three articles in defense of the Constitution under the name Philo-Publius , or "Friend of Publius."

Hamilton chose "Publius" as the pseudonym under which the series would be written, in honor of the great Roman Publius Valerius Publicola . The original Publius is credited with being instrumental in the founding of the Roman Republic. Hamilton thought he would be again with the founding of the American Republic. He turned out to be right.

John Jay was the author of five of the Federalist Papers. He would later serve as Chief Justice of the United States. Jay became ill after only contributed 4 essays, and was only able to write one more before the end of the project, which explains the large gap in time between them.

Jay's Contributions were Federalist: No. 2 , No. 3 , No. 4 , No. 5 , and No. 64 .

James Madison , Hamilton's major collaborator, later President of the United States and "Father of the Constitution." He wrote 29 of the Federalist Papers, although Madison himself, and many others since then, asserted that he had written more. A known error in Hamilton's list is that he incorrectly ascribed No. 54 to John Jay, when in fact Jay wrote No. 64 , has provided some evidence for Madison's suggestion. Nearly all of the statistical studies show that the disputed papers were written by Madison, but as the writers themselves released no complete list, no one will ever know for sure.

Opposition to the Bill of Rights

The Federalist Papers, specifically Federalist No. 84 , are notable for their opposition to what later became the United States Bill of Rights . Hamilton didn't support the addition of a Bill of Rights because he believed that the Constitution wasn't written to limit the people. It listed the powers of the government and left all that remained to the states and the people. Of course, this sentiment wasn't universal, and the United States not only got a Constitution, but a Bill of Rights too.

No. 1: General Introduction Written by: Alexander Hamilton October 27, 1787

No.2: Concerning Dangers from Foreign Force and Influence Written by: John Jay October 31, 1787

No. 3: The Same Subject Continued: Concerning Dangers from Foreign Force and Influence Written by: John Jay November 3, 1787

No. 4: The Same Subject Continued: Concerning Dangers from Foreign Force and Influence Written by: John Jay November 7, 1787

No. 5: The Same Subject Continued: Concerning Dangers from Foreign Force and Influence Written by: John Jay November 10, 1787

No. 6:Concerning Dangers from Dissensions Between the States Written by: Alexander Hamilton November 14, 1787

No. 7 The Same Subject Continued: Concerning Dangers from Dissensions Between the States Written by: Alexander Hamilton November 15, 1787

No. 8: The Consequences of Hostilities Between the States Written by: Alexander Hamilton November 20, 1787

No. 9 The Union as a Safeguard Against Domestic Faction and Insurrection Written by: Alexander Hamilton November 21, 1787

No. 10 The Same Subject Continued: The Union as a Safeguard Against Domestic Faction and Insurrection Written by: James Madison November 22, 1787

No. 11 The Utility of the Union in Respect to Commercial Relations and a Navy Written by: Alexander Hamilton November 24, 1787

No 12: The Utility of the Union In Respect to Revenue Written by: Alexander Hamilton November 27, 1787

No. 13: Advantage of the Union in Respect to Economy in Government Written by: Alexander Hamilton November 28, 1787

No. 14: Objections to the Proposed Constitution From Extent of Territory Answered Written by: James Madison November 30, 1787

No 15: The Insufficiency of the Present Confederation to Preserve the Union Written by: Alexander Hamilton December 1, 1787

No. 16: The Same Subject Continued: The Insufficiency of the Present Confederation to Preserve the Union Written by: Alexander Hamilton December 4, 1787

No. 17: The Same Subject Continued: The Insufficiency of the Present Confederation to Preserve the Union Written by: Alexander Hamilton December 5, 1787

No. 18: The Same Subject Continued: The Insufficiency of the Present Confederation to Preserve the Union Written by: James Madison December 7, 1787

No. 19: The Same Subject Continued: The Insufficiency of the Present Confederation to Preserve the Union Written by: James Madison December 8, 1787

No. 20: The Same Subject Continued: The Insufficiency of the Present Confederation to Preserve the Union Written by: James Madison December 11, 1787

No. 21: Other Defects of the Present Confederation Written by: Alexander Hamilton December 12, 1787

No. 22: The Same Subject Continued: Other Defects of the Present Confederation Written by: Alexander Hamilton December 14, 1787

No. 23: The Necessity of a Government as Energetic as the One Proposed to the Preservation of the Union Written by: Alexander Hamilton December 18, 1787

No. 24: The Powers Necessary to the Common Defense Further Considered Written by: Alexander Hamilton December 19, 1787

No. 25: The Same Subject Continued: The Powers Necessary to the Common Defense Further Considered Written by: Alexander Hamilton December 21, 1787

No. 26: The Idea of Restraining the Legislative Authority in Regard to the Common Defense Considered Written by: Alexander Hamilton December 22, 1787

No. 27: The Same Subject Continued: The Idea of Restraining the Legislative Authority in Regard to the Common Defense Considered Written by: Alexander Hamilton December 25, 1787

No. 28: The Same Subject Continued: The Idea of Restraining the Legislative Authority in Regard to the Common Defense Considered Written by: Alexander Hamilton December 26, 1787

No. 29: Concerning the Militia Written by: Alexander Hamilton January 9, 1788

No. 30: Concerning the General Power of Taxation Written by: Alexander Hamilton December 28, 1787

No. 31: The Same Subject Continued: Concerning the General Power of Taxation Written by: Alexander Hamilton January 1, 1788

No. 32: The Same Subject Continued: Concerning the General Power of Taxation Written by: Alexander Hamilton January 2, 1788

No. 33: The Same Subject Continued: Concerning the General Power of Taxation Written by: Alexander Hamilton January 2, 1788

No. 34: The Same Subject Continued: Concerning the General Power of Taxation Written by: Alexander Hamilton January 5, 1788

No. 35: The Same Subject Continued: Concerning the General Power of Taxation Written by: Alexander Hamilton January 5, 1788

No. 36: The Same Subject Continued: Concerning the General Power of Taxation Written by: Alexander Hamilton January 8, 1788

No. 37: Concerning the Difficulties of the Convention in Devising a Proper Form of Government Written by: Alexander Hamilton January 11, 1788

No. 38: The Same Subject Continued, and the Incoherence of the Objections to the New Plan Exposed Written by: James Madison January 12, 1788

No. 39: The Conformity of the Plan to Republican Principles Written by: James Madison January 18, 1788

No. 40: The Powers of the Convention to Form a Mixed Government Examined and Sustained Written by: James Madison January 18, 1788

No. 41: General View of the Powers Conferred by the Constitution Written by: James Madison January 19, 1788

No. 42: The Powers Conferred by the Constitution Further Considered Written by: James Madison January 22, 1788

No. 43: The Same Subject Continued: The Powers Conferred by the Constitution Further Considered Written by: James Madison January 23, 1788

No. 44: Restrictions on the Authority of the Several States Written by: James Madison January 25, 1788

No. 45: The Alleged Danger From the Powers of the Union to the State Governments Considered Written by: James Madison January 26, 1788

No. 46: The Influence of the State and Federal Governments Compared Written by: James Madison January 29, 1788

No. 47: The Particular Structure of the New Government and the Distribution of Power Among Its Different Parts Written by: James Madison January 30, 1788

No. 48: These Departments Should Not Be So Far Separated as to Have No Constitutional Control Over Each Other Written by: James Madison February 1, 1788

No. 49: Method of Guarding Against the Encroachments of Any One Department of Government Written by: James Madison February 2, 1788

No. 50: Periodic Appeals to the People Considered Written by: James Madison February 5, 1788

No. 51: The Structure of the Government Must Furnish the Proper Checks and Balances Between the Different Departments Written by: James Madison February 6, 1788

No. 52: The House of Representatives Written by: James Madison February 8, 1788

No. 53: The Same Subject Continued: The House of Representatives Written by: James Madison February 9, 1788

No. 54: The Apportionment of Members Among the States Written by: James Madison February 12, 1788

No. 55: The Total Number of the House of Representatives Written by: James Madison February 13, 1788

No. 56: The Same Subject Continued: The Total Number of the House of Representatives Written by: James Madison February 16, 1788

No. 57: The Alleged Tendency of the New Plan to Elevate the Few at the Expense of the Many Written by: James Madison February 19, 1788

No. 58: Objection That The Number of Members Will Not Be Augmented as the Progress of Population Demands Considered Written by: James Madison February 20, 1788

No. 59: Concerning the Power of Congress to Regulate the Election of Members Written by: Alexander Hamilton February 22, 1788

No. 60: The Same Subject Continued: Concerning the Power of Congress to Regulate the Election of Members Written by: Alexander Hamilton February 23, 1788

No. 61: The Same Subject Continued: Concerning the Power of Congress to Regulate the Election of Members Written by: Alexander Hamilton February 26, 1788

No. 62: The Senate Written by: James Madison February 27, 1788

No. 63: The Senate Continued Written by: James Madison March 1, 1788

No. 64: The Powers of the Senate Written by: John Jay March 5, 1788

No. 65: The Powers of the Senate Continued Written by: Alexander Hamilton March 7, 1788

No. 66: Objections to the Power of the Senate To Set as a Court for Impeachments Further Considered Written by: Alexander Hamilton March 8, 1788

No. 67: The Executive Department Written by: Alexander Hamilton March 11, 1788

No. 68: The Mode of Electing the President Written by: Alexander Hamilton March 12, 1788

No. 69: The Real Character of the Executive Written by: Alexander Hamilton March 14, 1788

No. 70: The Executive Department Further Considered Written by: Alexander Hamilton March 15, 1788

No. 71: The Duration in Office of the Executive Written by: Alexander Hamilton March 18, 1788

No. 72: The Same Subject Continued, and Re-Eligibility of the Executive Considered Written by: Alexander Hamilton March 19, 1788

No. 73: The Provision For The Support of the Executive, and the Veto Power Written by: Alexander Hamilton March 21, 1788

No. 74: The Command of the Military and Naval Forces, and the Pardoning Power of the Executive Written by: Alexander Hamilton March 25, 1788

No. 75: The Treaty Making Power of the Executive Written by: Alexander Hamilton March 26, 1788

No. 76: The Appointing Power of the Executive Written by: Alexander Hamilton April 1, 1788

No. 77: The Appointing Power Continued and Other Powers of the Executive Considered Written by: Alexander Hamilton April 2, 1788

No. 78: The Judiciary Department Written by: Alexander Hamilton June 14, 1788

No. 79: The Judiciary Continued Written by: Alexander Hamilton June 18, 1788

No. 80: The Powers of the Judiciary Written by: Alexander Hamilton June 21, 1788

No. 81: The Judiciary Continued, and the Distribution of the Judicial Authority Written by: Alexander Hamilton June 25, 1788

No. 82: The Judiciary Continued Written by: Alexander Hamilton July 2, 1788

No. 83: The Judiciary Continued in Relation to Trial by Jury Written by: Alexander Hamilton July 5, 1788

No. 84: Certain General and Miscellaneous Objections to the Constitution Considered and Answered Written by: Alexander Hamilton July 16, 1788

No. 85: Concluding Remarks Written by: Alexander Hamilton August 13, 1788

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The first amendment, we the people, james madison, ratification, and the federalist papers.

September 16, 2021

September 17 is Constitution Day—the anniversary of the framers signing the Constitution in 1787. This week’s episode dives into what happened after the Constitution was signed—when it had to be approved by “we the people,” a process known as ratification—and the arguments made on behalf of the Constitution. A major collection of those arguments came in the form of a series of essays, today often referred to as The Federalist Papers, which were written by Alexander Hamilton, James Madison, and John Jay using the pen name Publius and published initially in newspapers in New York. Guests Judge Gregory Maggs, author of the article “A Concise Guide to The Federalist Papers as a Source of the Original Meaning of the United States Constitution,” and Colleen Sheehan, professor and co-editor of The Cambridge Companion to The Federalist, shed light on the questions: What do The Federalist Papers say? What did their writers set out to achieve by writing them? How do they explain the ideas behind the Constitution’s structure and design—and where did those ideas come from? And why is it important to read The Federalist Papers today?

FULL PODCAST

This episode was produced by Jackie McDermott and engineered by Kevin Kilbourne. Research was provided by Sam Desai, John Guerra, and Lana Ulrich.

PARTICIPANTS

Colleen Sheehan is the Director of Graduate Studies at the Arizona State School of Civic and Economic Thought and Leadership. She is author of numerous books, including several on James Madison, and she co-edited The Cambridge Companion to The Federalist .

Judge Gregory E. Maggs is a judge on the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Armed Forces. He was a member of the full-time faculty at GW Law School from 1993 to 2018. He is the author of numerous works including the article “A Concise Guide to The Federalist Papers as a Source of the Original Meaning of the United States Constitution.”

Jeffrey Rosen   is the president and CEO of the National Constitution Center, a nonpartisan nonprofit organization devoted to educating the public about the U.S. Constitution. Rosen is also professor of law at The George Washington University Law School and a contributing editor of  The Atlantic .

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Questions or comments about the show? Email us at [email protected] .

Continue today’s conversation on Facebook and Twitter using  @ConstitutionCtr .

Sign up to receive Constitution Weekly, our email roundup of constitutional news and debate, at   bit.ly/constitutionweekly .

Please subscribe to  We the People   and  L ive at the National Constitution Center   on Apple Podcasts ,  Stitcher , or your favorite podcast app.

This transcript may not be in its final form, accuracy may vary, and it may be updated or revised in the future.

 [00:00:00] Jeffrey Rosen: I'm Jeffrey Rosen, President and CEO of the National Constitution Center, and welcome to We the People, a weekly show of constitutional debate. The National Constitution Center is a nonpartisan, nonprofit chartered by Congress to increase awareness and understanding of the constitution among the American people. September 17th is Constitution Day, the anniversary of the framers signing of the constitution in 1787.

This week, we dive into the philosophy of the Federalist Papers written by Madison, Hamilton, and John Jay to support the ratification of the constitution after it was signed. I'm so excited to be joined by two of America's leading experts on the Federalist Papers. Colleen Sheehan is director of graduate studies at the Arizona State School of Civic and Economic Thought and Leadership. She's the author of many books, including several on James Madison, and she co-edited The Cambridge Companion to The Federalist. Colleen, it is wonderful to have you back on the show.

[00:01:05] Colleen Sheehan: Always happy to be here with you, Jeff.

[00:01:07] Jeffrey Rosen: And Judge Gregory Maggs is a judge on the US court of appeals for the armed forces. He was my colleague as a member of the full-time faculty of GW Law School from 1993 to 2018, still teaches. And he's the author of many works including the article, A Concise Guide to the Federalist Papers as a Source of the Original Meaning of the United States Constitution. Greg, thank you so much for joining.

[00:01:34] Gregory Maggs: I'm delighted to be here. Thank you for inviting me.

[00:01:36] Jeffrey Rosen: Colleen, in your wonderful essay in the Cambridge Companion to the Federalist Papers, you write that the Federalist Papers can be traced back to Aristotle and the declaration of independence. And for Madison and Jefferson, you write, the freedom of the mind is the basis of all other liberties and rights. Each person has the right and responsibility to exercise freedom in a manner that accords with reason and manages to govern passions. And therefore, you say the rightful exercise of majority rule as described by the Federalist Papers is the accomplishment of the cool and deliberate sense of the community or the reason of the public. Tell us, distill the essence of the Federalist Papers and its classical antithesis between reason and passion.

[00:02:28] Colleen Sheehan: Well, that's a small question to start with. Thank you, Jeff. [laughs]

[00:02:32] Jeffrey Rosen: That, that's why I ask it.

[00:02:33] Colleen Sheehan: ... So the reason it goes back to Aristotle is because Aristotle comprehensively looked at the problems of politics, and the problems of politics have to do with human nature, that we don't always get along with each other, and that if we're gonna live in some kind of community so that there could be something more than just mere survival, but possibly more than safety, possibly freedom, even possibly happiness or the pursuit of happiness, then we have to find ways to live together. We have to do the kind of things that lawyers wanna do, make laws. But of course, not all laws are good laws not all laws are just.

And as Publius says in Federalist 51, justice is the end of government. It is the end of civil society. It ever has been and ever will be pursued until it be obtained or until liberty will be lost in its pursuit. And that's the challenge. How do we live together in such a way that we treat each other decently, fairly, justly? Well, if we want to have free government, government based on consent of the governed, on what we might call popular government or democratic republicanism, then the majority is going to rule. But of course, the age old problem is that a majority can be just as unjust as one individual. And when they have, when you have power in your hands, it's likely to be abused.

So the challenge Publius sets out for himself if we wanna speak of him, the three of them as one person, because they all signed the, the Federalist Papers under one name, Publius then we have to see that their challenge is they're, they're dedicated to the people ruling, government by the people, but it has to be also government for the people that is for all the people for the common good. So that's the challenge Publius sets for himself. And in other words, what we have to do is find a way for the majority to rule not on the basis of mere interest, self-interest, not on the basis of mere passion and prejudice, but on the basis of justice and the general good that is reasoning the, the thing that human beings have that the other animals don't have, that we can reason together to come to understand not simply what this abstract idea of justice is, because justice is really about it's, it's the social virtue. It's how we treat one another.

The American Republic that Publius is trying to describe as they've thought about it and framed at the Constitutional Convention in that long, hot summer of 1787 in Independence Hall was really about one thing, how can the people govern themselves, genuinely govern themselves? That is in such a way that they treat one another well. That's the American experiment.

[00:05:44] Jeffrey Rosen: Beautiful [inaudible 00:05:51]. And thank you so much for that. Greg, why should we care about the Federalist Papers as a legal source? In your important article in the Boston University Law Review, The Federalist Papers as a Source of the Original Meaning of the United States Constitution, you respond to the familiar arguments about why the Federalist Papers are not a good source of original meaning, including the idea that delegates to the state ratifying conventions didn't read many of them, they're often self-contradictory and so forth. You run through the objections and you refute them. Tell us why the Federalist Papers are a reliable guide to be original meaning of the constitution according to several different definitions of original meaning and original understanding.

[00:06:35] Gregory Maggs: Well, first of all, I, I don't think I refute the counter-arguments. There are arguments against it. I, I, I merely point out that it's sort of a mixed bag, that the Federalist Papers are a very important source of the original meaning of the constitution, but they are certainly not a perfect source and they are subject to many, very valid obje- claims made based on them are subject to many, very valid objections. However these objections also have counter-arguments which sort of mix the picture together.

You know, I think building on what Professor Sheehan said the Federalist Papers is a rich source of political philosophy. And I think one of the genius aspects of this was that the framer that the Madison and Hamilton and just sponsors and Jay, they had one mission, which was to convince the people of New York to ratify the constitution. And in order to do that, they had to take certain practical steps. They had to explain why the Articles of Confederation were problematic. They had to explain why we needed an important strong union. They had to explain the structure of the government, that it wasn't going to be a national government, it wasn't gonna be a federation. It was gonna be a federal system.

They had to also describe the Senate, describe the house, describe the judiciary and so forth. And at the same time, they included all the kinds of very important philosophical and political science arguments that Professor Sheehan remarked, so sort of ingenious meshing together of the two things. Well, in the process of doing this, they describe nearly every aspect of the constitution. And so if you're interested in knowing something about the original meaning of the constitution a source that is perhaps the most frequently cited source is the Federalist Papers because nearly everything that we talk about today has something said about it in the Federalist Papers.

Now, I should point out though it is not necessarily a perfect source. So for example, many people cite the Federalist Papers as a source of evidence of the original understanding of the constitution. That is to say, well, what did the people who ratified the constitution at the various state ratifying conventions, what did they think it meant? And I think a strong counterargument is most of them didn't read the Federalist Papers. In fact, half of the Federalist Papers weren't written until over half of the states had already ratified it. And one of the most cited papers paper number 78, it wasn't written until after eight of the states had already ratified the constitution.

But, you know, I think a counterargument to that is that it is a repository of the arguments that supporters of the constitution were making. And we know that the supporters won the day and something must have persuaded the ratifiers to adopt the constitution, and it was probably something similar to the arguments that were in the Federalist Papers. In other words, even if people didn't directly read the Federalist Papers, the Federalist Papers is a repository of the kinds of arguments that strong supporters of the constitution were making. And of course, ultimately the constitution was ratified.

[00:09:33] Jeffrey Rosen: Colleen, you have honored the NCC by joining a really exciting project called The Founders Library. We're putting online the sources that inspired the founders, and having the pleasure of learning from you about what Madison read before the convention and while writing the Federalist Papers, and how that influenced his distinctive understanding of faction as the triumph of, of, of passion over reason, of self interest over devotion to public good. We were brainstorming this now, but give we the people listeners a sense of some of the main books that Madison read before and during and after the convention that influenced the Federalist Papers.

[00:10:14] Colleen Sheehan: Sure. Before, before I talk about that, Jeff, let me just follow up on the, the last question momentarily. Jefferson said about the Federalist Papers that they're the best commentary on the principles of government that were ever written. And so I agree with Judge Maggs that you have to look deeper than just one argument here or there in terms of what people at the ratifying conventions were talking about and whether or not they'd read the Federalist Papers or any one particular one was published yet, because what Hamilton, Madison and Jay, mostly Hamilton and Madison did was they understood the principles that they were, that, that they at the federal convention were trying to implement into this document.

You know, it's not just words on paper. Those words are there for a purpose, are meant to accomplish something. And the Federalist Papers has a depth of commentary that's more than just describing article one, article two, article three. It's telling us what they are trying to accomplish and how the founders went about that. And I don't know a better commentary than the Federalist Papers that does that in terms of the purpose and design, the argument and action of the United States constitution. So what did Madison read? Madison read most everything. He, he, he didn't read every book in Jefferson's library, but he was constantly borrowing books from Jefferson's library whenever they lived in the same city.

For example, in Philadelphia when the, when the new government was just started Jefferson as was, was [inaudible 00:12:16] had to remodel his rental, rental property. And he built a whole library in it. And Madison was constantly borrowing books from him, in addition to the hundreds of books Madison had packed and taken with him. Imagine that, how, how long it took to get from Montpelier to Phi- Philadelphia. And what you take with you mostly is your books. I mean, that's Madison. He had a rented room in Mrs. Houses boarding house, because he's a bachelor. He's there in this boarding house with all these other folks. And, and basically his room is just full of books.

Madison was the scholar scholar of all the founders. John Adams wanted to be, but I think it's Madison who truly was. He read Aristotle, Plato, Xenophon, Thucydides for, for as examples of the classics, Cicero. He read, oh, he really studied Montesquieu. Of course, Locke, Hufendor, Sydney. The list goes on and on. They all read Hobbes and didn't like him that, that... and, and, and Madison comments on, on Rousseau once, and in not very kind terms. He didn't care much for Rousseau. So Madison's idea of how the majority rules is not the Rousseau in general will. He thought about all these things and he agreed with some people about some things and, and disagreed about other things, but he also had this independence thought, this spark of brilliance, and which he's the one, I believe, and I'd love to hear what Judge Maggs says Madison thinks that what he's discovered is a way to make popular government good government.

In other words, they talked about liberty hangs in the balance. The eyes of the world are upon us. We are engaged in the great experiment of self-government. And what that means is can a people govern themselves in a way that truly respects one another? And it's not just majority faction injustice and oppression. Madison thinks that he's found a way to do that, and has to do as you know, Jeff with this idea of an extensive territory and a larger number of population. And so the faction can counteract faction.

But it's more than just that negative faction counteracting faction. That's a big part of it, but there's a reason you want factions to be thwarted. It's so that the ma- there's time for the majority to refine and enlarge its views, to refine and enlarge the public views so that justice will reign rather than injustice. That's the goal of that Publius sets for himself in the Federalist Papers to show that Republican government can really work. And that when the eyes of the world are upon America, we're going to show the world as Robert Frost once put it not just how things work, but how democracy is meant.

[00:15:12] Jeffrey Rosen: Thank you so much for that. Greg, do you agree with Colleen's statement that Madison discovered for the first time in the history of the world a way of making popular government by good governments, and the way that he did that was by floating factions to give majorities time to refine and enlarge the public views of the justice and reason could prevail? And then after you tell us whether you, you agree with that, or wanna amplify on it, maybe introduce us to the idea of how Madison achieved that goal.

[00:15:43] Gregory Maggs: Well, you know there, there are probably s- I, I do agree with it, and I think there are probably several examples that could be given. But I think perhaps the best one concerns the idea of federalism. And Madison's idea or at least explanation of the idea that having two governments rather than one preserves individual liberty. It's been a very influential idea an idea that Justice Kennedy cited in various ways. And it seems counterintuitive when you first hear about it, that well, all of a sudden, there's gonna be two governments regulating. But when you realize that certain things will be left to the national government and others will be left to the states you realize that this has a tendency to break apart factions but to still allow local interests to be governed.

And, you know, we really didn't have a federal system of the kind that was developed in the world before this. And certainly, there wasn't a political science experiment or explication of this system until the Madison described what the different theory would be. In addition, there were of course, many debates about whether you could have a Republican government in a large country as opposed to say a small city state, and Madison of course, came up with the idea that well, actually, it's gonna work better in a large territory, because it'll have the the benefit of breaking apart factions. We'll have delegates who have to represent many people, and it will be difficult for factions to control in such an area.

I mean, again, I think this was original thought. This was, this was not something that had been tried and done before. And certainly the theory behind it hadn't been explained. Now, whether Madison completely invented it, or whether it's a joint product of all the people at the convention you know, I think that's a fair subject of, of debate. I don't think Madison claimed to be the sole inventor but I think he was one of the original explainers of the system and perhaps the best advocate for the system.

You know, just and I mentioned in my article that courts often cite the Federalist Papers, and there seem to be two sort of strands of citations at the Supreme Court. Some justices like Justice Scalia and Justice Thomas look at it for details. You know, when they use the word commerce, do they just mean trade or do they mean something broader? And then there are others like Justice Kennedy, who's obviously now retired but he looked at it for the big principles. He looked at it for questions of state sovereignty, of of federalism, of what was the overall picture of what they were trying to accomplish. And I think that's probably most in line with the kinds of things that Madison was trying to get at in his essays.

[00:18:20] Jeffrey Rosen: Thank you so much for that. Colleen, Greg mentions Madison's refinement of Montesquieu's view that a Republic is only possible in a small territory. You've written a wonderful article, Madison and the French Enlightenment. The Authority of Public Opinion, where you describe the influence of his thought on thinkers, including one you've recently called my attention to [foreign language 00:19:39]. So we'd love you to help us understand what Madison was reading that influenced his view of public opinion and how that affected his refinement of Montesquieu, and whether or not that was original Madison or not.

[00:19:01] Colleen Sheehan: Yeah. So, so Jefferson is in Paris as minister to France, right, in the late 1780s. And he's there. Well, Madison is with everyone else at the Philadelphia convention framing the constitution, and Jefferson will come back after the formation of the new government under President Washington. So during that time, Jefferson is sending cargo box, boxes full of books to Madison. And Madison is not just reading, but as Hamilton might have said, imbibing that French philosophy, the, the, that Jefferson and Madison have drunk too deeply from the well of French philosophy, Hamilton once said. And Madison was doing that and he wasn't agreeing with all of it, but there was a whole group of French thinkers, especially in the 1770s, 1780s, who were developing this new theory called a theory of public opinion, the opinion publique, that public opinion is queen of the world, because there's actually this new phenomenon called the public.

Why? What makes this different in the, in the, in the history of all the world? It has to do with communication, not just the commerce of goods, but the commerce of ideas, that you can spread ideas more than just from in one assembly in ancient Greece, for example, or just one salon in Paris. But through the printed word, you can get these ideas out to a much broader audience, a much broader public that can then communicate and have an influence on the center of government. And so the, the kings and queens of France had to watch out because there was a new power in the world, and it was predicted that it would be more powerful than anything else, and it's called public opinion. And it paved the way for what Tocqueville would later talk about in terms of public opinion when by then, by the late 1820s and 1830s, it's clear that public opinion is queen of the world, and that equality is a well-known irresistible principle of modern times.

And so Madison is reading all of this, and it's, he said, Montesquieu has a glimp- had a glimpse of it, but he lived a little too early and he really didn't quite understand the ramifications of it, that more than just the institutional arrangements of government checks and balances separation of powers, all those things are important, but there's something even more important going on here, and it has to do with not just stifling unjust opinion, but actually building, educating, shaping, forming the public into one that is not only clean of the world, but deserves to be queen of the world, capable, a people.

Think of that, a people coming into their own, a people capable of governing themselves. And this had never been possible in the history of the world before. This is partly why it's so new and why Madison is so excited about the discovery, how these things can work together, because you couldn't have government by the people over a large territory before this ability to communicate through the printed word because all large governments were considered empires, and empires, as Montesquieu said, tend to be despotic. But communication, the commerce of ideas changes the face of politics, the potential for, for popular government actually being successful in the modern world.

[00:23:01] Jeffrey Rosen: Thank you so much for that. I'm just reading your article on Rousseau now, and it's so exciting to see the connection between Rousseau's conclusion, public opinion has its source in the opinion of enlightened men, where we're in some gains partisans and becomes the general conviction. And Madison's conclusions, as you say, in his national gazette essays in 1791 that enlightened journalists and literati would communicate with the public through essays like the Federalist Papers and, and other 18th century version of long Atlantic articles, and would refine public opinion so it's guided by reason rather than passion.

Greg as, as you hear Madison's theory of public opinion as, as Colleen has helped us understand it w- w- wa- was it vindicated first of all in, in Madison's era by the thoughtful debates over ramification, where people actually did read the Federalist Papers and were guide and, and were able to engage complicated arguments? And, and does it seem too optimistic today in the age of Twitter?

[00:24:03] Gregory Maggs: Well, you know it's interesting if you if you look at the commentary on the Federalist Papers at the time they were written it was very mixed. They were recognized as being very scholarly. They the Supreme Court cited them and, and Chief Justice Marshall said that there's no greater explanation of our government than you'll find there by no greater minds. And, and yet when you look at other commentary there were people who said, well, they're kind of hard to get through. They're kind of boring. They're kind of long. I really doubt anybody has been able to read and digest all of them. Some said, for educated people, they don't really add that much, and for uneducated they're just too difficult to read.

So, you know, I again I, I think it's somewhat of a mixed picture. Certainly, their views did carry a lot of weight. We, we, we created the government according to the structure that they had adopted that they had proposed when we had the debates in Congress and the first cons- in the first Congress they passed, I don't know, about 80 or 90 laws in which they set up the structure of government, and they were all influenced by these ideas that were expressed in the Federalist Papers. Whether they actually read the Federalist papers or not they were certainly influenced by those kinds of thinking.

So, you know, whether everybody was able to read the printed word and, and learn about these ideas and the possibility of communication, we don't know. Interesting one scholar wrote a very interesting paper called Publius in the Provinces, and look to see where the Federalist Papers actually penetrated. And about half the states, none of the essays were ever reprinted. And maybe some of them were mailed there. We know that Madison and Hamilton took copies of the Federalists and mailed them to Virginia and elsewhere, but communication was still very difficult at the time. One estimate is that the newspapers that published the Federalist Papers only could print about 600 copies, 'cause that's, that's, it was a daily paper. And and the daily paper just physically could print 600 copies. And that's not a lot of copies.

Now, they floated around they floated around taverns and other places where people could read them. I think people who were interested could find them. Whether there was the penetration that would be ideal I don't think there was. I mean, I again, I think it's not so much the Federalist Papers were actually read by a large number of people and influence them as opposed to just the idea that they are repository of the kinds of arguments that were circulating, and that ultimately did pers- turn out to be persuasive.

[00:26:38] Jeffrey Rosen: Colleen, the greatest challenge to Madison's definition of both faction as any group of majority or a minority animated by passion rather than reason devoted to self-interest rather than the public good w- was the rise of political parties. And of course, Madison played a central role in the rise of the, the first party, the, the Republican Democratic Party. And yet, Madison had a philosophical defense of the rise of parties that he managed to reconcile with his views about public opinion and the refining powers of reason. Tell us how Madison justified the rise of political parties that seem to clash with this definition of faction.

[00:27:16] Colleen Sheehan: Ah, that's a great question. I ha- I have to say when, when Judge Maggs was talking about some, sometimes some people thought that the Federalist Papers are a little hard to get through, a little boring. I had to laugh to myself. We've heard that in the classroom from our students once or twice, haven't we, [laughs] when we teach the Federalists. But hopefully is that they get into the text. It's a little bit like Shakespeare. It seems foreign at first, but when you see there's actually a story there about a people, and let it, let the texts come alive, because I think the Federalist Papers are a vision for America, not just about the nuts and bolts of government. That's one thing, but the nuts and bolts are there to make them, to make this machine in this country full of this dynamic people to set forth the environment that allows us to live a certain kind of life, an ethos, to be a certain kind of people.

So I, I try to, try to get the students to see that there's more there than some 18th century tough language, but I admit it's a challenge. So, so all factions are parties. They're a part, not a whole. But not all parties are factions. That is a faction by definition whether a majority or minority is adverse to the rights of others or to the permanent and aggregate interest of the community. So faction is unjust or contrary to the common good by definition.

When Madison, who is one of the founders, he and Jefferson, the founders of the first Republican Party in the United States, the Federalist Party really becomes a party in the 1790s with the rise of the Republican Party. The Republican Party makes these federalists into a party, I would say. It's the Republicans who, who it's Jefferson and Madison, right, actually think it's led by Madison in the beginning more than Jefferson. In, in the spring of 1792, Madison is talking about the Republican cause, and he finally says, okay, it's the Republican Party we're talking about. It has to be an organized opposition to what he sees as the Hamiltonian plan of government that is focused on the money men in New York city. And he says, Hamilton is trying to interpret this constitution in the way he sees fit whereas what we have to do like it or not is understand those who ratified it and abide by that fundamental opinion of the American people as they understood this document.

In other words, Madison is taking seriously from day one that who... he asks the question, who are the best keepers of the people's liberties? And his answer is the people themselves. They are not just to have confidence in their rulers, submit and obey, which he thought some of the federalists believed was the, their understanding of representative government. Madison said, no, the people have to actually be their own governors. They have to be a part. They have to participate. They have to be attached to this government, which is of their own making. And then those laws that are made, they obey.

And so it really had to do the difference between the re- this newly established Republican Party and the federalist opposition had to do with what is the role of the people themselves as Larry Kramer put it in a wonderful article, the people themselves, what is the role of the people themselves in this new republic? Is it a ghostly body politic where we talk about popular sovereignty, but in the end, it's really a few elites ruling? Well, some of the federalists thought that was really the best way to go. I mean, Reed Fisher Ames, his speech at the Massachusetts ratifying convention, and he, you know, your people, sir, your people, sir, can be a great beast. We need we need a sober second thought. We've gotta be so careful of thi- this thing we call the people.

So there was a lot of skepticism about the people. Madison had his own skepticism, and he's not in favor of fleeting passions and interests ruling in the form of factions. That's why this whole processes of what we might call deliberative republicanism, where the space and time that he sees built into the American constitutional system is there for a reason. It's there... How do we refine and enlarge the public views? Well, in newspapers, as you said, Jeff, newspapers circulate laying among the great body of the people.

And look at the newspapers that are developing in the early 1790s in all the, the major cities across the 13 states. It's between the representatives and the people going back and forth to Congress. It's within Congress within the house itself, within the Senate, between the house and Senate, between the Congress and the presidency, between the presidency and the people. So this is great amount of communication that is happening over a period of time, because it takes a while to build a coalition of the majority. And during that time, people are talking, communicating. It's a kind of Socratic method at the civic level of weeding out the the unjust and erroneous notions to build a consensus among the majority that is a more just and refined notion of the public good.

[00:33:10] Jeffrey Rosen: Thank you so much for that. Greg, what is your reaction to Madison's defense of the rise of political parties? Is it persuasively consistent with the broader philosophy that he articulated in the Federalist, or was it a self-interested effort to justify the party that he was increasingly to have?

[00:33:35] Gregory Maggs: Well, you know, I, it's tempting to say, well, it looks like Madison was hypocritical or inconsistent. He opposed factions, and then he was part of a, a, a political party. But I think, I think in fairness if you look at Federalist 10 Madison recognized that there's always going to be different political interests. There are always gonna be fractions. So for example, he said, people who own property are gonna have different interests from people who don't own property, and that's always going to be the case. And really what he was talking about was, or what his goal was, was to create a system that would weaken the power of faction. Sort of behind the veil without knowing what was going to happen, he said, you know, if we have a federal system, if we have a republic where we have representatives who have to represent large numbers of people if we have the different components of government elected at different times all of these things will weaken faction and address their bad effects.

I don't think he had any illusion that there were going to be factions or groups with different interests. But from behind the veil without knowing whether his side was gonna be the majority or some other side was gonna be the majority, he was thinking of a system that would counteract the pernicious effects of faction. Now to say that after that system got going, he got involved in a political party is not really to say that he's hypocritical. And in fact, if he had been nefarious, he would have designed a system that would have favored his interests but I don't think that he did that. I, I think he did the opposite, which was to try to create a system that would further democracy, not direct democracy, but representative democracy, which would have the have counteracting effects on faction.

So I don't, I don't view him as being inconsistent or hypocritical. In fact on the contrary, he created a system behind the veil of not knowing what was gonna happen in the future that he thought would be best for the country by weakening fraction. And even if he later got involved in a faction, he was subject to those rules that the constituency would be divided. It would be represented by large numbers of people and so forth.

[00:35:41] Jeffrey Rosen: Thanks so much for that. Colleen, are you persuaded?

[00:35:44] Colleen Sheehan: Well, I don't think I answered the question you asked me very well. So let me give another shot at that. Madison deliberately establishes the Republican Party in the United States in 1792, and Jefferson as his cohort in this. And he writes a couple of articles about this and explains himself. One is called Parties, and one is called A Candid State of Parties. And he sees the opposition, the Federalist Party as the anti-Republican party.

By this point in 1792, he's so frustrated with the Hamiltonian federalists thrust of, of government that he feels it's necessary to organize this Republican Party not, it's not in the contemporary sense of just organization to be a part to win elections. Madison sees it as putting the country on the right track on the Republican smaller Republican tract, where we're not ignoring the people out in the countryside and just letting the stop jobbers in New York control things or these enlightened statesmen, or people who think they're enlightened statesmen at the seat of government. That for this kind of Republican government to work the way he's envisioned it, requires a genuine attention by the people and participation and governing by the people, not just when you vote, not just at election time, but to be real citizens, not like the ancient Greeks, where that's all you do with your life is go to the assembly every day but to have a real meaningful part in this thing called self-government.

And so for Madison, the Republican Party he's founding is not a faction. It's the opposite. It's meant to promote republicanism against what he sees as a tendency towards anti-republicanism in the early days of the Republic to set America on a course in which we could actually... You know, they were so afraid when Washington was in office that this would fail and that we can't do it without Washington. We were not ready to walk alone, as Jefferson put it. Washington had to stay a second term because the country wasn't ready to walk alone. And it's during this period that Madison and Jefferson are founding the Republican Party to bring the Republican cause into the workings of government. And so for them, it's, it's the culmination of the founding it republicanism so that it's not factions that will rule, but a just majority that will rule.

[00:38:36] Jeffrey Rosen: Thank you very much for that. Greg I wanna put on the table the main ideas of the Federalist Papers, and there are different ways to organize them. Do you have any particular papers? We've talked about of course 10 and, and 1. And, and are there any particular ones or groups of papers that you want with the people listeners to read and learn about?

[00:39:01] Gregory Maggs: Well you, you know, I, I think it's hard to single out any. I mean, it'd be like if you gave me the Bible and said w- which books are important and which ones are not, it would be hard to, to pick one or another, but you know, what I've always found to be very interesting are the initial essays where they describe the weaknesses of the articles of the government under the Articles of Confederation and the need for a stronger union. These these are not as philosophically deep as some of the other ones. And yet, when you do read them you recognize what they were trying to accomplish was to make the system better.

And I think without fully understanding some of the weaknesses of the the Articles of Confederation and also the article, the the the ones that were comparing the government to state governments that already existed. I think it's hard to understand, you know, what, what were they specifically trying to do.

One of the things that's very interesting is that nearly every provision in the Articles of Confederation has a corelative provision in the constitution often exchanged but you can sort of map the Articles of Confederation to the constitution. There are provisions in the constitution that are nowhere found in the Articles of Confederation. But you can look very carefully at these different provisions, because they weren't starting from scratch. They were, they had a system and they were trying to persuade people to change the system. The system had flaws, but they had to identify those flaws. And I think that in many ways although they're somewhat overlooked these are some of the most important ones.

And let me just give you some of the numbers. 15 to 22 are really the ones that mostly talk about the difficulties with the Articles of Confederation. And I think it, it's kind of the background that you need to to understand why they were undertaking this project. Now, this doesn't necessarily tell you what they were trying to accomplish but it does give you the background. So I, I think 15 to 22 are a very good place to start to get an idea of why they were trying to create a new constitution. It wasn't that we didn't have a government, it was that we wanted a better one.

[00:41:08] Jeffrey Rosen: Thank you very much for that. Colleen, in your introduction with Jack Rikove to the Cambridge Companion to the Federalist, you know, two ways of organizing the Federalists, one flags the division that, that Greg just did focusing on half A, the essays concerned with making the case for the national government and, and half B, the essays focused on the exposition of the constitution itself. And then you say another approach focuses on the broader political thought and vision of each of the authors including Madison's emphasis on republican government and Hamils- Hamilton's interests in state building like commerce and foreign affairs and so forth.

So maybe tell us more about that taxonomy. But also when I asked you which papers you wanted to talk about today, you said beside 10 and 51, I think 1, 14 39, 49, 57 and 63 are especially interesting. That's so tantalizing, and you c- you can't talk about all of them, but maybe give us a sense of why you picked some of those numbers that you did.

[00:42:11] Colleen Sheehan: Well, in terms of studying the Federalist Papers I think either and both, either and both is the answer to your question there that it's, it's, it's good to, to study it the way it was originally thought to be laid out by Hamilton. Of course, it doesn't quite work out as planned because this is a work in progress, right, as they're, they're writing these papers, staying up burning the midnight oil to get it in by the deadline, to publish it in the, in the newspapers. And so sometimes the plan didn't go quite as, as, as planned to begin with. So they don't really follow Hamilton's original plan perfectly.

And it is interesting to see the different personalities coming through despite the fact that they all sign the each paper Publius as if there's one persona writing these papers. Publius speaks with one voice, but you can discover in the pages of the Federalists when you see how Hamilton and Madison will disagree and be on different sides of the party line later on, you can see the seeds of some of that in, in their essays. For example, Madison, one of the essays talks about trade, h- how it has to take its natural, agriculture and trade, it has to take its natural course.

Well, that's exactly his argument in the 1790s against Hamilton's report on manufacturers. Hamilton wants to jumpstart manufacturers. Madison says, no, trade should take its natural course. Madison was with the physiocrats then, where he would be much of a free market kind of guy. Don't get government involved in subsidizing this. And Hamilton is saying, we have to, we have to in order to compete with England. Don't you understand economics? Madison and Jefferson, you guys don't get it. So you can see some of the seeds of that in the Federalist Papers.

I think Federalist number one, when Hamilton says, you know, seems to have been reserved to the people of this country to decide the important question, whether or not societies of men are really capable of establishing good government on the basis of reflection and choice, or whether they're forever destined for their political constitutions to depend on accident and force. That one sentence, a long sentence, but if you parse it out, think about that, our choices, I mean, it's either gonna be accident and force in some form, material near another, or the possibility of establishing good government on the basis of reflection and choice. That is exactly the dichotomy put before us in book one of Plato's Republic.

[00:44:56] Jeffrey Rosen: Hmm.

[00:44:57] Colleen Sheehan: This, that's, that's exactly what's going on in the pro-am of Plato's Republic, power, is it gonna be on the basis of power or is it gonna be on the basis of persuasion? Is it gonna be ballots ultimately or bullets? And are we facing that in the United States today? We're asking ourselves that question. Can we go on? Can we talk to each other so we can persuade each other and be one people rather than resort to force? Once we resort to force, the rule of law is in danger, as Lincoln tells us in the Lyceum address, and it's a very easy slide downhill, and just some kind of chaos, anarchy and disrespect for government and disrespect for each other.

So that opening salvo of Federalist number one is more than mere words. It's more than rhetoric. It's puts before us the question of politics, which is the question for each of us as citizens. What are we going to choose? And how we act is that choice. How we act with one another is making that choice. I have to say one word about Federalist 49, it's my favorite, though I like, though I have others that, that come in close seconds but Federalists 49 is Madison's disagreement with Jefferson, and he takes him to task, and he really kind of points out, he shows us that the seeds of his theory of public opinion are in Federalist 49. But there's another thing I like about it. And Jack Rikove, if he's listening will laugh at this.

So at Montpelier, that beautiful farm that you can, Madison's home that you can walk around, there are these, these gorgeous horses there. And Jack and I were ruminating one time about these horses, if, if any of them were race horses, wouldn't you wanna name one of them ticklish experiment?

[00:46:51] Jeffrey Rosen: [inaudible 00:49:26].

[00:46:54] Colleen Sheehan: Madison says, Madison says, you know, calling a second convention, you shouldn't do that. It's a ticklish experiment. So we, we thought that if there was a race horse from Montpelier, it ought to be named ticklish experiment. Let me con- let me just conclude with my favorite passage in the Federalist Papers. It's actually from Federalist 39, which I think sums up the vision of the Federalist. The first question that offers itself is whether the general form and aspect of the government be strictly republican. It is evident that no other form would be reconcilable with the genius of the people of America, with the fundamental principles of the revolution, or with the honorable determination, which animates every votary of, of freedom to rest all our political experiments on the capacity of mankind for self-government. That's the project of the Federalist, that's the challenge of the Federalist, that's our challenge still today.

[00:47:58] Jeffrey Rosen: So inspiring. Thank you so much for that. Thank you for reminding us that it all comes back to Plato and Aristotle, power and persuasion, reason and passion reflected in Federalist one. And thanks for sharing your favorites, including 49. Greg, I, I know it's very hard to pick one, but s- so, so much fun to hear which ones especially speak to you. Can you single out one or two Federalist Papers that you like especially?

[00:48:26] Gregory Maggs: Well, you know, the one that that captures the imagination as a, as a judge and as a legal scholar of constitutional laws Federalist 78. Now, as I mentioned earlier, Federalist 78, it's one of the most cited in the courts. Whether anybody actually read it at the time as I mentioned, eight states had already ratified before it was published. It was one of the last ones published. It was, wasn't first published in the newspaper. It was published in the, in the second volume of the Federalist and it was only later published in the newspapers. But it talks about the judiciary, and it says two things which both seem eminently reasonable until you think about them, and then you wonder whether they're contradictory.

One is it says that the, the courts, the judiciary is the least dangerous branch, because all they do is apply the law. They just decide the questions, and they don't have their own force or their own political will. And then in a very interesting passage, they expressly discuss judicial review, that if there are provisions that are contrary to the constitution, the courts have no choice but to enforce the constitution over the provisions. Now, this is somewhat remarkable because while there is the supremacy clause, which says that the constitution is supreme over state law, there's, there's nothing that really says what the relationship of the constitution to laws passed by Congress are. But the unmistakable implication of Federalist 78 is that they're talking about judicial review.

And those two propositions seem evident to us and, and reasonable that they're not like the president, they're not like the Congress. They, they take cases that come to them and they decide them according to law, and they're there for the least dangerous branch. And then at the same time, it says, and of course, they get to decide when there's a conflict between legislation and the constitution. And I don't think at the time they understood that that could be seen as making it perhaps one of the most dangerous branches. If not one of the most dangerous, one of the most powerful. And you know, it, it was difficult for them in their mindset to see things that would transpire later on. It doesn't make them wrong but it's very interesting.

And certainly any lawyer who's interested in judicial review and, and charges of judicial activism or arguments that there is in judicial activism should read the Federalist 78.

[00:50:43] Jeffrey Rosen: Thank you so much for that. So great to read Federalist 78 and also to hear [inaudible 00:53:36] recommendation of Federalist 49. Well, it is time for closing arguments in this wonderful discussion of the Federalist Papers on Constitution Day. Your homework with the people listeners is, is obvious read the Federalist Papers. And if you find you have a favorite, write to me and tell me what it is and why, [email protected] . And in order to inspire you to do that homework, I'm gonna ask for closing statements from Professor Sheehan and Judge Maggs. Colleen, the first one is to you, why should We the People listeners read the Federalist Papers on Constitution Day, and why are the Federalist Papers important?

[00:51:29] Colleen Sheehan: We the people would find it in our interest, if not for the purpose of simply of edification and amazement to read the Federalist, I think, because we don't depend on others to govern us. We have the responsibility to govern ourselves. And as Madison once put it, liberty and learning lean on each other. You can't have liberty without learning for free people. Otherwise, he says it's a prologue to a farce or a tragedy, or perhaps both. Well, I don't want either of those things to be the end of the American story. So one of the places that we can educate ourselves in both our rights and our responsibilities as citizens is by reading the Federalist. I think Jefferson's right, it's the best commentary on the principles of government that ever was written.

Let me just say one word about Constitution Day in 1787. I went back and looked at the weather map that day. It was a gloomy day in Philadelphia, September 17th, 1787. It was overcast. And you can just imagine the men in what we today call leggings, all these men walking around Independence Hall in leggings walking up to Washington's desk and putting their signature on that parchment. And then afterwards, they adjourned, e- except, I don't know if Elbridge Gary, Edmund Rudolf, and George Mason went with them, maybe to, probably to the city tavern over on, on, on second street, and they celebrated. But as, as Ben Franklin said, yes, it's a republic if we can keep it. I think there's never been a time more than today that that question is real for us. It was certainly the case in 1860, but it's again, the case in 2021. Do we wanna keep it? Are we willing to do the work to keep it? I think it's something that we as Americans have to give them a serious thought to. And Constitution is a good day to spend a little time thinking about that.

[00:53:48] Jeffrey Rosen: Thank you very much for that. Greg, the last words are to you. Why should We the People listeners read the Federalist Papers on Constitution Day, and why are they important?

[00:53:59] Gregory Maggs: You know, in in the 1820s Chief Justice Marshall in the case of Cohens v. Virginia said this about the Federalist Papers, it is a complete commentary on our constitution, and it is appealed to by all parties in the questions to which that instrument has given birth. Its intrinsic merit entitles it to this high rank, and the part of two of its members, and he was speaking about Hamilton and Madison, performed in the framing of the constitution put it very much in their power to explain the views with which it was framed. The Federalist Papers are not the final word. They are not a perfect source of the original meaning of the constitution. And yet, I think it's almost impossible to get ahold of the original meaning without at least considering what the Federalist Papers have to offer.

And I think if you're interested in the constitution, if you're interested in what they, the framers intended to accomplish, the ratifiers wanted I think you have to include the Federalist Papers in your study.

[00:54:58] Jeffrey Rosen: Thank you so much, Colleen Sheehan and Judge Gregory Maggs for a wonderful discussion of the Federalist Papers, the philosophy that inspired them, and the reasons for reading them today. Thank you We the People listeners for reading the Federalist Papers, and if you find a favorite, let me know. Colleen, Greg, thank you so much for joining, and happy Constitution Day.

[00:55:24] Gregory Maggs: Happy Constitution Day.

[00:55:26] Colleen Sheehan: Thank you very much. Happy Constitution Day, September 17th.

[00:55:31] Jeffrey Rosen: Today's show was produced by Jackie McDermott and engineered by Kevin Kilbourne. Research was provided by Sam Desai, John Guerra and Lana Ulrich. Please rate, review, and subscribe to We the People on Apple, and recommend the show to friends, colleagues, or anyone anywhere who is eager for a weekly dose of constitutional illumination and debate. And always remember that the National Constitution Center is a private nonprofit. Thanks so much to those of you who have been sending in donations of any amounts, $5, $10 to show your support for the mission. In honor of Constitution Day, it would be so great if you would go online and make a donation as a sign of your support. You can do that by becoming a member at constitutioncenter.org/membership, or give a donation of any amount at constitutioncenter.org/donate. On behalf of the National Constitution Center. I'm Jeffrey Rosen, and happy Constitution Day.

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Encyclopedia Virginia, Virginia Humanities

The Federalist Papers: No. 42 (January 22, 1788)

In this essay, the forty-second of the Federalist Papers, published January 22, 1788, James Madison makes the case for the compromise included in the U. S. Constitution that the slave trade would continue temporarily. He makes this case amidst a discussion of how the Constitution structures the government’s regulation of trade and commerce. The Federalist Papers were a series of essays by John Jay, James Madison , and Alexander Hamilton arguing for the ratification of the U.S. Constitution. The essays were written under the pseudonym “Publius.”

The Powers Conferred by the Constitution Further Considered

From the New York Packet. Tuesday, January 22, 1788.

To the People of the State of New York:

THE SECOND class of powers, lodged in the general government, consists of those which regulate the intercourse with foreign nations, to wit: to make treaties; to send and receive ambassadors, other public ministers, and consuls; to define and punish piracies and felonies committed on the high seas, and offenses against the law of nations; to regulate foreign commerce, including a power to prohibit, after the year 1808, the importation of slaves, and to lay an intermediate duty of ten dollars per head, as a discouragement to such importations. This class of powers forms an obvious and essential branch of the federal administration. If we are to be one nation in any respect, it clearly ought to be in respect to other nations. The powers to make treaties and to send and receive ambassadors, speak their own propriety. Both of them are comprised in the articles of Confederation, with this difference only, that the former is disembarrassed, by the plan of the convention, of an exception, under which treaties might be substantially frustrated by regulations of the States; and that a power of appointing and receiving “other public ministers and consuls,” is expressly and very properly added to the former provision concerning ambassadors.

The term ambassador, if taken strictly, as seems to be required by the second of the articles of Confederation, comprehends the highest grade only of public ministers, and excludes the grades which the United States will be most likely to prefer, where foreign embassies may be necessary. And under no latitude of construction will the term comprehend consuls. Yet it has been found expedient, and has been the practice of Congress, to employ the inferior grades of public ministers, and to send and receive consuls. It is true, that where treaties of commerce stipulate for the mutual appointment of consuls, whose functions are connected with commerce, the admission of foreign consuls may fall within the power of making commercial treaties; and that where no such treaties exist, the mission of American consuls into foreign countries may PERHAPS be covered under the authority, given by the ninth article of the Confederation, to appoint all such civil officers as may be necessary for managing the general affairs of the United States. But the admission of consuls into the United States, where no previous treaty has stipulated it, seems to have been nowhere provided for.

A supply of the omission is one of the lesser instances in which the convention have improved on the model before them. But the most minute provisions become important when they tend to obviate the necessity or the pretext for gradual and unobserved usurpations of power. A list of the cases in which Congress have been betrayed, or forced by the defects of the Confederation, into violations of their chartered authorities, would not a little surprise those who have paid no attention to the subject; and would be no inconsiderable argument in favor of the new Constitution, which seems to have provided no less studiously for the lesser, than the more obvious and striking defects of the old. The power to define and punish piracies and felonies committed on the high seas, and offenses against the law of nations, belongs with equal propriety to the general government, and is a still greater improvement on the articles of Confederation. These articles contain no provision for the case of offenses against the law of nations; and consequently leave it in the power of any indiscreet member to embroil the Confederacy with foreign nations.

The provision of the federal articles on the subject of piracies and felonies extends no further than to the establishment of courts for the trial of these offenses. The definition of piracies might, perhaps, without inconveniency, be left to the law of nations; though a legislative definition of them is found in most municipal codes. A definition of felonies on the high seas is evidently requisite. Felony is a term of loose signification, even in the common law of England; and of various import in the statute law of that kingdom. But neither the common nor the statute law of that, or of any other nation, ought to be a standard for the proceedings of this, unless previously made its own by legislative adoption. The meaning of the term, as defined in the codes of the several States, would be as impracticable as the former would be a dishonorable and illegitimate guide. It is not precisely the same in any two of the States; and varies in each with every revision of its criminal laws. For the sake of certainty and uniformity, therefore, the power of defining felonies in this case was in every respect necessary and proper.

The regulation of foreign commerce, having fallen within several views which have been taken of this subject, has been too fully discussed to need additional proofs here of its being properly submitted to the federal administration. It were doubtless to be wished, that the power of prohibiting the importation of slaves had not been postponed until the year 1808, or rather that it had been suffered to have immediate operation. But it is not difficult to account, either for this restriction on the general government, or for the manner in which the whole clause is expressed. It ought to be considered as a great point gained in favor of humanity, that a period of twenty years may terminate forever, within these States, a traffic which has so long and so loudly upbraided the barbarism of modern policy; that within that period, it will receive a considerable discouragement from the federal government, and may be totally abolished, by a concurrence of the few States which continue the unnatural traffic, in the prohibitory example which has been given by so great a majority of the Union. Happy would it be for the unfortunate Africans, if an equal prospect lay before them of being redeemed from the oppressions of their European brethren! Attempts have been made to pervert this clause into an objection against the Constitution, by representing it on one side as a criminal toleration of an illicit practice, and on another as calculated to prevent voluntary and beneficial emigrations from Europe to America. I mention these misconstructions, not with a view to give them an answer, for they deserve none, but as specimens of the manner and spirit in which some have thought fit to conduct their opposition to the proposed government.

The powers included in the THIRD class are those which provide for the harmony and proper intercourse among the States. Under this head might be included the particular restraints imposed on the authority of the States, and certain powers of the judicial department; but the former are reserved for a distinct class, and the latter will be particularly examined when we arrive at the structure and organization of the government. I shall confine myself to a cursory review of the remaining powers comprehended under this third description, to wit: to regulate commerce among the several States and the Indian tribes ; to coin money, regulate the value thereof, and of foreign coin; to provide for the punishment of counterfeiting the current coin and secureties of the United States; to fix the standard of weights and measures; to establish a uniform rule of naturalization, and uniform laws of bankruptcy, to prescribe the manner in which the public acts, records, and judicial proceedings of each State shall be proved, and the effect they shall have in other States; and to establish post offices and post roads. The defect of power in the existing Confederacy to regulate the commerce between its several members, is in the number of those which have been clearly pointed out by experience.

To the proofs and remarks which former papers have brought into view on this subject, it may be added that without this supplemental provision, the great and essential power of regulating foreign commerce would have been incomplete and ineffectual. A very material object of this power was the relief of the States which import and export through other States, from the improper contributions levied on them by the latter. Were these at liberty to regulate the trade between State and State, it must be foreseen that ways would be found out to load the articles of import and export, during the passage through their jurisdiction, with duties which would fall on the makers of the latter and the consumers of the former. We may be assured by past experience, that such a practice would be introduced by future contrivances; and both by that and a common knowledge of human affairs, that it would nourish unceasing animosities, and not improbably terminate in serious interruptions of the public tranquillity.

To those who do not view the question through the medium of passion or of interest, the desire of the commercial States to collect, in any form, an indirect revenue from their uncommercial neighbors, must appear not less impolitic than it is unfair; since it would stimulate the injured party, by resentment as well as interest, to resort to less convenient channels for their foreign trade. But the mild voice of reason, pleading the cause of an enlarged and permanent interest, is but too often drowned, before public bodies as well as individuals, by the clamors of an impatient avidity for immediate and immoderate gain. The necessity of a superintending authority over the reciprocal trade of confederated States, has been illustrated by other examples as well as our own. In Switzerland, where the Union is so very slight, each canton is obliged to allow to merchandises a passage through its jurisdiction into other cantons, without an augmentation of the tolls. In Germany it is a law of the empire, that the princes and states shall not lay tolls or customs on bridges, rivers, or passages, without the consent of the emperor and the diet; though it appears from a quotation in an antecedent paper, that the practice in this, as in many other instances in that confederacy, has not followed the law, and has produced there the mischiefs which have been foreseen here. Among the restraints imposed by the Union of the Netherlands on its members, one is, that they shall not establish imposts disadvantageous to their neighbors, without the general permission.

The regulation of commerce with the Indian tribes is very properly unfettered from two limitations in the articles of Confederation, which render the provision obscure and contradictory. The power is there restrained to Indians, not members of any of the States, and is not to violate or infringe the legislative right of any State within its own limits. What description of Indians are to be deemed members of a State, is not yet settled, and has been a question of frequent perplexity and contention in the federal councils. And how the trade with Indians, though not members of a State, yet residing within its legislative jurisdiction, can be regulated by an external authority, without so far intruding on the internal rights of legislation, is absolutely incomprehensible. This is not the only case in which the articles of Confederation have inconsiderately endeavored to accomplish impossibilities; to reconcile a partial sovereignty in the Union, with complete sovereignty in the States; to subvert a mathematical axiom, by taking away a part, and letting the whole remain.

All that need be remarked on the power to coin money, regulate the value thereof, and of foreign coin, is, that by providing for this last case, the Constitution has supplied a material omission in the articles of Confederation. The authority of the existing Congress is restrained to the regulation of coin STRUCK by their own authority, or that of the respective States. It must be seen at once that the proposed uniformity in the VALUE of the current coin might be destroyed by subjecting that of foreign coin to the different regulations of the different States. The punishment of counterfeiting the public securities, as well as the current coin, is submitted of course to that authority which is to secure the value of both. The regulation of weights and measures is transferred from the articles of Confederation, and is founded on like considerations with the preceding power of regulating coin.

The dissimilarity in the rules of naturalization has long been remarked as a fault in our system, and as laying a foundation for intricate and delicate questions. In the fourth article of the Confederation, it is declared “that the FREE INHABITANTS of each of these States, paupers, vagabonds, and fugitives from justice, excepted, shall be entitled to all privileges and immunities of FREE CITIZENS in the several States; and THE PEOPLE of each State shall, in every other, enjoy all the privileges of trade and commerce,” etc. There is a confusion of language here, which is remarkable. Why the terms FREE INHABITANTS are used in one part of the article, FREE CITIZENS in another, and PEOPLE in another; or what was meant by superadding to “all privileges and immunities of free citizens,” “all the privileges of trade and commerce,” cannot easily be determined. It seems to be a construction scarcely avoidable, however, that those who come under the denomination of FREE INHABITANTS of a State, although not citizens of such State, are entitled, in every other State, to all the privileges of FREE CITIZENS of the latter; that is, to greater privileges than they may be entitled to in their own State: so that it may be in the power of a particular State, or rather every State is laid under a necessity, not only to confer the rights of citizenship in other States upon any whom it may admit to such rights within itself, but upon any whom it may allow to become inhabitants within its jurisdiction. But were an exposition of the term “inhabitants” to be admitted which would confine the stipulated privileges to citizens alone, the difficulty is diminished only, not removed. The very improper power would still be retained by each State, of naturalizing aliens in every other State. In one State, residence for a short term confirms all the rights of citizenship: in another, qualifications of greater importance are required. An alien, therefore, legally incapacitated for certain rights in the latter, may, by previous residence only in the former, elude his incapacity; and thus the law of one State be preposterously rendered paramount to the law of another, within the jurisdiction of the other.

We owe it to mere casualty, that very serious embarrassments on this subject have been hitherto escaped. By the laws of several States, certain descriptions of aliens, who had rendered themselves obnoxious, were laid under interdicts inconsistent not only with the rights of citizenship but with the privilege of residence. What would have been the consequence, if such persons, by residence or otherwise, had acquired the character of citizens under the laws of another State, and then asserted their rights as such, both to residence and citizenship, within the State proscribing them? Whatever the legal consequences might have been, other consequences would probably have resulted, of too serious a nature not to be provided against. The new Constitution has accordingly, with great propriety, made provision against them, and all others proceeding from the defect of the Confederation on this head, by authorizing the general government to establish a uniform rule of naturalization throughout the United States. The power of establishing uniform laws of bankruptcy is so intimately connected with the regulation of commerce, and will prevent so many frauds where the parties or their property may lie or be removed into different States, that the expediency of it seems not likely to be drawn into question. The power of prescribing by general laws, the manner in which the public acts, records and judicial proceedings of each State shall be proved, and the effect they shall have in other States, is an evident and valuable improvement on the clause relating to this subject in the articles of Confederation. The meaning of the latter is extremely indeterminate, and can be of little importance under any interpretation which it will bear. The power here established may be rendered a very convenient instrument of justice, and be particularly beneficial on the borders of contiguous States, where the effects liable to justice may be suddenly and secretly translated, in any stage of the process, within a foreign jurisdiction. The power of establishing post roads must, in every view, be a harmless power, and may, perhaps, by judicious management, become productive of great public conveniency. Nothing which tends to facilitate the intercourse between the States can be deemed unworthy of the public care.

• Revolution and Early Republic (1763–1823)
• Legal Document
• Unpublished
• Letter from James Madison to James Monroe (February 10, 1820)
• Letter from James Madison to Thomas Jefferson (January 22, 1786)
• Letter from James Madison to Thomas Jefferson (October 17, 1784)
• Text A of the Virginia Plan, Presented by Edmund Randolph to the Federal Convention (May 29, 1787)
• Records of the Federal Convention (August 25, 1787)
• Debate in Virginia Ratifying Convention (June 15, 1788)
• Fugitive Slave Clause, The Constitution of the United States (1787–1992)
• Memorandum on an African Colony for Freed Slaves (ca. October 20, 1789)
• Letter from James Madison to Robert J. Evans (June 15, 1819)
•   The Federalist Papers: No. 54 (February 12, 1788)
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James Madison

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Federalist Papers

Known before the 20th century simply as The Federalist, The Federalist Papers were a series of 85 essays written by James Madison, Alexander Hamilton, and John Jay under the pseudonym "Publius." The essays were written between October 1787 and August 1788, and were intended to build public and political support for the newly constructed Constitution.

Interview with Joseph Ellis

Joseph Ellis, author of the Pulitzer Prize-winning book Founding Brothers: The Revolutionary Generation, discusses his latest book, The Quartet: Orchestrating the Second American Revolution, 1783-1789.

Washington, Jefferson, and Madison

Read about the personal and political relationships between these three founders, and how their changing relationships reflected America's changing political situation.

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Despite graduating with an excellent education from the College of New Jersey (present-day Princeton University) in 1771, Madison lacked direction in his life once he returned to Virginia. The American Revolution, however, provided him with a necessary spark. A member of the Virginia House of Delegates, Madison served as a member of the committee that framed the state's first constitution. At the national level, he served in the Second Continental Congress and its successor, the Confederation Congress.

Madison reveled in the political atmosphere that he encountered during these years. Along with Alexander Hamilton , he orchestrated the call by the Annapolis Convention for a constitutional convention in Philadelphia in 1787. Madison worked tirelessly to ensure George Washington's presence at the Philadelphia convention. A nationalist, Madison authored the so-called Virginia Plan at the convention.

Historian Joseph Ellis discusses the characters of Hamilton and Madison in this segment of an interview from Mount Vernon on Vimeo .

After the convention drafted a new constitution, Madison worked for its passage, particularly in Virginia and New York. Madison teamed up with New York residents Alexander Hamilton and John Jay to co-author the Federalist Papers . As a member of the First Congress, Madison would subsequently draft the first ten amendments to the Constitution, the Bill of Rights.

A close confidant of Washington, Madison helped the first president set up the new federal government by offering advice on a variety of issues, including personnel selection. Washington also frequently asked Madison to write important public addresses, including Washington's first inaugural address. Like many of Washington's close associates, Madison lobbied the president for a second term in office in 1792, even after Washington had asked Madison to prepare for him his farewell address to the country.

With Thomas Jefferson , Madison orchestrated the formation of the Democratic-Republican Party . The two men would later cooperate in their response to the Sedition Act of 1798, as Madison anonymously authored the Virginia Resolutions and Jefferson, the Kentucky Resolutions. Madison worked for Jefferson's election in 1800, becoming the third president's secretary of state.

Madison succeeded Jefferson as president in 1809. Foreign affairs dominated Madison's presidency, especially as the country sought to find a middle ground between warring Great Britain and France. In 1812, Madison finally asked for a declaration of war against Great Britain. Derogatorily called "Mr. Madison's War," the War of 1812 often found Madison in search of answers to numerous problems. After retiring from the presidency, Madison seldom journeyed from Montpelier. In 1829, he did travel to Richmond, where he served as a delegate to the convention revising the Virginia constitution. Madison died on June 28, 1836, and was laid to rest in the Madison family cemetery at Montpelier.

Jeffrey A. Zemler, Ph.D. Brookhaven College

Bibliography: "Editorial Note: Address of the President to Congress." The Papers of James Madison , Vol. 12. Charles F. Hobson and Robert A. Rutland, eds. Charlottesville: University Press of Virginia, 1979.

"Editorial Note: The General Assembly Session of October 1786." The Papers of James Madison , Vol. 9. William M.E. Rachal, ed. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1975.

"Editorial Note: Madison at the First Session of the First Congress, 8 April-29 September 1789." The Papers of James Madison , Vol. 12. Charles F. Hobson and Robert A. Rutland, eds.. Charlottesville: University Press of Virginia, 1979.

"Editorial Note: Virginia Resolutions." The Papers of James Madison , Vol. 17. David B. Mattern et al., eds. Charlottesville: University Press of Virginia, 1991.

Ketcham, Ralph. James Madison: A Biography . New York: The MacMillan Company, 1971.

James Madison: A Biography in His Own Words . Merrill D. Peterson, ed. New York: Newsweek Book Division, 1974.

Wills, Garry. James Madison . New York: Times Books, 2002. 

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Federalist no. 10 by james madison (1787).

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• Index of articles
• 1 Background of the author
• 2 Full text of The Union as a Safeguard Against Domestic Faction and Insurrection
• 3 Background of the Federalist Papers
• 4 Full list of Federalist Papers
• 6 External links
• 7 Footnotes

Federalist Number (No.) 10 (1787) is an essay by British-American politician James Madison arguing for the ratification of the United States Constitution . The full title of the essay is "The Same Subject Continued: The Union as a Safeguard Against Domestic Faction and Insurrection." It was written as part of a series of essays collected and published in 1788 as The Federalist and later known as The Federalist Papers . These essays were written by Alexander Hamilton , James Madison , and John Jay . They argued for ratification of the United States Constitution as a replacement for the Articles of Confederation . [1]

• Author: James Madison
• Source: Originally published in the New York Packet on November 22, 1787. Republished in 1788 as part of the collection The Federalist , now referred to as The Federalist Papers .
• Abstract: Madison argues that a well-constructed union will be able to control the violence of factions.

Background of the author

James Madison (1751-1836) was an American politician who served as the fourth president of the United States . He is considered a Founding Father of the United States and is also known as the Father of the Constitution due to his contributions to the development of the United States Constitution . Below is a summary of Madison's career: [2]

• 1775 : Joined the Virginia militia as a colonel
• 1777-1779 : Member of the Virginia Governor's Council
• 1780-1783 : Virginia delegate to the Continental Congress
• 1784-1786 : Member of the Virginia House of Delegates
• 1787 : Virginia representative to the Constitutional Convention
• 1789-1797 : Member of the U.S. House of Representatives from Virginia
• 1801-1809 : Fifth U.S. secretary of state
• 1809-1817 : Fourth president of the United States

Full text of The Union as a Safeguard Against Domestic Faction and Insurrection

The full text of Federalist No. 10 reads as follows: [1]

Background of the Federalist Papers

The Federalist Papers are the 85 articles and essays James Madison, Alexander Hamilton, and John Jay published arguing for the ratification of the U.S. Constitution and the full replacement of the Aritcles of Confederation. All three writers published their papers under the collective pseudonym Publius between 1787-1788. [4]

The Articles of Confederation were an agreement among the original thirteen states in the United States to unite under a central government consisting of the Continental Congress. The Continental Congress proposed the Articles in 1777, and they became effective in March 1781.

The Articles primarily authorized the national government to govern diplomatic foreign relations and regulate and fund the Continental Army. Under the Articles, the Continental Congress lacked the power to levy taxes and could only request funds from the states. The inability of the national government to raise money caused the government to default on pension payments to former Revolutionary War soldiers and other financial obligations, resulting in unrest. Shay's Rebellion was a prominent example of unrest related to the weakness of the central government and the Continental Congress' inability to fulfill its obligations.

The Constitutional Convention of 1787 was convened to solve the problems related to the weak national government. Federalists, including James Madison, Alexander Hamilton, and John Jay, advocated for a completely new government under the United States Constitution . They rejected the Articles of Confederation as a weak governing document that needed fully replaced. The federalists thought the strengthened national government could help protect individual rights from factional conflicts at the state and local levels. They argued the Constitution would strengthen the federal government enough to allow for effective governance but not enough to infringe on the rights of individuals. [5] [6] [4]

Anti-federalists like Patrick Henry, Melancton Smith, and George Clinton argued that the national government proposed under the Constitution would be too powerful and would infringe on individual liberties. They thought the Articles of Confederation needed amended, not replaced. [5] [6] [4]

Full list of Federalist Papers

The following is a list of individual essays that were collected and published in 1788 as The Federalist and later known as The Federalist Papers . These essays were written by Alexander Hamilton, James Madison, and John Jay. They argued for ratification of the United States Constitution as a replacement for the Articles of Confederation .

• Federalist Papers
• Anti-Federalist papers

External links

• Search Google News for this topic
• ↑ 1.0 1.1 Yale Law School , "The Federalist Papers: No. 10," accessed June 8, 2022
• ↑ Biography.com , "James Madison," accessed June 16, 2018
• ↑ Note: This text is quoted verbatim from the original source. Any inconsistencies are attributable to the original source.
• ↑ 4.0 4.1 4.2 The Federalist Papers , "THE ANTIFEDERALIST PAPERS," accesses May 27, 2022
• ↑ 5.0 5.1 Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy Archive , "Federalism," accessed July 27, 2021
• ↑ 6.0 6.1 Middle Tennessee State University , "Anti-Federalists," accessed July 27, 2021
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• The Federalist Papers

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Starting Points

The Place Where It All Starts

James Madison’s Federalist Essays as Aristotelian Political Education

November 15, 2021 Kevin Cherry

In the words of Marvin Meyers, “all roads lead to Federalist 10 ,” the essay in which Madison famously argues that the extended republic of the United States will control the effects of factions: By taking in a diversity of interests, opinions, and passions, it is less likely any one of them will be able to constitute a factious majority able to use political power contrary to the rights of citizens or to the good of the community.  Yet the careful reader will note throughout this essay a variety of qualifications: For instance, it is the Constitution’s “ tendency to break and control the violence of faction” that Madison praises and explains in the essay.  Compared to small republics, large republics are “ most favourable to the election of the proper guardians of the public weal.”  Factions are “ less to be dreaded” in large republics, for diverse interests are “ less apt to pervade” the union; the greater variety of parties and interests makes it “ less probable” a factious majority will arise and, if so, “it will be more difficult” for such a majority to act.  The national representatives are “ more likely to possess” enlightenment and virtue, and the diversity of a large republic affords “ greater security” against any one part being a majority and poses “ greater obstacles” to such a majority’s factious activity.

As a variety of scholars have shown, Madison believed that the new government ought to have the power to “negative” state laws that resulted from factious majorities—a power akin to that of the British king to veto acts of Parliament contrary to the good of the empire as a whole.  He never determined the precise manner in which this power would be exercised; even a narrower version, as presented in the Virginia Plan, met with little support at the Constitutional Convention.  Yet Madison’s dissatisfaction was evident in a letter sent to Thomas Jefferson after the Convention, almost half of which consists of what Madison himself calls an “immoderate digression” lamenting the absence of the negative from the final document.

To be sure, Madison thought the proposed Constitution superior to the existing Articles of Confederation and his efforts to secure ratification in the Virginia convention as well as through his contributions to the Federalist papers are reasonable on that grounds alone.  Yet I want to suggest that Madison’s other essays represent another side of his attempt to limit the influence of majority factions under the new Constitution.

In his Politics , Aristotle argues that the most valuable method of avoiding factional conflict and revolution is “education relative to the regime.”  This political education, however, is not what one might expect; for instance, it does not teach democratic citizens how to enjoy democracy but rather how to preserve democracy.  It teaches, moreover, democratic leaders what tendencies of democracy in fact destroy democracy so that they may be prevented.  Aristotle laments that few cities in his time make use of this.  Madison, however, seems to be engaging in such a political education in his Federalist essays.  In these essays, Madison sought not merely to defend the new Constitution but also to guide those who would, in the future, devise and revise other constitutions, in the hopes of developing institutions that would more effectively reconcile majority rule with the public good and protection of individual rights.

Although there is little evidence for a direct influence of Aristotle on Madison’s thought—his Politics was included on the list of books recommended to Congress in 1783—we do have some evidence that Madison recognized the importance of shaping the opinions of the American people in the way Aristotle recommends.  For instance, in Federalist 47 , Madison consciously sought to place the Constitution above the power of popular majorities to amend, or abolish, with ease.  Contrary to what Thomas Jefferson suggested in Notes on the State of Virginia , Madison argued instead that governments depended not merely on the consent of the people at any given moment but also on “veneration” and “reverence.”  In other words, he advocated, as Jim Ceaser has shown , a modern notion of founding in which the Constitution was both created through republican processes and yet subsequently placed outside of those processes.  In the debate over the Bill of Rights, Madison ultimately advocated the amendments less out of a conviction that “paper barriers” would protect these rights than a belief that the proclamation of the rights would have a “a salutary effect against the abuse of power” by reminding people of their importance and calling forth respect for them.  Even in his later writings for the National Gazette , Madison insisted that it was public opinion that maintained the various institutions in governments—which is precisely why that opinion needed to be “enlightened.”

As Michael Zuckert has observed, nearly all of Madison’s contributions to the Federalist papers are on the topic of whether the Constitution conforms to republican principles—or, rather, as Hamilton wrote in the first Federalist , “to the true principles of republican government” (emphasis added).  Madison not only argues persuasively that the Constitution conforms to these principles but also explicates these principles in such a way that the essays serve the same purpose recommended by Aristotle: indicating and moderating the dangers to which “the form of popular government” gives rise.  These principles thus provide the basis for institutions that reflect Madison’s unwavering commitment to majority rule while still attempting to avoid the distinctive problems resulting from that rule, in particular, majority factions and legislative usurpation.

The first of Madison’s essays on the true principles of republican government reminds readers that it is not enough for a government to be republican.  To be sure, he insists that “liberty and . . . the republican form” warrant careful attention, yet so too do the requirements of government more generally: “requisite stability and energy.”  These purposes are central to all forms of government, whether monarchical or republican; any government based on “true” republican principles must take these purposes into account.  The Constitution, therefore, should not be judged simply on whether it reflects the “genius of republican liberty”—for instance, by having short terms and numerous representatives—but must also be considered in light of what is necessary for stable and energetic government.  In later essays, he argued that representatives require longer terms to acquire knowledge necessary for good legislation and even to develop effective public policy over time.

In Federalist 39 , Madison makes his most explicit argument that the proposed Constitution is “strictly republican,” for no other kind of government, he writes, would be consistent with the “genius” of the people or the “principles of the Revolution.”  Yet here Madison takes advantage of historical and theoretical ambiguity about what republican government requires to offer his own definition.  He proposes that we may call a government republican if it “derives all its powers directly or indirectly from the great body of the people,” rather than a particular class thereof, and if its offices are held “for a limited period or during good behavior ” (emphases added).  To be sure, Madison presents support for this position from the provisions of various state constitutions—though the “limited” terms of the federal Constitution are longer than all of the examples cited—but the scope opened by such a definition is broad enough to encompass something like the (indirectly) elected president for life proposed, however ironically, by Alexander Hamilton at the Constitutional Convention.  The requirement of stability, of course, warrants longer duration, but both the varying modes of selection and terms of office make possible a genuine separation of powers in a republican form of government.

Indeed, numerous critics of the Constitution charged that “this essential precaution in favor of liberty” has been ignored, Madison acknowledges in Federalist 47 .  The obvious difficulty, Madison notes, is that these critics seem to misunderstand Montesquieu’s “celebrated maxim” in such a way that it would prevent the purpose of separating powers.  Perhaps more important, too many of these critics, and the state constitutions, have often allowed the legislative branch—precisely because it is the most republican—to exert more influence over the other branches than is, in fact, appropriate.  Too many of his contemporaries, Madison laments in Federalist 48 , still apprehend the danger of tyranny that may arise from the executive and not from “legislative usurpations.”  True republican principles must reconcile republican government with a genuine separation of powers; therefore in Federalist 51 , Madison insists on erecting defenses “commensurate to the dangers of attack,” which, perhaps counterintuitively, include fortifying the executive branch and weakening the legislative branch by dividing it into two houses.

This bicameral nature of the legislative branch offers us perhaps the best glimpse into both Madison’s commitment to republican principles and his modification of them.  Traditionally, republican governments were “mixed,” incorporating hereditary or oligarchic elements in order to prevent popular excesses.  In one of his earlier essays ( Federalist 14 ), Madison praised the United States as being not only an extensive but also an unmixed republic, with all offices being derived, as we have seen, from the people.  That makes constructing a system that allows for a true separation of powers difficult, insofar as all offices are intended to represent the people.  This, in turn, increases the danger of a popular majority treating a minority unjustly—the very problem that gave rise to Federalist 10 .

Madison therefore proposes, to the extent possible, that each branch should be constituted separately—and that the executive and judiciary, in particular, be independent of the legislature.  In effect, a proper separation of powers based on true republican principles relies upon having different, though often overlapping, bodies of electors for different offices: the people elect members of the House by district; senators (at the time) are chosen indirectly by state legislatures; and the president is determined by the electoral college.  Quite simply, as Federalist 63 makes clear, the necessary consequence of making all offices derive from the people is to exclude the people from acting collectively.  There is thus no single office in the United States that represents a single, simple majority; rather, the act of legislation requires the concurrence of different majorities, selected in different ways and holding offices for different periods, representing different constituencies.  (Madison opposed state equality in the Senate at the Convention and, in Federalist 62 , derided it as a necessary compromise that could not be defended theoretically; it is not a “true” republican principle.)  If we recall Madison’s famous definition of faction as a group that is animated by “some impulse of passion, or of interest,” we can see how a system of representation that requires the agreement of overlapping majorities to elicit the “cool and deliberate sense” of the people would make it more difficult for majority factions to achieve their purposes without ever relying upon a minority—whether of heredity, wealth, or geography—to impede them.

Much in the same way that one of Aristotle’s purposes in the Politics is to develop and defend a moderated understanding of democracy that avoids the worst consequences of the Athenian assembly, Madison sought to moderate the dangers occasioned by republican government not merely through defending the Constitution but also by explicating the “true principles of republican government” on which it was based—principles that could guide reform of state constitutions as well as drafting of constitutions elsewhere.  A republic based on such principles would preserve the right of the majority to rule while better achieving the public good and more securely protecting individual rights.

Kevin M. Cherry is associate professor of political science at the University of Richmond, where he teaches courses in the history of political thought.  His book Plato, Aristotle, and the Purpose of Politics  was published by Cambridge University Press (2012), and his articles have appeared in the American Journal of Political Science , History of Political Thought, Political Science Reviewer and  Political Theory.  He is currently at work on a book about the way various political theorists have understood and sought to ameliorate the problem of faction.

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James Madison, Property

This term in its particular application means "that dominion which one man claims and exercises over the external things of the world, in exclusion of every other individual."

In its larger and juster meaning, it embraces every thing to which a man may attach a value and have a right; and which leaves to every one else the like advantage.

In the former sense, a man's land, or merchandize, or money is called his property.

In the latter sense, a man has a property in his opinions and the free communication of them.

He has a property of peculiar value in his religious opinions, and in the profession and practice dictated by them.

He has a property very dear to him in the safety and liberty of his person.

He has an equal property in the free use of his faculties and free choice of the objects on which to employ them.

In a word, as a man is said to have a right to his property, he may be equally said to have a property in his rights.

Where an excess of power prevails, property of no sort is duly respected. No man is safe in his opinions, his person, his faculties, or his possessions.

Where there is an excess of liberty, the effect is the same, tho' from an opposite cause.

Government is instituted to protect property of every sort; as well that which lies in the various rights of individuals, as that which the term particularly expresses. This being the end of government, that alone is a just government, which impartially secures to every man, whatever is his own .

According to this standard of merit, the praise of affording a just securing to property, should be sparingly bestowed on a government which, however scrupulously guarding the possessions of individuals, does not protect them in the enjoyment and communication of their opinions, in which they have an equal, and in the estimation of some, a more valuable property.

More sparingly should this praise be allowed to a government, where a man's religious rights are violated by penalties, or fettered by tests, or taxed by a hierarchy. Conscience is the most sacred of all property; other property depending in part on positive law, the exercise of that, being a natural and unalienable right. To guard a man's house as his castle, to pay public and enforce private debts with the most exact faith, can give no title to invade a man's conscience which is more sacred than his castle, or to withhold from it that debt of protection, for which the public faith is pledged, by the very nature and original conditions of the social pact.

That is not a just government, nor is property secure under it, where the property which a man has in his personal safety and personal liberty, is violated by arbitrary seizures of one class of citizens for the service of the rest. A magistrate issuing his warrants to a press gang, would be in his proper functions in Turkey or Indostan, under appellations proverbial of the most compleat despotism.

That is not a just government, nor is property secure under it, where arbitrary restrictions, exemptions, and monopolies deny to part of its citizens that free use of their faculties, and free choice of their occupations, which not only constitute their property in the general sense of the word; but are the means of acquiring property strictly so called. What must be the spirit of legislation where a manufacturer of linen cloth is forbidden to bury his own child in a linen shroud, in order to favour his neighbour who manufactures woolen cloth; where the manufacturer and wearer of woolen cloth are again forbidden the oeconomical use of buttons of that material, in favor of the manufacturer of buttons of other materials!

A just security to property is not afforded by that government, under which unequal taxes oppress one species of property and reward another species: where arbitrary taxes invade the domestic sanctuaries of the rich, and excessive taxes grind the faces of the poor; where the keenness and competitions of want are deemed an insufficient spur to labor, and taxes are again applied, by an unfeeling policy, as another spur; in violation of that sacred property, which Heaven, in decreeing man to earn his bread by the sweat of his brow, kindly reserved to him, in the small repose that could be spared from the supply of his necessities.

If there be a government then which prides itself in maintaining the inviolability of property; which provides that none shall be taken directly even for public use without indemnification to the owner, and yet directly violates the property which individuals have in their opinions, their religion, their persons, and their faculties; nay more, which indirectly violates their property, in their actual possessions, in the labor that acquires their daily subsistence, and in the hallowed remnant of time which ought to relieve their fatigues and soothe their cares, the influence [inference?] will have been anticipated, that such a government is not a pattern for the United States.

If the United States mean to obtain or deserve the full praise due to wise and just governments, they will equally respect the rights of property, and the property in rights: they will rival the government that most sacredly guards the former; and by repelling its example in violating the latter, will make themselves a pattern to that and all other governments.

The Papers of James Madison . Edited by William T. Hutchinson et al. Chicago and London: University of Chicago Press, 1962--77 (vols. 1--10); Charlottesville: University Press of Virginia, 1977--(vols. 11--).

James Madison: America's Fourth President and Constitutional Contributor

James madison's presidency and role in the constitution's ratification..

James Madison, America's fourth President (1809-1817), made a major contribution to the ratification of the Constitution by writing The Federalist Papers, a series of essays advocating for the document's adoption. His dedication to the principles of the Constitution helped shape the early years of the United States government.

On September 28, 1789, just before leaving for recess, the first Federal Congress passed a resolution asking that the President of the United States be addressed as "His Excellency." This was a significant moment in the history of the presidency, setting a precedent for future leaders, including James Madison.

Nangolo Mbumba, who studied entomology at UConn in the 1970s, officially became Namibia's fourth president on Sunday, following the passing of the previous leader. As a new president, Mbumba faces the challenges and responsibilities of leading his country during a time of transition.

When and where is it? The debate will be held at the University of Alabama in Tuscaloosa city at 7pm (01:00 GMT) on Wednesday. Alabama is a state known for its political significance, hosting events that shape national discourse and decision-making.

Four Republican presidential candidates are scheduled to face off in the fourth debate of their party's 2024 nominating contest this week. The debate is expected to showcase the candidates' positions on key issues and provide insight into their plans for the future of the country.

The number of candidates on stage is shrinking, but the fundamentals of Wednesday's Republican presidential debate may be familiar to anyone following the election cycle. The candidates will likely discuss topics such as healthcare, immigration, and foreign policy, offering contrasting viewpoints on these critical issues.

The fireworks were back as four Republican candidates vying to emerge as the party's top alternative to Donald Trump in the 2024 election clashed in a heated debate. The intense exchange of ideas and arguments highlighted the diversity of opinions within the Republican Party.

So, again, it's not defensive, even if President Biden chooses to frame it as a defensive war. This is an offensive act. This is a breach of national security. The protection of the country and its citizens is a top priority for any president, including James Madison during his time in office.

On Presidents Day, learn fun facts about US presidents. Examples include Andrew Johnson befriending mice and Calvin Coolidge loving to take naps. These interesting anecdotes provide a glimpse into the personal lives and quirks of the individuals who have held the highest office in the land.

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James Madison

The 4th President of the United States

The biography for President Madison and past presidents is courtesy of the White House Historical Association.

James Madison, America’s fourth President (1809-1817), made a major contribution to the ratification of the Constitution by writing The Federalist Papers, along with Alexander Hamilton and John Jay. In later years, he was referred to as the “Father of the Constitution.”

At his inauguration, James Madison, a small, wizened man, appeared old and worn; Washington Irving described him as “but a withered little apple-John.” But whatever his deficiencies in charm, Madison’s … wife Dolley compensated for them with her warmth and gaiety. She was the toast of Washington.

Born in 1751, Madison was brought up in Orange County, Virginia, and attended Princeton (then called the College of New Jersey). A student of history and government, well-read in law, he participated in the framing of the Virginia Constitution in 1776, served in the Continental Congress, and was a leader in the Virginia Assembly.

When delegates to the Constitutional Convention assembled at Philadelphia, the 36-year-old Madison took frequent and emphatic part in the debates.

Madison made a major contribution to the ratification of the Constitution by writing, with Alexander Hamilton and John Jay, the Federalist essays. In later years, when he was referred to as the “Father of the Constitution,” Madison protested that the document was not “the off-spring of a single brain,” but “the work of many heads and many hands.”

In Congress, he helped frame the Bill of Rights and enact the first revenue legislation. Out of his leadership in opposition to Hamilton’s financial proposals, which he felt would unduly bestow wealth and power upon northern financiers, came the development of the Republican, or Jeffersonian, Party.

As President Jefferson’s Secretary of State, Madison protested to warring France and Britain that their seizure of American ships was contrary to international law. The protests, John Randolph acidly commented, had the effect of “a shilling pamphlet hurled against eight hundred ships of war.”

Despite the unpopular Embargo Act of 1807, which did not make the belligerent nations change their ways but did cause a depression in the United States, Madison was elected President in 1808. Before he took office the Embargo Act was repealed.

During the first year of Madison’s Administration, the United States prohibited trade with both Britain and France; then in May, 1810, Congress authorized trade with both, directing the President, if either would accept America’s view of neutral rights, to forbid trade with the other nation.

Napoleon pretended to comply. Late in 1810, Madison proclaimed non-intercourse with Great Britain. In Congress a young group including Henry Clay and John C. Calhoun, the “War Hawks,” pressed the President for a more militant policy.

The British impressment of American seamen and the seizure of cargoes impelled Madison to give in to the pressure. On June 1, 1812, he asked Congress to declare war.

The young Nation was not prepared to fight; its forces took a severe trouncing. The British entered Washington and set fire to the White House and the Capitol.

But a few notable naval and military victories, climaxed by Gen. Andrew Jackson’s triumph at New Orleans, convinced Americans that the War of 1812 had been gloriously successful. An upsurge of nationalism resulted. The New England Federalists who had opposed the war–and who had even talked secession–were so thoroughly repudiated that Federalism disappeared as a national party.

In retirement at Montpelier, his estate in Orange County, Virginia, Madison spoke out against the disruptive states’ rights influences that by the 1830’s threatened to shatter the Federal Union. In a note opened after his death in 1836, he stated, “The advice nearest to my heart and deepest in my convictions is that the Union of the States be cherished and perpetuated.”

Learn more about James Madison’s spouse, Dolley Payne Todd Madison .

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THE FEDERALIST PAPERS #60, "Concerning the Power of Congress to Regulate the Election of Members" (Cont.) by Alexander Hamilton Simple Gifts

Authored by Alexander Hamilton, James Madison and John Jay to appear anonymously in New York papers under the pseudonym ”Publius” in 1787 and 1788, the Federalist Papers aimed to rally public support for the proposed Constitution of the United States. As such, it is one of the most important sources for understanding the original intent of the US Constitution by those who participated in its construction. In Federalist number one Alexander Hamilton sets forth the ambition of arguing the following positions in favor of the adoption of the Constitution: ”I propose, in a series of papers, to discuss the following interesting particulars: THE UTILITY OF THE UNION TO YOUR POLITICAL PROSPERITY THE INSUFFICIENCY OF THE PRESENT CONFEDERATION TO PRESERVE THAT UNION THE NECESSITY OF A GOVERNMENT AT LEAST EQUALLY ENERGETIC WITH THE ONE PROPOSED, TO THE ATTAINMENT OF THIS OBJECT THE CONFORMITY OF THE PROPOSED CONSTITUTION TO THE TRUE PRINCIPLES OF REPUBLICAN GOVERNMENT ITS ANALOGY TO YOUR OWN STATE CONSTITUTION and lastly, THE ADDITIONAL SECURITY WHICH ITS ADOPTION WILL AFFORD TO THE PRESERVATION OF THAT SPECIES OF GOVERNMENT, TO LIBERTY, AND TO PROPERTY.” Articles and essays written by Alexander Hamilton, James Madison, and John Jay under the collective pseudonym ”Publius” to promote the ratification of the Constitution of the United States. If you enjoy our content, consider donating through PayPal via https://ko-fi.com/thechristianatheist Take a moment to enjoy our weekly Photos of the Day videos here - short slideshows with relaxing music ...https://www.youtube.com/channel/UC_9GPi4HTqoZ8xFgTldbBaA https://www.youtube.com/c/TheChristianAtheist/featured https://www.facebook.com/JnJWiseWords https://wisewordsforyouroccasion.wordpress.com #thechristianatheist #drjohndwise #drjohnwise #johnwise #christian #atheist #christianity #atheism #jesus #jesuschrist #god #bible #oldtestament #newtestament #nocompromise #rationality #faith #philosophy #philosopher #culture #society #hegelism #hegelianism #hegel #reason #incarnation #history#psychology #theology #literature #humanities #hardquestions #postmodernism #woke #wisdom #ethics #science #poetry #paradox #oxymoron

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