thesis for korean war

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The korean war 101: causes, course, and conclusion of the conflict.

North Korea attacked South Korea on June 25, 1950, igniting the Korean War. Cold War assumptions governed the immediate reaction of US leaders, who instantly concluded that Soviet Premier Joseph Stalin had ordered the invasion as the first step in his plan for world conquest. “Communism,” President Harry S. Truman argued later in his memoirs, “was acting in Korea just as [Adolf] Hitler, [Benito] Mussolini, and the Japanese had acted ten, fifteen, and twenty years earlier.” If North Korea’s aggression went “unchallenged, the world was certain to be plunged into another world war.” This 1930s history lesson prevented Truman from recognizing that the origins of this conflict dated to at least the start of World War II, when Korea was a colony of Japan. Liberation in August 1945 led to division and a predictable war because the US and the Soviet Union would not allow the Korean people to decide their own future.

Before 1941, the US had no vital interests in Korea and was largely indifferent to its fate.

Before 1941, the US had no vital interests in Korea and was largely in- different to its fate. But after Pearl Harbor, President Franklin D. Roosevelt and his advisors acknowledged at once the importance of this strategic peninsula for peace in Asia, advocating a postwar trusteeship to achieve Korea’s independence. Late in 1943, Roosevelt joined British Prime Minister Winston Churchill and Chinese Generalissimo Chiang Kaishek in signing the Cairo Declaration, stating that the Allies “are determined that in due course Korea shall become free and independent.” At the Yalta Conference in early 1945, Stalin endorsed a four-power trusteeship in Korea. When Harry S. Truman became president after Roosevelt’s death in April 1945, however, Soviet expansion in Eastern Europe had begun to alarm US leaders. An atomic attack on Japan, Truman thought, would preempt Soviet entry into the Pacific War and allow unilateral American occupation of Korea. His gamble failed. On August 8, Stalin declared war on Japan and sent the Red Army into Korea. Only Stalin’s acceptance of Truman’s eleventh-hour proposal to divide the peninsula into So- viet and American zones of military occupation at the thirty-eighth parallel saved Korea from unification under Communist rule.

Deterioration of Soviet-American relations in Europe meant that neither side was willing to acquiesce in any agreement in Korea that might strengthen its adversary.

US military occupation of southern Korea began on September 8, 1945. With very little preparation, Washing- ton redeployed the XXIV Corps under the command of Lieutenant General John R. Hodge from Okinawa to Korea. US occupation officials, ignorant of Korea’s history and culture, quickly had trouble maintaining order because al- most all Koreans wanted immediate in- dependence. It did not help that they followed the Japanese model in establishing an authoritarian US military government. Also, American occupation officials relied on wealthy land- lords and businessmen who could speak English for advice. Many of these citizens were former Japanese collaborators and had little interest in ordinary Koreans’ reform demands. Meanwhile, Soviet military forces in northern Korea, after initial acts of rape, looting, and petty crime, implemented policies to win popular support. Working with local people’s committees and indigenous Communists, Soviet officials enacted sweeping political, social, and economic changes. They also expropriated and punished landlords and collaborators, who fled southward and added to rising distress in the US zone. Simultaneously, the Soviets ignored US requests to coordinate occupation policies and allow free traffic across the parallel.

Deterioration of Soviet-American relations in Europe meant that neither side was willing to acquiesce in any agreement in Korea that might strengthen its adversary. This became clear when the US and the Soviet Union tried to implement a revived trusteeship plan after the Moscow Conference in December 1945. Eighteen months of intermittent bilateral negotiations in Korea failed to reach agreement on a representative group of Koreans to form a provisional government, primarily because Moscow refused to consult with anti-Communist politicians opposed to trustee- ship. Meanwhile, political instability and economic deterioration in southern Korea persisted, causing Hodge to urge withdrawal. Postwar US demobilization that brought steady reductions in defense spending fueled pressure for disengagement. In September 1947, the Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS) added weight to the withdrawal argument when they advised that Korea held no strategic significance. With Communist power growing in China, however, the Truman administration was unwilling to abandon southern Korea precipitously, fearing domestic criticism from Republicans and damage to US credibility abroad.

Seeking an answer to its dilemma, the US referred the Korean dispute to the United Nations, which passed a resolution late in 1947 calling for internationally supervised elections for a government to rule a united Korea. Truman and his advisors knew the Soviets would refuse to cooper- ate. Discarding all hope for early reunification, US policy by then had shifted to creating a separate South Korea, able to defend itself. Bowing to US pressure, the United Nations supervised and certified as valid obviously undemocratic elections in the south alone in May 1948, which resulted in formation of the Republic of Korea (ROK) in August. The Soviet Union responded in kind, sponsoring the creation of the Democratic People’s Re- public of Korea (DPRK) in September. There now were two Koreas, with President Syngman Rhee installing a repressive, dictatorial, and anti-Communist regime in the south, while wartime guerrilla leader Kim Il Sung imposed the totalitarian Stalinist model for political, economic, and social development on the north. A UN resolution then called for Soviet-American withdrawal. In December 1948, the Soviet Union, in response to the DPRK’s request, removed its forces from North Korea.

South Korea’s new government immediately faced violent opposition, climaxing in October 1948 with the Yosu-Sunchon Rebellion. Despite plans to leave the south by the end of 1948, Truman delayed military withdrawal until June 29, 1949. By then, he had approved National Security Council (NSC) Paper 8/2, undertaking a commitment to train, equip, and supply an ROK security force capable of maintaining internal order and deterring a DPRK attack. In spring 1949, US military advisors supervised a dramatic improvement in ROK army fighting abilities. They were so successful that militant South Korean officers began to initiate assaults northward across the thirty-eighth parallel that summer. These attacks ignited major border clashes with North Korean forces. A kind of war was already underway on the peninsula when the conventional phase of Korea’s conflict began on June 25, 1950. Fears that Rhee might initiate an offensive to achieve reunification explain why the Truman administration limited ROK military capabilities, withholding tanks, heavy artillery, and warplanes.

Pursuing qualified containment in Korea, Truman asked Congress for three-year funding of economic aid to the ROK in June 1949. To build sup- port for its approval, on January 12, 1950, Secretary of State Dean G. Ache- son’s speech to the National Press Club depicted an optimistic future for South Korea. Six months later, critics charged that his exclusion of the ROK from the US “defensive perimeter” gave the Communists a “green light” to launch an invasion. However, Soviet documents have established that Acheson’s words had almost no impact on Communist invasion planning. Moreover, by June 1950, the US policy of containment in Korea through economic means appeared to be experiencing marked success. The ROK had acted vigorously to control spiraling inflation, and Rhee’s opponents won legislative control in May elections. As important, the ROK army virtually eliminated guerrilla activities, threatening internal order in South Korea, causing the Truman administration to propose a sizeable military aid increase. Now optimistic about the ROK’s prospects for survival, Washington wanted to deter a conventional attack from the north.

Stalin worried about South Korea’s threat to North Korea’s survival. Throughout 1949, he consistently refused to approve Kim Il Sung’s persistent requests to authorize an attack on the ROK. Communist victory in China in fall 1949 pressured Stalin to show his support for a similar Korean outcome. In January 1950, he and Kim discussed plans for an invasion in Moscow, but the Soviet dictator was not ready to give final consent. How- ever, he did authorize a major expansion of the DPRK’s military capabilities. At an April meeting, Kim Il Sung persuaded Stalin that a military victory would be quick and easy because of southern guerilla support and an anticipated popular uprising against Rhee’s regime. Still fearing US military intervention, Stalin informed Kim that he could invade only if Mao Zedong approved. During May, Kim Il Sung went to Beijing to gain the consent of the People’s Republic of China (PRC). Significantly, Mao also voiced concern that the Americans would defend the ROK but gave his reluctant approval as well. Kim Il Sung’s patrons had joined in approving his reckless decision for war.

On the morning of June 25, 1950, the Korean People’s Army (KPA) launched its military offensive to conquer South Korea. Rather than immediately committing ground troops, Truman’s first action was to approve referral of the matter to the UN Security Council because he hoped the ROK military could defend itself with primarily indirect US assistance. The UN Security Council’s first resolution called on North Korea to accept a cease- fire and withdraw, but the KPA continued its advance. On June 27, a second resolution requested that member nations provide support for the ROK’s defense. Two days later, Truman, still optimistic that a total commitment was avoidable, agreed in a press conference with a newsman’s description of the conflict as a “police action.” His actions reflected an existing policy that sought to block Communist expansion in Asia without using US military power, thereby avoiding increases in defense spending. But early on June 30, he reluctantly sent US ground troops to Korea after General Douglas MacArthur, US Occupation commander in Japan, advised that failure to do so meant certain Communist destruction of the ROK.

Kim Il Sung’s patrons [Stalin and Mao] had joined in approving his reckless decision for war.

On July 7, 1950, the UN Security Council created the United Nations Command (UNC) and called on Truman to appoint a UNC commander. The president immediately named MacArthur, who was required to submit periodic reports to the United Nations on war developments. The ad- ministration blocked formation of a UN committee that would have direct access to the UNC commander, instead adopting a procedure whereby MacArthur received instructions from and reported to the JCS. Fifteen members joined the US in defending the ROK, but 90 percent of forces were South Korean and American with the US providing weapons, equipment, and logistical support. Despite these American commitments, UNC forces initially suffered a string of defeats. By July 20, the KPA shattered five US battalions as it advanced one hundred miles south of Seoul, the ROK capital. Soon, UNC forces finally stopped the KPA at the Pusan Perimeter, a rectangular area in the southeast corner of the peninsula.

On September 11, 1950, Truman had approved NSC-81, a plan to cross the thirty-eighth parallel and forcibly reunify Korea

Despite the UNC’s desperate situation during July, MacArthur developed plans for a counteroffensive in coordination with an amphibious landing behind enemy lines allowing him to “compose and unite” Korea. State Department officials began to lobby for forcible reunification once the UNC assumed the offensive, arguing that the US should destroy the KPA and hold free elections for a government to rule a united Korea. The JCS had grave doubts about the wisdom of landing at the port of Inchon, twenty miles west of Seoul, because of narrow access, high tides, and sea- walls, but the September 15 operation was a spectacular success. It allowed the US Eighth Army to break out of the Pusan Perimeter and advance north to unite with the X Corps, liberating Seoul two weeks later and sending the KPA scurrying back into North Korea. A month earlier, the administration had abandoned its initial war aim of merely restoring the status quo. On September 11, 1950, Truman had approved NSC-81, a plan to cross the thirty-eighth parallel and forcibly reunify Korea.

Invading the DPRK was an incredible blunder that transformed a three-month war into one lasting three years. US leaders had realized that extension of hostilities risked Soviet or Chinese entry, and therefore, NSC- 81 included the precaution that only Korean units would move into the most northern provinces. On October 2, PRC Foreign Minister Zhou Enlai warned the Indian ambassador that China would intervene in Korea if US forces crossed the parallel, but US officials thought he was bluffing. The UNC offensive began on October 7, after UN passage of a resolution authorizing MacArthur to “ensure conditions of stability throughout Korea.” At a meeting at Wake Island on October 15, MacArthur assured Truman that China would not enter the war, but Mao already had decided to intervene after concluding that Beijing could not tolerate US challenges to its regional credibility. He also wanted to repay the DPRK for sending thou- sands of soldiers to fight in the Chinese civil war. On August 5, Mao instructed his northeastern military district commander to prepare for operations in Korea in the first ten days of September. China’s dictator then muted those associates opposing intervention.

On October 19, units of the Chinese People’s Volunteers (CPV) under the command of General Peng Dehuai crossed the Yalu River. Five days later, MacArthur ordered an offensive to China’s border with US forces in the vanguard. When the JCS questioned this violation of NSC-81, MacArthur replied that he had discussed this action with Truman on Wake Island. Having been wrong in doubting Inchon, the JCS remained silent this time. Nor did MacArthur’s superiors object when he chose to retain a divided command. Even after the first clash between UNC and CPV troops on October 26, the general remained supremely confident. One week later, the Chinese sharply attacked advancing UNC and ROK forces. In response, MacArthur ordered air strikes on Yalu bridges without seeking Washing- ton’s approval. Upon learning this, the JCS prohibited the assaults, pending Truman’s approval. MacArthur then asked that US pilots receive permission for “hot pursuit” of enemy aircraft fleeing into Manchuria. He was infuriated upon learning that the British were advancing a UN proposal to halt the UNC offensive well short of the Yalu to avert war with China, viewing the measure as appeasement.

On November 24, MacArthur launched his “Home-by-Christmas Offensive.” The next day, the CPV counterattacked en masse, sending UNC forces into a chaotic retreat southward and causing the Truman administration immediately to consider pursuing a Korean cease-fire. In several public pronouncements, MacArthur blamed setbacks not on himself but on unwise command limitations. In response, Truman approved a directive to US officials that State Department approval was required for any comments about the war. Later that month, MacArthur submitted a four- step “Plan for Victory” to defeat the Communists—a naval blockade of China’s coast, authorization to bombard military installations in Manchuria, deployment of Chiang Kai-shek Nationalist forces in Korea, and launching of an attack on mainland China from Taiwan. The JCS, despite later denials, considered implementing these actions before receiving favorable battlefield reports.

Early in 1951, Lieutenant General Matthew B. Ridgway, new commander of the US Eighth Army, halted the Communist southern advance. Soon, UNC counterattacks restored battle lines north of the thirty-eighth parallel. In March, MacArthur, frustrated by Washington’s refusal to escalate the war, issued a demand for immediate surrender to the Communists that sabotaged a planned cease-fire initiative. Truman reprimanded but did not recall the general. On April 5, House Republican Minority Leader Joseph W. Martin Jr. read MacArthur’s letter in Congress, once again criticizing the administration’s efforts to limit the war. Truman later argued that this was the “last straw.” On April 11, with the unanimous support of top advisors, the president fired MacArthur, justifying his action as a defense of the constitutional principle of civilian control over the military, but another consideration may have exerted even greater influence on Truman. The JCS had been monitoring a Communist military buildup in East Asia and thought a trusted UNC commander should have standing authority to retaliate against Soviet or Chinese escalation, including the use of nuclear weapons that they had deployed to forward Pacific bases. Truman and his advisors, as well as US allies, distrusted MacArthur, fearing that he might provoke an incident to widen the war.

MacArthur’s recall ignited a firestorm of public criticism against both Truman and the war. The general returned to tickertape parades and, on April 19, 1951, he delivered a televised address before a joint session of Congress, defending his actions and making this now-famous assertion: “In war there is no substitute for victory.” During Senate joint committee hearings on his firing in May, MacArthur denied that he was guilty of in- subordination. General Omar N. Bradley, the JCS chair, made the administration’s case, arguing that enacting MacArthur’s proposals would lead to “the wrong war, at the wrong place, at the wrong time, and with the wrong enemy.” Meanwhile, in April, the Communists launched the first of two major offensives in a final effort to force the UNC off the peninsula. When May ended, the CPV and KPA had suffered huge losses, and a UNC counteroffensive then restored the front north of the parallel, persuading Beijing and Pyongyang, as was already the case in Washington, that pursuit of a cease-fire was necessary. The belligerents agreed to open truce negotiations on July 10 at Kaesong, a neutral site that the Communists deceitfully occupied on the eve of the first session.

North Korea and China created an acrimonious atmosphere with at- tempts at the outset to score propaganda points, but the UNC raised the first major roadblock with its proposal for a demilitarized zone extending deep into North Korea. More important, after the talks moved to Panmunjom in October, there was rapid progress in resolving almost all is- sues, including establishment of a demilitarized zone along the battle lines, truce enforcement inspection procedures, and a postwar political conference to discuss withdrawal of foreign troops and reunification. An armistice could have been concluded ten months after talks began had the negotiators not deadlocked over the disposition of prisoners of war (POWs). Rejecting the UNC proposal for non-forcible repatriation, the Communists demanded adherence to the Geneva Convention that required return of all POWs. Beijing and Pyongyang were guilty of hypocrisy regarding this matter because they were subjecting UNC prisoners to unspeakable mistreatment and indoctrination.

On April 11, with the unanimous support of top advisors, the presi- dent fired MacArthur.

Truman ordered that the UNC delegation assume an inflexible stand against returning Communist prisoners to China and North Korea against their will. “We will not buy an armistice,” he insisted, “by turning over human beings for slaughter or slavery.” Although Truman unquestionably believed in the moral rightness of his position, he was not unaware of the propaganda value derived from Communist prisoners defecting to the “free world.” His advisors, however, withheld evidence from him that contradicted this assessment. A vast majority of North Korean POWs were actually South Koreans who either joined voluntarily or were impressed into the KPA. Thousands of Chinese POWs were Nationalist soldiers trapped in China at the end of the civil war, who now had the chance to escape to Taiwan. Chinese Nationalist guards at UNC POW camps used terrorist “re-education” tactics to compel prisoners to refuse repatriation; resisters risked beatings or death, and repatriates were even tattooed with anti- Communist slogans.

In November 1952, angry Americans elected Dwight D. Eisenhower president, in large part because they expected him to end what had be- come the very unpopular “Mr. Truman’s War.” Fulfilling a campaign pledge, the former general visited Korea early in December, concluding that further ground attacks would be futile. Simultaneously, the UN General Assembly called for a neutral commission to resolve the dispute over POW repatriation. Instead of embracing the plan, Eisenhower, after taking office in January 1953, seriously considered threatening a nuclear attack on China to force a settlement. Signaling his new resolve, Eisenhower announced on February 2 that he was ordering removal of the US Seventh Fleet from the Taiwan Strait, implying endorsement for a Nationalist assault on the mainland. What influenced China more was the devastating impact of the war. By summer 1952, the PRC faced huge domestic economic problems and likely decided to make peace once Truman left office. Major food shortages and physical devastation persuaded Pyongyang to favor an armistice even earlier.

An armistice ended fighting in Korea on July 27, 1953.

Early in 1953, China and North Korea were prepared to resume the truce negotiations, but the Communists preferred that the Americans make the first move. That came on February 22 when the UNC, repeating a Red Cross proposal, suggested exchanging sick and wounded prisoners. At this key moment, Stalin died on March 5. Rather than dissuading the PRC and the DPRK as Stalin had done, his successors encouraged them to act on their desire for peace. On March 28, the Communist side accepted the UNC proposal. Two days later, Zhou Enlai publicly proposed transfer of prisoners rejecting repatriation to a neutral state. On April 20, Operation Little Switch, the exchange of sick and wounded prisoners, began, and six days later, negotiations resumed at Panmunjom. Sharp disagreement followed over the final details of the truce agreement. Eisenhower insisted later that the PRC accepted US terms after Secretary of State John Foster Dulles informed India’s prime minister in May that without progress toward a truce, the US would terminate the existing limitations on its conduct of the war. No documentary evidence has of yet surfaced to support his assertion.

Also, by early 1953, both Washington and Beijing clearly wanted an armistice, having tired of the economic burdens, military losses, political and military constraints, worries about an expanded war, and pressure from allies and the world community to end the stalemated conflict. A steady stream of wartime issues threatened to inflict irrevocable damage on US relations with its allies in Western Europe and nonaligned members of the United Nations. Indeed, in May 1953, US bombing of North Korea’s dams and irrigation system ignited an outburst of world criticism. Later that month and early in June, the CPV staged powerful attacks against ROK defensive positions. Far from being intimidated, Beijing thus displayed its continuing resolve, using military means to persuade its adversary to make concessions on the final terms. Before the belligerents could sign the agreement, Rhee tried to torpedo the impending truce when he released 27,000 North Korean POWs. Eisenhower bought Rhee’s acceptance of a cease-fire with pledges of financial aid and a mutual security pact.

An armistice ended fighting in Korea on July 27, 1953. Since then, Koreans have seen the war as the second-greatest tragedy in their recent history after Japanese colonial rule. Not only did it cause devastation and three million deaths, it also confirmed the division of a homogeneous society after thirteen centuries of unity, while permanently separating millions of families. Meanwhile, US wartime spending jump-started Japan’s economy, which led to its emergence as a global power. Koreans instead had to endure the living tragedy of yearning for reunification, as diplomatic tension and military clashes along the demilitarized zone continued into the twenty-first century.

Korea’s war also dramatically reshaped world affairs. In response, US leaders vastly increased defense spending, strengthened the North Atlantic Treaty Organization militarily, and pressed for rearming West Germany. In Asia, the conflict saved Chiang’s regime on Taiwan, while making South Korea a long-term client of the US. US relations with China were poisoned for twenty years, especially after Washington persuaded the United Nations to condemn the PRC for aggression in Korea. Ironically, the war helped Mao’s regime consolidate its control in China, while elevating its regional prestige. In response, US leaders, acting on what they saw as Korea’s primary lesson, relied on military means to meet the challenge, with disastrous results in Việt Nam.

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SUGGESTED RESOURCES

Kaufman, Burton I. The Korean Conflict . Westport, CT: Greenwood, 1999.

“Korea: Lessons of the Forgotten War.” YouTube video, 2:20, posted by KRT Productions Inc., 2000. http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=fi31OoQfD7U.

Lee, Steven Hugh. The Korean War. New York: Longman, 2001.

Matray, James I. “Korea’s War at Sixty: A Survey of the Literature.” Cold War History 11, no. 1 (February 2011): 99–129.

US Department of Defense. Korea 1950–1953, accessed July 9, 2012, http://koreanwar.defense.gov/index.html.

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Home — Essay Samples — War — Korean War

Essays on Korean War

Korean war essay topics and outline examples, essay title 1: the korean war (1950-1953): uncovering the origins, cold war context, and global implications.

Thesis Statement: This essay delves into the complex origins of the Korean War, the Cold War context that fueled the conflict, and the far-reaching global implications of the war, including its impact on international alliances and the division of Korea.

• Introduction
• Background and Historical Context: Pre-war Korea and Its Division
• The Cold War Setting: U.S.-Soviet Rivalry and Proxy Wars
• The Outbreak of War: North Korea's Invasion and International Response
• The Course of the Conflict: Battles, Truce Talks, and Stalemate
• Global Implications: The Korean War's Impact on East Asia and International Relations
• Legacy and Repercussions: The Division of Korea and Ongoing Tensions

Essay Title 2: The Korean War's Forgotten Heroes: Examining the Role of United Nations Forces and the Armistice Agreement

Thesis Statement: This essay focuses on the often-overlooked contributions of United Nations forces in the Korean War, the complexities of the Armistice Agreement, and the enduring impact of the war on Korean society and international peacekeeping efforts.

• The United Nations Coalition: Multinational Forces in Korea
• The Armistice Negotiations: Challenges, Agreements, and Ongoing Tensions
• Forgotten Heroes: Stories of Courage and Sacrifice
• Korean War Veterans: Their Post-War Experiences and Commemoration
• Peacekeeping and Reconciliation Efforts: The Role of the United Nations
• Implications for Modern International Conflict Resolution

Essay Title 3: The Korean War and the Origins of the Cold War: Analyzing the Impact on U.S.-Soviet Relations and Global Alliances

Thesis Statement: This essay explores how the Korean War influenced U.S.-Soviet relations, the formation of military alliances such as NATO and the Warsaw Pact, and the Cold War's evolution into a global struggle for influence.

• The Korean War as a Catalyst: Escalation of Cold War Tensions
• Military Alliances: NATO, the Warsaw Pact, and the Globalization of the Cold War
• The U.S.-Soviet Confrontation: Proxy Warfare and Diplomatic Efforts
• International Response and Support for North and South Korea
• The Aftermath of the Korean War: Paving the Way for Future Cold War Conflicts
• Assessing the Korean War's Long-Term Impact on U.S.-Soviet Relations

The Korean War – a Conflict Between The Soviet Union and The United States

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The Role of The Korean War in History

The origin of the korean conflict, the role of the battle of chipyong-ni in the korean war, the korean war and its impact on lawrence werner, let us write you an essay from scratch.

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Historical Accuracy of The Book Korean War by Maurice Isserman

Solutions for disputes and disloyalty, depiction of the end of the korean war in the film the front line, the impact of war on korea.

25 June, 1950 - 27 July, 1953

Korean Peninsula, Yellow Sea, Sea of Japan, Korea Strait, China–North Korea border.

China, North Korea, South Korea, United Nations, United States

Korean War was a conflict between the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (North Korea) and the Republic of Korea (South Korea) in which at least 2.5 million persons lost their lives. The war reached international proportions in June 1950 when North Korea, supplied and advised by the Soviet Union, invaded the South.

North Korean invasion of South Korea repelled; US-led United Nations invasion of North Korea repelled; Chinese and North Korean invasion of South Korea repelled; Korean Armistice Agreement signed in 1953; Korean conflict ongoing.

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Cite this chapter

• Kyu-hyun Jo 2  

In 1981, historian Bruce Cumings published the first volume of The Origins of the Korean War , in which he argued that the origins of the Korean War could be traced back to post-colonial Korean politics, one which was dominated by the Right-wing Democratic Party of Korea, a handful of Left-wing sympathizers, and the American military government situated uncomfortably in the middle of a hullabaloo featuring intense violence from both the Left and the Right and a struggle for political supremacy which inherited both tensions arising from the colonial period—anti-imperialistic nationalism pitted against among former pro-Japanese landlords and police officers who served in the colonial regime—and tensions arising from the Cold War which had just arrived in Korea—Communism pitted against anti-Communism. The book was radical, at least for many Western audiences for its implicit suggestion that North Korea did not initiate the Korean War when it launched a “surprise attack” against South Korea on June 25, 1950. Deeper causes lurked within the colonial and post-colonial structures of traditional and modern Korean society, and it is within these frameworks that the ideological antagonism sharpened the two tensions, instead of creating a fresh and new setting.

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Bruce Cumings, The Origins of the Korean War, Vol. I: Liberation and the Emergence of Separate Regimes, 1945–1947 (Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1981).

Examples of such works include T. Fahrenbach, This Kind of War (Washington: Potomac Books, 2001); Max Hastings, The Korean War (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1987); Callum MacDonald, Korea: The War Before Vietnam (New York: The Free Press, 1986); David Halberstam, The Coldest Winter (New York: Hyperion, 2007). A great synoptic volume which summarizes the main points from The Origins of the Korean War is Bruce Cumings, The Korean War: A History (New York: Modern Library Classics, 2010).

For a comprehensive survey of the “pre-revisionist” scholarship and Cumings’ works, see Lester Brune, “Recent Scholarship and Findings about the Korean War,” American Studies International , Vol. 36, No. 3 (October, 1998), 4–16. See also Kathryn Weathersby, “The Soviet Role in the Korean War: The State of Historical Knowledge,” in Stueck ed., The Korean War in World History , 63–64.

Arthur Marwick, “Two Approaches to Historical Study: The Metaphysical (Including Postmodernism) and the Historical,” Journal of Contemporary History , Vol. 30, No. 1 (January, 1995), 5–36; Alun Munslow, Deconstructing History (Routledge, 1997), 39.

Felix Gilbert, History: Politics or Culture?: Reflections on Ranke and Burckhardt (Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1990), 35 and 45.

Albert Cook, History/Writing: The Theory and Practice of History in Antiquity and in Modern Times (Cambridge University Press, 1988), 48–49.

Lowe, The Korean War , 24–25, 40, and 66.

Thomas Kuhn, The Structure of Scientific Revolutions (Chicago, Illinois: The University of Chicago Press, 2012), xxii.

Lee Harvey, “The Use and Abuse of Kuhnian Paradigms in the Sociology of Knowledge,” Sociology , Vol. 16, No. 1 (February, 1982), 86; Douglas Eckberg and Lester Hill Jr., “The Paradigm Concept and Sociology: A Critical Review,” American Sociological Review , Vol. 44, No. 6 (December, 1979), 928.

Harvey, “The Use and Abuse of Kuhnian Paradigms in the Sociology of Knowledge,” 87; Kuhn, The Structure of Scientific Revolutions , 27.

Paul Roth, “Who Needs Paradigms?” Metaphilosophy , Vol. 15, No. 3/4 (July/October, 1984), 229–230; W. Percival, “The Applicability of Kuhn's Paradigms to the History of Linguistics,” Language , Vol. 52, No. 2 (June, 1976), 285–294; Kuhn, The Structure of Scientific Revolutions , 19.

Calum Paton, “Of Paradigms and Precipitate Relativism: Kuhn and the Social Sciences,” Journal of Health Services Research and Policy , Vol. 19, No. 2 (April, 2014), 120. Robert Root-Bernstein, “On Paradigms and Revolutions in Science and Art: The Challenge of Interpretation,” Art Journal , Vol. 44, No. 2 (Summer, 1984), 111.

S. Barnes, “Paradigms—Scientific and Social,” Man , Vol. 4, No. 1 (March, 1969), 97–98.

Waltz, Theory of International Politics , 2.

Alberto Hirschman, “The Search for Paradigms as a Hindrance to Understanding,” World Politics , Vol. 22, No. 3 (April, 1970), 336 and 343.

Roth, “Who Needs Paradigms?” 231.

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Shen Zhihua, “Sino-Soviet Relations and the Origins of the Korean War,” Journal of Cold War Studies , Vol. 2, No. 2 (Spring, 2000), 62; Weathersby, “The Soviet Role in the Korean War” in Stueck ed., The Korean War in World History , 72; Lowe, The Korean War , 220. See also Vojtech Mastny, The Cold War and Soviet Insecurity: The Stalin Years (Oxford University Press, 1996). The image of a cautious Stalin is in stark contrast with a more belligerent and an aggressive Stalin presented in works such as Vladislav Zubok and Constantine Pleshekov, Inside the Kremlin's Cold War: From Stalin to Khrushchev (Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard University Press, 1996) or John Gaddis, We Now Know: Rethinking Cold War History (Oxford University Press, 1997).

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Chen Jian, “China's Changing Aims During the Korean War, 1949–1950,” The Journal of American-East Asian Relations , Vol. 1, No. 1 (Spring, 1992); Whiting, China Crosses the Yalu , 58; Rosemary Foot, A Substitute for Victory: The Politics of Peacemaking at the Korean Armistice Talks (Ithaca, New York: Cornell University Press, 1990), 20–21.

Chen, China's Road to the Korean War , 201.

Whiting, China Crosses the Yalu , 93–94.

On Mao's idea of “permanent revolution,” see Maurice Meisner, Mao's China and After: A History of the People's Republic (New York: The Free Press, 1999), 193–202; Stuart Schram, “Mao Tse-tung and the Theory of Permanent Revolution, 1958–1969,” The China Quarterly , No. 46 (April–June 1971), 221–244 and Schram, The Thought of Mao Tse-tung (Cambridge University Press, 1989). On the weaknesses of Maoism against modern technological warfare, see Chen, China's Road to the Korean War , 179.

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Hao and Zhai, “China's Decision to Enter the Korean War”.

Barry Naughton, “The Third Front: Defence Industrialization in the Chinese Interior,” The China Quarterly , No. 115 (September, 1988), 351–386; Whiting, China Crosses the Yalu , 49 and Chen, China's Road to the Korean War , 223. On the debate about whether Maoism was an original or an unoriginal ideology, see Karl Wittfogel, “The Legend of Maoism,” The China Quarterly , No. 1 (January–March, 1960), 72–86 and Benjamin Schwartz, “The Legend of the ‘Legend of Maoism,’” The China Quarterly , No. 2 (April–June 1960), 35–42.

Whiting, China Crosses the Yalu , 83 and 158; Masuda Hajimu, “The Korean War through the Prism of Chinese Society,” Journal of Cold War Studies , Vol. 14, No. 3 (2012), 3–38; Hajimu, Cold War Crucible , 174–175; Mo Tian, “The Korean War and Manchuria: Economic, Social, and Human Effects” in Morris-Suzuki ed., The Korean War in Asia , 49–52; Li Narangoa, “From One Divided Country to Another: The Korean War in Mongolia” in Morris-Suzuki ed., The Korean War in Asia , 67.

David Cheng Chang, The Hijacked War: The Story of Chinese POWs in the Korean War (Stanford, California: Stanford University Press, 2020); Catherine Churchman, “Victory with Minimum Effort: How the Chinese Nationalists “Won” the Korean War” in Morris-Suzuki ed., The Korean War in Asia, 77–104. For more comprehensive discussions about prisoners of war during the Korean War, see Charles Young, Name, Rank, and Serial Number: Exploiting Korean War POWs at Home and Abroad (Oxford University Press, 2014) and Monica Kim, The Interrogation Rooms of the Korean War: The Untold History (Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 2019). For a critique of Kim's book, see Kyu-hyun Jo, “The “Civil War” Thesis and the Myth of Revisionism in the Historiography of the Korean War: A Critical Review of Recent (Post-Cumings) Scholarly Literature” Korea Journal , Vol. 62, No. 4 (December, 2022).

Whiting, China Crosses the Yalu , 166; Chen, China's Road to the Korean War , 193.

Heonik Kwon, After the Korean War: An Intimate History (Cambridge University Press, 2020), 4.

Kwon, After the Korean War , 6–7, 20, 23, 27, 34, 36, 37, and 62–63.

Hajimu, Cold War Crucible , 67.

Tony Judt, Postwar: A History of Europe Since 1945 (Penguin, 2005), 96–97.

Walter LaFeber, “NATO and the Korean War: A Context,” Diplomatic History , Vol. 13, No. 4 (Fall, 1989), 461–477. Lowe, The Korean War , 162; Judt, Postwar , 90–91, 95, and 114–115. Leffler, For the Soul of Mankind , 55, 68–69, and 77.

Lowe, The Korean War , 13; Yellen, The Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere , 167. See also Michael Hunt, Lyndon Johnson's War: America's Cold War Crusade in Vietnam, 1945–1968 (New York: Hill and Wang, 1996), 7 and Mark Lawrence, “Explaining the Early Decisions: The United States and the French War, 1945–1954,” in Mark Bradley and Marilyn Young eds., Making Sense of the Vietnam Wars: Local, National, and Transnational Perspectives (Oxford University Press, 2008), 27–28, and 40; Bradley, Imagining Vietnam and America , 48, 56–59, 68, 70–71, 75–79, 84, 104, and 147.

William Fox, “Korea and the Struggle for Europe,” Journal of International Affairs , Vol. 6, No. 2 (Spring, 1952), 129–134; Judt, Postwar , 93.

Kwon, After the Korean War , 109.

Robert Jervis, “The Impact of the Korean War on the Cold War,” The Journal of Conflict Resolution , Vol. 24, No. 4 (December, 1980), 563–592. See also Foot, A Substitute for Victory , 4.

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Jo, Kh. (2024). The Korean War as a Civil War and Its Impact on Postwar Europe. In: East Asian International Relations in History. Springer, Singapore. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-981-97-4832-7_6

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Selling the Korean War: Propaganda, Politics, and Public Opinion in the United States, 1950-1953

Lecturer in International History

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How presidents spark and sustain support for wars remains an enduring and significant problem. Korea was the first limited war the United States experienced in the contemporary period—the first recent war fought for something less than total victory. This book explores how Truman and then Eisenhower tried to sell it to the American public. Based on primary sources, this book explores the government's selling activities from all angles. It looks at the halting and sometimes chaotic efforts of Truman and Acheson, Eisenhower and Dulles. It examines the relationships that they and their subordinates developed with a host of other institutions, from Congress and the press to Hollywood and labor. And it assesses the complex and fraught interactions between the military and war correspondents in the battlefield theater itself. From high politics to bitter media spats, this book guides the reader through the domestic debates of this messy, costly war. It highlights the actions and calculations of colorful figures, including Taft, McCarthy, and MacArthur. It details how the culture and work routines of Congress and the media influenced political tactics and daily news stories. And the book explores how different phases of the war threw up different problems.

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Korean War summary

Discover the causes and aftermath of the korean war.

Korean War , (1950–53) Conflict arising after the post-World War II division of Korea, at latitude 38° N, into North Korea and South Korea. At the end of World War II, Soviet forces accepted the surrender of Japanese forces north of that line, as U.S. forces accepted Japanese surrender south of it. Negotiations failed to reunify the two halves, the northern half being a Soviet client state and the southern half being backed by the U.S. In 1950 North Korea invaded South Korea, and U.S. Pres. Harry Truman ordered troops to assist South Korea. The UN Security Council, minus the absent Soviet delegate, passed a resolution calling for the assistance of all UN members in halting the North Koreans. At first North Korean troops drove the South Korean and U.S. forces down to the southern tip of the Korean peninsula, but a brilliant amphibious landing at Inch’ŏn, conceived by Gen. Douglas MacArthur , turned the tide in favour of the UN troops, who advanced near the border of North Korea and China. The Chinese then entered the war and drove the UN forces back south; the front line stabilized at the 38th parallel. MacArthur insisted on voicing his objections to U.S. war aims in a public manner and was relieved of his command by Truman. U.S. Pres. Dwight D. Eisenhower participated in the conclusion of an armistice that accepted the front line as the de facto boundary between the two Koreas. The war resulted in the deaths of approximately 2,000,000 Koreans, 600,000 Chinese, 37,000 Americans, and 3,000 Turks, Britons, and other nationals in the UN forces.

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Korean War, a ‘Forgotten’ Conflict That Shaped the Modern World

By Liam Stack

• Jan. 1, 2018

The Korean War has been called “the Forgotten War” in the United States, where coverage of the 1950s conflict was censored and its memory decades later is often overshadowed by World War II and the Vietnam War.

But the three-year conflict in Korea, which pitted communist and capitalist forces against each other, set the stage for decades of tension among North Korea, South Korea and the United States.

It also helped set the tone for Soviet-American rivalry during the Cold War, profoundly shaping the world we live in today, historians said.

As tensions between North Korea and the United States continue to mount amid missile tests and taunts, here is a brief guide to the Korean War and the impacts that linger more than 60 years after its end.

How did the Korean War start?

The Korean War began when North Korean troops pushed into South Korea on June 25, 1950, and it lasted until 1953. But experts said the military conflict could not be properly understood without considering its historical context.

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The Korean War: 1950-1953 Essay

• To find inspiration for your paper and overcome writer’s block
• As a source of information (ensure proper referencing)
• As a template for you assignment

Introduction

Works cited.

The Second World War marked the starting of the Korea predicament. According to SparkNotes, the 1950-1953 war started when the South Koreans, who were non communists, were attacked by the communist army of North Korea. This is when the Allies were assigned to take over the Korean cape that was previously engaged by Japan.

It is during the 38 th parallel that the Korean responsibility was divided between the Soviet Union and the United States. According to the Australian War Memorial, the years that followed saw the Soviet Union promote a tough collective administration in the north, while in the south, the government received support from the US. Anxiety rose by the mid 1950 amid the two regions, with each one of them being governed by a different government, up to the position where each one of the aggressive armies was reinforcing along the boundary.

On 25 of June 1950, the army of the North Korea lastly made its way into the southern region, and proceeded towards Seoul, the capital (Turner Publishing Company 15). In a period that was less than seven days, the city fell. This saw the North Korean military precede their way to the south, towards the significant Pusan port, deliberately.

In two days time, South Korea received support from the US which included both sea and air. According to SparkNotes, the Security Council of the United Nations requested for all its members to help in repelling molest by the North Koreans. This received a good response as troops, medical squads, aircraft, and ships, were offered by twenty one countries.

According to Australian War Memorial, Australia offered the Australian Royal Regiment, 77 RAAF Squadron, and the 3 rd Battalion. During this point in time, both of them were located in Japan where they formed a component of the Occupation Force of the British Commonwealth.

SparkNotes records that, United States did not consider Korea as of strategic importance, but at this period, the Cold War political environment was one that would define that policy makers were tough on communism. Technically, the intervention by the US was in form of police action that was managed by a peace keeping force of the United Nations. In reality, the US and the anti communists of NATO were maneuvering the UN to suit their own interests (Poulantzas 332).

The Inchon attack

In September 1950, while the US, the South Korean, and the UN armies stuck beside the sea at Pusan, Spaknotes records that, a bold amphibious attack was coordinated by Douglas C. McArthur on Inchon. This is a port located on Koreas Western coast. MacArthur, who used to be the Southwest Pacific commander during the Second World War, oversaw Japan’s occupation period after war. He also was in charge of the UN army in the early stages of the war in Korea.

With this accomplishment, McArthur evoked the South Korea capital, Seoul, through a pincer progress thereby overwhelming the North Korea army which by then was attacking Pusan (Poulantzas 331). He did not get contented with this fast mission he made on South Korea, but with the help of the US, he traversed the 38 th parallel. He chased the North Korean forces up to the North Korea northern most provinces (Poulantzas 332).

Chinese Intrusion

Scared, an army was clandestinely sent by the China Republic across River Yalu (Poulantzas 331). This is because the China Republic thought that US wanted to use North Korea to fight Manchuria. The Chinese force assaulted the US, the South Korea, and the UN armies. As of Australian War Memorial, when Lt. General Mathew Ridgway was appointed as the ground forces commander, there was progress in the American spirits, making the proposal to sway against the Chinese Communists’.

The Sack of McArthur

With the hope of ending the war fast, President Truman had to dismiss MacArthur as he did not oblige to his orders (Sweeney and Byrne 245). The president wanted him to be more diplomatic, but McArthur, the bright strategist, persisted, issuing provocative lines of his wishes of bringing together Korea.

According to SparkNotes, with the help of the Joint Staff Chiefs, the president was able to remove McArthur from authority. Though the decision was detested by Americans as McArthur was considered an admired war hero, the support of the Joint Staff Chiefs is the one that saved the president from prosecution after the dismissal.

Ridgway as the commander

As per Australian War Memorial, Ridgway held the position of the commander, and avoided the communists with strong defenses and entrenchments, immediate the 38 th parallel north. This is by sending occasional insults against the iron triangle, which was the enactment area for assaults meant for South Korea.

SparkNotes notes that, in the years 1951 and 1952, peace dialogues pulled at Kaesong, then made their way at Panmunjom. Through strategic bombing, the US attempted to frighten the communists into making dialogues of a peace accord, but they refused to move, mainly on the Prisoner of War matter repatriation ((Turner Publishing Company 13).

Both sides wanted to emerge strong making the talks to continue, sometimes stopping for months. This is because the Communists alleged that they were insulted by Mathew Ridgeway, and were demanding for an apology.

According to Australian War Memorial, the negotiations were resumed on October, but the location was changed to Panmunjom. Merely after a war hero, Eisenhower, who did not fear republican disapproval became president, the US formed ample compromises to the communists.

A peace agreement was marked on 27 July1953 at Panmunjom, after seventeen negotiation days, bringing to an end the war in Korea, which lasted for two years (Turner Publishing Company 12).This brought back Korea to a split position, essentially to similar as it was, prior to the war. Both the war and its effect did not contribute to the reduction of the anxiety that was there in the Cold War period.

The war created a crisis in Korea as it destroyed most of the country’s industrial plants. Regardless of the hydroelectric and mineral wealth found in North Korea, the region ended up in poverty, and could not afford to catch up with the financial rate of South Korea.

According to SparkNotes, this made South Korea to be four times the gross domestic product of North Korea. However, North Korea stayed quite sovereign of PRC and USSR authority. Actually, Chinese and Soviet wrangling over the one supposed to settle the bill for the war in Korea was one aspect in the Sino-Soviet Split, obvious soon after the cold war.

The Korean War was a depressing occurrence for the US. This is because it was the first war in which the US involved itself in and lost (Sweeney and Byrne 245). The war which claimed a total of 4 million lives including 50,000 of the US soldiers showed the US that, though it was able to come out of the Second World War as a powerful country, it was unable to firmly and imminently achieve its will and desires. Through this ending, America was able to improve and harden the Cold War policy for its future (Sweeney and Byrne 245).

Australian War Memorial. Korean War 1950-53. 2011. Web.

Poulantzas, Nicholas, M. The right of hot pursuit in international law . Hague: Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, 2002. Print.

SparkNotes. The Korean War (1950-1953). 2011. Web.

Sweeney, Jerry, K., and Byrne, Kevin, B. A handbook of American military history: from the Revolutionary War to the present. Lincoln, NE: U of Nebraska Press, 2006. Print.

Turner Publishing Company. Strike Swiftly Korea 1950-1953: 70 th Heavy Tank Battalion . Nashville, TN: Turner Publishing Company, 1988.

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IvyPanda. (2019, March 27). The Korean War: 1950-1953. https://ivypanda.com/essays/the-korean-war-1950-1953/

"The Korean War: 1950-1953." IvyPanda , 27 Mar. 2019, ivypanda.com/essays/the-korean-war-1950-1953/.

IvyPanda . (2019) 'The Korean War: 1950-1953'. 27 March.

IvyPanda . 2019. "The Korean War: 1950-1953." March 27, 2019. https://ivypanda.com/essays/the-korean-war-1950-1953/.

1. IvyPanda . "The Korean War: 1950-1953." March 27, 2019. https://ivypanda.com/essays/the-korean-war-1950-1953/.

Bibliography

IvyPanda . "The Korean War: 1950-1953." March 27, 2019. https://ivypanda.com/essays/the-korean-war-1950-1953/.

Educator Resources

US Enters the Korean Conflict

In 1948 the Korea Peninsula was divided between a Soviet-backed government in the north and an American-backed government in the south. War broke out along the 38th parallel on June 25, 1950. On that day, North Korean troops coordinated an attack at several strategic points along the parallel and headed south toward Seoul. The United Nations Security Council responded to the attack by adopting a resolution that condemned the invasion as a "breach of the peace."  Read More...

Related Primary Sources

Links go to DocsTeach, the online tool for teaching with documents from the National Archives.

President Truman's Statement on the Situation in Korea, 6/27/1950

Presidential Proclamation 2914 of December 16, 1950, by President Harry Truman Proclaiming the Existence of a National Emergency in Korea, 12/16/1950

Korean Armistice Agreement, 7/27/1953

Paratroopers Flying to the Dropzone in Korea, 3/1951

Marine Patrol In Korea, 9/26/1950

Signing the Korean Armistice, 7/27/1953

Teaching Activities

In the activity Containment in Korea: Entering the Korean War , students analyze President Truman's press release of June 27, 1950, announcing that he was committing American forces to a combined United Nations military effort in Korea at the beginning of the Korean War. Students reflect on the language used in Truman's statement to the American people, compare it with Soviet views of events in Korea, and identify how Truman's words reflect the US policy of containment during the Cold War.

Find other teaching activities related to the Cold War on DocsTeach .

Additional Background Information

While the end of World War II brought peace and prosperity to most Americans, it also created a heightened state of tension between the Soviet Union and the United States. Fearing that the Soviet Union intended to "export" communism to other nations, America centered its foreign policy on the "containment" of communism, both at home and abroad. Although formulation of the Truman Doctrine, Marshall Plan, and the Berlin Airlift suggested that the United States had a particular concern with the spread of communism in Europe, America's policy of containment extended to Asia as well. Indeed, Asia proved to be the site of the first major battle waged in the name of containment: the Korean War.

The division of Korea into two halves had come at the end of World War II. The United States and the Soviet Union agreed to temporarily divide Korea and oversee the removal of Japanese forces. In August of 1945, the Soviet Union occupied Korea, which had been under Japan's control since 1910. The United States quickly moved its own troops into southern Korea. Japanese troops surrendered to the Russians in the north and to the Americans in the south.

The U.S.-Soviet agreement temporarily divided Korea along the 38th parallel, a latitudinal line that bisected the country; this avoided a long-term decision regarding Korea's future. This line became more rigid after 1946, however, when Kim Il Sung organized a communist government in the north –the Democratic People's Republic. Shortly after, nationalist exile Syngman Rhee returned to Korea and set up a rival government in the south –the Republic of Korea (ROK). Each government hoped to reunify the country under its own rule.

On June 25, 1950, North Korean troops coordinated an attack at several strategic points along the 38th parallel and headed south toward Seoul. The United Nations Security Council voted 9-0 to adopt a resolution condemning the invasion as a "breach of the peace." The Security Council did not have a Soviet delegate, since six months prior, the Soviet Union had left to protest the United Nation's refusal to seat a delegate from China. 

President Harry S. Truman quickly committed American forces to a combined United Nations military effort and named Gen. Douglas MacArthur Commander of the U.N. forces. Fifteen other nations also sent troops under the U.N. command. Truman did not seek a formal declaration of war from Congress; officially, America's presence in Korea amounted to no more than a "police action."

However, the entry of the United States into the conflict signaled a reversal of policy toward Korea. Although it backed the government of Syngman Rhee, the United States had begun withdrawing its troops from South Korea in 1948. As late as January of 1950, Secretary of State Dean Acheson had implied that the Korea Peninsula lay outside the all-important "defense perimeter" of the United States, a statement that some took to mean that the United States would not defend the ROK from communist attack.

The decision to intervene in Korea, however, grew out of the tense atmosphere that characterized Cold War politics. On the eve of the North Korean invasion, a number of events had made Truman anxious. The Soviet Union exploded an atomic bomb in 1949, ending the United States' monopoly on the weapon. In Europe, Soviet intervention in Greece and Turkey had given rise to the Truman Doctrine and the Marshall Plan, which funneled aid to war-torn Europe in the hopes of warding off communist political victories. In early 1950, President Truman directed the National Security Council (NSC) to conduct an analysis of Soviet and American military capabilities. In its report, known as "NSC 68," the Council recommended heavy increases in military funding to help contain the Soviets.

Events in Asia also contributed to an increased sense of insecurity. In 1949 China underwent a revolution that brought Mao Zedong and his Communist party into power. The nationalists, led by Chiang Kai-Shek, had retreated to the island of Formosa (Taiwan) while they continued their war with mainland China. Mao quickly moved to ally himself with the Soviet Union, and signed a treaty with the Soviets in 1950. The Truman administration faced criticism from Republicans who claimed he had "lost" China. They criticized him for not providing enough aid to the Chinese nationalists. The suggestion by Secretary of State Dean Acheson that the administration recognize the communist government of China only gave them more ammunition for their attacks.

The Truman administration also faced internal criticism regarding its commitment to anti-communism at home. Republican Senator Joseph McCarthy of Wisconsin had recently begun his infamous hunt for communists within the U.S. Government. Although McCarthy was just getting started, the recent trials of Alger Hiss and others for espionage left the Truman administration apprehensive about its anti-communist credentials. Truman and his advisors found themselves under increased domestic pressure not to appear "soft" on communism abroad.

Thus, when North Korean troops invaded the South, the Truman administration seized upon the opportunity to defend a non-communist government from invasion by communist troops. Determined not to "lose" another country to communism, and interested in shoring up its anticommunist credentials, the Truman administration found itself defending a nation a world away from U.S. soil. Yet Truman's response was not merely a response to internal pressure. The invasion of South Korea made Truman genuinely fearful that the Soviet Union and China intended to expand the sphere of communism throughout Asia.

President Truman released a statement on June 27, 1950, illustrating his concern with communist aggression and expansion. He argued that "communism has passed beyond the use of subversion to conquer independent nations and will now use armed invasion and war." Truman's statement suggests that he believed the attack by North Korea had been part of a larger plan by communist China and, by extension, the Soviet Union. The President believed that the Korean situation was similar to that of Greece in 1947. He informed his advisors that he believed the invasion was "very obviously inspired by the Soviet Union." This gave America a moral imperative to act. "If we don't put up a fight now," Truman observed to his staff, there was "no telling what they'll do."

His concern over the future of anti-communist governments in Asia showed in his public statement. Truman pledged to defend Formosa (Taiwan) from attack and to support French forces in Indochina, a conflict that would eventually escalate into the Vietnam War. Yet Truman had no wish to provoke a full-scale war with the Soviets. By blaming "communism" in the statement, as opposed to the Soviet Union, Dean Acheson later explained, the administration sought to give the Soviets a "graceful exit" and not provoke open confrontation with Russia.

Truman's statement also reflected a new military order. Although the United States took the lead in the Korean action, it did so under the rubric of the United Nations. Truman made it clear that his actions fell within the measures recommended by the United Nations, and reminded "all members of the United Nations" to "consider carefully the consequences of this latest aggression in Korea" and that America "will continue to uphold the rule of law."

Truman's statement was released to newspaper reporters. That afternoon, Truman attended a meeting of the United Nations and proposed a resolution urging all UN member nations to give assistance to South Korea. The meeting had been originally planned for the morning but was postponed to accommodate one of its members. Secretary of State Dean Acheson later reflected that the Soviets liked to point out that since the U.N. meeting occurred after the President's statement, Truman could not truthfully claim that his decision to commit forces was influenced by the wishes of the United Nations. When it did meet later that day, the United Nations passed his resolution, although a handful of dissenting countries abstained.

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The Korean War

History 3575: the korean war.