changing nature of politics essay

The Changing Nature of Sovereignty

‘Does Greater Intervention Mean that Sovereignty is More Frequently Violated or Rather that the Nature of Sovereignty is Changing?’

“The time of absolute sovereignty and exclusive sovereignty…has passed; its theory was never matched by reality” -Boutros-Ghali 1992

The concept of sovereignty has long been seen as a “fundamental pillar of the international system” (Badescu 2011:20) and even a “grundnorm of international society” (Reus-Smit 2001:519). Some scholars have argued that certain aspects of the contemporary international system, like globalisation, have led to its erosion (Krasner 1999:1). For some, the greatest challenge (or perhaps threat) posed to sovereignty stems from international human rights obligations (Donnelly 2004:1). Human rights and sovereignty are often seen as juxtaposed, competing and contradictory regimes. Krasner, for example, argues that human rights compromise conventional notions of sovereignty (1999:125), suggesting that the two ideas are opposed and irreconcilable. The relationship between human rights and sovereignty has often been viewed in zero-sum terms – “the stronger the principle of sovereignty, the weaker norms of human rights, and vice versa ” (Reus-Smit 2001:519).

Following the end of the Cold War; a marked increase in the number of interventions occurred. This essay will define intervention as an invasive, military interference in the affairs of another state, often underpinned by a humanitarian rationale. During the 1990s, a series of military interventions supported by humanitarian justifications took place; (Welsh 2004:2) that arguably signalled the beginning of a more interventionist era in world politics. This essay will contend that the increased frequency of intervention and its increased permissibility in the post-Cold War world is a reflection of the changing and evolving nature of sovereignty. Although it is difficult to pinpoint when the nature of sovereignty changed, it certainly has undergone some sort of transformation. The rise of humanitarian intervention during the 1990s seemed to signal the beginning of this change. This author favours a constructivist take on sovereignty which maintains that it is “constantly undergoing change and transformation” and can be defined “in terms of the interactions and practices of states” (Biersteker & Weber 1996:10). This perspective allows the increased incidence of intervention and its greater permissibility – to be viewed as a change in the nature and understanding of sovereignty, not a violation of it.

The nature of sovereignty has seemingly changed from one that endows states with certain infallible rights, to one that grants them certain responsibilities. In order to demonstrate this change the essay will proceed in three stages. First of all, the essay will explore sovereignty as a concept, before outlining, and then debunking, the traditional, archetypal, ‘Westphalian’ conception. It will then proceed to highlight sovereignty’s conception during the Cold War, when the norm of non-intervention was preeminent, in order to contrast it with its contemporary reimagining. The final part of the essay will discuss instances of humanitarian intervention during the 1990s to demonstrate that its increased usage, and permissibility, was indicative of the changing nature of sovereignty. It will also chart sovereignty’s conceptual evolution in the post-Cold War period from notions of sovereignty as responsibility to the Responsibility to Protect (RtoP). Furthermore, tentative explanations for the shift will then be proffered before concluding.

Sovereignty as a concept has been characterised as “ambiguous” (Weber & Biersteker 1996:2) and “rather fuzzy” (Weber 1995:1). In spite of this, the essay will offer some definitions in order to ground the subsequent analysis. Sovereignty is defined by Weber and Biersteker as: “a political entity’s externally recognized right to exercise final authority over its affairs” (1996:2). Their definition stresses the external dimension of sovereignty. Whereas Ruggie, labels it “the institutionalization of public authority within mutually exclusive jurisdictional domains” (1983:275), thus highlighting its territorial aspect.

Krasner suggests that the term sovereignty has been used in four different ways, which he categorises as: domestic; interdependence; international legal; and Westphalian sovereignty (1999:9). Domestic sovereignty refers “to the nature of domestic authority structures” and the effective level of control they wield within a state’s borders (Krasner 2004:88). Interdependence sovereignty, on the other hand, describes a state’s ability to control trans-border movements. Moreover, international legal sovereignty refers to the process of mutual recognition (Krasner 1999:9). Perhaps the most significant use of the term sovereignty for this analysis is the notion of Westphalian sovereignty, which entails “the exclusion of external actors from domestic authority configurations” (ibid) i.e. autonomy. Interventionist practices are generally seen to violate the non-intervention norm associated with Westphalian sovereignty, as well as international legal sovereignty. It is important to note that the various kinds of sovereignty can co-vary – “a state can have one but not the other” (Krasner 1999:4).

Krasner’s proposition that states can possess one form of sovereignty, but not necessarily others, is shared by Jackson (1990), specifically through his notions of positive and negative sovereignty. Negative sovereignty is defined as freedom from external interference (non-intervention) (1990:27). It is a formal legal condition, which can be bestowed onto a state by others (ibid). His categorisation of negative sovereignty resonates with Krasner’s Westphalian and international legal sovereignty. On the other hand, positive sovereignty describes the capabilities “which enable governments to be their own masters” (Jackson 1990:29).  A positively sovereign government is one which has the capacity to provide political goods for those it claims to represent (ibid). A state may possess negative sovereignty, namely be recognised as sovereign, but lack the capability to provide goods for its citizens (see Somalia). Jackson argues that ex-colonial states have juridical independence (negative sovereignty) but possess only limited empirical statehood (positive sovereignty), leading him to label them ‘quasi-states’ (1990:21). This infers that some states can seemingly be more ‘sovereign’ than others. This hints at the existence of hierarchy in the international system, a theme which will be addressed below.

Both Krasner and Jackson suggest that sovereignty consists of both internal and external dimensions. Lake is even more forthcoming in his discussion of sovereignty arguing that it “possesses both an internal and external face” (2003:305). Internally, sovereignty defines the ultimate authority within a territory and entails a hierarchical relationship between the rulers and the ruled (ibid). Whereas externally; sovereignty involves the recognition of a state by others; implying a relationship of formal equality (ibid). The international system is deemed to be an anarchic arena as there is no higher authority (ibid). Lake (2003 & 2007) seeks to problematise the notion that relations between states are conducted on an equal footing. He argues that external sovereignty encompasses hierarchical (not just anarchical) relations.

The Westphalian Sovereign Ideal

The essay will now outline the conventional, ‘traditional’ conception of Westphalian sovereignty and the prerogatives that it grants its holder. The extent to which this ideal ever existed or was commonly agreed upon is certainly up for debate. The traditional tale of sovereignty is summarised neatly by Glanville, who suggests that it “is repeatedly told…that sovereignty was established sometime around the 17th century (at the Peace of Westphalia…) and, since that time, states have enjoyed ‘unfettered’ rights to self-government, non-intervention and freedom from interference in internal affairs” (2011:234). The sovereignty fairy tale holds that states, by virtue of being sovereign, enjoy the inviolable right to non-intervention, non-interference and self-government. Although, this ideal seemingly never existed; the discourse that it perpetuates is very significant. Without this ideal and the rights it supposedly grants to states, it would be impossible to discuss whether intervention violated sovereignty at all. Furthermore, this narrative also plays a significant role in entrenching the notion that states have a right to do as they please within their territories and to do so without interference.

Debunking the Myth

It is possible to refute the Westphalia myth fairly easily. This essay will contest the myth on three grounds: firstly, the non-intervention norm did not originate at Westphalia; secondly, the myth has seemingly never matched reality due to frequent cases of intervention; and thirdly, sovereign power has never been truly unchecked. The norm of non-intervention often associated with the Peace of Westphalia was actually codified at a later date during the mid-eighteenth century (see Glanville 2011:236 and Krasner 1999:21). This undermines the rather dubious claim that “in the history of sovereignty one can skip three hundred years without omitting noteworthy change” (Philpot 1996:43). Philpot is here certainly guilty of perpetuating the Westphalian myth.

Moreover, the extent to which the ‘traditional’ conception of sovereignty, specifically the non-intervention aspect, existed in practice is debatable. But it is unlikely it ever truly operated in the international system. As Krasner notes “the principles associated within both Westphalian and international legal sovereignty have always been violated” (1999:24), seemingly suggesting that the Westphalian ideal never existed. The frequent violation of sovereignty norms leads Krasner to deem them ‘organized hypocrisy’ as they are widely understood but frequently compromised (Krasner 1999:25). This take on sovereignty appears fairly rigid and static because it treats sovereignty as a constant with fixed characteristics, thus discounting the notion that it can change. Therefore, for Krasner, sovereignty constitutes something that can be violated by greater intervention. Moreover, Glanville also refutes the myth on the basis that the reality of sovereignty never matched the ideal anyway. He argues that sovereign authority has always involved varied and evolving responsibilities since it was first espoused (2011:234). He rebuffs the idea that sovereignty was absolute and empowered states with unfettered rights to do as they saw fit, instead arguing that sovereign power has always been to a degree – checked.

The Nature of Sovereignty During the Cold War

This essay will now depict the nature of sovereignty during the Cold War in order to lay the groundwork for a comparison with its contemporary reimagining. During the Cold War; the non-intervention norm associated with the political and territorial integrity of states was heavily stressed (Glanville 2006:155). Indeed, a “firmly non-interventionist conception of sovereignty” prevailed (Glanville 2011:248). Although despite the preponderance of this norm during this period, intervention by both superpowers did occur

During this period, military intervention in the affairs of another state, regardless of the rationale that underpinned it, was regarded as a violation of the non-intervention norm. Wheeler and Morris cite three instances of intervention during the Cold War: India’s intervention in East Pakistan (1971); Tanzania’s in Uganda (1978) and Vietnam’s in Cambodia (then Kampuchea) (1979) that were seen to be violations of the non-intervention norm (1996:142). They argue that “the international community chose to condemn… [them] as breaches of the principles of non-intervention and non-use of force” (ibid). Although they issue a caveat that the international response was influenced by overarching Cold War imperatives (ibid). Each of these instances of intervention arose as a response to genocidal violence (ibid), but nevertheless was perceived as an infringement of the statist, non-intervention norm.

Due to space constraints it is not possible to engage comprehensively with each case, although notable aspects of them and the international response will be highlighted. It is noteworthy that each intervention was, by and large, justified on the grounds of self-defence, not humanitarianism (see Wheeler 2000). For example, claims by India to justify its intervention rested predominately on grounds of self-defence, in light of Pakistan’s ‘refugee’ and ‘military’ aggression (Wheeler 2000:65). The international reaction to the intervention was condemnatory: “the overwhelming reaction…was to affirm Pakistan’s right to sovereignty and the rule of non-intervention” (Wheeler 2000:58). This is characteristic of the take on sovereignty that prevailed during the Cold War. Pakistan’s right to sovereignty was viewed as infallible regardless of its conduct; and India’s intervention was therefore deemed to be a breach of its sovereignty. It will be demonstrated later in the essay that the nature of sovereignty has changed markedly since then.

Moreover, the reaction to the Vietnamese intervention in Cambodia also exhibits the strength of the idea that sovereignty was inviolable and sacrosanct. Vietnam’s intervention, regardless of potential ulterior motives, ousted a regime that killed perhaps as many as one sixth of its six million people (Arend & Beck 1993:121). In spite of this, several states at United Nations Security Council (UNSC) meetings: “held that Vietnam had illegally intervened in Kampuchean internal affairs” (Arend & Beck 1993:122). The argument that the intervention was illegal was predicated on the idea that Vietnam had infringed upon Cambodian sovereignty, and that Cambodia’s ability to enjoy its sovereign rights was impervious, regardless of what the Khmer Rouge regime was doing to its people. This argument invokes notions of absolute sovereignty, which maintains that sovereigns can act with relative impunity.

Humanitarian Intervention during the 1990s – A Conceptual Shift?

During the 1990s a flurry of interventions occurred which were predicated on a humanitarian rationale (Welsh 2004:2). Interventions which sought to protect civilians took place in Iraq, Somalia, Haiti and the Balkans (Wheeler 2004:29). These interventions were notable in several ways. For example, they were explicitly supported by humanitarian rationales, which represented a significant break with the Cold War period. Moreover, they were also noteworthy as they were authorised by the UNSC, which displayed increased activism during this time. The UNSC “extended its Chapter VII powers into matters that had previously belonged to the domestic jurisdiction of states” (ibid). This series of interventions suggested that the non-intervention norm which was preponderant during the Cold War – where any intervention seemingly amounted to a violation of sovereignty – was to an extent ceding to humanitarian concerns. Indeed, Wheeler asserts “that the traditional understanding of state sovereignty as a barrier to international intervention [was] robbed of its legitimacy during the 1990s” (2004:32).

Extra attention will be paid to the intervention in Northern Iraq in 1991, as it was arguably the first instance of humanitarian intervention during this period and because it is illustrative of two important trends. Firstly, it demonstrated that states could no longer necessarily expect to act with impunity towards their own populations without being rebuked, and secondly; that concerns over human rights could trump those over sovereignty. The intervention was launched in riposte to brutal government repression of Iraqi rebels and civilians following an uprising. This brutal repression led to large scale loss of life and subsequent mass refugee flows (Freedman & Boren 1992:43) which culminated in a humanitarian crisis.  Media and political pressure mounted and the UNSC responded through Resolution 688 (Ramsbotham & Woodhouse 1996:70). ‘Operation Provide Comfort’ was launched in response by a Western coalition and entailed the delivery of vital supplies like food and blankets, the creation of a ‘no fly zone’, and the formulation of ‘safe havens’ (ibid). The creation of safe havens represented a particularly striking infringement of Iraqi sovereignty – as the core logic behind them was to essentially “establish western military authority over a substantial area of Iraq” (Freeman & Boren 1992:57).

In spite of the unique circumstances under which the intervention took place (in the aftermath of the Second Gulf War), it is noteworthy that the non-intervention norm (and Iraq’s sovereignty) was not construed as inviolable in this instance. This is in contrast with the East Pakistan case where the government’s repression of the Bengalis was essentially deemed to fall “within the domestic jurisdiction of Pakistan” (Wheeler 2000: 58), and therefore, India received international criticism for “tearing up the sovereignty rule book” (Evans 2008:24). The intervention in Northern Iraq, and the ones that followed, seemed to suggest that sovereignty was undergoing a degree of change. State-sponsored mass human rights abuse was no longer considered to be a strictly internal affair, which rendered the international community powerless, due to sovereignty norms. The new role of the UN as a legitimating agent and the intrusive nature of the Iraqi intervention itself seemed to suggest that the sovereignty rulebook was being revised – to echo the words of Evans.

The response of the international community to (some) instances of mass human rights violations during the 1990s demonstrated that state sovereignty was no longer sacrosanct and that leaders no longer had a free hand to act with impunity on their own territory. A new norm of military intervention for humanitarian purposes emerged which suggested that the apparent era of ‘sovereignty without responsibility’ – to borrow Glanville’s turn of phrase (2011:247) – was over. Sovereignty was no longer conceived of as an inherent right, and crucially, states that did claim this right had to recognise the accompanying responsibilities for protecting their citizens (Wheeler 2004:37).

Sovereignty as Responsibility

Francis Deng’s appointment as the UN Secretary General’s Special Representative on internally displaced persons (IDPs) in 1993 served as a catalyst for the concept of sovereignty as responsibility (Bellamy 2009: 21). The concept arose in response to the complexities associated with the issue of IDPs. IDPs pose a dilemma because if civilians cross an international border, they can claim refugee status, but as IDPs they were afforded no extra protection and were vulnerable to the whims of their home state (Bellamy 2009:22). IDPs could be left “outside the reach of the international community because of the…approach to sovereignty as a barrier against international involvement” (Deng 2004:20). Deng’s notion of sovereignty as responsibility was a method of circumventing the use of sovereignty to deny IDPs international assistance (Bellamy 2009:22).

The notion of sovereignty as responsibility recognises that “sovereignty carries with it responsibilities for the population” (Deng et al 1996:32) and that “a government that allows its citizens to suffer… cannot claim sovereignty in an effort to keep the outside world from stepping in” (Deng et al 1996:33). The concept has two aspects; firstly; it confers a responsibility on states to ensure “a certain level of protection for” and to provide for “the basic needs of the people” (Deng et al 1996:27). Additionally, it also confers a responsibility on the international community to offer assistance to those in need and to hold governments accountable for fulfilling their responsibility (Deng 2010:354). This understanding of sovereignty was novel as it conferred explicit responsibilities on both; states, and crucially the international community at large. The responsibility allocated to states challenges notions of absolute sovereignty. Moreover, it also confers a new responsibility on the international community to do something about situations where states fail in their responsibilities. This dramatically contrasts with traditional notions of sovereignty which merely impelled states to stay out of the affairs of others.  The idea of sovereignty as responsibility is noteworthy as it served as an intellectual precursor to the RtoP norm which will now be discussed.

The ICISS and the RtoP

The notion that sovereignty entails responsibilities and not just rights was a theme central to the report of the International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty (ICISS) published in 2001. The crux of the report is that “sovereign states have a responsibility to protect their own citizens from avoidable catastrophe…but when they are unwilling or unable to do so, that responsibility must be borne out by the broader community of states” (ICISS 2001:VII). Clear parallels can be seen between the RtoP and the concept of sovereignty as responsibility. Both suggest that states have a responsibility towards their own citizens to provide basic protection and if states fail in this capacity then there is some license for the international community to act. The report sought to modify the language of the debate around humanitarian intervention, which had been framed in terms of the right to intervene, toward the responsibility to protect, and thereby place emphasis on the rights of the victims, not the interveners (Bellamy 2005:35).

For the ICISS, a “residual responsibility…lies with the broader community of states” and this “responsibility is activated when a particular state is clearly either unwilling or unable to fulfil its responsibility…or is …the actual perpetrator of crimes or atrocities” (2001:17). The international community is envisioned as a guarantor or a back-up enforcer of basic rights. The report envisioned a range of coercive measures to resolve or contain situations of compelling need for human protection including political; economic; and judicial measures (2001:29). Additionally; in extreme cases, it also envisioned a role for the use of military force (ibid). Although, for the commission, military intervention for human protection purposes has to meet six criteria, those being: right authority; just cause; right intention; last resort; proportional means; and reasonable prospects (ICISS 2001:32).

Like its precursor; the RtoP styles sovereignty as a conditional concept, which its holder is only granted in its entirety upon the fulfilment of certain duties.  As Bellamy notes: “only those states that…fulfil their sovereign responsibilities are entitled to the full panoply of sovereign rights” (2009:19). Therefore, “living up to the responsibilities of sovereignty becomes in effect the best guarantee of sovereignty” (Deng 2010:364). The right to non-intervention and non-interference in internal matters is not a given, it is contingent. This is far removed from sovereignty’s formulation during the era of decolonization in the period after the Second World War where “sovereign statehood was…granted…regardless of the capacity of the state” (Glanville 2011:247). The apparent conditionality which underpins sovereignty’s contemporary reformulation, led Zaum in his discussion of state-building to argue that notions of sovereignty as responsibility constitute a new standard of civilization [1] , similar to those which prevailed in the nineteenth and early twentieth century (2007:40). Although this is certainly a powerful critique, perhaps it is worth living with if it will aid the prevention of future Rwanda’s and Srebrenica’s?

The UN and the RtoP – ‘Rtop Lite’?

The RtoP principle was adopted by the UN following the 2005 World Summit (Bellamy & Drummond 2011:181). Although it is important to note that it was a different version than that proposed by the ICISS [2] (Bellamy 2008:622). The RtoP adopted by the UN [3] held that states have a responsibility to protect their populations from: genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing, and crimes against humanity (UN 2005:30). Moreover, it also says that the international community should help states exercise this responsibility and take action, at first peacefully, and if necessary more forcefully, when a state is ‘manifestly failing’ to protect their population from the four crimes (ibid). Bellamy and Drummond contend that the member states adopted the language of RtoP, but chose not to adopt the ICISS recommendations in a wholesale fashion, instead centring the new principle on the notion of sovereignty as responsibility (2011:183). The divergence between the ICISS RtoP and the UN’s RtoP led to criticism from some quarters, as the UN version was perceived to be ‘watered down’ (see Byers 2005) or even ‘RtoP lite’(see Weiss 2007:117).

However, despite the differences between both versions, the fact that the essence of the doctrine is retained by the UN version is perhaps the most important thing to note. The crux of the ICISS RtoP – that states have a responsibility towards their own population, and if they do not live up to it, the international community can assist them in doing so, or if necessary fulfil its obligations for them – is retained. This represents a very significant normative shift. During the Cold War era the supremacy of the non-intervention norm seemed to suggest that the only responsibility states really had was to stay out of each other’s affairs. This is a far cry from today where states have recognised and made a commitment to the idea that they not only have responsibilities towards their own population; but potentially even to others as well.

How Can the Change be Accounted For?

This essay has so far sought to argue that the nature of sovereignty has changed by charting how its practice and understanding has evolved, with a stress on the post-Cold War period. But how did this change come about? The essay will now offer some tentative explanations.

The end of the Cold War and the demise of the Soviet Union arguably played the most significant role. During the Cold War era; “the normative tensions between principles of human rights and non-intervention were suppressed by bipolar tensions” (Glanville 2011:248). Additionally, “the superpowers were largely indifferent…to what happened inside the other block and were incapable…of doing much about atrocity crimes….because of the inevitable…Security Council veto” (Evans 2008:22). The end of the Cold War changed this. Following the break-up of the USSR, the UNSC was able to address this tension between human rights and non-intervention (ibid). It seemed to – in a way – liberate it, as evidenced by its increased activism during the 1990s. During this period it played a crucial role in legitimating instances of humanitarian intervention and thus contributed to the redefinition of sovereignty.

Moreover, the increased saliency of human rights norms during this period also played an important role. Ignatieff argues that “since the end of the Cold War, human rights [have] become the dominant moral vocabulary in foreign affairs” (2002) underscoring their increased prominence. It was increasingly appreciated that mass human rights abuse was a matter of international concern, not a mere domestic one, as demonstrated by the greater frequency of humanitarian intervention.

To conclude, greater instances of intervention demonstrate that the nature of sovereignty is changing. The fact that intervention has occurred with greater incidence since the end of the Cold War, and is increasingly permissible as a policy tool, underscores the notion that sovereignty has changed. The process of change seems to be on-going as the RtoP norm matures and is further utilised. This essay has contended that the nature of sovereignty has changed from one which vests states with certain rights, like the right to non-intervention, to one which grants them certain responsibilities – primarily towards its own population. The rise of humanitarian intervention during the 1990s supports this argument. Human rights violations perpetrated by governments were no longer perceived to be an internal matter, which the international community could do little about, due to the binds of sovereignty norms.

The notion that a state’s sovereignty was sacrosanct and impervious, regardless of what it was doing to its people, lost all credibility. During the Cold War; military intervention within another state, regardless of its rationale, was deemed to be a violation of sovereignty. Interventions that did take place during this period, which arguably had grounds to be viewed as humanitarian, were construed as sovereignty violations. As Evans notes “the state of mind that…massive atrocity crimes such as those of the Cambodian killing fields were just not the rest of the world’s business was dominant…” (2011:116). This perception changed during the 1990s when mass human rights abuse was deemed to be a matter of international concern, that in some instances warranted coercive military intervention. This change was underpinned by a growing recognition that states had a basic responsibility towards their own people, a principle at the very heart of notions of sovereignty as responsibility and the RtoP. The adoption of the RtoP by UN member states arguably demonstrates just how much sovereignty has changed. In 2005; states recognised, at least in principle, their responsibility towards their own people and also to those of other states as well.

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[1] The  new ‘standard of civilisation’ theme has also been addressed by Donnelly 1998

[2] For an analysis of the differences see – Bellamy & Drummond 2011 and Bellamy 2006

[3] The UN’s RtoP was built upon and given greater substance in the Secretary-General’s 2009 report entitled ‘Implementing the responsibility to protect’.

— Written by: Michael Bolt Written at: University of Exeter Written for: Dr. Kledja Mulaj Date written: April 2013

Further Reading on E-International Relations

• Sovereignty with Chinese Characteristics? Norms in a Changing World Order
• Is the Nature of War Changing? Time to Avoid a Supposedly Unavoidable Question
• Breaking and Entering: Subverting Sovereignty Despite the International System
• A Critical Reflection on Sovereignty in International Relations Today
• From Bandung to R2P: Non-Western Contributions to Modern Sovereignty
• Sovereignty, Cosmopolitanism, and the Case of Sweden’s Foreign Policy

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Introduction to Politics (4th edn)

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• 1. Introduction: The Nature of Politics and Political Analysis
• 2. Politics and the State
• 3. Political Power, Authority, and the State
• 4. Democracy and Political Obligation
• 5. Freedom and Justice
• 6. Traditional Ideologies
• 7. Challenges to the Dominant Ideologies
• 8. Institutions and States
• 9. Political Culture and Non-Western Political Ideas
• 10. Law, Constitutions, and Federalism
• 11. Votes, Elections, Legislatures, and Legislators
• 12. Political Parties
• 13. Executives, Bureaucracies, Policy Studies, and Governance
• 14. Civil Society, Interest Groups, and the Media
• 15. Democracies, Democratization, and Authoritarian Regimes
• 16. Introducing Global Politics
• 17. Traditional Theories in Global Politics
• 18. Critical Approaches to Global Politics
• 19. Security and Insecurity
• 20. Diplomacy and Foreign Policy
• 21. International Organizations in Global Politics
• 22. Global Political Economy
• 23. Conclusion: Towards a Globalizing, Post- Western-Dominated World

p. 1 1. Introduction: The Nature of Politics and Political Analysis

• Robert Garner Robert Garner Professor of Politics, University of Leicester
• https://doi.org/10.1093/hepl/9780198820611.003.0001
• Published in print: 08 April 2020
• Published online: August 2020

This introductory chapter examines the nature of politics and the political, and more specifically whether politics is an inevitable feature of all human societies. It begins by addressing questions useful when asking about ‘who gets what, when, how?’; for example, why those taking decisions are able to enforce them. The discussion proceeds by focusing on the boundary problems inherent in an analysis of the nature of the political. One such problem is whether politics is equivalent to consensus and cooperation, so that it does not exist in the event of conflict and war. The chapter then explores different forms of political analysis — the empirical, the normative, and the semantic—as well as deductive and inductive methods of studying politics. Finally, it asks whether politics can ever be a science to rival subjects in the natural sciences.

• boundary problem
• political analysis
• empirical analysis
• normative analysis
• semantic analysis
• deductive method
• inductive method
• natural sciences

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Global Governance

Perspectives on a Changing World Order

Although the world seems destined to grow more competitive, congested, and contested in the coming years, the logic of major power cooperation remains inescapable. Any effort to shape a new international order that is stable, inclusive, and beneficial to all must be a collaborative undertaking.

Report by Paul B. Stares , Qingguo Jia , Nathalie Tocci , Dhruva Jaishankar , and Andrey Kortunov

June 2020 , 38 Pages

Publisher – Council on Foreign Relations

Release Date – June 3, 2020

Pages – 38

ISBN 978-0-87609-006-0

Observers of world affairs like to point to a defining moment or pivotal event to proclaim the end of one era and the beginning of another. Not surprisingly, the novel coronavirus pandemic has already spawned much speculation that the world will undergo profound change as a consequence, even that contemporary history will forever be divided between what happened before coronavirus and after coronavirus. However, historical eras—and certainly international orders—rarely, if ever, hinge on singular events. They are simply too entrenched to change rapidly. For this reason, it is more accurate to identify transitional periods that span the rise and fall of specific international orders. In these periods, elements of the old order are still discernible, albeit functioning below their peak, while features of the new order are clearly emerging and playing a more influential role.

General John W. Vessey Senior Fellow for Conflict Prevention and Director of the Center for Preventive Action

Professor & Director of the Center on Global Governance, Peking University

Director, Istituto Affari Internazionali

Director, U.S. Initiative, Observer Research Foundation

Director General, Russian International Affairs Council

Just such a situation appears to exist today. The international order largely constructed by the United States in the aftermath of World War II is still very much in evidence, but, at the same time, the global distribution of power is inexorably shifting with the rise of new powers as well as influential nonstate actors. The United States is also growing more reluctant to bear the costs of world leadership, especially when it comes to using military force. China and Russia, along with lesser regional powers, have taken advantage of this reticence in recent years to assert their own interests and to undermine the United States’ international standing and authority.

International Organizations

Regional Organizations

Treaties and Agreements

In addition, the benefits of the U.S-led order and, in particular, the many international agreements that the United States has championed to open up the world to the free flow of goods, services, ideas, and people, no longer look so promising—not least to many Americans. This shift has caused a public backlash against globalization not only in the United States but also in many Western countries.

Where all this leads is by no means certain. The major powers either do not comprehend the risks of the current transitional period or they do not have a clear vision for a new international order that will be broadly acceptable and thus considered legitimate by most other states. If anything, mistrust and friction is steadily growing among them. The prospect of a war breaking out between two or more of the major powers, something that was generally considered to be risibly improbable just a few years ago, is no longer unimaginable.

The prospect of a war breaking out between two or more of the major powers is no longer unimaginable.

With these concerns in mind, the Center for Preventive Action (CPA) at the Council on Foreign Relations launched the Managing Global Disorder project with the generous support of the Carnegie Corporation of New York. At the outset, CPA thought it valuable to get different perspectives on the state of the world from leading scholars in each of the major powers. Each scholar was asked to address a common set of questions about the current international order and their answers, which were drafted before COVID-19, varied considerably.

Qingguo Jia from China argues that the post–World War II order is not ending but is clearly in “serious trouble” as a result of recent developments. Military conflict among the major powers, particularly between the United States and China, remains unlikely, however, given the shared incentives to avoid such a catastrophe. Their relationship will nevertheless grow more competitive. If the current international order is to be sustained for the benefit of all, the leading powers will need to work together to reform its working practices and institutions in a mutually satisfactory and sustainable way.

Nathalie Tocci from Italy is much less sanguine. She sees the liberal international order as “fraying” badly, and though the risk of war is not preordained, “potent drivers” are at work that make it more likely. The European Union, she argues, needs to wake up to the evolving reality of growing rivalry among the major powers and develop a coherent and practical new strategy for defending EU interests and preserving the multilateral institutions of the current rules-based international order. The world will become more unstable and dangerous if the practice of multilateralism is replaced by narrow, nationalistic approaches.

The world will become more unstable and dangerous if the practice of multilateralism is replaced by narrow, nationalistic approaches.

Dhruva Jaishankar from India also views the world as in a transitional phase, but, unlike Jia and Tocci, sees it evolving in a more complex way with elements of unipolarity, bipolarity, and multipolarity coexisting uneasily. He shares Tocci’s concern, however, that if current multilateral approaches to international problem-solving become “undermined, bypassed, or disregarded,” then the risk of great power conflict will increase. To avoid the world growing more fragmented and dangerous, existing global governance institutions will need to adapt and new ones be created to accommodate rising powers.

Andrey Kortunov from Russia sees the world as entering a period of increasing volatility if the leading powers do not adjust to its new realities and new imperatives. In contrast to the other commentators, however, he sees the greater risk stemming less from great power competition and more from the uneven reach and benefits of globalization. The major powers, he argues, should not only develop new crisis management mechanisms but also work together to ensure that global institutions are able to manage these growing international schisms.

Preventive Action Update

A snapshot of global hot spots along with expert analysis on ways to prevent and mitigate deadly conflict from the center for preventive action.  quarterly..

While each of these scholars views the world today and the challenges that lay ahead in different ways, they share a common belief that the opportunity to shape a new international order that is stable, inclusive, and beneficial to all still exists, though the window to do this is growing smaller. The experience of earlier transitional periods suggests that any effort to reform or create a new global order must be a collaborative undertaking. Although the world seems destined to grow more competitive, congested, and contested in the coming years, the logic of major power cooperation is inescapable.

This is the first Discussion Paper in the Managing Global Disorder series , which explores in greater depth how to promote a stable and mutually beneficial relationship among the major powers that can in turn provide the essential foundation for greater cooperation on pressing global and regional challenges.

The Council on Foreign Relations acknowledges the Carnegie Corporation of New York for its generous support.

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The 21st Century Conflicts: Understanding the Changing Nature and Character of War

The nature of conflict has changed dramatically over the last few decades. Conflicts between States have become the exception rather than the rule. On the other hand, we increasingly witness acute crises and hybrid conflict characterized by internal strife, sometimes in the context of failed or dysfunctional States; or violent separatism, in some cases accompanied by quasi-military operations affecting the civilian population. The law of war or international (humanitarian) law, i.e. theGeneva and Hague Conventions, is a branch of public international law that sets the acceptable justifications to engage in war (ius ad bellum) and the limits to acceptable wartime conduct (ius in bello). Some principles of customary law became peremptorynorms of jus cogens, a "formal" source of internationallaw that apply erga omnes. Any existing treaty which isin conflict with these norms becomes void and terminates.

Related Papers

Christophe L Barbier

International law takes its roots in the ancient religious precept by the most famous name of all, Holland’s Hugo Grotius (1583-1645). He devised the global system of law which originated from the genesis in the early formation of states. There are two important concepts to take into account: the cause of war and the conduct of war. Within the world of international law, there are legal, domestic and international systems that operate by a set of rules that dictate trade, commerce, finance, communication, and travel. The International law came into being because of the intricate relationship between states and their relations to each other. Centuries in the making, international law has shaped the international community, the evolution of globalization, and the expectancy of each state to be interdependent by being aware of their environment and maintain diplomatic relation on human rights. In this research paper, I will draw the line between the international law in regards to the laws of war that seem to supersede the universal standard of acceptance. I will provide concrete examples that support the notion that sometimes international law and the law of wars can be misguided, miscalculated, and blended into-a-out-of-focus concept at the international level that brings conflicts of interests between states. Self-gain and self-interests cause wars to be engaged and world peace to be disturbed based on false assumption and misbehavioral preemptive measures based on irrationality. The spread of democracy worldwide is often threatened by wars. There is a growing body of evidence that the laws of wars could not support wars in general terms to be fought in the first place.

Agora International Journal of Juridical Sciences

David Ungureanu

The international humanitarian law applicable in armed conflicts has evolved continuously since antiquity until today, its doctrinal writings pointing out during the modern period the influence that the progress of the concepts and the practices of war has had on the development of the normative conventions, especially the first and second world war, resulting in texts that are applicable even today.

The International Humanitarian Law Research Initiative

Derek Jinks

Anikó Szalai

Beth Van Schaack

Sharon Jumper

Philippiniana Sacra

Ranhilio Aquino

Legal Magazine

Prof. Marco Tabili

International Society of Military Sciences 2020 (ISMS 2020)

Marco Marsili

Introduction The lines between conventional and unconventional conflicts become blurred. Alongside non-international and international conflicts, a third category of armed conflict is emerging: hybrid, asymmetric, and transnational conflicts which involve state and non-state actors whose legal status and classification is disputed.[1] While it’s a blend of traditional and irregular tactics, hybrid warfare makes use of a wide range of tools: military and civilian; conventional and unconventional. Hybrid warfare was linked almost exclusively with non-state actors. Afterwards the concept of hybrid warfare developed in a way that is now commonly accepted to describe the interplay between conventional and unconventional means used also by governments and regular armies. For such emerging conflicts/warfare there is no legal definition, therefore leaving room for interpretation and applicable law. International law (IL) and international humanitarian law (IHL) – in particular the law of war (Geneva and Hague law) – apply in case of armed conflict. The law of war, a branch of public international law, sets the acceptable justifications to engage in war (jus ad bellum) and the limits to acceptable wartime conduct (jus in bello). The law of war regulates inter alia: declaration of war; acceptance of surrender and the treatment of prisoners of war; military necessity, along with distinction and proportionality; and the prohibition of certain weapons that may cause unnecessary suffering. Research problem and question investigated The research aims to investigate whether and how current international customary[2] and treaty law applies to unconventional conflicts that characterize the 21st century. The study investigates whether new rules are required, or if current rules are still valid and can be used/adapted. The research aims to check whether and to what extent states abide IL/IHL in dealing with unconventional conflicts, or if, through their course of conduct, states are attempting to create new customary law, or to adapt the existing instruments to the challenges that unconventional conflicts pose. The study investigates also whether these conducts abide customary IL and peremptory norms (jus cogens), that are not consent-based, but still are obligatory upon state and non-state actors. The research has the purpose to contribute to develop solutions for the global challenges of today and tomorrow by understanding the present and imaging future scenarios. Basic design of the study, including sources and methods The research topic involves main cross-cutting issues (the rule of law, fundamental human rights and ethical principles) and therefore requires an interdisciplinary approach: history, political science, political philosophy, sociology, law, ethics. The research requires an empirical, positivist framework that rests on qualitative data analysis.[3] Although in complicated legal systems no ultimate distinction can be made between legal and moral standards, as positivism insists, socio-legal theory offers a contrasting/complementary perspective that will be useful in a global study like this. The research is conducted applying the concept of triangulation, which combines different methods (exploratory, descriptive and analytical) and fits to qualitative studies. The specific nature of the methodology employed in this study is reflected in its structure, which is divided into two principal parts. The first part considers the theoretical elements, definitions and current research. The second part analyzes the legal aspects of some case studies and nests them within the broader discussion on the applicable law, starting from an analysis based on three pillars: historical, theoretical-conceptual and legal (in the light of IL/IHL). To answer the starting question, the research moves from a historical-documentary analysis, then takes into consideration the literature and eventually focuses on some case studies of the post Cold War era: NATO bombing of Yugoslavia (1999); Gulf War (1990); Iraq War (2003); invasion of Afghanistan (2001); Syrian conflict (2011); the War on Terror (2001). At first stage the study explores the theoretical elements: literature and legal framework. The legal framework consists of customary IL/IHL; international instruments (conventions and treaties); documents produced by relevant UN international agencies, bodies and entities; rulings of relevant supranational courts and international tribunals. Then an empirical analysis based on these tools checks the compliance of some case studies with current IL/IHL. Under most circumstances, an analysis of this type requires an empirical, positivist framework that rests on either a qualitative or quantitative data analysis. Major findings The approach to warfare in political and legal discourse changed dramatically over the last fifty years and left significant room for free interpretation by policymakers and military leaders. Current rules are applied partially (and with difficulty) in situations that go beyond the rigid classifications established by international conventions and customary law. International law, in particular IHL, is good as long as it dealt with conventional conflict, or with civil war within a single country, but it shows its limits when faced with hybrid conflict. However, current rules may be sufficient to manage unconventional conflicts, but must be strictly respected and applied by all actors. Some governments and international organizations such as the NATO face difficulty using the tools currently available and therefore attempt to overtake IL/IHL by adopting a course of conduct to change de facto current legal framework through customary law. The nature and the scope of IL makes it easy for states to escape from their obligations, in the absence of mandatory constraints and of an effective sanctioning mechanism. Lastly, lexicon and definition of terms are essential, and the international community should find common, undisputed and unambiguous legal formulations for terms such as: conventional/unconventional; traditional/non-traditional; kinetic/non-kinetic; lethal/non-lethal. Interpretations and conclusions This research does not rest on pre-defined hypotheses, but rather relies on the ability to divulge meaning from different elements of research without being bound by pre-existing limitations. While this presents a serious challenge, it does open much room for possible explorations of new fields of research without necessitating a fixed point of departure – or arrival. Findings and conclusions are to be considered provisional. Acknowledgment This study received financial support by the European Social Fund (ESF) and by the Fundação para a Ciência e a Tecnologia (FCT), Portugal, under grant SFRH/BD/136170/2018. The participation in this conference was funded by the Military University Institute (IUM), Armed Forces General Staff (EMGFA), Ministry of National Defence (MDN), Portugal. Disclaimer This abstract is published open access under the CC BY 4.0 license in the FNDU institutional repository "Doria"at with URN http://urn.fi/URN:NBN:fi-fe2020110489302 at https://www.doria.fi/handle/10024/178092. [1] For a definition of the term hybrid conflict, see: Gray, C.S. (2005). Another Bloody Century: Future Warfare, London: Weidenfeld & Nicolson. [2] For a discussion, see: Bederman, D.J. (2004). International Law in Antiquity. Cambridge University Press. [3] For a definition of research methods cited: Given, L.M. (ed.) (2008). The SAGE Encyclopedia of Qualitative Research Methods Vol. 1&2. Los Angeles/London: SAGE.

Revista de Direito Internacional

Sven Peterke

According to the dominant view, the supposedly state-centric concept of war has been successively replaced after the Second World War by the concepts of use of force, aggression, and armed attack in international security law, on the one hand, and the concept(s) of armed conflict in international humanitarian law, on the other. Based on an analysis of post-war codifications, in particular, international human rights law, this article argues that it is yet still too premature to bid farewell to war as a concept that for centuries has shaped the practice and theory of international law. Rather, it should be treated as a dynamic umbrella concept recognizing that non-state actors may be capable of committing acts of war, i.e., armed attacks triggering a state´s inherent right to self-defence. As further explained by the authors, this 21st century concept of war might be located in international law´s general part, thus overstretching its different subareas and without altering the lex s...

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The Changing Nature of World Power

JOSEPH SAMUEL NYE, JR . is director of the Center for Science and International Affairs at the Kennedy School of Government and director of the Center for International Affairs of the Faculty of Arts and Sciences, as well as Ford Foundation Professor of International Security and associate dean for International Affairs at Harvard University. He is the author of numerous books and articles on international affairs and foreign policy. This article draws from his recently published book Bound to Lead: The Changing Nature of American Power (Basic Books, 1990) .

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Joseph S. Nye, The Changing Nature of World Power, Political Science Quarterly , Volume 105, Issue 2, Summer 1990, Pages 177–192, https://doi.org/10.2307/2151022

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The Changing Nature of Conflict: The Need for a Conflict-Sensitive Approach

• First Online: 24 July 2017

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• Sulagna Maitra 3  

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Conflicts and complex emergencies provide the most pervasive context for contemporary humanitarian action as they drive more than 80% of current humanitarian need. Conflicts are a universal feature of society, although every conflict is unique in terms of its actors, causes, consequences and dynamics. For humanitarian organisations

the word ‘conflict’ is usually used with reference to countries where there is politically motivated violence, internally or internationally, and where several parties (e.g. states, communities, political parties or groups) are involved in acting out their disagreement using violence.

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What Responsibilities Does the International Community Have in Complex Humanitarian Crises and Mass Atrocity Situations?

Emergency’s Challenges

War as a Technique of International Conflict Resolution – An Analytical Approach

Global Peace Index ( 2016 ), http://economicsandpeace.org/wp-content/uploads/2016/06/GPI-2016-Report_2.pdf ; UN WHS Secretariat ( 2015 ).

Trocaire ( 2011 ), p. 6, http://www.trocaire.org/resources/policyandadvocacy/conflict-sensitivity-toolkit .

Zicherman et al. ( 2011 ), p. 6. This study surveyed five members of the Conflict Sensitivity Consortium, ActionAid International, CAFOD, CARE International, Plan International and World Vision International.

Id. , p. 9.

Anderson ( 1999 ).

Loane ( 2011 ).

Médecins Sans Frontières ( 2016 , May 5), http://www.msf.org.uk/article/msf-to-pull-out-of-world-humanitarian-summit ; UN Secretary-General ( 2016 ).

In 2015, 75 hospitals managed or supported by Médecins Sans Frontières/Doctors Without Borders (MSF) were bombed.

MSF ( 2016 , May 5) and UN Secretary-General ( 2016 ).

UN Secretary General, ibid .

World Humanitarian Summit ( 2016 ).

Wallensteen ( 2007 ).

The Cold War demonstrated how allies such as the US, UK and USSR who fought a major war together can get locked into a dangerous conflagration within a matter of few years. At the same time, the coming together of two former enemies, Germany and France, under the same bloc showed a potential for reversing the conflict dynamics (Wallensteen 2007 ).

Wallensteen ( 2007 ) and Ramsbotham et al. ( 2011 ).

Galtung ( 1967 ), http://www.transcend.org/files/Galtung_Book_unpub_Theories_of_Peace_-_A_Synthetic_Approach_to_Peace_Thinking_1967.pdf ; Galtung ( 1969 ), pp. 167–191.

Conflict Sensitivity Consortium (Undated), http://www.conflictsensitivity.org/do-no-harm-local-capacities-for-peace-project ; Zicherman et al. ( 2011 ).

Zicherman et al. ( 2011 ).

ICRC ( 2008 ), http://www.icrc.org/eng/assets/files/other/opinion-paper-armed-conflict.pdf .

Lawand ( 2012 ), http://www.icrc.org/eng/resources/documents/interview/2012/12-10-niac-non-international-armed-conflict.htm .

Vite ( 2009 ), pp. 70–94; Human Security Report Project ( 2013 ).

For example, sometimes States tend to play down the intensity of a situation of violence and claim to undertake actions in the name of maintaining public order, see Vite, ibid .

Kalpakian ( 2004 ), p. 193.

Zeitoun and Mirumachi ( 2008 ), pp. 297–316.

Inter Press Service News Agency, Wars, No, Conflicts, Yes, 2007, http://www.globalpolicy.org/component/content/article/198/40379.html .

UCDP, Definitions, http://www.pcr.uu.se/research/ucdp/definitions/ .

Sarkees ( 2011 ), http://cow.la.psu.edu/COW2%20Data/WarData_NEW/COW%20Website%20-%20Typology%20of%20war.pdf .

Sarkees and Schafer ( 2000 ), pp. 123–144.

Human Security Report Project ( 2013 ).

UCDP, Definitions, http://www.pcr.uu.se/research/ucdp/definitions/ , extrasystemic conflicts refer to colonial wars or wars of independence, which occur between governments and non-state groups located outside a State’s own territory. Interstate armed conflicts involve two or more States. Internal armed conflicts are those that take place between the government and non-state groups located within the State or between two non-state actors within one State. It does not involve outside actors. Internationalised internal conflict however, is an internal conflict with intervention from external actors on one or both sides.

HIIK ( 2015 ), http://www.hiik.de/en/konfliktbarometer/pdf/ConflictBarometer_2015.pdf .

Jeong ( 2008 ).

Galtung ( 1967 , 1969 ).

Brahm ( 2003 ), http://www.beyondintractability.org/essay/latent-conflict .

Ibid , citing Wehr, P., Conflict Emergence, http://www.colorado.edu/conflict/peace/problem/cemerge.htm .

Joint Evaluation of Emergency Assistance to Rwanda ( 1996 ), p. 3, http://www.oecd.org/derec/sweden/50189495.pdf .

Deutsch and Coleman ( 2000 ), pp. 428–450.

Deutsch ( 1983 ).

Id ., p. 4.

ICRC ( 2014 ), p. 277.

DG ECHO ( 2015 ), http://ec.europa.eu/echo/what/humanitarian-aid/needs-assessments_en .

Global Peace Index ( 2016 ) and United Nations WHS Secretariat ( 2015 ).

HIIK ( 2015 ).

United Nations WHS Secretariat ( 2015 ).

Global Humanitarian Assistance (GHA) Report ( 2016 ).

Global Peace Index ( 2016 ), http://economicsandpeace.org/wp-content/uploads/2016/06/GPI-2016-Report_2.pdf .

GHA Report ( 2016 ).

PRIO ( 2015 ), http://www.prio.org/Projects/Extensions/ConflictTrends/Graphs/ , accessed on 06 December, 2016.

Uppsala Conflict Data Program ( 2016a , b , c ).

Ramsbotham et al. ( 2011 ).

See www.transcend.org for a comprehensive bibliography of Galtung’s publications on peace and conflict research.

Galtung ( 1971 ), pp. 173–206.

Ibid .; Galtung ( 1971 ).

Ibid .; Ramsbotham et al. ( 2011 ).

SDC ( 2005 ), http://www.css.ethz.ch/content/dam/ethz/special-interest/gess/cis/center-for-securities-studies/pdfs/Conflict-Analysis-Tools.pdf .

Trocaire ( 2011 ).

OECD ( 2012 ).

Zeitoun and Mirumachi ( 2008 ).

Conflict Sensitivity Consortium , Introduction, http://www.conflictsensitivity.org/an-introduction-to-conflict-sensitivity-3/ .

Id ., p. 3.

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Maitra, S. (2018). The Changing Nature of Conflict: The Need for a Conflict-Sensitive Approach. In: Heintze, HJ., Thielbörger, P. (eds) International Humanitarian Action. Springer, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-14454-2_4

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The Character of War Is Constantly Changing

The U.S. Navy and Marine Corps face daunting times, particularly with the return of great power competition. The known is becoming unknown; the predictable, unpredictable. Surprise at every level is likely—technical, tactical, operational, strategic. Organizations and people who can rapidly and effectively adapt are more likely to prevail; those who cannot, will fail. This, perhaps, is why the old warning not to fight the last war should resonate. 2

Prevailing against the capable and powerful opponents that are emerging demands the Department of the Navy (DoN) up its game—it must get better at all aspects of war, from political and strategic thinking through plans and procurement to tactics and techniques. Getting better means thinking and doing differently. Business as usual will no longer suffice.

War is changing at a dramatic rate and scope. Knowledge gained from one’s own experiences informs a shrinking portion of the emerging reality. The DoN must look elsewhere for insights and guidance. This generation’s predecessors looked to history and theory, even in periods of dramatic technological change, geostrategic upheaval, and economic dislocation. Indeed, it was because of such changes that they turned to history. 3

Naval leaders must come to grips with how the character of war (how war is fought) is changing within the context of the enduring nature of war (the human element: a politically guided clash of actively opposed wills). 4 Understanding and action must be rooted in accepting that war’s fundamental nature shapes and constrains the phenomenon, and that its character flows from and interacts with war’s human dimensions. To do otherwise is to risk basing plans, hopes, and the security of the nation and world on a tenuous footing. 5

The old ways are rapidly being supplemented by new ones; legacy organizations, processes, and thought are increasingly at odds with emerging conditions. A return to thinking holistically about war, its nature, its character—indeed, its long history—and the demands it places on nations and military professionals is called for.

Comprehending the future of war will require not only technical, tactical, and bureaucratic mastery, but also a deep understanding of war as a total construct. Because of the changes that are increasingly moving war away from the known and into the unknown, the unforeseen will become the norm. This will place a premium on institutional abilities to handle surprises and adapt to rapidly shifting realities.

Russia’s recent invasion of Ukraine has ended a long period of peace—one that saw dramatic changes in technology, global trade and integration (particularly via telecommunications and social media), and, consequently, societal expectations. Few people today have experienced war between great powers. The return of great power competition is the driving trend today and brings with it all aspects of a changing character of war. 6

How today’s military—and U.S. naval forces in particular—will deal with the changes and prepare for a radically different security environment are pressing questions. It is not the most experienced minds that will win in the future, but the most flexible and adaptable; it is not the biggest, best-funded bureaucracy that will win, but the most agile and versatile.

War’s Incessantly Changing Character

“War’s nature is violent, interactive between opposing wills, and driven by politics. War’s character, its conduct, constantly evolves under the influence of technology, moral forces (law or ethics), culture, and military culture, which also change across time and place.” 7

Commentators, analysts, and even military professionals frequently conflate the lasting nature of war with the ever-changing character of war. While this might seem a trivial distinction, it is not. The fundamental nature of war—as defined by Carl von Clausewitz in On War —is the clash of actively opposed wills comprised of violence, chance, and rational thought. 8 By comparison, war’s character is rapidly and continuously evolving. Technology, societal expectations and culture, geostrategic dynamics, doctrine, economics, trade, and even history all combine to shape war in a given era.

Failure to distinguish between war’s nature and character encourages viewing it as something it is not. Such failures have significant and negative impacts on militaries—both in the preparation and the conduct of war. For example, failing to account for the human element (and the derivative elements of chance, friction, fear, and uncertainty) may lead militaries to believe that chaos and confusion can be designed out of war, or that the next technological development will ensure victory, or that forces can be employed with perfect efficiency, controlled by all-knowing but distant commanders. War’s intrinsic human element and all the uncertainty it introduces lay bare the fallacy of such beliefs.

Today, accelerating change is making itself felt across all aspects of war’s character—and not just in each element, but also in the interactions between those elements. The reemergence of great power competition is rapidly altering the geostrategic landscape; the possibility of war between powers at the top of the global pecking order brings with it many new factors that have been ignored for the past 30 years: technical equivalence, the return of mass, the end of air and sea sanctuary, and the reality of weapons of mass destruction.

Technology—military and commercial—offers new capabilities to combatants, from enhanced decision aids to unmanned/robotic platforms, to drone swarms. The maturation of artificial intelligence, big data and data analytics, machine learning, and digital twins herald what the Chinese term “cognitive warfare” as a new domain of war. 9 Even more cutting-edge innovations, such as human enhancements, nano- technologies, advances in materials science, and high-power/density energy sources, bring into sharp relief the scope and pace of changes in the character of war. 10 As with most tools of war, these capabilities offer a double-edged sword. Cyber weapons, information warfare, and cheap, easy-to-use, effective weapons offer opportunities to exploit as well as vulnerabilities to defend.

A significant part of the technological revolution is the omnipresence of social media. The war in Ukraine showcases this in surprising ways. Despite decades of wars around the world in the internet era, this conflict pits two tech-capable adversaries against each other. The battle to shape domestic, enemy, and global opinion is emerging as a significant element of modern war. This battle is taking place in a new environment, where private companies are direct actors: Elon Musk’s Starlink services are helping Ukrainians stay online, facilitating the social media battle. 11 More broadly, the growing role of social media also is a double-edged sword. Not only does it allow immediate reporting of events, but it also opens the door for sophisticated propaganda that can sway populations. The potential to manipulate an adversary’s population will be balanced by how savvy—or (more cynically) how distrusting—those populations are, as well as government efforts to counter enemy information campaigns.

In addition, the evolving nature of globalized trade and its associated finance mechanisms and economic integration offer opportunities and vulnerabilities in military planning. As Nicholas Lambert has argued, today’s global economic system is more like that existing in 1914 than in 1939. The Navy is unlikely to enjoy such a clear anticommerce battlefield as it did in World War II in a future war. Neutrals will abound. On the other hand, the global system offers a new role for sea power in interdicting enemy trade. The integrated nature of the economy—with just-in-time manufacturing and shipping—sends ripples up the supply chain when any element is disrupted. If, as Lambert argues, the British strategy of hobbling the German economy in the summer of 1914 was going to work in months, today’s much faster, more connected world may see such impacts in days or weeks. 12

At the same time, legacy elements of war remain valid—implying that in addition to adopting new processes and structures, the DoN must also reinvigorate and renovate existing ones. 13 The stalled Russian offensive in Ukraine may well demonstrate the end of the operational offensive or the weakness of a conscript army, as some argue, but it may also underscore the impact of incompetence, poor planning, poor leadership, and slavish dedication to established doctrine. 14

A different take on the Russo-Ukraine war may be that a combined-arms force remains central to future war—but it must be supported by effective networks, surveillance, countersurveillance, air power, cognitive warfare, logistics, and agile doctrine. More significantly, this war emphasizes the critical importance of leadership, education, training, and organization shaped by the need for agility of intellect and operations, decentralization of authority to decide and act, and versatility in the face of uncertainty.

The character of war is evolving at an extraordinary rate. The pace of change casts military strategists adrift from previous thought. This is particularly true for the Sea Services. The U.S. Navy has not fought a capable foe at sea since 1945. 15 The staggering breadth of change in every domain and at every level since that time poses significant challenges to naval thinking. Naval leaders at the turn of the last century realized that their experiences could not help them anticipate where war was headed. But unlike today, that Navy turned to history and naval theory to inform decisions about the future. The result flowed from works such as Alfred T. Mahan’s 1890 seminal work, The Influence of Seapower Upon History , and ultimately guided the Navy to victory in World War II. In today’s environment of change and uncertainty, there is wisdom in turning to history for insight. In this way, history, too, is a factor in the changing character of war. 16

Implications

The rapidly evolving character of war has significant implications for the Sea Services. As with every major war in the past, tomorrow’s competitions and conflicts will need new doctrine, new organizations, and new service cultures to prevail.

In the face of these changes, experiences in the Cold War and the various hot wars since 1991 will be inadequate. Recourse to historical examples can supplement experience and understanding. This, in turn, raises the need to reinvigorate the development and study of military—and naval—theory. As Jon Sumida has argued, both Clausewitz and Mahan developed theory not as a checklist for fighting, but as a tool for filling in the gaps, for allowing students to empathize with decisions in past wars, and to hone their judgment for when the test comes. 17

Effectiveness in the give and take of technological competition will be an essential element of military capability. This may seem obvious, but the character of that competition is changing. First, the U.S. military increasingly competes against peer competitors, not just their proxies. The term “peer competitor” implies an adversary who can acquire the same or better capabilities. Consequently, the U.S. military can no longer take for granted technological superiority. Second, competition at this level means that time and tempo matter in technological developments. Developing and fielding technology must happen more quickly. Third, how adversaries develop and employ technology will differ from U.S. approaches to the same technology. Understanding adversary strategic culture and approaches will be essential. 18 Fourth, an era of peer competition means that any technological advantages gained will be temporary. The playing field is more level, which means that reliance on technical advantage will not be sufficient. 19 This, in turn, puts a premium on the ability of institutions and individuals to think and adapt quickly. Even as technology offers stunning new capabilities (and threats), the human element remains essential.

A more fundamental implication of the changing character of war is that once again Americans are in a long-term competition between systems, each holding up its own version of global order. This is driving the need for a national consensus on an enduring grand strategy that balances the requirement for sustained national security against the unfinished work on our democracy at home. It will require a whole-of-government approach to competition—the military alone, or even chiefly, cannot solve new strategic dilemmas. Factors long ignored will once again be important: improving the U.S. education system, stoking advantages in knowledge capital, bringing critical manufacturing capability back onshore, overhauling the immigration system, and rebuilding infrastructure. The United States and its allies offer significant strengths in the competition against the rising authoritarian powers. At issue is how well the nation can bring those tools to bear and how long it can sustain the effort.

The need for organizational reform is amplified by the changing character of war as well. In an era in which the adversary is capable, speed is important in everything. Current U.S. military bureaucratic processes have evolved over the past 30 years, with a focus on high efficiency and in an environment where time and tempo were of less importance. Reforming them will involve process change and organizational overhaul, which means fundamental reform of acquisition, careful attention to joint military organizations, a hard look at operational commands and staff processes, and enhanced government–industry teaming.

War’s evolving character also places a heavy demand on military training (preparing for the expected) and education (preparing for the unexpected). The uncertainty surrounding how war is evolving means that military professionals will need to have a firm foundation in theory and history as well as in tactics and techniques. Education will need to broaden and deepen, while training will have to accelerate.

Finally, the U.S. military in general—and the Navy–Marine Corps team in particular—must emphasize intellectual agility, maximize operational fluidity, improve its ability to assess and handle risk, and, in the end, learn how to fight adversaries with greater numbers and better technology. Such changes will bring the need to rethink doctrine, to test new doctrine in games and exercises, and to continuously adapt. And finally, the U.S. military will require toughness in the face of adversity unlike any it has seen in decades. It will have to learn how to fight back after defeat and setback. In wars of necessity, the option of packing up and going home no longer exists.

Adapting Forward

A new era of warfare is upon us, and myriad emerging technologies will help define how wars will be fought in the future. What is less understood is that many other factors are contributing to the flow of change. Moreover, America’s long-standing faith in technology as a solver of operational and strategic problems, combined with a confidence bordering on hubris regarding recent military experience, tends to minimize the importance of the interaction between the nature of war and its character. 20

The U.S. military insists on casting war as it would wish it to be vice as it is. Belief in the power of information technology to allow efficient application of force—with lower echelons being merely executors of plans devised and managed above them—persists. There is little discussion of the chaos of war, leaving little room for surprise, chance, uncertainty, and fear. As a result, while there are doctrinal statements alluding to the need for low-level initiative and decision making, the reality is that these qualities are often ignored if not discouraged. 21

Resetting U.S. military thinking about war has become an urgent mission. The U.S. Navy, Marine Corps, and their joint service partners must reevaluate all aspects of organization, procurement, training, and operations to align with new realities. For the first time in more than a century, the United States faces the possibility of fighting a war of necessity , outnumbered against very capable adversaries, and under the threat of nuclear weapons. This will require an approach that is starkly different from the technology-centric style to which the military has become accustomed.

Versatility, speed and tempo, individual initiative, and decentralization, along with a comprehensive understanding of what war is and how to integrate the myriad elements of national power to a given purpose, are the keys to prevailing in these challenging times. In short, the Sea Services must adapt to the new realities of war. Doing so will require a deep understanding of both its fundamental nature and its changing character in the coming era.

1. U.S Marine Corps, FMFM 1, Warfighting (Washington: Headquarters, U.S. Marine Corps, 1989), 6 and 64. Williamson Murray singles out Warfighting as one of the few service doctrinal statements worth reading in America and the Future of War: The Past as Prologue (Stanford, CA: Hoover Institution Press, 2017), p. 34.

2. General Douglas MacArthur once said, “New conditions require, for solution … new and imaginative methods. Wars are never won in the past.” MacArthur’s point is that slavish adherence to past experiences and doctrine will be ill-suited in a new war. Cited by Frank Hoffman in “The Changing Character of Warfare: The ‘Four Faces’ of the Future,” a brief presented to the Swedish Defense University, 8 March 2022.

3. John B. Hattendorf, “History and Technological Change: The Study of History in the U.S. Navy, 1873–1890,” in his Naval History and Maritime Strategy: Collected Essays (Malabar, FL: Krieger Publishing Company, 2000).

4. Carl von Clausewitz was the first theorist to distinguish between war’s fundamental nature as a human clash of actively opposed wills and its character in any given era. See On War , ed. & trans. by Michael Howard and Peter Paret (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1976), book I, chapter 1, 88-89.

5. Alan Beyerchen, “Clausewitz, Nonlinearity, and the Unpredictability of War,” International Security , Vol. 17, no. 3 (Winter 1992/93), 50-90. Beyerchen argues that chance and uncertainty (stemming from the human element in war) are not just part of war but are intrinsic to it. The interactions stemming from chance are nonlinear and unpredictable. Any theory of—or approach to—war that downplays this dynamic fails to account for war as it is. A superb analysis of Beyerchen’s work is in Jon Tetsuro Sumida, Decoding Clausewitz: A New Approach to On War (Lawrence, KS: University of Kansas Press, 2008), 112–116.

6. See for example, CAPT Sam J. Tangredi, USN (Ret.), “Relearn the Lessons of Desert Shield/Desert Storm,” U.S. Naval Institute Proceedings 148, no.3 (March 2022).

7. LtCol Frank G. Hoffman, USMCR (Ret.), “Will War’s Nature Change in the Seventh Military Revolution?” The US Army War College Quarterly: Parameters (Winter 2017): 23.

8. Clausewitz, On War , 89.

9. Discussion with Jason Bruzdzinski at MITRE, 19 March 2022. See also Yuan-Chou Jing, “How Does China Aim to Use AI in Warfare,” The Diplomat , 28 December 2021, and Jeffrey Engstrom, Systems Confrontation and System Destruction Warfare: How the Chinese People’s Liberation Army Seeks to Wage Modern Warfare (Santa Monica, CA, RAND, 2018).

10. LtCol Hoffman, “The Changing Character of Warfare.” See also Hoffman, “Will War’s Nature Change in the Seventh Military Revolution?” 21.

11. Musk’s activities in this arena have been widely reported. See, for example, Sam Raskin, “Elon Musk Activates Starlink in Ukraine After Vice Prime Minister’s Plea,” New York Post , 27 February 2022.

12. This argument is based on discussions with Dr. Nicholas Lambert as well as his published work. Lambert argues for the importance of economic warfare as a U.S. Navy mission, one that is fundamentally different than what it executed against Japan in World War II. For more in-depth consideration, see, “What Real Economic Warfare Looked Like,” The Wall Street Journal , 18 March 2022, and “What Is a Navy For?” U.S. Naval Institute Proceedings 147, no.4 (April, 2021); and his Planning Armageddon: British Economic Warfare and the First World War (Boston: Harvard University Press, 2012).

13. The author wishes to thank Paul Giarra for pointing out the distinction between reforming for the new and renovating the old.

14. John Q. Bolton and Andrew Senesac, “Does Ukraine Spell the Death of the Operational-Level Offense?” Small Wars Journal , 17 March 2022.

15. Some would argue that the Cold War face-off between the U.S. and Soviet navies constituted war. This author does not hold with that argument. First, Clausewitz argued that war is based on armed violence, not threats alone ( On War , 87). Second, while the Cold War naval competition was fraught with danger and knife-edged brinkmanship—and required consummate skill and dedication of its participants—it did not witness the violence and death of actual combat.

16. Alfred Thayer Mahan, The Influence of Sea Power Upon History, 1660–1783 , 12th ed. (Boston: Little, Brown & Co., 1943; originally published 1890). Trent Hone, Learning War: The Evolution of Fighting Doctrine in the U.S. Navy, 1898–1945 , (Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press, 2018).

17. Jon Tetsuro Sumida, Inventing Grand Strategy and Teaching Command: The Classic Works of Alfred Thayer Mahan Reconsidered (Baltimore, MD: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1997), and Sumida, Decoding Clausewitz .

18. According to Williamson Murray, this is a significant challenge for a U.S. decisionmaking and military establishment that is largely ignorant of its adversaries. See America and the Future of War , 44 and 118. The latter page references a quote from General James Mattis on the importance of studying military history and adversary cultures.

19. Mick Ryan, War Transformed: The Future of Twenty-First Century Great Power Competition and Conflict (Annapolis, MD: U.S. Naval Institute Press, 2022), p. 6. The ephemeral nature of technological advantage is underscored by both Martin van Creveld in Technology and War From 2000 B.C. to the Present , (New York: The Free Press, 1989) 228) and Edward Luttwak in Strategy: The Logic of War and Peace (Cambridge, MA: The Belknap Press, 1987) 29ff.

20. Murray, America and the Future of War , 29–32.

21. In addition to the Marine Corps’ older FMFM 1, Warfighting statement, see Joint Pub 3-0, Joint Operations , 11 August 2011, and Gen. Martin E. Dempsey, USA, “Mission Command White Paper,” 3 April 2012.

Captain Gerard Roncolato, U.S. Navy (Retired)

Captain Roncolato commanded the USS The Sullivans (DDG-68) and Destroyer Squadron 26. Since retiring from the Navy, he has focused on strategy and crew training as a consultant.

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How to answer an Edexcel exam question on socialism

You could get asked two questions on socialism in Paper 1. There is no guarantee that the two questions will be on more than one idea. All questions start with ‘To what extent…?’, so they are looking for you to evaluate the extent of agreement or disagreement.

Question topics

Questions will focus on the agreement and disagreement within the various strands. In socialism this is more complex, as you have three strands: revolutionary (Marxist), social democracy and the Third Way. Within these strands you also have division over the means (how to achieve goals) and ends (what kind of society you are trying to create). Do not worry about the strands within social democracy — you do not need to explore the difference between democratic socialism and social democracy. Questions may ask generally about agreement or disagreement between strands or will focus on specific areas such as the state. Make sure you are clear which type of question you are answering.

Divisions in socialism

·          Human nature: How collectivist is human nature? How important is the concept of common humanity ? To what extent are we the product of our environment? Marxists examine how human nature is damaged by capitalist society, but supporters of the Third Way believe that individuals can flourish within the globalised free market.

·         Society : Revolution or evolution as a means to achieve goals? Are socialists aiming for a completely equal society (in economic terms) or a more equal society? Socialists do not agree on what is meant by equality: while revolutionaries want social equality, social democrats wish to narrow the gap and Third Way supporters favour equal opportunities and reducing poverty.

·         State : Should the state — as a tool of the bourgeoisie, according to revolutionary socialists — be abolished by revolutionary means? Or, as social democrats believe, can you use the neutral state to achieve equality of outcome using intervention, such as nationalisation and progressive taxation?

·          Economy: Should capitalism be abolished via revolution or other means? Or can it be tamed and regulated, and economic growth used to help the many and not the few? Third Way supporters go even further and pragmatically support the free market.

Introduction

These essays are quite short (Edexcel 24 marks so about 25-30 minutes) So a one or two-line introduction will do. E xplain the debate, e.g.:

Although all socialists agree that society should be much more equal, there is significant disagreement over how to achieve it and what exactly it would mean.

Then add your line of argument, e.g.:

The divisions within socialism over the role of the state far outweigh the areas of agreement.

Socialists used to disagree significantly over the means of achieving their goals — revolution or evolution — but there is now much less disagreement, as revolutionary socialism has been discredited.

This is AO3, and must not be left to your conclusion — the examiner will expect to see it throughout the essay.

Main body of essay

The danger here is that you focus on the areas of division, as there are so many within socialism. Another hazard is that you simply describe the three strands in separate paragraphs and lose focus on the question until your conclusion. As all questions ask ‘To what extent…?’ you must look at agreement as well as disagreement (AO2). If your line of argument is that there is more disagreement than agreement, then start with a paragraph highlighting all the areas socialists agree on, in relation to the topic.

Use an agree disagree sandwich. This means three paragraphs in the main body of your essay with agree/disagree/agree or disagree/ agree/ disagree- depending on your line of argument. Your middle paragraph i.e. the line you are not arguing should be qualified - e.g distance yourself with phrases like 'It can be argued....' and end the middle paragraph with a restatement of your line. e.g 'Granted there are some differences/agreements  over ........however more fundamental differences/ agreements are 

 Add in a key thinker.

Areas of agreement:

·        A critique of capitalism as fundamentally damaging to human nature and society.

·        Common humanity and cooperation are natural.

·        A belief that inequality is not due to differing ability or effort but is the result of the fundamentally unfair structure of a society based on inherited privilege.

·        The plasticity, sociability and malleability of human nature — a positive and optimistic view of the possibility of improvement and the role of our surroundings in creating our personalities.

·        Equality of outcome — the need to eradicate or narrow the gap between rich and poor to ensure fairness, freedom and justice for all.

Finish your paragraph with a clear judgement (AO3) and link back to the exact wording of the question, such as:

Although there are significant areas of agreement over capitalism, the areas of disagreement between the strands are much more significant.

Then move onto the areas of division and pick out 2–3 significant aspects to write on. Use key thinkers to show contrast, e.g.:

Marx argued that capitalism created two classes, whose interests were utterly in conflict and irreconcilable. However, Crosland, writing in the mid-twentieth century, updated this view to argue that there was now a large and growing managerial class in the middle, and that instead of focusing on capitalism, socialists should focus on how to create a more equal society using progressive taxation and a generous welfare state.

Differences within socialism

Make sure you use the Edexcel specification terminology. For example, ‘bourgeoisie and proletariat’ is much more accurate than ‘rich and poor’ or ‘upper and lower class’.

Integrating the thinkers

You need to cite at least two thinkers or your mark will be capped. Three would be wiser. Use them to support and explain your ideas, rather than adding them to the end of a paragraph as an afterthought. For example, you can use Marx’s analysis of capitalism to explain the revolutionary socialist approach to the economy. Beatrice Webb is useful, as she bridges the gap between revolutionary and evolutionary socialism, rejecting violence and revolution but seeking radical alternatives to capitalism. She could be used to show how socialists agree in terms of their analysis of capitalism, even if they don’t agree on methods.

Do I need examples?

It is not necessary to include recent examples in socialism, such as Bernie Sanders or Jeremy Corbyn. There is probably no time, although you could include them in a conclusion if linked to the question, for example mentioning Sanders to show how Third Way ideas have not necessarily triumphed. Examples can be used to develop your AO2 evaluation and analysis points, such as showing how the creation of the welfare state by the postwar Labour government demonstrates how social democrats used the mixed economy and state intervention in order to create a more equal society. That said, you are very limited for time and it is much more important to include the key thinkers.

Do not sit on the fence. To get those AO3 marks you cannot argue that there is both disagreement and agreement. For example:

Socialists do agree that capitalism is deeply flawed and damaging to human nature and society. Therefore the agreement is more significant than the disagreement, which focuses on the alternatives.

clearly comes down on the side of agreement. You will have already mentioned your viewpoint in the introduction and in each paragraph, so it should not come as any surprise to the examiner.

How to write an essay on socialism and common humanity