argumentative essay on military regime is better than civilian regime

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A comparison of Buhari's military regime and his civilian regime

Muhammadu Buhari has had two distinct regime types in Nigeria, military and civilian, which have had their implications for the country’s development trajectory. During his military regime, Buhari implemented austere economic policies and fought corruption, but his government was criticized for human rights abuses, which negatively impacted Nigeria’s development trajectory. However, his focus on tackling corruption laid the foundation for better governance in subsequent years. In his civilian regime, Buhari has prioritized infrastructure development, social welfare programs, and diversifying Nigeria’s economy beyond oil. Nonetheless, his record on security issues has been criticized particularly after the outbreak of insurgency in the Northeast region of the country. Overall, the implications of Buhari’s policies and governance approach have been mixed, and this study highlights the challenges and opportunities of his tenure for Nigeria’s development aspirations, particularly in the areas of growth, governance, and human rights.

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Jacob T Salihu

Muhammadu Buhari has had two distinct regime types in Nigeria, military and civilian, which have had their implications for the country's development trajectory. During his military regime, Buhari implemented austere economic policies and fought corruption, but his government was criticized for human rights abuses, which negatively impacted Nigeria's development trajectory. However, his focus on tackling corruption laid the foundation for better governance in subsequent years. In his civilian regime, Buhari has prioritized infrastructure development, social welfare programs, and diversifying Nigeria's economy beyond oil. Nonetheless, his record on security issues has been criticized particularly after the outbreak of insurgency in the Northeast region of the country. Overall, the implications of Buhari's policies and governance approach have been mixed, and this study highlights the challenges and opportunities of his tenure for Nigeria's development aspirations, particularly in the areas of growth, governance, and human rights.

Port-Harcourt Journal of History and Development Studies

The western liberal democratic model of governance has apparently become acceptable not just in Nigeria but all over the continent of Africa and the Arab World in the light of the 'Arab Spring'. Sadly, the anticipated improvements in the areas of development, national integration and security promised by advocates of democracy, seem to far removed from the Africa. This is evident in the face of widespread violence of different dimensions across the continent with attendant underdevelopment and poverty. This paper therefore seeks to examine the nexus between democratic institutions, national security and development in Nigeria. It argues that perhaps, the stability and development promised by democracy seems to be elusive owing to weak democratic and governance institutions that are yet to displace the strong men of African politics. The paper recommends building strong democratic institutions other than strong men as admonished by Barack Obama.

Bukar Abba Ibrahim University Seminar Series

Ali Ibrahim Abbas

Since 1999 the civilian administration which Nigerians have aspired for, can be said to have arrived and consolidated with 10 years of uninterrupted democratic governance. It is however noted that decades of their autocratic rule have created numerous negative legacies to the current democratic governance. This paper is attempts to assess the impacts of military rule on democratic governance in Nigeria. It set a conceptual basis for the argument, a review of the phenomenon of military, democratisation and governance. Similarly, an analysis of the brief Nigerian military experience in governance and its legacies on the current democratic experience through its various manifestations were advanced. The paper finally suggested how to address the predicament, restore good governance and pursue democratic practices that can lead Nigeria to a stable democracy.

Mike Omilusi

In Nigeria, authoritarianism has manifested itself through years of military rule marked by intimidation, absence of debate, disregard for civil rights and the rule of law. This has produced an intolerant environment, in which the language of politicians remains militaristic and people still use violence to settle issues. The return to democracy in 1999 acted like the springboard for the release of pent-up feelings by the people who seized the opportunity to express themselves more freely and forcefully in some instances. The multi-dimensional conflicts (and now in addition to the Boko Haram terrorism) in which Nigeria has been enmeshed since the emergence of the present civilian rule are indeed threatening the existence of the country. Yet, the deployment of the army and other security agencies by the present administration to oversee simple civic exercises like electioneering and legislative proceedings or harassing opposition parties or mounting road check points in major cities of the country gives the impression that the present civilian political leadership is incapable of consolidating democracy without the military involvement. This paper examines the country’s democratic experiment since 1999 within the context of universally acceptable values of democracy and its slide to authoritarian civilian rule in Nigeria.

Africa-Dynamics of Social Science Review

By May 29, 1999 Nigeria had been through series of successful, as well as unsuccessful coups, which had installed 7 military regimes (Ejiofor, 2002). The civilian administration, which Nigerians have for long aspired for, can be said to have, at last arrived and consolidated with 14 years of uninterrupted democratic governance. However, according to some scholars, it is generally recognized that the involvement of Nigerian military in governance has done more harm than good despite their current stay in the barracks. Decades of their autocratic rule have created so many negative legacies to our current democratic experiment that if it should be tackled individually; each of these legacies can sap the energies of any serious administration. This paper is therefore, an attempt to assess the impacts of military rule on democratic governance in Nigeria. In an attempt to set a conceptual basis for the argument, a review of the phenomenon of military, democratisation and governance are advanced. This is followed by an analysis of the brief Nigerian military experience in governance as well as its legacies on the current democratic experience through its various manifestations. The paper also suggests what needs to be done to address the predicament, restore good governance and pursue genuine democratic practices that can lead Nigeria to a stable and prosperous democracy in the league of developed nations.

The Round Table

Roseline Oshewolo

ELK Asia Pacific Journal of Social Science

Adewunmi J Falode

General Sani Abacha took over the reign of political power in Nigeria after a bloodless putsch against the interim civilian government in Nigeria in 1993. Abacha ruled Nigeria with an iron fist. Nigeria’s domestic and foreign policies suffered greatly during the Abacha years. As a result of the massive human rights violation that the country witnessed under him, not least the execution of the ‘Ogoni 9’ activists in 1995, especially the renowned playwright and environmentalist Ken Saro-Wiwa, Nigeria became a pariah in the international community. This was an uncharted territory for Nigeria. Undaunted by the opprobrium from the international community, Abacha instituted a transition programme that would have ensured that he becomes the president of Nigeria when the country is eventually returned to civilian rule. But for his untimely death in 1998, Abacha would have become the first Nigerian president in the Fourth Republic. This work is an analysis of the various efforts and programmes of General Sani Abacha in the nation-building process in Nigeria between 1993 and 1998.

Odoh Pattrick Abutu

Abstract: President Buhari like any other president across the world in modern time who came to power through democratic election usually showcase their successes and failures recorded whenever they complete one calendar year in office. On the 29th day of May, 2016, the President in a national broadcast to the nation to mark his 100 days in office presented to Nigerians his drawbacks and his triumphs that will be use to assess him while comparing it with his acceptance/inaugural speech on his swearing-in day a year ago on the 29th May, 2015. The author of this paper used the opportunity to access Buhari in his one year steering of Nigeria as a civilian President. In view of this therefore, the paper using qualitative content analysis methodology x-rays the Buhari’s Administration through the review of latest Nigeria newspapers and related available documents and presents his achievements and failures within the specified period under study. The paper in its findings reveals that his challenges are results of long years of exercise of the British colonial activities in Nigeria which culminated in merging different and unmatchable ethnic groups together under a federation followed by prevalent and continuous agitation for marginalization by different ethnic groups in the Nigeria state since Nigeria political independence in 1960. The paper’s major recommendations based on the findings is for Buhari to implement the recommendations of the Constitutional Conference of 2014 in full because it is a unanimous voice of Nigerians on how to live together in peace, preserve the unity of their nation and govern themselves and it will correct all the agitation for any marginaliztion. The second important recommendation is an appeal to all Nigerians to cooperate with Buhari based on his transparent and practical campaign against corruption as demonstrated by the publication of the recovered loots by past political leaders and public servants.

Journal of Social Economics Research

Oluwaseun S A M U E L Osadola

Mediterranean Journal of Social Sciences

Rufus Akindola

Nigeria continues to face difficult challenges as a country comprising many ethnic groups with different socio-cultural, religious and economic backgrounds. This paper critically reviewed literature and found that these challenges have shaped Nigeria’s leadership and created unhealthy rivalry including, in particular, a deep sense of exploitation, marginalisation and oppression among certain ethnic groups. Despite Nigeria’s abundant natural resources, the early politicians became self-centred and failed to make good use of these resources to improve the well-being of poor Nigerians, especially those in the rural areas. Instead, it was found that the politicians were engaged in economic vandalism and political opportunism, which precipitated a premature military takeover of government.

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Civil-Military Relations: What Is the State of the Field

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• First Online: 22 March 2020
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In the study of states and societies, civil-military relations ought to occupy a central position. It is only the armed forces that can provide for a nation’s defense and at the same time are capable of overturning that nation’s government. These dual powers are extraordinary and can constitute both an essential coercive asset and a potential threat to governments and citizens that must be neutralized. The goal of any state is to harness military professional power to serve vital national security interests, while guarding against the misuse of power that can threaten the well-being of its people. To face this challenge, governments must be properly equipped and motivated to lead, militaries must be sufficiently subordinate to civilian rule, and societies must better understand what roles the armed forces should and should not play. The rich literature on civil-military relations addresses these topics, and much more. In fact, the subfield is vast, and no single essay can do it justice. To simplify the task, we have focused on four essential elements: military coups, democratic transitions, civilian control, and military-societal relations. Within each of these topics, discussion will be limited to what are, in our view, some of the key scholarly works on the subjects.

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Guns and Roses: The Nexus Between the Military and Citizenry in the New Security Environment

Civil-Military Relations

Civil-Military Relations in Two “Third Wave” Democracies: The First and a Follower

• Civil-military relations
• Civilian control
• Coup d’état
• Military-society relations

Introduction

Armed forces ultimately exist to protect society from outside threats. Often, however, militaries overstep this role and become political actors, undermining the system they are intended to protect. The challenge for governments is therefore to establish armed forces capable of protecting the state while at the same time refraining from use of their military power to determine political affairs of that state. This challenge forms the central focus of the field of civil-military relations. At the core of this are questions of military’s proper role in the society, its appropriate level of political influence, and the means by which to achieve a balance. In addressing these questions, we focus on four essential elements of the field of civil-military relations: military coups, democratic transitions, civilian control, and military-societal relations.

Military coups have long been at the heart of the field of civil-military relations as they represent an ultimate symbol of military insubordination to civilian authorities. When armed forces overthrow civilian authorities from power, they become critical arbiters of political contests and processes, whether they assume leadership positions or transfer powers to new authorities. As such, understanding the circumstances and causes of military coups is often seen as the central challenge of civil-military relations.

However, while overt intervention against the government represents the most extreme means of military’s intrusion in politics, the armed forces may undermine civilian authority in subtler ways; by defying orders, challenging decisions, and using formal and informal channels to exert undue influence over policymakers, the military may expand its political reach and impair the government’s ability to exercise its political prerogatives. As a result, scholars ask how governments can exert civilian control over the armed forces without undermining their capacity to defend the country? We answer that question by focusing on four factors often emphasized in the literature: beliefs, context, institutions, and agency.

The process of establishing democratic control over armed forces is particularly complex during democratic transitions. Emerging democracies must not only survive the military’s potential to disrupt the process of democratization, but they often must redesign the military’s role in the society, establish a proper distribution of power between soldiers and civilians, and develop institutional structures for effective oversight of the defense establishment. While these may be challenging tasks for any country, they are particularly difficult in incipient democracies with underdeveloped democratic institutions and legacies of nondemocratic civil-military relations.

While the field of civil-military relations often focuses on the relationship between civilian leadership and the military institution, the broader relationship between the armed forces and the citizenry is just as essential in understanding the military’s role in a society. To what extent are the interest and preferences of the government, the military, and the society aligned? To what extent does the military resemble the society it is intended to protect? Answers to these questions may affect whether a military chooses to identify with the public or with the government if the two are opposed to each other and may ultimately affect political outcomes.

Military Coup

A military coup d’état is the most extreme manifestation of military intervention in politics. Militaries in both democratic and authoritarian states have overthrown governments they were intended to serve, either seizing power themselves or transferring power to new authorities. While arguably most militaries have the ability to overthrow their civilian rulers at any point in time, they do so only when a number of elements align. The soldiers must be motivated to topple their government and the conditions must be favorable to allow them to do so with least resistance and most support. This section explains four elements essential in understanding military coups and their occurrence: what motivates military coups, under which conditions will the armed forces opt to topple their rulers, what is needed to execute a successful military coup, and which preventive measures can the government take to reduce the likelihood of military coups.

One of most commonly offered explanations of military’s motivation to intervene in politics is the interest of the military organization and its members. In Soldiers in Politics: Military Coups and Governments , Nordlinger ( 1977 ) argues that “by far the most common and salient interventionist motive involves the defense or enhancement of the military’s corporate interests” (pp. 63–64). Such interests of the military include the satisfaction with the budgetary support it receives from the government, preservation of its autonomy from civilian interference, and the lack of threat to the military institution by competing rivals such as militias under civilian control. Threat to any one of these interests can provide the military with sufficient incentive to enmesh itself in the political processes of the country and even to overthrow the government whose actions have endangered its corporate interests. While acknowledging that military’s corporate interests often play a role in its decision to intervene, Finer ( 1962 ) argues that individual interests of soldiers can also serve as a motive for intervention, ranging from a desire to be a part of an important event, to receive higher pay, or to advance up the promotion ladder.

But the threat to military interests can be less direct and still motivate the military to overthrow the government it is supposed to serve. If the military personnel identify with a particular socioeconomic class or region, the armed forces might topple the governing elites if they perceive interests of that class or region to be threatened (Finer 1962 ; Huntington 1968 ; Nordlinger 1977 ; O’Donnell 1986 ). Based on Latin American experiences, Nordlinger ( 1977 ) demonstrated that the armed forces mainly identified with the middle class, and would intervene to protect its interests as well as its own, in the face of challenges from the lower classes. Similarly, O’Donnell ( 1986 ) argued that societal changes brought about by rapid modernization lead to political and economic instability and high levels of class conflict, affecting the interests of middle class soldiers. Huntington ( 1968 ) agreed that the military intervenes on behalf of the middle class, either by toppling oligarchies to permit the middle class to enter the political arena or populist governments whose policies endanger the interests of the middle class. Finally, Finer ( 1962 ) went beyond class interests in arguing that the military as an institution which identifies with national interest might feel obligated to overthrow the government whose actions seem to threaten the interests of the nation.

While government’s actions that adversely affect the military organization and its members may incentivize soldiers to intervene, this is unlikely to occur unless the circumstances favor a military intervention. The question of when the military will act on its interests and take extreme steps to protect them requires a look outside the military organization and into the broader societal conditions. As Huntington ( 1968 ) pointed out, “the most important causes of military intervention in politics are not military but political and reflect not the social and organizational characteristics of the military establishment but the political and institutional structure of the society” (p. 194). Scholars have identified the government’s loss of legitimacy as the most important context in which militaries may turn to coups (Belkin and Schofer 2003 ; Huntington 1968 ; Nordlinger 1977 ).

The loss of legitimacy by the ruling elites challenges their right to continue to govern and provides an opening for the military to translate its interests into actions by generating public support for military intervention. While the actual act of toppling the government may be performed by a small number of individuals, “normally the support of a fairly large proportion of the total number of political actors in the society is achieved before the coup is launched” (Huntington 1968 , p. 219). Such support is likely to be gained when government performance failures manifest themselves in constitutional violations, persistent economic crises, and pervasive violence and disorder in the country (Nordlinger 1977 ). As Huntington ( 1968 ) pointed out in Political Order in Changing Societies , “military intervention is thus usually a response to the escalation of social conflict by several groups and parties coupled with the decline in the effectiveness and legitimacy of whatever political institutions may exist” (p. 216). A military coup under such circumstances serves to reduce societal tensions and put a stop to violence by removing from power the object of popular discontent.

In addition to government legitimacy, Belkin and Schofer ( 2003 ) argue that the history of successful coups and the strength of civil society can also explain the incidence of coup attempts. A history of successful coups increases coup risks while a strong civil society acts as a brake against military coups; an organized public will openly resist illegitimate overthrows of civilian governments. This focus on weak civil society as a facilitating condition of coups echoes Luttwak’s ( 1969 ) argument that “The social and economic conditions of the target country must be such as to confine political participation to a small fraction of the population” (p. 24). In his seminal work Coup D’état: A Practical Handbook , Luttwak argued that the lack of political participation among the general population, political independence of the state, and centralized state power are three core requirements for the military to execute a successful coup because they allow a relatively small number of military personnel to efficiently seize power without provoking much resistance from the general public.

While motives and opportunities may translate into a coup attempt, its success will largely depend on the capacity of coup participants: unity, secrecy, and organization, must all align to result in a successful ouster of the existing authority. According to Nordlinger ( 1977 ), it is essential that the military be unified in its agreement that a coup is necessary, that “strategically situated, middle-level troop commanders” (p. 102) be actively involved in the coup, that the military possesses sufficient troops to take over key positions, and that it acts quickly and in a coordinated manner in order to surprise the government. Singh ( 2014 ) adds another necessary element: the ability of coup participants to convince other armed elements that the coup will succeed. Considering military coups as coordination games, Singh argues that if coup participants are able to assure potential opponents that the coup is widely supported, it becomes a self-fulfilling prophecy: different groups and individuals join in support because they don’t want to be on the losing side. Luttwak agrees – the success of any coup rests on the participants’ ability to turn key armed sectors into active participants of the coup and to neutralize other military, police, and security agencies. Political opposition, surprisingly, does not have to be neutralized at the onset of a coup; because political forces do not present a physical threat to coup participants, their opposition can be defused in the immediate aftermath of a successful coup (Luttwak 1969 , p. 51).

Military motivations and structural conditions of the society are not sufficient to guarantee a successful toppling of the existing authority, because governments that face high levels of coup risks have developed coup-proofing strategies. James T. Quinlivan ( 1999 ) demonstrates how Middle Eastern authoritarian governments have successfully used five coup-proofing strategies: taking advantage of family, ethnic, and religious allegiances by strategically building support among crucial groups; creating parallel military forces loyal to the government, with the purpose of protecting the leadership against a possible military intervention; establishing various security agencies in charge of overseeing different security sectors, possible opposition, as well as each other; promoting and enhancing military professionalism; and committing enough resources to fund not only extra military and security agencies but to offer rewards for loyalty to the ruling elites. While the author demonstrates that these strategies have reduced the likelihood of military coups in Saudi Arabia, Iraq, and Syria, he also recognizes that they have also had negative effects on these states’ military readiness and expertise by diverting funding and delaying modernization of the regular armed forces.

Other scholars have similarly identified the division of armed forces into rival organizations as a common coup-proofing strategy used by authoritarian leaders (Belkin 2005 ; Belkin and Schofer 2005 ; Stepan 1971 ). Belkin and Schofer ( 2005 ) argue that a divide and conquer strategy, which involves a creation of additional armed services such as new military branches or paramilitary and intelligence agencies, diffuses military power and offers governments a safeguard against a possible coup risk. “Counterbalancing is the only strategy that pits force against force, and alternative strategies that leaders use to minimize the risk of a coup can be quite ineffective” (Belkin and Schofer 2005 , p. 150). They, however, go a step further and argue that since even divided militaries may collaborate against the governing elites, the leaders may engage in or aggravate international conflicts to “drive wedges between different branches, further reducing the risk of military coup” (p. 151; see also Belkin 2005 ). Scholars have disagreed, however, on the extent to which international conflicts serve to reduce the likelihood of coups. While Desch ( 1999 ) would agree that external threats lead to higher levels of civilian control over military, Finer ( 1962 ) argued that both international and domestic conflicts lead to the governments’ dependence on the armed forces, increasing the influence of the military and thus its opportunity to intervene in politics.

Civil-Military Relations and Democratic Transitions

The issue of civil-military relations is particularly significant during democratic transitions as it poses challenges that can greatly affect both the outcome of the transition process and the quality of the democratic system that emerges. States undergoing regime transition face two distinct challenges in the realm of civil-military relations. First, they must neutralize the military’s potential to disrupt the democratization process. If the armed forces are threatened by political and social changes and their effects on the security establishment, they may derail the process or halt it altogether. Second, transitioning societies must not only reform their political systems but must carefully redefine civil-military relations. As any transition ought not be considered complete until the armed forces have been placed under the control of democratically elected civilian authorities (Barany 2012 ; Karl 1990 ), it is essential that transitioning countries redefine the role of the military, its levels of autonomy, eliminate the military’s political prerogatives, establish a proper distribution of power between civilian and military authorities, and develop institutional structures for democratic control over armed forces if their democratic endeavors are to succeed.

According to Cottey, Edmunds, and Forster ( 2002b ), the process of establishing democratic civil-military relations in transitioning societies proceeds through two generations of reforms. During the first stage, the establishment of formal institutional structures for democratic oversight over the defense sector launches the process of reforming civil-military relations and provides a foundation for the second stage during which those institutions are strengthened and implemented through capacity-building, through strengthening democratic civilian control of defense policy and democratic governance. However, the first generation reforms can only be undertaken if the military allows the transition to take place by refraining from intervention. As a result, the first stages of transition should be marked by reducing military political prerogatives, removing it from the political arena, and lessening its inclination and capability to intervene through a rudimentary legislative framework (Pion-Berlin and Martínez 2017 ; Serra 2010 ). Only after the threat of military intervention has been neutralized can the government focus on strengthening institutions for democratic control over the armed forces and defense policy, which usually occurs during the phase of consolidation.

Thus, the primary challenge transitioning countries face is preventing the armed forces from disrupting the process of democratization. A threat of a military coup, undue influence over domestic and foreign defense policies, use of entrenched positions to prevent political and economic reforms, and obstruction of human rights prosecutions are some of the means by which the military may undermine and alter the outcome of democratic transition. Such a threat is particularly acute in countries emerging from military-dominant regimes. As the outgoing ruling elites, the armed forces will use their power to negotiate favorable transition conditions (Burton et al. 1992 ; Geddes 1999 ; Geddes et al. 2018 ; Karl 1990 ; O’Donnell and Schmitter 1986 ; Whitehead 1986 ), and if they can’t secure satisfactory terms they may halt the reforms altogether. At this point, the balance of power between the civilians and the military will define the role of each side in the transition process (Agüero 1995 , 2001 ; Arceneaux 2001 ; Barany 2012 ).

The balance of power between civilians and the military during regime transformations will greatly be affected by the nature and the level of success of the outgoing authoritarian regime. As Craig Arceneaux ( 2001 ) puts it, “transition control is determined long before the actual transition from military rule to democracy occurs” (p. 13). Focusing on Latin American transition experiences, Arceneaux finds that officers are in a better position to negotiate favorable transition terms if their rule was marked by military unity and strategy coordination. While unity provides the armed forces with a stable basis of support and allows them to fend off challenges from the opposition, strategy coordination produces a consistent economic and political agenda, reducing the emergence of challenges altogether. Where both factors are present, the military is able to exert control over the transition process and its outcome, leading to a democratic system to a large extent designed by the outgoing military elites.

Felipe Agüero ( 1995 ) similarly focuses on the nature of the previous regime but argues that the level of military empowerment during authoritarian rule and the mode of transition are essential in explaining its bargaining strength in the transition process. Where civilians managed political decisions, even if the military occupied important positions within the government, the military was not able to set the transition agenda and dictate policy reforms. If on the other hand the officers directly crafted public policy and determined successions of the executive, they were also more likely to dominate the transition process. This empowerment of the military is further reinforced in states undergoing a planned transition introduced incrementally by the outgoing authoritarian elites. When, however, a regime suffers an unanticipated collapse as a result of domestic uprising or a military defeat, civilian authorities are more likely to take charge, thus dictating the terms and the timing of reforms and limiting the range of options for the former ruling elites (Agüero 1995 ).

Barany ( 2012 ) similarly finds that a defeat in a major war is more likely to result in a successful democratization of civil-military relations and of the political system in general, as it decreases the legitimacy of the old elites and increases the leverage of the incoming democratizing forces. In his comprehensive study of 27 countries across six different contexts, Barany concludes that democratization of civil-military relations is also facilitated by the European setting and the legacy of communist one-party rule. In line with other scholars who have found that prospects of NATO and European Union membership have provided additional incentives for democratization of defense establishments (Betz 2004 ; Cottey et al. 2006 ; Epstein 2005 , 2006 ; Matei 2013 ; Serra 2010 ; Vankovska and Wiberg 2003 ), Barany finds that the European context in both former communist and military-dominant regimes created conditions conducive to democratization of civil-military relations. The prospect of international integration encouraged the states to establish democratic institutional structures, and their militaries were motivated to reform, professionalize, and turn their attention to external missions.

The Central and Eastern European context provided an additional safeguard against military intervention during the transition process: the legacy of communist rule (Barany 2012 ; Cottey et al. 2002c ). In contrast to former military-dominant regimes, Eastern European armed forces did not pose a direct threat to emerging democracies because of their history of subordination to civilian authorities. By practicing subjective civilian control in Huntington’s sense (Herspring 1999 ), the ruling elites of communist states maintained firm control over their armed forces through political indoctrination of the ranks, resulting in their unconditional allegiance to the Communist party and its ideology. Because the militaries were conditioned to be subordinate to civilian leadership, democracies emerging from communism did not face praetorian threats from their armed forces and civilian supremacy was not contested. As a result, in Politics and the Russian Army , Taylor ( 2003 ) concludes that the organizational culture of the Russian armed forces prevented military intervention during the period of political transition and state transformation, even when opportunities and motives for such interventions were present.

The level of violence and human rights abuses committed during an authoritarian regime is another important factor in explaining the military’s determination to obstruct the process of democratization. High levels of violence during authoritarianism, especially if committed by the military, will lead to more resistance to transition due to increased fears of human rights trials. Threatened by the transition, the officers “will strive to obtain iron-clad guarantees that under no circumstances will ‘the past be unearthed’; failing to obtain that, they will remain a serious threat to the nascent democracy” (O’Donnell and Schmitter 1986 , p. 29). Despite this threat, ignoring the issue of accountability may undermine the legitimacy of the new democracy (O’Donnell and Schmitter 1986 ; Serra 2010 ) and may empower the military by instilling a sense of invulnerability (Rouquié 1986 ). As a result, the new democratic rulers must carefully balance the need for justice with the need to keep the army in the barracks. To that end, Barany ( 2012 ) recommends “strategic compromises” which avoid drastic actions against the armed forces and take into account both the timing of reforms and the need for accountability (p. 351).

Preventing the soldiers from obstructing the process of transition is just one challenge of democratizing civil-military relations. The militaries must be reformed, and civilians must have the will and the capacity to carry out the necessary reforms. According to Serra ( 2010 ), a successful transition requires not only the reduction of military autonomy and its political prerogatives, but also the lessening of societal conflict, which if persistent can strengthen the armed forces. Additionally, the military profession must be reformed to coexist within a democratic context (Serra 2010 ). The nature of military reforms, however, differs in countries emerging from military-dominant and civilian-dominant one-party regimes. In post-military regimes the priority is removal of soldiers from the political arena; in post-communist states, on the other hand, the main challenge is removal of politics from the armed forces (Barany 1997 , 2012 ). While soldiers in one-party communist systems tend to be subordinate to civilian authorities, they are at the same time deeply politicized, loyal solely to the Communist party whom their career advancements depend on (Betz 2004 ; Cottey et al. 2002a ; Herspring 1999 ). As a result, Danopoulos and Skandalis ( 2011 ) find that Albania’s newly democratized government prioritized four aspects of military reform: depoliticization, departization, democratization, and professionalization.

Another particularly challenging legacy of both civilian- and military-dominant authoritarian systems is the lack of civilian competence in defense matters. As has been recognized by civil-military relations scholars, at least some level of knowledge of and expertise is required if civilians are to take charge of security and defense policies (Bruneau 2005 ; Bruneau and Goetze 2006 ; Gibson and Snider 1999 ; Giraldo 2006 ; Pion-Berlin 2009 ). As even some established democracies still continue to struggle with the lack of civilian expertise in defense matters (Pion-Berlin et al. 2019 ), transitioning societies are even more likely to face the problem of uninformed civilian officials, leading to their dependence on military guidance on defense issues. In addition to affecting the trajectory of political reforms, O’Donnell and Schmitter ( 1986 ) demonstrate that such deference to the officers can reinforce the military’s image of itself as guardians of the national interests. If civilians continue to defer under the pressure of uncertain developments brought on by the transition, they will reinforce these sentiments, endangering further the process of democratic completion.

Civilian Control

There are numerous approaches to the topic of civilian control – too numerous in fact to review them all. This chapter will confine itself to four important ones: beliefs, context (historical and political), institutions, and agency. These are the themes that crop up most persistently in the literature. The central dilemma facing all governments is how to maximize their political power over the military so that it serves the interests of the government, while allowing the military to perform well, professionalize, and conduct the missions assigned to it. The military instrument is a potent one, and it must be utilized carefully so that it furthers the defense and security interests of the nation without jeopardizing the political system it is a part of. Unlike the United States and many European countries, relations of power are not completely settled in vast parts of the developing world. Militaries contest policy and policymakers, exert pressure outside of officials channels, and in worst case scenarios, topple governments. So governments in developing countries must learn how to curb military political influence while preserving or enhancing military professionalism. This is the challenge of civilian control.

Scholars agree that civilian control is made easier where there is a military belief in political obedience. This can be attributed to long periods of professionalization, where through educational indoctrination, soldiers have internalized the concept of obedience to political authorities (Bruneau 2005 ; Finer 1962 ; Fitch 1998 ; Huntington 1957 ; Pion-Berlin and Martínez 2017 ; Taylor 2003 ). As S.E. Finer said, the armed forces will not intervene when they believe in the principle of civil supremacy. Principles get reinforced from one generation of military students to the next, and lessons learned are not forgotten as officers climb through the ranks. When principles become deeply embedded within the military, there develops an internal, organizational culture of respect for political authorities and rejection of insubordinate behavior (Taylor 2003 ). By the same token, ideas favoring intervention and coup d’états can be reinforced across generations, becoming elements of an alternative organizational culture.

In The Armed Forces and Democracy in Latin America , Samuel Fitch ( 1998 ) demonstrated that while core professional values regarding hierarchy, discipline, and expertise (Huntington  1957 ) remain unchanged, role beliefs do not. Role beliefs are “military conceptions of their role in politics” (p. 61), and the “proper relationships between civilian authorities, the armed forces, and society” (p. 61). Those officers who embrace a “democratic professionalist” mindset believe they should stay out of politics, and fully comply with government orders handed to them. Alternatively, officers who subscribe to a set of beliefs known as “conditional subordination” maintain that in crisis situations – where national interests are imperiled – they have the right to intervene.

Militaries subscribe to different ideologies which affect their judgments about incumbent regimes and the wisdom of military intervention. During the Cold War, in Latin America, Asia, and Africa, anti-communist and counter-revolutionary doctrines often shaped military views. Fearing that elected governments were not up to the task of defeating left-wing insurgencies, militaries seized the reins of power themselves. Then and today, developmental doctrines have been important components of military thought. The military has been called upon to play a role in development projects (building infrastructure, schools, hospitals, etc.), as well as to relieve hardships and respond to immediate material needs of disadvantaged populations (food distribution, health provision, housing, etc.). Is this detrimental to civilian control? It depends. According to Pion-Berlin ( 2016a ) in Military Missions in Democratic Latin America , threats to civilian control are minimized if the military’s development role is carefully circumscribed, prohibiting officers from occupying positions of political and fiscal authority, and assuring that government or outside agencies exert oversight. However, civilian control could be adversely affected if the military’s developmental role becomes so significant that governments come to depend on soldiers who cash in on that dependency by demanding a say on policy matters.

The values that are learned and relearned within the military are affected by the larger political context surrounding the military institution. Professionalization on its own may or may not induce norms of compliance. For Samuel Huntington ( 1957 ) it did, and his concept of objective control is foundational to the field. Military institutions, he claimed, become increasingly subordinate when left to their own devices to modernize, professionalize and in that matter, become politically neutral. In the U.S., part and parcel of that process was the cultivation of a military mind-set that was dismissive of societal trends, contemptuous of politicians, and yet committed to remaining nonpartisan and obedient.

This is a curious blend that has often been absent in developing societies. In fact, the more familiar pattern is one where a professionally qualified yet aloof military convinces itself that it is in many respects superior to the political elites and thus more capable of governing than they. Hence, professionalism may actually set the stage for military intervention . In the late 1800s and early 1900s, Latin American militaries became more professional largely thanks to counsel from military missions sent from Europe. But like the Europeans – indeed because of them – Latin American military establishments acquired deep distrust of, if not contempt for, civilian authorities. According to the work of Frederick Nunn ( 1983 ) and Brian Loveman ( 1999 ), military professionals advocated a form of professional militarism, viewing governments of that era as incompetent and corrupt while seeing themselves as more capable and ethical. Hence, with professional upgrading came improved self-image, and officers increasingly believed they could manage the affairs of state better than the politicians themselves. Eventually, many militaries would seize state power to prove they were up to the task.

If officers are convinced they are superior to politicians, they may still refrain from intervening if civil society is resolutely committed to defending the political order against efforts to overturn it. As S.E. Finer argued in his classic text, Man on Horseback (1962), widespread public approval for legitimate procedures of transferring power and agreement on who has sovereign authority act as a constraint against coercive modes of influence. The military will choose noncoercive actions compatible with the prevailing political order. Conversely, when the public loses faith in the legitimacy of government, this can set the stage for military intervention, as Alfred Stepan ( 1971 ) persuasively showed in The Military in Politics: Changing Patterns in Brazil . Militaries, he argued, often gauge public sentiment before toppling regimes, to make sure that a sizeable portion of the public is behind them.

National cohesion is another component to context. How unified or divided is a nation? (Dudley 2016 ; Mietzner 2014 ; Shah 2014 ; Wilkinson 2015 ). When nations are polarized between competing parties, factions, and groups, the instability that results can invite military intervention, as scholarship on India and Pakistan illuminates. Though they share the same heritage – both products of British colonialism and officer training – the Indian military has remained firmly subordinate to civilian control since the nation’s birth, whereas the Pakistani military has intervened repeatedly to topple democratic governments. What explains the difference? Aqil Shah ( 2014 ) in The Army and Democracy: Military Politics in Pakistan argues it has much to do with national divisions and party politics. Pakistan failed to overcome serious ethnic, regional, and religious divides because the ruling party enforced a single language on a nation with linguistically different subregions. This only fueled anger and conflict, sharpening the military perception that civilians were not capable of governing. By contrast, Steven I. Wilkinson ( 2015 ) in Army and Nation: The Military and Indian Democracy Since Independence demonstrates how in India, The Congress Party incorporated many different ethnic groups, thus generating cross-cutting cleavages and avoiding sharp ethnic polarization and disenfranchisement that could have drawn the military in.

Institutions

The third approach to the study of civil-military affairs is institutional. Institutionalists put their stock in organizational designs which can either define barriers to entry or ease access for soldiers who would attempt to unduly influence policy. As Croissant et al. ( 2013 ) have said, “institutions define power relationships and hierarchies, empowering some actors while closing channels of power to others” (p. 47). Military behavior would be subject to laws, rules, and procedures embedded within an institutional setting that could either enhance its influence or diminish it. In the USA, the framers were more concerned about concentrated power in the hands of a civilian despot than they were about power in the hands of a military still in its nascent stages of development (Huntington ( 1957 ). For them, the solution was to divide control of the armed forces between the federal government and the states, and between the executive and legislative branches. Unfortunately, this allowed the military to play off one center of civilian power against another. In Huntington’s view (1957), civilian control has remained strong only because of US geographical isolation and international balances of power.

More contemporary scholars have followed up on Huntington’s interest in institutional arrangements. Deborah Avant ( 1994 ) argued that unified political institutions in Great Britain facilitated civilian intervention to shape military doctrine, allowing it to adapt to changing threats, whereas divided institutions in the USA ceded greater autonomy to inflexible military planners who failed to respond to changing circumstances. Pion-Berlin ( 1997 ) explained how the ability of the armed forces to exert pressure on Argentine policymakers depended on how concentrated (or dispersed) decision-making authority was, and how insular (or vulnerable) decision-makers were. High levels of concentrated authority and autonomy within the democratic state allowed civilians to design and execute policies more easily because the military would have fewer intragovernmental divisions to exploit. Conversely, dispersed authority and low autonomy forced policymakers to navigate more decision points from execution to implementation, affording the military numerous avenues of influence.

If there is one institution that represents the keystone holding up the arch of civilian control, it is the defense ministry (Bruneau and Tollefson 2006 ; Edmonds 1985 ; Pion-Berlin 2009 ). As Bruneau and Goetze ( 2006 ) say, the ministry “has become widely viewed as the best solution to the classic paradox, ‘Who guards the guardians?’” (p. 71). The purpose of the defense ministry is to prepare the armed forces to serve the policy goals of government and act as a buffer zone between the president and the service branches. Should active duty or retired military officers occupy too many top positions within the defense sector, they may exhibit divided loyalties, exert undue influence, dominate defense and security policymaking, and crowd out alternative viewpoints, according to a number of scholars (Bruneau and Tollefson 2006 ; Pion-Berlin 2009 ). A proper ministerial buffer means one with a sizeable presence of civilian leaders to ensure that policy preferences get translated into defense actions and to stand vigilant against military efforts to push an armed forces agenda at the expense of a national agenda.

The final approach has to do with agency: the difference that individuals make as they operate within contexts and institutions. Scholars often conclude, appropriately, that agency is possible, but that the range of options available to the decision-maker to effect changes in the armed forces is constrained by her unique environment. Civilians who want to reduce the political power of the military and insure its cooperation in the development of defense policy must have some knowledge and strategies for doing so. A few prominent scholars have investigated this issue. Alfred Stepan ( 1988 ) in Rethinking Military Politics argued that achieving civilian control involved a process of reducing military contestation and prerogatives. He delimited 11 important areas where military power had to be cut back, ranging from its participation in the cabinet to its role in internal security, policing, state enterprises, intelligence gathering, etc. While he provided ordinal measures for these prerogatives delineating low, moderate, or high scores for each, he also treated all prerogatives equally, with no suggestion as to how democratic leaders might sequence their selection of prerogative-reducing strategies.

Narcís Serra ( 2010 ) in The Military Transition based on the Spanish case proposed one solution to this problem. He differentiated between measures that ought to be taken during a period of democratic transition, from those taken during consolidation. During the transitional phase, emphasis is placed on limiting the military’s proclivities for intervention and extracting the armed forces from policy processes and spheres of influence. Then, policymakers could turn their attention to crafting military and defense policies, and strengthening institutions such as the defense ministry, during the consolidation phase. Serra’s approach bears resemblance to Cottey et al. ( 2002b ) who distinguished between first and second generational problems.

Peter Feaver ( 2003 ) greatly advanced the study of civil-military strategic interaction in Armed Servants: Agency, Oversight and Civil-Military Relations . Using a Principal-Agent theoretical framework, Feaver demonstrates how civilians (principals) can overcome the vexing moral hazard of losing some control once they delegate defense and security tasks to the military. They reduce the chance of military shirking via a range of monitoring strategies backed up by sanctioning, affording civilians the ability to punish the military for avoiding its duties. This is a more intrusive form of control, where civilians break through the stiff barrier that Huntington had set up between politicians and soldiers. In a similar vein, Eliot A. Cohen ( 2002 ) argues that in wartime, political leaders have the right to prudently intrude into the military sphere, because battlefield decisions have political consequences.

Croissant et al. ( 2013 ) in Democratization and Civilian Control in Asia follow up on Feaver’s work by broadening the concept of control strategy while contextualizing its use. Civilians can resort to monitoring and sanctioning – what they describe as a robust power strategy – but only in a context that affords them ample resources and opportunities (p. 51). Civilians with scant resources and fewer opportunities may have to settle for weaker forms of control, relying either on legitimization strategies which alter military norms or compensation strategies that attempt to purchase military compliance via rewards. This framework borrows from Trinkunas’ ( 2005 ) model in Crafting Civilian Control of the Military in Venezuela: A Comparative Perspective . He identifies four strategies civilians have relied upon to develop leverage over the armed forces: appeasement, monitoring, divide and conquer, and sanctioning. The choice of strategy is conditioned (but not determined) by the breadth or narrowness of the opportunities availed to civilians in the aftermath of transitions from authoritarian rule. Policymakers have more room for maneuver when armies are fragmented while civilian elites are unified. But Trinkunas argues that agency is critical, because while some policymakers take advantage of their wide opportunities, others do not.

Military-Society Relations

When civil-military relations are analyzed, they are most often linear – restricted to discussions on the interaction between armed forces personnel and government officials. That comes at the expense of the broader, triangular relations between the soldiers, politicians, and society (Serra 2010 ). Every nation has to, at some point in its history, come to grips with achieving a more enduring harmony between those three elements. The Prussian theorist Carl von Clausewitz (1780–1831) referred to this as the “Great Trinity,” the essential ingredient to fighting successful wars. Political theorists have since contended that in peacetime too, there should be an alignment between a government’s military policy, the military itself, and societal interests (Burk 1998 ). This is a point of view originally put forth by the sociologist, Morris Janowitz ( 1960 ) who claimed that armies should and would adopt features of society, mirroring its attitudinal, occupational, and professional traits.

In the contemporary world, how important is it that there be a connection, and mutual understanding and respect between society and its armed forces? Feaver and Kohn’s ( 2001 ) study discovered problems with the US military-societal relation, most notably a civil-military attitudinal gap featuring sizeable differences in partisan attachments and ideology between military leaders compared to nonveteran civilians and the general public. The military had increasingly aligned itself with the Republican Party and conservative ideology to a degree not seen within the American citizenry. A follow-up study of the army conducted a decade later by Jason Dempsey ( 2010 ) confirmed there was a gap but of a different kind. Senior officers identified with Republicans much more than junior officers and enlisted soldiers, but the political preferences of the lower ranks did not differ much from the general population. In the aggregate, the gap was still present, but appeared to be closing.

But are differences between elite officers and civilians a function of military culture or demographics? The US Army, for example, is more male, white, wealthier, and more highly educated than the general population – traits that may skew its ideology and party ID. To control for this Jason Dempsey’s study ( 2010 ) took a stratified sample of civilians that mirrored the army’s demographics. Sizeable differences still emerged between the civilian sample and army senior officers which could not be explained by demographic traits. Are they explained by army identification? Dempsey could not confirm that either, and more research is warranted.

Be that as it may, do military-societal differences matter? Rahbek-Clemmensen et al. ( 2012 ) argue that gaps are not the same as crises. Large gaps may result in no crises at all, whereas smaller gaps may be of the kind that do generate crises. For example, it has been found that the military has a certain contempt for societal mores. But so long as it abides by its professional duties in defending the nation, such a gap in cultural attitudes may have no detrimental effects.

If there is one potentially harmful gap, it is the breach between society’s admiration for the armed forces and its understanding of it (Schake and Mattis 2016b ). The US public is both enamored with the military and ignorant about it, while at the same time considerably distrustful of political leaders. A citizenry seduced into what Andrew J. Bacevich ( 2005 ) calls a new American militarism is one that accepts, indeed invites, misguided notions that the military should be a nation’s number one problem solver. In a study based on a 2014 survey of Americans, half of those nonveteran civilians polled think military rather than political goals should determine the application of force, and a strong majority (83%) believe a civilian government should let the military take over running a war (Golby et al. 2016 , p. 112). These sentiments run counter to every principle of civilian control, reflect the public’s lack of knowledge about civil-military affairs, and can tempt political leaders to make poor foreign policy decisions.

When an unknowing public wants the military to be more influential, it creates an atmosphere where politicians would rather align with public sentiments than lead, by deferring to those admired generals. Accordingly, more resources flow to the defense budget to pay for military personnel while leaving the diplomatic corps and State Department depleted of funds (Brooks 2016 ). The tendency is for civilian policymakers to “rely on the credibility of their military commanders to garner support for their policies” (Schake and Mattis 2016a , p. 302). This then “creates perverse incentives for senior officers to use the threat of public opposition or resignation to extract policy concessions from elected officials” according to Golby, Cohn, and Feaver ( 2016 , p. 134). Political leaders will allow themselves to be led by an increasingly assertive military. The irony is that all this may eventually erode the military’s fine standing with the public if it is perceived to be too political.

Latin America is one part of the world where the military has for too long been demonstrably political, often at the expense of democratic rule. Studying civil-military relations and democracy in Latin America, Pion-Berlin and Martínez ( 2017 ) argue there needs to be a greater convergence between the armed forces and society that centers on the military’s increased respect for core democratic values and institutions. Convergence is hard to come by, because soldiers are physically, institutionally, and attitudinally walled off from society, adhering to their own standards and norms which may collide with those of society. Again, the question can be asked: does it matter? The answer in the Latin American context is yes. Isolation has often reinforced an attitude of superiority among officers, exhibiting contempt for politicians who are perceived as less capable of managing the affairs of state than they. From there it was often just a short jump to the conclusion that officers should take charge of governing. Though the threat of coup is much lower today in Latin America than in the past, scholars agree that society must be vigilant in defense of democracy, and the military must take steps to conform to democratic rules of the game.

In any country, tearing down the walls separating military from civil society is a process whereby soldiers and civilians come to better understand, value, and respect each other. Moskos and Wood ( 1988 ) urged armies and societies to forge links, calling this an “external integration” of the armed forces. One such link is through education. Donald A. Downs and Ilia Murtazashvili ( 2012 ) argue that civilian students must open their minds to the value of duty, discipline, and sacrifice, while cadets steeped in the culture of hierarchy and command could stand to broaden their intellectual outlook, sharpen their critical thinking, and appreciate the value of a liberal education. This convergence ought to occur on campuses because the authors argue the university “is a microcosm of civil-military relations…” (p. 31). Their goal is to integrate a military perspective into education, not to promote one, and can be accomplished through programs such as the ROTC. On balance however, these authors do seem more concerned with overcoming civilian educational deficits than military ones.

How convergent or divergent are military-society relations can have serious repercussions for regime survival. Civil-military scholarship on the Arab Spring and its aftermath has brought into sharp relief just how critical the military is to the fate of popular uprisings against autocratic regimes, and to the fate of the besieged autocrats themselves (Albrecht et al. 2016 ; Barany 2016 ; Bellin 2012 ; Croissant et al. 2018 ; Lutterbeck 2013 ; Pion-Berlin 2016b ; Pion-Berlin et al. 2014 ). A military has choices: it can remain loyal to the authorities by repressing the opposition; it can stay quartered and remove itself from the political maelstrom; or it can defect by either joining the protests or overthrowing the regime. Scholars demonstrate that the decision rests on military’s institutional traits and distinct ties to the regime, its strategic calculations based on corporate self-interest, the size and breath of a mobilized public, and the military’s links to it (Barany 2016 ; Bellin 2012 ; Pion-Berlin et al. 2014 ).

A patrimonial military is one whose ranks are filled with soldiers recruited based on ethnic, tribal, religious, or familial identities which closely match those of the ruling elite. In that case, the military will be deeply invested in the regime’s survival and prepared to suppress the opposition (Bellin 2012 ). A more professional force chosen on meritorious criteria and attentive to its own corporate interests could decide to withhold its support of the regime. In every case where a president (and his government) has fallen from power as a consequence of a civilian uprising, the armed forces had refused his pleas for assistance (Barany 2016 ; Pion-Berlin 2016b ).

Larger, broad-based, nonviolent protests invite autocrats to call for a decisive military response, but at the same time cause the armed forces to deliberate, often questioning the wisdom of the order (Bellin 2012 ). The application of brute force could lead to massive bloodshed, harming the military’s reputation. Soldiers on the frontlines may balk at the orders, and senior officers not wishing to invite a breach within the ranks may decide the best course of action is to resist repression orders for the sake of institutional unity (Lutterbeck 2013 ). In addition, soldiers who more strongly identify with the demonstrators will be more hesitant to fire on them. Those connections hinge on whether the armed forces are a conscripted force that recruits from a broader cross section of society or are chosen based on ascriptive identities that accentuate the differences between them and the opposition (Barany 2016 ). Thus, the ties that bind a military to society are ones that can spell doom for authoritarian regimes.

The civil-military field is a sprawling, complex mix of various themes and analytical approaches. But there are threads that weave through the entire fabric, holding it together. At its heart the field shows a lasting concern for how nations attempt to deal with the one organization that has unchallenged coercive might. Whether it be preventing coups, navigating transitions from ancient regimes to new ones, enhancing professionalism and subordination, or forging stronger ties to society, the field is always preoccupied with the interactions between political leaders, soldiers, and civilians. No matter how seemingly stable those relations may be, they should never be taken for granted. Those relations are dynamic, subject to unanticipated changes that could create moments of instability or crisis. Both policymaking elites and ordinary citizens alike need to pay closer attention to the armed forces – who they are, what makes them tick, what their legitimate needs are, and what roles they should and should not play. Likewise, officers and the enlisted must be more sensitive to the concerns, attitudes, and values of civilians who they ultimately serve. Improvements in civil-military relations will depend on whether enhanced mutual understanding can be forged between the two sides.

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Pion-Berlin, D., Dudley, D. (2020). Civil-Military Relations: What Is the State of the Field. In: Sookermany, A. (eds) Handbook of Military Sciences. Springer, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-02866-4_37-1

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• Introduction

Origins of military rule

• Mechanisms and impacts of military rule
• Transitions from military rule

military rule

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military rule , political regime in which the military as an organization holds a preponderance of power. The term military rule as used here is synonymous with military regime and refers to a subtype of authoritarian regime.

For most of human history, attaching military to rule would have been redundant , because almost all political regimes in large-scale societies of the premodern period fused military, religious, economic, and monarchical power. The separation of military and civilian powers and the development of professional bureaucratic armed forces in European states in the 18th and 19th centuries gave birth to the contemporary understanding of military rule.

Not all authoritarian regimes involve military rule. In the 20th century the most-repressive nondemocratic regimes, most notably the Nazis in Germany and the Stalinist regime in the Soviet Union , were party dictatorships in which civilian control of the military was well established. Other types of authoritarian rule distinct from military rule include traditional (e.g., absolutist monarchies) and personalistic, or “sultanistic,” regimes.

Since the end of World War II , military rule has occurred almost exclusively in countries of the so-called developing world. Modernization theorists, influential in the 1950s and ’60s, were initially confident that the newly independent nations of the Middle East , Africa, and Asia (as well as Latin America) would evolve into capitalist democracies , with civilian control over the military. Those expectations were dashed by a wave of military coups d’état that reached its height in the 1960s and ’70s.

Analyses of the circumstances that lead to the rise of military rule abound. Empirical studies suggest that there is no direct correlation between the size of the military or its budget and its propensity to seize power. Further, the reasons for hierarchical coups (led by the high command) tend to be different from those for coups led by junior officers (those with the rank of, or equivalent to, army captain or below). Rather more useful is the distinction between factors internal to the armed forces, domestic political variables, and international influences. In the first category, violations of military hierarchy by civilian politicians, an expansion of the military’s capacity or sense of mission, and a heightened sense of threat can all trigger coups. With regard to domestic politics, high degrees of political conflict (especially ethnic and religious conflict), economic crises, weak political parties (especially right-wing parties), and low-capacity state institutions have been observed to precede military takeovers. Significant in that category is also the image of the military in national politics and, in particular, the degree of popular identification of the military with certain positive national values. Internationally, the threat of or defeat in war, foreign political and military assistance, and an enabling international environment , including military rule in neighbouring countries and international recognition of military regimes, can facilitate coups. A “cascade effect” has been observed in some regions, whereby military rule, first established in a single country, occurs elsewhere in subsequent years, leading to cooperation between military regimes. (For example, the 1964 coup in Brazil was followed by a coup in Argentina in 1966, coups in Chile and Uruguay in 1973, and another coup in Argentina in 1976.)

Superpower competition was likely an important factor in the proliferation of military regimes seen during the Cold War . Large amounts of military assistance from the United States and the Soviet Union strengthened military capacity within allied or “client” states. Within the U.S. sphere of influence, the increased emphasis on internal security threats in the wake of the Cuban Revolution (1959) contributed to an increase in direct military involvement in politics. Since the end of the Cold War and the breakup of the Soviet Union in 1991, there has been a marked decline in the number of military regimes in the developing world.

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Annual Review of Political Science

Volume 17, 2014, review article, military rule.

• Barbara Geddes 1 , Erica Frantz 2 , and Joseph G. Wright 3
• View Affiliations Hide Affiliations Affiliations: 1 Department of Political Science, University of California, Los Angeles, California 90095-1472; email: [email protected] 2 Department of Political Science, Bridgewater State University, Bridgewater, Massachusetts 02325; email: [email protected] 3 Department of Political Science, Pennsylvania State University, University Park, Pennsylvania 16802; email: [email protected]
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• First published as a Review in Advance on January 27, 2014
• © Annual Reviews

Military rule as a form of autocratic governance can mean either rule by a military strongman unconstrained by other officers or rule by a group of high-ranking officers who can limit the dictator's discretion. We label the latter form a military regime. Both military strongmen and military regimes are more likely to commit human rights abuses and become embroiled in civil wars than are civilian dictatorships. The behavior of strongmen diverges from that of more constrained military rulers in other areas, however. Military strongmen start more international wars than either military regimes or civilian dictators, perhaps because they have more reason to fear postouster exile, prison, or assassination. Fear of the future may also motivate their resistance to transition. Military strongmen are more often ousted by insurgency, popular uprising, or invasion than are military regimes or civilian dictators. Their tenures rarely end in democratization, whereas the opposite is true of military regimes.

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Introduction, military in government and international conflict, research design, additional analyses, syria during the black september crisis.

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Generals in the Cabinet: Military Participation in Government and International Conflict Initiation

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Peter White, Generals in the Cabinet: Military Participation in Government and International Conflict Initiation, International Studies Quarterly , Volume 65, Issue 2, June 2021, Pages 551–561, https://doi.org/10.1093/isq/sqab012

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How does the presence of military officers in national government affect a state's likelihood of international conflict? We know a great deal about how overall regime type affects international conflict, but there is substantial variation within regime types in the participation of military officers in the government. We know little about how this variation affects a state's conflict propensity. In this Research Note, I examine three competing arguments for the effect of military participation in government on conflict initiation: Military Aggression, Military Conservatism, and Civil–Military Competition. Military Aggression suggests that military involvement in government will tend to guide the state toward conflict, given a military predisposition to favor the use of force. In contrast, Military Conservatism argues that military officers in government will lead the state to less conflict, given their personal familiarity with its costs. Civil–Military Competition holds that when military officers and civilians share political power, a variety of pathologies in national security deliberation and decision-making emerge, increasing conflict propensity. I test these three propositions cross-nationally using data on the number and type of positions held by military officers in cabinets and state councils and international conflict and find the strongest support for Civil–Military Competition.

¿Cómo impacta la presencia de oficiales militares en el gobierno nacional en la propensión a conflictos internacionales de un estado? Sabemos mucho sobre cómo el tipo de sistema general impacta en el conflicto internacional, pero hay variaciones importantes dentro de los tipos de sistemas en lo que refiere a la participación de oficiales militares en el gobierno. Sabemos poco sobre cómo esta variación afecta la propensión a conflictos de un estado. En esta Nota de investigación, examino tres argumentos distintos sobre cómo la participación militar en el gobierno afecta su predisposición a iniciar conflictos: Agresión Militar, Conservadurismo Militar y Competencia Cívico-Militar. La Agresión Militar plantea que la participación militar en el gobierno tenderá a influenciar al estado hacia el conflicto, debido a la predisposición militar a favor del uso de la fuerza. En cambio, el Conservadurismo Militar propone que la presencia de oficiales militares en el gobierno llevará a que el estado se involucre en menos conflictos, debido a que los oficiales están familiarizados con su costo. La Competencia Cívico-Militar sostiene que, cuando los oficiales militares y los civiles comparten poder político, surgen diversas patologías en la deliberación y toma de decisiones en materia de seguridad nacional, lo que aumenta la propensión a conflictos. Evalúo estas tres premisas a nivel internacional utilizando datos sobre el número y el tipo de cargos ocupados por oficiales militares en los gabinetes y consejos estatales y sobre el conflicto internacional, y encuentro mayor evidencia a favor de la Competencia Cívico-Militar.

Dans quelle mesure la présence d'officiers militaires dans un gouvernement national affecte-t-elle la probabilité de conflit international de cet état ? Nous savons beaucoup de choses sur la manière dont la globalité du type de régime affecte les conflits internationaux, mais il y a des variations substantielles de participation des officiers militaires aux gouvernements selon les différents types de régime. Nous ne savons que peu de choses sur la façon dont cette variation affecte la propension d'un état à s'engager dans un conflit. Dans cet exposé de recherche, j'examine trois arguments concurrents sur l'effet de la participation militaire aux gouvernements sur le déclenchement de conflits :  agression militaire,  conservatisme militaire et concurrence entre civils et militaires. L'argument de l'agression militaire suggère que l'implication des militaires dans un gouvernement aurait tendance à orienter l’État vers le conflit en raison de la prédisposition des militaires à favoriser l'utilisation de la force. À l'inverse,  l'argument du conservatisme militaire soutient que les officiers militaires présents dans le gouvernement mèneront l’État vers moins de conflits du fait de leur propre familiarité avec leurs coûts. Et l'argument de la concurrence entre civils et militaires prétend que lorsque des civils et des militaires partagent le pouvoir politique, diverses pathologies émergent dans la délibération et la prise de décisions sur la sécurité nationale, ce qui accroît la propension au conflit. J'ai mis ces trois propositions à l’épreuve à l’échelle transnationale en utilisant des données sur le nombre et le type de postes occupés par des officiers militaires dans les cabinets et conseils d’État ainsi que sur les conflits internationaux, et j'ai constaté que l'argument le plus justifié était celui de la concurrence entre civils et militaires.

How does military participation in national cabinets affect international conflict? Recent research has advanced our understanding of the conflict propensity of military regimes ( Weeks 2014 ), as well as how the military background of leaders influences conflict propensity ( Horowitz, Stam, and Ellis 2015 ). However, across regimes-types and leaders there is substantial variation in the levels of military involvement in government. The military is not absent from civilian regimes, and leaders with military backgrounds sometimes have civilian cabinets and at other times cabinets that are heavily militarized. We do not understand the impact of military involvement in government on international conflict outside of the background of the leader and regime type.

In this Research Note, I test three arguments to address this question: Military Aggression, Military Conservatism , and Civil–Military Competition. Military Aggression argues that there are inherent attributes of military officers that make them favor military action. As military officers in the government increase, so will that state's conflict propensity. In contrast, Military Conservatism suggests that, given their familiarity with the cost of armed conflict, military officers are judicious with regard to the use of force. As military officers have an increasing role in government, conflict propensity will decrease. The final argument is Civil–Military Competition . This argument focuses on the pathologies that arise in governments where there is shared power between military officers and civilian elites. Where the military is involved in non-security aspects of the government, conflict propensity is higher, and this is particularly true where there is also a strong civilian elite in the regime.

I test these competing arguments quantitatively using yearly, cross-national data on the number of military officers in national cabinets. In examining the initiation of militarized disputes where there are fatalities, I find the strongest evidence in support of Civil–Military Competition . Rather than there being a broad trend toward conservatism or aggression, increased military officers in government correspond to the increased likelihood that a state initiates violent international conflict when the military is involved in the non-security aspects of government. Military participation in government (MPG) exerts a stronger impact on the conflict propensity of civilian-led regimes, though this does not make them more conflict-prone than military-led regimes except at very high levels of military participation.

This note makes three contributions. First, it advances our understanding of how the military influences foreign policy. Second, it demonstrates significant variation in military involvement in government across and within different regime types and the role that it plays in explaining international conflict. Third, it leverages new data on MPG to adjudicate between three competing arguments in the literature regarding military attitudes toward conflict, suggesting that it is not inherent traits of military officers, but rather it is institutional arrangements in civil–military relations that matter.

This note proceeds in six sections. In the first, I outline the arguments. In the second, I discuss the data and the research design. In the third, I present the results of the empirical analysis. In the fourth, I conduct additional analyses to verify the robustness of the main results. In the fifth, I demonstrate the mechanisms behind non-security MPG and conflict in a brief case narrative of Syria during the Black September crisis of 1970. The article concludes with discussion of the implications of the results.

While we know that military-dominated regimes are more likely to initiate international conflict ( Lai and Slater 2006 ; Weeks 2014 ) and that certain types of military experience make leaders more likely to initiate conflict ( Horowitz, Stam, and Ellis 2015 ), we do not understand the impact of military involvement in government outside of the leader and regime type. The military is not absent from regimes that are not military dictatorships. For example, the People's Liberation Army has played an extensive, and varied, role in government and politics throughout Communist rule in China. Democracies also are not immune to military involvement in government, with the records of Bangladesh, Pakistan, Turkey, and Sri Lanka showing periods when military cabinet officials or parallel ruling councils have coexisted (often uneasily) with elected civilian governments.

How does this more limited type of military involvement in government affect the likelihood of international conflict? There are clear cases of civil–military dysfunction contributing to international conflict that cannot easily be explained by regime type: for example, the Pakistani military's possible role in autonomously initiating the 1999 Kargil War with India 1 and the role that political struggles between civilian and military factions played in miscalculations by the Egyptian government in the lead up to the 1967 war with Israel ( Brooks 2008 ). In each case, the military was a political actor, but not the dominant one. In this section, I outline the three competing arguments for the effect of MPG on conflict initiation.

Military Aggression

The expectation that military officers should favor more aggressive postures in international relations is intuitively appealing. In their training and experience, senior military officers may be socialized to favor offensive military doctrines, which may lead them to favor “first-strike” options ( Posen 1986 ). Weeks (2014) argues that military officers are socialized to view military action favorably for resolving international disputes and as less costly. Horowitz, Stam, and Ellis (2015 , hereafter HSE) agree that military socialization in favor of conflict does occur—though the enthusiasm for military action is tempered by combat experience. They may also view the international environment as inherently hostile and prefer an aggressive stance in international affairs ( Brunk, Secrest, Tamashiro 1990 ). In contrast, civilian politicians and experts are more likely to take into account the diplomatic, economic, and political ramifications of conflict—which may serve to make them more cautious ( Desch 1999 ; Brooks 2008 ). Military officers may also favor international conflict, because heightened tensions and conflict increase military resources and budgets ( Sechser 2004 ). International conflict can also lead dictators to loosen coup-proofing controls on militaries, increasing their autonomy ( Talmadge 2015 ). Logically, given military preferences, socialization, and incentives, as the number of military officers in the government—and the degree of military influence in the regime—increases, so should the state's propensity for international conflict.

Hypothesis 1 : As military participation in government increases, so too does the likelihood of international conflict initiation .

Military Conservatism

The inverse of the Military Aggression argument is Military Conservatism . Related to HSE's argument that combat experience should temper military enthusiasm for aggression, there is a literature that argues for Military Conservatism regarding the use of force. Huntington (1957 , Ch. 3) argues that military officers are characterized by “Conservative Realism,” where they view the international environment in terms of potential threats and value security above all else but see war as a last resort that carries with it extreme danger. There is some empirical evidence in support of this. In several studies of retired and current American military officers and civilian foreign policy practitioners, there have been findings that those with a military background are no more likely to favor military action in response to foreign policy problems than civilians—though military officers and veterans generally favor escalation to higher levels of force once conflict has begun ( Betts 1991 ; Feaver and Gelpi 2011 ). Military officers may also view military force as useful in a more limited set of foreign disputes than civilian politicians ( Feaver and Gelpi 2011 ). Further, while HSE find that leaders with military experience without combat and those who are former rebels are more conflict-prone, those with combat experience are no more bellicose than civilian leaders. Because military members bear the costs of war most acutely and are also uniquely qualified to evaluate the limitations of military force, when the military is more involved in the highest levels of government, there may be reduced propensity for international conflict. 2

Hypothesis 2 : As military participation in government increases, the likelihood of international conflict initiation decreases .

Civil–Military Competition

A third approach, Civil–Military Competition , is agnostic regarding any inherent predisposition to conflict, instead arguing that where civilians and military elites are sharing and in competition over political power, pathologies are introduced into foreign policy decision-making, which make international conflict more likely. These include poor information sharing, multiple chains of command, the growth of armed organizations outside the military, and political incentives to exacerbate international tensions. Most important is the existence of more than one authority in the state to initiate and escalate international conflict, which creates more opportunities for domestic actors to use international conflict to gain political advantage.

First, Civil–Military Competition makes errors in “strategic assessment” more likely ( Brooks 2008 ). Brooks demonstrates that both preference divergence and shared political power between civilian and military elites negatively affect a government's ability to effectively process information and make sound, unified foreign policy decisions. 3 Brooks argues that when civilian politicians and military officers share political power, foreign policy decision-making authority is contested and unclear. Here, military and civilian officials may issue contradictory orders, postpone a decision, or fail to reach a decision. It is unlikely that the state's decision-making process is fully coordinated between the military, diplomatic, and intelligence arms of the government. There is little in the way of consultation, information sharing, and joint decision-making. Poor decisions—that do not take into account relative capabilities, externalities, and other factors that would suggest caution—are more likely.

In addition to these types of error, a particular dangerous element of Civil–Military Competition is the existence of more than one command authority. Both the military and the civilian authority are capable of commanding military force. In Egypt's case, the diffusion of authority between Nasser and ‘Amr meant that ‘Amr was able to unilaterally escalate tensions with Israel by prepositioning troops without civilian authorization ( Brooks 2008 , 89–91). This dual authority is exacerbated by the proliferation of armed organizations within the state. Political competition between civilian and military leaders takes place in the shadow of a coup (e.g., Svolik 2012 ). A common response is for civilian leaders to build up armed alternatives to the military to “counter-balance” it (e.g., De Bruin 2018 ). This has the effect of not only creating two command authorities, but two militaries—one which answers to the military hierarchy and the other to the civilian leadership. Either the civilian or military leadership can use the forces under their command to initiate or escalate international conflict.

Because the political contest divides the authority to initiate armed conflict, common elements of political competition—e.g., policy disagreement, outbidding—are exacerbated. If there is disagreement over foreign policy between civilian and military leaders, under Civil–Military Competition, one side has the outside option of unilaterally escalating a potential dispute to achieve their preferred outcome, such as Pakistan's military in the 1999 Kargil conflict.

Another factor is domestic political support. When civil and military leaders are sharing power, a key factor in their relative power is their respective support in the broader society ( Brooks 2008 ). When an international issue has domestic salience, there is an incentive for “outbidding”—with either the civil or military leaders escalating international conflict to demonstrate their bona fides to a domestic audience. Because under Civil–Military Competition the authority to start or escalate conflict is divided, the outbidding risk extends beyond rhetoric to actual conflict. This was a likely factor, for example, in the civilian faction in Syria sending the armed forces under its control into Jordan in 1970 to support the Palestinian side in the civil war there.

Domestic political incentives for international conflict exist for leaders under other civil–military arrangements, but they are especially severe under Civil–Military Competition, because of the division of military authority. There is more than one command authority, and very often, more than one armed force that can be ordered into conflict. Put differently, under Civil–Military Competition, in addition to a higher likelihood of miscalculation, there is a greater opportunity for the civil or military factions in a regime to act on incentives to outbid or divert domestic politics using international conflict. This opportunity does not exist in the same way in systems where command authority is unitary. In contrast to the aggression and conservatism arguments, Civil–Military Competition does not presuppose that one group—the military or the civilians—will pursue a more aggressive course; either can. In Egypt in 1967, it was the military pursuing escalatory action, while in Syria in 1970 it was the civilians.

Under Civil–Military Competition, it is likely that there will be military officers at high levels of government in non -security roles. This creates the conditions for competition between the military and civilians as political factions. With the division of political power into military and civilian factions, also comes the division of the authority to initiate international conflict. Under Civil–Military Competition, there are more paths through which international conflict may be initiated and through which either faction may act on political incentives to escalate international tensions.

In some cases, the military-held positions themselves will endow the holder with political and decision-making authority. For example, in Egypt in 1967, Field Marshal ‘Amr was also the first Deputy President of Egypt. In other cases, the holding of ministries related to economic or social affairs indicates a broader share of political power for the military as an institution and potential civil–military conflict more broadly. In Syria in 1970, General Mamdouh Jaber was the Minister of Rural Affairs, but Syrian military influence extended far beyond this particular portfolio. Even if the positions do not statutorily include in their duties the decision to go to war, when the military occupies positions related to political leadership, economic or social policy, or territorial administration, it indicates military intrusion into traditionally civilian decision-making and domains of governance.

Hypothesis 3 : As military participation in areas of government outside of defense increases, so too does the likelihood of international conflict initiation .

Critically, for the Civil–Military Competition argument to be supported, the effect of military intrusion into the non-security aspects of government should be found in civilian-led regimes—where there is truly shared power between civilians and the military. Where there is a military leader of the state, increased military involvement in government reflects the increased militarization of an already military executive.

Hypothesis 3a : As military participation in areas of government outside of defense increases, so too does the likelihood of international conflict initiation. This effect will be observable in civilian-led regimes .

The logic of Civil–Military Competition also suggests that not only will there be a strong effect in civilian-led regimes. Regimes with shared civil–military power will be more conflict-prone than military-led regimes. Military dominance of politics also negatively affects foreign policy decision-making but not to the same degree as contested political power between civilian and military factions ( Brooks 2008 ). Accordingly, the effect of non-security MPG should be greatest where there is also a strong civilian component to the regime.

Hypothesis 3b : As military participation in areas of government outside of defense increases, so too does the likelihood of international conflict initiation. This effect will be greatest in civilian-led regimes .

For the independent variable, I use the MPG data ( White 2017 ). These data capture the number and types of positions held by military officers in national cabinets or cabinet equivalents. Following White (2017) , I use counts of active-duty officers to capture the military’s role in executive decision-making. The MPG data divide the counts into security- and non-security components. Government members are counted in either the security or non-security count based on whether any of their portfolios pertained to security or the armed forces. Incidences of active-duty military officers holding non-security positions occur in 21.69 percent of country-years.

Security positions include the ministers of defense, foreign affairs, interior, and justice—as well as any national security adviser position, positions related to specific regions or security concerns, specific military branches, as well as border security or law enforcement. Examples in the data of non-security positions held by active military officers include a range of political leadership roles, such as the Vice Premiership in China (1964–1988) or that of Deputy Prime Minister in Syria (1985–2003), as well as that in various economic and social ministries, such as the Minister of Civil Aviation in Egypt (2002) and the Minister of Health in Sierra Leone (1967).

Figure 1 shows the proportion of states that have active military officers in cabinets and state councils from 1964 to 2008 (the data's range), differentiating by security or non-security role (differentiations by regime-type are in the online appendix ). This demonstrates that having some military involvement in the security sector is always more common than in non-security areas. 4 It is clear also that a greater share of states in the international system see military involvement in government during the Cold War. This may stem from the relative frequency of military regimes during that period. For both types of military involvement in government, there was a steep drop-off with the end of the Cold War. It is notable, however, that decline in military involvement in government at the end of the Cold War has not continued in the post–Cold War period, with non-security involvement never dropping below 12 percent of states and security involvement never below 29 percent.

Proportion of states with active military officers in government, security, and non-security roles.

I use as independent variables counts of the number of active military officers in government, aggregating all military officers in government (MPG) and differentiating by role—security ( Security MPG ) versus non-security ( Non-security MPG ). For the dependent variable, I generated an indicator for whether or not a state initiated a militarized interstate dispute (MID) in a given year using the MID 4.0 data ( Palmer et al 2015 ). I also generated an indicator for whether or not a state initiated an MID that resulted in fatalities in a given year to examine whether any effect for Security MPG or Non-security MPG extends to MIDs that involve at least some violence.

To ensure that the analyses do not conflate military involvement in government with overall regime characteristics, I include regime-type indicators from Geddes, Wright, and Frantz (2014 , hereafter, GWF). These include separate indicators for civilian personalist dictatorships, military personalist dictatorships, collegial/institutional military regimes (i.e., juntas), dominant party systems, and democracies. Effectively, this approach gives each regime type its own intercept and captures the effect of within-regime variation in MPG on conflict initiation.

I include from HSE indicators for whether the leader was a former soldier or officer with combat experience, without combat experience, or a former rebel—with the base category being no rebel or military experience. While HSE conduct leader-year analysis, I am using the country-year, so I aggregate HSE's leader-year data to this level of analysis. This means that in years where there were leadership changes, these indicators account for the experience of multiple leaders.

In addition to state capability controls, such as the state's value in the Composite Index of National Capabilities ( Singer, Bremer, and Stuckey 1972 ) and major power status, I include a counter for the age of the regime in years (from GWF), which controls for the conflict-proneness of new regimes ( Mansfield and Snyder 2007 ). Given the connection between intra - and interstate armed conflict ( Gleditsch, Salehyan, and Schultz 2009 ), I included also an indicator for an internal armed conflict that resulted in at least twenty-five battle-deaths in that year—using the UCDP/PRIO Armed Conflict Dataset ( Themner and Wallensteen 2014 ). I control for state's history of conflict and underlying conflict-propensity in two ways. The first is the inclusion of a count of the total number of MIDs that a state has experienced since 1946. The second is the inclusion of a cubic polynomial of a count of the years since the last MID initiation by the state. This also addresses temporal dependence with a binary dependent variable ( Carter and Signorino 2010 ). In all models, the right-hand side variables were lagged by one year to address potential reverse causality. Robust standard errors were calculated by clustering on country. Given the binary dependent variable, I used logistic regression.

Table 1 shows the results from country-year analysis of MID initiation, where the independent variable is the aggregated count of all MPG. The analysis examines separately MPG's impact on the initiation of all MIDs and also only MIDs that result in fatalities. Once control variables are added (Models 2 and 3; table in the online appendix ), MPG is not significant for all MIDs but is highly significant and positive throughout the MIDs with fatalities models. This suggests that where military involvement in government influences conflict initiation, it is generally in those conflicts that ultimately result in actual violence.

Military participation in government and international conflict initiation

Table 2 shows results for the same analysis, but MPG is disaggregated into its security and non-security components. The results here demonstrate that the positive effect for overall MPG is driven primarily by military involvement in the non-security aspects of government. In the fatal MIDs analysis, both the security and non-security MPG counts are positive, but only non-security MPG is positive and significant ( p  < .01).

Security- and non-security MPG and international conflict initiation

Notes : Robust standard errors in parentheses.

** p  < .01, * p  < .05, + p  < .1 (two-tailed); tables with controls in the online appendix .

Figures 2 and 3 plot the predicted probabilities of a state initiating an MID that results in fatalities at different levels of MPG and non-security MPG—generated from the full models. They demonstrate large increases in the probability of fatal MID initiations as the levels of MPG increase. At 0 MPG, the predicted probability of fatal MID initiation is 4.09 percent; with the addition of one military officer, it increases to 4.28 percent (a 4.65 percent increase); and with two, it increases to 4.48 percent (a 9.54 percent increase). When there are sixteen military officers, the probability of fatal MID initiation more than doubles—to 8.31 percent—with the level of uncertainty around these predictions becoming substantially greater at the rarer, highest levels of MPG. For non-security MPG, the effects are greater than with overall MPG, with one military officer in a non-security role corresponding to a 4.44 percent chance of conflict initiation, two to a 4.67 percent chance, and with the probability doubling at fifteen officers (rather than sixteen).

Substantive effect of MPG on fatal MID initiation.

Substantive effect of Non-security MPG on fatal MID initiation.

Taken together, the main analyses are strongly suggestive of a lack of support for the Military Conservatism argument (Hypothesis 2). Neither the aggregated MPG count nor its disaggregated security and non-security components are negatively associated with conflict initiation at any conventional level of statistical significance. Rather, with fatal MIDs aggregated MPG is positively associated, and this effect is driven primarily by non-security MPG. The positive effect for aggregated MPG suggests support for the Military Aggression argument. However, the outsized role that non-security MPG plays in this effect suggests support for Civil–Military Competition .

Here, it is important to contrast the null result for security MPG with the positive and significant result for non-security MPG. The results indicate that military officers occupying positions related to foreign policy and national security—including those of minister of defense, foreign affairs, or national security adviser—do not exert a significant impact on conflict initiation. In contrast, when the military “steps out of its lane” and holds positions relating to political leadership, economic or social affairs, or territorial administration, there is a significantly greater likelihood of conflict initiation. This provides support for the Civil–Military Competition argument in relation to Military Aggression. Were the Military Aggression argument supported, logically we would expect increased military influence in the sectors of the government directly related to security and foreign policy decision-making and advising to be increasingly associated with international conflict. Rather, it is only when the military occupies positions that have little direct relevance to security and foreign affairs that international conflict initiation is more likely.

To further adjudicate between the Military Aggression and Civil–Military Competition arguments, an examination of the corollary hypotheses to the competition argument is useful. Hypothesis 3a anticipates that there will be an observable effect of non-security MPG in civilian-led regimes, while Hypothesis 3b anticipates that this will make civilian-led regimes more conflict-prone than military regimes when there is non-security MPG.  Figure 4 a shows plots of predicted probabilities at different levels of non-security MPG, conditional on a military- or civilian-led regime (table in the online appendix ). There are also two plots derived from the first that compare separately the predicted probabilities for military- (4b) and civilian-led (4c) regimes with the baseline probability of a state initiating a fatal MID derived from the same model (in black). The model from which these predicted probabilities were derived builds off of the main analyses, but aggregates the collegial military regime and personalist-military regime indicators into one “military regime” indicator to set these apart from civilian-led regimes—the base category. Security and non-security MPG were interacted with the military regime indicator to examine the impact of each type of MPG conditional on whether the regime was civilian- or military-led.

(a–c) Non-security MPG's effect on fatal MID initiation, conditional on civilian- or military-led regime.

The space between the 95 percent confidence intervals for the baseline prediction (in black,  figure 4c ) and the predictions for civilian-led regimes at different levels of non-security MPG (in green) indicates that on average, in civilian-led regimes, where non-security MPG is at least five, the probability of that state initiating a fatal MID is significantly greater than the baseline probability. The same is not true, however, for military-led regimes (in orange). This suggests that not only is there a strong effect for non-security MPG in civilian-led regimes (supporting Hypothesis 3a), the effect of non-security MPG on the conflict propensity of civilian-led regimes is greater than its effect on military-led regimes. This is suggestive of support for Hypothesis 3b. However, it cannot be said that non-security MPG makes civilian regimes more conflict-prone than military-led regimes. When the predicted probabilities for both military- and civilian-led regimes are overlaid ( Figure 4a ), the overlap of the confidence intervals suggests that there is not a statistically significant difference between the two at different levels of MPG. This is confirmed by examining the statistical significance of the difference of the predicted probabilities between the two regime categories—which is significant at the 0.05 level only when non-security MPG is greater than 21. In the rare cases where civilian-led regimes have extremely high levels of non-security MPG, they may be more conflict-prone than military-led regimes. The results do demonstrate, however, that non-security MPG in civilian-led regimes makes them more conflict-prone than other civilian regimes at a rate that is greater than the impact on military-led regimes.

MPG has a strong positive effect on the initiation of violent international conflict, but this effect is driven primarily by military officers taking non-security roles in government, indicating that the military is intruding into traditionally civilian spheres of policy-making and leadership. Taken together, the results provide strong evidence against the Military Conservatism hypothesis (Hypothesis 2). Distinguishing between the Military Aggression and Civil–Military Competition hypotheses is more difficult, but the results provide stronger support for Civil–Military Competition. The effect of MPG on fatal MID initiation is positive and significant across these analyses, but this effect is driven by military involvement in non-security roles. Critically, there is no evidence that increasing the military's role in positions related to security or foreign policy increases international conflict propensity—only when the military steps into fields outside of those that directly pertain to international conflict does the state's risk for initiating violent international conflict increase. There is also strong evidence that increasing non-security MPG has a greater effect on the conflict propensity of civilian-led regimes than military regimes, though this will only make civilian-led regimes more conflict-prone than military regimes at extremely high levels of non-security MPG.

To provide added confidence in the statistical analyses, I explored a range of additional control variables and model specifications. In all robustness checks, I focused on fatal MID initiation, examining three specifications—full MPG, security/non-security MPG, and the security/non-security MPG interaction with the military regime indicator. The full results from these analyses are available in the online appendix .

First, I parsed the non-security MPG variable into separate counts for non-security positions related to policy areas central to the political and economic administration of the country—e.g., political leadership, economic development, finance, and territorial administration—and positions in more peripheral policy areas—e.g., culture, health, education, and religion. I found that positions focused on the political, territorial, financial, and economic administration of the country account for most of the effect found for non-security MPG. This suggests that it is areas related to leadership and administration of the country that are most salient to the Civil–Military Competition that can drive increased conflict propensity.

In additional analyses, I included two binary indicators for whether or not there was any active-duty military officer in a security role or in a non-security role. I found these binary indicators to be not significant both alone and with the security and non-security MPG counters—whose effect remains substantively unchanged. This suggest that it is not the mere presence of any military officers in non-security roles that affects conflict propensity, it is their level—e.g., how deep is military intrusion into government? This holds too when the effects are separated by civilian- and military-led regimes in the model with the interaction with the military regime indicator.

Given the relative rarity of fatal MID initiation in the data, I reran the analysis using rare events logit ( King and Zeng 2001 ). In this specification, none of the findings for MPG change substantively, and indeed, in most cases achieve greater statistical significance. Second, as  figure 1 indicates, there are clear system-wide time trends in MPG. In order to ensure that these temporal trends were not an omitted factor that biased the results, I added yearly fixed effects, which did not substantively change the main findings.

In additional models, I included a counter for the number of years since the state last experienced a coup attempt—derived from Powell and Thyne's (2011) data. This also did not substantively alter the main findings. To ensure that the effect of the MPG counts was not merely picking up the effect of overall cabinet/state council size, I included the count of the total number of cabinet- or state council-level officials in the government (civilians and military). I also explored an alternative specification of military involvement in government—Military Government Share (MGS) from White (2017) . Rather than capture the overall level of MPG, MGS captures the share of cabinet-level positions held by active military officers—i.e., a proportion ranging from 0 to 1. The use of these measures does not yield results that are meaningfully different from those using MPG.

Additional international factors also may contribute to both MPG and conflict propensity. Accordingly, I replicated the main analyses with the addition of controls for both the number of contiguous states using the Correlates of War (COW) contiguity data ( Stinnett et al. 2002 ), as well as the number of alliances in which the state is engaged, using the COW alliance data ( Gibler 2009 ). The results from these analyses also did not substantively alter those from the main analyses.

Another potential concern is that the anticipation of international conflict may both contribute to a state's propensity to initiate conflict and also to bring more military officers into government. Existing literature ( Desch 1999 ; Piplani and Talmadge 2016 ; White 2017 ) has demonstrated that the effect of international conflict on MPG and coups is negative. Given this, any potential bias should set a higher bar for finding a statistically significant positive association for MPG and conflict initiation. In addition, non-security MPG exerts the strongest impact on international conflict initiation. If the anticipation of international conflict by the government was driving both increased MPG and conflict, we would expect to see this played out most clearly in Security MPG—i.e., in defense-and security-focused government positions.

I also explored the effect of MPG on the outcomes of MIDS. I reproduced the multinomial logit analysis of MID outcomes from Maoz et al. (2019) , adding to their models the independent variables from the main analyses here (expanded discussion in the online appendix ). I find that fatal MIDs initiated by states with higher levels of non-security MPG are not significantly more or less likely to end in victories (relative to stalemates or draws). There is some weak evidence that for states with higher levels of non-security MPG, a stalemate or draw is more likely than an outright loss, though these results are not significant at conventional levels. The strongest finding is that higher security MPG makes decisive outcomes more likely (victories or loses, relative to stalemates or draws). Taken with the main analyses, these results suggest that while military participation in regime leadership makes the initiation of violent international disputes more likely—particularly when that military involvement is in non-security aspects of the regime. The impact on the subsequent outcome of the dispute is largely indeterminate.

I further explore the connection between Civil–Military Competition, non-security MPG, and international conflict with an examination of Syrian intervention in Jordan during the 1970 “Black September” crisis. While the Syrian regime had come to power in a military coup in 1963, by 1970 the leadership had bifurcated into distinct and competing civilian and military camps. This was described in Syria as izdiwajiyyah —“power dualism” between the military on one hand, and the civilians, intelligence services, and non-military security forces on the other ( Batatu 1999 , 144–45). Salah al-Jadid, the head of the Syrian Ba'ath Party, led the civilian faction and favored more radical economic, social, and foreign policies—including active support for the Palestinian cause. The more moderate, military faction was headed by then-Minister of Defense General Hafez al-Assad and favored a less aggressive policy ( Collelo 1987 ; Seale 1988 , Chapter 11; Dam 1996 , 67–68). This was competition for political power between distinct civilian- and military-based factions ( Maoz 1988 , 37). Early in 1970, Assad had severed the military from the civilian Ba'ath Party and set up a separate party structure within the military ( Seale 1988 , Chapter 11).

At the same time that the Syrian regime split into competing military and civilian factions, the highest levels of the regime exhibited shared offices between civilian and military authorities. Inside Syria's cabinet in 1970, in addition to civilian ministers, there were five generals, including Assad. Assad was Minister of Defense, and there were three other “Deputy Ministers of Defense,” as well as a general as Minister of Rural Affairs. 5 The military occupation of the Ministry of Rural Affairs—belied a much greater military role in regime and Ba’ath Party politics. And while holding nominally security portfolios, two of the generals in ministry of defense roles, including Assad, also held positions in the Ba’ath Party's sixteen-member executive committee, indicating a broader non-security role as well.

On September 16, Jordan began a military operation against the Palestinian Liberation Organization (PLO). This was motivated by the increased assertiveness and autonomy of the PLO inside Jordan. In Syria, the Civilian Party faction saw this crisis as an opportunity to both support the PLO and to strengthen its hand relative to the Army—given the Party's close identification with the Palestinian cause and the military's relative caution ( Lawson 1996 , 68–71). Forging connections with Palestinian groups was a way for factions in Syria to cultivate anti-Israeli and revolutionary bona fides in domestic politics—a strategy that the Party actively pursued in the late 1960s, “outbidding” the Army faction in terms of championing the politically popular Palestinian cause ( Lawson 1996 , 71; Borghard 2014 , 111). Further, the Party established Palestinian militias that answered directly to it—serving as an armed counterweight to the military ( Collelo 1987 , 38–39; Van Dam 1996 , 67). Pursuing aggressive support of the Palestinian cause allowed the Party to distinguish itself politically from the Army, increase their domestic political support, and build an armed counterweight to the military. This armed counterweight also allowed the Party to intervene abroad without the military.

On September 18, Palestinian units in Syria under the command of Jadid—the Palestinian Liberation Army (PLA) and the al-Saiqah (“Thunderbolt”) militia—crossed into Jordan to support the PLO. Two days later a single armored division with its tanks repainted with PLA markings followed ( Ashton 2006 , 148–50; Lawson 1996 , 74–75). The total force mobilized amounted to less than two divisions—and was conspicuously denied any air cover by the Syrian Air Force, which was kept grounded by its commander, Assad. This can likely be explained by the opposition to intervention by Assad and other senior commanders ( Lawson 1996 ). The small size of the force and the lack of air cover proved fatal to the intervention, with the unopposed Jordanian Air Force destroying almost 100 Syrian/PLA tanks, forcing a retreat ( Ashton 2008 ).

The near-universal consensus in the literature is that the withholding of air power stemmed from the competition between the Party and the Army (e.g., Collelo 1987 ; Lawson 1996 ; Pollack 2004 ). The piecemeal nature of the ground intervention by units under Jadid's control supports the interpretation that the intervention was on at the behest of the Party faction, not the Syrian regime as a whole ( Maoz and Yaniv 1986 ; Ashton 2008 , 195). That Assad was able to withhold forces even after the civilian side of the regime committed itself to intervention illustrates the multiple chains of command that stem from Civil–Military Competition. Military force could be both deployed to Jordan and withheld by the dueling command authorities.

In the struggle for power with the Army, the Party was able to distinguish itself in Syrian politics as the champion of the Palestinian cause. While this likely represented a sincerely held policy preference, it also allowed the Party faction to identify itself with a popular, revolutionary cause, at the expense of the Army. This allowed it to cultivate Palestinian militias answerable directly to the Ba’ath Party as a counterweight to the military and which would spearhead the incursion into Jordan.

The failure of the incursion in Jordan was a major factor in Jadid losing power less than two months later and Assad and the Army faction rising to power. While Jadid sought to blame Assad for the failure in Jordan, Assad was able to associate Jadid with the failure ( Lawson 1996 , 74–75). Pro-Palestinian adventurism was a double-edged sword for the Party faction—any success in Jordan would have represented a political windfall for the Party faction at the expense of the Army—but the Party also “owned” any failure.

Of the three arguments, the results presented here provide the strongest support for Civil–Military Competition . MPG in non-security areas is strongly associated with the initiation of violent international conflict, while MPG in security roles is not. When military officers occupy typically civilian positions, it can be indicative of shared power and a diffusion of decision-making authority between the civilians and the military. The multiple command authorities create more opportunities for policy disagreements and political rivalry to spill over into international conflict. In line with this logic, the effect of MPG on conflict propensity is greater in civilian- than military-led regimes—though only at very high levels of MPG do civilian-led regimes become more conflict-prone than military regimes.

This suggests that military involvement in government has a strong effect on a state’s conflict propensity, but it is not some inherent trait of military officers that exerts an effect on conflict, rather it is institutional arrangements that matter. There is no evidence in support of the Military Conservatism argument—no aspect of MPG is negatively and significantly associated with conflict initiation. And while the aggregated MPG count is positive and significant, this effect is driven by non-security MPG.

These findings give us a much greater understanding of the role that militaries can play in governments and in foreign policy decision-making. In between civilian- and military-dominated regimes, there is a spectrum of military involvement in government, and in this spectrum, there is the potential for substantially increased conflict propensity. Civilian-led regimes that are only partially civilianized see increases in their tendency toward conflict. This is not because the military officers in the regime are inherently aggressive, but because shared power and potential competition between civilian and military elites lends itself to poor decision-making and more opportunities for competing political actors to initiate international conflict.

A key takeaway is that civilian-led regimes should not be judged as being inherently pacific without examining the role that the military plays in such settings. While democracies and single-party states tend to, on average, be less conflict-prone ( Weeks 2014 ), the results here suggest when these regimes incorporate a substantial military presence in the government outside of a purely security role, they are more conflict-prone than civilian-led regimes without such civil–military arrangements.

It is useful to place these findings in the context of the broader civil–military relations literature. Narang and Talmadge (2018) find that militaries that are involved in politics tend to perform poorly once interstate war actually beings. (Though auxiliary analyses of a broader set of MID outcomes in this note does not provide clear evidence to support or contradict these findings.) Narang and Talmadge's findings relate also to White's (2017) finding that international conflicts that end badly are likely to lead to military withdrawal from civilian government roles. Bringing these works together with the findings here presents a compelling story regarding civilian-led regimes that share political power with their militaries: regimes with military officers in non-security roles are more likely to initiate international conflict, which may go poorly, and these losses tend to lead to periods of reform that depoliticize and professionalize the military, reducing its role. Future research first should seek to more fully unpack the relationship between MPG and performance in international conflict. A second question is the degree to which regimes who initiate conflict stemming from civil–military conflict “repeat their mistakes”—i.e., do regimes that initiate international conflict because of the pathologies brought on by shared civil–military power reform to avoid that dynamic in the future?

The data used in this project were collected with support from a National Science Foundation (NSF) Dissertation Improvement Grant (SES #1424001). The views expressed in this article are the author's own and do not necessarily reflect those of the NSF or the US government.

Peter B. White ( [email protected] ) is an Assistant Professor in the Department of Political Science at Auburn University.

Author's note : The author would like to thank Richard Betts, Risa Brooks, David Cunningham, Michael Desch, Paul Huth, Michael Kenwick, Lucia Tiscornia, and Robie White, as well as three anonymous reviewers at International Studies Quarterly, for their valuable feedback. Earlier versions of this article were presented at the 2017 annual meetings of the American Political Science Association and the International Studies Association International Security Studies Section, as well as the 2017 Emerging Scholars in Grand Strategy workshop at the University of Notre Dame. The data used in this project were collected with support from a National Science Foundation (NSF) Dissertation Improvement Grant (SES #1424001). The views expressed in this article are the author's own and do not necessarily reflect those of the NSF or the US government. The data underlying this article are available on the ISQ Dataverse at https://dataverse.harvard.edu/dataverse/isq .

“Nawaz blames Musharraf for Kargil.” May 28, 2006. The Times of India . http://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/world/pakistan/Nawaz-blames-Musharraf-for-Kargil/Research Noteshow/1581473.cms? . Accessed July 4, 2017.

Another possible argument is that military officers’ preferences depend on capabilities. Weak state capabilities make for conservative military views and vice versa. For this to be true, we would expect that any impact of MPG be conditional on state capabilities. I explore this in the online appendix and do not find strong evidence of a conditional effect.

Certainly there are cases where there will be salient intra-regime divides between political factions that include both civilians and military officers. It has been argued, for example, that this was the case in China during Mao's rule ( Whitson 1972 ), where the lines between Communist Party (CCP) cadres and PLA officers could be blurry. However, even in such cases, there is still a military institutional identity to which at least some military officers will adhere.

This reflects the proportion of states that have at least one active-duty military officers serving in each category. When military officers serve in a non-security capacity, they tend to be present in greater numbers. In countries where there is at least one military officer in a security role, the average number in a security role is 1.682; for officers in a non-security role, it is 3.327.

According to the MPG data.

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• Globally, Broad Support for Representative and Direct Democracy
• 2. Democracy widely supported, little backing for rule by strong leader or military

Table of Contents

• 1. Many unhappy with current political system
• Acknowledgments
• Methodology
• Appendix: Political categorization

Governance can take many forms: by elected representatives, through direct votes by citizens, by a strong leader, the military or those with particular expertise. Some form of democracy is the public’s preference.

[a representative democracy]

A global median of 78% back government by elected representatives. But the intensity of this support varies significantly between nations. Roughly six-in-ten Ghanaians (62%), 54% of Swedes and 53% of Senegalese and Tanzanians hold the view that representative democracy is very good. Just 8% of Brazilians and 9% of Mexicans agree. The only countries where there is significantly strong opposition to representative democracy are Colombia (24% say it is very bad) and Tunisia (23% very bad).

In many countries, skepticism of representative democracy is tied to negative views about economic conditions. In 19 countries, people who say their national economies are in bad shape are less likely to believe representative democracy is good for the country.

In 23 nations, the belief that representative democracy is good is less common among people who think life is worse today than it was 50 years ago. In Spain, for example, just 63% of those who believe life is worse than before consider representative democracy a good thing for their country, compared with 80% who support representative democracy among those who say life is better than it was a half century ago.

Similarly, pessimism about the next generation is related to negative views about representative democracy. In roughly half the nations surveyed those who think today’s children will be worse off financially than their parents are less likely than others to say representative democracy is a good form of government. Among Mexicans who believe the next generation will be worse off, only 52% say representative democracy is good for the country. Backing for government by elected representatives is at 72% among those who say children will be better off than their parents.

Attitudes toward representative democracy are also associated with opinions about diversity. In more than a third of the nations surveyed those who think that having people of many different backgrounds – such as different ethnic groups, religions and races – makes their country a worse place to live are less likely than others to support government by elected representatives. In South Africa, a country with a troubled history of racial oppression and conflict, 73% of those who embrace diversity describe representative democracy as a good thing for their country; just 54% agree among those who say diversity makes South Africa a worse place to live.

Many publics want a direct say

Direct democracy, a governing system where citizens, not elected officials, vote directly on major national issues, is supported by roughly two-thirds of the public around the world, with little difference in views between regions.

The strongest support for governing through referenda is found in Turkey (84%), where 53% of the public say it would be very good to have citizens vote on major national issues. Lebanon (83%) and Kenya (80%) also show broad support for direct democracy.

There is also strong backing for such governance in Japan (65%) even though the country has not had a referendum in the post-World War II era.

In the U.S., Germany and the Netherlands, people with a high school education or less are more likely than those with more than a high school education to support direct democracy. Such differences are small in the U.S. (6 percentage points) and Germany (8 points) but there is a 17-point differential in the Netherlands (62% of those with less educational attainment back direct democracy, but only 45% of those with more education agree).

In six of seven Latin American nations surveyed, those with a secondary school education or above are more supportive of direct democracy than those with less than a high school education. This educational divide is 16 points in Chile and 14 points in Argentina and Colombia. In each of these countries, those with less education are less likely to hold an opinion of direct democracy.

In Latin America, there is also a generation gap in views of direct democracy. In Brazil, Chile, Mexico and Venezuela, those ages 18 to 29 are more supportive than those ages 50 and older of having citizens, not elected officials, vote directly on issues of major national importance.

Notably, in the U.S. it is people ages 30 to 49 who are most likely (73%) to back referenda.

In other countries there are sharp divisions along religious or ethnic lines. In Israel it is Arabs (83%) more than Jews (54%) who favor direct democracy, and in Nigeria it is Muslims (70%) more than Christians (55%).

Supporters of some populist parties in Europe are particularly enthusiastic about direct democracy. In Spain, 88% of those who hold a favorable view of Podemos say citizens voting on national issues would be good for the country. In Germany, 84% of AfD backers agree, as do 77% of PVV supporters in the Netherlands.

Support for direct democracy can also be seen in other recent Pew Research Center findings in Europe. In the wake of the United Kingdom’s decision to leave the European Union, a median of just 18% in nine continental EU member states say they want their country to exit the EU. But 53% support holding a national vote on their own country’s EU membership.

And such support is particularly strong among backers of Euroskeptic populist parties, many of whom have promised their supporters a referendum on EU membership. (For more on European’s attitudes about staying in the EU, see Post-Brexit, Europeans More Favorable Toward EU .)

And in six of the nine continental European nations surveyed, strong majorities of those who believe that direct democracy is a very good form of governance support their own EU membership referendum.

Technocracy has its champions

The value of expert opinion has been questioned in the eyes of the public in recent years. But when asked whether a governing system in which experts, not elected officials, make decisions would be a good or bad approach, publics around the world are divided: 49% say that would be a good idea, 46% think it would be a bad thing.

Europeans (a median of 43%) and Americans (40%) are the least supportive. But among Europeans, roughly two-thirds of Hungarians (68%) say leaving decision-making to experts would be a good way to govern.

Asian-Pacific publics generally back rule by experts, particularly people in Vietnam (67%), India (65%) and the Philippines (62%). Only Australians are notably wary: 57% say it would be a bad way to govern, and only 41% support governance by experts.

More than half of Africans surveyed also say governing by experts would be a good thing for their country. Nigerians (65%) are especially supportive. And it is Nigerian Muslims more than Christians who say this.

Young people in a number of advanced economies are particularly attracted to technocracy. In the U.S. the age gap is 10 percentage points – 46% of those ages 18 to 29 but only 36% of those ages 50 and older say it would be good if experts, not elected officials, made decisions. The young-old differential is even greater in Australia (19 points), Japan (18 points), the UK (14 points), Sweden (13 points) and Canada (13 points).

Some support for rule by strong leader

Rule by a strong leader is generally unpopular, though minorities of a substantial size back it. A global median of 26% say a system in which a strong leader can make decisions without interference from parliament or the courts would be a good way of governing. Roughly seven-in-ten (71%) say it would be a bad type of governance.

Opposition is particularly widespread in Europe (a median of 86% oppose rule by a strong leader), with strong opposition in Germany (93%), Sweden (90%) and the Netherlands (89%).

But autocracy is not universally opposed. Roughly four-in-ten Italians (43%) who have a favorable view of Forza Italia, the political party founded by former Italian Prime Minister Silvio Berlusconi, and a similar share of the British (42%) who favor UKIP say a strong leader making decisions would be good for their country. Nearly half of Russians (48%) back governance by a strong leader.

In Asia, 55% of Indians, 52% of Indonesians and 50% of Filipinos favor autocracy. Such support is particularly intense in India, where 27% very strongly back a strong leader.

Public views of rule by a strong leader are relevant in countries that have experienced degrees of authoritarianism in recent years. Roughly eight-in-ten Venezuelans (81%) and 71% of Hungarians oppose a strong leader who makes decisions without interference of parliament or the courts.

Rule by a strong leader also appeals to older members of the public in some countries. More than a quarter of Hungarians (29%) and South Koreans (34%) ages 50 and older favor governance by a strong leader.

In advanced economies there is little overall backing for autocracy. But, where such support does exist, it is often people with a secondary education or below who are more likely than those with more education to favor autocratic rule. This educational divide is particularly wide in the UK (19 percentage points), the U.S. (15 points), Poland and South Korea (both 13 points).

In a number of nations there is a significant division of opinion about strong leaders based on ideology. Those who place themselves on the right of the ideological spectrum are more likely than those who place themselves on the left to say a strong leader making decisions would be a good way of governing. The ideological gap is 20 percentage points in South Korea and Australia and 16 points in Italy and the UK. Notably, in Venezuela, which has been ruled by populist, left-wing strongmen, those on the left are more supportive of autocratic rule than those on the right.

Significant minorities support military rule

There is minority support for a governing system in which the military rules the country: a median of 24% in the 38 nations surveyed. At least four-in-ten Africans (46%) and Asians (41%) see value in a government run by the generals and admirals.

The strongest backing is in Vietnam (70%), where the army has long played a pivotal role in governance in close collaboration with the Communist Party, especially in the 1960s and 70s during the war with the United States. Some of this may be nostalgia for the past: By two-to-one (46% to 23%) Vietnamese ages 50 and older are more likely than those ages 18 to 29 to say military rule would be very good for their country.

Notably, roughly half of both Indians (53%) and South Africans (52%), who live in nations that often hold themselves up as democratic exemplars for their regions, say military rule would be a good thing for their countries. But in these societies, older people (those ages 50 and older) are the least supportive of the army running the country, and they are the ones who either personally experienced the struggle to establish democratic rule or are the immediate descendants of those democratic pioneers. In South Africa, blacks (55%) more than whites (38%) also favor the military making governance decisions.

Only one-in-ten Europeans back military rule. But some on the populist right of the political spectrum voice such support. Nearly a third of those who hold a favorable view of the National Front in France (31%) say a governing system in which the military rules the country would be a good thing, as do nearly a quarter of those who favor UKIP in the United Kingdom (23%).

Support for a governing system in which the military rules the country enjoys backing among people with less education in at least half the countries surveyed, with some of the strongest support among those with less than a secondary education in Africa and Latin America.

More than half of Peruvians with less than a high school education (55%) prefer military rule. Only about a third (32%) of more educated Peruvians agree.

Particularly strong backing for military rule also exists among the less educated in Vietnam (76%), Nigeria (57%), Kenya (49%) and the Philippines (47%).

Notably, one-in-five of those ages 50 and older in the U.S. support military rule, as do roughly one-in-four Japanese (24%) ages 18 to 29.

Ideology also plays a role in public views of military rule. But it can cut both ways. In some countries, people on the right of the political spectrum are significantly more supportive of military governance than those on the left, especially in Chile. In Hungary and Venezuela, on the other hand, it is more likely to be individuals on the left who see value in military rule.

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Why civilian government is better than military in Nigeria?

Civilian government is better than military rule in Nigeria because it promotes democracy, respect for human rights, and the rule of law, leading to greater stability and economic prosperity for the country.

What are the key differences between civilian and military rule in Nigeria?

Civilian government is run by elected officials and is based on the principles of democracy, while military rule is characterized by the control of the government by the armed forces.

How does civilian government promote democracy in Nigeria?

Civilian government allows for free and fair elections, gives citizens the right to participate in politics, and fosters a system of checks and balances.

What role does respect for human rights play in civilian government?

Civilian government is based on the respect for human rights, including freedom of speech, assembly, and religion, which are essential for a thriving society.

How does civilian government contribute to the rule of law?

Civilian government upholds the rule of law by ensuring that all individuals, including government officials, are subject to the same laws and justice system.

What are the economic benefits of civilian government in Nigeria?

Under civilian government, Nigeria can attract more foreign investment, develop strong institutions, and implement economic policies that promote growth and development.

Can civilian government help to reduce corruption in Nigeria?

Yes, civilian government can foster transparency, accountability, and anti-corruption measures to combat corrupt practices.

What are the drawbacks of military rule in Nigeria?

Military rule often leads to restrictions on civil liberties, political repression, and a lack of accountability, which can hinder the country’s progress.

How does military rule impact foreign relations for Nigeria?

Military rule can strain diplomatic relations with other countries and affect Nigeria’s international standing and credibility.

What are the common concerns with military intervention in Nigerian politics?

Military interventions in Nigerian politics often lead to instability, human rights abuses, and a lack of trust in the government.

How does civilian government contribute to national unity in Nigeria?

A civilian government can work towards inclusivity, representation, and dialogue among diverse ethnic and religious groups in Nigeria, fostering national unity.

What role does the military play in a civilian government?

The military in a civilian government serves to protect the country’s borders, contribute to peacekeeping efforts, and assist in disaster relief.

How does civilian government impact the development of democratic institutions in Nigeria?

Civilian government can strengthen democratic institutions such as the legislature, judiciary, and civil society organizations, promoting good governance.

What are the challenges of transitioning from military to civilian rule in Nigeria?

Challenges include consolidating democratic gains, addressing political fragmentation, and reforming military institutions to be subordinate to civilian authority.

How does civilian government address the needs of the Nigerian people?

Civilian government can implement social and economic policies that address poverty, unemployment, healthcare, and education, prioritizing the well-being of its citizens.

What is the role of the citizenry in upholding a civilian government?

Citizens play a crucial role in holding their elected officials accountable, participating in civic engagement, and defending democratic values to ensure the success of civilian government in Nigeria.

About Robert Carlson

Robert has over 15 years in Law Enforcement, with the past eight years as a senior firearms instructor for the largest police department in the South Eastern United States. Specializing in Active Shooters, Counter-Ambush, Low-light, and Patrol Rifles, he has trained thousands of Law Enforcement Officers in firearms. A U.S Air Force combat veteran with over 25 years of service specialized in small arms and tactics training. He is the owner of Brave Defender Training Group LLC, providing advanced firearms and tactical training.

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2001 WAEC English Language Theory You are a speaker in a debate on the topic “Civilian rule is better than...

You are a speaker in a debate on the topic “Civilian rule is better than military." Write your contribution for or against the motion. 

Explanation

Good morning Mr. Chairman, panel of Judges, accurate time-keeper, co-debaters, ladies and gentlemen. I am here to support the motion which says: "Civilian rule is better than military rule."        Firstly, I would like to take the pains to enlighten some of the younger ones here about what civilian rule and military rule are actually all about. Civilian rule can be likened to a democratic rule. Democracy, in the opinion of the layman, is government for the people, of the people and by the people. From the definition, it can be noted that civilian rulers are actually chosen by the people and they work for the benefit of the people who choose them.        On the other hand, military rule can be likened to an autocratic rule where the people are instructed to go and comes without any argument from anyone. It is like a do or die affair. Let me now get down to the motion.        First and foremost, in every democratic dispensation, there is freedom to vote and be voted for, which is not present in the military rule. The civilians only rule when they have been elected by the people. They do not impose themselves on anyone. Meanwhile, the people have no say when the military is ruling. Military rule is imposed on the people and military heads of state rule without the consent of the people. Because military men have guns, the people can not protest, they just have to accept them. Moreover, when civilians rule, the people enjoy freedom of speech and of the press. An indigene can criticise a civilian leader either in the newspaper or on television without any fear of molestation. Nowadays, it is very common to see people criticising or admonishing the civilian president of Nigeria on the television. Everybody is believed to be equal under a civilian dispensation. However, in military rule, no one has the guts to talk against a ruler even in the enclosure of his room because walls are believed to have ears.        Furthermore, in military rule, some innocent citizens, being victims of circumstances, are shot down accidentally. This often occurs in a military dispensation. There is little respect or regard for human lives and the military can be likened to armed robbers because instead of using their guns for security purposes, they maim innocent lives. However, in civilian rule, the intimidating guns are not present and this actually brings a sense of security to the citizens.        Lastly, civilian rulers execute good and popular projects which are aimed at ameliorating the suffering of the people they rule. They know that the people who vote them into power would judge them by their performance. Therefore, they execute good projects and provide infrastructural facilities that could speak for them when they are called to render account of their stewardship in governance. On the contrary, military rulers are not guided by the wishes and demands of the people they rule when it comes to project execution. This is because they are not accountable to the people.        I believe that I have been able to convince you that civilian rule is better than military rule. I thank you for your patience. 

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• > Journals
• > British Journal of Political Science
• > Volume 6 Issue 3
• > The Economic Performance of Military Regimes: A Cross-National...

Article contents

The economic performance of military regimes: a cross-national aggregate study.

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  27 January 2009

The military regime has now become a common phenomenon throughout the world. Research on the military in low-income systems used to focus on the military coup rather than on the military regime, but in recent years this imbalance has lessened. Moreover, many of the old ‘standard findings’ about military regimes have come to be rejected. It is fitting that they should have been since they tended to be the products more of stereotyping and inadequate theorizing than of systematic research.

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1 For a review of the literature in the field and a useful bibliography see Bienen , H. , ‘The Background to the Contemporary Study of Militaries and Modernization’, in Bienen , H. , ed., The Military and Modernization ( Chicago : Aldine Press , 1971 ), pp. 4 – 39 Google Scholar . For a general view of the conflicting viewpoints expressed in the literature the following works may be useful: Nordlinger , E. A. , ‘ Soldiers in Mufti ’, American Political Science Review , LXIV ( 1970 ), 1131 –48 Google Scholar ; Feit , E. , ‘ Pen, Sword and People ’, World Politics , XXV ( 1973 ), 251 –73 Google Scholar ; Feit , E. , Armed Bureaucrats ( Boston : Houghton Mifflin , 1973 ) Google Scholar ; Pinkney , R. , ‘ The Theory and Practice of Military Government ’, Political Studies , XXI ( 1973 ), 152 –66 Google Scholar ; Willner , A. R. , ‘ Perspectives on Military Elites as Rulers and Wielders of Power ’, Journal of Comparative Administration , II ( 1970 ), 261 –76 Google Scholar ; Kossok , M. , ‘Changes in the Political and Social Functions of the Armed Forces in the Developing Countries, The Case of Latin America’, in Janowitz , M. and Van Doom , J. , eds., On Military Intervention ( Rotterdam : Rotterdam University Press , 1971 ) Google Scholar ; and in the same book, Schmitter , P. C. , ‘Military Intervention, Political Competitiveness and Public Policy in America: 1950–67’ Google Scholar ; and Welch , C. E. and Smith , A. K. , Military Role and Rule ( North Scituate, Mass. : Duxbury Press , 1974 ). Google Scholar

2 For a critical review of the ways in which the literature on revolution, development, and instability has dealt with the phenomena of military coups and military regimes, see McKinlay , R. D. and Cohan , A. S. , ‘Military Coups, Military Regimes and Social Change’ (paper presented at the annual meeting of the American Political Science Association in Chicago, 1974 ). Google Scholar

3 Data for the economic variables were collected on an annual basis. The main sources were United Nations , Statistical Yearbook ( New York : United Nations , 1951 –72) Google Scholar ; United Nations , Yearbook of National Account Statistics ( New York : United Nations , 1950 –72) Google Scholar ; and International Monetary Fund , International Financial Statistics ( Washington, D.C. : International Monetary Fund , 1964 –72). Google Scholar

4 Data for the military size and expenditure variables were drawn from The Military Balance (London: Institute for Strategic Studies, 1960 –72) Google Scholar ; Stockholm International Peace Research Institute , Yearbook of World Armaments and Disarmament ( Stockholm : Almqvist , 1968 –72) Google Scholar ; Booth , Richard , The Armed Forces of African States , Adelphi Papers, No. 67 ( London : Institute for Strategic Studies , 1970 ). Google Scholar

5 The main data sources for political variables were Europa Yearbook (London: Europa Publications, 1958 –70) Google Scholar ; Statesman's Yearbook (London: Macmillan, 1951 –70) Google Scholar ; Stebbins , Richard P. and Amoia , Alma , eds., Political Handbook and Atlas of World ( New York : Simon and Schuster , 1970 ) Google Scholar ; Whitaker's Almanack (London: J. Whitaker, 1951 –70) Google Scholar ; Keesing's Contemporary Archives (London: Keesing, 1950 –70). Google Scholar

6 The type of coup is dichotomized into either ( a ) a coup in which a military government is replaced with a further military government, or ( b ) a coup in which a civilian government is replaced with a military one. The branch of the armed forces making the coup is categorized in terms of ( a ) the army alone, ( b ) the army in combination with either the navy or air-force, or ( c ) the navy or air-force without the army. The rank of the coup leader is categorized as ( a ) captain and below, ( b ) above captain to colonel, ( c ) above colonel to general. Civilian involvement is dichotomized in terms of either ( a ) direct participation by civilians in the execution of the coup, or ( b ) no participation. The degree of violence incurred during the coup is scored ( a ) none, ( b ) incidental (twenty or less killed), ( c ) substantial, ( d ) extensive (i.e. civil war).

7 The following types of executive may occur: ( a ) the single dominantly military executive (at least 90 per cent of positions are held by military personnel), ( b ) the single, mixed civilian-military executive, ( c ) the dual system in which there exists a dominantly military council together with a mixed executive. The type of civilian employed in the executive may be ( a ) none, ( b ) politicians, ( c ) non-politicians (i.e. technical experts) or ( d ) a mix of politicians and non-politicians. The use of an assembly or a party is dichotomized simply in terms of use or non-use. Additionally, on occasion we shall use an index of civilianization which is a composite index of the degree of civilian participation in the executive, in parties and in the legislative assembly. Each of these three variables is scaled from high to low participation. Each scale is of the same length, i.e. we assume parties, assemblies and executives are of equal importance. The composite index is the geometric mean of these three scales. The rationale for the multiplicative nature of the composite index is that we assume that high civilian participation on one scale will interact with high civilian participation on other scales.

8 The agent responsible for the termination may be ( a ) the military alone, ( b ) a coalition of military and civilian forces, or ( c ) civilians alone. The method of termination may be ( a ) an election, ( b ) a direct transfer to a civilian government, ( c ) a military coup, or ( d ) an uprising. The form of post-transfer government may be ( a ) another military government, ( b ) military leadership of a civilian regime, or ( c ) a civilian regime.

9 McKinlay and Cohan, ‘A Comparative Analysis of the Political and Economic Performance of Military Regimes’. In Table 1, MR refers to military regime, CRM refers to a civilian regime in a system which has experienced military rule, CR(900–) is a civilian regime in a system which has never experienced military rule with a per capita GNP of less than $900, and CR(900+) is the same type of regime system with a per capita GNP greater than $900.

10 A canonical correlation can be seen as representing a linear correlation between two sets of variables. Basically, the technique seeks to maximize a linear correlation between two variates representing each of two sets. The variates can be seen as being broadly analogous to principal components except that principal component analysis seeks; o produce variates with maximum intercorrelation. The canonical coefficients can be interpreted as a form of standardized regression coefficient in that they represent standardized contributions of each variable to the appropriate canonical variable.

11 In all the multiple regressions we allow variables to enter the equation as long as the residual mean square is bejng reduced.

12 R 2 = ·34; the regression equation is significant at ·008.

13 R 2 = ·56; the regression equation is significant at ·001.

14 R 2 = ·37; the regression equation is significant at ·01.

15 R 2 = ·20; the regression equation is significant at ·08.

16 R 2 = ·35; the regression equation is significant at ·05.

17 R 2 = ·78; the regression equation is significant at ·001.

18 The regression equation for the trade balance has an R 2 of ·33 (significant at ·01). The regression for the rate of growth of food production has an R 2 of ·17 (significant at ·03).

19 R 2 = ·60; the regression equation is significant at ·001 (military expenditure accounts for 42 per cent of the variance).

20 For these T tests we have used a significance level of ·10.

21 For the canonical correlations, the variables were dichotomized (e.g. the method of termination is either election or non-election with coup and uprising becoming non-election).

22 Discriminant analysis can be viewed as a multivariate extension of ANOVA. Given a set of categoric groups and a profile of scores across n variables for each of these groupings, discriminant analysis attempts to produce composite linear functions consisting of the variables which maximally differentiate these groupings. Discriminant analysis will produce a number of functions equal to whichever is the smaller of the number of groups or the number of variables minus one. As a consequence of the discriminant analysis it is possible to allocate cases to particular groups from scores on a particular set of variables. The degree of success of the discriminant analysis can be gauged from the number of cases which given their scores on the functions would be allocated to a group to which in reality they do not belong. In our particular examples, were it to be the case that our critical variables were valid over time, then we would have a useful means for predicting the form of termination of current military regimes.

23 The first discriminant function accounts for 86 per cent of variance and is significant at the 04 level. Seventeen per cent of cases are misallocated. The mean discriminant scores for the election, uprising, and coup are –·93, –·16 and 1·19 respectively.

24 The discriminant function accounts for 86 per cent of variance and is significant at ·002. Thirty per cent of cases are misallocated. The mean discriminant scores for the uprising, election, and coup groups are – 1·45, –·49 and 1·37 respectively.

25 The two discriminant functions account for 60 and 40 per cent of variance respectively. The mean discriminant scores on the first function for uprising, coup and election are –1·56, ·77 and ·06; the mean discriminant scores on the second function are –·51, –·65 and ·78.

26 Mean Scores of Key Coup/Structure Variables by Termination Method

27 This discriminant analysis misallocates only 7 per cent of cases. The mean discriminant scores on the first function for the uprising, election, and coup groups are –1·68, –·85 and 1·93 respectively. The scores on the second function are –1·41, –·22 and ·84.

28 The discriminant function misallocates 17 per cent of cases and is significant at ·008.

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• Volume 6, Issue 3
• R. D. McKinlay and A. S. Cohan
• DOI: https://doi.org/10.1017/S0007123400000715

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