notice of assignment court

What is a notice of assignment?

An assignment takes place when one party is holding a right to property, claims, bills, lease, etc., of another party and wishes to pass it along (or sell it) to a third party. As complicated as that sounds, it really isn’t. Strangely enough, many assignments can be made under the law without immediately informing, or obtaining the permission, of the personal obligated to perform under the contract. An example of this is when your mortgage is sold to another mortgage company. The original mortgage company may not inform you for several weeks, and they certainly aren’t going to ask your permission to make the sale.

If a person obligated to perform has received notice of the assignment and still insists on paying the initial assignor, the person will still be obligated to pay the new assignee according to the agreement. If the obligated party has not yet been informed of the assignment and pays the original note holder (assignor), the assignor is obligated to turn those funds over to the new assignee. But, what are the remedies if this doesn’t take place? Actually, the new assignee may find themselves in a difficult position if the assignor simply takes off with their funds or payment. They are limited to taking action against the person they bought the note from (assignor) and cannot hold the obligator liable. Therefore, it is important to remember that if any note or obligation is assigned to another party, each party should be well aware of their responsibilities in the transaction and uphold them according to the laws of their state. Assignment forms should be well thought out and written in a manner which prevents the failure of one party against another.

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Factoring , Newsletters

THE NOTICE OF ASSIGNMENT: A REFRESHER COURSE

Allen J. Heffner Nov 20, 2023

The Notice of Assignment is probably the single most important document for a Factor. Understanding what needs to be included in the Notice of Assignment, how to send it, and who to send it to can mean the difference between getting paid and not. Despite the fact that every Factor is (or should be) familiar with legal requirements relating to Notices of Assignment, we still find that many of our factoring clients who end up in litigation make basic mistakes relating to their Notices of Assignment. The article focuses on what information needs to be included in the Notice, who the Notice should be sent to, and how the Notice should be delivered.

What needs to be included in the Notice of Assignment?

To be effective, there is certain information that must be included in the Notice of Assignment. The Uniform Commercial Code (“UCC”) requires that the notice must:

• Notify the Account Debtor that the amount due or to become due has been assigned;
• Notify the Account Debtor that payment is to be made to the Factor;
• Reasonably identify the rights assigned; and
• Be signed by the Factor or its client.

The Notice of Assignment should also include a remittance address so the Account Debtor is informed how and in what manner the Factor should be paid.

Additionally, while not explicitly required under the current version of the UCC, Factors should include language in their Notice of Assignment that: (i) the Client has assigned all of its present and future accounts receivable to Factor; (ii) the Factor holds a first priority security interest in all of the client’s accounts receivable; and (iii) all payments owing to the client must be paid to the Factor.

Who should the Notice of Assignment be sent to?

Notices of Assignment should not be sent directly to individuals with an Account Debtor. Sending the Notice to a specific individual may lead to issues relating to the authority of that individual to receive documents on behalf of the Account Debtor. Moreover, Factors that direct Notices of Assignment directly to individuals open themselves up to arguments that the Notices of Assignment was not properly delivered. For instance, our clients that have sent Notices of Assignment to individuals have ended up in situations where the individual to whom the Notice of Assignment was addressed no longer worked with the Account Debtor or the individual was located at a different office and the Notice of Assignment was not sent to the proper location. To be safe and to avoid unnecessary issues, Factors should send the Notice of Assignment to the Account Debtor’s accounts payable department.

Additionally, some states have specialized definitions for what constitutes “notice” on behalf of a company. If there is any question as to where a Notice of Assignment should be sent, Factors should check with their attorney to determine where these should be sent.

How should the Notice of Assignment be delivered?

The crucial issue for the enforceability of a Notice of Assignment is proof of receipt by the Account Debtor, not proof of delivery. Therefore, it is good business practice to send the Notice of Assignment either certified mail or other method that provides for proof of delivery.

Many of our clients have asked about whether it is proper to deliver the Notice of Assignment via e-mail asking the Account Debtor to confirm receipt or with “read receipts” turned on. Some Factors prefer this method because it is more cost efficient.

While sending Notices of Assignment via e-mail is enforceable, we would not recommend it as a general business practice. Sending the Notice in this manner requires delivering the Notice to a specific individual, which we have discussed above can be problematic. Sometimes officers and directors of companies have assistants or other personnel manage their e-mail accounts, raising the possibility that the individual to whom the Notice was sent, never saw the e-mail, even though the e-mail was “read.”

Last, there is no requirement that the Notice be signed by the Account Debtor and returned to the Factor. Often, we see our client’s Notice include a “confirmation of receipt” line for the Account Debtor to sign and return. Sometimes, the Factor will have proof of delivery to the Account Debtor but the Notice was not signed and returned by the Account Debtor. This adds unnecessary ambiguity as to whether the Notice was actually received by the Account Debtor. Therefore, we instruct our clients not to include such requests for proof of receipt.

Who should send the Notice of Assignment?

Some of our clients that have had bad experiences with Account Debtors after delivering a Notice of Assignment have chosen to have their Client be the one to deliver the Notice of Assignment. There is no legal requirement as to whether the Factor or the Client is the correct party to deliver the Notice of Assignment. However, we recommend the Factor be the one to deliver the Notice of Assignment. This way, the Factor is in complete control of the contents of the Notice of Assignment, how it is delivered, and receives confirmation of its delivery. We have been in situations in which the Factor allowed the Client to deliver the Notice of Assignment, but the Client did not deliver the Notice of Assignment in accordance with the law, leading to avoidable litigation.

Should a Factor respond to an Account Debtors questions regarding a Notice of Assignment?

Absolutely, yes. If requested by an Account Debtor, pursuant to the UCC, a Factor must furnish reasonable proof of the assignment for the Notice of Assignment to be valid. Too often we see situations in which requests are made or questions are posed by Account Debtors that the Factor ignores, thinking that because the Account Debtor received the Notice of Assignment, nothing else needs to be done. The Factor should respond to the Account Debtor and provide reasonable proof of the assignment. These communications can also provide invaluable insight as to the relationship between the client and the Account Debtor, how and when payments will be made, and can provide the Account Debtor a sense of trust with the Factor.

A Notice of Assignment is crucial for Factors because it provides legal protection, establishes priority of interest, prevents confusion, facilitates legal recourse, and enables effective communication with Account Debtors. Without this notice, Factors may encounter difficulties in asserting their rights and collecting payments from Account Debtors, potentially jeopardizing the financial transaction.

Bruce Loren and Allen Heffner of the Loren & Kean Law Firm are based in Palm Beach Gardens and Fort Lauderdale. For over 25 years, Mr. Loren has focused his practice on construction law and factoring law.  Mr. Loren has achieved the title of “Certified in Construction Law” by the Florida Bar. The Firm represents factoring companies in a wide range of industries, including construction, regarding all aspects of litigation and dispute resolution. Mr. Loren and Mr. Heffner can be reached at [email protected] or [email protected] or 561-615-5701

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Assignments: why you need to serve a notice of assignment

Catherine phillips.

PSL Principal Associate

It's the day of completion; security is taken, assignments are completed and funds move. Everyone breathes a sigh of relief. At this point, no-one wants to create unnecessary paperwork - not even the lawyers! Notices of assignment are, in some circumstances, optional. However, in other transactions they could be crucial to a lender's enforcement strategy. In the article below, we have given you the facts you need to consider when deciding whether or not you need to serve notice of assignment.

What issues are there with serving notice of assignment?

Assignments are useful tools for adding flexibility to banking transactions. They enable the transfer of one party's rights under a contract to a new party (for example, the right to receive an income stream or a debt) and allow security to be taken over intangible assets which might be unsuitable targets for a fixed charge. A lender's security net will often include assignments over contracts (such as insurance or material contracts), intellectual property rights, investments or receivables.

An assignment can be a legal assignment or an equitable assignment. If a legal assignment is required, the assignment must comply with a set of formalities set out in s136 of the Law of Property Act 1925, which include the requirement to give notice to the contract counterparty.

The main difference between legal and equitable assignments (other than the formalities required to create them) is that with a legal assignment, the assignee can usually bring an action against the contract counterparty in its own name following assignment. However, with an equitable assignment, the assignee will usually be required to join in proceedings with the assignor (unless the assignee has been granted specific powers to circumvent that). That may be problematic if the assignor is no longer available or interested in participating.

Why should we serve a notice of assignment?

The legal status of the assignment may affect the credit scoring that can be given to a particular class of assets. It may also affect a lender's ability to effect part of its exit strategy if that strategy requires the lender to be able to deal directly with the contract counterparty.

The case of General Nutrition Investment Company (GNIC) v Holland and Barrett International Ltd and another (H&B) provides an example of an equitable assignee being unable to deal directly with a contract counterparty as a result of a failure to provide a notice of assignment.

The case concerned the assignment of a trade mark licence to GNIC . The other party to the licence agreement was H&B. H&B had not received notice of the assignment. GNIC tried to terminate the licence agreement for breach by serving a notice of termination. H&B disputed the termination. By this point in time the original licensor had been dissolved and so was unable to assist.

At a hearing of preliminary issues, the High Court held that the notices of termination served by GNIC , as an equitable assignee, were invalid, because no notice of the assignment had been given to the licensee. Although only a High Court decision, this follows a Court of Appeal decision in the Warner Bros Records Inc v Rollgreen Ltd case, which was decided in the context of the attempt to exercise an option.

In both cases, an equitable assignee attempted to exercise a contractual right that would change the contractual relationship between the parties (i.e. by terminating the contractual relationship or exercising an option to extend the term of a licence). The judge in GNIC felt that "in each case, the counterparty (the recipient of the relevant notice) is entitled to see that the potential change in his contractual position is brought about by a person who is entitled, and whom he can see to be entitled, to bring about that change".

In a security context, this could hamper the ability of a lender to maximise the value of the secured assets but yet is a constraint that, in most transactions, could be easily avoided.

Why not serve notice?

Sometimes it's just not necessary or desirable. For example:

• If security is being taken over a large number of low value receivables or contracts, the time and cost involved in giving notice may be disproportionate to the additional value gained by obtaining a legal rather than an equitable assignment.
• If enforcement action were required, the equitable assignee typically has the option to join in the assignor to any proceedings (if it could not be waived by the court) and provision could be made in the assignment deed for the assignor to assist in such situations. Powers of attorney are also typically granted so that a lender can bring an action in the assignor's name.
• Enforcement is often not considered to be a significant issue given that the vast majority of assignees will never need to bring claims against the contract counterparty.

Care should however, be taken in all circumstances where the underlying contract contains a ban on assignment, as the contract counterparty would not have to recognise an assignment that is made in contravention of that ban. Furthermore, that contravention in itself may trigger termination and/or other rights in the assigned contract, that could affect the value of any underlying security.

What about acknowledgements of notices?

A simple acknowledgement of service of notice is simply evidence of the notice having been received. However, these documents often contain commitments or assurances by the contract counterparty which increase their value to the assignee.

Best practice for serving notice of assignment

Each transaction is different and the weighting given to each element of the security package will depend upon the nature of the debt and the borrower's business. The service of a notice of assignment may be a necessity or an optional extra. In each case, the question of whether to serve notice is best considered with your advisers at the start of a transaction to allow time for the lender's priorities to be highlighted to the borrowers and captured within the documents.

For further advice on serving notice of assignment please contact Kirsty Barnes or Catherine Phillips  from our Banking & Finance team.

NOT LEGAL ADVICE. Information made available on this website in any form is for information purposes only. It is not, and should not be taken as, legal advice. You should not rely on, or take or fail to take any action based upon this information. Never disregard professional legal advice or delay in seeking legal advice because of something you have read on this website. Gowling WLG professionals will be pleased to discuss resolutions to specific legal concerns you may have.

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Assignments: why you need to serve a notice of assignment

It's the day of completion; security is taken, assignments are completed and funds move. Everyone breathes a sigh of relief. At this point, no-one wants to create unnecessary paperwork – not even the lawyers! Notices of assignment are, in some circumstances, optional. However, in other transactions they could be crucial to a lender's enforcement strategy. In the article below, we have given you the facts you need to consider when deciding whether or not you need to serve notice.

What's the issue?

Assignments are useful tools for adding flexibility to banking transactions. They enable the transfer of one party's rights under a contract to a new party (for example, the right to receive an income stream or a debt) and allow security to be taken over intangible assets which might be unsuitable targets for a fixed charge. A lender's security net will often include assignments over contracts (such as insurance or material contracts), intellectual property rights, investments or receivables.

An assignment can be a legal assignment or an equitable assignment. If a legal assignment is required, the assignment must comply with a set of formalities set out in s136 of the Law of Property Act 1925, which include the requirement to give notice to the contract counterparty.

The main difference between legal and equitable assignments (other than the formalities required to create them) is that with a legal assignment, the assignee can usually bring an action against the contract counterparty in its own name following assignment. However, with an equitable assignment, the assignee will usually be required to join in proceedings with the assignor (unless the assignee has been granted specific powers to circumvent that). That may be problematic if the assignor is no longer available or interested in participating.

Why should we serve a notice of assignment?

The legal status of the assignment may affect the credit scoring that can be given to a particular class of assets. It may also affect a lender's ability to effect part of its exit strategy if that strategy requires the lender to be able to deal directly with the contract counterparty.

The case of General Nutrition Investment Company (GNIC) v Holland and Barrett International Ltd and another (H&B) provides an example of an equitable assignee being unable to deal directly with a contract counterparty as a result of a failure to provide a notice of assignment. The case concerned the assignment of a trade mark licence to GNIC. The other party to the licence agreement was H&B. H&B had not received notice of the assignment. GNIC tried to terminate the licence agreement for breach by serving a notice of termination. H&B disputed the termination. By this point in time the original licensor had been dissolved and so was unable to assist. At a hearing of preliminary issues, the High Court held that the notices of termination served by GNIC, as an equitable assignee, were invalid, because no notice of the assignment had been given to the licensee. Although only a High Court decision, this follows a Court of Appeal decision in the Warner Bros Records Inc v Rollgreen Ltd case, which was decided in the context of the attempt to exercise an option.

In both cases, an equitable assignee attempted to exercise a contractual right that would change the contractual relationship between the parties (i.e. by terminating the contractual relationship or exercising an option to extend the term of a licence). The judge in GNIC felt that "in each case, the counterparty (the recipient of the relevant notice) is entitled to see that the potential change in his contractual position is brought about by a person who is entitled, and whom he can see to be entitled, to bring about that change".

In a security context, this could hamper the ability of a lender to maximise the value of the secured assets but yet is a constraint that, in most transactions, could be easily avoided.

Why not serve notice?

Sometimes it's just not necessary or desirable. For example:

• If security is being taken over a large number of low value receivables or contracts, the time and cost involved in giving notice may be disproportionate to the additional value gained by obtaining a legal rather than an equitable assignment.
• If enforcement action were required, the equitable assignee typically has the option to join in the assignor to any proceedings (if it could not be waived by the court) and provision could be made in the assignment deed for the assignor to assist in such situations. Powers of attorney are also typically granted so that a lender can bring an action in the assignor's name.
• Enforcement is often not considered to be a significant issue given that the vast majority of assignees will never need to bring claims against the contract counterparty.

Care should however, be taken in all circumstances where the underlying contract contains a ban on assignment, as the contract counterparty would not have to recognise an assignment that is made in contravention of that ban. Furthermore, that contravention in itself may trigger termination and/or other rights in the assigned contract, that could affect the value of any underlying security.

What about acknowledgements of notices?

A simple acknowledgement of service of notice is simply evidence of the notice having been received. However, these documents often contain commitments or assurances by the contract counterparty which increase their value to the assignee.

Each transaction is different and the weighting given to each element of the security package will depend upon the nature of the debt and the borrower's business. The service of a notice of assignment may be a necessity or an optional extra. In each case, the question of whether to serve notice is best considered with your advisers at the start of a transaction to allow time for the lender's priorities to be highlighted to the borrowers and captured within the documents.

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Deed of Assignment and the Notice of Assignment -What is the Difference?

In this article, Richard Gray barrister takes a brief look at the differences between a Deed of Assignment and a Notice of Assignment and the effect of the assignment on the contracting party

At the end of 2020, Elysium Law were instructed to act for a significant number of clients in relation to claims made by a company known as Felicitas Solutions Ltd (an Isle of Man Company) for recovery of loans which had been assigned out of various trust companies following loan planning entered into by various employees/contractors.

Following our detailed response, as to which please see the article on our website written by my colleague Ruby Keeler-Williams , the threatened litigation by way of debt claims seem to disappear. It is important to note that the original loans had been assigned by various Trustees to Felicitas, by reason of which, Felicitas stood in the shoes of the original creditor, which allowed the threatened action to be pursued.

After a period of inertia, Our Clients, as well as others, have been served with demand letters by a new assignee known as West 28 th Street Ltd . Accompanying the demand letters is a Notice of Assignment, by reason of which the Assignee has informed the alleged debtor of the Assignees right to enforce the debt.

Following two conferences we held last week and a number of phone call enquiries which we have received, we have been asked to comment upon the purport and effect of the Notice of Assignment, which the alleged debtors have received. Questions such as what does this mean (relating to the content) but more importantly is the ‘Notice’ valid?

Here I want to look briefly at the differences between the two documents.

There is no need for payment to make the assignment valid and therefore it is normally created by Deed.

 The creation of a legal assignment is governed by Section 136 of the Law of Property Act 1925:

136 Legal assignments of things in action.

(1)Any absolute assignment by writing under the hand of the assignor (not purporting to be by way of charge only) of any debt or other legal thing in action, of which express notice in writing has been given to the debtor, trustee or other person from whom the assignor would have been entitled to claim such debt or thing in action, is effectual in law (subject to equities having priority over the right of the assignee) to pass and transfer from the date of such notice—

(a) the legal right to such debt or thing in action;

(b) all legal and other remedies for the same; and

(c) the power to give a good discharge for the same without the concurrence of the assignor:

Some of the basic requirements for a legal assignment are;

• The assignment must not be subject to conditions.
• The rights to be assigned must not relate to only part of a debt, or other legal chose in action.
• The assignment must be in writing and signed by the assignor.
• The other party or parties to the agreement must be given notice of the assignment.

Notice of assignment

To create a legal assignment, section 136 requires that express notice in writing of the assignment must be given to the other contracting party (the debtor).

Notice must be in writing

Section 136 of the LPA 1925 requires “express notice in writing” to be given to the other original contracting party (or parties).

 Must the notice take any particular form?

The short answer is no. Other than the requirement that it is in writing, there is no prescribed form for the notice of assignment or its contents. However, common sense suggests that the notice must clearly identify the agreement concerned.

Can we  challenge the Notice?

No. You can challenge the validity of the assignment assignment by ‘attacking the Deed, which must conform with Section 136. In this specific case, the Notice sent by West 28 th Street in itself is valid. Clearly, any claims made must be effected by a compliant Deed and it is that which will require detailed consideration before any right to claim under the alleged debt is considered.

Can I demand sight of the assignment agreement

On receiving a notice of assignment, you may seek to satisfy yourself that the assignment has in fact taken place. The Court of Appeal has confirmed that this is a valid concern, but that does not give an automatic right to require sight of the assignment agreement.

In Van Lynn Developments Limited v Pelias Construction Co [1969]1QB 607  Lord  Denning said:

“After receiving the notice, the debtor will be entitled, of course, to require a sight of the assignment so as to be satisfied that it is valid…”

The Court of Appeal subsequently confirmed this  stating the contracting party is entitled to satisfy itself that a valid absolute assignment has taken place, so that it can be confident the assignee can give it a good discharge of its obligations

The important document is the Deed of Assignment, which sets out the rights assigned by the Assignor. The Notice of Assignment is simply a communication that there has been an assignment. The deed is governed by Section 136 of the LP 1925. It should be possible to obtain a copy of the Deed prior to any action taken in respect of it.

For more information on the claims by West 28 th Street or if advice is needed on the drafting of a Deed, then please call us on 0151-328-1968 or visit www.elysium-law.com .

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Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, September 3, 2024

Angelica Evans, Nicole Wolkov, Grace Mappes, Davit Gasparyan and Frederick W. Kagan

September 3, 2024, 8:10pm ET

Click here to see ISW’s interactive map of the Russian invasion of Ukraine. This map is updated daily alongside the static maps present in this report.

Click here to see ISW's interactive map of Ukraine's offensive in Kursk Oblast.

Click here to see ISW’s 3D control of terrain topographic map of Ukraine. Use of a computer (not a mobile device) is strongly recommended for using this data-heavy tool.

Click here to access ISW’s archive of interactive time-lapse maps of the Russian invasion of Ukraine. These maps complement the static control-of-terrain map that ISW produces daily by showing a dynamic frontline. ISW will update this time-lapse map archive monthly.

Note: The data cut-off for this product was 1:30 pm ET on September 3. ISW will cover subsequent reports in the September 4 Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment.

NOTE: ISW is introducing a new section of the Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, "Ukrainian Operations in the Russian Federation," in which ISW will track Ukrainian ground attacks, offensive operations, and long-range strikes within Russia. ISW will hereafter report on tactical updates on Ukrainian offensive operations in Kursk Oblast in this section, unless there is a major inflection in the situation on the ground. ISW will also track Ukrainian long-range strikes on targets within the Russian Federation in this section. ISW will not, however, offer assessments about Ukrainian objectives or capabilities in this new section.

Russian forces struck civilian infrastructure and a military educational facility in Poltava City with two Iskander-M ballistic missiles, killing and wounding a significant number of people, as part of a wider strike series on the night of September 2 to 3. The Ukrainian Air Force reported that Russian forces launched three Iskander-M/North Korean KN-23 ballistic missiles from occupied Crimea, a Kh-59/69 cruise missile from Kursk Oblast, and 35 Shahed-136/131 drones from Kursk Oblast and occupied Cape Chauda, Crimea.[1] The Ukrainian Air Force reported that Ukrainian forces downed 27 Shahed drones over Kyiv, Odesa, Kharkiv, Mykolaiv, Kherson, Poltava, Chernihiv, and Sumy oblasts, that six Shaheds did not strike their target, and that two Shahed drones flew toward Belgorod Oblast and occupied Donetsk Oblast.[2] Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky and Ukrainian Commander-in-Chief General Oleksandr Syrskyi reported that two Iskander missiles struck a military educational institution and a nearby hospital in Poltava City, partially destroying a building at the Poltava Military Communications Institute.[3] Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky stated the strike killed at least 51 and injured at least 271.[4] Zelensky highlighted Ukraine's need for more air defense systems and interceptors and called on Western countries to lift restrictions on Ukrainian forces conducting long-range strikes against military targets within Russia as such restrictions inhibit Ukraine from defending against long-range Russian strikes.[5] Ukrainian Foreign Minister Dmytro Kuleba told CNN on September 3 that only Patriot and SAMP/T air defense systems are capable of intercepting Russia's ballistic missiles.[6] Russian milbloggers celebrated the strike and amplified footage of the strike and its aftermath.[7]

The wider impacts of the Ukrainian incursion into Kursk Oblast on the war and any envisioned diplomatic solution to the war are not yet clear, and assessments of these impacts are premature. Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky stated during an interview with NBC on September 3 that Ukrainian forces are "conceptually" planning to hold territory in Kursk Oblast for an unspecified period of time, but did not offer further details about Ukraine's objectives for the incursion due to concerns about operational security.[8] Zelensky reiterated that the Ukrainian incursion is an aspect of Ukraine's "victory plan" to end the war on just terms and bring Russia to the negotiating table.[9] Zelensky noted that Ukraine intends to exchange Russian prisoners of war (POWs) captured in Kursk Oblast for Ukrainian POWs currently in Russian captivity and reiterated that one of the goals of the incursion was to force Russia to redeploy troops from the frontline throughout Ukraine, particularly eastern Ukraine. Zelensky stated that Russia has diverted roughly 60,000 troops from Ukraine to Kursk Oblast, and Ukrainian Commander-in-Chief General Oleksandr Syrskyi reported on August 27 that Russia has redeployed over 30,000 troops from the frontline in Ukraine to Kursk Oblast.[10] ISW has observed indications for several weeks that the Russian military command was redeploying forces from northern Kharkiv Oblast, the Kupyansk-Svatove-Kreminna line, and western Zaporizhia Oblast to Kursk Oblast and recently observed indications that the Russian military command is redeploying forces likely intended for future higher priority offensive operations in the Pokrovsk direction to Kursk Oblast.[11] Russian President Vladimir Putin has thus far avoided redeploying the type of combat effective and experienced frontline units that will likely be necessary to push Ukrainian forces from Kursk Oblast, and Zelensky's statement suggests that Ukrainian forces will likely maintain positions in the over 1,100 square kilometers of territory where Ukrainian forces are reportedly operating in Kursk Oblast until Putin chooses to commit such forces. ISW assesses that Putin is attempting to preserve the Russian drive on Pokrovsk at the expense of delaying the clearing of Kursk but that the incursion is likely to have a variety of other important impacts on Russian military operations over various time periods regardless of its impact on the current Pokrovsk operation.[12]

While the Ukrainian incursion into Kursk Oblast appears to be having operational-level impacts on the Russian military, the incursion has likely not yet shifted Putin's strategic-level thinking . ISW assesses that Putin maintains that Russia can slowly and indefinitely subsume Ukraine through grinding advances and that Russia can achieve its goals through a war of attrition against Ukrainian forces and by outlasting Western support for Ukraine — assessments that make Putin averse to peace negotiations on terms other than Ukrainian and Western capitulation to his demands.[13]

Attempts to assess the impacts of the Ukrainian incursion at this premature stage will likely come to partial and inaccurate conclusions about Ukraine's ability to change the trajectory of the conflict and the Kremlin's appetite for peace negotiations on acceptable terms. Ukrainian counteroffensives in Fall 2022 both successfully pushed the frontline back from Kharkiv City – Ukraine's second largest city – and liberated Kherson City and established a defensible frontline along the Dnipro River.[14] Ukraine demonstrated its ability to conduct operationally significant counteroffensive operations and liberate large swaths of territory when properly aided and equipped by the West in Fall 2022, and the assumption that Ukraine is permanently unable to conduct future counteroffensive operations that result in operationally significant gains with timely and reliable deliveries of Western aid is premature. Delays in the provision of Western aid, among other factors, hindered the Ukrainian 2023 counteroffensive and generated a military crisis in Ukraine in 2024 from which Ukraine is still attempting to recover.[15] Russian forces were able to make tactically significant advances in northern Kharkiv Oblast and Donetsk Oblast in Spring and early Summer 2024 in large part because of the shortages of artillery and air defense munitions caused by the suspension of US military assistance.[16] ISW continues to assess that prompt and reliable Western security assistance will be critical to Ukraine's ability to conduct future counteroffensive operations, and that the US and wider Western alliance can make decisions to redress Ukrainian materiel constraints caused by delays in Western security assistance.[17]

Russia will very likely resolve to continue its genocidal war against Ukraine unless faced with significant battlefield setbacks and strong Western support for Ukraine, and it is highly unlikely that any foreseeable Russian leader after Putin will be more amenable to peace negotiations and a just resolution to the war. The Kremlin has spent years denying the existence of a Ukrainian nation and delegitimizing Ukrainian sovereignty, and this effort has had widespread and likely long-term impacts on Russian society and elite opinion.[18] Russian officials in both Putin's inner circle and the wider Russian government have publicly stated their aversion to peace negotiations with Ukraine on terms other than capitulation, and Putin's successor is far more likely to hold such views than to reject them in the absence of significant Russian setbacks.[19] A negotiated ceasefire on current lines and under current circumstances will only benefit Russia and will afford the Kremlin time to further radicalize and militarize Russian society against Ukraine and the Russian military time to rest and reconstitute, likely before conducting a future attack on Ukraine.[20] The Ukrainian incursion into Kursk Oblast has highlighted that the war in Ukraine is not indefinitely stalemated, however, and shown that Ukraine, Russia, and the West maintain the ability to make decisions that significantly impact current battlefield realities and the future end state of the war.

Reuters reported that the US is considering providing Ukraine with long range Joint Air-to-Surface Standoff Missiles (JASSMs) but that Ukraine would not receive the missiles for months . Reuters reported, citing three sources including US officials, that the US is close to an agreement to provide JASSMs to Ukraine and that the missiles would be announced in a military assistance package in Fall 2024 but that the US has not yet finalized the deal.[21] Reuters noted that the JASSM has only been integrated into US-designed aircraft, and one US official told Reuters that "there were efforts" to integrate the JASSM with other fighter jets in Ukraine's air fleet. The standard JASSM has a range of roughly 370 kilometers, and the extended-range JASSM (JASSM-ER) has a range of about 1,000 kilometers.[22] Reuters reported that it is unclear which variant the US would send to Ukraine under this deal, although both variants have ranges longer than the maximum range of ATACMS missiles that the US has already provided to Ukraine.[23] ISW has previously assessed that there are at least 245 Russian military objects — at least 85 percent of which are not airfields — within range of ATACMS, and even just the standard JASSM launched from over Ukrainian airspace would likely further expand the set of military objects within Russia that would be in range of Ukrainian missiles.[24] It is unclear whether Ukraine would be able to take advantage of the JASSM's extended range given that current US policy restricts Ukraine from using the US-provided long-range precision weapons to strike military targets in Russia.[25] ISW continues to assess that current US restrictions on Ukraine's ability to use US-provided weapons to strike military targets within Russia and the slow provision of small numbers of such weapons are actively hindering Ukraine's ability to conduct offensive operations and substantially disrupt Russian operations.[26]

Russian President Vladimir Putin concluded his trip to Mongolia by signing agreements that strengthen bilateral economic ties and trilateral energy relations between Russia, Mongolia and the People's Republic of China (PRC). [27] Putin and Mongolian President Ukhnaagiin Khurelsukh emphasized increasing projects under the Mongolia-Russia-China Economic Corridor program, which supports the Russian “Greater Eurasian partnership” economic initiative, China’s “One Belt, One Road” initiative, and Mongolia’s “Steppe Road” development plan.[28] Putin emphasized that the Soyuz Vostok gas pipeline connecting Russia, Mongolia, and the PRC is fully constructed and awaits state examination.[29] Putin invited Kurelsukh to the BRICS forum in Fall 2024 and suggested that Mongolia join the BRICS Plus/Outreach format.[30] Mongolia is also reportedly close to completing a temporary trade agreement with the Russian-led Eurasian Economic Union (EAEU).[31] Russia and Mongolia also signed bilateral agreements to increase oil and petroleum product exports from Russia to Mongolia, and Putin announced that Russian energy company Inter RAO will assist in restoring Ulaanbaatar Thermal Power Plant No. 3 (TPP-3).[32]

South African President Cyril Ramaphosa and People's Republic of China (PRC) President Xi Jinping issued a joint statement praising each other’s purported efforts to address the war in Ukraine. The two presidents released a joint statement on September 2 expressing support for the joint PRC–Brazilian proposal on the “Political Settlement of the Ukraine Crisis” and the African Union’s efforts to solve the war in Ukraine.[33] The two leaders affirmed that inclusive dialogue and peaceful negotiations are essential for a lasting solution to the war and called on Russia and Ukraine to adhere to three key principles that favor Russia: avoiding battlefield expansion, preventing escalation of fighting, and refraining from provocations. ISW continues to assess that the PRC's peace plan is favorable to Russia and that several African states seek to balance Ukraine and Russia to maintain longstanding bilateral relationships with Russia without officially voicing support for Russia.[34]

Key Takeaways:

• Russian forces struck civilian infrastructure and a military educational facility in Poltava City with two Iskander-M ballistic missiles, killing and wounding a significant number of people, as part of a wider strike series on the night of September 2 to 3.
• The wider impacts of the Ukrainian incursion into Kursk Oblast on the war and any envisioned diplomatic solution to the war are not yet clear, and assessments of these impacts are premature.
• Attempts to assess the impacts of the Ukrainian incursion at this premature stage will likely come to partial and inaccurate conclusions about Ukraine's ability to change the trajectory of the conflict and the Kremlin's appetite for peace negotiations on acceptable terms.
• Reuters reported that the US is considering providing Ukraine with long range Joint Air-to-Surface Standoff Missiles (JASSMs) but that Ukraine would not receive the missiles for months .
• Russian President Vladimir Putin concluded his trip to Mongolia by signing agreements that strengthen bilateral economic ties and trilateral energy relations between Russia, Mongolia, and the People's Republic of China (PRC).
• South African President Cyril Ramaphosa and People's Republic of China (PRC) President Xi Jinping issued a joint statement praising each other’s purported efforts to address the war in Ukraine.
• Russian forces recently advanced near Toretsk and Pokrovsk and southwest of Donetsk City.
• Russian occupation authorities continue to advertise Russian military service to civilians in occupied Ukraine.

We do not report in detail on Russian war crimes because these activities are well-covered in Western media and do not directly affect the military operations we are assessing and forecasting. We will continue to evaluate and report on the effects of these criminal activities on the Ukrainian military and the Ukrainian population and specifically on combat in Ukrainian urban areas. We utterly condemn Russian violations of the laws of armed conflict and the Geneva Conventions and crimes against humanity even though we do not describe them in these reports.

Ukrainian Operations in the Russian Federation

• Russian Main Effort – Eastern Ukraine (comprised of three subordinate main efforts)
• Russian Subordinate Main Effort #1 – Push Ukrainian forces back from the international border with Belgorod Oblast and approach to within tube artillery range of Kharkiv City
• Russian Subordinate Main Effort #2 – Capture the remainder of Luhansk Oblast and push westward into eastern Kharkiv Oblast and encircle northern Donetsk Oblast
• Russian Subordinate Main Effort #3 – Capture the entirety of Donetsk Oblast
• Russian Supporting Effort – Southern Axis
• Russian Air, Missile, and Drone Campaign
• Russian Mobilization and Force Generation Efforts
• Russian Technological Adaptations
• Activities in Russian-occupied areas
• Ukrainian Defense Industrial Base Efforts

Russian Information Operations and Narratives

• Significant Activity in Belarus

Russian sources claimed that Ukrainian forces continued ground attacks in Kursk Oblast but did not advance on September 3. The Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) and other Russian sources claimed that Ukrainian forces attacked near Komarovka (southwest of Korenevo), Korenevo, Olgovka (east of Korenevo), Cherkasskoye Porechnoye (north of Sudzha), and Borki (southeast of Sudzha).[35] A Russian milblogger claimed that Ukrainian forces are still in Olgovka but that the settlement is contested.[36] Another Russian milblogger claimed that Ukrainian forces are consolidating positions in Kursk Oblast.[37] One Russian source claimed that Russian forces are counterattacking near Aleksandrovka (northeast of Korenevo).[38] Elements of the Russian 810th Naval Infantry Brigade (Black Sea Fleet [BSF]) are reportedly operating near Sheptukhovka (northeast of Korenevo), and elements of the 56th Airborne (VDV) Regiment (7th VDV Division) are reportedly operating near Korenevo.[39]

Russian sources claimed that Ukrainian forces attempted to strike Migalovo military Air Base near Tver City with drones on the night of September 2 to 3. Russian sources amplified footage purportedly showing Russian air defenses attempting to intercept Ukrainian drones near Migalovo Air Base.[40] Footage published on September 3 purportedly shows a smoke cloud over Kalininskyi Raion, Tver Oblast.[41] Neither Russian nor Ukrainian official sources have commented on the strike.

Russian Main Effort – Eastern Ukraine

Russian Subordinate Main Effort #1 – Kharkiv Oblast ( Russian objective: Push Ukrainian forces back from the international border with Belgorod Oblast and approach to within tube artillery range of Kharkiv City)

Russian forces continued ground attacks northeast of Kharkiv City in Vovchansk on September 3, but there were no confirmed changes to the frontline.[42] The Ukrainian Kharkiv Group of Forces reported that an engineering element of the Russian 11th Tank Regiment (18th Motorized Rifle Division, 11th Army Corps, Leningrad Military District [LMD]) arrived at an advanced Russian position near Hlyboke (north of Kharkiv City) and that elements of the Russian 82nd Motorized Rifle Regiment (69th Motorized Rifle Division, 6th Combined Arms Army [CAA], LMD) conducted an internal rotation near Vovchansk.[43]

Russian Subordinate Main Effort #2 – Luhansk Oblast (Russian objective: Capture the remainder of Luhansk Oblast and push westward into eastern Kharkiv Oblast and northern Donetsk Oblast)

Russian forces continued offensive operations along the Kupyansk-Svatove-Kreminna line on September 3, but did not make any confirmed advances. A Russian military expert claimed on September 3 that Russian forces recently advanced in Nevske and Hrekivka (both northwest of Kreminna).[44] Russian forces continued ground attacks northeast of Kupyansk near Synkivka; east of Kupyansk near Petropavlivka; northwest of Svatove near Hlushkivka, Kolisynkivka, Stelmakhivka, and Berestove; southwest of Svatove near Tverdokhlibove, Chereshchyna, Druzhelyubivka, Hrekivka, Makiivka, Nevske, and Novosadove; west of Kreminna near Torske and Terny; and south of Kreminna in the Serebryanske forest area on September 2 and 3.[45] Elements of the Russian 144th Motorized Rifle Division (20th Combined Arms Army [CAA], Moscow Military District [MMD]) are reportedly operating along the Svatove-Kreminna line.[46]

Russian Subordinate Main Effort #3 – Donetsk Oblast (Russian objective: Capture the entirety of Donetsk Oblast, the claimed territory of Russia’s proxies in Donbas)

Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Siversk direction on September 3, but there were no confirmed changes to the frontline. A Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces advanced east of Pereizne (south of Siversk) and consolidated positions on the outskirts of the settlement, although ISW has not observed confirmation of this claim.[47] Russian forces continued offensive operations east of Siversk near Verkhnokamyanske and southeast of Siversk near Vyimka, Spirne, and Ivano-Darivka on September 2 and 3.[48] Drone operators of the Russian 106th Airborne (VDV) Division are reportedly operating in the Siversk direction.[49]

Russian forces continued offensive operations near Chasiv Yar on September 3, but there were no confirmed changes to the frontline. A Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces advanced in southeastern Hryhorivka (northeast of Chasiv Yar) and within the Zhovtnevyi Microraion in eastern Chasiv Yar.[50] Russian forces continued offensive operations near Chasiv Yar; north of Chasiv Yar near Kalynivka; south of Chasiv Yar near Stupochky and Bila Hora; and southeast of Chasiv Yar near Klishchiivka and Andriivka on September 2 and 3.[51] The spokesperson for a Ukrainian brigade operating in the Chasiv Yar direction reported on September 3 that Russian infantry units are attacking in company-sized groups of two to eight personnel and that Russian forces are currently using fewer glide bombs in this direction than Russian forces used in Spring and early Summer 2024.[52] The spokesperson estimated that Russian forces currently have a two-to-one artillery fire advantage over Ukrainian forces in the area. Elements of the Russian 98th VDV Division and 88th "Hispaniola" Volunteer Brigade (Russian Volunteer Corps) are reportedly operating near Chasiv Yar.[53]

Russian forces recently marginally advanced northeast of Toretsk amid continued assaults in the area on September 3. Geolocated footage published on September 3 indicates that Russian forces recently marginally advanced in northwestern Druzhba (northeast of Toretsk).[54] A Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces completely seized Druzhba, although ISW has not observed visual confirmation of this maximalist claim.[55] Russian forces continued offensive operations near Toretsk and south of Toretsk near Nelipivka on September 2 and 3.[56]

Russian forces recently advanced southeast of Pokrovsk amid continued offensive operations east and southeast of the town on September 3. Geolocated footage published on September 3 indicates that Russian forces recently advanced into southwestern Halytsynivka (southeast of Pokrovsk), and ISW assesses that Russian forces have likely seized the settlement.[57] A Ukrainian officer operating in the Pokrovsk direction reported on September 2 that Ukrainian forces withdrew from Novohrodivka (southeast of Pokrovsk) to preserve the lives of Ukrainian servicemembers, indicating that Russian forces have likely seized Novohrodivka.[58] Russian milbloggers claimed that Russian forces seized Nevelske (southeast of Pokrovsk) and advanced southeast of Pokrovsk in the fields northwest of Nevelske, north of Zhelanne Pershe, and west and south of Lysivka.[59] ISW has not observed confirmation of these claims, however. A Ukrainian military observer stated that Russian forces are roughly eight kilometers from Pokrovsk, which is consistent with ISW's assessed extent of Russian advances in the area, and that Russian company-sized groups of three to six personnel with drone support are conducting reconnaissance-in-force operations against Ukrainian positions in the area.[60] The Ukrainian military observer noted that Russian forces are not conducting armored assaults and that Russian forces are suffering significant manpower losses in the Pokrovsk direction. Russian forces continued offensive operations east of Pokrovsk near Kalynove, Vozdvyzhenka, Zelene Pole, Myrolyubivka, Mykhailivka, Hrodivka, and Krutyi Yar and southeast of Pokrovsk near Novohrodivka, Selydove, Ukrainsk, and Halytsynivka on September 2 and 3.[61]

Russian forces reportedly recently advanced west of Donetsk City amid continued offensive operations west and southwest of Donetsk City on September 3. A Russian milblogger claimed that elements of the Russian 5th and 110th motorized rifle brigades (both of the 51st Combined Arms Army [CAA], formerly the 1st Donetsk People's Republic Army Corps [DNR AC]) conducted a mechanized attack of an unspecified size in western Krasnohorivka (west of Donetsk City) seized a windbreak in the area.[62] A Ukrainian brigade operating in the Kurakhove (west of Donetsk City) direction published footage on September 2 of Ukrainian forces repelling a Russian roughly reduced-company sized mechanized assault in an unspecified area in the Kurakhove direction.[63] Fighting also continued west of Donetsk City near Heorhiivka and Maksymilyanivka on September 2 and 3.[64]

Russian forces reportedly marginally advanced southwest of Donetsk City near Vuhledar amid continued offensive operations in the area on September 3. Russian milbloggers claimed that Russian forces advanced 4.17 kilometers deep along a 5.78-kilometer-wide front from Pavlivka (southwest of Vuhledar) towards Prechystivka (west of Vuhledar and northwest of Pavlivka), into central Prechystivka, and in fields east of Prechystivka.[65] Russian milbloggers continued to claim that these advances were due to a Russian mechanized assault against Prechystivka in the past few days, but ISW has still not observed visual confirmation of the assault or of the purported advances.[66] A milblogger claimed that Russian forces also advanced east of Vodyane (northeast of Vuhledar).[67] Milbloggers claimed that Russian forces are attempting to envelop or encircle Ukrainian forces in Vuhledar from the east and southwest.[68] Russian forces also continued ground attacks southwest of Donetsk City near Kostyantynivka, Vuhledar, and Vodyane on September 2 and 3.[69] Elements of the Russian 238th Artillery Brigade (8th CAA, Southern Military District [SMD]) reportedly continue firing on targets near Kostyantynivka.[70]

Neither Russian nor Ukrainian sources reported fighting in the Donetsk-Zaporizhia Oblast border area on September 3.

Russian Supporting Effort – Southern Axis (Russian objective: Maintain frontline positions and secure rear areas against Ukrainian strikes)

Fighting continued in western Zaporizhia Oblast near Robotyne, Novoandriivka (north of Robotyne), and Mala Tokmachka (northeast of Robotyne) on September 3, but there were no confirmed changes to the frontline.[71] A Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces advanced in fields north of Robotyne, but ISW has not observed confirmation of this claim.[72] Elements of the Russian 71st Motorized Rifle Regiment (42nd Motorized Rifle Division, 58th Combined Arms Army [CAA], Southern Military District [SMD]) are reportedly operating near Robotyne.[73]

Limited fighting continued in east (left) bank Kherson Oblast on September 3.[74]

Russian Air, Missile, and Drone Campaign (Russian Objective: Target Ukrainian military and civilian infrastructure in the rear and on the frontline)

See topline text.

Russian Mobilization and Force Generation Efforts (Russian objective: Expand combat power without conducting general mobilization)

Russian occupation authorities continue to advertise Russian military service to civilians in occupied Ukraine. The Kherson Oblast occupation administration offered on September 3 a one-time payment of 400,000 rubles (about $4,600) and a 210,000-ruble (about $2,400) minimum monthly salary to individuals who sign service contracts with the Russian military.[75] The Kherson Oblast occupation administration advertised that individuals who sign military service contracts will receive combat veteran status, which would entitle them to social and economic benefits.

Russian Technological Adaptations (Russian objective: Introduce technological innovations to optimize systems for use in Ukraine)

Nothing significant to report.

Ukrainian Defense Industrial Efforts (Ukrainian objective: Develop its defense industrial base to become more self-sufficient in cooperation with US, European, and international partners)

ISW is suspending publishing coverage of Ukrainian defense industrial efforts until further notice.

Activities in Russian-occupied areas (Russian objective: Consolidate administrative control of annexed areas; forcibly integrate Ukrainian citizens into Russian sociocultural, economic, military, and governance systems)

ISW is not publishing coverage of occupied areas today.

Russian officials attempted to distract from the International Criminal Court's (ICC) arrest warrant for Russian President Vladimir Putin by discrediting the ICC amid Putin’s visit to Mongolia. Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA) Spokesperson Maria Zakharova claimed without offering any basis on September 3 that Ukraine is negotiating with the ICC to secure an exemption from the ICC's jurisdiction, allegedly enabling Ukrainian forces to commit war crimes without accountability.[76] Zakharova’s statement comes during Putin’s visit to Mongolia, which failed to arrest Putin under this warrant despite having a legal obligation to do so as a signatory of the ICC Rome Statue.[77] Russia itself has repeatedly stated that it does not recognize the jurisdiction of the ICC.[78]

Russia continues to expand its informational reach by establishing an office of Russian state newswire TASS in Myanmar. Burmese Union Solidarity and Development Party Head Khin Yi gave an interview to TASS on September 3 announcing the new TASS office in Myanmar and claiming that it will provide the international community with an “accurate” picture of events in the country.[79] TASS recently claimed that it has 62 international offices in 57 countries.[80] Khin Yi also highlighted that Myanmar could benefit from Russia’s efforts to organize and conduct elections, drawing a parallel to Myanmar’s upcoming elections in 2025. Khin Yi also claimed that Burmese officials are collaborating with the ruling United Russia Party on domestic Burmese legislation.[81]

Significant activity in Belarus (Russian efforts to increase its military presence in Belarus and further integrate Belarus into Russian-favorable frameworks and Wagner Group activity in Belarus)

Note: ISW does not receive any classified material from any source, uses only publicly available information, and draws extensively on Russian, Ukrainian, and Western reporting and social media as well as commercially available satellite imagery and other geospatial data as the basis for these reports. References to all sources used are provided in the endnotes of each update.

[1] https://t.me/kpszsu/18697

[2] https://t.me/kpszsu/18697

[3] https://t.me/V_Zelenskiy_official/11532 ; https://t.me/osirskiy/836 ; https://t.me/pgo_gov_ua/25875

[4] https://t.me/V_Zelenskiy_official/11537

[5] https://t.me/V_Zelenskiy_official/11533

[6] https://www.cnn.com/2024/09/03/europe/ukraine-poltava-russia-attack-intl/index.html

[7] https://t.me/warhistoryalconafter/182736; https://t.me/rybar/63242 ; https://t.me/z_arhiv/27954 ; https://t.me/motopatriot/27158 ; https://t.me/boris_rozhin/135998 ; https://t.me/dva_majors/51443 ; https://t.me/milinfolive/129809 ; https://t.me/vysokygovorit/17184

[8] https://www.nbcnews.com/news/world/zelenskyy-ukraine-russia-territory-seized-putin-kursk-rcna169280

[9] https://www.nbcnews.com/news/world/zelenskyy-ukraine-russia-territory-seized-putin-kursk-rcna169280 ; https://isw.pub/UkrWar082724

[10] https://isw.pub/UkrWar082724

[11] https://isw.pub/UkrWar083124

[12] https://isw.pub/UkrWar082924

[13] https://isw.pub/UkrWar060724

[14] https://isw.pub/UkrWar120422 ; https://isw.pub/UkrWar111222 ; https://isw.pub/RusCampaignOct5

[15] https://isw.pub/UkrWar042024 ; https://isw.pub/UkrWar041824 ; https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-april-14-2024 ; https://isw.pub/UkrWar060724 ; https://isw.pub/UkrWar051124 ; https://isw.pub/UkrWar052424

[16] https://isw.pub/UkrWar072624 ; https://isw.pub/UkrWar08072024 ; https://isw.pub/UkrWar053124 ; https://isw.pub/UkrWar042724

[17] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-august-21-2024-0 ; https://isw.pub/UkrWar012324 ; https://isw.pub/UkrWar072424

[18] https://isw.pub/UkrWar112322 ; https://isw.pub/UkrWar010523 ; https://www.wilsoncenter.org/blog-post/putins-dehumanized-russia ; https://uacrisis.org/en/degumanizatsiya

[19] https://isw.pub/UkrWar052624 ; https://isw.pub/UkrWar052424 ; https://isw.pub/UkrWar071124 ; https://isw.pub/UkrWar012724 ; https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-march-3-2024

[20] https://isw.pub/UkrWar070924 ; https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-july-2-2024

[21] https://www.reuters.com/world/us-close-agreeing-long-range-missiles-ukraine-delivery-take-months-2024-09-03/;

[22] https://missilethreat.csis.org/missile/jassm/

[23] https://www.reuters.com/world/us-close-agreeing-long-range-missiles-ukraine-delivery-take-months-2024-09-03/;

[24] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/interactive-map-hundreds-known-russian-military-objects-are-range-atacms

[25] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/interactive-map-hundreds-known-russian-military-objects-are-range-atacms

[26] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/interactive-map-hundreds-known-russian-military-objects-are-range-atacms; https://isw.pub/UkrWar070724; https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-august-15-2024

[27] http://kremlin dot ru/events/president/news/74993

[28] http://kremlin dot ru/events/president/news/74993 ; https://t.me/tass_agency/270165 ; https://t.me/tass_agency/270170  

[29] http://kremlin dot ru/events/president/news/74993 ; https://t.me/tass_agency/270165 ; https://t.me/tass_agency/270170  

[30] https://t.me/tass_agency/270121 ; https://t.me/tass_agency/270124 ; https://t.me/tass_agency/270125  

[31] http://kremlin dot ru/events/president/transcripts/74992

[32] https://tass dot com/politics/1837501

[33] https://dirco dot gov.za/joint-statement-between-the-peoples-republic-of-china-and-the-republic-of-south-africa-on-the-occasion-of-the-second-state-visit-to-china-by-he-president-cyril-ramaphosa-and-the-establishment/ ; http://en.cppcc dot gov.cn/2024-09/03/c_1017982.htm ; https://t.me/tass_agency/270099

[34] https://isw.pub/UkrWar061723 ; https://isw.pub/UkrWar053124 ; https://isw.pub/UkrWar051624

[35] https://t.me/mod_russia/42926 ; https://t.me/dva_majors/51403 ; https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/14937

[36] https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/14937

[37] https://t.me/dva_majors/51403

[38] https://t.me/RVvoenkor/76247

[39] https://t.me/NgP_raZVedka/18931 ; https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/14937

[40] https://t.me/tver_chp/18293 ; https://t.me/milinfolive/129773 ; https://t.me/bazabazon/30903 ; https://t.me/vchkogpu/50607 ; https://t.me/mash/57276

[41] https://t.me/vchkogpu/50631

[42] https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0ab5BmUgbcWP5U7HYaCA29QkAEigE4dB75jLk8r6xNKwtEY5gu5ZskSwUxV9CVNqJl; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid02Sxt1KeryDAETE6N5tJ2sGikTK2Y3a8NPXE29VYeFaE6dSiGJYbjFypxUAFY44jx3l; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid016E1g1wyv4rqub4c6pJSiP5aziUBC73PZ7yddK4jHkFVGVWrEqMDJ4Ykzfo8dXuml

[43] https://t.me/otukharkiv/1068

[44] https://t.me/tass_agency/270114

[45]https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0ab5BmUgbcWP5U7HYaCA29QkAEigE4dB75jLk8r6xNKwtEY5gu5ZskSwUxV9CVNqJl; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid02Sxt1KeryDAETE6N5tJ2sGikTK2Y3a8NPXE29VYeFaE6dSiGJYbjFypxUAFY44jx3l; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid016E1g1wyv4rqub4c6pJSiP5aziUBC73PZ7yddK4jHkFVGVWrEqMDJ4Ykzfo8dXuml; https://t.me/tass_agency/270111; https://t.me/mod_russia/42922

[46] https://t.me/boris_rozhin/135937 ; https://t.me/vysokygovorit/17174

[47] https://t.me/motopatriot/27160

[48] https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0ab5BmUgbcWP5U7HYaCA29QkAEigE4dB75jLk8r6xNKwtEY5gu5ZskSwUxV9CVNqJl ; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid016E1g1wyv4rqub4c6pJSiP5aziUBC73PZ7yddK4jHkFVGVWrEqMDJ4Ykzfo8dXuml; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid02Sxt1KeryDAETE6N5tJ2sGikTK2Y3a8NPXE29VYeFaE6dSiGJYbjFypxUAFY44jx3l

[49] https://t.me/russian_airborne/7102 ; https://t.me/voin_dv/10588

[50] https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/14918

[51] https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0ab5BmUgbcWP5U7HYaCA29QkAEigE4dB75jLk8r6xNKwtEY5gu5ZskSwUxV9CVNqJl ; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid016E1g1wyv4rqub4c6pJSiP5aziUBC73PZ7yddK4jHkFVGVWrEqMDJ4Ykzfo8dXuml; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid02Sxt1KeryDAETE6N5tJ2sGikTK2Y3a8NPXE29VYeFaE6dSiGJYbjFypxUAFY44jx3l ; https://t.me/dva_majors/51403 ; https://t.me/wargonzo/21896

[52] https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=aDXWlQ2K0dM; https://suspilne dot media/donbas/827687-oborona-casovogo-aru-kabiv-stalo-mense-rf-zastosovue-nekerovani-aviaraketi/

[53] https://t.me/milinfolive/129779 ; https://t.me/milinfolive/129779

[54] https://t.me/creamy_caprice/6647; https://t.me/rubpak28/357

[55] https://t.me/voenkorKotenok/58762

[56] https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid02Sxt1KeryDAETE6N5tJ2sGikTK2Y3a8NPXE29VYeFaE6dSiGJYbjFypxUAFY44jx3l ; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0ab5BmUgbcWP5U7HYaCA29QkAEigE4dB75jLk8r6xNKwtEY5gu5ZskSwUxV9CVNqJl ; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid016E1g1wyv4rqub4c6pJSiP5aziUBC73PZ7yddK4jHkFVGVWrEqMDJ4Ykzfo8dXuml

[57] https://t.me/creamy_caprice/6646; https://www.facebook.com/119obtro/videos/1224038728628786/?mibextid=rS40aB7S9Ucbxw6v

[58] https://www.unian dot net/war/novogrodivka-boji-na-pokrovskomu-napryamku-12745791.html

[59] https://t.me/z_arhiv/27951 ; https://t.me/voenkorKotenok/58763

 ; https://t.me/milinfolive/129820 ; https://t.me/voenkorKotenok/58763

[60] https://t.me/ButusovPlus/13300 ; https://www.facebook.com/butusov.yuriy/posts/pfbid028idjwoUqJqxz8vMkaAmqE4xL5GqAfLFFYsCw9Yc2Fcr4grDKDPvF4eZMYfoDhU6hl

[61] https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0ab5BmUgbcWP5U7HYaCA29QkAEigE4dB75jLk8r6xNKwtEY5gu5ZskSwUxV9CVNqJl ; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid02Sxt1KeryDAETE6N5tJ2sGikTK2Y3a8NPXE29VYeFaE6dSiGJYbjFypxUAFY44jx3l ; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid016E1g1wyv4rqub4c6pJSiP5aziUBC73PZ7yddK4jHkFVGVWrEqMDJ4Ykzfo8dXuml ; https://t.me/dva_majors/51403 ; https://t.me/wargonzo/21896 ; https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/14930 ; https://t.me/RVvoenkor/76249 ;

[62] https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/14926

[63] https://t.me/odshbr79/326 ; https://x.com/666_mancer/status/1830844258380550161

[64] https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0ab5BmUgbcWP5U7HYaCA29QkAEigE4dB75jLk8r6xNKwtEY5gu5ZskSwUxV9CVNqJl; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid02Sxt1KeryDAETE6N5tJ2sGikTK2Y3a8NPXE29VYeFaE6dSiGJYbjFypxUAFY44jx3l; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid016E1g1wyv4rqub4c6pJSiP5aziUBC73PZ7yddK4jHkFVGVWrEqMDJ4Ykzfo8dXuml; https://t.me/wargonzo/21896; https://t.me/RVvoenkor/76249;

[65] https://t.me/dva_majors/51404; https://t.me/wargonzo/21896; https://t.me/z_arhiv/27948; https://t.me/RVvoenkor/76249; https://t.me/boris_rozhin/135972;

[66] https://t.me/RVvoenkor/76227; https://t.me/dva_majors/51403; https://t.me/RVvoenkor/76249; https://t.me/dva_majors/51386

[67] https://t.me/z_arhiv/27948

[68] https://t.me/dva_majors/51403; https://t.me/boris_rozhin/135972; https://t.me/voin_dv/10601; https://t.me/voenkorKotenok/58748

[69] https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0ab5BmUgbcWP5U7HYaCA29QkAEigE4dB75jLk8r6xNKwtEY5gu5ZskSwUxV9CVNqJl; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid02Sxt1KeryDAETE6N5tJ2sGikTK2Y3a8NPXE29VYeFaE6dSiGJYbjFypxUAFY44jx3l; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid016E1g1wyv4rqub4c6pJSiP5aziUBC73PZ7yddK4jHkFVGVWrEqMDJ4Ykzfo8dXuml; https://t.me/dva_majors/51404; https://t.me/wargonzo/21896

[70] https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/14926

[71] https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0ab5BmUgbcWP5U7HYaCA29QkAEigE4dB75jLk8r6xNKwtEY5gu5ZskSwUxV9CVNqJl; https://t.me/dva_majors/51461; https://t.me/motopatriot/27163

[72] https://t.me/motopatriot/27163

[73] https://t.me/motopatriot/27163

[74] https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0ab5BmUgbcWP5U7HYaCA29QkAEigE4dB75jLk8r6xNKwtEY5gu5ZskSwUxV9CVNqJl; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid016E1g1wyv4rqub4c6pJSiP5aziUBC73PZ7yddK4jHkFVGVWrEqMDJ4Ykzfo8dXuml; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid02Sxt1KeryDAETE6N5tJ2sGikTK2Y3a8NPXE29VYeFaE6dSiGJYbjFypxUAFY44jx3l

[75] https://t.me/VGA_Kherson/24463

[76] https://t.me/tass_agency/270160

[77] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-september-2-2024; https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-august-29-2024; https://tass dot com/politics/1837707

[78] https://www.theguardian.com/world/2023/mar/14/russia-says-it-does-not-recognise-hague-court-amid-reports-of-arrest-warrants

[79] https://tass dot ru/interviews/21751915 ; https://t.me/tass_agency/270184

[80] https://isw.pub/UkrWar082824

[81] https://tass dot ru/interviews/21751915 ; https://t.me/tass_agency/270184